Skip to main content

Full text of "Science, technology, and American diplomacy : an extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy"

See other formats


COMMITTEE    ON    INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS 


Science,  Technology,  and 
American  Diplomacy 


An  extended  study  of  the  interactions  of  science 
and  technology  with  United  States  foreign  policy 


Volume  I 


COMMITTEE   PRINT 


U.S.  House  of  Representatives 


COMMITTEE    ON    INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS 


Science,  Technology,  and 
American  Diplomacy 


An  extended  study  of  the  interactions  of  science 
and  technology  with  United  States  foreign  policy 


Volume  I 


1  tr 
:o 
!  m 

j  zr 
□ 
o 
o 


MARINE 


..  c.  l. 


COMMITTEE   PRINT 


U.S.  House  of  Representatives 


U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington:  1977 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.   Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402  (3-Part  Set ;  Sold  in  Sets  Only) 
Stock  Number  052-070-04350-4 


COMMITTEE  ON  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 
CLEMENT  J.  ZABLOCKI,  Wisconsin,   Chairman 


L.  H.  FOUNTAIN,  North  Carolina 
DANTE  B.  FASCELL,  Florida 
CHARLES  C.  DIGGS,  Jr.,  Michigan 
ROBERT  N.  C.  NIX,  Pennsylvania 
DONALD  M.  FRASER,  Minnesota 
BENJAMIN  S.  ROSENTHAL,  New  York 
LEE  H.  HAMILTON,  Indiana 
LESTER  L.  WOLFF,  New  York 
JONATHAN  B.  BINGHAM,  New  York 
GUS  YATRON,  Pennsylvania 
MICHAEL  HARRINGTON,  Massachusetts 
LEO  J.  RYAN,  California 
CARDISS  COLLINS,  Illinois 
STEPHEN  J.  SOLARZ,  New  York 
HELEN  S.  MEYNER,  New  Jersey 
DON  BONKER,  Washington 
GERRY  E.  STUDDS,  Massachusetts 
ANDY  IRELAND,  Florida 
DONALD  J.  PEASE,  Ohio 
ANTHONY  C.  BEILENSON,  California 
WYCHE  FOWLER,  Jr.,  Georgia 
E  (KIKA)  DE  LA  GARZA,  Texas 
GEORGE  E.   DANIELSON,  California 
JOHN  J.  CAVANAUGH,  Nebraska 


WILLIAM  S.  BROOMFIELD,  Michigan 
EDWARD  J.  DERWINSKI,  Illinois 
PAUL  FINDLEY,  Illinois 
JOHN  H.  BUCHANAN,  Jr.,  Alabama 
J.  HERBERT  BURKE,  Florida 
CHARLES  W.  WHALEN,  Jr.,  Ohio 
LARRY  WINN,  Jr.,  Kansas 
BENJAMIN  A.  GILMAN,  New  York 
TENNYSON  GUYER,  Ohio 
ROBERT  J.  LAGOMARSINO,  California 
WILLIAM  F.  GOODLING,  Pennsylvania 
SHIRLEY  N.  PETTIS,  California 


John  J.  Brady,  Jr.,  Chief  of  Staff 
George  R.  Berdes,  Staff  Consultant 


Subcommittee  on  International  Security  and  Scientific  Affairs 
CLEMENT  J.  ZABLOCKI,  Wisconsin,   Chairman 


L.  H.  FOUNTAIN,  North  Carolina 
JONATHAN  B.  BINGHAM,  New  York 
GERRY  E.  STUDDS,  Massachusetts 
ANTHONY  C.  BEILENSON,  California 


WILLIAM  S.  BROOMFIELD,  Michigan 
LARRY  WINN,  Jr.,  Kansas 


Ivo  J.  Spalatin,  Subcommittee  Staff  Director 

William  H.  Fite,  Minority  Staff  Consultant 

Forrest  R.  Frank,  Subcommittee  Staff  Associate 

La  Verne  Still,  Staff  Assistant 


(ID 


FOREWORD 


This  publication  of  Science,  Technology,  and  American  Diplomacy 
represents  the  culmination  of  7  years  of  research  and  brings  together, 
in  a  current  perspective,  results  previously  published  in  a  series  of  15 
committee  prints  of  this  committee  and  its  Subcommittee  on  Inter- 
national Security  and  Scientific  Affairs. 

In  the  foreword  to  the  first  of  the  15  committee  prints — an  anno- 
tated bibliography  published  in  March  1970  (superseded  by  an  exten- 
sive new  bibliography  in  the  present  collection) — I  noted  that  previ- 
ous work  by  the  subcommittee  had  revealed  many  instances  in  which 
U.S.  foreign  policy  had  lagged  behind  technological  innovations  of 
worldwide  importance.  In  asking  the  Congressional  Research  Service 
to  undertake  the  Science,  Technology,  and  American  Diplomacy  re- 
search project,  the  subcommittee  sought  to  move  toward  improving 
xVmerica's  performance  in  this  vital  area. 

It  seems  appropriate  here  to  recapture  some  of  the  thoughts  ex- 
pressed in  presenting  other  committee  prints  of  the  series.  Collec- 
tively these  brief  excerpts  suggest  the  broad  sweep  of  the  study,  the 
depth  and  durability  of  the  committee's  concern,  and  why  the  subject 
is  one  of  compelling  urgency  and  significance  for  legislators,  officials 
throughout  the  executive  branch,  industrial  leaders,  scholars,  and  the 
American  people : 

With  the  detonation  of  the  first  atomic  bomb  at  Hiroshima,  Japan,  in  1945  the 
United  States  and  the  world  entered  the  nuclear  age.  The  development  of  the 
bomb  revolutionized  world  affairs  and  set  off  a  strategic  arms  race.  .  .  .  (The 
Baruch  Plan:  U.S.  Diplomacy  Enters  the  Nuclear  Age.) 

Put  to  destructive  ends  by  the  wrong  hands,  that  discovery  [nuclear  fission] 
represents  the  potential  unleashing  of  a  force  capable  of  destroying  civilization. 
However,  given  wise  and  prudent  management,  it  also  represents  the  release  and 
increase  of  human  energy  capable  of  opening  a  new  phase  in  human  history. 
(Commercial  Nuclear  Power  in  Europe:  The  Interaction  of  American  Diplomacy 
with  a  New  Technology.) 

As  our  consciousness  of  the  world  as  a  "global  village"  intensifies,  we  are  be- 
coming increasingly  aware  of  the  dangers  and  opportunities  involved  when  tradi- 
tional values  of  time  and  space  are  no  longer  relevant.  (The  Politics  of  Global 
Health.) 

Although  our  times  are  often  characterized  as  the  Space  Age  .  .  .,  they  might 
also  be  characterized  as  the  Sea  Age  because  for  the  first  time  human  beings 
have  begun  to  explore  below  the  waters  of  the  world.  .  .  .  the  seabed  has  become 
the  object  of  intense  economic,  legal,  and  political  interest.  This  interest  is  almost 

(HI) 


IV 

directly  the  result  of  the  increasing  capability  of  nations  to  exploit  the  natural 
resources  which  lie  beneath  the  sea.  (Exploiting  the  Resources  of  the  Seabed.) 

Today,  in  many  parts-  of  the  earth,  there  is  a  food/people  imbalance  which 
causes  the  lives  of  millions  to  he  a  desperate  search  for  sustenance.  .  .  . 
In  the  helief  that  the  food/population  equation  can  he  and  should  he  brought 
into  balance,  modern  man  is  applying  scientific  knowledge  and  technical  skills. 
The  United  States,  through  its  foreign  aid  programs,  has  been  in  the  forefront.  .  .  . 
(Beyond  Malthus:  The  Food /People  Equation.) 

In  the  minds  of  many  today  the  idea  of  science  and  technology  as  oppressive 
and  uncontrollable  forces  in  society  is  becoming  increasingly  more  prevalent. 
They  see  in  the  power  of  science  and  technology  the  means  of  destruction  in  war- 
fare, the  source  of  environmental  violation,  and  the  stimulant  behind  man's  grow- 
ing alienation.  .  .  .  [Often  overlooked],  however,  is  the  corresponding  alterna- 
tive these  influences  present  for  man's  good — for  his  advancement,  for  the  enrich- 
ment of  his  life,  and  for  world  peace.  (The  Mekong  Project:  Opportunities  and 
Problems  of  Regionalism.) 

Science  and  technology  are  compelling  determinants  of  the  human  condition. 
In  September  1975  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  voted  to  convene  an 
international  conference  on  science  and  technology.  The  intent  of  this  move  was 
to  allow  the  technologically  sophisticated  and  dynamic  elements  of  the  U.N.  family 
to  focus  the  efforts  of  the  1979  General  Assembly  on  a  concerted  program  of 
global  advance.  The  agenda  of  this  program  would  include  economic,  social,  polit- 
ical, and  commercial  concerns,  but  its  backbone  would  be  technical  and  mana- 
gerial. .  .  .  Leaders  of  our  diplomatic,  technological,  and  national  security 
affairs  are  not  devoid  of  imagination  or  insensitive  to  the  oppressive  weight  of 
danger  and  insecurity  ahead.  However,  if  these  leaders  propose  to  meet  future 
threats  with  the  same  strength  of  purpose  and  creative  initiative  that  have  largely 
marked  the  first  two  centuries  of  American  independence,  they  must  seek  new 
forms  and  find  new  applications  in  a  world  of  growing  interdependence.  The  prob- 
lem of  how  to  manage  our  relationships  in  such  a  world  resolves  in  large  part  into 
the  problem  of  managing  technological  dynamism  and  directing  it  to  humane  ends. 
(Science,  Technology,  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Age  of  Interdependence.) 

Our  purpose  was  not  just  to  describe  and  analyze  a  specialized  set 
of  diplomatic  problems  and  opportunities ;  it  was  also,  and  primarily, 
to  examine  America's  capability  for  dealing  with  these  problems  and 
opportunities  and  to  suggest  legislative  options  for  improving  that 
capability-  This  aim  was  the  particular  focus  of  the  last  two  studies 
of  the  project :  Science  and  Technology  in  the  Department  of  State, 
by  Dr.  Franklin  P.  Huddle,  the  project  director,  and  Science,  Tech- 
nology, and  Diplomacy  in  the  Age  of  Interdependence,  a  summary 
and  analysis  of  the  whole  series  co-authored  by  Dr.  Huddle  and  the 
associate  project  director,  Mr.  Warren  R.  Johnston. 

To  repeat  a  further  thought  expressed  in  presenting  the  summary 
report:  It  is  my  hope  and  expectation  that  these  analytical  contribu- 
tions of  the  Congressional  Research  Service  will  prove  in  a  practical 
way  to  have  yielded  three  separate  sets  of  products:  (1)  specific  legis- 
lative options  and  administrative  initiatives  to  strengthen  the  conduct 
of  ongoing  diplomacy,  with  its  increasingly  important  and  inseparable 


technical  component;  (2)  encouragement  of  a  consensus  toward 
stronger  and  longer-range  planning  of  technical  initiatives  in  sup- 
port of  U.S.  diplomacy,  involving  closer  cooperation  among  all  ele- 
ments of  the  Federal  Government;  and  (3)  a  more  far-reaching  par- 
ticipation in  the  foreign  policy  process  throughout  government  at  all 
levels  and  involving  also  the  academic  and  technical  communities, 
private  industry,  and  the  public  at  large. 

The  findings  contained  herein  are  the  responsibility  of  the  individual 
authors  and  of  the  Congressional  Research  Service  and  do  not  neces- 
sarily reflect  the  views  of  the  membership  of  the  Committee  on  Inter- 
national Relations. 

Clement  J.  Zablocki,  Chairman, 
Committee  on  International  Relations. 

January  1978. 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  ORIGINAL  STUDY  SERIES 

(These  documents  are  now  out  of  print.  They  are  incorporated,  with  some 
minor  revisions,  in  the  present  volume.  The  documents  are  listed  here  in  the 
order  of  their  publication.  An  explanation  of  the  different  order  followed  in  pre- 
senting them  all  together  in  this  volume  is  given  in  Chapter  Fifteen  under  the 
heading,  Methodology  of  the  Study.) 


A  Selected,  Annotated  Bibliography  of  Articles,  Books,  Documents,  Periodicals, 
and  Reference  Guides.  (Superseded  by  Ms.  Knezo's  bibliography  of  January 
1976/July  1977,  reproduced  at  end  of  volume  III.)  Compiled  by  Genevieve 
Knezo.  (69  pages.)  Issued  March  1970. 

Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a  Scientific  Age.  An  introduction  to  the  entire  study 
by  Franklin  P.  Huddle.  (28  pages.)  Issued  April  1970. 

The  Evolution  of  International  Technology.  A  review  of  the  emergence  of  tech- 
nology as  a  factor  of  change  in  international  relations  by  Franklin  P.  Huddle. 
(70  pages.)  Issued  December  1970. 

The  Politics  of  Global  Health.  A  study  of  worldwide  efforts  to  prevent  epidemic 
disease  by  Freeman  H.  Quimby.  (79  pages.)  Issued  May  1971. 

Exploiting  the  Resources  of  the  Seabed.  A  survey  of  technical,  economic,  legal, 
and  political  considerations  involved  in  using  the  natural  wealth  of  land  below 
the  seas  by  George  A.  Doumani.  (86  pages,  plus  appendixes.)  Issued  July  1971. 

Beyond  Malthus:  The  Food/ People  Equation.  A  study  of  the  interrelation  of  food 
and  population  and  the  resulting  impact  on  international  affairs  by  Allan  S. 
Xanes.  (96 pages.)  Issued  October  1971. 

The  Mekong  Project:  Opportunities  and  Problems  of  Regionalism.  A  case  study 
of  the  accomplishments  and  failures  of  the  massive  Indochina  works  project 
by  Franklin  P.  Huddle.  (86  pages. )  Issued  May  1972. 

The  Baruch  Plan:  U.S.  Diplomacy  Enters  the  Nuclear  Age.  A  study  of  an  early, 
serious  attempt  to  bring  atomic  energy  and  weapons  under  international  control 
by  Leneice  N.  Wu.  (67  pages.)  Issued  August  1972. 

Commercial  Nuclear  Power  in  Europe,:  The  Interaction  of  American  Diplomacy 
With  a  New  Technology.  Analysis  of  the  interaction  during  last  30  years 
between  American  diplomacy  and  the  technological  development  of  nuclear 
power  in  Europe  by  Warren  H.  Donnelly.  (163  pages.)  Issued  December  1972. 

U.S.-Soviet  Commercial  Relations:  The  Interplay  of  Economics,  Technology 
Transfer,  and  Diplomacy.  An  assessment  of  the  linkages  in  U.S.-Soviet  relations 
among  diplomacy,  economics,  and  technology  transfer  by  John  P.  Hardt  and 
George  D.  Holliday.  (105  pages.)  Issued  June  1973. 

The  Political  Legacy  of  the  International  Geophysical  Year.  An  analysis  of  atti- 
tudes, behavior  patterns,  and  procedures  followed  in  the  IGY  as  a  step  toward 
detente  by  Harold  Bullis.  (64  pages.)  Issued  November  1973. 

U.S.  Scientists  Abroad:  An  Examination  of  Major  Programs  for  Nongovern- 
mental Scientific  Exchange.  A  study  of  major  Federal  programs  which  send 
nongovernment  U.S.  scientists  and  technical  personnel  abroad  by  Genevieve  J. 
Knezo.  (163  pages.)  Issued  April  1974. 

(VII) 


VIII 

Brain  Drain:  A  Study  of  the  Persistent  Issue  of  International  Scientific  Mobility. 

Assessment  of  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  migration  of  technically  trained 
persons,  especially  from  developing  to  developed  countries,  by  Joseph  G. 
Whelan.  (272  pages. )  Issued  September  1974. 

Science  and  Technology  in  the  Department  of  State:  Bringing  Technical  Content 
Into  Diplomatic  Policy  and  Operations.  This  concluding  study  of  the  series,  by 
Franklin  P.  Huddle,  analyzes  the  impact  of  science  and  technology  on  the 
Department  of  State,  and  describes  departmental  efforts  and  opportunities  to 
relate  science  and  technology  to  its  mission.  (180  pages.)  Issued  June  1975. 

Science,  Technology,  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Age  of  Interdependence.  A  review  of 
the  entire  series  by  Franklin  P.  Huddle  and  Warren  R.  Johnston,  with 
analysis  of  implications  for  improved  mechanisms  and  strengthened  procedures 
in  both  executive  and  legislative  branches.  (360  pages,  plus  132-page  bibli- 
ography prepared  by  Genevieve  J.  Knezo. )  Issued  June  1976. 


Contents — Volume  I 


Page 

Foreword ni 

Documents  in  the  Original  Series vii 

Organization  of  the  Study xi 

Letter  of  Submittal xin 

Acknowledgments xv 

Preface xvii 

Introduction  to  the  Study  as  a  Whole  : 

Chapter  1 — Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a  Scientific  Age  ■  1 

Chapter  2 — The  Global  Context  of  Science,  Technology, 

and  Diplomacy    .     • 37 

Part  1 — Six  Cases  : 

Chapter  3 — The  Baruch  Plan :  U.S.  Diplomacy  Enters  the 
Nuclear  Age 53 

Chapter  4 — Commercial  Nuclear  Power  in  Europe:  The 
Interaction  of  American  Diplomacy  With  a  New  Tech- 
nology      123 

Chapter   5 — The   Political   Legacy   of  the   International 

Geophysical  Year 293 

Chapter  6 — The  Mekong  Project :  Opportunities  and  Prob- 
lems of  Regionalism    . 361 

Chapter  7 — Exploiting  the  Resources  of  the  Seabed  .    .     .       435 
Chapter  8 — United  States-Soviet  Commercial  Relations: 
The  Interplay  of  Economics,  Technology  Transfer,  and 
Diplomacy 525 

(IX) 


ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  STUDY 


Volume  I 
Introduction  to  the  Study  as  a  Whole 

Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a  Scientific  Age 

The  Global  Context  of  Science,  Technology,  and  Diplomacy 

Part  1 — Six  Cases 

The  Baruch  Plan 

Commercial  Nuclear  Power  in  Europe 

The  Political  Legacy  of  the  International  Geophysical  Year 

The  Mekong  Project 

Exploiting  the  Resources  of  the  Seabed 

United  States-Soviet  Commercial  Relations 

Volume  II 
Part  2 — Six  Issues 

The  Evolution  of  International  Technology 

The  Politics  of  Global  Health 

Beyond  Malthus 

U.S.  Scientists  Abroad 

Brain  Drain 

Science  and  Technology  in  the  Department  of  State 

Volume  III 

Introduction  to  the  Analysis  and  Findings 

Recapitulation  of  Purpose,  Scope,  and  Methodology  of  the  Study 

Part  3 — Analysis  of  the  Cases  and  Issues 

Analysis  of  the  Cases 
Analysis  of  the  Issues 

Part  4 — Principal  Policy  Implications 

About  the  Essays  to  Follow 

Initiative  Versus  Reactive  Foreign  Policy 

Bilateral  Versus  Multilateral  Diplomatic  Relationships 

High-Technology  Diplomacy  Versus  Low-Technology  Diplomacy 

Roles  and  Interactions  of  Public  and  Private  Institutions  in  International 
Technology 

Independence  Versus  Interdependence 

Long-Range  and  Short-Range  Planning 

Concluding  Observations 

Bibliography 

(XI) 


LETTER  OF  SUBMITTAL 

October  28,  1977. 

Hon.  Clement  J.  Zablocki, 

Chairman,  Committee  on  International  Relations,  and  Chairman, 
Subcommittee  on  International  Security  and  Scientific  Affairs, 
U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  Washington,  B.C. 

Dear  Mr.  Chairman  :  In  response  to  your  request  of  April  6,  1977, 
I  am  pleased  to  submit  in  edited  and  updated  form  the  entire  set  of 
reports  produced  for  your  subcommittee  in  the  Science,  Technology, 
and  American  Diplomacy  project  and  published  by  the  committee  be- 
tween March  1970  and  June  1976. 

These  reports,  as  originally  planned,  now  form  an  integrated  whole. 
Parts  1  and  2  present  the  12  individual  case  and  issue  studies  in  full. 
Parts  3  and  4  examine  the  cases  and  issues  from  a  mid-1977  perspective 
to  shed  light  on  the  capabilities  and  deficiencies  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment in  dealing  with  technology-based  diplomatic  issues. 

This  is  the  final  study  phase  of  the  research  project  that  you  initiated 
with  your  request  to  this  service  in  September  1969.  Since  then  the 
project  has  been  under  the  continuous  direction  of  Dr.  Franklin  P. 
Huddle,  senior  specialist  in  science  and  technology,  with  Mr.  Warren 
R.  Johnston  as  associate  project  director.  Mr.  Johnston,  who  served  as 
assistant  chief  of  the  Foreign  Affairs  Division  and  then  as  an  assistant 
director  of  CRS  before  his  recent  retirement,  has  been  responsible,  in 
consultation  with  Dr.  Huddle,  for  preparing  this  edited  and  updated 
version  of  the  study. 

The  study  includes  an  extensive  supplement  of  July  1977  to  the 
January  1976  annotated  bibliography.  Both  were  prepared  by 
Ms.  Genevieve  J.  Knezo,  Analyst  in  Science  and  Technology.  In  pre- 
paring the  supplement  Ms.  Knezo  was  aided  by  Mrs.  Elaine  Carlson, 
research  assistant  to  Dr.  Huddle. 

Let  me  convey  once  again  the  thanks  of  all  concerned  for  the  oppor- 
tunity of  taking  part  in  this  unique  research  undertaking. 
Sincerely, 

Gilbert  Gude,  Director. 

(XIII) 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 


It  seems  fitting  on  the  completion  of  a  research  undertaking  of  the 
magnitude  of  Science,  Technology,  and  American  Diplomacy  for  the 
project  director  and  associate  director  to  claim  the  privilege  of  giving 
recognition  to  the  significant  contributions  to  the  project. 

To  begin  at  the  beginning :  We  are  indebted  to  the  Honorable  Clem- 
ent J.  Zablocki,  chairman  of  the  Subcommittee  on  International  Se- 
curity and  Scientific  Affairs,  for  his  foresight  in  initiating  the  series 
and  his  dedicated  efforts  in  seeing  it  through  its  completion.  In  addi- 
tion, two  successive  staff  consultants  of  the  Subcommittee  on  Interna- 
tional Security  and  Scientific  Affairs,  Dr.  John  H.  Sullivan  and  Mr. 
George  R.  Berdes,  are  to  be  thanked  for  their  constructive  guidance 
during  the  past  7  years  and  for  the  unfailingly  sympathetic  support  of 
an  enterprise  that  proved  more  demanding,  and  extended  over  a  longer 
period  of  time,  than  was  originally  foreseen.  Mr.  Ivo  J.  Spalatin,  who 
has  now  succeeded  them  in  the  important  role  of  subcommittee  staff 
director,  and  his  associates,  are  also  due  our  thanks  for  their  encour- 
agement and  support  in  the  final  stages  of  this  enterprise. 

Apart  from  the  codirectors,  there  were  10  authors  of  studies,  as  iden- 
tified at  the  beginning  of  this  volume  under  the  heading  Documents 
in  the  Original  Study  Series.  They  deserve  recognition  and  gratitude, 
not  merely  for  superior  accomplishment  but  for  their  tolerance  of 
strenuous  conditions  of  competing  work  assignments,  their  thousands 
of  hours  of  volunteered  overtime,  and  their  assistance  in  the  review 
and  updating  of  material  in  the  final  study.  Genevieve  J.  Knezo  pre-- 
pared  both  the  original  annotated  bibliography  for  the  series  and 
the  current  bibliography  to  be  found  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 
Dr.  Huddle's  assistant,  Mrs.  Elaine  Carlson,  performed  many  essential 
editorial  and  research  support  tasks. 

Dozens  of  others  in  CRS,  over  the  years,  contributed  their  time  and 
skills  in  bibliographic,  research,  and  clerical  assistance,  and  in  the  re- 
view of  studies  in  draft.  CRS  Coordinator  of  Research  James  W. 
Robinson  reviewed  the  studies  in  their  entirety  and  made  many  helpful 
suggestions. 

In  addition,  many  scholars  and  officials  outside  CRS  were  generous 
with  their  help  in  reviewing  draft  text  and  providing  constructive 
criticism.  Prof.  Edgar  S.  Robinson  of  American  University  submitted 
extensive  notes  in  review  of  Science  and  Technology  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  which  were  of  value  in  preparing  the  final  study ;  he 
also  served  as  consultant  in  the  preparation  of  the  latter.  To  him  and 
to  the  other  scholars,  too  numerous  to  cite  individually,  appreciation 
and  thanks  are  expressed  for  their  assistance  in  collecting  facts,  offer- 
ing suggestions,  and  encouraging  the  ultimate  completion  of  this 
undertaking. 

A  final  important  acknowledgment :  gratitude  beyond  measure  is 
due  our  wives,  Clare  Scott  Huddle  and  Eunice  C.  Johnston,  for  years 
of  indispensable  support  and  forbearance. 

Franklin  P.  Huddle. 
Warren  R.  Johnston. 

(XV) 


PREFACE 

The  finding  of  this  study  is  that  U.S.  diplomacy  is  neglecting  two 
powerful  instruments  of  policy  formation  and  policy  execution :  tech- 
nological expertise  and  management  skill.  Most  of  the  countries  of  the 
world  look  to  the  United  States  as  the  undoubted  leader  in  both  tech- 
nological achievement  and  in  the  skills  of  organization  and  administra- 
tion to  apply  technology  effectively.  But  during  the  rise  of  the  United 
States  to  technological  preeminence,  the  Department  of  State  has  given 
slight  attention  to  the  implications  of  technology  for  foreign  policy. 
Only  meager  resources  have  been  spared  to  search  for  ways  to  turn 
technology  to  achievement  of  diplomatic  goals. 

The  emerging  trend  toward  congressional  participation  in  the  diplo- 
matic process  plays  a  significant  role  in  this  context.  The  opportunity 
is  at  hand  for  the  Congress  to  examine  the  uses  of  technology  made  by 
the  executive  branch  toward  the  purposes  of  foreign  policy. 

More  than  that,  the  study  suggests  that  the  necessary  teamwork  of 
the  legislative  branch  with  the  executive  branch  in  the  field  of  foreign 
policy  requires  that  the  Congress  equip  itself  with  its  own  resources  of 
equal  diplomatic  expertise.  The  impressive  array  of  technological 
implications  for  U.S.  diplomacy  further  requires  that  these  congres- 
sional resources  of  diplomatic  expertise  contain  a  strong  technological 
element  for  both  current  oversight  and  long-range  planning  of  future 
initiatives. 

Technology  has  made  intolerable  the  consequences  of  failure  to  at- 
tain the  primary  objectives  of  U.S.  foreign  policy.  But  technology 
also  offers  many  opportunities  for  the  attainment  of  these  objectives. 
No  element  of  national  policy  and  no  component  of  national  program 
warrants  more  respect  in  the  short-range  or  the  long-range  future  of 
the  United  States. 

(xvn) 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1 


INTRODUCTION   TO   THE  STUDY 

AS   A   WHOLE 

<TfO 

Chapter  1 — Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a 

Scientific  Age 


CONTENTS 


Page 

Introduction   5 

The  Congressional  Role 5 

Discussion  of  the  Problem 8 

1.  Purpose  of  the  Study 8 

2.  Description  of  the  Problem 9 

3.  Importance  of  the  Problem  for  the  Future 9 

4.  Growing  Recognition  of  the  Importance  of  Science  and  Technology 

for  American  Diplomacy 10 

5.  Impact  of  Nuclear  and  Rocket  Technologies  on  World  Outlook 12 

6.  Further    Contemporary    Evaluations 14 

Definitions  of  Terms : 

1.  Science  and  Technology 19 

2.  Diplomacy 20 

The  Context  of  the  Study  : 

1.  The  Structure  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy  Formulation 21 

2.  Goals  of  American  Foreign  Policy 21 

3.  The    Growing    Importance    of    Science    and    Technology    in    U.S. 

Culture 22 

4.  Policy  Formulation  in  Science  and  Technology 24 

5.  Scientific  and  Technological  Elements  in  International  Relations.  25 
Formal  Aspects  of  the  Study  : 

1.  Scope  and  Limitations 27 

2.  Methodology 27 

Plan  of  the  Study 28 

1.  Criteria  for  the  Selection  of  Issues 29 

2.  Format  for  the  Exposition  of  Issues 29 

3.  Illustrative  Questions  Researched 29 

4.  Enumeration  of  the  Issues 30 

5.  Criteria  for  the  Selection  of  Cases 31 

6.  Format  for  the  Presentation  of  Cases 31 

7.  Illustrative  Questions  To  Be  Researched 32 

8.  Enumeration  of  the  Cases  Researched 32 

9.  Organization  of  the  Total  Study 33 

(3) 


CHAPTER  1— TOWARD  A  NEW  DIPLOMACY  IN  A 

SCIENTIFIC  AGE 

Introduction 

This  study  addresses  the  interaction  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  and 
diplomacy  with  modern  science  and  technology. 

The  hypothesis  of  the  study  was  that  detailed  examination  of  the 
dynamics  of  specific  instances  of  these  interactions  would  provide  the 
Congress  with  insights  into  present  arrangements  for  (a)  the  uses  of 
foreign  policy  to  support  U.S.  science  and  technology,  and  (b)  the 
uses  of  science  and  technology  to  develop  and  support  U.S.  foreign 
policy. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  history  of  America  as  a  nation,  the 
Congress  has  had  a  shared  responsibility  for  the  formulation  and 
implementation  of  foreign  policy.  Congressional  concern  with  science 
and  technology  has  greatly  intensified  since  World  War  II.  Science 
and  technology,  exerting  an  ever-increasing  influence  on  domestic 
public  policy,  also  appear  to  have  a  growing  effect  on  the  content  and 
conduct  of  American  foreign  policy. 

Arts  of  peace  and  war  alike  rest  on  an  increasingly  technological 
base.  Science  and  technology  contribute  in  a  major  way  to  many  pro- 
grams of  Government  departments  and  agencies :  For  defense,  space 
exploration,  agriculture,  industry,  transportation,  communications, 
medicine,  meteorology,  natural  resource  development  and  use,  and 
management  of  information  itself.  Most  of  these  programs  have 
international  as  well  as  scientific  aspects.  The  purposeful  coordination 
of  the  international  aspects  of  science  and  technology  presents  unusual 
difficulties  because  of  their  range,  complexity,  and  specialized  nature. 

The  Congress  of  the  United  States  has  many  reasons  for  devoting 
attention  to  the  problems  of  science,  technology,  and  American 
diplomacy.  Apart  from  the  special  constitutional  role  of  the  Senate  in 
giving  advice  and  consent  to  appointment  of  principal  presidential 
advisers  and  to  formal  agreements  with  foreign  governments,  the 
Congress  authorizes  programs  to  develop  and  use  technology  for  inter- 
national purposes,  funds  international  programs  of  the  Chief  Execu- 
tive, and  conducts  oversight  of  the  executive  branch  in  policy  imple- 
mentation, program  execution,  and  the  observance  of  law.  As  science 
and  technology  have  become  important  for  American  diplomacy,  they 
have  become  of  corresponding  importance  for  the  Congress. 

The  Congressional  Role 

The  congressional  response  to  the  need  for  public  action  generated 
by  such  major  innovations  as  atomic  energy  and  artificial  earth 
satellites  was  positive  and  vigorous.  Also  of  importance  has  been  the 

(5) 


concurrent  effort  of  the  Congress  to  provide  itself  with  the  institutional 
means  for  examining  important  scientific  and  technological  develop- 
ments to  determine  the  needs  of  the  public  for  their  support,  exploita- 
tion, and  regulation. 

When  the  Congress  in  1946  created  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  it  also  brought  into  being  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy,  a  novel  and  uniquely  equipped  congressional  institution,  to 
oversee  and  guide  developments  in  the  emerging  field  of  atomic 
power,  nuclear  weaponry,  and  supporting  research  and  development. 
The  Joint  Committee  played  a  significant  role  in  atomic  energy  deci- 
sions: e.g.,  in  support  of  President  Eisenhower's  peaceful  atom 
initiative,  in  winning  congressional  approval  for  U.S.  participation 
in  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  It  also  participated  in  the 
joint  hearings  held  with  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee  on  the 
Nuclear  Test  Ban  Treaty.  However,  the  95th  Congress  abolished  the 
Joint  Committee  and  reassigned  its  functions  and  authorities  to  other 
appropriate  committees. 

The  Russian  Sputnik  evoked  a  corresponding  congressional  re- 
sponse. The  Senate  Special  Committee  on  Space  and  Astronautics  was 
created  on  February  6,  1958,  and  the  House  Select  Committee  on 
Astronautics  and  Space  Exploration  was  created  on  March  5.  These 
undertook  a  vigorous  program  of  policy  formulation.  One  important 
product  originated  by  the  House  committee  was  the  House  concurrent 
resolution  on  the  peaceful  uses  of  space,  on  which  hearings  were  then 
held  before  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Another  was  the 
National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Act  (NASA)  of  1958,1  approved 
July  29,  which  not  only  established  the  basic  space  policy  of  the  Nation, 
but  blueprinted  the  organizational  form  for  its  implementation  as  well. 

An  important  feature  of  the  NASA  Act,  section  205,  provided  that : 

The  Administration,  under  the  foreign  policy  guidance  of  the  President,  may 
engage  in  a  program  of  international  cooperation  in  work  done  pursuant  to  agree- 
ments made  by  the  President  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate. 

On  the  executive  side,  the  President  instructed  Ambassador  Henry 
Cabot  Lodge,  U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations,  to  request 
the  inclusion  on  the  agenda  of  the  13th  General  Assembly  of  a  program 
for  international  cooperation  in  the  field  of  outer  space.  The  resolution 
initiated  by  the  United  States  was  introduced  November  13,  1958, 
and  was  adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  December  13 ;  it  established 
a  Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space,  and  instructed 
the  committee  to  report  on  appropriate  forms  such  cooperation 
should  take. 

A  permanent  standing  Committee  on  Aeronautical  and  Space 
Sciences  was  established  under  an  amendment  to  the  Standing 
Rules  of  the  Senate.  January  14,  1959.  This  committee  was  abolished 
in  February  1977;  its  functions  were  transferred  to  the  Commerce, 
Science,  and  Transportation  Committee.  In  the  House,  action  had 
already  Ix-en  taken,  July  21,  1958,  to  establish  the  standing  Com- 
mittee'on  Science  and  Astronautics;  to  this  committee  was  assigned 
the  broader  jurisdiction  over  astronautical  research  and  development, 
the  Bureau  of  Standards.  NASA  and  the  National  Aeronaut  ics  and 
Space  Council,  the  National  Science  Foundation,  outer  space,  science 

1  72  Stat.  426  ;  42  U.S.C.  2451  et  seq.,  as  amended. 


scholarships,  and  scientific  research  and  development.2  (In  January 
1975,  the  committee  was  renamed  the  Committee  on  Science  and  Tech- 
nology and  was  given  additional  jurisdiction  over  civil  aviation 
research  and  development,  environmental  research  and  development, 
all  energy  research  and  development  except  nuclear  research  and 
development,  and  the  National  Weather  Service.  At  this  time,  the 
committee  was  also  given  general  and  special  oversight  functions  of 
reviewing  and  studying,  on  a  continuing  basis,  all  laws,  programs, 
and  Government  activities  dealing  with  or  involving  nonmilitary  re- 
search and  development.) 

Apart  from  the  dramatic  impacts  of  atomic  energy  and  space  explo- 
ration, science  and  technology  subjects  have  been  incorporated  in  the 
jurisdictions  of  many  standing  committees  of  both  Houses  of  Congress. 
In  her  study  of  "Congressional  Organization  for  Science  and  Tech- 
nology, 95th  Congress,"  Mauree  W.  Ayton  lists  10  Senate  Committees, 
10  House  Committees,  and  2  Ad  Hoc  Committees  with  such  concerns.3 
Among  those  that  apparently  combine  the  concerns  of  science  and 
technology  with  foreign  affairs  are  the  following : 

SENATE 

Committee  on  Agriculture,  Nutrition,  and  Forestry 

Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Agricultural  Policy 
Committee  on  Appropriations 

Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Operations 
Committee  on  Armed  Services 

Subcommittee  on  Research  and  Development 
Committee  on  the  Budget 

Committee  on  Commerce,  Science  and  Transportation 
Committee  on  Energy  and  Natural  Resources 
Committee  on  Environment  and  Public  Works 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  on  Governmental  Affairs 

Subcommittee  on  Energy,  Nuclear  Proliferation  and  Federal 
Services 
Committee  on  Human  Resources 

Subcommittee  on  Health  and  Scientific  Research 

HOUSE 

Committee  on  Appropriations 

Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Operations 
Committee  on  Armed  Services 
Committee  on  Banking,  Finance,  and  Urban  Affairs 

Subcommittee  on  International  Trade,  Investment  and  Monetary 
Policy 


-  Taking  note  of  the  scope  given  to  the  House  committee,  Speaker  McCormack  later 
observed  that  "The  importance  attached  to  science  and  technology  by  the  House  leader- 
ship in  1958  was  signaled  by  the  fact  that  as  majority  leader  I  was  chairman  of  the  select 
committee  and  the  minority  leader  of  that  period  was  ranking  minority  member  of  this 
committee."  (Statement  of  Hon.  John  W.  McCormack,  Speaker,  U.S.  House  of  Representa- 
tives In  U.S.  Congress.  House.  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics.  '  Applied 
Science  and  World  Economy  :  Panel  on  Science  and  Technology,  Ninth  Meeting."  Pro- 
ceedings before  the  *  *  *  Jannarv  23,  24.  and  25.  1968,  90th  Congress,  second  session 
(Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1968),  page  11.) 

3  Mauree  W.  Ayton,  "Congressional  Organization  for  Science  and  Technology,  95tn 
Congress  :  A  listing  of  congressional  committees  and  subcommittees  having  jurisdiction 
over  scientific  and  technological  activities."  (Scheduled  for  publication  in  November  1977.) 


8 

Committee  on  the  Budget 
Committee  on  Government  Operations 
Committee  on  Interior  and  Insular  Affairs 
Committee  on  International  Relations 
Committee  on  Interstate  and  Foreign  Commerce 
Committee  on  Merchant  Marine  and  Fisheries 

Subcommittee  on  Oceanography 
Committee  on  Science  and  Technology 

AD    HOC    COMMITTEES 

Ad  Hoc  Committee  on  Energy 

Ad  Hoc  Select  Committee  on  Outer  Continental  Shelf 

Advisory  services  on  science  and  technology  matters,  including 
those  of  an  international  nature,  are  provided  by  a  variety  of  institu- 
tional arrangements.  These  include  staff  assistants  to  individual  Mem- 
bers of  Congress;  staffs  of  Congressional  Committees;  the  National 
Security  and  International  Affairs  Section  of  the  Congressional 
Budget  Office;  the  Science  Policy  Research,  Environment  and  Natural 
Resources,  and  Foreign  Affaire  and  National  Defense  Divisions  of  the 
Congressional  Research  Service  of  the  Library  of  Congress;  the  Office 
of  Technology  Assessment;  the  International  Division  of  the  General 
Accounting  Office;  and  the  Commission  on  International  Relations 
of  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences. 

Discussion  of  the  Problem 

1.  Purpose  of  the  Study 

This  study  is  intended  to  provide  Congress  with  background  mate- 
rial useful  in  strengthening  the  resources  that  support  the  conduct  of 
American  diplomacy.  The  plan  of  the  study  is  to  describe  and  analyze 
the  formulation  and  administration  of  American  diplomatic  policies 
having  significant  science  and  technology  components.  Specifically, 
the  study  examines  a  selected  set  of  particular  developments  and  events 
in  recent  diplomatic  history  in  order  to : 
— Characterize  processes  and  problems  involving  the  interaction  of 

science  and  technology  with  diplomacy ; 
— Define  organizational  requirements  for  the  effective  formulation 
of  important  policies  to  direct  and  control  activities  involving 
this  interaction; 
— Identify  ways  in  which  the  capabilities  of  agencies  serving  at  this 
interface  can  be  strengthened  legislatively  or  administratively; 
and  more  generally,  to 
—  Discover  ways  in  which  science  and  technology  can  better  support 

foreign  policy  objectives  of  the  United  States ;  and 
— Discover  ways  in  which  the  conduct  of  diplomatic  activities  can 
better  support  the  healthy  growth  of  national  and  international 
science  and  technology. 


9 

2.  Description  of  the  Problem 

The  interaction  of  science  and  technology  with  diplomacy  has  wide 
ramifications  and  many  challenges.  Diplomacy  is  concerned  with 
carrying  out  American  foreign  policies:  The  formulation  of  U.S. 
political,  economic,  and  military  interests  and  their  representation 
in  other  nations  and  in  international  bodies.  Traditionally,  diplomacy 
has  been  recognized  as  requiring  superior  skills  and — in  the  best 
sense — sophisticated  attitudes  in  interpersonal  relations,  negotiation, 
persuasion,  forensics,  perception,  cultural  empathy,  and  adaptability 
to  unfamiliar  situations.  Science  represents  generally  a  somewhat 
different  environment,  a  cultural  activity  whose  disciplinary  walls  are 
not  easily  passed  over.  It  involves  systematic  understanding  of  the 
fundamentals  of  man  and  nature.  Technology  is  still  a  third  area  of 
human  activity,  with  its  own  special  characteristics  of  materialistic, 
sometimes  trial-and-error,  evolution  of  hardware  and  systems.  The 
impacts  on  society  of  the  uses  of  technology  are  profound  and  many- 
sided.  Accordingly,  a  study  of  the  interactions  of  science  and  tech- 
nology with  diplomacy  presents  three-dimensional  problems  of  large 
scope,  many  kinds  of  specialization,  and  difficult  analysis. 

Domestically,  science  policy  has  two  distinct  aspects :  (  1)  The  use  of 
science  and  technology  as  an  instrument  to  aid  in  the  formulation  and 
execution  of  public  policy  (called  "science  in  policy")  ;  and  (2)  the 
formulation  and  execution  of  Government  policy  to  aid  in  the  exploi- 
tation of  publicly  beneficial  science  and  technology  (called  "policy 
in  science"). 

Public  funds  have  to  satisfy  so  many  different  needs  that  support 
for  basic  science  encounters  budgetary  constraints ;  the  resultant  search 
for  criteria  to  assure  an  ordering  of  the  priorities  of  basic  science  is 
the  subject  of  considerable  and  unresolved  controversy.  Questions 
remain  open  as  to  the  priority  to  be  given  basic  research  in  fields 
with  a  high  probability  of  opening  up  new  opportunities  for  socially 
useful  technology  as  against  fields  in  which  the  scientific  interest  is 
high  but  the  results  offer  no  obvious  promise  of  application.  There  are 
also  unresolved  questions  as  to  the  comparative  economic  and  social 
costs  and  benefits  of  particular  technologies  (the  supersonic  transport, 
for  example)  and  of  competing  technologies  and  their  costs  and  bene- 
fits. Will  a  desalinization  plant  be  socially  more  cost-effective  than  an 
urban  rapid  transit  system,  or  a  novel  waste-disposal  system?  Clearly, 
the  formulation  of  policies  to  harness  science  and  technology  effec- 
tively to  national  need  presents  many  difficulties. 

Similar  problem  areas  exist  in  the  field  of  international  science  and 
technology.  In  the  international  field,  too,  there  is  "science  in  policy" 
and  "policy  in  science."  Moreover,  the  impacts  of  science  and  tech- 
nology have  made  diplomacy  itself  more  difficult  by  introducing  the 
factor  of  dynamic  and  rapid  change,  often  of  great  magnitude. 

3.  Importance  of  the  Problem  for  the  Future 

Nowhere  are  the  changes  wrought  by  science  and  technology  more 
evident  than  in  international  affairs.  In  his  study,  "Science,  Tech- 
nology, and  American  Foreign  Policy,"  Eugene  B.  Skolnikoff  observes 


10 

that  "*  *  *  scientific  and  technological  developments  during  and 
since  World  War  II  have  altered  former  relationships  among 
nations,  overturned  traditional  measures  of  power  and  influence,  and 
made  the  future  a  hostage  to  the  scientific  discoveries  that  are  un- 
certain in  form  but  sure  to  come.'"  * 

Elsewhere,  Skolnikoff  observes  that  the  relevance  today  of  the 
"facts  or  expectations  of  science  and  technology  to  many  foreign 
policy  issues  is  not  entirely  without  precedent." 

Quite  a  few  foreign  policy  concerns  in  the  past  were  heavily  conditioned  by 
technical  considerations :  fishery  matters,  treaties  on  the  use  of  common  water 
resources,  international  agreements  on  weights  and  measures,  and  others. 

However  [he  continues],  gradually  since  1900,  and  explosively  since  World 
War  II,  there  has  been  a  change  in  degree  of  dependence  that  is  tantamount  to 
a  change  in  kind.  Now,  not  only  are  many  of  the  central  issues  of  foreign  policy — 
those  that  affect  the  fundamental  international  position  and  security  of  the 
Nation — intimately  tied  to  scientific  and  technological  variables,  but  whole  new 
areas  of  policy  concern  based  on  science  and  technology  have  arisen  that  demand 
the  time  and  attention  of  senior  policy  officials.5 

Apart  from  the  obvious  instances  of  defense  and  space  technology, 
he  calls  attention  to  the  "*  *  *  need  to  estimate  the  future,  to  examine 
the  ways  in  which  international  relations  and  perhaps  the  interna- 
tional political  system  will  be  altered  as  science  and  technology  con- 
tinue their  explosive  advance  *  *  *."  6 

4.  Growing  Recognition,  of  the  Importance  of  Science  and  Technology 
for  American  Diplomacy 
A  quarter  of  a  century  ago,  when  the  great  expansion  in  scientific 
and  technological  effort  in  the  United  States  was  just  getting  under- 
way, Lloyd  Berkner  as  consultant  to  the  Secretary  of  State  presented 
a  report  on  "Science  and  Foreign  Relations"  in  which  he  addressed 
the  dichotomy  of  science-in-policy  and  policy-in-science  in  the  inter- 
national sphere : 

First,  how  can  the  potentialities  of  scientific  progress  be  integrated  into  the 
formulation  of  foreign  policy,  and  the  administration  of  foreign  relations,  so  that 
the  maximum  advantage  of  scientific  progress  and  development  can  be  acquired 
by  all  the  peoples?  Second,  how  can  foreign  relations  be  conducted  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  create  the  atmosphere  that  is  essential  to  effective  progress  of 
science  and  technology?  7 

A  little  more  than  a  decade  after  the  Berkner  report  had  urged  a 
strengthening  of  diplomatic  resources  of  scientific  and  technological 
expertise,  a  similar  recommendation  was  made  to  the  Federal  Council 
for  Science  and  Technology  by  its  International  Committee,  chaired  by 
Walter  G.  Whitman: 

Science  and  its  applications  in  technology  are  exerting  a  revolutionary  influ- 
ence on  the  destinies  of  nations  and  mankind.  Our  domestic  and  foreign  policies 
must  lie  attuned  to  this  revolution  and  to  its  implications  of  change  in  the  pattern 
of  world  relationships. 


4  Eugene  I?.  Skolnikoff.  Science,  Technology,  and  American  Foreign  Polio/.  (Cambridge, 
Ma8BaChU8ett8,  The  M.I.T.  Press.  1907),  p.  .'t. 

"Ibid.,  p.  :'.s.r,.  Sec  also:  Eugene  B.  Skolnikoff.  "Scientific  Advice  In  the  State  Depart 

Dient."  In  William  K.  Nelson,  <•<!.  The  Politics  of  Science:  Headings  in  Science.  Technology, 
and    Gorernment.    (New    York,    Oxford    inlversity    Press,    1968),    pp.    884    396. 

8  Skolnikoff.   Science,   Technology,  and   American    Foreign    Policy,  op.    cit.,    p.    •'!!•-. 

7  Lloyd  viel  Berkner,  "Science  and  Foreign  Relations  :  International  Plow  of  Scientific 
and  Technological  Information."  (Washington,  International  Science  Policy  Survey 
Group,  U.S.  Department  of  state.  I960),  p.  2.  (Department  of  state  Publication  8860, 
General  Foreign  Policy  Series,  No.  30.) 


11 

Not  only  does  our  domestic  strength  rely  on  a  vigorous  technological  base;  our 
nation's  role  as  a  leader  in  the  international  scene  will  increasingly  be  deter- 
mined by  the  accomplishments  of  our  scientists  and  engineers  in  this  country 
and  by  our  contributions  to  the  well  being  of  other  societies. 

[Science,  the  report  continued]  possesses  an  objectivity  which  transcends  dif- 
ferences in  political  and  social  systems — its  language,  its  methods  and  its  ethics 
are  universal.  It  can  therefore  be  a  powerful  tool  for  building  understanding 
among  the  peoples  of  the  world  and  towards  achieving  eventual  world 
cooperation. 

These  two  potentials  of  science,  which  often  lead  to  conflicting  conclusions,  are 
each  significant  factors  in  the  formulation  of  policies  to  guide  our  international 
scientific  and  technological  activities.8 

Two  months  later,  Adlai  E.  Stevenson,  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
United  Nations,  in  a  speech  to  a  scientific  group  called  attention  to  the 
lag  of  policy  behind  technological  advance : 

Scientifically  and  technically  [he  said]  the  world  has  already  become  a  single 
community,  yet  in  our  ethical  response  to  this  fact  and  in  our  political  institu- 
tions we,  governments  and  citizens,  are  lagging  dangerously  far  behind  you,  the 
scientists. 

You  have  given  us  dangerous  powers,  but  we  have  not  yet  learned  to  control 
them.  You  have  given  us  tools  to  abolish  poverty,  but  we  have  not  yet  mastered 
them.  You  have  given  us  means  to  extend  the  span  of  human  life,  but  this  may 
prove  a  curse,  not  a  blessing,  unless  we  can  assure  food,  survival,  and  then  health 
and  a  good  life  for  the  bodies  and  minds  of  our  exploding  populations.  You  have 
made  the  world  small  and  interdependent,  but  we  have  not  built  the  new  institu- 
tions to  manage  it — nor  cast  off  the  old  institutions  which  scientific  progress  has 
made  obsolete. 

Every  great  change  wrought  by  science  is  foreshadowed  years  ahead  in  the 
laboratory  and  on  the  drawing  board.  But  it  is  not  until  the  new  device  is  fully 
built  and  functioning,  and  has  astonished  the  whole  world,  that  we  begin  to  think 
of  its  human  and  political  implications.  We  are  forever  running  today  to  catch  up 
tomorrow  with  what  you  made  necessary  yesterday.9 

Subsequently,  Jerome  B.  Wiesner,  in  his  capacity  as  Director  of 
the  Office  of  Science  and  Technology,  told  the  Military  Operations 
Subcommittee  of  the  House  Committee  on  Government  Operations  in 
1962,  the  "Swift  emergence  of  science  and  technology  as  vital  instru- 
ments of  national  policy"  involved  "forces  that  will  determine  our 
future,  will  shape  the  balance  of  power  among  nations,  influence  our 
military  security,  facilitate  our  success  in  achieving  foreign  policy  ob- 
jectives, provide  the  vigor  for  our  domestic  economy,  and  guarantee 
the  health  of  our  citizens.*'  He  went  on : 

In  an  era  of  explosive  growth  and  international  tensions  that  evoke  an  unprec- 
edented demand  on  our  total  resources — physical  and  intellectual — there  is  need 
to  make  most  effective  use  of  our  total  technical  resources. 

We  are  faced  with  two  realities :  The  increasing  role  of  science  and  technology 
in  policy  decision  making,  and  the  increasing  federal  support  for  research  and 
development.  These  two  aspects  are  sometimes  contrasted  as  the  role  of  science  in 
government  and  the  role  of  government  in  science.  While  they  are  clearly  related, 
it  is  important  to  recognize  that  they  often  pose  quite  different  problems.10 

President  John  F.  Kennedy,  in  a  speech  to  the  National  Academy  of 
Sciences,  October  22,  1963,  called  "wholehearted  understanding  today 

8  U.S.  Federal  Council  for  Science  and  Technology.  "International  Scientific  and  Tech- 
nological Activities."  A  report  to  the  Federal  Council  for  Science  and  Technology  by 
its  International  Committee,  June  20,  1961.  (For  Authorized  Committee  Use,  Mimeo, 
1961,  p.  1.) 

9  Adlai  E.  Stevenson,  "Science,  Diplomacy,  and  Peace."  Remarks  by  Adlai  E.  Stevenson. 
U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations.  Made  before  the  International  Astronomical 
Union  at  Berkeley,  California,  August  15,  1961.  Department  of  State  Bulletin  (Septem- 
ber 4.  1961),  pp.  402-3. 

10  Jerome  B.  Wiesner.  "The  Federal  Role  in  Science  and  Technology."  Bulletin  of  the 
Atomic  Scientists  (November  1962),  p.  42. 


12 

of  the  importance  of  pure  science"  the  distinguishing  feature  of  the 
twentieth  century  in  the  United  States.  It  Avas  well  established,  he 
said,  that  progress  in  technology  depended  on  progress  in  theory. 
Science  had  emerged  from  a  peripheral  concern  of  Government  to 
active  partnership. 

I  would  suggest  that  science  is  already  moving  to  enlarge  its  influence  in  three 
general  ways:  in  the  interdisciplinary  area,  in  the  international  area,  and  in  the 
intercultural  area.  For  science  is  the  most  powerful  means  we  have  for  the  unifi- 
cation of  knowledge,  and  a  main  obligation  of  its  future  must  be  to  deal  with  prob- 
lems which  cut  across  boundaries,  whether  boundaries  between  the  sciences, 
boundaries  between  nations,  or  boundaries  between  man's  scientific  and  his  hu- 
mane concerns. 

[Continued  the  President:]  Every  time  you  scientists  make  a  major  invention, 
we  politicians  have  to  invent  a  new  institution  to  cope  with  it,  and  almost  invari- 
ably these  days,  and  happily,  it  must  be  an  international  institution.11 

5.  Impact  of  Nuclear  and  Rocket  Technologies  on  World  Outlook 

The  two  principal  innovations  that  intensified  awareness  of  the 
relevance  of  science  and  technology  for  diplomacy  in  the  Twentieth 
Century  were  atomic  energy  and  artificial  earth  satellites.  The  first  led 
to  creation  of  the  Atomic  Enerffv  Commission,  the  Office  of  Naval  Re- 
search and  other  military  research  agencies,  and  the  National  Science 
Foundation.  The  second  produced  the  National  Aeronautics  and  Space 
Administration,  the  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Council,  the 
Office  of  the  Director  of  Defense  Research  and  Engineering  and  the 
Advanced  Research  Projects  Agency  in  the  Department  of  Defense, 
and  a  much-expanded  science  organization  in  the  Executive  Office  of 
the  President;  the  emphasis  resulting  from  these  actions  led  in  turn 
to  the  designation  of  a  number  of  Assistant  Secretaries  for  Science 
and  Technology  (or  equivalent)  in  old-line  departments.  The  litera- 
ture responding  to  the  two  notable  scientific/ technological  achieve- 
ments contains  many  references  to  their  international  impact,  of  which 
the  following  are  representative : 

Bernard  M.  Baruch: 

My  Fellow-Members  of  the  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  and  my 
Fellow-Citizens  of  the  World, 

We  are  here  to  make  a  choice  between  the  quick  and  the  dead. 

That  is  our  business. 

Behind  the  black  portent  of  the  new  atomic  age  lies  a  hoi>e  which,  seized  upon 
with  faith,  can  work  our  salvation.  Let  us  not  deceive  ourselves.  We  must  elect 
World  Peace  or  World  Destruction." 

Secretary  of  State  John  Foster  Dulles: 

The  United  Nations  Charter  now  reflects  serious  inadequacies.  One  inade- 
quacy sprang  from  ignorance.  When  we  were  in  San  Francisco  in  the  Spring  of 
1945,  none  of  us  knew  of  the  atomic  bomb  which  was  to  fall  on  Hiroshima  on 
August  6,  1945.  The  Charter  is  thus  a  pre-Atomic  Age  Charter.  In  this  sense  it 
was  obsolete  before  it  actually  came  into  force.  As  one  who  was  at  San  Francisco, 
I  can  say  with  confidence  that  if  the  delegates  there  bad  known  that  the  mysteri- 
ous and  immeasurable  power  of  the  atom  would  be  available  as  a  means  of  mass 


11  U.S.  President  (John  P.  Kennedy).  "Address  at  the  Anniversary  Convocation  of  the 
National  Academy  of  Sciences."  Speech  given  October  22,  196:5.  in  Public  Papers  of  the 
Presidents,  John  F.  Kennedy,  1963.  (Washington,  r.s.  Government  Printing  Office,  1964), 

PP.   802  •". 

« Opening  salutation  by  Bernard  M.  Baruch  to  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
mission, June  14,  1040,  before  Introducing  his  plan  for  the  International  control  of  atomic 
energy. 


13 

destruction,  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  dealing  with  disarmament  and  the 
regulation  of  armaments  would  have  been  far  more  emphatic  and  realistic.18 

Secretary  of  State  Dean  Rusk : 

Today  the  United  States  has  operational  weapons  in  its  arsenal  hundreds  of 
times  as  destructive  as  that  first  atom  bomb.  The  Polaris  and  Minuteman  missiles 
are  armed  with  warheads  tens  of  times  as  powerful.  The  Soviets  also  have  weap- 
ons of  great  destructive  power. 

The  hard  fact  is  that  a  full-scale  nuclear  exchange  could  erase  all  that  man  has 
built  over  the  centuries.  War  has  devoured  itself  because  it  can  devour  the 
world.  *  *  * 

No  responsible  man  will  deny  we  live  in  a  world  of  vast  and  incalculable 
risks.  Where  decisions  may  be  required  in  minutes,  we  must  be  constantly  on 
guard  against  the  accident  or  miscalculation  that  can  lead  where  no  one  wants  to 
go.  A  local  conflict  anywhere  around  the  globe  in  which  the  interests  of  the  great 
powers  are  engaged  might  suddenly  pose  the  prospect  of  nuclear  war.14 

Senate  Majority  Leader  Lyndon  B.  Johnson : 

*  *  *  We  have  lost  an  important  battle  in  technology.  That  has  been  demon- 
strated by  the  satellites  that  are  whistling  above  our  heads.13 

Unanimous  statement  by  Senate  Preparedness  Subcommittee: 

We  began  with  a  simple — but  revolutionary — fact.  It  was  that  for  the  first 
time  in  all  history  a  manmade  satellite  was  placed  into  orbit  around  the  earth. 

There  were  many  who  realized  that  this  was  an  inevitable  development  of  the 
march  of  science.  But  the  circumstances  under  which  it  happened  were  startling 
and  brought  into  sharp  focus  facts  which  had  been  known  previously  but  not 
fully  appreciated. 

We  had  expected  to  be  first  with  this  achievement.  In  fact,  we  have  yet  to  prove 
second.  *  *  * 

From  the  beginning,  however,  it  developed  that  there  was  much  more  at  stake 
than  the  prestige  of  being  "first".  *  *  * 

[This  achievement  by  the  Soviet  Union  1  has  two  important  implications. 

First,  it  demonstrates  beyond  question  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  the  propulsive 
force  to  hurl  a  missile  from  one  continent  to  another. 

Second,  the  Soviet  Union  has  gathered  basic  information  about  outer  space. 
*  *  *  It  can  now  be  said: 

*  *  *  The  Soviet  Union  has  led  the  world  into  outer  space.  *  *  * 

We  are  engaged  in  a  race  for  survival  and  we  intend  to  win  that  race.  But  the 
truly  worthwhile  goal  is  a  world  of  peace — the  only  world  in  which  there  will 
also  be  security. 

The  immediate  objective  is  to  defend  ourselves.  But  the  equally  important 
objective  is  to  reach  the  hearts  and  minds  of  men  everywhere  so  the  day  will  come 


13  Address  by  Secretary  of  State  John  Foster  Dulles  before  the  American  Bar  Asso- 
ciation, August  26,  1953.  However,  according  to  Bernhard  G.  Bechhoefer  ["Postwar  Nego- 
tiations for  Arms  Control,"  Brookings  Institution,  1961,  p.  28]  :  "Dulles'  statement  that 
the  delegates  at  San  Francisco  knew  nothing  of  the  bomb  is  not  literally  correct."  Among 
those  present  who  knew  were  Secretary  of  State  Stettinius,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War 
John  J.  McCloy,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Artemus  Gates,  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State  Clement  Dunn,  British  Ambassador  Lord  Halifax,  and  perhaps  others. 

14  "Statement  of  Hon.  Dean  Rusk,  Secretary  of  State."  In  U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations.  Nuclear  Test  Ban  Treaty.  Hearings  before  the  *  *  *  on 
Executive  M.  88th  Congress,  1st  Session.  The  treaty  banning  nuclear  weapon  tests  in  the 
atmosphere,  in  outer  space,  and  underwater,  signed  at  Moscow  on  August  5,  1963,  on 
behalf  of  the  United  States  of  America,  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Northern  Ireland,  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  August  12,  13,  14,  15,  19, 
20,  21.  22,  23,  26,  and  27,  1963.  88th  Congress,  first  session.  (Washington,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  1963),  p.  12. 

15  Statement  by  Chairman  Lyndon  B.  Johnson  to  Preparedness  Investigating  Subcom- 
mittee Nov.  25,  1957.  (The  Sputnik  had  been  launched  Oct.  4,  1957.)  In  U.S.  Congress. 
Senate.  Committee  on  Armed  Services.  Inquiry  Into  Satellite  and  Missile  Programs.  Hear- 
ings before  the  Preparedness  Investigating  Subcommittee  of  the  *  *  *  Part  I.  Novem- 
ber 25,  26,  27,  December  13,  14,  16,  and  17,  1957,  January  10,  13,  15,  16,  19,  20, 
21  and  23,  1958.  85th  Congress,  first  and  second  sessions.  (Washington,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  1958),  p.  3. 


14 

when  the  ballistic  missile  will  be  merely  a  dusty  relic  in  the  museums  of  mankind 
and  men  everywhere  will  work  together  in  understanding.16 

House  Concurrent  Resolution  326 : 

Resolved  by  the  House  of  Representatives  (the  Senate  concurring),  That  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  believes  that  the  nations  of  the  world  should  join 
in  the  establishment  of  plans  for  the  peaceful  exploration  of  outer  space,  should 
ban  the  use  of  outer  space  for  military  aggrandizement,  and  should  endeavor  to 
broaden  man's  knowledge  of  space  with  the  purpose  of  advancing  the  good  of 
all  mankind  rather  than  for  the  benefit  of  one  nation  or  group  of  nations.  *  *  *  a 

Representative  John  W.  McCormack : 

Mr.  McCormack.  Mr.  Speaker  *  *  *  This  resolution  represents  the  unanimous 
views  of  the  members  of  the  Select  Committee  on  Astronautics  and  Space  Explo- 
ration. *  *  *  The  resolution  *  *  *  expresses  the  sense  of  the  Congress  that  the 
United  States  should  strive,  through  the  United  Nations  or  such  other  means 
as  may  best  be  appropriate,  for  international  agreements  designed  to  accomplish 
these  purposes.  *  *  *  But  it  is  impossible  to  analyze  man's  forthcoming  explora- 
tion of  space  solely  in  terms  of  such  technological  benefits ;  its  scope  and  mean- 
ing for  man  and  his  development  far  transcend  such  calculations.  Not  least 
among  the  possibilities  of  this  great  adventure  is  the  potentiality  of  a  reemphasis 
in  men's  hearts  of  the  common  links  that  bind  the  members  of  the  human  race 
together  and  the  development  of  a  strengthened  sense  of  community  of  interest 
which  quite  transcends  national  boundaries.  It  is  my  belief  that  in  such  a  develop- 
ment lies  our  strongest  hope  of  world  peace  and  the  security  necessary  to  live  in 
happiness  and  prosperity.  *  *  *  But  *  *  *  attempts  to  project  nationalistic  rival- 
ries beyond  the  earth's  boundaries  cannot  but  lead  to  a  perpetuation  of  exist- 
ing world  tensions  and  the  increased  likelihood  of  war.  *  *  *  Our  country  must 
cast  the  weight  of  its  great  influence  and  leadership  firmly  on  the  side  of  peaceful 
international  cooperation  *  *  *.18 

Senator  Lyndon  B.  Johnson : 

We  should,  certainly,  make  provisions  for  inviting  together  the  scientists  of 
other  nations  to  work  in  concert  on  projects  to  extend  the  frontiers  of  man  and  to 
find  solutions  to  the  troubles  of  this  earth.  *  *  *  It  would  be  appropriate  and 
fitting  for  our  Nation  to  demonstrate  its  initiative  before  the  United  Nations  by 
inviting  all  member   nations  to  join  in  this  adventure  into  outer  space  together. 

The  dimensions  of  space  dwarf  our  national  differences  on  earth.58 

6.  Further  Contemporary  Evaluations 

The  role  of  science  as  a  medium  of  international  communication  was 
recognized  by  Representative  George  P.  Miller,  chairman  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics,  in  a  statement  to  a  seminar  of 
the  Foreign  Service  Institute,  early  in  1965.  Said  Chairman  Miller : 

Now,  let  me  proceed  to  a  facet  of  Congressional  relationship  with  science  and 
technology  that  holds  great  promise  to  ourselves  and  is,  no  doubt,  of  immediate 
interest  to  you — that  is,  in  the  field  of  international  relations.  I  believe  that  one  of 


10  Unanimous  statement  by  Preparedness  Subcommittee  ("Statement  of  the  Senate 
preparedness  Subcommittee  Issued  by  Chairman  Lyndon  I?.  Johnson  and  Ranking  Minority 
Member  Styles  bridges  at  the  Direction  of  the  Subcommittee")  January  ".'(,  1958.  in 
U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  Committee  on  Armed  Services.  Inquiry  Into  Satellite  and  Missile 
Programs.  Hearings  before  the  Preparedness  Investigating  Subcommittee  of  tin-  •  *  * 
Reports  of  Secretary  of  Defense  on  Accomplishments  of  Defense  Department  on  Recom 
■  Herniations  of  the  Preparedness  Subcommittee  dated  January  23,  1  !>;">s.  Tart  III.  Feb- 
ruary 26,  April  .'{,  and  July  24,  1958.  (Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
1958J,  P-  2427. 

17  House  Concurrent  Resolution  320,  which  passed  the  House  June  2,  19T>N,  was  favor- 
ably reported  by  unanimous  vote  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee.  June  1<). 
1!»TiS,  and  was  agreed   to  by  the  Senate  on  July  2'A,   1958.   Ttl   I'.S.  Congress.   Senate.   Special 

Committee  on  space  and  Astronautics.  Final  Report  of  the  *  *  *  Pursuant  to  8.  Bee.  856 
uj  tin  H.'ith  Congress.  Senate  Report  NO.  100,  March  11,  1959.  86th  Congress,  first  session. 
(Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office;  1959),  p.  17. 

'"John  W.  McCormack.  "Relative  to  the  Establishment  of  Plans  for  the  Peaceful 
Exploration  of  Outer  space."  statement  of  the  lion.  John  \v.  McCormack  on  the  floor 
Of  the  House,  in  support  of  House  Concurrent  Resolution  '.W>,  June  2,  1958.  Congressional 
Record   (June  2,  1958),  p.  9912. 

'  •  Address  by  Senator  Lyndon  B.  Johnson  before  a  meeting  of  the  Columbia  Broad- 
casting System  Affiliates,  Shoreham  Hotel.  Washington,  i>.c.  January  14,  1958.  At  that 
time  he  was  chairman  of  the  Senate  Special  Committee  on   Space  and  Astronautics. 


15 

the  most  important  characteristics  of  science  is  that  it  can  be,  and  usually  is, 
outside  the  realm  of  politics.  It  has  provided  us  areas  of  peaceful  dialogue  and  co- 
operation between  ourselves,  our  friends  and  our  potential  enemies  that  have 
hardly  been  possible  in  any  other  field  of  activity.  The  International  Geophysical 
Year  programs  were  great  testimony  to  this  fact.20 

Dr.  James  R.  Killian,  Jr.,  of  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology, 
who  had  been  the  first  Presidential  science  adviser  following  the  Sput- 
nik success  of  the  Soviet  Union,  told  the  same  Seminar  that  the  inte- 
gration of  science  and  technology  into  foreign  policy  was  a  practical 
imperative.  There  was  a  "diplomatic  opportunity  to  grasp  a  powerful 
new  lever  to  advance  our  national  interest  in  the  world  arena." 

The  United  States  [he  continued]  has  exceptional  technical  resources  that  are 
understood  all  over  the  world,  both  by  advanced  peoples  and  by  less-advanced 
peoples.  This  scientific  and  technological  strength  is  among  the  most  conspicuous, 
most  admired,  and  most  persuasive  features  on  the  American  landscape  *  *  *. 
In  this  technology  and  the  education  which  supports  it,  lies  a  unique  diplomatic 
opportunity,  if  we  can  but  cultivate  the  complicated  skills  and  understanding 
required  to  exploit  it,  and  create  the  condition  where  this  skill  and  understanding 
can  be  made  really  at  home  in  agencies  concerned  with  affairs  abroad.  The  power 
of  our  science  and  technology  to  serve  national  goals  at  home  and  abroad  also 
presents  to  the  Department  of  State  a  compelling  reason  to  pursue  policies 
designed  to  maintain  and  augment  this  quality.21 

However,  Dr.  Killian  also  took  note  of  the  fact  that  fewer  than  150 
of  the  members  of  the  Foreign  Service  have  "majored  in  the  sciences, 
engineering,  or  mathematics";  he  called  this  number  "disappointingly 
small." 

Scientists  in  the  United  States  have  become  keenly  aware  of  the 
expanding  scope  and  reach  of  scientific  inquiry.  A  report  by  the  Com- 
mittee on  Science  in  the  Promotion  of  Human  Welfare,  of  the  Ameri- 
can Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  in  1965,  warned 
that  "The  entire  planet  can  now  serve  as  a  scientific  laboratory."  22 

Glenn  T.  Seaborg,  Chairman  of  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commis- 
sion, in  a  speech  in  1966,  called  attention  to  the  essential  international- 
ism of  science,  which  he  said  "may  ultimately  be  mankind's  greatest 
blessing."  He  offered  two  reasons  for  this  belief. 

The  first,  and  more  obvious,  is  that  international  cooperation  in  science  will 
accelerate  those  advances  of  mankind  which,  if  applied  wisely  and  equally  around 
the  world,  will  help  to  eliminate  the  causes  of  political  and  economic  strife. 

The  second  idea  is  that  internationality  in  science  extends  the  rational 
processes  of  science  to  other  human  activities  in  all  countries,  and  that  the 
ascendancy  of  scientists  within  their  respective  countries  will  influence  national 
leaders  and  their  people  to  deal  with  problems  in  a  more  rational  and  hence  more 
peaceful  and  productive  way  *  *  *.  If  we  view  science  in  its  broadest  terms,  that 
is,  as  a  highly  organized  and  penetrating  pursuit  of  knowledge  and  truth,  some 
good  is  going  to  come  by  having  the  attitudes  and  approaches  of  science  applied 
to  other  areas. 

As  an  example  of  necessary  international  cooperation,  he  called 
attention  to  the  growth  of  "big  science,"  whose  researches  "demand 


20  Hon.  George  P.  Miller.  "Legislative  Scientific  Committees."  Address  by  the  Hon. 
George  P.  Miller,  Chairman,  House  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics,  January  12, 
1965.  Made  at  Foreign  Service  Institute  Seminar.  In  U.S.  Department  of  State.  Science, 
Technology,  and  Foreign  Affairs.  Report  on  the  Seminar  held  at  the  Foreign  Service 
Institute,  January  11  to  February  2,  1965.  Prepared  by  L.  R.  Audrieth,  Visiting  Pro- 
fessor of  Science  Affairs  at  the  Foreign  Service  Institute,  and  H.  I.  Chinn,  Science  Officer, 
International  Scientific  and  Technological  Affairs,  Department  of  State.  (Washington, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1965),  p.  5. 

21  Dr.  James  R.  Killian,  Jr.,  "Science  in  the  State  Department:  A  Practical  Impera- 
tive." Address  by  Dr.  James  R.  Killian,  Jr.,  Chairman  of  the  Corporation,  M.I.T.,  Janu- 
ary 11.   1965.  Made  at  Foreign   Service  Institute  Seminar.   In  Ibid.,   pp.   42—43. 

22  "The  Integrity  of  Science  :  A  Report  by  the  AAAS  Committee  on  Science  in  the  Pro- 
motion of  Human  Welfare."  American  Scientist   (No.  53,  1965),  p.   191. 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1 


16 

large  facilities  and  expensive  equipment,  beyond  the  financial  means 
of  many  individual  scientific  organizations  and  even  many  nations."  ** 
Speaking  as  Secretary  of  State  to  the  Panel  on  Science  and  Tech- 
nology of  the  House  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics,  Jan- 
uary 24, 1967.  Dean  Rusk  described  the  need  to  deal  more  explicity  with 
the  "uncharted  region  where  the  interests  of  science  and  foreign  policy 
meet" : 

For  any  American  involved  in  public  affairs  today  [he  said],  scientific  literacy 
is  a  must ;  and  that  is  particularly  so  in  foreign  affairs.  We  are  firmly  convinced 
that  the  Foreign  Service  officer  should  be  familiar  with  the  ways,  the  concepts, 
and  the  purposes  of  science.  He  should  be  able  to  grasp  the  social  and  economic 
implication  of  current  scientific  discoveries  and  engineering  accomplish- 
ments. *  *  * 

But  the  burden  is  not  all  on  one  side.  Scientists  and  engineers  must,  of  course, 
recognize  very  real  progress  in  many  fields  outside  their  own  specialties,  and  they 
should  be  conscious  of  the  difference  between  the  values  of  society  and  the  verifi- 
able truths  of  the  natural  sciences.  For  such  men  there  is  a  role  in  the  foreign 
policy  process. 

Secretary  Rusk  also  spoke  of  the  need  to  look  ahead,  in  appraising 
future  prospects  and  opportunities  in  science  and  technology  as  these 
impact  on  the  foreign  policy  process :  "We  cannot  clearly  foresee  the 
advances,  discoveries,  and  innovations  which  lie  ahead,  but  the  uses  to 
which  we  put  the  new  knowledge  in  our  human  relationships  may  well 
be  critical."  It  was  necessary  to  "*  *  *  examine  some  aspects  of  the 
changing  modern  environment  which  are  of  direct  concern  to  foreign 
affairs,  many  of  which  can  only  be  dealt  with  internationally."  As 
examples,  he  suggested  the  pollution  of  the  atmosphere,  population 
pressures,  the  spread  of  nuclear  power  reactors,  the  need  for  a  "co- 
operative assault  on  the  treasure  chest  of  the  seas,"  the  "challenges  of 
our  space  environment,"  and  assistance  to  the  developing  countries  in 
building  a  base  for  their  technological  competence.  He  also  called  for 
an  "alliance  of  the  natural  sciences  with  the  social  sciences  in  meeting 
new  facets  of  old  problems  in  the  world  laboratory."  ** 

Caryl  P.  Haskins,  president  of  the  Carnegie  Institution  of  Wash- 
ington, has  called  for  a  "scientific  revolution"  among  the  developing 
countries  as  a  means  of  spurring  their  advance.  While  there  were 
material  reasons  for  his  proposal,  it  was  in  the  "*  *  *  qualities  of 
science  as  a  structure  of  communication,  of  philosophy,  of  faith  that 
we  find  the  deepest  reasons." 

Without  a  living  science,  the  new  countries  will  have  no  access  to  the  cultural 
world  fraternity  that  the  fabric  of  scientific  understanding  implies.  They  will  not 
share  in  the  lofty  concepts  that  form  the  priceless  heritage  of  the  scientifically 
literate  peoples.  They  will  be  denied  access  to  one  of  the  significant  assurances  that 
there  is  an  inherent  logic,  an  underlying  stability,  unifying  the  currents  of  scien- 
tific and  technical  change  that  so  alarmingly  threaten  to  engulf  them.  *  *  * 
Finally,  an  original  science  demands,  as  it  also  stimulates,  the  development  of 
the  critical  and  creative  habits  of  mind  that  are  essential  to  the  leadership  of  the 


23  Glenn  T.  Seaborj,'.  "What's  Ahead  for  International  Science  V  Article  based  upon 
•  i  Bpeech  delivered  at  the  International  Conference  on  Nuclear  Physics  held  in  Gatlinburg, 
Tennessee,  September  13,  1966.  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists  (January  1067),  \>.  26. 

-'Dean  Kusk.  "Science  and  Foreign  Affairs."  Keynote  address  made  before  Hie  eighth 
annual  Panel  on  Science  and  Technology  of  the  House  Committee  on  Science  and  Astro- 
nautics, by  the  Hon.  Dean  Kusk,  Secretary  of  State,  January  24,  1!»<!7.  Department  of 
state  Bulletin  (February  13,  19G7),  pp.  238-242. 


17 

new  nations  in  every  field — the  unfettered,  flexible,  empirical  view  so  essential 
if  the  nations  they  lead  are  to  survive  and  grow.83 

On  a  related  subject,  Herman  Pollack,  as  Director  of  International 
Scientific  and  Technological  Affairs,  Department  of  State,  has  ob- 
served that 

The  realization  that  the  vigor  of  a  nation's  economy  is  now  largely  dependent 
upon  the  quality  of  and  the  use  to  which  it  puts  its  science  and  technology  has 
given  rise  to  international  comparisons  of  technological  proficiency  and  in  turn 
to  the  problem  of  the  "technological  gap."  This  today  is  as  meaningful  to  a  diplo- 
mat as  were  comparisons  of  the  size  of  standing  armies  several  generations  ago. 
The  brain  drain  is  no  longer  merely  an  interesting  phenomenon.  It  has  acquired 
the  status  of  a  political  issue  and  a  fairly  hot  one,  at  that.26 

President  Nixon,  in  a  formal  statement  on  "United  States  Foreign 
Policy  for  the  1970's,"  addressing  himself  mainly  to  the  political 
aspects  of  the  subject,  called  attention  to  the  importance  of  science 
and  technology  for  international  relations.  In  military  science,  he 
observed  that  "We  are  now  entering  an  era  in  which  the  sophistica- 
tion and  destructiveness  of  weapons  present  more  formidable  and 
complex  issues  affecting  our  strategic  posture."  In  the  field  of  arms 
control,  he  warned  that  "Modern  technology  makes  any  balance 
precarious  and  prompts  new  efforts  at  ever  higher  levels  of  com- 
plexity." Moreover,  "The  spread  of  technological  skills  knows  no 
national  boundaries;  and  innovation  in  weaponry  is  no  monopoly  of 
the  superpowers."  And  more  generally,  "Unprecedented  scientific 
and  technological  advances  as  well  as  explosions  in  populations, 
communications,  and  knowledge  require  new  forms  of  international 
cooperations."  27 

Earlier,  in  his  address  to  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly, 
Sept.  2,  1969,  the  President  had  urged  that  body  to  come  to  grips 
with  several  important  challenges  with  an  important  scientific  and 
technological  content.  Said  the  President,  in  part: 

We  can  only  guess  at  the  new  scientific  discoveries  that  the  seventies  may  bring. 
But  we  can  see  with  chilling  clarity  the  gap  that  already  exists  between  the 
developed  economies  and  the  economies  of  the  developing  countries  and  the  urgent 
need  for  international  cooperation  in  spurring  economic  development. 

If  in  the  course  of  that  Second  Development  Decade  we  can  make  both  signifi- 
cant gains  in  food  production  and  significant  reductions  in  the  rate  of  population 
growth,  we  shall  have  opened  the  way  to  a  new  era  of  splendid  prosperity.  If  we 
do  only  one  without  the  other,  we  shall  be  standing  still ;  and  if  we  fail  in  both, 
great  areas  of  the  world  will  face  human  disaster. 

Increasingly,  the  task  of  protecting  man's  environment  is  a  matter  of  inter- 
national concern.  Pollution  of  air  and  water,  upsetting  the  balance  of  nature — 
these  are  not  only  local  problems,  and  not  only  national  problems,  but  matters 
that  affect  the  basic  relationships  of  man  to  his  planet. 


25  Caryl  P.  Haskins.  "Technology,  Science,  and  American  Foreign  Policy."  Foreign 
Affairs  (January  1962),  p.  239. 

26  Herman  Pollack.  "Science,  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  State  Department."  Address  at 
the  University  of  Illinois  Centennial  Colloquium  on  Science  and  Human  Affairs,  May  17, 
1967,  by  Herman  Pollack,  then  Acting  Director,  International  Scientific  and  Technological 
Affairs,  Department  of  State.  Reprinted  from  Department  of  State  Bulletin,  June  19, 
1967.  In  "Science,  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  State  Department,"  Reprint.  Department  of 
State  Publication  8204  (July  1967),  p.  3. 

27  l\S.  President  (Richard  Nixon),  United  States  Foreign  Policy  for  the  1970's:  A  New 
Strategy  for  Peace.  A  Report  by  President  Richard  Nixon  to  the  Congress,  February  18, 
1970.  Released  from  Office  of  the  White  House  Press  Secretary,  Mimeo  (February  18, 
1970),  pp.  7,  106,  110-111. 


18 

The  United  Nations  already  is  planning  a  conference  on  the  environment  in 
1972.  I  pledge  the  strongest  support  of  the  United  States  for  that  effort.  I  hope 
that  even  before  then  we  can  launch  new  national  and  international  initiatives 
toward  restoring  the  balance  of  nature  and  maintaining  our  world  as  a  healthy 
and  hospitable  place  for  man. 

Of  all  man's  great  enterprises,  none  lends  itself  more  logically  or  more  eom- 
pellingly  to  international  cooperation  than  the  venture  into  space.  *  *  *  We  are 
just  beginning  to  comprehend  the  benefits  that  space  technology  can  yield  here  on 
earth.  And  the  potential  is  enormous. 

For  example,  we  now  are  developing  earth  resource  survey  satellites,  with  the 
first  experimental  satellite  to  be  launched  sometime  early  in  the  decade  of  the 
seventies. 

Present  indications  are  that  these  satellites  should  be  capable  of  yielding  data 
which  could  assist  in  as  widely  varied  tasks  as  these :  the  location  of  schools  of 
fish  in  the  oceans,  the  location  of  mineral  deposits  on  land,  and  the  health  of  agri- 
cultural crops.  *  *  *  We  shall  be  putting  several  proposals  in  this  respect  before 
the  United  Nations.28 

Columnist  James  Reston  epitomized  the  matter :  "The  New  Science 
has  created  a  New  Diplomacy."  29 

In  summary,  science  and  technology  have  effected  changes  in  the 
substantive  tasks  of  foreign  policy,  in  the  methodology  of  diplomacy, 
in  the  management  of  information  on  which  diplomacy  is  based,  in  the 
intellectual  training  of  diplomats,  in  the  range  of  present  options  of 
negotiators,  and  in  the  prospects  for  future  evolution  of  diplomacy, 
foreign  policy  objectives,  and  the  international  political  system. 
Science  and  technology  cannot  be  mere  disciplines  added  to  the  cur- 
riculum of  Foreign  Service  Officers,  or  services  to  be  rendered  by  an 
appointed  officer  or  unit  of  country  teams.  On  the  contrary,  they  are 
an  essential  and  major  ingredient  of  many  aspects  of  foreign  policy, 
diplomatic  relations,  and  international  behavior.  The  need  is  clearly 
evident  for  improved  understanding  of  the  underlying  and  future 
significance  of  scientific  and  technological  developments  and  their 
relation  to  basic  patterns  in  the  formulation  and  conduct  of  interna- 
tional policy. 

Accordingly,  Chairman  Clement  J.  Zablocki  of  the  House  Commit- 
tee on  International  Relations  and  its  Subcommittee  on  International 
Security  and  Scientific  Affairs  (acting  as  chairman  of  the  latter,  then 
named  the  Subcommittee  on  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific 
Developments) ,  in  a  letter  of  September  1969  to  the  Director  of  the 
Legislative  Service,  called  for  this  study  in  the  following  terms: 

Hearings  held  by  the  Sul)eommittee  on  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific 
Developments  during  the  past  year  while  I  have  been  Chairman  have  convinced 
me  of  the  pressing  need  for  greater  coordination  between  science  and  diplomacy 
if  the  United  States  is  to  conduct  a  successful  foreign  policy.  Time  after  time  the 
Subcommittee  has  been  told  of  scientific  and  technological  developments  with 
significant  international  ramifications,  for  which  little  or  no  policy  planning 
has  been  done. 

The  current  conditions  cannot  continue  if  the  United  States  is  to  maintain  a 
posture  of  resi>onsible  leadership  in  international  affairs.  We  must  begin  to 
do  the  hard  thinking  necessary  to  bring  our  technical  abilities  and  our  diplomatic 
skills  into  concert. 


28  U.S.  President  (Richard  Nixon).  "Strengthening  the  Total  Fabric  of  Pence."  Address 
made  before  the  "4th  session  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  at  the  United  Nations,  NY., 
on  Sept.   18,   1!m;9.  Department  of  State  Bulletin   (October  C,  1969),  p.  301. 

™New  York  Times  (Sunday,  Dec.  13,  1964),  p.  8E. 


19 

Definitions  of  Terms 

1.  Science  and  Technology 

Every  study  that  treats  of  the  interactions  of  science  or  technology 
with  culture  encounters  the  same  problem  of  characterizing  the  various 
descriptive  terms  relating  to  science  and  its  exploitation.  In  an  earlier 
study  by  the  Legislative  Reference  Service,  an  effort  was  made  to 
clarify  the  relationship  of  basic  and  applied  research  with  technology. 
The  concept  expressed  there  was  that  basic  research  has  as  its  goal  the 
discovery  of  facts  about  nature.  It  was  structured  into  such  disciplines 
as  physics,  chemistry,  biology,  and  astronomy;  into  such  subdisci- 
plines  as  solid  state  physics,  inorganic  chemistry,  and  solar  astronomy ; 
and  into  such  integrating  disciplines  as  physical  chemistry,  astro- 
physics, and  ecology. 

Applied  research  was  defined  as  the  use  of  information  about  nature, 
derived  from  basic  research,  and  employed  to  make  feasible  some 
social  goal  or  to  create  new  technological  options  for  man.  It  was 
structured  in  two  ways:  (1)  into  loose  categories  of  like  fields  or  sub- 
ject disciplines,  such  as  meteorology,  metallurgy,  electronics,  agron- 
omy; these  overlapped  with  (2)  subject  categories  suggesting  purpose 
or  mission,  such  as  transportation,  communications,  materials,  and 
standards.  All  goals  of  applied  research  were  observed  to  aim  at  a 
single  overriding  objective,  which  was  to  develop  ways  to  improve 
man's  compatibility  with  his  environment. 

The  products  of  applied  research  are  thus  options  which  man  can 
exploit  by  means  of  technology.  Broadly,  these  options  appear  to  fall 
into  four  categories  of  technology,  as  follows: 

1.  Physical  modification  of  man. — An  improvement  in  the 
feasibility  of  man's  capability  to  adapt  himself  to  his  environment 
by  physical  changes  of  his  own  structure. 

2.  Application  of  natural  resources. — An  improvement  in  the 
feasibility  of  man's  exploitation  of  the  resources  of  nature  to 
change  the  physical  environment  to  render  it  more  compatible 
with  man. 

3.  Environmental  restoration. — An  improvement  in  the  feasi- 
bility of  corrective  actions  to  restore  the  physical  environment  by 
reversing  impairments  wrought  by  man  or  by  natural  forces. 

4.  The,  social  environment. — An  improvement  in  the  feasibility 
of  actions  by  man  to  enhance  his  compatibility  as  an  element  of 
the  changing  social/human  environment.30 

In  this  concept,  the  effects  of  basic  science  take  the  form  of  con- 
tributions to  culture — an  appreciation  of  the  universe  of  man  in  all 
its  natural  laws  and  relationships.  The  effects  of  applied  research  are 

30  U.S.  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics.  Technical  Information 
for  Congress.  Report  to  the  Subcommittee  on  Science,  Research,  and  Development  of  the 
*  *  *  Prepared  by  the  Science  Policy  Research  Division,  Legislative  Reference  Service, 
Library  of  Congress,  April  25,  1969.  House  Document  No.  91-137,  91st  Congress,  first  ses- 
sion. (Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1969).  p.  11.  For  a  more  extended 
definition  of  the  terms  "basic  research,"  "applied  research,"  and  "technology,"  see  :  U.S. 
Congress.  House.  Committee  on  Science  and  Technology.  Science  Policy  :  A  Working  Glos- 
sary [Third  Edition — 197-6],  Prepared  for  the  Subcommittee  on  Science,  Research  and 
Technology  by  the  Science  Policy  Research  Division,  Congressional  Research  Service, 
Librarv  of  Congress,  March  1976.  (Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Com- 
mittee print.)  pp.  56,  57,  82. 


20 

opportunities.  Only  in  technology  does  the  system  of  science  make 
tangible  and  material  impacts  upon  human  affairs.  Technology  is 
thus  the  cutting  edge  of  science,  the  point  at  which  economic  and 
political  decisions  are  required,  as  to  whether  an  innovation  is  com- 
patible with  the  needs  and  limitations  of  society.  Basic  science  can 
reveal  information  about  the  passage  of  pure  water  through  a  mem- 
brane; applied  science  can  develop  information  as  to  which  mem- 
branes work  best  to  separate  water  from  dissolved  salts;  technology 
provides  a  desalting  plant. 

The  relationship  of  technology  to  domestic  and  foreign  affairs  is 
limitless.  It  encompasses  almost  all  forms  of  foreign  aid,  military 
hardware,  arms  control,  the  extraction  of  minerals,  agricultural  tech- 
nology, transportation  and  communications  systems,  exploitation  of 
the  seas  and  the  ocean  floor.  It  raises  questions  as  to  the  reshaping 
of  social  institutions  to  accommodate  new  capabilities  of  man,  whether 
to  feed  his  expanding  numbers  by  the  "Green  Revolution"  or  to  achieve 
peace  through  "balance  of  terror."  Industrial  production  and  gross 
national  product  are  only  two  of  many  measures  of  the  application  of 
technology;  others  are  the  satisfaction  man  can  take  from  his  control 
or  his  preservation  of  his  own  environment. 

Almost  all  forms  of  technology  pass  over  international  boundaries. 
The  beneficial  effects  are  eagerly  sought  in  East  and  West.  Moreover, 
the  sometimes  adverse  second-order  consequences  of  technology  (such 
as  pollution,  noise,  risk  of  accident,  and  the  like)  are  felt  in  all  countries 
where  technology  takes  root.  As  with  science,  the  interest  in  technology 
is  international,  and  diplomatic  concern  is  warranted  for  both  its 
benefits  and  its  costs. 

2.  Diplomacy 

The  word  diplomacy  in  this  study  stands  for  the  broad  function  of 
making  and  carrying  out  foreign  policy,  and  the  word  diplomat  is  used 
for  a  person  engaged  in  this  function.  While  scientists  may  sometimes 
be  diplomats,  in  this  study  the  term  will  be  used  to  identify  those 
whose  primary  training,  interest,  and  work  is  in  international  political 
problems  as  apart  from  scientific  or  technological  problems.  It  includes 
not  only  those  who  negotiate  with  other  nations  directly  but  also 
participants  in  the  foreign  policy  making  machinery  within  the  United 
States. 

The  background  of  diplomats,  in  this  sense  of  the  word,  may  be 
quite  varied.  The  preparation  for  a  traditional  diplomatic  career  in 
the  Foreign  Service  has  been  a  liberal  arts  education,  with  much  of  the 
specific  knowledge  and  skills  acquired  through  experience  in  the  State 
Department  or  at  posts  abroad,  supplemented  by  brief  courses  at  the 
Foreign  Service  Institute.  However,  many  who  are  engaged  in  the 
political  and  economic  aspects  of  foreign  policy  are  not  in  the  Foreign 
Service  and  have  never  served  abroad.  They  may  be  generalists  or 
specialists  in  some  geographic  area  or  functional  field,  and  some — 
including  the  President,  many  ambassadors,  heads  of  agencies,  and 
.Members  of  Congress — may  have  achieved  their  influential  positions 
in  the  making  of  foreign  policy  primarily  because  they  were  active  in 
politics,  lather  than  because  of  their  academic  background  or  expert- 
ness  in  any  international  activity. 


21 

The  Context  of  the  Study 

1.  The  /Structure  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy  Formulation 

The  classical  method  of  the  conduct  of  international  relations  by  the 
United  States  as  well  as  other  nations  was  through  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives stationed  in  national  capitals.  The  President  was  in  charge 
of  the  dealings  with  other  countries,  assisted  primarily  by  the  Secretary 
and  Department  of  State.  From  the  beginning,  however,  the  making  of 
foreign  policy  in  the  United  States  has  not  been  a  simple  matter  of 
information  and  decisions  flowing  up  and  down  a  chain  of  command 
within  the  Executive  Branch.  In  establishing  a  democratic  republic, 
the  drafters  of  the  Constitution  built  checks  and  balances  into  the 
system  of  making  foreign  policy  as  well  as  into  other  areas.  Senatorial 
approval  was  made  a  requirement  for  all  treaties  and  appointments 
of  ambassadors.  Congress  as  a  whole  was  given  several  major  powers 
directly  related  to  foreign  policy,  such  as  the  power  to  declare  war,  to 
raise  and  support  armies  and  to  provide  and  maintain  a  navy,  and  to 
regulate  foreign  commerce,  as  well  as  the  responsibility  for  making  all 
laws  and  appropriating  funds.  The  people  of  the  United  States  could 
also  make  their  voice  heard  through  communications  and  elections 
and  thus  were  an  important  factor. 

As  profound  technological  and  political  changes  occurred  in  the 
middle  of  the  twentieth  century  and  the  United  States  increased  its 
participation  and  leadership  in  world  affairs,  the  conduct  of  Ameri- 
can diplomacy  became  far  more  complex.  New  agencies  such  as  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency,  the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency,  and  the  U.S.  Information  Agency,  were  established  to  cope 
with  specific  problems  or  handle  special  programs  in  the  foreign 
affairs  field.  Older  agencies  such  as  the  Department  of  Agriculture, 
the  Department  of  Commerce,  and  the  defense  establishment  found 
themselves  increasingly  involved  in  foreign  affairs.  The  National 
Security  Council  and  other  groups  were  formed  to  help  advise  the 
President  or  to  coordinate  activities  relating  to  foreign  affairs  spread 
throughout  the  Government. 

Official  contacts  with  foreign  governments  were  no  longer  made 
almost  entirely  through  ambassadors  and  other  members  of  the  foreign 
service.  Large  numbers  of  Americans  traveled  abroad  in  a  wide 
variety  of  capacities,  and  an  increasing  number  of  foreign  visitors 
came  to  the  United  States.  Membership  in  numerous  international 
organizations,  such  as  the  United  Nations,  made  multilateral  diplo- 
macy increase  vastly  in  importance.  Rapid  transportation  facilitated 
meetings  between  chiefs  of  state  and  other  high  government  officials, 
and  instantaneous  communication  made  it  possible  for  messages  of 
foreign  policy  importance  to  be  carried  directly  between  both  the  lead- 
ers and  the  people  of  different  nations  outside  of  traditional  diplomatic 
channels.  Diplomacy,  once  the  narrow  task  of  a  few  high  officials  and 
a  select  few  in  the  Foreign  Service,  expanded  into  a  broad  effort 
involving  a  large  part  of  the  Government  as  a  whole. 

2.  Goals  of  American  Foreign  Policy 

Before  taking  up  the  question  as  to  the  place  of  science  and  tech- 
nology in  advancing  the  goals  of  American  diplomacy,  it  may  be 


22 

useful  to  explore  some  relevant  goals  of  American  foreign  policy. 
There  are  overall  goals,  variously  expressed,  of  American  foreign 
policv  toward  which  all  foreign  policy  actions  are  more  or  less  directed, 
but  they  may  seem  too  vague  or  Utopian  to  be  helpful.  While  there  is 
no  single  document  accepted  by  all  Americans  as  the  official  declara- 
tion of  foreign  policy  goals,  there  is  a  consensus  on  what  the  ultimate 
goals  are.  These  might  be  summarized  as  a  world  of  peace  and  freedom, 
or  a  peaceful  world  order  in  which  justice  and  freedom  prevail,  or  a 
world  in  which  the  United  States  may  exist  in  peace  and  security. 

Within  these  broad  goals  there  are  more  specific  objectives.  The 
promotion  Qf  mutual  understanding  and  friendly  relations,  further 
progress  toward  a  sound  and  expanding  world  economy,  the  wider 
application  of  international  law,  the  reduction  and  control  of  arma- 
ments and  the  building  of  collective  security  systems,  for  example,  are 
objectives  through  which  the  United  States  is  seeking  to  attain  a 
world  of  peace  and  freedom.  These  objectives  in  turn  may  be  broken 
down  into  still  more  specific  components  such  as,  in  the  case  of  the 
reduction  and  control  of  armaments,  regulation  of  the  military  use 
of  the  ocean  bed  or  outer  space.  Defining  foreign  policy  goals  in  each 
case  will  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  process  of  determining  how  science 
and  foreign  policy  are  interrelated.  Among  the  questions  which  might 
be  asked  are:  To  what  degree  are  the  goals  of  science  and  foreign 
policy  in  specific  cases  the  same  or  different  ?  Who  formulates  the  goals 
in  each  case?  Can  foreign  policy  goals  be  as  clear  as  scientific  goals? 
How  are  priorities  determined  when  there  is  conflict  between  a  scien- 
tific goal  and  a  foreign  policy  goal,  or  between  different  foreign  policy 
objectives  when  science  and  technology  can  be  applied  to  strengthen 
one  or  the  other? 
3.  The  Growing  Importance  of  Science  and  Technology  in  U.S.  Culture 

The  importance  of  basic  science  for  technological  advance  is  well 
established:  it  provides  essential  new  information  and  ideas,  training 
in  underlying  principles  and  new  concepts  of  hardware,  laboratory 
skills,  and  an  attitude  of  receptivity  of  innovation.  In  the  long  run, 
the  disclosures  of  basic  scientific  research  may  be  the  most  momentous 
factor  in  social  change,  and  political  decisions  concerning  the  support 
of  this  research  may  be  of  the  highest  consequence.  However,  the 
effects  on  society  of  technology  are  more  obvious  and  immediate  than 
those  of  science. 

Agricultural  technology  in  this  century  has  brought  farm  families 
down  from  50  percent  to  less  than  5  percent  of  the  population  while 
cultivated  land  shrank  and  production  rose.  The  application  of  tech- 
nology to  personal  transportation  brought  into  being  the  dominant 
industry  in  the  Nation,  restructured  the  city  and  altered  the  social 
role  and  values  of  the  family.  Public  health,  medical  drugs,  and  pesti- 
cides have  enabled  a  worldwide  increase  in  populations,  raising  life 
expectancy  almost  everywhere.  Communication  technology  has 
spawned  business  enterprises  extending  into  many  political  jurisdic- 
tions, a  large  television  industry  for  home  entertainment,  and  infor- 
mation flows  that  are  national — and  often  international — in  their 
reach.  The  coupling  of  computers  with  wire  communications  serves  as 
an  ever-increasing  part  of  the  population  with  bank  records,  billings, 


23 

and  access  to  data  bases,  giving  to  the  time-sharing  computer  network 
the  character  of  a  public  utility.  Abundant  electrical  energy  is  taken 
for  granted  in  modern  society. 

Government  concern  with  the  stimulation  of  science  and  the  uses  of 
technology  has  greatly  intensified  in  the  Twentieth  Century.  Basic 
scientific  research,  mainly  in  the  universities,  relies  to  a  large  extent 
on  Government  sponsorship.  In  fields  of  applied  science  and  techno- 
logical development,  virtually  every  agency  of  Government  has  found 
some  role  to  play.  For  many  well-established  technologies,  Govern- 
ment regulation  has  been  found  necessary,  such  as  with  rail  and  air 
transport,  electric  power,  radio,  and  pharmaceutical  preparations.  An- 
other main  interest  of  Government  is  in  the  stimulation  of  new  tech- 
nologies; specific  technological  tasks  have  been  widely  assigned  within 
the  Government,  such  as  weather  modification,  water  desalting,  coal 
utilization,  helium  conservation,  weather  satellites,  highway  construc- 
tion, high-speed  trains,  rapid  excavation,  communications  satellites, 
and  marine  resources  exploitation. 

On  the  other  hand,  defects  or  "second-order  consequences''  of  mod- 
ern technology  are  receiving  increasing  public  attention  and  present  a 
challenge  to  engineers  to  reduce  the  adverse  effects  of  their  innova- 
tions. Modern  issues  center  on  pollution  of  the  air ;  pollution  of  streams, 
oceans,  and  ground  water;  the  spread  of  pesticides;  eutrophication  of 
lakes ;  disposal  of  solid  wastes ;  the  effects  of  noise ;  toxic  chemicals  in 
general  public  use;  the  information  explosion;  invasion  of  personal 
privacy ;  the  hazards  of  radiation ;  the  upsetting  of  the  ecological  bal- 
ance ;  automobile  unsafety ;  and,  currently,  the  complex  problems 
created  by  a  growing  energy  shortage  relative  to  a  dynamically  ex- 
panding pattern  of  energy  utilization. 

Cogent  description  of  the  organization  of  scientists  and  engineers 
is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  study.  The  disciplines  of  science  are  prac- 
ticed in  the  universities  and  foundations,  in  some  Government  labora- 
tories, and  to  a  degree  in  private,  industry.  Organizations  of  scientists, 
mainly  to  exchange  and  disseminate  information,  are  largely  by  dis- 
ciplines, although  interdisciplinary  academies  of  sciences  are  active  in 
many  regions.  A  large  and  loose  federation  of  scientists  and  scientific 
societies  exists  in  the  American  Association  for  the  Advancement  of 
Science.  A  more  formal  interface  between  science  and  Government  is 
provided  by  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences,  which  has  access  to  all 
scientific  and  technical  societies  through  the  medium  of  the  National 
Research  Council.  Contact  of  U.S.  scientists  with  those  abroad  takes 
many  routes:  direct  person-to-person  communication,  through  the 
Scientific  Unions,  and  through  scientific  groups  under  the  aegis  of  the 
United  Nations,  among  others. 

Organization  of  technologies  is  still  further  diversified.  Technical 
societies,  along  roughly  disciplinary  lines,  abound — such  as  the  Ameri- 
can Society  for  Metals,  the  Society  of  Plastics  Engineers,  and  the  In- 
stitute of  Electrical  and  Electronic  Engineers.  Other  technological 
societies  have  been  formed  along  "mission"  lines,  such  as  the  American 
Institute  of  Aeronautics  and  Astronautics,  American  Ordnance  Asso- 
ciation, and  the  American  National  Standards  Institute.  Since  tech- 
nology is  a  major  activity  in  most  private  industrial  corporations,  its 


24 

concerns  interlock  with  the  economic  interests  of  the  business  com- 
munity generally.  The  increasing  use  of  technology  to  support  Govern- 
ment programs  has  brought  many  agencies  into  direct  working  con- 
tact with  the  complex  private  networks  of  technologists. 

Since  military  programs  absorb  the  bulk  of  governmental  invest- 
ment in  technology,  the  organizational  consequences  are  profound; 
they  include: 
— The  evolution  of  a  "military-industrial  complex*'  with  specialized 

capabilities  and  needs ; 
— The  development  of  "systems  techniques''  to  make  possible  the 
design  and  construction  of  advanced  military  weaponry  of  great 
cost,  complexity,  and  sophistication ; 
— The  evolution  of  numerous  "think  tanks''  using  mathematical  and 
other   analytical   techniques   to   forecast   requirements,   develop 
weapons  concepts,  examine  alternative  solutions  to  problems,  and 
evaluate  progress. 
The  technologists  also  have  their  more  formal  point  of  contact  with 
the  Government  through  the  offices  of  the  National  Academy  of  En- 
gineering, which  shares  with  the  Academy  of  Sciences  the  facilities 
and  resources  of  the  National  Research  Council. 

4,.  Policy  Formulation  in  Science  and  Technology 

A  study  of  "American  science  policy"  by  Wallace  S.  Say  re,  some 

years  ago,  concluded  that  it  was  fragmented  and  unsystematic  and 

perhaps  necessarily  so.  He  wrote : 

Unity  and  comprehensiveness  are  *  *  *  not  likely  to  be  the  hallmarks  of 
American  science  policy.  Talk  of  a  single,  comprehensive  "American  science 
policy"  has  an  essentially  fictitious  quality.  There  will  be  many  science  policies, 
rather  than  a  master  science  policy.  Diversity,  inconsistency,  compromise,  experi- 
mentation, pulling  and  hauling,  competition,  and  continuous  revision  in  science 
policies  are  more  predictable  continuing  characteristics  than  their  antonyms. 
This  has  been  the  history  of  American  science  policies  and  this  describes  their 
present  state  of  affairs  as  deplorable.  But  to  live  with  diversity  and  accommoda- 
tions of  policy,  and  yet  to  be  impatient  of  them,  may  be  the  process  by  which  a 
democratic  society  achieves  progress  in  science  as  well  as  in  other  fields.  In  any 
event,  the  future  seems  to  offer  American  scientists  more  dilemmas  than  un- 
equivocal answers  in  science  policy.31 

More  recently,  a  study  by  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co- 
operation and  Development,  in  its  "Reviews  of  National  Science 
Policy"  series,  concluded  similarly,  although  its  view  of  science  in- 
corporated both  research  and  development.  Said  the  OECD  report: 

The  vast  research  and  development  enterprise,  as  it  exists  today  [in  the  United 
States],  does  not,  therefore  spring  from  a  deliberate,  coordinated  endeavor  to 
make  the  most  of  the  country's  potential  resources,  but  rather  from  scattered 
initiatives,  taken  in  haste  to  meet  an  emergency  and  prolonged  by  limited  pro- 
grammes. In  many  instances,  the  mobilisation  of  men  and  institutions  and  the 
establishment  of  the  necessary  framework  of  political  structures,  have  been 
improvised  ad  hoc,  as  and  when  the  needs  dictated  by  the  international  situation 
have  been  recognised.  The  goal  of  the  United  States,  asserted  since  the  Second 
World  War,  has  now  become  the  maintenance  and  strengthening  of  its  political, 
economic,  scientific  and  technical  leadership.  *  *  * 


n  Wallace  8.  Bayre.  "Scientists  and  American  Science  Policy."  ( Reprinted  from  Science. 
Vol.  133,  Nil  3456,  March  24,  1961,  pp.  859  864.)  /"  Bernard  Barber  and  Walter  Hlrscb; 
eds.  The  Sociology  of  Science.  (New  York.  The  Free  Press  of  Qlencoe,  1002),  p.  602.  How- 
ever, by  Title  I,  "National  Science.  Engineering,  and  Technological  Policy  and  Priorities", 
of  P.L.  94  2S2.  approved  May  11.  1!>7»>.  the  Congress  undertook  to  reverse  the  position 
taken  by  Sayre  toward  a  "master"  science  policy. 


25 

The  Federal  Government  has  thus  come  to  look  upon  the  scientific  and  tech- 
nical effort  as  a  valuable  instrument  for  achieving  its  political  aims  and  it  has 
been  led  to  assume  primary  responsibility  for  the  development  and  success  of 
this  undertaking.8" 

With  respect  to  the  organization  of  policy  institutions  within  the 
Federal  Government  to  effect  this  general  aspiration,  the  OECD 
report  noted  that  there  was  a  "plurality  of  institutions"  without  an 
overall  plan.  It  said : 

The  Executive  and  the  Legislature  have  each  laboured  in  their  own  field  to 
develop  the  scientific  enterprise.  They  have  done  so  in  the  light  of  their  own 
concrete  problems,  of  defense  or  national  security,  of  the  country's  prestige  or 
its  internal  affairs.  Their  concerns  have  not  always  been  identical,  and  the  priori- 
ties adopted  by  the  one  have  not  always  commended  themselves  to  the  other. 
These  different  wills,  though  very  often  complementary,  partly  explain  the 
institutional  diversity  of  the  Federal  science  policy  mechanism. 

This  Federal  mechanism  thus  embodies  two  sets  of  bodies.  The  first  forms  part 
of  the  inner  workings  of  the  Presidency,  and  especially  of  the  Executive  Office, 
which  takes  a  direct  part  in  preparing  the  decisions  of  the  President.  The  second 
originates  in  the  structure  of  Congress  itself,  which  has  equipped  itself  with 
specialised  bodies  to  carry  out  its  mission  of  keeping  a  watch  on  the  Administra- 
tion and  enforcing  its  own  priorities.  The  two  groups  are  engaged  in  a  continuous 
dialogue  on  the  methods,  means,  and  aims  of  the  scientific  enterprise.33 

Although  national  science  policy  is  a  diffused  responsibility,  the 
policy  regarding  technology  is  much  more  so.  The  exploitation  of 
technology  is  the  business  of  most  private  companies,  and  is  involved 
in  the  programs  of  nearly  every  agency  of  Government.  Accordingly, 
almost  every  committee  of  Congress  encounters  technological  issues 
at  some  time.  Technology  is  the  physical  means  to  many  national 
ends.  Political  leaders  in  the  Congress  and  in  the  executive  branch  tend 
to  look  to  the.  capabilities  of  technology — with  its  support  in  the  more 
basic  sciences — to  wipe  out  disease,  achieve  military  security,  extend 
man's  life,  control  the  numbers  of  his  progeny,  eliminate  the  hazards 
of  accident  and  environmental  degradation,  insure  economic  growth 
and  stability,  erase  pockets  of  poverty,  expand  the  utility  of  leisure 
time,  explore  and  utilize  the  oceans  and  outer  space,  and  perpetuate 
the  resource  base  needed  to  feed,  clothe,  house,  and  equip  man  for 
safety,  comfort,  and  happiness. 

5.  Scientific  and  Technological  Elements  in  International  Relations 

Science  and  technology  are  both  a  part  of  the  substance  of  inter- 
national relations  and  an  influence  on  the  processes  of  international 
relations;  they  create  objectives,  influence  the  environment  surround- 
ing and  conditioning  issues,  and  open  up  future  prospects  for  signifi- 
cant further  change  that  the  process  and  conditions  of  diplomacy 
must  accommodate. 

Substantively,  science  and  technology  create  opportunities  and 
problems  in  the  achievement  of  diplomatic  goals,  and  sometimes 
both  together.  In  the  exploitation  of  the  seabed,  for  example,  science 
and  technology  provide  stimulus  for  global  research  and  cooperative 
developmental  ventures  in  a  traditionally  international  environment, 
and  problems  concerning  soverign  jurisdiction  of  new  "territory."  The 
global  spread  of  such  polluting  materials  as  DDT,  radioactive  wastes, 
and  the  lead  additive  in  hydrocarbon  fuels,  result  from  expanded 

32  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-Operation  and  Development.  "Reviews  of  National 
Science  Policy:  United  States."  (Paris,  OECD  Publications,  March  1968),  pp.  23,  25. 

33  Ibid.,  p.  62. 


26 

opportunity  in  agricultural  production,  energy  generation,  and  human 
mobility.  However,  their  second-order  effects  as  global  pollutants  have 
begun  to  motivate  concerted  action  among  nations  to  preserve  and 
restore  the  world's  natural  environment.  Science  and  technology  are 
called  upon  to  contribute  to  the  solution  of  such  human  problems  as 
the  worsening  food/population  balance,  the  "information  explosion." 
and  the  worldwide  problem  of  water  resource  management.  Science 
and  technology  have  generated  such  diplomatic  problems  as  the  control 
of  atomic  weaponry  and  radiation,  the  rapid  spread  of  diseases  vec- 
tored by  modern  aircraft  transportation,  and  the  occurrence  of  crises 
resulting  from  the  instant  global  communication  made  possible  by 
modern  electronics. 

Science  and  diplomacy  are  intertwined  in  many  other  ways.  The 
multiplication  of  such  global  science  programs  as  the  International 
Geophysical  Year,  World  Weather  Watch,  and  the  International  Bio- 
logical Program,  invariably  have  their  diplomatic  aspects.  The  IGY, 
for  example,  led  a  chain  of  events  that  included  the  Antarctic  Treaty, 
progress  in  the  use  of  satellites  for  space  exploration,  and  the  "Treaty 
Banning  Nuclear  Weapons  Tests  in  the  Atmosphere,  in  Outer  Space, 
and  Under  Water."  The  travel  of  scientists  to  frequent  international 
meetings,  or  personal  consultation,  or  research  abroad,  increases  the 
need  for  services  by  the  Department  of  State  to  help  and  support 
American  scientists  in  these  activities.  Scientists  themselves  participate 
in  unofficial,  exploratory  investigations  of  possible  future  diplomatic 
opportunities,  in  such  ventures  as  the  "Pugwash  Conferences.''  All 
these  international  contacts  among  scientists  and  engineers  are  difficult 
to  evaluate  as  to  their  diplomatic  consequences,  but  they  are  cerrainly 
significant. 

The  methods  of  science  and  technology  also  offer  support  for  the 
conduct  of  diplomacy  in  the  analysis  and  solution  of  international 
problems.  Investment  in  research  is  a  continuing  function  of  the  U.S. 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency,  for  example.  The  factfind- 
ing and  hypothesis-testing  methods  of  science  have  been  advanced  as 
offering  possible  methodologies  for  the  study  of  strategy,  decisionmak- 
ing, and  information  dissemination.  Engineering  techniques  are  com- 
ing into  use  in  the  establishment  and  achievement  of  goals  in  foreign 
aid  and  communications  management.  The  use  of  cybernetics,  systems 
analysis,  and  PERT  (program  evaluation  and  review  technique) 
network  analysis  are  suggested  as  having  application  to  the  manage- 
ment of  the  huge  flow  of  diplomatic  information. 

In  view  of  the  deep  penetration  of  the  substance,  the  problems,  and 
the  methods  of  science  and  technology  into  American  diplomacy,  a 
number  of  questions  become  salient.  To  what  extent  have  the  problems 
generated  by  science  and  technology  been  assessed  by  the  institutions 
created  to  maintain  U.S.  diplomacy  \  I  low  adequately  stalled  and  sup- 
ported are  these  institutions  to  exploit  the  potent  ia lit ies  of  science  and 
technology  in  support  of  the  objectives  of  U.S.  diplomacy?  What 
problems  and  opportunities  for  the  future  are  discernible  as  a  result 
of  the  great  increase  in  the  Government  sponsorship  of  science  and 
technology?  In  what  ways  are  the  results  of  this  expanded  science  and 
technology  beneficial  for  American  diplomacy?  In  what  ways  are  the 
results  injurious,  or  potentially  so  (  And  again,  what  can  be  done  for 
the  future  \ 


27 

Formai,  Aspects  of  the  Study 

./.  Scop*  and  Lim  itations 

As  noted  earlier,  this  study  was  undertaken  at  the  request,  in  1969,  of 
the  then  Subcommittee  on  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific 
Developments  of  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  (now  the 
Subcommittee  on  International  Security  and  Scientific  Affairs  of  the 
House  International  Relations  Committee) .  Thus,  the  focus  throughout 
is  on  the  kinds  of  issues  and  outcomes  that  are  of  particular  interest 
to  the  committee  and  involve  institutional  mechanisms  or  policy  con- 
siderations particularly  amenable  to  congressional  review  and  per- 
haps action.  The  substantive  issues  chosen  for  study  are  of  importance 
in  terms  of  the  recent  past  (since  World  War  II),  and  involve  ques- 
tions in  which  some  consensus  has  already  been  reached.  Some  em- 
phasis has  been  placed  on  the  roles,  policies,  and  problems  of  U.S. 
Government  agencies  participating  in  international  scientific  and 
technological  programs,  and  of  international  organizations  (both  gov- 
ernmental and  nongovernmental)  in  which  the  United  States  partici- 
pates officially  or  nonofficially. 

Subjects  have  been  avoided  in  which  the  essence  of  the  situation  in- 
volves extensive  analysis  of  information  denied  to  the  general  public, 
although  some  classified  information  was  reviewed  for  purposes  of 
background.  Covert  international  activities,  such  as  of  the  Central  In- 
telligence Agency,  and  Department  of  Defense  international  scien- 
tific and  technological  policies  and  programs,  also  are  not  treated. 

2.  Methodology 

The  methodology  used  in  this  project  is  the  case  study  approach. 
By  examining  a  selected  set  of  cases  and  issues  illustrating  interac- 
tions of  science  and  technology  with  diplomacy,  it  may  be  possible 
to  derive  insights  for  the  Congress  on  how  to  devise  policies  and 
mechanisms  to  improve  U.S.  resources  for  the  management  of  these 
interactions. 

Use  of  the  case  study  method  enables  different  researchers  to  use 
common  and  accepted  concepts  important  in  explaining  decisionmak- 
ing, and  it  facilitates  critical  review  of  the  findings  of  each  case  by  stu- 
dents of  policymaking.  It  also  permits  the  surfacing  of  similar  ob- 
stacles, problems,  and  inefficiencies  at  the  intersections  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  and  other  institutions,  governmental  or  scientific,  with 
an  international  program  content. 

The  case  study  method,  in  this  project,  is  used  to  assess  two  kinds . 
of  interaction  of  science  and  technology  with  diplomacy ;  one  episodic 
(called  "cases"),  the  other  continuing  (called  "issues").  The  subjects 
to  be  studied  were  chosen  to  provide  an  appreciation  of  the  ways  in 
which  modern  science  and  technology  have  altered  the  environment, 
the  goals,  the  substance,  the  methodology,  the  organization,  and  the 
personnel  qualifications  of  American  diplomats.  The  choice  of  items 
for  study  has  been  guided  by  the  following  considerations : 

(a)  To  point  the  way  to  a  strengthening  of  support  of  the 
diplomatic  process  over  a  broad  spectrum  of  problems  salient 
and  meaningful  to  the  Congress ;  and 

(b)  To  demonstrate  the  workings  of  the  various  administrative 
mechanisms  that  contribute  to  diplomacy,  including  factfinding, 


28 

information  management,  communication,  problem-identification, 
problem-analysis,  policy  decisionmaking,  negotiation  and  media- 
tion, and  implementation  feed-back. 
Cases  are  defined  as  discrete,  coherent,  and  manageable  episodes 
involving  the   interaction   of   science   and   technology   with    foreign 
policy,  which  are,  or  are  capable  of  being,  encompassed  within  a  single 
program.  Interactions  of  science  and  technology  with  diplomacy  take 
many  forms.  Episodic  subjects  chosen  to  represent  these  various  inter- 
actions are  the  international  control  of  atomic  energy;  commercial 
uses  of  atomic  energy  in  Europe ;  the  Mekong  Regional  Development 
Proposal;  the  United  Nations  and  the  sea  bed;  the  International  Geo- 
physical Year;  and  United  States-Soviet  relations  and  technology 
transfer. 

The  continuing  issues  are  recurrent  international  problems  or  condi- 
tions, with  general,  long-range  goals  and  incremental  or  partial  ease- 
ments. They  are  discussed  by  the  late  Charles  O.  Lerche  in  the  follow- 
ing terms : 

Within  American  foreign  policy  today  there  are  a  number  of  "continuing 
issues."  These  are  problems  stemming  from  the  general  policy  line  the  United 
States  has  been  pursuing  that  are  peculiar  in  that  they  do  not  seem  to  permit 
of  any  final  resolution.  Each  has  been  met  often  within  the  context  of  a  given 
set  of  circumstances,  but  each  change  in  the  situational  milieu  has  required  that 
new  answers  be  given  to  the  old  questions.34 

Among  the  examples  suggested  by  Lerche  were  strategic  weaponry 
policy,  arms  control,  foreign  assistance,  trade  and  tariff  policy,  and 
psychological  factors. 

The  continuing  issues  chosen  for  intensive  analysis  in  this  study  are 
expressed  in  such  terms  as  understanding  the  evolution  and  interna- 
tional political  impacts  of  technology;  influencing  the  level  of  world 
health;  achieving  improvements  in  the  food/population  balance  on  a 
global  basis;  understanding,  evaluating,  and  redirecting  the  flow  of 
scientific  and  technical  personnel  from  one  country  to  another;  ex- 
amining the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  U.S.  Government  programs 
for  sending  U.S.  scientists  abroad;  and  improving  the  diplomatic 
skills  of  scientists  and  the  scientific  understanding  of  diplomats. 

Each  of  these  cases  and  issues  is  dealt  with  in  a  separate  chapter. 
Parts  3  and  4  of  the  study  entail  analysis  of  all  the  "issues"  and 
"cases"  to  ascertain  what  generalizations  might  be  drawn  as  to  present 
measures  and  resources  for  constructively  relating  science  or  technol- 
ogy and  American  diplomacy. 

Plan  of  the  Study 

In  general,  the  issues  selected  for  study  are  definable  but  open- 
ended,  of  a  continuing  nature.  They  Have  wide  ramifications,  and 
require  a  careful  selection  of  data  to  bring  them  into  focus.  Instead  of 
an  outcome,  they  may  reveal  a  general  tendency  or  direction.  The 
cases,  by  contrast,  are  set  in  a  shorter  time  frame.  They  tend  to 
be  more  sharply  defined  and  discrete  as  problems,  more  precise  in 
scope,  with  some  more  measurable  consequences.  For  the  most  part 
they  are  essentially  resolved  as  to  their  outcome. 

**  Charles  0.  Lerche,  Foreign  Policy  of  the  American  People.  Third  Edition.  (Englewood 
Cliffs,  Prentice-Hall,  Inc.,  1U07),  p.  223, 


29 

1.  Criteria  for  the  Selection  of  Issues 

The  specific  criteria  to  be  satisfied  by  each  subject  for  study,  as  estab- 
lished at  the  outset,  are  four  in  number.  First.  The  subject  should  be 
of  substantial  moment,  and  be  regarded  as  such.  Second.  The  subject 
should  have  a  significant  technical  content,  so  that  it  involves  a  prob- 
lem of  communication  between  the  expert  in  the  field  and  the  gen- 
eralist  concerned  with  the  diplomatic  implications.  Third.  The  prob- 
lem should  involve  some  aspect  of  "science  in  policy"  or  "policy  in 
science" ;  that  is,  it  should  deal  with  the  application  of  science  or  tech- 
nology to  advance  some  international  policy  of  the  United  States,  or 
it  should  deal  with  some  way  in  which  U.S.  science  or  technology  is 
sought  to  be  strengthened  by  diplomatic  action.  Fourth.  The  subject 
should  have  had  sufficient  continuity  and  persistence  as  a  problem  be- 
fore the  diplomatic  community  to  enable  observation  of  changes  that 
have  occurred  as  a  result  of  national  action. 

2.  Format  for  the  Exposition  of  Issues 

An  effort  was  made  to  achieve  some  degree  of  uniformity  in  the 
organization  of  the  various  chapters  on  issues.  The  format  adhered  to, 
as  planned  at  the  beginning  of  the  project,  is  in  general  the  following: 

(a)  Definition  of  the  issue  to  be  studied ; 

(b)  Significance  of  the  issue  in  present  and  future  contexts; 

(c)  How  the  issue  developed; 

(d)  U.S.  involvement  in  the  issue; 

(e)  Congressional  concern  with  the  issue; 

(/)   Formulation  of  policy  to  influence  the  issue; 
(g)   Options  available  to  the  policymakers  and  prospects  for 
the  future ;  and 

(h)  Further  questions  posed  by  the  issue. 
Although  consistency  in  treatment  is  advantageous,  both  for  con- 
venience in  reading  and  for  ease  in  subsequent  comparison  and  analy- 
sis of  cases,  nevertheless  variation  has  been  unavoidable.  Respect  for 
the  subject  matter  as  well  as  independent  authorship  has  inevitably 
compelled  some  degree  of  departure  from  a  superimposed  outline. 

3.  Illustrative  Questions  Researched 

In  developing  the  individual  discussion  of  the  issues  to  be  re- 
ported on,  attention  was  given  to  such  questions  as  the  following: 

(a)  In  what  different  ways  has  the  issue  been  characterized?  What 
conflicts  arise  out  of  different  perceptions  of  it?  Is  there  some  kind  of 
time  frame  in  which  these  different  perceptions  predominate? 

(b)  What  is  the  place  of  the  issue  in  the  general  matrix  of  foreign 
policy?  What  priority  of  attention  has  been  assigned  to  it  at  different 
times? 

(c)  What  are  the  significant  interactions  of  the  issue  in  question 
with  other  policy  elements?  Does  it  benefit  or  threaten  other  national 
policies  or  programs  ? 

(d)  Has  response  to  need  been  comprehensive  or  incremental?  Is 
the  effort  mounted  to  influence  the  issue  a  powerful  and  motivated 
national  effort,  or  is  it  being  tackled  bit  by  bit  ? 

(e)  Has  a  clear  and  positive  U.S.  policy  been  evolved  respecting  the 
issue?  What  is  its  place  in  the  general  structure  of  foreign  policy? 

(/)  Has  a  technically  sophisticated  mechanism  been  developed  for 
choosing  among  alternative  courses  or  options  in  achieving  progress 


30 

in  the  problem  ?  Has  the  scientific-technological  community  been  en- 
listed in  the  development  of  a  program?  What  does  the  literature  of 
this  community  say  about  the  way  the  program  has  been  developed, 
and  about  its  outcome  ? 

(g)  What  interactions  have  occurred  between  the  United  States  and 
multinational  bodies,  or  foreign  countries,  in  respect  to  the  issue? 
What  is  the  documentation  of  international  conversations?  What  sort 
of  joint  action  has  been  found  feasible?  What  degree  of  understanding 
as  to  methods  and  expected  results  ? 

If..  Enumeration  of  the  Issues 

Six  issues  were  chosen  for  study.  They  are  as  follows : 

(1)  Evolution  of  international  technology. — A  review  of  the  emer- 
gence of  technology  as  a  factor  of  change  in  international  relations. 
Under  this  heading  are  considered  such  factors  as :  The  growing  aware- 
ness of  the  relevance  of  technology  for  diplomacy ;  the  practical  separa- 
tion of  technology  from  science ;  the  relations  between  the  international 
exchange  of  technology  and  governmental  and  economic  forms  of 
social  organization;  problems  of  technological  transfer  (from  whom, 
what,  to  whom,  and  how)  ;  U.S.  organizations  and  programs  to  exploit 
technology  for  advancement  of  foreign  policy  goals;  recruitment  and 
training;  successes;  prospects. 

(2)  World  medicine. — Long-range  consequences  of  worldwide  appli- 
cation of  medical  sciences.  Considered  under  this  heading  are  such 
factors  as:  An  overview  of  medical  advances  of  the  past  and  their 
impact  on  the  world  society,  cultural  and  medical  standards,  perspec- 
tives on  the  present  state  of  medical  knowledge,  the  dilemmas  of 
world  medicine  and  national  policy,  national  and  international  medical 
organizations  and  programs,  problems  and  prospects  for  the  future. 

(3)  Food  and  population. — A  study  of  the  changing  food/popula- 
tion balance  in  developing  countries.  Under  this  heading  will  be  con- 
sidered such  factors  as :  A  review  of  historical  evolution  of  formulation, 
coordination,  and  administration  of  U.S.  foreign  assistance  policies  to 
provide  for  adequate  food  resource  development  and  management, 
public-health  services,  stabilization  of  the  population  growth  rate, 
direct  transfer  of  American  technological  expertise,  U.S.  policies  in 
support  of  the  development  of  indigenous  E.  &  D.  capabilities  to  ad- 
dress questions  of  the  food/population  balance,  and  obstacles  (cultural, 
social,  political,  economic,  technical)  to  successful  design  and  imple- 
mentation of  U.S.  programs. 

(4)  Programs  for  sending  U.8.  scientists  and  technical  personnel 
abroad. — A  study  of  the  purposes,  scope,  accomplishments,  problems, 
and  needs  of  the  various  Federal  programs  that  sponsor  the  movement 
of  nongovernment  scientists  and  technologists.overseas  to  teach  and  to 
study. 

(5)  The  "brain  drain'''  problem-. — Occurrence,  consequences,  and 
issues  of  one-way  flows  of  scientific  manpower  (including  in  this  con- 
text the  entire  array  of  basic  and  applied  sciences  and  associated 
technologies).  Under  this  heading  are  considered:  The  development 
of  trained  scientists  at  home  and  abroad,  factors  attracting  scientists 
to  new  areas,  consequences  of  outflows  and  inflows  of  scientists,  prob- 
lems of  retention  and  use  of  scientists,  and  administration  of  the  forces 
that  influence  scientist  migrations. 


31 

(6)  Science  and  technology  in,  the  Department  of  State. — Under 
this  heading  are  considered  such  factors  as:  State  Department  organ- 
ization and  procedures  for  marshaling  science  and  technology  in  sup- 
port of  both  short-range  and  long-range  U.S.  foreign  policy  objectives, 
educational  programs  and  briefings  on  science  and  technology-  for  the 
Foreign  Service  at  home  and  abroad,  organization  of  specialists  in 
science  and  technology  within  the  Department  of  State  and  their  re- 
lations with  generalists  in  the  Department,  opportunities  and  prob- 
lems, and  prospects  for  the  future. 

5.  Criteria  for  the  Selection  of  Cases 

Being  time-oriented  and  discrete,  the  cases  are  concerned  with  op- 
erational matters  and  action  decisions,  and  with  the  consequences  of 
these.  They  afford  a  somewhat  different  outlook  from  *he  studies  of 
issues  in  the  ways  in  which  foreign  policy  is  determined  and  imple- 
mented in  a  variety  of  specific  problems.  Nevertheless,  most  of  the 
criteria  applicable  to  the  selection  of  issues  for  study  apply  also  to  the 
cases.  They  need  to  be  consequential,  and  regarded  as  such.  They  need 
to  have  a  substantial  technical  content.  And  they  need  to  involve  de- 
cisions as  to  the  uses  of  science  or  technology  to  further  policy,  or  as 
to  the  use  of  diplomatic  measures  to  further  some  basic  capability  or 
activity  of  science  or  technology. 

Some  additional  criteria  are  of  particular  relevance  in  the  selection 
of  the  cases.  Inasmuch  as  a  number  of  fields  involve  sensitive  and 
classified  matters,  for  which  documentation  would  be  difficult  in  an 
unclassified  study,  these  will  be  avoided.  Then,  the  cases  need  to  deal 
with  subjects  that  yield  explicit  findings  of  actions  taken  and  their 
results.  They  should  illustrate  both  geographically-oriented  and  disci- 
pline-oriented problems.  Care  has  been  taken  to  select  a  range  of 
cases  to  illustrate  a  range  of  institutional  structures,  kinds  of  tech- 
nical expertise,  and  administrative  concepts.  Finally,  the  cases  selected 
all  present  the  problem  of  time  orientation  in  a  dynamic  subject-area; 
that  is,  the  timing  of  the  action-decision  and  the  timing  of  its  imple- 
mentation are  relevant  to  the  action  and  its  results. 

6.  Form-at  for  the  Presentation  of  Cases 

An  effort  parallel  to  that  applied  to  the  issues  was  made  to  achieve 
some  degree  of  uniformity  in  the  organization  of  the  various  chapters 
dealing  with  cases.  The  format  adhered  to  is  in  general  the  following : 

(a)  The  environment  of  the  case  and  its  historical  evolution; 

(b)  Definition  and  development  of  the  problem; 

(c)  Organizational  framework  involved  in  dealing  with  the 
problem ; 

(d)  Chronological  account  of  the  development  of  the  problem; 

(e)  How  the  problem  came  to  the  attention  of  the  decision- 
making institution; 

(/)  Methods  and  procedures  employed  in  the  decision  process; 

(g)   Description  of  the  ultimate  decision; 

(h)  Subsequent  developments  that  flowed  from  the  decision  (its 
implementation  and  the  responses  evoked)  ; 

(i)  Evaluation  of  the  decision  in  terms  of  the  ultimate  outcome ; 

(j)  Evaluation  of  the  decisionmaking  process,  with  particular 
attention  to  its  technical  aspects; 

(k)  Further  questions  raised  by  the  case. 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.   1-4 


32 

Here  again,  some  departure  from  the  outline  has  been  unavoid- 
able and  probably  desirable.  The  6  cases  have  different  authors  and  dif- 
ferent content,  and  the  subject  matter  has  tended  to  determine  the 
organization  and  exposition  of  the  findings. 

7.  Illustrative  Questions  To  Be  Researched 

In  documenting  and  analyzing  the  respective  cases,  authors  were 
guided  by  the  following  questions : 

(a)  How  was  the  problem  identified  and  characterized?  Was  its  im- 
portance perceived  at  the  outset,  or  did  it  go  through  an  evolutionary 
process?  Was  the  problem  correctly  identified  at  first,  or  did  it  emerge 
from  initial  concern  for  some  different  issue  ? 

(b)  How  timely  was  the  identification  of  the  problem?  Was  it  per- 
ceived in  time  to  take  effective,  constructive  action  or  action  after  the 
fact?  How  did  the  identification  of  the  problem  relate  to  the  con- 
temporary political  climate  and  the  climate  of  public  opinion  ? 

(c)  What  difficulties  were  encountered  with  communication  in  ap- 
proaching and  analyzing  the  problem  ?  Did  technical  content  obscure 
the  political  question  or  did  political  content  obscure  the  technical 
problem  ? 

(d)  What  difficulties  were  encountered  in  separating,  and  giving 
separate  treatment  to,  the  technical  and  political  aspects?  Were  the 
decisionmakers  able  to  coordinate  the  treatment  of  both  together? 

(e)  What  was  the  nature  of  the  decision,  and  how  did  it  relate  to  the 
various  possible  alternatives  available  ?  Were  the  various  alternatives 
fairly  evaluated?  Were  the  decision  criteria  appropriate  to  the  prob- 
lem ?  Were  all  voices  heard  ? 

(/)  How  timely  was  the  decision?  Did  the  technical  difficulties  delay 
action  unnecessarily  ?  Were  opportunities  lost  ? 

(g)  How  stable  has  the  decision  proved  to  be?  Were  the  intended 
purposes  accomplished  ?  Have  alternatives  emerged  subsequently  that 
later  opinion  would  have  preferred  ? 

(h)  How  effective  was  the  decisionmaking  process  used?  Did  it  deal 
comprehensively  and  accurately  with  the  alternatives,  their  technical 
assessment,  and  their  political  evaluation  ? 

8.  Enumeration  of  the  Cases  Researched 
The  6  cases  chosen  for  study  are  as  follows : 

(1)  The  international  control  of  atomic  energy. — The  events  follow- 
ing the  initial  use  in  warfare  of  atomic  weaponry,  and  the  evolution  of 
the  Acheson  report  and  the  Baruch  plan. 

(2)  Commercial  uses  of  atomic  energy  in  Europe. — Events  sur- 
rounding the  Eisenhower  initiative  for  nuclear  sharing,  the  evolution 
of  the  International  Atomic  Energv  Agency,  and  the  events  that  re- 
sulted from  these  actions. 

(3)  The  International  Geophysical  Year. — Interactions  of  the  In- 
ternational Council  of  Scientific  Unions,  national  scientific  institu- 
tions, and  national  governments.  Origins  of  the  program.  Conduct  of 
the  planning  process.  The  roles  of  the  Department  of  State,  the  Na- 
tional Academy  of  Sciences,  and  the  National  Science  Foundation.  As- 
sessment of  t  lie  scientific  and  political  consequences. 

(4)  The  Mekong  Regional  Development  Proposal,— Events  that  led 
to  the  proposal  by  President  Johnson  for  a  comprehensive,  integrated 
multinational,  aid  program  for  Vietnam,  as  an  initiative  to  end  the 


33 

conflict  there,  expressed  in  his  speech  at  Johns  Hopkins  University. 
Assessment  of  the  Mekong  project  itself  as  example  of  the  opportuni- 
ties and  problems  of  the  multinational  regional  approach  to  integrat- 
ing technological  achievement  and  social  policy. 

(5)  The  United  Nations  and  the  Seabed. — Interactions  of  national 
sovereignty  with  international  technology  in  an  international  environ- 
ment. Attempted  resolution  of  the  issue  of  territorial  limits.  Problems 
created  by  the  case  seen  as  political  and  diplomatic  rather  than  techno- 
logical, although  it  is  technology  that  makes  the  case  important. 

(6)  U.S. -Soviet  Commercial  Relations. — Exploratory  assessment  of 
the  political  and  economic  costs  and  benefits  of  the  emerging  trade  re- 
lationship between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  and  of  the 
transfer  of  technology  from  the  former  to  the  latter. 

9.  Organization  of  the  Total  Study 

A  comprehensive  and  detailed  analysis  of  the  12  individual  studies 
(6  cases  and  6  issues)  and  their  findings  is  given  in  parts  3  and  4.  The 
methodology  of  the  analysis  is  described  in  chapter  14.35 

A  word  might  be  said  here  about  the  working  philosophy  which  has 
governed  the  Science,  Technology,  and  American  Diplomacy  research 
project.  Authors  were  encouraged  to  conduct  and  present  the  analysis 
of  each  case  or  issue  with  two  perspectives  continuously  in  mind :  that 
of  the  case  or  issue  as  a  worthy  subject  in  itself,  as  well  as  that  of  its 
relationship  to  the  broad  theme  of  the  overall  study :  i.e.,  the  interac- 
tion of  science,  technology,  and  U.S.  foreign  policy. 

The  returns  are  in  for  the  first  of  those  two  complementary  aims — 
to  make  available  to  the  congressional  (and  in  general  the  public 
affairs)  community  the  analysis  and  findings  of  specific  cases  and  is- 
sues, on  their  individual  merits ;  the  results  are  gratifying.  All  12  stu- 
dies have  served  significant  congressional  or  other  governmental  pur- 
poses relating  to  their  specific  themes;  all  have  received  serious  atten- 
tion in  academic  circles  as  well;  most  have  had  to  be  reprinted  to 
satisfy  a  demand  which  persisted  for  some  years  after  the  date  of 
publication. 

But  it  was  the  second  and  larger  aim  that  prompted  Chairman 
Zablocki  to  request  this  extended  research  undertaking  to  begin  with, 
and  to  seek  the  critical  reactions  of  knowledgeable  persons  in  and  out 
of  government  for  the  benefit  of  Congress.  This  was  the  aim  of  making 
an  empirical  examination,  by  the  case  study  method,  of  representative 
instances  of  the  interplay  of  science  and  technology  with  diplomacy 
for  the  light  they  might  shed  on  how  the  U.S.  Government  could  bet- 
ter equip  itself  to  meet  the  compelling  challenges  posed  by  that  inter- 
play. To  see  this  problem  whole,  it  was  planned  at  the  outset  to  bring 
all  of  the  research  results  together  in  one  collected  study.  The  present 
document  represents  fulfillment  of  that  plan. 

« Numerous  references  to  material  In  the  12  basic  studies  occur  throughout  the  overall 
study  In  both  text  and  footnotes.  These  references  cite  pages  of  the  overall  study  rather 
than  the  original  page  numbers. 

-.1  PhaPter-study   equivalents  are  as  follows    (for  full  citations  of  individual  studies,  see 
list  Of  documents  in  the  original  study  series,  p.  VII. 

Chapter  1 — Huddle.  Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a  Scientific  Age 
Chapter  3 — Wu.  The  Bamch  Plan:  U.S.  Diplomacy  Enters  the'Nuclear  Age. 
Chapter  4 — Donnelly.    Commercial    Nuclear    Poner    in    Europe:    The    Interaction    of 
American  Diplomacy  With  a  New  Technology. 

(Continued) 


34 

The  empirical  approach  followed  in  the  project,  and  the  broad 
matrix  analysis  of  project  findings  in  chapters  18  through  23,  have 
resulted  in  a  research  product  of  somewhat  formidable  proportions. 
A  certain  amount  of  unavoidable  repetition  has  also  resulted.  (On 
the  other  hand,  many  of  the  insights  scattered  through  the  12  individ- 
ual studies  could  not  be  captured  in  the  concluding  analysis  without 
distracting  from  the  latter,  with  its  main  focus  on  the  shortcomings 
of  American  institutions  for  coping  with  global  issues;  the  individual 
studies  therefore  remain  unique  and  useful  resources  in  themselves.) 

The  complete  study  consists  of  24  chapters  (the  major  subdivisions 
of  which,  identified  by  Roman  numerals,  are  referred  to  as  sections) 
organized  into  a  general  introduction  and  4  parts.  A  short  chapter 
introducing  the  main  analytical  portion  of  the  study  intervenes  be- 
tween parts  2  and  3.  Following  two  introductory  chapters  at  the  be- 
ginning, part  1  contains  a  separate  chapter  for  each  of  the  six  case 
studies.  Part  2  is  made  up  of  six  chapters  presenting  the  studies  of 
continuing  issues.  Part  3  is  devoted  to  a  comprehensive  analytical 
review  of  the  preceding  12  studies,  taken  individually.  Part  4  ex- 
amines the  studies  collectively  under  G  cross-cutting  headings  reflect- 
ing broad  policy  concerns,  with  concluding  observations  as  to  policy 
options  for  the  Congress  and  the  executive  branch.  The  study  ends 
with  an  extensive  annotated  bibliography. 

As  noted  in  Chapter  15  under  Methodology,  the  order  followed  in 
presenting  the  cases  and  issues — both  at  large  in  the  overall  study 
and,  in  parallel,  in  the  analysis  of  parts  3  and  4 — was  established  by 
the  subject  matter  itself,  independently  of  the  date  of  publication  of 
the  particular  study.  The  aim  in  any  given  case  is  to  focus  on  enduring 
problems  and  underlying  relationships,  not  to  provide  up-to-the- 
minute  details.  (As  a  practical  matter,  the  basic  studies — chapters 
3  through  14 — have  not  been  updated  for  inclusion  in  the  full  study 
collection;  Chapters  1,  2,  and  15,  however,  have  been  revised  from  a 
mid-1977  perspective,  and  to  the  extent  deemed  useful  chapters  16 
through  24  also  have  been  brought  up  to  date.)  The  appropriateness 
of  this  approach  seems  borne  out  by  the  fact  that,  in  general,  the  in- 
dividual studies  have  not  been  outdated  with  the  passage  of  time,  and 
that  virtually  all  of  their  findings  remain  valid  and  relevant. 

The  foregoing  introduction  has  been  a  restatement  of  the  original 
project  prospectus.3"  The  latter  is  here  modified  only  to  reflect  the 

Continued) 

Chapter  5 — Rullis,   The  Political  Legacy  of  the  International  Geophysical  Year. 
Chapter  6 — Huddle,  The  Mekong  Project:  Opportunities  and  Problems  of  Regionalism. 
Chapter  7- — Doumanl,  Exploiting  the  Resources  of  the  Seabed. 
Chapters — Hardt  and  Holllday,   U.S. -Soviet  Commercial  Relations:  The  Interplay  of 

Economics,  Technology  Transfer,  and  Diplomacy. 
Chapter  9 — Huddle,  The  Evolution  of  International  Technology. 
Chapter  10 — Quimby,  The  Politics  of  Global  Health. 
Chapter  11 — Nanes,  Beyond  Malthas:  The  Food/People  Equation. 
Chapter  12 — Knezo,   U.S.  Scientists  Abroad:  An  Examination  of  Major  Programs  for 

Nongovernmental  Scientific  Exchange. 
Chapter  13 — Whelan,  Brain   Drain:  A    Study  of  the  Persistent  Issue  of  International 

Scientific    Mobility. 
Chapter  14 — Huddle,   Science  and  Technology   in    tlic  Department  of  Stat<  :    Bringing 

Technical  Content  Into  Diplomatic  Policy  and  Operations. 
Chapters  15  through  -i  (and  Chapter  21     Huddle  and  Johnston,  Science,  Technology, 
ami  Diplomacy  in  the  Vge  of  Interdependence. 
"U.S.   Congress,    House,   Committee  on   Foreign  Affairs,   Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a 
scientific  Age,  in  the  series  Selenee,  Technology,  and  American  Diplomacy,  prepared  for  the 
Subcommittee  on  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific  Developments  by  Franklin  P.  Hud- 
dle, Science  Policy  Research  Division.  Congressional  Research  Service.  Library  of  Congress, 
Washington,  D.C.,  c.s.  Govt.  Print.  Off.,  1970,  28  p.  (Committee  print.) 


35 

facts  of  work  completed  in  place  of  the  intentions  of  work  in  pros- 
pect. In  the  final  reckoning,  each  user  of  the  study  can  judge  how 
the  original  goals  of  the  project  have  been  met,  as  expressed  in  the 
closing  words  of  that  prospectus.  The  project,  said  the  latter,  will — 

.  .  .  involve  an  identification  of  the  underlying  principles  of  policy,  organiza- 
tion, and  methodology  in  the  uses  of  science  and  technology  as  instruments  of 
diplomacy,  and  the  concurrent  principles  in  the  uses  of  diplomacy  to  strengthen 
U.S.  goals  in  science  and  technology.  It  will  be  a  search  for  opportunities  for 
new  initiatives,  a  search  for  areas  of  organization  and  administration  needing 
more  emphasis  or  support,  and  the  identification  of  unresolved  issues  of  policy. 
Beyond  this,  it  is  hoped  that  the  intrinsic  merit  of  each  of  the  case  studies 
will  make  it  stand  alone,  as  a  study  of  policy  on  an  important  matter,  and  that 
restatement  of  the  findings  will  serve  as  a  useful  compendium  and  index  of 
the  whole  enterprise. 


Chapter  2 — The  Global  Context  of  Science, 
Technology,  and  American  Diplomacy 


CONTENTS 


Page 

Detente  Vis-a-Vis  the  U.S.S.R 41 

Deterrence  42 

Weaponry 42 

The  P.R.C 42 

Isolationism 43 

U.S.  Economic  Burdens 43 

The  Changing  U.S.  Industrial  Economy 43 

The  Shaky  Global  Economy 45 

Atomic  Energy 45 

Populations  46 

Food 46 

Oceans 47 

Resource   Allocation 47 

Multinational    Corporations 48 

Nationalism 48 

United  Nations 48 

Regionalism '. 49 

Shrinking  World  Community 49 

Global  Flows 50 

Disorientation 50 

(39) 


CHAPTER  2— THE  GLOBAL  CONTEXT  OF  SCIENCE,  TECH- 
NOLOGY, AND  AMERICAN  DIPLOMACY 

U.S.  foreign  policy  today  as  never  before  is  confronted  by  a  world 
of  restless  strivings  and  uncertain  directions.  The  modern  world 
presents  a  complex  mixture  of  dynamic  new  forces  and  drift,  of  active 
or  potential  conflict  and  detente,  of  wayward  nationalism  and  a  grow- 
ing curriculum  of  multinational  cooperative  activities.  The  200th 
anniversary  of  the  beginnings  of  history's  most  successful  experiment 
in  political  democracy  finds  the  Nation  pondering  the  question  of  how 
to  define  and  advance  those  aspects  of  its  heritage  of  independence 
that  are  valuable  in  a  world  of  growing  interdependence.  The  mid- 
1970s  are  thus  a  pivotal  time:  a  time  of  reassessment  of  U.S.  foreign 
policy,  a  time  to  search  for  a  new  and  more  stable,  more  durable  world 
structure  that  could  be  realized  by  creative  diplomatic  initiatives, 
built  deliberately  according  to  a  purposeful  and  coherent  design.  The 
resources  that  the  United  States  can  mobilize  to  meet  this  challenge 
are  mainly  the  technology  and  managerial  skills  in  which  the  Nation 
enjoys  an  unchallenged  superiority.  These  two  strengths,  by  a  con- 
venient fact  of  history,  are  precisely  those  needed  by  most  of  the 
other  nations  of  the  world  in  order  to  achieve  progress  toward  their 
own  internal  national  aspirations. 

However,  elements  of  this  changing  world  do  not  automatically 
simplify  or  facilitate  the  exercise  of  U.S.  leadership  in  applying  these 
needed  skills  toward  the  achievement  of  a  more  stable,  more  durable 
world  structure  of  cooperative  and  peaceful  nations.  The  enormous 
complexity  of  the  world  of  the  1970s  derives  from  the  great  variety 
of  nations  and  groupings  of  nations,  each  with  its  own  rate  and  direc- 
tion of  political,  economic,  and  technological  change,  leading  in  turn 
to  changing  goals  and  national  attitudes.  Change  can  generate  conflict 
or  it  can  promote  harmony  and  cooperation.  All  of  diplomacy  resolves 
ultimately  into  the  balancing  of  these  opposites.  Whether  by  bold 
creative  moves  or  by  slow  and  cautious  increments,  the  largely  un- 
recognized challenge  facing  the  United  States  is  to  use  its  skills  of 
technology  and  management  to  assemble  the  elements  of  the  present 
changing  world  into  the  more  constructive  and  reliable  order  on  which 
the  future  of  civilization  so  manifestly  depends. 

As  the  first  consideration,  what  are  the  salient  elements  of  the 
modern  world?  Some  of  them  are  the  following: 

Detente  Vis-a-Vis  the  U.S.S.R. 

The  rigidities  of  the  cold  war  are  being  replaced  by  a  new  flexibility 
in  which  the  still-potent,  still-dangerous  adversary  relationship 
between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  is  moderated  by  an 
uneasy  and  partial  truce.  This  truce  is  marked  by  trade  agreements, 
grain  transactions,  agreements  on  scientific  and  technological  co- 
operation, technology  transfers,  and  other  unwarlike  dealings  epit- 
omized by  the  term  "detente." 

(41) 


42 


Deterrence 

The  underpinning  of  detente  remains  the  possession  by  both  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  of  an  overwhelming  nuclear 
destructive  capability  sufficient  to  deny  survival  to  either  party  in  the 
event  of  its  use.  Having  learned  to  live  with  this  fact  for  nearly  two 
decades,  leaders  of  each  nation,  while  still  maneuvering  for  some  slight 
and  transitory  technological  advantage.1  are  mainly  seeking  a  pattern 
of  beneficial  relationships  for  their  own  country — recognizing  that  it 
may  incidentally  be  beneficial  to  the  adversary,  but  in  the  nonmilitary 
sphere.  Emerging  out  of  this  uneasy  truce  may  possibly  be  a  more  or 
less  conscious  balance  of  cooperation  and  conflict  reflecting  both 
ideological  opposition  and  mutual  anxiety  over  survival. 

Weaponry 

The  purpose  of  weaponry  is  national  security.  However,  the  enor- 
mous destructive  power  of  thermonuclear  weapons  accompanied  by 
irresistible  delivery  system  possessed  by  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  has  created  an  impasse.  Both  parties  continue  to  invest 
scientific  talents  and  resources  in  further  refinements  of  nuclear 
weaponry  but  after  a  epiarter  century  of  this  arms  race  the  impasse 
continues,  the  destructive  capability  on  both  sides  has  increased,  and 
the  national  security  on  both  sides  has  diminished.  Beneath  this 
nuclear  umbrella  that  makes  overt  conflict  between  the  two  super- 
powers an  act  of  insanity,  the  adversaries  have  experimented  with 
various  kinds  of  war  by  proxy.  Experiments  in  limited  war  by  the 
United  States  in  Korea  and  Vietnam  showed  that  U.S.  high  technology 
weaponry  had  limited  utility  against  a  determined  adversary  in  open 
warfare.  Competitive  supply  of  weaponry  to  the  opposing  sides  in  the 
Middle  East  has  raised  the  level  of  intensity  of  that  conflict  and  in- 
creased the  risk  of  confrontation  between  the  superpowers.  Exports 
of  U.S.  weaponry  to  Latin  America,  Iran,  Jordan,  and  other  countries 
has  multiplied  the  potential  destructiveness  of  warfare  involving 
these  recipients;  the  gain  to  the  United  States  has  been  measured  in 
favorable  balanee-of-paymenis  increments  and  varying  degrees  of 
transitory  influence,  but  the  cost  has  frequently  been  diminished 
national  security  for  the  United  States.  Proliferation  of  subnuclear 
weaponry  continues  but  the  ultimate  consequences  appear  to  offer  no 
significant  benefit  to  the  United  States  while  making  small  wars  more 
lethal  and  draining  the  resources  of  -mall  States  to  maintain  their 
arsenals  of  high  technology. 

The  P.R.C. 

Emergence  of  the  world's  most  populous  nation  from  the  self-im- 
posed  isolation  of  the  period  of  painful  transition  to  ;i  Communist 
dictatorship  i-  now  in  process.  The  growing  military  and  economic 
power  of  t  hi-  former  "sleeping  giant"  gives  indication  that  in  time  the 
People's  Republic  of  China  will  become,  in  some  respects  at  least, 

the  coequal  pa  rt  ner  ad  \  er-a  ry  of  holh  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  Meanwhile  the  l\ \i.(\,  currently  more  hostile  toward 
the  Soviel  Union  than  toward  the  United  Slate-,  seeks  to  persuade 
t  he  la t  ter  of  the  dangers  of  Soviel  aggressive  designs. 


1  A  major  technological  advantage  by  either  adversary  would  be  Intolerable  to  th<>  othor, 
iiikI  wniiiil  pose  :i  serious  Invitation  t"  preemptive  attack  before  the  new  weapon  could  \w 
deployed. 


43 


Isolationism 

One  lively  dispute  that  divided  Americans  in  the  period  between  the 
two  great  wars  concerned  the  extent  to  which  this  country  could  re- 
main aloof  from  European  conflicts.  The  rise  of  Nazi  Germany  made 
the  dispute  salient  but  it  was  not  resolved  until  Japanese  ambitions 
for  Asiatic  hegemony  precipitated  a  conflict  halfway  around  the 
world  from  the  initial  theater  of  war.  Thereafter,  the  ties  among  the 
Axis  Powers  undercut  the  position  of  those  who  favored  U.S.  isolation. 
The  views  of  the  interventionists  were  confirmed  by  events:  It  became 
fixed  in  U.S.  foreign  policy  that  the  United  States  had  an  inescapable 
role,  a  compelling  interest,  and  a  great  power  responsibility  in  assur- 
ing world  peace  and  stability.  During  the  cold  war,  this  theme  domi- 
nated U.S.  dealings  abroad.  An  attempt  to  withdraw  from  this  re- 
sponsibility on  the  mainland  of  Asia  led  to  the  Korean  war.  The 
attempt  to  assert  it  led  to  the  U.S.  involvement  in  Vietnam.  The 
declining  fortunes  of  the  United  States  in  Vietnam  led  to  renewed 
questioning  of  the  extent  of  U.S.  responsibility  for  maintaining 
peace  and  stability  abroad,  and  even  to  a  denial  of  such  respon- 
sibility. 

The  rationale  of  great  power  control  over  small-country  wars  and 
internal  disturbances  remains  ill-defined,  but  recent  events  in  the 
Middle  East  have  demonstrated  the  hazard  of  a  unilateral  withdrawal 
of  one  great  power  from  the  scene,  and  the  perhaps  equal  hazard  of 
several  great  powers'  committing  themselves  to  opposing  causes  of 
small  nations.  Several  lessons  can  be  drawn  from  this  sequence. 
The  most  obvious  is  that  the  diplomatic  reaction  to  this  kind  of  crisis 
is  necessarily  ad  hoc  and  governed  by  circumstances;  rigid  adherence 
to  either  isolationism  or  interventionism  would  invite  disastrous 
consequences.  A  less  obvious  but  more  fundamental  lesson  is  that  the 
most  successful  kind  of  diplomacy  is  that  which  anticipates,  and 
devises  initiatives  to  keep  small  crises  from  developing.  It  is  note- 
worthy that  such  successes  generate  no  headlines  and  create  no 
popular  heroes,  and  are  recognized  only  in  a  small  community. 

U.S.  Economic  Burdens 

Since  World  War  II  the  U.S.  dollar  has  remained  the  primary — 
and  until  recently  the  strong  and  stable — currency  of  international 
commerce.  U.S.  assistance  has  been  extended  to  many  nations  abroad 
in  the  form  of  nuclear  deterrence,  trained  soldiery,  and  arms  ship- 
ments to  treaty  allies  and  developing  nations.  These  economic  bur- 
dens have  been  increased  by  U.S.  efforts  to  raise  the  technological 
levels  of  developing  countries  and  by  commitments  to  supply  ag- 
ricultural products  to  needy  countries  at  less  than  market  value. 
Efforts  to  persuade  other  developed  countries  to  shoulder  more  of  the 
burden  of  maintaining  an  international  currency  and  credit  system 
and  to  evolve,  with  the  Soviet  Union,  a  less  demanding  level  of 
armament  programs  are  features  of  the  contemporary  economic 
scene.  However,  the  abrupt  rise  in  world  petroleum  prices,  unease  in 
the  Middle  East,  and  persistent  ideological  and  organizational  ob- 
stacles to  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  cooperation  tend  to  perpetuate  the  U.S. 
economic  burdens. 

The  Changing  U.S.  Industrial  Economy 

The  word  "developed"  applied  to  the  U.S.  national  economy  means 
that  a  large  territory  was  settled,  and  that  the  predominant  form  of 


44 


productive  activity  changed  from  agriculture  to  manufacturing  during 
the  first  third  of  the  20th  century,  and  from  manufacturing  to  services 
in  the  second  third.  The  products  of  agriculture  and  other  extractive 
industries  are  food,  fiber,  lumber,  and  minerals;  those  of  manufacturing 
are  the  highly  diversified  items  ranging  from  clothing  to  automobile-; 
those  of  services  industries  are  information  and  noncommodity- 
related  activities.  This  sequence  is  probably  not  reversible,  and  the 
future  health  of  the  U.S.  economy  depends  on  the  development  of  the 
services  industries  and  the  enhancement  of  their  productivity.  How- 
ever, much  of  the  services  industry  is  in  Government  services  which 
consume  but  do  not  generate  income:  Teachers,  police,  firemen,  other 
State  and  municipal  employees,  Federal  workers,  and  those  in  military 
service. 

The  trend  in  the  United  States  toward  services  industries  is  the 
central  feature  in  a  complex  of  developments  that  include  increased 
emphasis  on  the  quality  and  quantity  of  security  services  that  are 
provided  by  governments,  such  as  protections  against  crime,  unem- 
ployment, old  age,  and  medical  costs.  Environmental  protection  has 
recently  been  added  to  this  list.  These  services  are  costly  and  most  of 
them  are  tax-supported  instead  of  yielding  tax  revenues.  Even  as 
population  movements  toward  urban  centers  have  increased,  erosion 
has  occurred  in  the  urban  tax  base  as  the  wealthier  segment  of  the 
urban  population — and  industry  as  well — has  left  the  central  city  for 
the  suburbs. 

Another  complicating  factor,  perhaps  more  transient,  is  the  shift 
in  the  demographic  distribution  of  population  toward  the  young  and 
old  parts  of  the  lifescale;  these  are  less  productive  than  persons  in 
the  middle  range  but  absorb  services  at  a  higher  rate. 

The  U.S.  tax  structure,  which  is  effective  in  an  expanding  economy, 
tends  to  amplify  cycles  of  high  and  low  economic  activity. 

In  turn,  depression  of  the  economy  tends  to  worsen  all  the  other 
economic  problems  that  appear  as  the  Nation  proceeds  further  into 
the  "services"  phase.  As  the  tax  base  shrinks  and  the  service-  industries 
grow,  the  ability  of  the  Federal  Government  to  support  ambitious 
programs  diminishes,  while  the  demand  for  services  and  payment  for 
them  continues  to  grow. 

The  extractive  industries  in  the  United  States  (accounting  for  half 
the  labor  force  in  1890)  now  employ  less  than  5  percent  of  the  labor 
force;  manufacturing  perhaps  another  25  or  30  percent:  and  services 
the  rest.  The  trend  is  toward  further  shrinkage  of  the  first  two  and 
expansion  of  the  third. 

Shrinkage  of  the  tax  base  and  expansion  of  tax-supported  activities 
have  important  implications  for  diplomacy:  as  to  ability  to  fund 
military  programs,  support  foreign  assistance,  contribute  to  United 
Nation-,  agencies  a  major  fraction  of  their  support,  and  invest  in  large 

re  earch  and  develop nt  efforts  whose  product  is  increasinglj  resisted 

h>  the  industrial  sector  as  profit  margins  narrow.  The  pattern  of  U.S. 
trade  is  likewise  disrupted  by  internal  economic  dislocations.  Stag- 
flation, decline  in  the  value  of  the  dollar,  and  increasing  compel  it  ive 
difficult}  of  U.S.  industry  all  lead,  in  turn,  to  balance-of-payments 
deficit-,  making  funding  of  U.S.  programs  abroad  difficult. 

A    public  stniithiKi    in  services  and  welfare  rise,  demands  grow  for 

a  afer  and  more  wholesome  environment,  control  over  hazardous 
condil  ion  in  indust  rj  ,  and  reduced  impacts  of  mining  and  forestry  on 
wilderness  area-. 


45 

While  these  brakes  on  industrial  growth  and  productivity  have  not 
yet  reached  full  strength,  they  have  served  to  warn  that  these  rising 
long-term  and  incremental  costs  in  the  industrial  economy  are  ap- 
proaching a  serious  stage.  When  such  costs  were  coupled  with  the  im- 
pact of  the  petroleum  embargo  and  price  increases  from  1973  on,  the 
observable  result  was  a  mixed  situation  of  recession  combined  with 
inflation.  The  effects  of  these  forces  were  felt  most  keenly  in  areas  of 
largest  populations,  notably  New  York  City.  Escape  from  this  dilemma 
is  vital  to  the  future  health  of  the  U.S.  diplomatic  posture  in  the 
world — as  indeed  also  for  U.S.  domestic  economic  health — but  the 
escape  route  remains  undefined.  The  economic  surplus  needed  to  fund 
past  levels  of  global  programs  may  be  a  product  of  the  U.S.  past.  U.S. 
foreign  policy  may  rest  more  in  the  future  on  the  skill  of  its  diplomacy 
than  on  the  weight  of  its  economic  programs. 

The  Shaky  Global  Economy 

Economic  interdependence  has  long  prevailed  in  international  re- 
lations. In  the  19th  century,  Central  Europe  fed  on  American  grain; 
agricultural  nations  relied  on  Chilean  nitrates;  England  supplied 
capital  to  develop  rail  transportation  systems  in  Argentina,  India,  the 
United  States,  and  China ;  English  textile  mills  wove  cloth  with  United 
States  and  Indian  cotton;  and  so  on.  During  the  1920s  efforts  to  restore 
this  global  economy  conflicted  with  internal  efforts  to  stabilize  na- 
tional economies  and  employment;  the  global  monetary  system  col- 
lapsed in  the  face  of  stiff  tariff  barriers,  competitive  devaluations, 
multiple  currency  schemes,  and  quotas.  Restoration  of  the  global 
economy  was  a  high-priority  U.S.  goal  after  World  War  II  but,  despite 
real  progress,  its  achievement  was  obstructed  by  cold  war  divisiveness, 
nationalistic  tendencies  of  former  colonial  regions,  and — ultimately — 
the  inability  of  the  dollar  to  serve  as  a  global  currency  in  place  of  the 
long-defunct  gold  standard.  Achievement  of  a  stable  global  economy 
continues  to  be  a  U.S.  goal.  D6tente  with  the  Soviet  Union  was  con- 
sidered a  positive  move  toward  its  achievement.  But  many  old  and 
some  new  forces  obstruct  progress  toward  the  goal:  internal  obligations 
of  developed  countries  to  sustain  economic  growth  and  high  levels  of 
employment;  resistance  of  developing  countries  to  terms  of  trade 
which  they  see  as  blocking  their  escape  from  economic  colonialism; 
and  most  recently  the  exploitation  by  the  OPEC  countries  of  a 
(probably  temporary  but  severely  acute)  monopoly  position  in  world 
petroleum  supply.  Efforts  at  reaching  international  agreement  on  a 
new  world  economic  structure  were  underway  at  the  time  of  this 
writing  but  the  issue  remains  in  doubt. 

Atomic  Energy 

Atomic  energy  places  such  extreme  demands  on  technology  that 
its  advance  in  competition  with  fossil  fuels  as  a  source  of  electrical 
energy  has  been  slow.  However,  the  manipulated  rise  in  petroleum 
prices  by  OPEC  and  the  complex  environmental  problems  in  the 
return  to  coal  as  a  principal  energy  source  are  making  atomic  energy 
potentially  more  attractive  for  the  future.  This  trend  makes  more  and 
more  difficult  the  maintenance  of  control  over  fuel  elements  and  by- 
product plutonium  to  protect  the  world  and  its  peoples  against  en- 
vironmental insults  and  irresponsible  conversion  of  plutonium  into 
weapons.  Since  the  early  1960s  a  principal  goal  of  U.S.  foreign  policy 
has  been  prevention  of  nuclear  proliferation.  The  economics  of  energy 
now  places  that  goal  in  serious  jeopardy.  Scientific  efforts  to  develop 


46 


a  safer  form  of  energy  from  nuclear  fusion  are  proceeding  but  the  prob- 
lem is  one  of  greatT  technical  difficulty  and  the  estimates  of  time  to 
achieve  success  range  from  20  to  50  years.  Half  a  century  of  uncon- 
trolled nuclear  proliferation  as  a  consequence  of  supplying  electricity 
to  mankind  is  a  fearsome  prospect. 

Populations 

The  ultimate  concern  of  all  governments,  in  terms  of  both  ends  ;md 
means,  is  people.  Of  growing  concern  is  the  relationship  between  total 
available  resources  and  population  in  the  entire  world,  but  especially  in 
the  most  populous  regions  and  those  in  which  the  rate  of  population 
increase  is  sharpest.  Populations  are  significant  in  relation  to  resources 
of  arable  land  and  materials,  ability  to  buy  food,  levels  of  consumption 
of  all  goods,  rates  at  which  environmental  pollution  occurs,  and  ability 
to  extend  governance.  As  populations  increase,  problems  worsen  in  all 
these  categories  unless  means  are  found  to  exert  strong  positive  con- 
trols or  motivations.  In  an  interdependent  world,  population  problems 
in  any  country  have  effects  on  all  countries.  Rates  of  population 
increase  of  different  countries  in  the  contemporary  world  tend  to  be  in 
inverse  proportion  to  achieved  levels  of  development.  Technology  is 
available  to  feed  large  increases  in  populations  as  well  as  to  control  the 
rates  of  increase,  but  the  enlistment  of  technology  toward  either 
purpose  requires  institutional  support  which  is  generally  inadequate. 
Many  forces  are  at  work  that  cause  population  increases  while  few 
forces  have  been  devised  to  inhibit  population  growth  in  poor  coun- 
tries, other  than  food  deprivation  as  a  consequence  of  food/population 
unbalance.  International  tensions  resulting  from  population  pressures 
are  regarded  as  serious  and  worsening  but  international  agreement  on 
the  resolution  of  the  problem  is  lacking.  The  dilemma  facing  the  world 
is  that  governments  of  poor  countries  call  for  aid  from  developed 
countries  to  secure  the  rights  of  their  citizens  to  living  standards 
achieved  by  developed  countries,  but  cannot  reconcile  these  expecta- 
tions with  their  practical  impossibility  in  the  face  of  uninhibited 
increases  of  populations. 

Food 

As  with  population  control,  the  limiting  factor  on  food  supply  is  not 
primarily  technological  but  institutional.  Wider  exploitation  of  well- 
established  technology  of  plant  genetics,  fertilization,  storage,  process- 
ing, and  marketing  could  treble  or  quadruple  the  available  food  supply 
of  the  world.  But  the  institutional  remedies  for  the  almost  inevitable 
increase  of  famine  conditions  in  the  closing  quarter  of  the  20th  century 
must  deal  with  food  production  and  distribution  as  only  one  ingredient 
in  a  pattern  of  development  that  encompasses  health  and  education, 
nonagricultural  employment  opportunities  in  urban  and  rural  area-, 
stable  currencies  and'  international  exchanges.  Land  management 
reform,  and  stable  institutions  of  government  able  to  administer 
effective  tax  and  investment  programs.  Failing  achievement  of  these 
conditions,  the  poor  countries  will  need  to  rely  increasingly  on  imported 
supplies  of  food  of  which  the  United  States  is  the  leading  exporter. 
For  the  United  Slate,  the  options  include  (a)  short-term  economic 
advantage  by  sales  to  the  best  market,  (b)  stern  compulsion  on  the 
poor  countries  to  effect  reforms  by  deliberate  choice  of  markets  to 
reward  the  countries  that  do  so,  ami  (c)  compassionate  doling  out  of 
dwindling  food  reserves  to  populations  on  the  basis  of  relative  extremes 
of  need.  Averting  so  painful  a  decision  rests  not  with  the  United  States 


47 

alone  but  with  all  potentially  food-deficient  countries  as  well.  But  if 
effective  means  of  cooperation  in  development  are  not  achieved,  the 
ultimate  decision  will  rest  inescapably  with  the  leadership  of  the  most 
productive  country,  the  United  States. 

Oceans 

The  status  of  the  three-fifths  of  the  globe  covered  by  oceans  was  in 
question  in  the  mid-1970s.  Squabbles  over  fishing  rights  and  seaward 
extent  of  national  sovereignty  were  frequent.  U.S.  entrepreneurs 
impatiently  waited  for  some  sort  of  legal  determination  of  seabed 
sovereignty  and  property  rights  in  order  to  exploit  emerging  tech- 
nologies for  securing  the  petroleum  and  metallic  wealth  of  this  remain- 
ing frontier.  Naval  use  of  the  international  medium  of  the  oceans 
remained  a  plausible  exercise  of  national  power,  but  question  was 
being  raised  as  to  U.S.  supremacy  at  sea,  once  taken  for  granted  and 
now  seriously  challenged.  Environmentalists  were  vocal  in  denuncia- 
tion of  Japanese  and  Soviet  overfishing  of  the  dwindling  population  of 
whales  and  of  the  pollution  of  the  oceans  by  oil  spills  and  chemical 
effluents.  Failure  of  the  maritime  nations  to  agree  on  a  new  law  of 
the  sea  in  pending  negotiations  threatened  to  leave  the  ocean  commons 
in  a  state  of  anarchy,  instead  of  leading  to  a  system  of  cooperation  to 
maximize  the  management  of  the  oceans  as  a  sustained  source  of  food 
and  mineral  wealth. 

Resource  Allocation 

Consumption  of  minerals  and  fossil  fuels  is  proportional  to  the 
level  of  economic  development  of  nations,  and  levels  of  development 
differ  greatly.  Production  of  minerals  and  fossil  fuels  is  related  to  their 
occurrence  in  the  earth,  and  they  are  unevenly  distributed  among 
nations.  Since  extractive  industries  are  first  to  be  attempted  by 
developing  nations,  the  effect  is  that  of  a  flow  of  materials  from  the 
poor  countries  to  the  rich,  and  a  flow  of  processed  goods  from  the 
rich  countries  to  the  poor.  Efforts  by  poor  countries  to  correct  these 
evidently  disadvantageous  terms  of  trade  have  brought  controversy 
into  the  United  Nations  and  other  forums.  For  all  poor  countries  to 
reach  the  levels  of  materials  consumption  already  achieved  by  the 
developed  countries  would  far  exceed  the  available  reserves  of  the 
earth.  Demands  by  the  poor  countries  for  a  larger  share  of  the  benefits 
of  the  wealth  from  their  mines  and  oil  fields  signal  the  need  for  eventual 
agreement  among  nations  as  to  an  equitable  allocation  of  these 
resources.  The  wealth  of  developed  countries  is  in  the  form  of  tech- 
nology, management,  a  built  industrial  plant,  and  investment 
capital.  It  remains  to  be  determined  how  much  of  a  transfer  of  the 
technical  resources  of  the  rich  nations  to  the  poor  will  be  acceptable, 
and  how  large  a  share  of  raw  materials  the  poor  nations  will  insist 
on  retaining.  Clearly,  the  developed  nations  will  need  to  practice  a 
greater  conservation  of  imported  resources  and  the  developing  coun- 
tries will  need  to  moderate  their  expectations  of  equaling  the  con- 
sumption levels  achieved  by  the  rich.  There  is  simply  not  enough  to 
go  around.  But  by  the  mid-1970s,  these  constraints  were  insufficiently 
appreciated  in  either  the  rich  or  the  poor  countries.  An  attempt  to 
ascertain  the  limits  to  growth,  though  usefully  signaling  an  alert,  had 
foundered  on  dubious  assumptions  while  neglecting  the  practical 
question  of  how  high  a  standard  of  consumption  was  achievable 
over  the  entire  globe  with  its  inexorably  increasing  population. 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1-5 


48 


Multinational  Corporations 

In  response  to  efforts  by  many  foreign  nations  to  protect  their 
own  balances  of  international  exchange  by  restricting  the  penetration 
of  foreign  corporations,  a  form  of  international  commercial  institution 
has  rapidly  proliferated.  This  form,  the  multinational  corporation 
or  MNC,  is  designed  to  accomplish  the  age-old  dream  of  the  economist : 
to  minimize  the  economic  significance  of  national  boundaries.  It 
does  help  to  alleviate  once-potent  economic  causes  of  international 
disputes,  and  it  can  be  an  effective  agent  of  technology  transfer, 
but  it  also  generates  new  causes  of  conflict  and  frustration.  Charac- 
teristically, the  MNC  moves  capital,  materials,  credit,  managerial 
expertise,  technological  skills,  intellectual  property,  and  even  trained 
labor  from  country  to  country  in  order  to  maximize  its  total  overall 
and  long-term  profit.  In  the  process  it  erodes  the  national  sovereignty 
of  host  countries,  diverts  capital  and  labor  from  nationally  planned 
economic  allocations,  and  competes  for  economic  and  even  political 
power,  while  preserving  its  own  economic  and  technological  power 
base  remote  from  the  countries  it  penetrates.  At  the  same  time, 
because  of  the  complex  and  farflung  nature  of  its  operations,  it  tends 
to  elude  controls  which  the  base  country  seeks  to  impose,  or  even  at 
times  to  outpace  the  base  country's  perception  that  certain  controls 
may  be  needed  in  its  own  national  interest.  In  so  doing  it  tends  to 
neglect  political,  social,  and  institutional  costs  of  its  operations. 

As  an  institution  the  MNC  offers  the  capability  of  influencing  con- 
structively the  evolution  of  a  stable  world  economy  and  the  develop- 
ment of  lagging  economies.  But  as  the  MNC  currently  operate-,  it 
excites  resentment  among  U.S.  labor  unions  as  an  instrument  to 
cause  unemployment  at  home;  it  excites  resentment  in  developed 
countries  by  superimposing  foreign  management  over  domestic 
labor;  and  it  excites  resentment  in  developing  countries  by  co-opting 
labor  and  resources  to  feed  into  technologies  which  are  often  inap- 
propriate to,  and  tend  to  distort,  the  development  process  in  those 
countries. 

Nationalism 

The  disintegration  of  10th  century  colonial  empires  has  resulted  in  a 
large  increase  (to  L59  as  of  mid-1977)  in  the  number  of  separate 
sovereign  slate-,  each  groping  toward  independence,  governance,  self- 
determination  of  national  policy,  and  coherence.  Some  of  these  states 
have  discovered  the  ancient  formula  whereby  nationalism,  in  term-  of  a 
contrived  hostility  toward  their  own  neighbors,  toward  other  groupings 
of  states,  or  toward  one  or  another  of  the  great  powers,  can  serve  to 
unify  and  promote  coherence  of  their  own  political  structures.  At  the 
same  time,  claims  turn  into  "rights"  and  exchanges  of  values  become 
"exploitation,"  creating  an  attitude  of  manifesl  destiny  of  the  poor. 

I  rnited  Nations 

Bom  in  an  epoch  of  hope  for  a  cooperative  world  of  peaceful  tuitions, 
the  United  Nations  has  degenerated  into  a  cockpil  of  parochial  squab- 
bles. Since  the  penalty  for  intransigence  in  the  United  Nations  is 
inconsequential,  the  motive  for  compromise  has  disappeared  and  deci- 
sions without  practical  effect  are  arrived  at  in  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly  by  counting  the  votes  of  the  ministates.  Effectiveness  of  the 
U.N.  Security  Council  is  largely  nullified  by  exercise  of  the  veto  power 
by  the  leading  permanent  members.  Constructive  programs  of  the 


49 


World  Bank  and  the  World  Health  Organization  offer  a  glimmer  of 
hope  but  the  intransigence  evident  in  the  General  Assembly  has  found 
its  counterpart  in  UNESCO  and  ILO.  By  the  mid-1970s,  respect  for  the 
United  Nations  in  the  United  States  had  been  seriously  impaired  and 
the  cost  benefit  of  the  association  of  nations  was  widely  qtiestioned. 
The  very  substantial  contributions  of  the  U.N.  system  were  largely 
unseen  while  its  futilities  were  highly  visible.  Whether  public  opinion 
would  be  content  to  tolerate  this  unsatisfactory  state  of  affairs  long 
enough  to  evolve  a  more  workable  and  useful  U.N.  structure  remained 
to  be  seen. 

Regionalism 

A  basic  building  block  available  to  U.S.  diplomacy  in  the  balancing 
of  cooperation  and  conflict  is  the  circumstance  that  many  contiguous 
nations  share  common  geographic  and  economic  problems  and  oppor- 
tunities. Many  such  multinational  regions  exist  throughout  the  world 
but  their  effect  on  the  nations  that  share  them  varies  widely.  Some,  like 
the  Scandinavian  countries,  have  established  cooperative  relations; 
others,  like  the  nations  of  former  French  Indochina,  have  a  long  history 
of  strife;  some,  like  the  States  of  Central  America,  are  groping  toward 
cooperation;  and  some,  like  the  Middle  East,  are  fiercely  divided  by 
religion  and  ideology.  The  opportunity  for  economic  and  social  benefits 
to  such  regions  is  great  but  largely  wasted;  cooperative  planning, 
division  of  labor  in  the  development  and  testing  of  useful  technology, 
shared  infrastructures,  and  the  recognition  of  commonality  of  prob- 
lems, opportunities,  goals,  and  approaches,  are  all  available  as  elements 
to  reduce  the  economic  significance  of  national  boundaries.  Reasons 
for  the  neglect  of  this  opportunity  to  strengthen  international  amity  are 
easy  to  find,  but  the  want  of  effort  to  this  end  seems  hard  to  justify. 

Shrinking  World  Community 

Instant  global  communications,  verbal  and  visual,  bring  the  whole 
world  into  the  living  room.  A  terrorist  attack  in  the  Middle  East  or 
Northern  Ireland,  an  earthquake  in  Chile  or  Turkey,  an  election  in 
Australia  or  Portgual,  is  described  or  shown  minutes  later  everywhere 
else.  The  infinite  variety  of  events  inviting  global  attention  over- 
loads the  receptors  of  the  individual  and  the  time  or  space  of  the 
communicators.  Censorship  is  inherent,  not  only  for  reasons  of  na- 
tional policy  or  economic  advantage  but  because  limited  capacity 
compels  selection  according  to  some  policy  or  principle.  "Newsworthy" 
events — like  war  or  unrest  in  Morocco,  Angola,  Belize,  Ethiopia,  Por- 
tugal, Cyprus,  Lebanon,  or  elsewhere — are  reported  while  crop  statis- 
tics, new  schools,  technological  developments,  and  other  constructive 
events  are  ignored.  Even  so,  the  individual  is  told  more  than  he  can 
assimilate.  Excessive  demands  are  placed  on  his  enthusiasm  and  indig- 
nation. In  response,  the  individual  tends  to  dismiss  the  information 
flow  as  irrelevant  to  his  own  interests,  and  to  rely  on  the  "experts" 
to  deal  with  these  hopelessly  numerous  and  complex  matters.  Or  else,- 
in  support  of  his  own  tradition  or  esthetic  sense,  the  individual  may 
seize  on  some  one  conflict  as  his  own,  choosing  a  side  for  reasons  of 
moral  predilection  or  ethnic,  religious,  or  national  origin.  Even  so, 
the  average  American  in  1977  is  more  aware  of  the  world  outside  his 
own  country  than  ever  before  but  perhaps  more  depressed  by  what 
he  perceives. 


50 


Global  Flows 

Information  on  current  events  is  only  one  of  many  kinds  of  flows 
that  cross  national  boundaries.  The  entire  globe  is  a  complex  network, 
bound  together  by  systems  of  transportation  and  communication  by 
land,  sea,  air,  and  electronic  linkages.  Almost  all  nations  contribute 
to  and  receive  these  flows,  and  the  traffic  along  the  various  media 
continues  to  grow.  The  flows  include  trained  persons  moving  to  new 
homes,  students  seeking  further  education,  tourists  learning  about 
the  world,  business  people  looking  for  opportunities  for  profit,  scien- 
tists seeking  to  exchange  knowledge,  and  diplomats  bent  on  facilitating 
the  conduct  of  international  relations.  Transactional  flows  also  take 
place,  in  the  form  of  credit,  materials  and  products,  ideological  views, 
information,  diplomatic  influence,  and  expressions  of  national  interests 
and  goals.  Still  other  flows,  ranging  from  highly  destructive  to  some- 
thing less  than  constructive,  take  the  form  of  terrorist  attacks,  dis- 
semination of  weaponry,  the  international  movement  of  dangerous, 
drugs,  the  spread  of  disease  epidemics,  hostile  signals  and  threats, 
guerrilla  and  "underground"  movements,  and  covert  operations. 
Encouragement  and  discouragement  of  various  of  these  flows  is  the 
business  of  every  government,  some  more  than  others.  Together  with 
the  responses  to  them  that  feed  back  to  the  original  source  country, 
these  flows  aggregate  into  what  is  called  "foreign  relations."  Since 
most  flows  are  on  the  increase,  it  can  be  said  that  foreign  relations 
are  progressively  intensifying  for  all  countries.  In  the  case  of  the 
United  States,  the  indices  of  size,  wealth,  economic  activity,  military 
strength,  and  other  measures  of  a  dynamic  society,  are  all  surpassingly 
high;  U.S.  foreign  relations  are  accordingly  more  intensive  and  com- 
plex than  those  of  any  other  country  in  the  world. 

However,  U.S.  institutional  mechanisms  to  manage,  plan  for,  or 
even  keep  track  of  these  increasing  flows  are  not  growing  correspond- 
ingly. This  fact  suggests  that  the  United  States  is  less  and  less  able 
to  administer  a  more  and  more  demanding  responsibility  for  foreign 
policy.  It  is  also  probable  that  the  same  deficiency  exists  in  other 
highly  dynamic  developed  countries. 

Disorientation 

Rarely,  if  ever,  has  U.S.  foreign  policy  faced  so  many  fundamental 
changes — in  the  power  base  of  its  own  political  system,  in  the  com- 
plexities of  the  external  world,  and  in  the  challenges  and  obstacles  to 
be  met  in  furtherance  of  its  goals.  Disorientation  is  not  too  strong  a 
term  for  the  state  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  in  the  mid-1970s. 

The  Nation  has  recently  emerged  from  a  tragic,  divisive,  and  in  the 
minds  of  ninny  a  futile,  war.  National  attitudes  are  mixed  toward 
further  exercise  of  U.S.  power  and  influence  in  the  world,  even  to  the 
revival  of  the  isolationism  of  the  1930s.  Domestic  issues  are  most 
salient  :  worries  oxer  unemployment  and  inflation,  apprehension  over 
threatened  shortage  of  energy,  concern  for  the  deteriorating  environ- 
ment. 

A  long  list  of  disrupt  ions  abroad  have  also  been  of  public  and  official 
concern:  the  festering  and  periodically  explosive  A.rab-Israeli  con- 
did,  the  revolt  of  the  Third  World  in  the  U.N.  General  Assembly. 
Third  "World  economic  challenges  to  prevailing  patterns  of  commerce, 
periodically  renewed  concern  over  the  global  increase  in  populations 


51 


relative  to  global  food  supply,  assertions  of  nationalism  and  intran- 
sigence by  the  many  new  nations,  incidents  of  bombing  and  terrorism 
around  the  world,  hijackings  and  kidnapings,  urban  guerrilla  move- 
ments in  several  countries,  religious  conflict  in  Northern  Ireland  and 
communal  conflict  in  Cyprus  and  Lebanon,  power  shifts  or  active 
contests  at  many  points  in  Eurasia  and  Africa,  unease  over  prolifera- 
tion of  nuclear  weapons  and  the  stability  of  the  nuclear  deterrent, 
frustration  over  the  issue  of  seabed  sovereignty,  growing  awareness  of 
the  disintegration  of  the  world  monetary  structure  erected  after  World 
War  II  and  of  the  possibility  of  world  monetary  collapse,  and  a  general 
sense  that  national  goals  of  the  many  old  and  new  nations  of  the  world 
were  at  cross-purposes. 

The  want  of  coherence  and  shared  common  purpose  in  the  United 
Nations,  the  superpowers,  NATO,  and  other  groups  of  nations  that 
once  found  opportunities  for  cooperation  is  a  distressing  characteristic 
of  the  contemporary  world.  It  is  a  time  for  rebuilding  and  new  leader- 
ship toward  purposes  that  all  can  share.  That  is  the  prime  challenge 
of  American  diplomacy  in  the  final  quarter  of  the  20th  century. 


PART  1— SIX  CASES 

Chapter  3 — The  Baruch  Plan:  U.S.  Diplomacy 
Enters  the  Nuclear  Age 


CONTENTS 


Page 

I.  Introduction 57 

Definition  of  the  Problem  and  Scope  of  the  Study 57 

II.  A  Short  Chronology  of  Atomic  Control  Diplomacy  After  World  War  II  _  59 
Preliminary  Agreements  on  Nuclear  Sharing;  U.S.  Preparations 

To  Negotiate 59 

Impasse  of  Negotiations  in  the  United  Nations 60 

The  Historical  Context  of  the  Negotiations;  the  Turbulent  Post- 
war Years 60 

III.  The  Postwar  Paradox:  Cold  War  and  Internationalism 62 

Preparation  for  International  Control  Efforts 62 

Formulation  of  Atomic  Policy  in  the  United  States 63 

Domestic  Control 64 

Hasty  Demobilization  of  U.S.  Military  Forces 65 

Formulation  of  U.S.  Policy  on  International  Control 66 

Early  Efforts 66 

Preparations  for  Negotiations  in  the  UNAEC 68 

The  U.S.  Negotiator  and  Final  Steps  to  Define  Policy. _  69 

Abortive  Efforts  in  the  United  Nations  Toward  Control 71 

The  U.S.  Proposal 71 

The  Soviet  Proposal 72 

Debate  and  Impasse 73 

IV.  Issues  in  the  Interplay  Between  Diplomacy  and  Nuclear  Technology.  76 

Significance  of  Technological  Factors  for  U.S.  Policy 76 

The  Form  and  Purposes  of  International  Control 80 

Proposals  of  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  Report 80 

The  Board  of  Consultants'  Position  Against  Inspection.  80 
International  Ownership  and  Operation  of  Dangerous 

Activities.  _ 82 

Retention  of  "Safe"  National  Activities 84 

Inspection  Provisions  in  the  Report 85 

Reactions  Among  U.S.  Policymakers  to  the  Proposals  of  the 

Board  of  Consultants 8.6 

Trend  Toward  Control  in  U.S.  Policy 87 

U.N.  Stalemate  Over  Control  and  Inspection 88 

Soviet  Reaction  to  Proposed  Internationalization 88 

Action  by  the  UNAEC 89 

The  Issue  of  Stages  of  Transition  to  International  Control 93 

The  Political  Basis  for  Proceeding  by  Stages 94 

Insistence      by      Acheson      Committee      on      Step-by-Step 

Approach 95 

Origins  of  the  Discussion 95 

Final  Version — Some  Technological  Considerations 97 

Inconclusive  Treatment  of  the  Transition  Issue  by  UNAEC.  99 

The  Issue  of  Enforcement:  Sanctions  and  the  Veto 103 

Determining  U.S.  Policy  on  Sanctions 103 

U.S.  Policy  on  the  Veto:  Its  Relation  to  Enforcement 104 

Political  Unacceptability  of  Veto-Free  Control  in  the  Nego- 
tiations    107 

Recapitulation  of  the  Three  Issues  of  Atomic  Control 108 

V.  Some  Distinctive  Features  of  the  Negotiations 110 

Excessive  U.S.  Reliance  on  Technical  Control  Plan 110 

Lack  of  U.S.  Attention  to  Soviet  Requirements 111 

Soviet  Calculation  of  U.S.  Position 112 

(55) 


56 

V.  Some  Distintive  Features  of  the  Negotiations — Continued  PaK« 

One  Attempt  at  Technical-Diplomatic  Coordination 113 

Underlying  Misconceptions  in  U.S.  Policy 114 

VI.  Concluding  Observations 118 

Impact  of  New  Technologies  on  International  Relations 118 

The  Diplomatic  Task:  Combining  Effectiveness  and  Acceptability.  119 

U.S.  Attitudes  in  the  Conduct  of  the  Negotiations 122 


CHAPTER  3— THE  BARUCH  PLAN:  U.S.  DIPLOMACY 
ENTERS  THE  NUCLEAR  AGE 

I.   Introduction 

This  study  is  concerned  with  the  first  international  negotiations  on 
the  control  of  atomic  energy,  during  the  years  immediately  following 
"World  War  II.  The  arrival  of  the  atom  bomb  was  a  technological 
event  of  unparalleled  significance  for  international  affairs.  The  ulti- 
mate meaning  of  the  bomb  itself,  as  distinct  from  the  possible  peaceful 
applications  of  atomic  energy,  was  that  it  raised  the  cost  of  general 
war  for  total  victory  to  an  unacceptable  level.  This  fact  radically 
altered  the  basis  for  the  positions  of  the  diplomats  at  the  bargaining 
table,  and  brought  with  it  the  problem  of  how  to  evaluate  and  to  com- 
municate the  significance  of  the  new  development.  At  the  same  time, 
a  changed  pattern  of  relations  among  nations  had  emerged  as  a  result 
of  the  worldwide  upheaval  of  World  War  II.  Participants  in  this  new 
configuration  of  power  faced  the  unique  technological  and  diplomatic 
situation  created  by  atomic  energy. 

Technological  advances  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy  added  a  new 
dimension  and  a  new  vocabulary  to  world  affairs  through  such  con- 
cepts as  mutual  deterrence  and  preemptive  strikes.  The  dynamics  of  a 
nuclear  arms  race  were  dimly  perceived  at  the  outset  of  the  nuclear 
age;  even  so,  it  is  not  clear  that  awareness  of  this  potential  would 
have  prevented  its  development.  In  retrospect,  it  is  understandable 
how  the  atom  bomb,  a  product  of  science  and  technology  and  a  tool  of 
diplomacy,  prompted  a  world  drive  for  control. 

More  important  to  this  study  is  the  fact  of  failure  in  the  initial 
efforts  of  this  drive.  Despite  the  strong  impetus  for  diplomatic  initia- 
tive in  response  to  a  great  technological  achievement,  the  negotiations 
got  nowhere  then  and  have  made  little  progress  since.  A  principal  aim 
of  the  study  is  to  examine  the  causes  of  this  costly  failure  in  order  to 
provide  insights  into  the  interactions  among  science,  technology,  and 
diplomacy  when  they  are  confronted  with  a  technological  development 
of  the  first  magnitude — in  this  case,  one  with  urgent  implications  for 
the  future  of  all  mankind. 

Definition  of  the  Problem  and  Scope  of  the  Study 

Because  these  early  efforts  to  control  nuclear  weapons  occurred  more 
than  25  years  ago,  much  historical  discussion  has  accumulated  in  pub- 
lished sources.  In  light  of  this  fact  and  considering  the  purpose  of  this 
series  of  reports,  the  study  will  not  duplicate  the  history  of  these  early 
international  negotiations.  Rather,  it  will  focus  on  issues  associated 
with  the  interaction  of  science,  technology,  and  diplomacy. 

The  advent  of  the  atomic  weapon  in  1945  represented  a  unique  tech- 
nological advancement:  applications  of  the  newly  acquired  knowledge 
regarding  atomic  energy  could  serve  either  constructive  or  destructive 
purposes.  This  factor,  combined  with  the  immediate  recognition  of 
atomic  energy  development  as  a  great  step  forward  in  man's  inquiry 
into  scientific  knowledge,  signified  that  such  development  had  political 
implications  of  global  proportions.  Further  recognition  of  the  im- 
portance of  the  technological  development  of  atomic  energy  for  U.S. 

Note  :  This  chapter  was  prepared  in  1972  by  Leneice  N.  Wu.  , 

(57) 


58 


foreign  policy  was  inevitable.  Its  significance  was  enhanced  by  the 
fact  that  the  first  demonstration  of  the  technology  was  its  use  as  a 
weapon  in  actual  warfare.  Considering  the  decisive  role  which  the 
atomic  weapon  played  in  ending  the  war  with  Japan,  its  use  gave  rise 
to  a  number  of  questions  for  the  United  States  on  both  the  international 
and  national  levels. 

On  the  international  level,  the  nations  of  the  world  recognized  a 
need  to  prevent  proliferation  of  atomic  energy  weapons  technology 
and  capabilities.  Questions  were  raised  in  official  quarters  both  at  home 
and  abroad  with  regard  to  the  intentions  of  the  United  States,  as  sole 
owner  of  atomic  weapons,  and  how  this  fact  would  affect  its  relations 
with  the  rest  of  the  world.  Officials  in  the  U.S.  Government  perceived 
the  urgency  of  devising  a  policy  regarding  the  U.S.  contribution  to  an 
international  arrangement  for  the  control  of  atomic  energy  to  pre- 
vent its  employment  for  weapons  purposes,  and  also  perceived  the  need 
for  monitoring  by  some  international  means  the  country-by-count  re- 
development of  atomic  energy. 

The  new  nuclear  science  and  its  early  technology  also  offered  the 
potential  for  development  of  atomic  energy  to  serve  beneficial  pur- 
poses, national  and  international.  Traditionally,  scientific  advance- 
ments are  shared  readily  within  the  scientific  community  without  re- 
gard to  national  boundaries.  However,  the  military  implications  of 
atomic  energy  generated  pressures  to  prevent  traditional  free  com- 
munication in  this  instance.1 

Moreover,  concern  for  the  military  applications  of  atomic  energy 
necessarily  overrode  attention  to  peaceful  uses.  In  turn,  these  military 
security  factors  presented  obstacles  and  limitations  for  the  hoped-for 
international  cooperation  in  developing  peaceful  uses,  for  the  formu- 
lation of  a  U.S.  policy  regarding  its  role  in  international  cooperation, 
and  for  a  program  within  the  United  States  itself  to  pursue  peaceful 
exploitation. 

What  challenges  did  the  innovation  of  the  atom  bomb  present  to 
traditional  concepts  of  diplomacy  ?  Did  the  policymakers  in  the  United 
States  or  the  diplomats  of  the  negotiations  meet  them  ?  Were  the  scien- 
tific and  technological  factors  of  the  situation  used  to  support  or  to 
correct  established  principles  of  U.S.  foreign  policy?  What  steps  were 
taken  by  diplomats  and  scientists  to  understand  each  other's  points  of 
view  ?  Were  they  successful  ?  How  did  they  fail? 

These  are  a  few  of  the  salient  questions  to  which  this  study  is  ad- 
dressed. The  following  discussion  offers  a  brief  historical  overview 
mikI  an  explanation  of  the  political,  military,  and  technical  factors  of 
(he  atmosphere  in  which  the  negotiations  took  place.  During  the  nu- 
clear policymaking  process  in  the  United  States  and  in  the  interna- 
tional negotiations,  certain  issues  arose  which  are  pertinent  to  this 
series  of  studies  on  science,  technology,  and  American  diplomacy.  The 
study  examines  the  development  of  these  issues  from  (he  I'.S.  policy 
deliberations  through  their  outcome  in  the  negotiations.  Finally,  it 
discusses  a  number  of  prominent  features  in  the  negotiations  and  sets 
forth  some  general  concluding  observations. 

1  It  was  the  early  nuclear  scientists  themselves  who  adopted  a  policy  of  secrecy  In  the 
United  States,  well  before  the  start  of  the  Manhattan  Project,  the  wartime  Rovernment 
effort  which  developed  the  atom  bomb. 


II.  A  Short  Chronology  or  Atomic  Control  Diplomacy  After 

World  War  II 

A  chronological  summary  of  the  sequence  of  early  developments 
aiming  toward  international  controls  may  be  helpful  in.  setting  the 
stage  for  consideration  of  the  international  negotiations  and  why  they 
failed. 

Deliberations  on  U.S.  policy  in  light  of  the  development  of  the  atom 
bomb  had  been  initiated  as  early  as  May  1945,  when  Henry  L.  Stimson, 
the  Secretary  of  War,  led  a  committee  which  reported  to  President 
Truman  on  the  subject.  Shortly  thereafter,  in  June,  the  stage  was  set 
for  the  machinery  to  handle  the  international  negotiations  on  the  con- 
trol of  atomic  energy,  with  the  signing  of  the  United  Nations  Charter. 
Two  months  later  the  weapon  was  actually  used  on  Hiroshima  on 
August  6,  1945. 

Once  the  use  of  atomic  energy  for  destructive  purposes  had  been 
demonstrated,  the  Administration  took  action  to  publicize  as  much  in- 
formation as  was  judged  appropriate  to  contribute  to  public  under- 
standing of  the  weapon  and  its  significance  for  the  United  States.  An 
important  step  in  this  direction  was  the  publication  in  August  1945  of 
the  Smyth  report,2  which  explained  the  basic  scientific  information  on 
the  bomb  but  kept  its  disclosures  within  the  limits  defined  by  security 
considerations.  President  Truman  took  initial  steps  to  enunciate  U.S. 
atomic  energy  policy  at  both  the  national  and  international  levels  in 
two  major  addresses  in  October  1945. 3 

Preliminary  Agreements  on  Nuclear  Sharing;  U.S.  Preparations  To 
Negotiate 

Public  attention  shifted  to  international  activity  during  the  closing- 
months  of  1945.  On  November  15,  an  agreement  was  concluded  by  the 
United  States,  Canada,  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Called  the  "Three 
Nation  Agreed  Declaration,"  this  agreement  laid  a  foundation  for  in- 
ternational action  to  control  atomic  energy.  The  Soviet  Union  was  in- 
cluded in  this  endeavor  when  the  Moscow  Declaration  was  signed  the 
following  month,  as  a  result  of  meetings  of  representatives  of  the 
Governments  of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia.  In  the 
United  States,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Acheson  had  been 
appointed  earlier  in  December  to  head  a  committee  to  report  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  on  U.S.  policy  for  the  international  control  of 
atomic  energy. 

In  January  1946,  the  newly  formed  United  Nations  created  an  orga- 
nization to  deal  with  the  specific  problem  of  controlling  atomic  energy 
when  it  drew  up  the  terms  of  reference  of  the  United  Nations  Atomic 

2  Henry  D.  Smyth.  A  General  Account  of  the  Development  of  Methods  of  Using  Atomic 
Energy  for  Military  Purposes  Vnder  the  Auspices  of  the  U.S.  Government,  1940—^5. 
(Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1945.) 

3  President  Truman  delivered  a  message  to  Congress  on  atomic  energy  on  Oct.  3,  1945, 
and  elaborated  on  U.S.  atomic  energy  policy  in  his  Navy  Day  address  on  October  27,  in 
New  York.  Complete  texts  of  both  can  be  found  in  Public  Papers  of  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  1945.  (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1961). 
pp.  362-366,  431-438. 

(59) 


60 


Energy  Commission  (UNAEC).  At  the  same  time,  the  deliberations 
of  Acheson's  group  were  getting  underway  as  an  additional  group  of 
policymakers,  largely  from  the  scientific  community,  provided  the 
technical  advice  necessary  to  an  understanding  of  the  problem  and 
to  formulating  an  appropriate  policy.  This  group,  known  as  the  Board 
of  Consultants,  was  led  by  David  Lilienthal,  Chairman  of  the  Tennes- 
see Valley  Authority. 

The  findings  of  these  two  groups,  known  as  the  Acheson-Lilienthal 
report,4  were  released  in  March  1946.  In  the  same  month,  Bernard 
M.  Baruch  was  appointed  by  President  Truman  to  speak  for  the 
United  States  in  the  UNAEC.  Combining  his  own  views  on  interna- 
tional control  of  atomic  energy  with  the  proposals  set  down  in  the 
Acheson-Lilienthal  report,  Baruch  presented  the  U.S.  proposal,  which 
became  known  as  the  Baruch  plan,  at  the  opening  session  of  the 
UNAEC  on  June  14, 1946. 

Impasse  of  Negotiations  in  the  United  Nations 

Opening  proposals  of  the  Soviet  Union  were  presented  to  the 
UNAEC  on  June  19.  The  extensive  differences  between  the  policies 
of  the  two  countries  were  to  undergo  few  modifications  during  the 
negotiations  to  follow.  Once  the  initial  proposals  of  the  major  powers 
had  been  made,  procedural  arrangements  of  the  UNAEC  were  devised 
and  implemented.  An  important  group  was  the  Scientific  and  Tech- 
nical Committee,  which  examined  the  technical  feasibility  of  con- 
trol. The  report  of  this  group  was  issued  to  a  major  organ  of  the 
UNAEC,  called  Committee  Two,  in  October  1946.  Following  discus- 
sions by  this  latter  body,  a  report  of  the  whole  UNAEC  was  made 
to  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  on  December  31,  1947. 

The  Security  Council  did  not  resolve  the  questions  raised  by  the  first 
report  of  the  UNAEC  on  international  control  of  atomic  energy,  and 
referred  the  problem  back  to  the  UNAEC  in  March  1947.  The  second 
session  of  that  body  had  been  underway  since  January  1  and  continued 
until  September  1947,  when  a  second  report  was  issued  to  the  Security 
Council.  Again,  decisive  action  was  not  forthcoming  from  the  Security 
Council,  and  further  deliberations  were  carried  on  by  the  UNAEC, 
which  issued  its  third  and  final  report  on  May  7,  1948.  This  document 
recorded  the  admission  by  the  negotiators  that  their  deliberations  had 
reached  a  stalemate.  The  General  Assembly  pressed  for  continuation 
of  the  discussions,  but  they  were  finally  suspended  in  November  1949. 
In  the  meantime,  an  important  event  substantially  altered  the  char- 
acter and  outlook  of  the  negotiations  and  added  to  the  existing  diffi- 
culties of  an  extremely  complex  international  problem.  This  event  was 
the  explosion  by  the  Soviet  Union  on  September  v2.">.  L949,  of  its  own 
nuclear  device. 
The  Historical  Context  of  the  Negotiations;  the  Turbulent  Postwar 

Years 

The  events  reviewed  in  this  study  occurred  during  a  turbulent    I 

years  during   which   the  great    powers  and   the   lesser  powers  moved 

to  establish  post  war  mechanisms  and  configural  ions  of  power,  security. 

and  influence.  The  splitting  of  Europe  occurred  ns  Bulgaria  (Septem- 

u IS  Department  of  State  t  Report  on  the  International  Control  of  Atomic  Energy, 
Publication  No.  2498  (Washington,  D.C  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1040),  re- 
ferred to  as  the  "Acheson  Lilienthal  Report." 


61 


ber  1946),  Czechoslovakia  (June  1948),  Hungary  (August  1949),  and 
East  Germany  (October  1949)  became  Communist  People's  Republics. 
The  Greek  civil  war  raged  through  the  early  postwar  years;  the 
Truman  doctrine  and  Marshall  plan  proposals  came  in  March  and 
June  1947 ;  the  Berlin  blockade  and  airlift  began  in  mid-1948 ;  and  the 
NATO  Treaty  was  signed  in  April  1949. 

The  Far  Eastern  world  was  no  less  in  flux.  Indochina  and  Indo- 
nesian anticolonial  wars  were  in  progress  by  1946.  The  Philippines, 
India,  and  Pakistan  attained  independence  in  1946  and  1947.  U.S. 
dominance  in  the  Pacific  was  consolidated  from  Hawaii  to  occupied 
Japan.  And  the  Chinese  civil  war  ended  in  1949  with  Communist 
ascendency  over  the  mainland. 

The  rapidly  changing  system  of  international  power  relationships 
and  national  interests  in  the  postwar  world  made  more  difficult  the 
analysis  of  policy  alternatives  in  the  national  and  international  con- 
trol of  the  atom.  Viewed  as  the  most  commanding  source  of  military 
power  in  the  postwar  world,  the  atomic  weapon  altered  the  world 
power  structure  immeasurably,  and  the  United  States  tried  to  use  the 
fact  of  its  possession  as  a  surrogate  for  great  troop  strength.  But  its 
very  potency  made  it  an  unusable  weapon  in  influencing  the  shifts  of 
power  alignment  during  these  years.  Meanwhile,  the  Soviet  Union 
sought  to  blunt  the  bomb's  influence  in  diplomacy  while  striving 
vigorously  to  secure  its  own  nuclear  capability.  Taking  into  considera- 
tion all  these  parallel  developments,  it  is  clear  why  the  negotiations  to 
bring  the  new  force  under  international  control  yielded  no  useful 
diplomatic  product. 


III.  The  Postwar  Paradox  :  Cold  War  and  Internationalism 

The  historical  setting  for  U.S.  diplomatic  efforts  aimed  at  the  inter- 
national control  of  atomic  energy  contained  two  opposite  and  irrecon- 
cilable trends.  On  the  one  hand,  the  end  of  World  War  II  had  wit- 
nessed the  emergence  of  two  great  powers,  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  whose  basic  ideologies  were  intrinsically  at  odds  with 
one  another.  The  early  years  of  the  postwar  period  when  the  Baruch 
plan  was  being  negotiated  were  to  reveal  a  growing  antagonism  in 
United  States-Soviet  relations  which  was  to  become  known  as  the  cold 
war.  On  the  other  hand,  there  also  emerged  a  widespread  attitude  of 
international  cooperation  in  world  affairs,  as,  in  June  1945,  the  diverse' 
powers  attempted  to  establish  a  framework  for  peace  through  the 
United  Nations,  an  organization  which  was  to  receive  a  serious  chal- 
lenge in  its  attempts  to  establish  international  control  of  atomic  energy. 
And  despite  the  increasing  awareness  of  the  widening  breach  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  efforts  were  made  to  achieve 
some  measure  of  cooperation  between  the  two  countries,  e.g.,  the  post- 
war conferences  of  ministers. 

Preparation  for  International  Control  Efforts 

On  the  international  level,  a  major  concern  was  the  control  of  atomic 
energy,  both  as  a  means  of  destruction  and  as  a  new  power  which 
could  benefit  mankind,  and  the  nations  of  the  world  acted  to  set  up 
international  machinery  to  cope  with  this  problem.  The  first  step  was 
an  agreement  among  those  powers  which  had  been  involved  in  the 
development  of  atomic  energy  during  the  war,  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain,  and  Canada.  Meetings  were  held  in  Washington  among 
President  Hairy  S.  Truman,  British  Prime  Minister  Clement  Attlee, 
and  Canadian  Prime  Minister  W.  L.  Mackenzie  King;  as  noted  above, 
the  resulting  agreement  of  November  15,  1945  is  known  as  the  Three 
Nation  Agreed  Declaration.  In  it,  the  three  countries  declared  their 
intention  to  share  with  all  nations  the  scientific  information  associated 
with  atomic  energy  for  peaceful  purposes.  However,  the  Declaration 
acknowledged  the  dilemma  posed  by  the  practical  applications  of 
atomic  energy,  in  that  much  of  the  information  necessary  to  carry  out 
the  industrial  applications  was  virtually  the  same  as  that  needed  for 
weapons  production.  It  was  agreed,  therefore,  that  it  was  necessary  to 
withhold  this  information  until  appropriate  safeguards  could  be  es- 
tablished to  insure  that  it  would  be  used  only  for  peaceful  purposes. 
To  this  end,  the  three  heads  of  state  suggested  that  the  United  Nations 
Organization  set  up  a  Commission  which  would  make  recommendations 
on  the  question  of  international  control  to  the  United  Nations.5 

Russian  agreement  to  the  principles  of  the  Three  Nation  Agreed 
I  teclaration  was  obtained  the  next  month,  at  the  Conference  of  Minis- 
ters in  Moscow,  and  was  made  public  on  December  27  in  the  Moscow 


'For  a  complete  text  of  the  Three  Nation  Agreed  Declaration,  sre  U.S.  Department 
of  State  The  international  Control  of  Atomic  Energy,  drouth  of  a  Policy,  Publication 
•J702    (Washington,    D.C. :    U.S.    Government    Printing  office,    1946),    pp.    118-120. 


(62) 


63 


Declaration,  a  Soviet-Anglo-American  statement.  In  addition  to  sup- 
porting the  idea  of  establishing  a  Commission  in  the  United  Nations, 
the  Moscow  Declaration  contained  the  text  of  a  proposed  resolution 
to  establish  the  organization,  and  invited  Fiance,  China,  and  Canada 
to  cosponsor  it  at  the  first  session  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  in 
January  1946.°  The  text  of  the  Moscow  Declaration  was  incorporated 
unchanged  in  a  resolution  which  was  passed  by  the  General  Assembly 
without  a  dissenting  vote  on  January  24,  1946,  and  which  thereby  es- 
tablished the  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission  (UNAEC) . 
Under  the  terms  of  the  resolution,  the  UNAEC  was  to  operate 
closely  within  the  framework  of  the  Security  Council,  with  its  provi- 
sion for  the  veto  power,  a  fact  with  significance  for  subsequent  nego- 
tiations on  the  control  of  atomic  energy.  The  Commission  was  to  be 
composed  of  one  representative  of  each  country  on  the  Security  Coun- 
cil and  receive  directions  from  the  Council  "in  matters  affecting  secu- 
rity." The  resolution  added,  "On  these  matters,  the  Commission  shall 
be  accountable  for  its  work  to  the  Security  Council,"  a  provision  which 
was  included  as  a  result  of  the  initiative  of  the  Soviet  Union  at  the 
Moscow  Conference.  The  rationale  behind  this  approach  rested  on  the 
assertion  that  the  most  important  aspect  of  the  control  question  was 
the  assurance  of  security.  Even  at  this  early  stage,  the  concern  over 
the  military  applications  of  atomic  energy  dominated  the  discussions, 
diverting  attention  from  ways  to  share  knowledge  necessary  in  the 
economic  or  industrial  applications  of  atomic  energy.7  The  resolution 
also  set  down  the  terms  of  reference  for  the  Commission's  proposals 
as  follows : 

(a)  For  extending  between  all  nations  the  exchange  of 
basic  scientific  information  for  peaceful  ends; 

(b)  For  control  of  atomic  energy  to  the  extent  necessary 
to  ensure  its  use  only  for  peaceful  purposes ; 

(c)  For  the  elimination  from  national  armaments  of 
atomic  weapons  and  of  all  other  major  weapons  adaptable 
to  mass  destruction ;  and 

(d)  For  effective  safeguards  by  way  of  inspection  and 
other  means  to  protect  complying  States  against  the  hazards 
of  violations  and  evasion.8 

Formulation  of  Atomic  Policy  in  the  United  States 

The  commanding  position  of  the  United  States  as  a  world  power 
resulting  from  its  role  in  World  War  II  and  in  helping  to  shape  the 
postwar  world  led  to  an  unprecedented  involvement  in  international 
relations.  As  the  nation  in  sole  possession  of  atomic  weapons,  the 
United  States  bore  an  added  responsibility  to  seek  international  con- 
trol over  this  new  and  terrible  form  of  destruction. 

Not  onlv  was  it  necessary  to  define  national  policv  on  international 
control,  but  it  was  also  important  to  determine  an  appropriate  means 
of  domestic  control,  a  responsibility  which  had  been  given  to  the  Army 

6  See  Ibid.  pn.  125-127  for  the  text  of  the  Moscow  Declaration. 

7  Joseph  I.  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  The  Struggle  to  Control  Atomic 
Weapons,  191,5-1,9  (Boston,  Mass.  :  Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  1970),  p.  213. 

8  "Establishment  of  a  Commission  to  Deal  With  The  Problems  Raised  by  the  Discovery 
of  Atomic  Energy,"  United  Nations  General  Assembly  Resolution  I,  Resolutions  Adopted  b?/ 
the  General  Assembly  During  the  First  Part  of  Its  First  Session  from  10  January  to  11, 
February  191,6,  United  Nations  Document  A/64  (London,  England:  Church  House,  1946), 
p.  9. 

96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1-6 


64 


during  the  war.  National  control  of  weapons  production  and  disclos- 
ure of  information  necessary  for  this  purpose  posed  controversy.  In 
addition,  consideration  was  given  to  the  role  of  U.S.  domestic  control 
in  relation  to  international  negotiations  and  control. 

DOMESTIC  CONTROL 

The  congressional  controversy  over  domestic  control  of  atomic  en- 
ergy occurred  during  the  early  stages  of  formulation  of  U.S.  policy 
on  international  control  and  during  the  first  months  of  the  negotia- 
tions in  the  United  Nations.  A  prominent  issue  in  the  vigorous  public 
debate  concerned  the  extent  of  the  military  role  in  U.S.  atomic  energy 
programs.  Proposals  ranged  from  a  military-dominated  commission 
responsible  for  U.S.  development  of  atomic  energy  to  complete  ex- 
clusion of  the  military.  Equally  difficult  was  the  issue  of  the  kind  of 
control  to  be  placed  on  the  release  of  information  on  industrial  appli- 
cations, that  is,  data  which  could  apply  to  weapons  production  as  well, 
without  obstructing  the  exchange  of  information  within  the  scien- 
tific community  necessary  to  foster  maximum  development  of  atomic 
energy. 

The  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946,  approved  July  26,  provided  for  a 
full-time  civilian  Atomic  Energy  Commission  whose  members  were 
to  be  appointed  by  the  President  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate.  It  also  established  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy 
of  the  Congress  to  oversee  atomic  energy  matters.  Provision  was  made 
for  consultations  with  and  recommendations  from  a  Military  Liaison 
Committee  on  "'matters  relating  to  military  applications,"9  but  final 
decisions  were  left  to  the  civilian  Commission.  As  far  as  dissemina- 
tion of  information  was  concerned,  the  law  set  up  a  category  called 
"restricted  data,""  which  included  primarily  data  associated  with 
atomic  weapons  and  fissionable  materials.  The  law  then  set  down  the 
nature  of  the  punishments  to  be  used  against  those  convicted  of  trans- 
mitting restricted  data  for  the  purpose  of  injuring  the  United  States 
or  for  granting  an  advantage  to  a  foreign  country.  Exchange  of  in- 
formation with  foreign  countries  on  the  use  of  atomic  energy  for  in- 
dustrial purposes  was  forbidden  until  Congress  declared  "by  joint 
resolution  that  effective  and  enforceable  international  safeguards 
against  the  use  of  atomic  energy  for  destructive  purposes  have  been 
established."10 

One  section  of  the  law  was  devoted  to  the  relationship  between  do- 
mestic control  and  any  international  control  arrangements  which 
might  be  concluded.  The  law  defined  "international  arrangement"  as 
a  t  reaty  approved  by  t  he  Senate  or  ( )ongress,  and  recognized  the  possi- 
bility t  hat  portions  of  the  U.S.  law  might  be  inconsistent  with  such  an 
arrangement.  If  this  should  be  the  case,  according  to  the  law,  the  pro- 
visions of  the  international  arrangement  would  take  precedence  as 
long  as  the  agreement  was  in  force.  Moreover,  tin-  Commission  was  to 
"give  maximum  effect  to  the  policies  contained  in  any  such  interna- 
t  ional  arrangement."  " 

The  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946  may  have  had  some  effect  on  foreign 
perceptions  of  ih<>  U.S.  position  in  the  negotiations  on  international 


"  Sec.  •_'(<■).  nil  Stat.  757. 

"■  Sec    10(a)(1).  «;<>  stat.  7<;<; 

"  Soc  8(C),  00  Stat.  765 


65 


control.  For  example,  an  argument  in  the  United  States  which  favored 
complete  civilian  control  had  been  the  assertion  that  a  military-con- 
trolled program  might  convey  the  impression  that  the  general  purpose 
of  U.S.  atomic  energy  programs  was  oriented  toward  weapons  pro- 
duction, thereby  presenting  an  unfavorable  prospect  for  U.S.  willing- 
ness to  seek  or  accept  international  control.  As  the  bill  was  finally 
passed  by  the  Congress,  the  emphasis  on  civilian  control  may  have 
helped  avoid  such  an  impression.  Moreover,  the  law  marked  an  un- 
precedented intrusion  of  the  Federal  Government  into  private  enter- 
prise through  its  provisions  for  Government  ownership  and  control 
over  fissionable  materials  and  provisions  for  various  licensing  powers 
with  respect  to  facilities  and  activities.  Thus,  by  these  provisions  the 
Congress  demonstrated  its  awareness  of  the  unprecedented  importance 
and  dangers  of  the  development  of  atomic  energy.  The  section  on 
international  control  may  have  served  to  show  a  positive  U.S.  view 
toward  international  control  and  preparedness  to  implement  it. 

However,  the  considerable  precautions  which  were  taken  regarding 
release  of  information  may  have  served  to  reflect  a  U.S.  desire  to  retain 
its  atomic  monopoly.  Although  these  precautions  were  also  based  on 
U.S.  security  considerations  and  on  U.S.  suspicions  of  how  other  coun- 
tries might  use  atomic  weapons  once  they  had  acquired  them,  nonethe- 
less, the  debate  on  this  issue  and  the  resulting  provisions  in  the  law  may 
have  inspired  doubts  in  other  countries  as  to  the  sincerity  of  U.S. 
pledges  to  relinquish  its  monopoly  to  an  appropriate  international  au- 
thority. In  any  case,  the  following  conclusion  of  a  State  Department 
publication  seems  applicable: 

The  evolution  of  a  policy  for  domestic  control  not  only  pro- 
vided parallels  for  the  problems  that  were  certain  to  be  met 
in  international  planning,  but  it  illustrated  as  no  other 
process  could  the  magnitude  and  complexity  of  the  task  that 
awaited  inter-Governmental  collaboration.12 

HASTY  DEMOBILIZATION   OF  U.S.    MILITARY  FORCES 

A  relevant  consideration  in  the  evolution  of  early  U.S.  policy  for 
the  atom  is  the  overall  state  of  the  U.S.  defense  posture  in  1945  and 
1946.13  With  the  advent  of  peace,  the  American  public  and  the  troops 
themselves  clamored  to  bring  the  armies  home,  on  the  grounds  that 
there  was  no  longer  a  need  to  maintain  the  wartime  level  of  military 
manpower.  Besides  being  influenced  by  the  euphoric  atmosphere 
brought  on  by  the  end  of  war,  many  people  looked  to  the  newly  de- 
veloped atomic  bomb  as  a  sufficient  source  of  military  strength.  A 
week  after  the  bomb  was  dropped  on  Hiroshima  in  August  1945. 
President  Truman  responded  to  public  and  congressional  pressure, 
and  announced  that  inductions  would  drop  from  80,000  to  50,000  per 
month  and  that  within  12  to  18  months,  5i/2  million  men  would  be 
released  from  the  service.  By  April  1946,  the  number  of  those  dis- 
charged from  the  Army  had  reached  nearly  7  million.  By  June  30, 
1946,  out  of  a  total  of  about  3  million  military  personnel  remaining  on 

12  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  p.  21. 

"The  following  discussion  is  based  primarily  on  Lieberman.  The  Scorpion  and  the 
Tarantula,  pp.  227-234. 


66 


active  duty  in  all  of  the  U.S.  armed  services  combined,  approximately 
1.4  million  were  in  the  Army.14 

Many  U.S.  Government  officials,  especially  among  the  military 
services,  had  opposed  such  rapid  demobilization  of  the  armed  forces 
because  of  their  mistrust  of  the  Russians.  One  historian  cites  the 
power  vacuum  in  Europe  which  resulted  from  rapid  U.S.  withdrawal 
as  at  least  one  reason  for  the  imposition  of  Soviet  hegemony  in  East- 
ern Europe  during  this  period.15  The  dramatic  cuts  in  the  armed 
forces  also  were  to  have  an  effect  on  the  negotiations  for  the  control 
of  atomic  energy.  One  source  interprets  the  situation  as  follows : 

As  the  nation's  conventional  military  resources  grew 
wTeaker  and  weaker  at  a  time  when  Soviet  dynamism  made 
it  imperative  that  the  United  States  be  strong,  the  place  of 
atomic  weapons  in  the  overall  American  military  posture 
would  naturally  become  more  critical  and  worthy  of 
protection.16 

FORMULATION  OF  U.S.  POLICY  ON  INTERNATIONAL  CONTROL 

Early  efforts:  Even  before  the  first  atomic  bomb  was  used  during 
the  war-,  some  persons  in  the  United  States  were  aware  of  the  potential 
need  for  control  of  atomic  energy  and  encouraged  the  Administration 
to  initiate  action  to  formulate  its  policy  on  the  subject.  Largely  at  the 
recommendation  of  Vannevar  Bush,  a  scientific  advisor  to  President 
Truman  and  Chairman  of  the  Office  of  Scientific  Research  and  Devel- 
opment, and  another  presidential  advisor,  Harvard  University  Presi- 
dent James  B.  Conant,  Truman  called  on  Henry  L.  Stimson,  Secretary 
of  War,  to  appoint  a  group  to  consider  the  future  needs  in  the  area  of 
control,  on  both  the  international  and  domestic  levels.  Stimson  recog- 
nized that  to  deal  with  the  unique  situation  created  by  the  development 
of  the  atomic  bomb  required  knowledge  in  both  science  and  politics; 
he  gathered  advisors  from  these  areas,  including  Bush  and  Conant, 
Ralph  Bard,  the  Undersecretary  of  the  Navy,  William  L.  Clayton, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Economic  Affairs,  and  James  F. 
Byrnes,  who  would  become  Secretary  of  State  two  months  later,  to 
serve  as  the  President's  personal  representative  on  the  Committee. 
Other  members  were  George  Harrison,  president  of  the  New  York 
Life  Insurance  Company  and  a  Special  Assistant  to  Stimson,  Karl 
Compton,  a  physicist  and  president  of  the  Massachusetts  Institute  of 
Technology,  and  several  scientists  who  had  led  in  the  development  of 
the  bomb:  Dr.  J.  Robert  Oppenheimer,  Dr.  Ernest  O.  Lawrence,  Dr. 
Arthur  II.  Compton,  and  Dr.  Enrico  Fermi.  The  unpublished  report 
of  what  is  known  as  the  Secretary  of  War's  Interim  Committee,  which 
nut  during  May  L945,  reached  a  number  of  conclusions  affecting  inter- 
national control  which  were  to  remain  at,  issue  in  future  attempts 
toward  such  control. 

Within  a  month  after  the  first  atomic  weapons  were  used,  in  August 
194.">,  a  report  w  as  issued  which  explained  the  basic  scientific  facts  asso- 
ciated with  the  development  of  atomic  energy.  Prepared  in  1944  by  a 
physicist  who  had  been  involved  in  the  bomb  effort,  Dr.  Henry  I). 


11  U.S.  Department  of  Defense,  Selected  Manpower  Statistics  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  l!»7i  >.  p.  lit. 

16  Thomas  A.  Bailey,  '  Dlplomatio  History  of  the  American  People  (New  York  :  Appleton- 
Century  Crofts,  1964),  p.  778. 

19  Lleberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  234. 


67 


Smyth  of  Princeton,  the  report  was  released  to  avert  any  misconcep- 
tion or  wild  speculation  by  the  public  concerning  the  new  weapon. 
Moreover,  it  v  as  hoped  that  by  supplying  a  substantial  amount  of  in- 
formation at  this  time,  the  report  would  alleviate  public  pressure,  espe- 
cially from  the  scientific  community,  for  release  of  all  pertinent  infor- 
mation. The  Smyth  report  supplied  basic  facts,  but  not  enough  to  aid 
rival  efforts  to  develop  an  atomic  weapon.17 

The  decision  to  release  the  Smyth  report  was  much  debated  within 
the  Administration,  but  the  reasons  noted  above  prevailed.  The  Smyth 
report  was  later  used  as  a  basic  source  for  the  discussions  in  a  Scien- 
tific and  Technical  Committee  of  the  UNAEC.  The  conclusion  of  the 
report  is  often  cited  when  the  study  is  considered  in  relation  to  inter- 
national control : 

We  find  ourselves  with  an  explosive  which  is  far  from 
completely  perfected.  Yet  the  future  possibilities  of  such 
explosives  are  appalling,  and  their  effects  on  future  wars  and 
international  affairs  are  of  fundamental  importance.  Here  is 
a  new  tool  for  mankind,  a  tool  of  unimaginable  destructive 
power.  Its  development  raises  many  questions  that  must  be 
answered  in  the  near  future. 

*  *  *  These  questions  are  not  technical  questions ;  they  are 
political  and  social  questions,  and  the  answers  given  to  them 
may  affect  all  mankind  for  generations  *  *  *  In  a  free  country 
like  ours,  such  questions  should  be  debated  by  the  people  and 
decisions  must  be  made  by  the  people  through  their  repre- 
sentatives. This  is  one  reason  for  the  release  of  this  report.  It 
is  a  semi-technical  report  which  it  is  hoped  men  of  science  in 
this  country  can  use  to  help  their  fellow  citizens  in  reaching 
wise  decisions.  The  people  of  the  country  must  be  informed 
if  they  are  to  discharge  their  responsibilities  wisely.18 

Among  the  initial  public  statements  of  U.S.  policy  on  arrangements 
for  international  control  was  President  Truman's  address  to  Congress 
on  October  3,  1945.  Affirming  the  U.S.  commitment  to  seek  interna- 
tional control  of  atomic  energy  and  the  U.S.  desire  to  share  informa- 
tion for  peaceful  purposes,  the  President  announced  the  impending 
discussions  with  Canada  and  Great  Britain  which  were  to  result  in  the 
Three  Nation  Agreed  Declaration.  On  October  27,  1945,  he  further 
defined  U.S.  policy  by  enunciating  five  basic  principles  which,  for 
the  most  part,  had  originated  with  Stimson's  committee.  These  con- 
clusions might  be  viewed  as  a  combination  of  the  primary  technological 
and  political  factors  which  would  condition  the  evolution  of  the  U.S. 
plan  for  international  control  and  the  negotiations  to  achieve  such 
control.  Bernhard  G.  Bechhoefer,  associated  with  early  U.S.  arms  con- 
trol negotiations  in  the  Department  of  State,  has  summarized  these 
principles  as  follows : 

1.  No  nation  can  long  maintain  a  monopoly  of  atomic 
weapons. 

2.  No  nation  could  long  maintain  or  morally  defend  a 
monopoly  of  peaceful  benefits  of  atomic  energy. 

17  Richard  G.  Hewlett  and  Oscar  B.  Anderson,  Jr.  The  New  World  1939/191,6,  A  History 
of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  vol.  I  (University  Park,  Pa.  :  Pennsyl- 
vania State  University  Press,  1962)  pp.  400-407. 

18  Smyth,  General  Account  of  the  Development  of  Methods  of  Using  Atomic  Energy  for 
Military  Purposes,  p.  165. 


68 


3.  For  the  foreseeable  future  there  can  be  no  adequate 
military  defense  against  atomic  weapons. 

4.  All  the  initial  processes  in  the  production  of  fissionable 
materials  and  certain  subsequent  processes  are  identical 
whether  their  intended  use  or  purpose  is  peaceful  or  military. 

5.  The  nuclear  chain  reaction  required  for  the  release  of 
atomic  energy  is  now  based  upon  uranium  or  thorium  as  the 
only  suitable  raw  materials  occurring  in  nature.  Ores  contain- 
ing these  materials  are  only  relatively  rare.  Although  rich  de- 
posits are  not  numerous,  the  lower  concentrations  of  the  ores 
have  a  wide  geographical  distribution.19 

Preparations  for  negotiations  in  the  UNAEC :  In  January  1946, 
1  month  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Moscow  Declaration,  James  F. 
Byrnes,  Secretary  of  State,  announced  that  he  had  appointed  a  com- 
mittee "to  study  the  subject  of  controls  and  safeguards  necessary  to 
protect  this  00^-61-11™^!!^'  during  the  international  negotiations  on 
atomic  energy.  Assistant  Secretary  Acheson  had  been  named  chair- 
man; the  other  members  were  Bush,  Oonant,  General  Leslie  Groves — 
head  of  the  Manhattan  project  which  had  developed  the  atomic  bomb 
during  the  war — and  John  McCloy,  former  Assistant  Secretary  of 
War.  Although  the  members  of  the  committee  had  some  knowledge  of 
atomic  energy  matters  from  the  standpoint  of  both  its  technological 
and  political  aspects,  Acheson  suggested  appointing  a  Board  of  Con- 
sultants to  advise  the  committee  on  the  technological  aspects  of  inter- 
national control.  David  Lilienthal,  Chairman  of  the  Tennessee  Valley 
Authority,  was  given  the  task  of  leading  the  Board.  Its  other  members 
were  Chester  Barnard,  president  of  New  Jersey  Bell  Telephone,  who 
had  been  active  in  the  U.N.  Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Administration ; 
Harry  A.  Winne,  an  engineer  and  a  vice  president  of  General  Electric 
Company,  who  had  participated  in  the  Manhattan  Project ;  and  Dr.  J. 
Robert  Oppenheimer,  the  physicist  who  had  directed  the  weaponry 
installation  of  the  Manhattan  Project  at  Los  Alamos,  New  Mexico. 
The  composition  of  the  two  groups  was  intended  to  provide  the  talents 
necessary  to  consider  both  the  political  and  technological  aspects  of 
the  problem  of  providing  a  basis  for  a  workable  system  of  international 
control. 

In  the  course  of  the  next  two  months,  the  Board  drafted  a  basic  plan 
for  international  control.  Following  a  series  of  meetings  with  Ache- 
son's  committee,  which  led  to  certain  modifications  and  additions,  it 
produced  a  document  entitled  "A  Report  on  the  International  Control 
of  Atomic  Energy."  Known  as  the  "Acheson-Lilienthal  report,"  the 
study  set  down  the  basic  technological  factors  involved  in  the  develop- 
ment of  atomic  energy,  particularly  those  which  would  affect  the  na- 
ture of  the  international  control  system.  Once  these  considerations  had 
been  provided,  the  Hoard  outlined  the  basic  features  of  a  control  plan, 
governed  primarily  by  the  technological  data.  ( )n  the  whole,  the  Board 
regarded  its  work  "not  as  a  -final  plan,  but  as  a  place  to  begin,  a  foun- 
dation  on  which  to  build."20  The  report  was  released  in  late  March 
1!»  H'»  as  a  basis  for  public  discussion. 

'•Bernhard   G.    Ftwhhtiofer.   I'ostwar  Xcaotintionfi  for  Arms  Control   (Washington,  D.C.  : 
Brookings,  19fil),  p.  :{.'{. 

*  State  Department  "Aeheson-Llllenthal  report,"  p.  vlii. 


69 


Writing  in  1948,  J.  Robert  Oppenheimer  summarized  the  general 
trend  of  thinking  within  the  scientific  community  toward  the  atomic 
challenge  which  confronted  U.S.  diplomacy  : 

The  control  of  atomic  weapons  always  appeared  possible 
only  on  the  basis  of  an  intensive  and  working  collaboration 
between  peoples  of  many  nationalities,  on  the  creation  *  *  * 
of  supra-national  patterns  of  communication,  of  work,  and  of 
development.  The  development  of  atomic  energy  lay  in  an  area 
peculiarly  suited  to  such  internationalization,  and  in  fact  re- 
quiring it  for  the  most  effective  exploitation,  almost  on  tech- 
nical grounds  alone.  The  development  of  atomic  energy  lay  in 
a  field  international  by  tradition  and  untouched  by  pre-exist- 
ing national  patterns  of  control.  Thus,  the  problem  as  it  ap- 
peared in  the  summer  of  1945  was  to  use  our  understanding  of 
atomic  energy,  and  the  developments  that  we  had  carried  out, 
with  their  implied  hope  and  implied  threat,  to  see  whether  in 
this  area  international  barriers  might  not  be  broken  down, 
and  patterns  of  candor  and  cooperation  established  which 
would  make  the  peace  of  the  world.21 

The  U.S.  negotiator  and  final  steps  to  define  policy :  In  the  mean- 
time, on  March  18,  1946,  to  bring  the  issue  to  the  United  Nations,  the 
President  named  Bernard  M.  Baruch  U.S.  representative  to  the 
UNAEC.  One  source  offers  the  following  description  : 

Bernard  Mannes  Baruch  *  *  *  had  by  his  75th  year  become 
a  symbol  of  America  to  his  fellow  Americans  as  well  as  to 
people  all  over  the  world.  An  immensely  successful  financier 
who  had  built  a  fortune  in  the  lusty  days  of  business  boom, 
a  public  servant  and  sought-after  counselor  to  Presidents  of 
both  political  parties,  Baruch  was  one  of  the  most  trusted  men 
in  all  of  America.  The  fact  that  he  was  Jewish  seemed  to 
assure  his  place  in  the  public  mind  because  it  gave  his  life  that 
quality  of  equal  opportunity  realized,  of  Horatio  Alger,  that 
is  so  important  to  America's  self-image.22 

Included  in  the  delegation  to  the  UNAEC  were  Baruelvs  choices 
from  leading  members  of  the  banking  business :  Herbert  Swope,  John 
M.  Hancock,  and  Ferdinand  Eberstadt ;  the  fifth  member  of  the  dele- 
gation was  Fred  Searls,  a  mining  engineer,  formerly  a  journalist,  and 
head  of  the  New  York  State  Racing  Commission.  Richard  C.  Tolman, 
who  had  served  as  a  scientific  advisor  to  General  Groves,  was  chosen 
for  the  same  role  in  Baruelvs  delegation. 

Aside  from  the  fact  that  Baruch  spoke  for  U.S.  policy  on  inter- 
national control  of  atomic  energy,  his  appointment  might  be  consid- 
ered in  two  respects  with  regard  to  the  central  issues  of  this  study :  the 
primary  motives  behind  the  appointment  and  his  role  in  the  policy- 
making process.  As  to  the  reasoning  behind  the  appointment  of  Ba- 
ruch, at  this  time  the  issues  surrounding  the  domestic  control  of  atomic 
energy  were  far  from  resolved,  and  prominent  among  them  was  the 
possibility  of  excessive  restrictions  on  the  release  of  information.  Con- 
gressional hesitation  to  allow  a  free  flow  of  information  had  been  ex- 


a  J.    Robert   Oppenheimer,   "International    Control   of  Atomic  Energy,"   Bulletin  of  the 
Atomic  Scientists,  v.  4.  no.  2  (February  1948),  pp.  41-42. 
83  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  tarantula,  p.  261. 


70 


pressed  sufficiently  to  make  it  reasonably  clear  that  the  United  States 
would  be  limited,  if  not  completely  crippled,  in  its  ability  to  meet  its 
secret  agreements  with  the  British  for  postwar  collaboration  on  atomic 
energy  matters.23 

His  appointment  was  apparently  motivated  by  a  belief  that  he  could 
help  enlarge  the  Administration's  freedom  of  action  in  the  field  of 
international  negotiation.  Baruch  represented  the  kind  of  public 
servant  who  could  be  entrusted  with  America's  security,  as  well  as 
one  who  was  respected  in  international  circles.  Indeed,  the  chairman 
of  the  Senate  Foreign  Eelations  Committee  pledged  Baruch's  con- 
firmation without  a  hearing,  once  he  had  assured  the  committee  in 
writing  that  "there  would  be  no  treaty  and  no  disclosures  without  safe- 
guards, and  that  no  agreement  of  any  kind  would  be  entered  without 
the  consent  of  Congress."  24 

The  appointment  and  acceptance  of  Baruch  appear  to  have  been 
based  primarily  on  respect  for  his  political  acumen.  At  any  rate,  the 
motivations  behind  the  choice  of  the  chief  negotiator  were  not  of  the 
same  character  which  prompted  the  appointment  and  work  of  Ache- 
son's  committee  and  the  Board  of  Consultants.  Indeed,  by  some  per- 
sons, Baruch  was  not  thought  to  be  qualified  for  the  job.  The  members 
of  the  Board  and  Acheson's  committee  declined  to  continue  in  these 
groups  under  Baruch,  partly  on  the  grounds  that  if  Baruch  pursued 
policies  with  which  they  disagreed,  they  wanted  to  retain  the  right  to 
voice  their  opposition.25 

One  member  of  Baruch's  group — namely,  Hancock — reacted  nega- 
tively to  Baruch's  suggestion  that  the  Board  of  Consultants  continue 
its  work  under  the  auspices  of  the  State  Department.  Hancock  stated : 

These  problems  are  not  often  purely  scientific  problems. 
They  blend  very  quickly  into  political  problems  *  *  *.  The 
scientists  tend  to  be  unbending  and  calculating  in  the  field 
of  science — which  is  natural — but  they  carry  over  their  in- 
elasticity into  arguments  in  the  field  of  international  affairs, 
politics  in  the  proper  sense,  and  negotiation.26 

Apparently  there  was  little  common  outlook  between  those  represent- 
ing mainly  a  scientific  approach,  who  had  developed  the  recommen- 
dations for  a  policy  of  international  control  of  atomic  energy,  and 
those  representing  chiefly  a  political  approach,  who  were  responsible 
for  conducting  the  diplomatic  negol  iations  to  implement  the  emerging 
policy. 

2n  In  August  1943,  Roosevelt  and  Churchill  had  signed  an  executive  agreement,  known 
as  thi'  Quebec  Agreement,  which  was  nol  made  public,  and  affirmed  Anglo-American  coop 
eration  on  atomic  energy  during  the  war.  A  year  later,  the  two  leaders  signed  an  aide- 
memoire  to  supplement  the  earlier  agreement,  which  provided  for  full  collaboration  between 
the  two  countries  following  the  war.  Attempts  were  made  to  renegotiate  the  agreement 
al  the  time  of  the  Truman-Attlee-Klng  conference,  when  the  Americans  asserted  that  active 
collaboration  could  not  be  carried  out  through  an  executive  agreement.  Nonetheless  they 
agreed,  at  least  in  principle,  to  the  idea  of  equal  partnership,  in  the  form  of  "full  and 
effective  cooperation."  Eventually  In  April  1!)4<;.  when  the  British  pressed  for  further 
fulfillments,  Truman   Informed   them   thai   he  Interpreted   this  phrase  to  Include  only  the 

field  Of  hasic  scientific  Information,  and  thereby  finalized  the  U.S.  decision  to  withdraw 
from  any  arrangement   which  WOUld   have  Involved  lending  practical  assistance  to  endeavors 

such  as  building  ami  operating  production  plants.  The  primary  rationale  behind  thi^  policy 
was  that  the  agreement  could  aol  be  kept  secret  under  the  provisions  of  the  U.N.  ("barter 
and  public  control  efforts  which  were  about  to  begin,  Afte.  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946 
was  passed,  compliance  with  the  agreements,  as  the  British  Interpreted  them,  would  have 
been  legally  forbidden.  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic 
Energy  Commission,  pp,  i'7s  280,  177    I7:i 

-'  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  264 

"■Hewlett    and    Anderson.    History  of   tin    United  States   Atomic  Energy   Commission, 
p.  560. 

"  Llebennan.  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  291. 


71 


As  to  Baruch's  role  in  the  policymaking  process,  the  negotiator's  own 
view  of  the  part  he  should  play,  as  well  as  that  of  his  advisors,  would 
have  a  substantial  influence  on  the  shape  of  U.S.  policy,  and  on  the 
course  of  the  negotiations.  He  resented  the  fact  that  the  Acheson- 
Lilienthal  report  had  been  published,  lest  it  be  regarded  as  a  statement 
of  U.S.  policy,  thus  placing  him  in  the  role  of  a  mere  "messenger  boy." 
Only  after  consultations  with  the  President  and  Byrnes  was  Baruch 
satisfied  that  his  personal  views  on  atomic  energy  control  would  be 
considered,  although  later  accounts  by  Truman  and  Baruch  differ  re- 
garding their  perceptions  of  the  extent  of  Baruch's  powers  at  that 
time. 27 

Although  Baruch  had  asked  Acheson's  committee  and  its  Board  of 
Consultants  to  remain  at  his  disposal  during  the  negotiations,  this  ar- 
rangement did  not  materialize.  Some  meetings  were  held  between 
Baruch's  delegation  and  the  two  groups.  These  encounters  provided 
the  forum  for  expression  of  a  variety  of  views  on  U.S.  policy  but  not 
on  a  sustained  basis. 

Abortive  Efforts  in  the  United  Nations  Toward  Control 

On  June  14,  1946,  the  end  product  of  these  meetings,  and  of  discus- 
sions within  the  Administration,  was  enunciated  by  Baruch  at  the  op- 
ening session  of  the  UNAEC.  The  views  of  both  the  military  services 
and  the  Congress  had  been  considered,  and  some  of  the  basic  ingredi- 
ents of  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  had  been  retained ;  other  impor- . 
taut  characteristics  had  originated  with  Baruch  and  his  deputies. 

THE  U.S.  PROPOSAL 

In  Baruch's  speech  to  the  opening  session  of  the  UNAEC,  he  noted 
that  his  proposal  was  made  as  a  basis  for  discussion,  although  it 
eventually  came  to  be  regarded  as  a  rather  firm  statement  of  the 
U.S.  position.  Baruch  proposed  that  an  International  Control  Au- 
thority be  established  "to  which  should  be  entrusted  all  phases  of  the 
development  and  use  of  atomic  energy."  It  would  control  or  own  all 
atomic  energy  activities  potentially  dangerous  to  world  security,  and 
would  control,  license,  and  inspect  all  others.  Its  functions  would  in- 
clude fostering  the  beneficial  uses  of  atomic  energy,  and  conducting 
research  and  development  in  the  field,  in  order  to  remain  at  the  fore- 
front of  potential  new  developments.  Once  the  Authority  was  estab- 
lished, all  bomb  manufacturing  would  be  halted  and  existing  bombs 
destroyed,  and  the  Authority  would  possess  all  the  information  as- 
sociated with  atomic  energy.  This  proposal  marked  the  first  time  that 
diplomats  had  sought  to  establish  a  worldwide  system  of  control  and 
use  of  a  scientific  discovery. 

An  important  point  which  was  included,  and  a  major  contribution 
of  Baruch,  concerned  the  issue  of  enforcement  of  the  arrangement  for 
international  control.  Because  of  the  serious  nature  of  atomic  energy 
questions,  Baruch  expressed  the  view  that  any  countries  which  pur- 
sued activities  that  ran  counter  to  or  usurped  those  of  the  Authority 
should  be  subject  to  punishments.  Specific  violations  were  listed,  such 
as  possession  or  manufacture  of  an  atomic  weapon.  Moreover,  in  order 
to  ensure  that  violators  would  be  punished,  Baruch  proposed  that  the 

27  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
pp.  557-560. 


72 


veto  power  in  the  Security  Council  would  not  apply  on  questions  con- 
cerning the  fulfillment  of  sanctions.28 

In  the  course  of  the  negotiations,  the  U.S.  delegation  submitted 
three  memoranda  which  elaborated  on  the  U.S.  position.29  These 
documents  and  the  speeches  of  Baruch  set  forth  the  details  of  the  U.S. 
position  on  the  various  issues  covered  in  the  discussion  below. 

THE   SOVIET   PROPOSAL 

The  Soviet  proposal  was  presented  at  the  second  meeting  of  the 
UNAEC  on  June  19,  1946,  by  Andrei  Gromyko,  Deputy  Foreign 
Minister  and  the  Soviet  Representative  on  the  U.N.  Security  Council. 
Demanding  that  atomic  energy  should  be  used  only  for  peaceful 
purposes,  he  proposed  that  a  first  step  should  be  a  convention  outlaw- 
ing the  production  and  use  of  atomic  weapons.  Following  such  an 
agreement,  he  continued,  there  should  be  established  "a  system  of  su- 
pervision and  control  to  see  that  the  conventions  and  agreements  are 
observed,  and  measures  concerning  sanctions  against  unlawful  use  of 
atomic  energy."  30 

At  this  time,  Gromyko  introduced  two  resolutions  to  implement  the 
Soviet  principles  of  international  control.  The  first  called  for  an  agree- 
ment to  ban  the  use  and  production  of  atomic  bombs  and  to  destroy 
existing  weapons  within  three  months  of  the  conclusion  of  the  agree- 
ment. This  resolution  also  provided  that  the  parties  to  the  proposed 
agreement  would  pass  legislation  to  punish  violators  of  the  agreement. 
The  second  resolution  proposed  that  two  committees  be  established :  one 
to  make  recommendations  on  the  exchange  of  scientific  information, 
and  another  to  examine  methods  of  insuring  compliance  with  the 
prohibitions  of  the  agreement,  including  sanctions.  The  only  direct 
response  by  Gromyko  to  the  U.S.  proposal  was  the  expression  of 
Soviet  opposition  to  elimination  of  the  veto: 

Efforts  made  to  undermine  the  activity  of  the  Security 
Council,  including  efforts  directed  to  undermine  the  require- 
ments of  unanimity  of  the  members  of  the  Security  Council, 
upon  questions  of  substance,  are  incompatible  with  the  in- 
terests of  the  United  Nations  *  *  *  .  Such  attempts  should  be 
resisted.31 

The  veto  question  was  to  remain  at  issue  throughout  the  negotiations. 
One  source  has  described  the  Soviet  proposals  as  inchoate: 

Gromyko's  proposals  of  June  19  have,  frequently  been  de- 
scribed in  the  Western  press  and  by  the  Soviet  representatives 
t  hemselves  as  the  "Soviet  plan":  but  they  really  constituted  no 
plan  at  all.  Not,  if  by  a  plan,  one  comprehends  a  systematic 

28  For  a  complete  text  of  Banich's  speech,  see  "Proposals  for  an  International  Atomic 
Development  Authority."  Department  of  State  Bulletin,  v.  14,  no.  364  (June  23,  1946), 
pp.    1057-1062,  or   State  Department,   Growth   of  a  Policj/,  pp.    138-147. 

»The  three  memoranda  were  entitled  U.S.  Memorandum  No.  1.  Submitted  to  Sub- 
committee  No.  1  <>t  the  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  New  V>rk.  July  -'. 
1946;  D.S.  Memorandum  No.  'J  Dealing  with  the  Functions  and  Powers  of  the  Proposed 
Atomic  Development  Authority.  Submitted  to  Subcommittee  No.  1  of  the  United  Nations 
Atomic-  Energy  Commission,  New  York,  July  r>,  1046;  and  D.S.  Memorandum  No.  3,  Deal 
Ing  With  the  Relations  Between  the  Atomic  Development  Authority  and  the  Organs  of  the 
United  Nations,  Submitted  to  Subcommittee  No.  1  of  the  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy 
Commission,  New  York,  July  12,  1946.  _, 

30  Joseph  I,.  Nogee,  Soviet  Policy  Toward  International  control  of  Atomic  Energy. 
t  N.>tre  l  lame.  Ind.  :  I'niversit  v  of  Notre  Dame  Press,  l!'t;i  |,  p.  36. 

m  Ibid.,  p.  37. 


73 


and  comprehensive  procedure  for  action.  Gromyko's  "plan" 
was,  in  fact,  the  enunciation  of  three  or  four  basic  principles 
which  guided  Soviet  policy  ( promotion  of  peaceful  develop- 
ment of  atomic  energy,  prohibition  of  atomic  weapons,  agree- 
ment on  international  control,  and  the  retention  of  full  sov- 
ereign freedom  of  action)  plus  proposals  for  the  further 
organization  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  to  deal  with 
the  problems  of  control  and  the  exchange  of  scientific  informa- 
tion. On  the  exact  form  of  international  control,  Soviet  state- 
ments were  deliberately  vague. 


32 


DEBATE    AND    IMPASSE 

Early  in  the  negotiations,  the  structure  of  the  UNAEC  was  orga- 
nized to  include  four  committees :  a  Scientific  and  Technical  Commit- 
tee, a  Legal  Advisory  Committee,  Committee  Two  to  examine  all  the 
questions  associated  with  a  control  plan,  and  Committee  One  to  coordi- 
nate the  work  of  the  other  three  committees.  In  July  1946,  at  the  second 
session  of  Committee  Two,  Soviet  representative  Gromyko  delivered 
a  major  speech  condemning  the  U.S.  proposals,  and  declaring  that 

as  they  are  presented  now  [the  proposals]  could  not  be  ac- 
cepted by  the  U.S.S.R.,  either  as  a  whole  or  in  their  separate 
parts.33 

When  further  efforts  to  negotiate  seemed  fruitless,  it  was  decided  to 
postpone  the  deliberations  of  Committee  Two  until  a  report  from  the 
Scientific  and  Technical  Committee  had  been  submitted. 

The  report  of  the  latter  Committee,  similar  in  purpose  to  that  of  the 
Acheson-Lilienthal  groups,  was  given  to  Committee  Two  on  October  2, 
1946.  Committee  Two  had  passed  a  resolution  suggesting  that  the  Sci- 
entific and  Technical  Committee  "present  a  report  on  the  question 
whether  effective  control  is  possible,  together  with  an  indication  of 
the  methods  by  which  *  *  *  effective  control  can  be  achieved."  34  The 
Scientific  and  Technical  Committee  had  decided  to  confine  its  con- 
siderations to  the  requirements  of  a  control  system  as  dictated  solely 
by  the  technical  characteristics  of  atomic  energy  development,  and 
disclaimed  any  responsibility  for  taking  political  feasibility  into  ac- 
count. Obviously,  the  major  portion  of  the  information  on  atomic 
energy  was  supplied  by  the  United  States,  primarily  through  the 
Smyth  report  and  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report.  In  light  of  this  fact, 
the  Soviet  representative  to  the  Committee  interpreted  the  conclusions 
of  the  Committee  as  "hypothetical  and  conditional"  because  the  Soviets 
considered  the  information  "limited  and  incomplete."  35  Despite  this 
statement,  the  members  of  the  Scientific  and  Technical  Committee 
concluded  that  "we  do  not  find  any  basis  in  the  available  scientific 
facts  for  supposing  that  effective  control  is  not  technologically 
feasible."  3G 


33  Ibid.,  pp.   38-39. 

33  State  Department.  Growth  of  a  Policy,  r>.  SI. 

34  As  quoted  in  First  Renort  on  the  Scientific  and  Technical  Aspects  of  Control.  In  United 
Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  "First  Report  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  to 
the  Security  Council,  31  December  1946,"  Official  Records.  Special  Supplement.  Report  to 
the  Security  Council.  (Lake  Success,  New  York  :  1946),  p.  20. 

35  Ibid.,  n.  50. 

36  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  p.  86. 


74 


In  addition,  the  Committee  reemphasized  the  scientific  principle  which 
had  provided  a  basic  element  in  the  efforts  to  establish  international 
control  of  atomic  energy,  when  it  stated : 

There  is  an  intimate  relation  between  the  activities  required 
for  peaceful  purposes  and  those  leading  to  the  production  of 
atomic  weapons;  most  of  the  stages  which  are  needed  for  the 
former  are  also  needed  for  the  latter.3' 

The  report  defined  the  various  dangerous  points  in  atomic  energy 
development  at  which  some  form  of  safeguard  should  be  applied,  but 
made  no  recommendations  for  specific  methods  of  safeguards. 

Committee  Two  continued  its  deliberations  and  prepared  a  report 
which  set  forth  specific  safeguards  for  various  activities,  but  these 
were  deemed  only  the  basic  elements  of  a  plan  and  not  a  complete  plan 
for  control. 

The  report  on  safeguards  and  that  of  the  Scientific  and  Technical 
Committee  were  included  in  a  report  prepared  by  the  full  membership 
of  the  TT.X.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  and  submitted  to  the  Security 
Council  on  December  31,  1946.  The  report  had  been  approved  by  10 
members  of  the  Commission,  with  the  remaining  two,  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Poland,  abstaining.  Following  this  expression  of  majority  ap- 
proval, Baruch  and  his.  staff  resigned  on  the  grounds  that  the  U.S. 
representative  to  the  United  Nations  (at  this  time,  Warren  Austin) 
should  serve  as  the  U.S.  spokesman  in  the  Security  Council.  This  first 
report  of  the  UNAEC  offered  various  findings  and  recommendations 
based  largely  on  the  proposals  submitted  by  the  United  States.  By 
March  1!>  17.  when  its  debate  on  the  provisions  of  the  first  report  failed 
of  agreement,  the  Security  Council  passed  a  resolution  which  referred 
the  discussions  back  to  the  UNAEC  and  requested  a  second  report 
from  that  body.  The  major  sources  of  disagreement  in  the  negotiations 
are  discussed  below.  There  was  to  be  little  narrowing  of  these  differ- 
ences in  the  subsequent  negotiations  of  the  UNAEC. 

One  source  describes  the  "deadlock"  at  this  time  as  "particularly 
ominous  not  because  of  specific  Soviet  objections  to  the  majority  plan, 
but  because  Soviet  criticism  was  made  a  part  of  its  ideological  con- 
flict with  the  West."  !s  Some  of  the  U.S.  policymakers  who  had  engi- 
neered the  U.S.  plan,  including  both  scientists  and  politicians,  became 
disillusioned  with  the  negotiations,  and  even  suggested  that  the  United 
States  withdraw  from  them.  However,  consultations  with  U.S.  allies 
had  discouraged  such  an  idea,  and  the  negotiations  continued  "'because 
world  opinion  would  not  let  them  stop."  39 

In  September  11)47,  the  UNAEC  submitted  the  second  report  to  the 
Security  ( louncil,  elaborating  on  the  specific  recommendations  for  con- 
trol in  the  first  report.  Besides  engaging  in  this  exercise,  the  second 
round  of  the.  UNAEC  deliberations  had  considered  a  list  of  12  amend- 
ments which  the  Soviet  Union  proposed  be  applied  to  the  findings  and 
recommendations  of  the  first  report.  These  amendments,  which  sought 
to  alter  some  of  the  fundamental  features  of  the  majority  plan,  were 
not  accepted  by  the  Commission.  Examples  of  the  questionsot  principle 

;  [bid.,  p.  36. 

Is  NoRee,  Soviet  Policy,  p.  88. 

80 Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  391. 


75 


raised  by  the  Soviet  amendments  on  which  no  agreement  had  been 
reached  are  the  question  of  what  was  required  for  strict  international 
control  of  atomic  energy,  whether  international  control,  including  the 
prohibition  of  atomic  weapons,  was  to  be  established  by  one  treaty  or 
several  and  in  the  latter  case,  the  question  of  priorities,  or  the  question 
of  the  right  of  the  proposed  Authority  to  conduct  research  in  atomic 
weapons.  As  was  the  case  with  the  first  report  of  the  UNAEC,  the 
second  report  had  been  approved  by  10  members  of  the  Commission, 
but  this  time  only  Poland  had  abstained,  while  the  Soviet  Union  had 
registered  opposition. 

Because  of  more  pressing  matters  on  its  agenda,  like  the  Palestine 
question  or  the  India-Pakistan  question,  the  Security  Council  de- 
cided not  to  consider  the  second  report  of  the  UNAEC.  Deliberations 
continued  in  the  latter  institution  through  the  remainder  of  1947  and 
the  spring  of  1948.  These  discussions  prompted  the  UNAEC  third  re- 
port to  conclude  that  an  impasse  had  been  reached,  and  to  request  that 
UNAEC  negotiations  be  suspended.  A  resolution  for  Security  Council 
approval  of  all  the  reports  of  the  UNAEC  was  vetoed  by  the  Soviet 
Union  in  the  summer  of  1948 ;  in  the  fall,  General  Assembly  consider- 
ation of  the  question  of  atomic  energy  control  resulted  in  a  40-6— 1  ap- 
proval of  the  majority  plan,  but  the  value  of  this  non-binding  reso- 
lution lay  in  propaganda  more  than  in  support  for  successful  collabora- 
tion. Further  negotiations  in  the  UNAEC,  which  were  continued  at  the 
insistence  of  the  General  Assembly,  rapidly  deteriorated,  and  by  No- 
vember 1949,  the  General  Assembly  agreed  to  suspend  the  work  of  the 
UNAEC. 


IV.  Issues  in  the  Interplay  Between  Diplomacy  and  Nuclear 

Technology 

Identification  of  a  number  of  basic  issues  prominent  in  the  U.S. 
policymaking  process  and  in  the  negotiations  will  help  to  clarify  the 
way  in  which  technological  and  diplomatic  factors  interacted  during 
the  formulation  and  negotiation  of  the  Baruch  proposals.  These  basic 
issues  will  be  explored  to  show  this  interaction,  and  also  how  it  affected 
the  outcome  of  each  issue.  Each  issue  will  be  examined  in  this  man- 
ner, first  in  the  course  of  the  U.S.  policymaking  process  and  then  in 
the  international  negotiations.  Special  attention  will  be  given  to  the 
U.S.  proposals  as  finally  presented,  the  Soviet  reaction  to  them,  and 
the  outcome  of  the  negotiations. 

Broadly,  these  issues  all  dealt  with  the  interlocking  concerns  of 
national  power,  human  safety,  secrecy  of  atomic  technology,  privacy 
of  the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  potential  utility  of  peaceful  atomic  en- 
ergy. Three  broad  issues  emerged :  ( 1 )  the  form  of  control,  that  is, 
international  ownership  and  management  versus  inspection ; 
('2)  transitional  stages  for  the  establishment  of  international  control, 
involving  transfer  of  control  of  information  and  nuclear  production 
facilities  from  the  United  States  to  the  international  authority;  and 
( 3 )  the  question  of  sanctions  and  the  veto. 

Significance  of  Technological  Factors  for  U.S.  Policy 

Before  these  issues  are  discussed  in  detail,  it  might  be  helpful  to 
note  a  number  of  general  factors  of  technology  and  diplomacy  which 
may  have  influenced  U.S.  policy  and  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations. 

Foremost  among  the  technological  considerations  was  the  U.S. 
monopoly  over  atomic  weapons.  The  very  nature  of  scientific  inquiry 
made  it  axiomatic  that  the  U.S.  monopoly  was  transitory.  Acceptance 
of  this  factor  was  a  major  political  motivation  for  U.S.  efforts  toward 
international  control.  Nevertheless,  the  question  arose  as  to  how  the 
United  States  could  prevent  a  premature  end  to  its  monopoly  and 
thereby  avoid  endangering  either  its  own  security  or  world  security 
while  an  international  system  of  control  was  being  established.  U.S. 
policy  on  this  question  would  influence  the  general  political  atmos- 
phere surrounding  the  effort  to  establish  international  control. 

Among  the  possible  measures  which  the  United  States  could  use  to 
protect  itself  and  the  world  from  proliferation  of  atomic  weapons 
until  an  international  system  could  be  set  up  was  stringent  control 
of  the  dissemination  of  information  which  would  contribute  to  devel- 
opment of  military  applications  of  atomic  energy.  This  idea  led  to  a 
persistent  popular  misconception  regarding  the  "secret"  of  the  atomic 
bomb: 

Many  of  the  semantic  difficulties  dated  from  the  first 
months  of  public  knowledge  of  the  wartime  program.  The 
"secret"  of  the  atomic  bomb  was  a  case  in  point.  After  more 
than  two  years  of  efforts  to  explain  this  term  accurately,  use 
of  it  still  induced  an  almost  automatic  emotional  response. 

(76) 


77 


Polling  questions  which  contained  references  to  both  "bomb 
secrets"  and  "international  control"'  invariably  brought 
fewer  approvals  of  the  control  principle,  the  automatic  reac- 
tion being  to  "keep  the  secrets." 40 

At  the  time  of  the  December  1945  conference  which  resulted  in  the 
Moscow  Declaration,  Senator  Arthur  Vandenberg,  Chairman  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  and  other  members  of  Congress 
repeatedly  sought  and  obtained  assurances  from  the  President  that  the 
United  States  would  not  release  atomic  energy  information  prior  to 
the  establishment  of  adequate  safeguards.  The  protective  attitude  to- 
ward the  U.S.  "secrets"  was  heightened  by  the  revelation  in  early 
1946  of  evidence  of  espionage  in  Canada  involving  the  transmission 
of  atomic  energy  information  to  the  Soviet  Union.  These  events  served 
not  only  to  reinforce  the  public  attitude  toward  nuclear  secrecy  sur- 
rounding the  bomb,  but  also  to  engender  a  growing  mistrust  in  the 
United  States  of  the  Soviet  Union.41 

In  general,  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  the  secret  of 
the  bomb  may  have  had  several  effects  on  its  policy  and  on  other  coun- 
tries' conceptions  of  that  policy.  Mistrust  of  the  Soviet  Union,  coupled 
with  the  idea  that  sole  possession  of  the  atomic  weapon  represented  a 
"sacred  trust"  42  in  terms  of  U.S.  responsibility  for  world  security, 
may  have  acted  as  a  motive  to  withhold  as  much  information  as  pos- 
sible, for  as  long  as  possible,  until  the  international  control  system  was 
secure.  But  a  marked  reluctance  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to 
part  with  information  or  facilities  may  have  encouraged  critics  of 
the  U.S.  proposals,  especially  in  the  Soviet  Union,  to  conclude  that 
the  United  States  did  not  intend  to  relinquish  its  monopoly  and 
eventually  would  exercise  "atomic  diplomacy." 

The  notion  of  devising  methods  to  protect  the  secret  of  the  bomb 
figured  importantly  in  U.S.  policy  discussions  on  international  control 
of  atomic  energy.  However,  considerations  of  this  nature  ran  counter 
to  a  principle  which  might  be  deemed  applicable  to  any  field  of  scien- 
tific inquiry :  that  secrecy  cannot  long  delay  the  independent  acquisi- 
tion of  scientific  and  technological  information.  This  principle  had 
special  force  in  the  case  of  atomic  energy,  in  light  of  the  inherent  im- 
portance of  this  information  to  other  nations,  especially  a  great  power 
like  the  Soviet  Union. 

A  related  question  which  entered  U.S.  policy  deliberations  involved 
estimates  of  how  long  it  would  take  the  Soviet  Union  to  develop  its 
own  atomic  weapon  without  access  to  outside  information.  Such  esti- 
mates would  indicate  how  long  the  United  States  could  expect  to 
enjoy  its  preeminence  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy  even  if  its  efforts 
to  maintain  secrecy,  before  establishment  of  effective  international 
control,  should  be  entirely  successful.  Thus,  the  U.S.  assessment  of 
Soviet  technological  capabilities  was  a  factor  to  be  reckoned  with  in 
the  U.S.  diplomatic  approach  to  the  international  negotiations. 

"U.S.  Department  of  State,  The  International  Control  of  Atomic  Energy,  Policy  at  the 
Crossroads,  Publication  3161   (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1948), 

4R,Pewlett  and  Anderson-  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
I>.  5(11.  The  spv  cas"8  also  had  an  effW-r  on  Oip  concessional  deliberations  oi  domestic 
control  of  atomic  energy  and  on  the  U.S.  attitude  toward  international  information  ex- 
change, e.g.,  wartime  agreements  with  the  British.  Ibid.,  p.  480. 

4-This  phrase  was  used  by  President  Truman  to  describe  the  U.S.  role  in  relation  to  its 
monopoly  on  atomic  weapons.  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  p    117. 


78 


Opinions  varied  within  the  Administration  as  to  the  length  of  time 
necessary  for  the  Soviet  Union  to  develop  an  atomic  weapon.  As  early 
as  1D4T).  the  question  was  raised  in  Administration  circles.  During  a 
meeting  of  Stimson's  Interim  Committee,  a  memorandum  was  cited 
which  reflected  the  estimate  by  Bush  and  Conant  that  it  would  be  3 
to  4  years  before  the  Soviets  could  develop  an  atomic  weapon.  General 
Groves'  estimate  is  described  as  follows:  ''Taking  a  very  low  view  of 
Russian  ability,  he  considered  20  years  a  much  likelier  figure."43 
Conant  called  this  figure  "highly  unsafe." 

The  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  noted  the  speculative  nature  of  esti- 
mates of  this  kind.  In  order  to  assess  a  technological  situation  accu- 
rately, the  report  contended,  it  was  necessary  to  have  a  knowledge  of 
the  progress  of  foreign  development.  Such  knowledge,  of  course,  was 
not  then  forthcoming.  But  on  balance,  the  report  seemed  to  minimize 
the  possibility  of  an  imminent  acquisition  of  atomic  weapons  by  other 
countries.  The  Consultants  touched  on  this  question  insofar  as  it  re- 
lated to  how  much  a  rival  effort  would  be  accelerated  by  the  release 
of  U.S.  information.  Even  with  the  release  of  purely  theoretical  in- 
formation, according  to  the  Consultants,  "a  major  program,  surely 
lasting  many  years,  is  required  for  the  actual  production  of  atomic 
weapons."  44  It  might  be  inferred  from  this  statement  that  the  Con- 
sultants' view  of  rival  efforts,  without  access  to  theoretical  informa- 
tion, could  hardly  have  been  an  imminent  cause  for  alarm  to  U.S. 
policymakers. 

One  high  Administration  view,  even  more  explicit  regarding  esti- 
mates of  Russia's  ability  to  develop  its  own  bomb,  was  conveyed  to  the 
U.S.  negotiating  team.  Hancock  kept  a  record  of  a  meeting  which  he 
attended  between  Byrnes  and  Baruch,  which  states : 

Mr.  Byrnes  briefly  reviewed  his  impression  that  the  Rus- 
sians don't  know  much  about  atomic  energy  or  its  use  in 
bombs.  Dr.  Conant  got  no  facts  regarding  it  while  he  was  in 
Russia  and  the  assumption  is  that  they  know  nothing.' 

While  it  is  difficult  to  appraise  the  extent  to  which  these  assessments 
of  Soviet  nuclear  development  influenced  U.S.  policy,  one  might  infer 
from  the  course  and  outcome  of  the  negotiations  that  these  considera- 
tions had  weight.  Considering  the  fact  that  differing  estimates  were 
made  regarding  Soviet  atomic  capabilities,  it  is  possible  to  note  an 
example  of  one  problem  which  can  arise  when  diplomacy  is  depend- 
ent upon  science  and  technology.  Policymakers  do  not  always  receive" 
a  technological  assessment  to  which  all  members  of  the  scientific  com- 
munity agree.  A  wide  divergence  only  complicates  the  diplomat's  task. 
If.  for  example,  there  is  no  clear  consensus  that  an  imminent  danger 
exists,  the  diplomat  will  probably  tend  to  be  guided  by  counsels  of 
compromise  rather  than  urgency.  And  perhaps  he  should  be — but  it 
must  also  be  noted  that  the  counsels  of  urgency  could  be  right,  ami  that 
in  the  present  instance  it  was  the  conservative  estimates  of  General 
Groves  which  turned  out  to  be  the  furthest  from  the  true  situation. 

An  equally  thorny  political  factor  which  would  enter  into  the  dis- 

11  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  p.  3.r>4. 

11  state  Department,  "Acheson  Llllentbal  Report,"  p.  51. 

**  Lleberman,  The  Scorpion  and  tin-  Tarantula,  p.  274.  Hancock  may  have  been  referring 
ti.  Conant's  trip  t"  Russia  with  Byrnes,  for  the  meetings  which  resulted  in  the  Moscow 
Declaration.  Ibid.,  pp.  iog-107. 


79 


cussions  was  the  secrecy  shrouding  Soviet  activities.  One  source  de- 
scribes this  phenomenon  as  follows : 

Western  ignorance  about  the  real  condition  of  Russia  was 
deemed  by  the  regime,  quite  logically  from  its  point  of  view, 
as  one  of  the  greatest  assets  it  had  in  its  conduct  of  foreign 
relations.  Access  to  the  U.S.S.R.  was  never  so  difficult — i.e., 
virtually  impossible — for  a  foreigner  who  was  not  a  diplomat 
or  Communist,  travel  throughout  the  country  never  so  limited 
as  between  1946  and  1954.  Not  even  during  the  Great  Purge 
of  the  1930's  were  restrictions  so  all-encompassing.  The  fear 
which  this  restrictive  behavior  suggests  cannot  have  been 
simply  a  concern  over  revelations  about  the  police-state 
aspects  of  Soviet  life.  By  1947,  only  Communists,  fellow 
travelers,  and  the  most  naive  of  Western  liberals  denied  that 
aspect  of  Soviet  reality.  Much  more  dangerous  was  any  revela- 
tion of  Russian  weakness,  of  the  magnitude  of  the  tasks  of 
industrial  reconstruction  and  rapid  demobilization  lying 
ahead  of  this  still  primitive  society.  A  truer  picture  of  Rus- 
sia's strength  and  weaknesses  might  induce  some  new  and 


unwelcome    thinking    in    the    State    Department    and    the 
Pentagon.46 

Just  as  U.S.  secrecy  surrounding  the  bomb  presented  problems  for  its 
policy  and  the  negotiations,  the  secretive  nature  of  the  Soviet  Union 
would  have  a  serious  effect  on  the  efforts  to  reach  agreement  on  some 
of  the  fundamental  elements  of  control. 

Soviet  development  of  atomic  energy  had  proceeded  quite  well  until 
World  War  II.47  In  terms  of  the  quality  of  research,  the  Soviet  capa- 
bility at  that  point  has  been  estimated  to  have  been  on  a  par  with  that 
of  the  United  States,  and  the  Soviets  were  catching  up  in  the  field  of 
equipment.  As  the  extent  of  Soviet  involvement  in  World  War  II  in- 
creased, however,  they  apparently  found  it  necessary  to  abandon  their 
efforts.  All  available  manpower  and  resources  were  directed  to  meet 
the  German  attacks,  rather  than  toward  the  "calculated  gamble"  of 
research  for  a  nuclear  weapon,  at  least  until  the  setback  for  the  Ger- 
mans at  Stalingrad  in  1943.  Moreover,  as  one  writer  has  asserted,  "the 
Soviet  military  strategy  of  enormous  masses  of  ground  troops,  backed 
by  artillery  and  close  air  support  was  not  conducive  to  a  whole-hearted 
search  for  weapons  useful  to  strategic  aircraft."  4S 

Nuclear  research  in  the  Soviet  Union  was  resumed  in  1944,  but  a 
blackout  was  imposed  on  information  at  that  time.  It  has  been  theorized 
that  the  first  Soviet  nuclear  reactor  was  in  operation  by  late  1947.  This 
occurrence  was  considered  a  turning  point  in  the  Soviet  efforts,  a  point 
which  was  reached  less  than  two  years  after  the  opening  of  the  nego- 
tiations for  international  control  of  atomic  energy.  It  was  only  a 
matter  of  time  before  the  Soviet  research  efforts  succeeded,  as  evi- 
denced by  the  explosion  of  its  first  nuclear  device  in  1949. 

The  contribution  of  Soviet  espionage  activities  in  the  United  States 
to  progress  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy  is  hard  to  assess.  One  writer 

^Adam  B.  Ulam,  The  Rivals.  America  and  Russia  Since  World  War  II.  (New  York: 
Viking  Press.  1971).  pp.  106-107. 

47  The  following  discussion  is  based  on  Kenneth  Whiting.  "Post-War  Strategy,"  in  Asher 
Lee,  ed.  The  Soviet  Air  and  Rocket  Forces.  (New  York:  Praeger,  1959),  pp.  91-95. 

«Ibid.,  p.  92. 

96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1-7 


80 


has  attempted  to  put  this  question  in  perspective  when  he  comments  on 
this  possibility  as  follows : 

We  still  do  not  know  how  much  the  relatively  short  gap 
between  the  first  American  and  the  first  Russian  explosion 
was  due  to  successes  in  Soviet  espionage,  and  how  much  it 
was  due  simply  to  native  Russian  capability.  At  the  time  it 
seemed  to  many  of  us  that  espionage  must  have  been  far  and 
away  the  main  reason  they  were  able  to  accomplish  the  job  so 
quickly,  especially  after  the  devastation  that  had  been 
wreaked  on  them  by  World  War  II.  Haying  since  seen  some 
excellent  Russian  technological  progress  in  other  fields,  we  are 
no  longer  quite  so  sure  that  this  was  the  case.  We  should  note, 
furthermore,  that  it  is  always  easier  to  do  something  a  second 
time,  even  if  the  only  thing  known  from  the  first  time  is  that 
it  can  be  done.49 

All  things  considered,  an  awareness  of  the  progress  of  Soviet  nuclear 

technology  may  contribute  to  an  understanding  in  retrospect  of  the 

Soviet    perceptions   and    attitudes    during   the   negotiations   of   the 

UNAEC. 

The  Form  and  Purposes  of  International  Control 

The  first  question  which  arose  in  connection  with  the  atomic  energy 
policy  formulation  in  1947  was  whether  the  general  form  of  control 
should  depend  primarily  on  a  system  of  international  ownership  and 
management,  or  on  a  system  which  left  atomic  energy  development  in 
national  hands  and  relied  on  inspection  to  assure  compliance  with  an 
agreement  not  to  develop  atomic  energy  for  military  purposes.  Few 
specifics  regarding  the  substantive  aspects  of  this  control  issue  were 
offered  in  the  early  international  political  actions  on  the  subject.  The 
resolution  which  established  the  UNAEC  simply  called  on  the  pro- 
posed Commission  to  make  proposals  for  "effective  safeguards"  to  in- 
sure compliance  with  the  control  arrangement.  Although  it  mentioned 
inspection  as  one  type  of  safeguard,  it  offered  no  commitment  to  a 
particular  method. 

PROPOSALS    OF   THE    ACHESON-LILIENTHAL   REPORT 

The  Hoard  of  Consultants'1  position  against  inspection:  The  con- 
cept of  inspection  was  distasteful  to  the  members  <>!'  the  Hoard  of  Con- 
sultants. The  Hoard  saw  it  as  inherent  in  the  leading  alternative  to 
their  own  proposals:  to  leave  atomic  energy  development  in  the  hands 
of  individual  nations  while  prohibiting  its  development  for  military 
purposes  would  require  inspection  of  national  activities.  Thus,  inspec- 
tion would  be  the  sole  means  of  verification  of  the  control  system,  an 
arrangement  which  t  he  ( lonsilltants  opposed. 

The  Hoard's  position,  as  expressed  in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report, 
was  not  based  solely  on  technological  considerations;  it  included  "the 
inseparable  political,  social,  and  organizational  problems  involved  in 
enforcing  agreements  between  nations,  each  free  to  develop  atomic 
energy,  but  only  pledged  not  to  use  it  for  bombs."  "  Nevertheless,  the 
argument  against  inspection  in  the  report  originated  with  the  techno- 

'"Herberl  York,  Race  to  oblivion:  A  Participant's  liar  of  the  Arm*  Race.  (New  York: 

Si d  &  Schuster,  1971  >,  pp.  34   35. 

60  State  I)t'i>iirtinent,  "Acheson-Lilienthal  report",  p.  4. 


81 


logical  premise  that  the  processes  associated  with  the  development  of 
atomic  energy,  whether  for  military  or  peaceful  purposes,  "are  in 
much  of  their  course  interchangeable  and  interdependent."  Because  of 
this  factor,  it  was  considered  necessary  under  a  control  arrangement  to 
monitor  each  stage  in  the  process  of  developing  atomic  energy,  from 
raw  materials  to  finished  product,  to  insure  that  the  materials  were 
not  diverted  at  some  point  in  the  process  to  weapons  development  by 
an  individual  nation.  Such  a  comprehensive  inspection  system  would 
take  a  great  number  of  inspectors;  moreover,  the  inspectors  would  be 
called  upon  to  determine  intent  behind  an  operation  associated  with 
atomic  energy  development.  The  Consultants  asserted  that  "at  no 
single  point  can  external  control  of  an  operation  be  sufficiently  reliable 
to  be  an  adequate  sole  safeguard."  51 

Another  technological  argument  against  inspection  concerned  the 
need  for  technical  expertise  in  the  staff  which  monitored  atomic  energy 
activities.  To  determine  the  existence  of  violations,  staff  members  of 
an  inspectorate  would  have  to  be  highly  trained  in  the  field  of  atomic 
energy  development.  Moreover,  the  organization  would  have  to  be 
involved  in  research  and  development  activities  to  keep  abreast  or 
ahead  of  advanced  and  changing  developments,  in  a  field  which  is  "es- 
sentially a  living  art."  Otherwise,  would-be  violators  might  try  to 
exploit  breakthroughs  if  they  discovered  them  first.  According  to  the 
Board  of  Consultants,  an  inspection  system  would  "inevitably  be  slow 
to  take  into  account  changes  in  the  science  and  technology  of  the 
field."  52 

The  remainder  of  the  remarks  against  inspection  in  the  Acheson- 
Lilienthal  report  seem  to  be  derived  from  the  "political,  social,  and 
organizational  problems"  of  a  control  system,  rather  than  from  the 
technological  requirements.  The  Consultants  asserted  that  an  inspec- 
tion system  having  a  generally  policelike  character,  would  be  deemed 
negative  and  suppressive.  This  quality  would  have  a  number  of  ill 
effects  on  the  control  system  and  its  personnel.  First,  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult to  attract  highly  qualified  personnel  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy 
to  an  inspection  team  having  this  character,  and  the  team  itself  would 
encounter  problems  in  morale.  Second,  because  inspection  of  facilities 
would  require  a  large  number  of  inspectors,  the  presence  of  many  for- 
eigners in  participating  countries  would  intrude  excessively  into  na- 
tional activities,  challenge  the  good  faith  of  the  nations,  and  provide 
a  likely  source  of  tension  and  friction.  On  this  particular  point,  the 
Consultants  declared  that  this  arrangement  would  be  "as  obnoxious  to 
Americans  as  to  any  others."  53  Finally,  the  Consultants  contended,  un- 
der a  system  which  entrusted  atomic  energy  development  to  individual 
nations,  "suspicion  by  one  nation  of  the  good  faith  of  another  and  the 
fear  engendered  thereby  are  themselves  strong  incentives  for  the  first 
to  embark  on  secret  illicit  operations  [and]  any  system  based  on  out- 
lawing the  purely  military  development  of  atomic  energy  and  relying 
solely  on  inspection  for  enforcement  would  at  the  outset  be  surrounded 
by  conditions  which  would  destroy  the  system."  54  Indeed,  a  basic 
source  of  the  problem  associated  with  inspection,  according  to  the 

51  Ibid.,  p.  6. 

52  Ibid. 

53  Ibid.,  p.  7. 

54  Ibid.,  p.  8. 


82 


Board,  was  the  national  rivalries  which  would  result  as  countries  en- 
gaged in  atomic  energy  development : 

National  rivalries  in  the  development  of  atomic  energy 
readily  convertible  to  destructive  purposes  are  the  heart  of 
the  difficulty.  So  long  as  intrinsically  dangerous  activities  may 
be  carried  on  by  nations,  rivalries  are  inevitable  and  fears  are 
engendered  that  place  so  great  a  pressure  upon  a  system  of 
international  enforcement  by  police  methods  that  no  degree 
of  ingenuity  or  technical  competence  could  possibly  hope  to 
cope  with  them.55 

International  oionership  and  operation  of  dangerous  activities: 
Awareness  of  the  political  problems  caused  by  inescapable  national 
rivalries  provided  the  main  basis  for  the  Consultants'  proposals.  The 
Consultants  sought  to  eliminate  these  rivalries  by  internationalizing 
certain  activities  which  might  become  a  source  of  competition  among 
nations.  As  was  the  case  with  the  Consultants'  views  of  inspection,  they 
looked  to  both  technological  and  political  considerations  to  support 
their  ideas  for  assigning  certain  activities  to  an  international 
Authority. 

The  practicability  of  such  an  international  Authority,  in  their  view, 
would  be  derived  from  certain  technological  characteristics  of  atomic 
energy  development.  An  inherent  technological  difficulty  of  an  inspec- 
tion system  was  how  to  determine  the  intent  behind  an  activity  in 
atomic  energy  development,  that  is.  whether  it  was  designed  for  peace- 
ful or  military  purposes. 

The  Consultants  asserted  that  specific  categories  of  activity  could  be 
identified  which,  if  undertaken  by  an  individual  nation,  clearly  would 
constitute  a  violation  of  the  control  system:  such  activities  should  be 
assigned  to  an  international  Authority.  This  arrangment  would  elim- 
inate the  need  to  determine  intent  behind  a  national  activity  in  the 
atomic  energy  field.  This  concept  was  developed  to  the  extent  that  the 
Board  named  in  broad  terms  certain  '"safe"  and  "dangerous"  activi- 
ties. They  warned,  however,  that  these  categories  would  have  to  be 
subject  to  constant  reevaluation  and  revision  in  light  of  potential  ad- 
vances in  atomic  energy. 

One  example  of  how  internationalization  would  function  concerned 
the  raw  materials  needed  for  atomic  weapons;  namely,  ores  of  uranium 
and  possibly  thorium.5"  The  existing  technical  knowledge  at  that  time 
supported  the  conclusion  that  these  materials  were  the  only  source  of 
nuclear  fuel  materials57  which  could  energize  nuclear  reactors  for  use 
either  to  produce  fissionable  materials  for  nuclear  explosives,  or  to 
generate  electricity.  The  practical  problems  posed  by  attempting  to 

monitor  the  use  of  these  raw  materials  were  considered  "most  difficult." 
Hut  management  of  actual  mining  operations  by  an  international 
Authority  would  provide  assurance  that  it  could  account  for  all  sources 

ra  Ihid      ]>    5 

w  The  role  of  thorium  in  atomic  energy  illustrates  the  difficulty  Imposed  by  secrecy.  The 
fact  was  still  "classified"  In  1946.  that  the  addition  of  slow  neutrons  to  thorium  converted 
it  Into  U238,  which  was  fissionable.  Nevertheless  the  Acheson-Lillenthal  report  proposed 
thai  its  presence  In  a  nuclear  reactor  Bhould  be  prohibited  withoul  Baying  why. 

Uranium  ores  could  provide  the  raw  material  for  production  of  the  fissionable  isotope 
uranium-235,  and  also  for  the  manufacture  of  plutonlum  by  the  exposure  of  uranium-238 
to  neutrons  within  a  nuclear  reactor.  Uranium  235  and  plutonlum  could  be  used  for  nuclear 
weapons. 


83 


of  raw  materials.  Moreover,  if  possession  of  raw  materials  should  be- 
come the  exclusive  prerogative  of  the  international  Authority,  any  at- 
tempt on  the  part  of  an  individual  nation  to  exercise  control  over  raw 
materials  would  represent  a  clear  violation.  Mere  possession,  irrespec- 
tive of  use  or  intent,  would  be  illegal.  An  added  advantage  owing  to 
technological  factors  was  that  this  particular  violation  would  occur 
early  enough  in  the  development  process  to  allow  other  nations  to  take 
appropriate  action  to  prevent  national  production  of  atomic  weapons. 
Another  advantage  created  by  technological  circumstances  was  that 
uranium  and  thorium  occurred  under  special  geological  conditions 
which  reduced  the  task  of  controlling  the  raw  materials  to  "manage- 
able proportions,"  a  characteristic  of  a  control  system  which  the  Con- 
sultants considered  essential  to  effective  safeguards.  Moreover,  the 
Consultants  concluded  that  enough  knowledge  had  been  acquired  to 
indicate  that  this  principle  regarding  raw  materials  (as  well  as  others) 
was  not  likely  to  be  altered  significantly  by  further  scientific 
discoveries.58 

A  similar  case  could  be  made  for  the  plutonium-producing  atomic 
reactor,  a  design  which  produces  material  usable  for  either  atomic 
weapons  or  power.  By  granting  responsibility  for  building  and  operat- 
ing such  reactors  solely  to  an  international  Authority,  an  attempt  by  a 
country  to  usurp  this  activity  would  represent  an  unambiguous  viola- 
tion. Determination  of  intent  for  the  use  of  the  product  of  the  re- 
actors would  not  be  necessary. 

Aside  from  the  technological  concepts  which  were  considered  to 
justify  international  operation  of  a  number  of  specified  activities,  the 
report  commented  on  another  quality  of  such  an  approach  which  would 
make  it  advantageous  to  a  secure  system  of  safeguards.  The  activities 
which  the  Consultants  contemplated  turning  over  to  an  international 
Authority  were  also  considered  those  most  likely  to  foster  rivalry 
among  nations.  Removing  these  from  national  hands  would  greatly 
reduce,  if  not  eliminate  competition  among  nations  in  atomic  energy 
development,  thereby  enhancing  the  security  of  nations  under  the  con- 
trol system. 

Another  advantage  of  internationalization  was  illustrated  by  the 
proposal  to  give  the  Authority  the  function  of  development  and  re- 
search in  the  field  of  atomic  energy.  This  function  would  be  aided  by 
the  fact  that  the  Authority  would  conduct  the  principal  processes  of 
atomic  energy  development.  Both  practical  and  political  concepts 
played  a  role  in  establishing  the  report's  position  on  this  point.  In  the 
opinion  of  the  Board,  the  control  organization  would  have  to  stay  in 
the  forefront  of  knowledge  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy  to  maintain 
awareness  of  discoveries  which  could  have  a  potential  for  violation  of 
a  control  agreement.  Thus  a  research  and  development  function  for 
the  international  agency  would  enhance  the  efficiency  of  the  control  or- 
ganization in  detecting  violations.  An  additional  reason  for  assigning 
this  function  to  the  international  Authority  was  based  partly  on  the 
technological  prospect  that  in  the  foreseeable  future,  atomic  energy 
could  be  used  substantially  in  a  beneficial  way.  This  function,  it  was 
suggested,  would  attract  and  hold  the  skilled,  imaginative  staff  so 
vital  to  the  successful  operation  of  a  control  authority.  But  the  prin- 


58  Indeed,  one  section  of  the  report,  "The  Adequacy  of  Present  Scientific  Knowledge."  is 
devoted  to  explaining  that  there  were  basic  scientific  principles  which  could  be  expected 
to  remain  unchanged,  and  would  therefore  provide  a  reasonably  sound  basis  for  devising 
a  control  system. 


84 


ciples  to  support  this  idea  are  expressed  in  terms  which  hardly  could 
be  considered  scientific  or  technological : 

While  suppression  is  not  possible  where  we  are  dealing 
with  the  quest  for  knowledge,  this  thirst  to  know  (that  can- 
not be  ''policed"  out  of  existence)  can  be  used,  affirmatively, 
in  the  design  and  building  of  an  effective  system  of  safe- 
guards. 

Human  history  shows  that  any  effort  to  confine  the  inquir- 
ing human  mind  *  *  *  is  doomed  to  failure.  *  *  *  Like  the 
jiu  jitsu  wrestler  whose  skill  consists  in  making  his  opponent 
disable  himself  with  his  own  thrusts,  the  designers  of  a  sys- 
tem of  safeguards  for  security  should  and  can  utilize  for  en- 
forcement measures  that  driving  force  toward  knowledge 
that  is  part  of  man's  very  nature.59 

Retention  of  "safe"  national  activities :  The  Consultants  recognized 
that  a  complete  monopoly  of  atomic  energy  activities  by  an  inter- 
national Authority  would  not  be  acceptable  politically  or  economically. 
Therefore,  based  on  the  existing  technical  knowledge,  certain  types 
of  activities  were  classified  as  "safe"  and  Mould  be  allowed  to  remain 
in  national  hands.  The  judgment  that  such  activities  could  be  retained 
safely  on  a  national  level  relied  primarily  on  a  technological  assump- 
tion that  "denaturing"  of  atomic  fuel  was  possible.  The  Consultants 
asserted  that  fissionable  materials  could  be  contaminated  in  such  a 
way  that  they  would  "not  readily  lend  themselves  to  the  making  of 
atomic  explosives,  but  they  can  still  be  used  with  no  essential  loss  of 
effectiveness  for  the  peaceful  applications  of  atomic  energy."60  Re- 
versal of  the  denaturing  process,  to  make  the  materials  suitable  for 
weapons  production,  was  thought  to  involve  a  difficult  and  easily  de- 
tectable effort. 

Using  denatured  materials,  the  Consultants  declared,  nations  could 
puisne  a  number  of  legitimate  activities,  such  as  the  operation  of  re- 
search reactors  (kept  below  a  certain  power  level),  construction  and 
operation  of  reactors  to  produce  radioactive  materials,  and  construc- 
tion and  operation  of  reactors  to  generate  electric  power.  For  these 
activities  to  be  entrusted  to  national  hands,  designs  would  have  to  be 
devised  for  reactors  which  could  not  be  diverted  to  dangerous  use.  The 
denatured  materials  and  operation  of  these  activities  would  have  to 
be  licensed  or  controlled  in  some  way  by  the  international  Authority. 
In  discussing  the  Authority's  licensing  functions  under  which  national 
activities  would  operate,  the  Consultants  raised  the  following 
questions : 

How  shall  control  be  exercised  lightly  enough  to  assure  the 
free  play  of  national  and  private  enterprise  without  risk  to 
security?  I  low  shall  facilities  and  materials  available  for 
national  and  private  exploitation  1m>  allocated  and  at  what 
cosl  '.  How  may  safe  activities,  assigned  to  national  hands,  be 
withdrawn  if  new  discoveries  show  them  to  be  dangerous? 61 

The  entire  discussion  of  national  activities  in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal 
report  would  seem  to  imply  that  the  Consultants  envisioned  and  sup- 
ported rather  active  national  programs  in  atomic  energy  development. 
These  activities  would  be  of  a  sufficient  scale  and  variety  to  encourage 

m  Ibid.,  p.  15. 

00  Ibid  .  p.  2\\. 
81  Ibid.,  p.  35. 


85 


development  and  competition  among  nations  and  private  industry. 
Moreover,  active  national  participation  in  atomic  energy  development, 
they  hoped,  would  "help  correct  any  tendencies  that  might  otherwise 
develop  toward  bureaucratic  inbreeding  and  over-centralization,  and 
aid  in  providing  healthy,  expanding  national  and  private  develop- 
ments in  atomic  energy."  62 

Although  the  Board  contended  that  the  technological  factors  associ- 
ated with  denatured  materials  lent  credence  to  their  expectations  for 
national  activities,  they  warned  that : 

Although  as  the  art  now  stands  denatured  materials  are 
unsuitable  for  bomb  manufacture,  developments  which  do 
not  appear  to  be  in  principle  impossible  might  alter  the 
situation.'"'3 

During  Administration  deliberations  before  the  opening  of  the 
UNAEC,  Baruch  said  denaturing  had  inspired  false  hopes,  and  in  his 
initial  address  to  the  UNAEC  he  stated  that  "Denaturing  seems 
to  have  been  overestimated  by  the  public  as  a  safety  measure.'' G4 
Both  the  first  and  second  reports  of  the  UNAEC  granted  the 
possibility  of  permitting  national  activity  using  denaturing  mate- 
rials only  if  the  denaturing  process  proved  technologically  feasible. 
This  skepticism  of  the  reliability  of  denaturing,  as  well  as  Soviet  op- 
position to  proposals  for  international  ownership  and  inspection,  ap- 
pear to  have  been  responsible  for  the  fact  that  the  proposed  reliance 
on  denaturing  did  not  become  a  major  issue  in  the  negotiations.  In 
retrospect,  the  U.S.  position  on  denaturing  appears  to  have  been 
based  upon  a  technology  forecast — the  assumption  of  a  principle  which 
today,  25  years  later,  has  remained  undemonstrated  in  practice.  This 
fact  points  up  one  occasion  when  forecasts  by  scientific  advisors  would 
not  have  met  the  needs  of  the  diplomats. 

Inspection  jrrovisions  in  the  report :  Despite  the  number  of  nega- 
tive aspects  of  inspection,  the  Board  members  pointed  out  that  the 
need  for  it  could  not  be  eliminated  entirely.  However,  the  overall  plan 
they  recommended  was  aimed  at  making  inspection  "so  limited  and 
so  simplified  that  it  would  be  practical  and  could  aid  in  accomplishing 
the  purposes  of  security."  65  The  requirements  for  inspection  are  dis- 
cussed in  detail  among  the  functions  of  the  proposed  international 
Authority. 

The  discussion  of  the  issue  tended  to  emphasize  that  inspection  could 
be  beneficial.  Because  inspectors  would  also  be  engaged  in  research 
on  atomic  energy ,GC  their  "policing"  of  national  facilities  (for  example, 
those  using  denatured  materials)  would  offer  opportunities  to  provide 
helpful  guidance  and  advice  to  the  operators  of  those  facilities,  mak- 
ing inspection  less  objectionable.  The  only  "systematic  or  large-scale 
inspection  activities"  contemplated  for  the  proposed  Authority  were 
those  which  would  be  used  to  take  control  over  raw  materials.67  In 
addition,  the  report  recognized  that  some  procedure  would  have  to  be 
devised  for  the  investigation  of  suspected  clandestine  dangerous  activ- 


82  Ibid.,  p.  22. 

83  Ibid.,  p.  23. 

64  Baruch,  "Proposals  for  an  International  Atomic  Development  Authority,"  p.  1061. 

65  State  Department,  "Acheson-Lilienthal  report,"  p.  5. 

98  The  inspectors  of  tlie  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA)  today  do  not  reflect 
this  concept  of  the  scientist-inspector.  Rather,  present-day  inspectors  are  precisely  that, 
professional  men  in  the  complicated  and  uncertain  art  of  nuclear  materials. 

87  Contemporary  inspection  is  focused  more  on  processing,  fabrication,  use.  and  reproc- 
essing of  nuclear  fuel  materials  than  upon  mining  and  refining. 


86 


ities,  which  might  involve  the  International  Court  of  Justice  or  some 
similar  body,  to  determine  if  enough  evidence  of  clandestine  activity 
existed  to  warrant  investigation.68 

The  report  stressed  that  operation  of  dangerous  activities  by  the 
proposed  international  Authority  could  eliminate  the  need  for  deter- 
mination of  intent  behind  national  or  private  facilities,  and  would 
thereby  avoid  the  need  for  extensive  and  intrusive  inspection.  In  addi- 
tion, the  following  statement  regarding  some  of  the  technical  diffi- 
culties of  engaging  in  clandestine  activities  seemed  to  minimize  not 
only  the  need  for  inspection  but  also,  perhaps,  the  possibility  that 
evasions  might  be  attempted  : 

It  is  true  that  a  thoroughgoing  inspection  of  all  phases  of 
the  industry  of  a  nation  will  in  general  be  an  unbearable 
burden;  it  is  true  that  a  calculated  attempt  at  evasion  may, 
by  camouflage  or  by  geographical  location,  make  the  specific 
detection  of  an  illegal  operation  very  much  more  difficult. 
Hut  the  total  effort  needed  to  carry  through  from  the  mine  to 
the  bomb,  a  surreptitious  program  of  atomic  armament  on  a 
scale  sufficient  to  make  it  a  threat  or  to  make  it  a  temptation 
to  evasion,  is  so  vast,  and  the  number  of  separate  difficult 
undertakings  so  hard  to  conceal,  that  the  fact  of  this  effort 
should  be  impossible  to  hide.  The  fact  that  it  is  the  existence 
of  the  effort  rather  than  a  specific  purpose  or  motive  or  plan 
which  constitutes  an  evasion  and  an  unmistakable  danger  sig- 
nal is  to  our  minds  one  of  the  great  advantages  of  the  pro- 
posals we  have  outlined.60 

REACTIONS   AMONG  U.S.   POLICYMAKERS  TO  THE  PROPOSALS  OF  THE  BOARD 

OF    CONSULTANTS 

When  the  Board  originally  presented  its  plan  to  Achesoirs  commit- 
tee, both  Conant  and  Groves  voiced  apprehension  that  the  need  for 
inspection  had  been  minimized  too  much  and  that  the  terms  which 
the  Consultants  used  to  characterize  it  were  too  negative.  Conant  con- 
sidered it  vital  that  there  be  freedom  of  access  for  inspectors.  At  one 
point  McCloy  raised  the  possibility  that  this  plan  might  be  one  way 
"'to  alter  Russia's  closed  society.'' 70  But  Acheson  discouraged  the  idea 
on  the  grounds  that  the  basic  political  issues  associated  with  the  diffi- 
culties in  United  States-Soviet  relations  could  not  be  resolved  through 
the  efforts  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  international  control  of  atomic 
energy.  Although  Lilienthal  agreed  readily  to  make  changes  appropri- 
ate to  the  views  of  Conant  and  Groves,  the  report's  general  tone  on  the 
issue  of  inspection  remained  negat  ive. 

Despite  the  fact  that  the  Board  had  retained  the  idea  of  some  na- 
tional activity,  significant  forces  at  work  in  the  policymaking  proc- 
ess opposed   extensive   internationalization,   for  technical    and   other 

98  For  a  discussion  of  Inspection,  sop  State  Department,  "Acheson-Lillenthal  Report", 
pp.  35  39. 

•"Ibid.,  pp.  36  ':t    The  Board  seems  t<>  have  given  little  thought   to  the  possible  emer 
gence  <>f  an  international  black  market  in  fissionable  materials,  an  issue  that  is  attracting 
considerable  attention  todaj  as  the  United  states  and  other  governments  push  ahead  with 

die  development  "i   i>r ler  reader  technology,  which  can  greatly  increase  the  amount  "i 

fissionable  material  available  for  direct  use  in  weapons  manufacture,  Today  it'  a  nation  or 
other  institutions  can  obtain  nuclear  materials  en  q  black  market,  it  is  probable  that  such 
an    instrumentality    could    fabricate    small,    inefficient,    but    still    enormously    destructive 

at Iininhs. 

7"  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  United  Stairs  Atomic  Energy  Commxxsion, 
p.   548. 


87 


reasons.  The  issue  of  ownership  of  raw  materials  is  an  apt  example. 
Searls,  the  mining  engineer  on  Baruch's  delegation,  did  not  share  the 
Consultants'  view  regarding  the  manageability  of  all  the  sources  of 
raw  materials,  and  advised  Baruch  that  the  arrangement  proposed  in 
the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  would  be  difficult.  His  views  were  sec- 
onded by  representatives  of  mining  interests  who  sought  out  Baruch 
to  argue  against  international  ownership.  One  mining  executive  told 
Baruch  "an  international  administration  would  upset  wages,  dissat- 
isfy people,  and,  on  account  of  the  different  nationals  involved,  present 
tremendous  management  difficulties."  71 

Another  argument  against  international  ownership  was  that  it  vio- 
lated the  rights  of  private  enterprise.  Hancock,  of  Baruch's  group, 
contended  that  if  uranium  was  the  byproduct  of  mining  operations 
which  contributed  significantly  to  a  country's  economy,  international 
ownership  would  be  unacceptable  to  that  country.  At  one  meeting, 
when  Hancock  expressed  his  preference  for  more  inspection  over  own- 
ership, Acheson  pointed  out  that  the  Russians  would  not  accept  this 
arrangement  as  the  predominant  safeguard.  Hancock  disagreed,  and 
the  two  men  did  not  resolve  the  issue.72  An  alternative  plan  called  for 
operation  of  nationally  owned  mines  under  "reasonable  regulations" 
of  the  Authority  or  "a  system  of  rigorous  inspection  and  accounting 
procedures  for  the  separation  operations  at  mining  locations  through- 
out the  world."  Baruch's  team  was  willing  to  support  this  position 
against  international  ownership.73  When  Baruch  met  with  the  Ache- 
son  and  Lilienthal  groups,  he  announced  the  delegation's  preference 
for  "some  form  of  licensing  of  private  mining  operations"  and  sug- 
gested using  the  term  "dominion"  to  describe  the  relationship  between 
the  international  Authority  and  raw  materials.74  Apparently,  the  tech- 
nological assertions  which  were  advanced  to  support  the  Consultants' 
proposals  for  ownership  of  raw  materials  were  insufficient  for  the 
United  States  to  overcome  traditional  political  and  economic  concepts 
of  sovereignty  and  private  ownership.  The  varying  assertions  by  the 
qualified  experts  on  the  manageability  of  raw  materials  compounded 
the  confusion  surrounding  the  problem  of  atomic  energy  control.  In 
retrospect,  a  more  important  factor  was  the  discovery  of  uranium 
in  the  years  following  the  negotiations  in  places  where  it  was  not 
anticipated  in  1946. 

TREND   TOWARD    CONTROL    IN    U.S.    POLICY 

As  enunciated  at  the  negotiations,  the  main  thrust  of  U.S.  policy  on 
the  general  form  of  control  shifted  somewhat  from  the  plan  proposed 
in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report.  In  describing  the  international  Au- 
thority, Baruch's  speech  to  the  UNAEC  offered  a  variety  of  specific 
methods  of  control  over  various  phases  of  atomic  energy  development. 
Among  the  safeguards  he  proposed  were  "various  forms  of  ownership, 
dominion,  licenses,  operation,  inspection,  research,  and  manage- 
ment."70 While  Baruch  stated  that  these  duties  should  interfere  as 
little  as  possible  with  the  internal  affairs  of  the  states  involved,  every 
phase  of  atomic  energy  development  would  be  placed  under  the  juris- 

71  Ibid.,  p.  563. 

72  Ibid.,  p.  569. 

73  Lieberman.  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  276. 

74  Ibid.,  p.  281. 

75  Baruch,  "Proposals  for  an  International  Atomic  Development  Authority,"  p.  1060. 


88 


diction  of  the  international  Authority,  in  one  way  or  another.  One 
point  on  which  the  United  States  yielded  to  private  and  national  in- 
terests concerned  raw  materials,  which  were  proposed  to  be  placed 
under  the  international  Authority's  "dominion"1;  specific  forms  of 
control  over  the  natural  deposits  would  depend  on  the  geological,  min- 
ing, refining,  and  economic  circumstances  of  the  various  locations 
where  they  were  found.  While  the  second  U.S.  memorandum  stated 
that  the  Authority  should  have  such  control  as  would  insure  "its  com- 
plete and  absolute  ownership  of  all  uranium  and  thorium  produced,'' 
the  proposal  involved  a  control  system  imposed  upon  national  mining 
and  concentrating  operations,  rather  than  simply  transferring  these 
activities  to  the  international  Authority,  as  the  Acheson-Lihenthal 
report  had  proposed. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  displayed  some 
enthusiasm  for  allowing  national  and  private  participation  in  certain 
areas  of  atomic  energy  development.  But  when  Baruch  presented  the 
U.S.  proposals  to  the  UNAEC,  the  main  concern  over  national  ac- 
tivities was  that  they  Avould  be  subject  to  licensing  and  inspection  by 
the  Authority.  As  noted  above,  he  questioned  the  effectiveness  of  de- 
naturing to  prevent  illegal  diversion  of  activities  in  national  hands. 
Moreover,  Baruch  stated  that  national  activities  should  be  subordinate 
to  the  international  Authority  and  added  that  this  represented  "neither 
an  endorsement  nor  a  disapproval  of  the  creation  of  national  author- 
ities." 

In  the  brief  discussion  of  inspection  in  Baruch's  speech,  he  men- 
tioned the  advantages  of  the  overall  plan,  which  stressed  international 
ownership,  thus  providing  unambiguous  evidence  of  violations  and 
limiting  inspection  requirements.  He  also  noted  that  those  activities 
licensed  by  the  Authority  would  be  subject  to  inspection.  II is  third 
point,  however,  which  was  to  become  a  focus  for  Soviet  opposition 
dining  the  negotiations,  was  an  insistence  on  freedom  of  access.  He 
said  :  Adequate  ingress  and  egress  for  all  qualified  representatives  of 
the  Authority  must  be  assured."  7"  Less  attention  was  given  to  the  idea 
of  linking  the  developmental  function  with  inspection,  as  the  Acheson- 
Lilienthal  report  had  done.77 

U.N.    STALEMATE    OVER    CONTROL    AND    INSPECTION 

Soviet  reaction  to  jrroposed  interTiationalizaiion:  Typical  of  the 
Soviet  I'nion's  reaction  to  the  notion  of  international  ownership  was 
Gromyko's  comment  on  the  IXAEC's  first  report;  he  labelled  the 
whole  concept  "thoroughly  vicious  and  unacceptable,"  and  added  that 
international  ownership  and  managerial  control  "would  lend  to  inter- 
ference by  the  control  organ  in  the  internal  affairs  and  internal  life 
of  States  and  eventually  would  lead  to  arbitrary  action  by  the  control 
organ  in  the  solution  of  such  problems  as  fall  completely  within  the 
domestic  jurisdiction  of  a  State."  78 

Soviet  reaction  to  the  requirements  for  inspection  set  forth  by 
Baruch    was   unequivocal,  as   indicated   by   a    press  release   which  dis- 

•"  Ibid.,  i>.  1001. 

"The  first  U.S.  memorandum  touched  on  the  issue  of  inspection  In  a  manner  similar  to 
that  of  Baruch's  speech.  The  second  memorandum  expanded  on  the  Idea  by  elaborating  the 
d(  tail-  of  Inspection,  I.e..  adequate  provision  would  have  to  be  made  for  inspectors  in  terms 

Of    communication    and    transportation,    as    well    as    unhindered    access    to    the    facilities    In 

question. 

7"Stat>-   Department,   Polioi/  at   the  Crossroads,  p.  80. 


89 


cussed  a  speech  by  Gromyko  to  a  committee  of  the  UNAEC  in  July 

1946: 

Mr.  Gromyko  said  that  the  proposed  inspection  is  not  re- 
concilable with  the  principle  of  sovereignty  of  states.  "No  in- 
spection as  such  can  guarantee  peace  and  security."  And.  he 
added,  ''This  idea  of  inspection  is  greatly  exaggerated  in  im- 
portance. Tt  is  a  too  superficial  understanding  of  the  problem 
of  control."  The  Soviet  Delegate  repeated  that  inspection  has 
assumed  undue  importance  in  the  course  of  the  discussions 
and  said  that  the  only  real  underlying  method  of  control  is 
"by  the  cooperation  of  the  United  Nations."  79 

The  origin  for  this  opposition  appears  to  have  been  in  the  precepts 
associated  with  the  political  principle  of  national  sovereignty.  One 
U.S.  response  to  this  argument  was  made  by  Baruch  in  a  speech  be- 
fore Freedom  House  in  October  1946 : 

Every  treaty  involves  some  diminution  of  absolute  national 
sovereignty,  but  nations  enter  into  such  treaties  of  their  own 
free  will  and  to  their  common  advantage.  Indeed,  freedom  to 
enter  into  such  voluntary  international  arrangements  is  in- 
herent in  the  very  concept  of  national  sovereignty.80 

Action  by  the  UNAEC:  The  first  report  of  the  UNAEC  declared  in 
its  "Findings"  that : 

Ownership  by  the  international  control  agency  of  mines 
and  of  ores  still  in  the  ground  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  man- 
datory.81 

Broad  terms  of  reference  were  applied  to  dangerous  activities,  a  cate- 
gory which  seemed  to  include  all  aspects  of  the  production  of  fission- 
able materials: 

*  *  *  Effective  control  of  atomic  energy  depends  upon 
effective  control  of  the  production  and  use  of  uranium, 
thorium,  and  their  fissionable  derivatives.  Appropriate  mech- 
anisms of  control  to  prevent  their  unauthorized  diversion  or 
clandestine  production  and  use  and  to  reduce  the  dangers  of 
seizure — including  one  or  more  of  the  following  types  of  safe- 
guards: accounting,  inspection,  supervision,  management, 
and  licensing — must  be  applied  through  the  various  stages  of 
the  processes  from  the  time  the  uranium  and  thorium  ores  are 
severed  from  the  ground  to  the  time  they  become  nuclear  fuel 
and  are  used.82 

Looking  back  from  the  early  1970s,  when  most  contemporary  chal- 
lenges to  nuclear  power  focus  on  safety  and  environmental  effects,  it 
is  interesting  to  note  that  these  matters  received  scant  attention  by  the 
United  Nations  in  the  1940s. 

The  second  report  of  the  UNAEC  elaborated  on  the  general  concept 
of  ownership  by  the  Agency  and  how  it  applied  to  source  material  and 
the  operation  of  dangerous  facilities,  and  thereby  addressed  itself  to 
political  problems  inherent  in  such  an  arrangement.  The  report's  dis- 


79  State  Department,  Groirth  of  a  Policy,  p.  83. 

80  Ibid.,  p.  91.   He  might,  however,  have  added  that  the  ripht  of  withdrawal  is  also  in 
herent  in  national  sovereignty. 

81  United    Nations    Atomic '  Energy    Commission,    "First    Report    of    the   Atomic    Energy 
Commission  to  the  Security  Council,  31  December  1946,"  p.  16. 

8-  Ibid. 


90 


cussion  was  premised  on  the  assertion  that  it  was  not  possible  to  main- 
tain security  by  allowing  nations  or  individuals  to  have  proprietary 
rights  over  source  materials,  nuclear  fuels,  or  dangerous  facilities.  It 
recognized  the  need  to  protect  certain  rights  of  individual  nations 
and  to  guard  against  any  abuse  of  power  by  the  international  Agency. 
Ownership  by  the  Agency  would  be  "in  the  sense  of  a  trust  exercised 
on  behalf  of  signatory  States  jointly."  While  broad  powers  over  the 
materials  and  facilities  would  be  granted  to  the  Agency  as  owner, 
many  of  these,  especially  those  dealing  with  ''rights  of  disposition." 
would  be  '"very  closely  controlled  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty  or  conven- 
tion." Certain  arrangements,  for  example,  the  location  of  facilities 
within  a  country  or  compensation  for  source  materials,  would  have  to 
be  determined  through  agreement  with  individual  nations.  Other  ac- 
tivities would  be  executed  by  the  Agency  in  accordance  with  the  prin- 
ciples established  by  treaty  for  governing  the  Agency's  rights  and 
duties  as  "trustee." 

Similarly,  the  report  proposed  that  the  treaty  or  convention  deter- 
mine principles  respecting  the  geographic  distribution  of  production 
facilities  and  stockpiles  of  materials  suitable  for  weapons  use ;  these 
principles  would  be  such  that  no  particular  location  would  have  a 
greater  share  of  materials,  and  thus  would  avoid  the  potential  for  a 
military  capability  or  military  superiority.  It  was  decided  that  the 
Agency  could  not  be  allowed  to  determine  policy  on  this  subject  as 
decisions  in  this  area  affected  world  security.83  Thus,  the  UNAEC  en- 
visioned that  decisions  on  political  considerations  arising  from  the 
rights,  duties,  and  limitations  of  international  ownership  would  be 
agreed  to  before  assumption  by  the  Authority  of  the  powers  entrusted 
to  it. 

In  additional  sections  of  the  second  UNAEC  report,  these  and  other 
concepts  were  developed  in  considerable  detail ;  specific  proposals  dealt 
with  the  mining  of  raw  materials  and  with  dangerous  activities.  Dis- 
cussion of  "dangerous  activities''  offered  proposals  on  the  refining  of 
raw  materials;  the  stockpiling,  production,  and  distribution  of  nuclear 
fuels;  and  the  design,  construction,  and  operation  of  isotope  separa- 
tion plants  and  of  nuclear  reactors. 

These  later  sections  of  the  report  contained  several  observations  with 
regard  to  arrangements  with  individual  nations  which  the  Authority 
would  have  to  make,  some  of  which  might  have  to  be  included  in  the 
treaty  or  convention  establishing  the  Authority.  The  need  for  such 
arrangements  was  recognized,  as  certain  activities  of  the  Authority 
might  a  licet  the  economy  of  a  nation  or  might  otherwise  warrant  com 
pensation  by  the  Authority.  The  report  also  listed  the  various  forms  of 
inspection  and  licensing  activities  and  where  they  would  be  required. 
Although  these  proposals  in  the  second  UNAEC  report  were  based 
primarily  on  technological  considerations,  they  also  involved  political 
factors,  as  reflected  in  the  prescription  that  : 

Production  facilities,  facilities  utilizing  nuclear  fuel,  and 
stockpiles  be  distributed  in  such  a  way  as  to  minimize  the 
possibility  that  seizure  could  provide  an  aggressor  with  a 
militarv  advantage.84 


*>  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  "The  International  Control  of  Atomic 
Energy.  The  Second  Report  •  •  ♦  to  the  Security  Council.-  Sept.  11.  1047.  Reproduced  for 
the  United  Nations  Mission  to  the  United  Nations.  U.N.  Document  S/557,  Mimeo  L>e« 
York     United  Nations,  1047),  pp.  13   17. 

"Ibid.,  p.  3 


91 


Despite  the  kind  of  attention  to  detail  which  might  have  been  expected 
to  ease  Soviet  fears,  the  Soviets  continued  to  express  adamant  opposi- 
tion to  some  of  the  fundamental  features  of  the  plan.  This  attitude 
may  have  lessened  the  value  of  the  efforts  by  the  UNAEC  to  formulate 
the  finer  points  of  the  control  system. 

The  third  report  of  the  UNAEC  may  have  been  commenting  on  the 
need  for  the  acceptance  of  the  general  concept  of  international  owner- 
ship, when  it  stated : 

Only  if  traditional  economic  and  political  practices  are 
adapted  to  the  overriding  requirements  of  international  se- 
curity, can  these  proposals  be  implemented.  Traditional  con- 
cepts of  fhe  economic  exploitation  of  the  resources  of  nature 
for  priv  •  e  or  national  advantage  would  then  be  replaced  in 
this  fielu  by  a  new  pattern  of  co-operation  in  international 
relations.85 

With  regard  to  inspection,  the  first  report  of  the  UNAEC  had  stated 
that  "only''  through  an  "international  system  of  control  and  inspec- 
tion" can  atomic  energy  be  "freed  from  nationalistic  rivalries."  86  It 
called  for  "a  strong  and  comprehensive  system  of  control  and  inspec- 
tion." On  the  "freedom  of  access"  issue,  the  UNAEC  seemed  to  put  its 
recommendations  in  even  more  specific  terms  than  Baruch,  when  the 
report  stated  that  the  treaty  or  convention  establishing  the  interna- 
tioral  Authority  should  contain  provisions — 

*  *  *  Affording  the  duly  accredited  representatives  of  the 
utornational  control  agency  unimpeded  rights  of  ingress, 
3gi  ss,  and  access  for  the  performance  of  their  inspections 
and  other  duties  into,  from,  and  within  the  territory  of  every 
participating  nation,  unhindered  by  national  or  local 
authorities.87 

Committee  Two's  report,  appended  to  the  first  UNAEC  report,  had 
referred  to  the  need  for  inspection  quite  frequently  in  regard  to  a  num- 
ber of  activities.  The  group  defined  inspection  as  follows : 

2.  Inspection  means  close  and  careful  independent  scrutiny 
of  operations  to  detect  possible  evasions  or  violations  of  pre- 
scribed methods  of  operation.  In  addition  to  direct  auditing 
measures  as  described  above,  inspection  may  include  observa- 
tion of  points  of  ingress  to  and  egress  from  an  establishment 
or  installation  to  ensure  that  materials  and  supplies  are  flow- 
ing in  the  prescribed  manner,  observation  of  the  activities 
within  the  establishment  or  installation,  and  measures  in  the 
form  of  aerial  or  ground  survey  and  otherwise  to  guard 
against  clandestine  activities.  To  be  fully  effective,  the  power 
of  inspection  may  require  that  the  operations  be  carried  on  in 
a  specified  manner  in  order  to  facilitate  the  inspection.  In  this 
event,  inspection  verges  on  supervision.88 

The  need  for  inspection  was  discussed  in  Committee  Two's  report, 
and  during  the  negotiations,  insofar  as  it  related  to  examination  of 
"declared"  activities,  i.e.,  those  facilities  operated  by  the  proposed 

83  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Official  Records.  Third  year.  Special 
Supplement.  "Third  Report  to  the  Security  Council.  May  17.  194S."  (Lake  Success,  New 
York  :  August  1948)  p.  4.  (AEC/31/Rev.  1.  June  27,  1948.) 

86  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  "First  Report  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
mission to  the  Security  Council,  31  December  1946,"  p   16. 

87  Ibid.,  pp.  18-19. 

88  Ibid.,  p.  44. 


92 


Authority  or  by  national  or  private  management  licensed  bv  the  Au- 
thority. Suspected  clandestine  activities  seemed  to  present"  the  most 
difficulties  in  the  findings  and  recommendations  of  the  UNAEC  and 
in  the  negotiations  themselves.  Committee  Two's  report  seemed  to  rec- 
ognize that  inspection  for  clandestine  activities  represented  one  of 
the  more  troublesome  political  problems  to  be  dealt  with  in  the  ne- 
gotiations. Moreover,  it  reflected  a  recognition  of  how  certain  inherent 
technological  demands  of  atomic  energy  control  were  in  conflict  with 
traditional  political  requirements  of  states: 

Like  all  problems  in  atomic  energy,  the  detection  of  clan- 
destine operations  is  greatly  simplified  by  the  technical  facts 
of  the  field.  Nevertheless,  general  and  political  considerations 
play  a  larger  part  in  the  effectiveness  and  acceptability  of  any 
system  for  the  detection  of  clandestine  operations  than  in  most 
other  parts  of  the  problem.  They  will  need  most  careful  con- 
sideration when  the  functions,  powers,  and  organization  of 
the  agency  are  defined.  It  will  be  here  that  the  conflicts  be- 
tween the  requirements  of  the  international  control  agency  on 
the  one  hand  and  considerations  of  national  sovereignty  and 
present  practice  on  the  other  will  have  to  be  resolved.89 

The  second  report  of  the  UNAEC  attempted  to  deal  with  the  politi- 
cal problems  associated  with  inspection  in  a  section  entitled  "Rights 
of  and  Limitations  on  the  International  Agency  in  Relation  to  In- 
spections, Surveys,  and  Explorations."  It  offered  21  specific  proposals 
on  such  subjects  as  procedural  details  of  inspections,  ground  or  aerial 
surveys,  and  the  like.  Six  of  these  were  devoted  to  proposals  dealing 
with  investigation  of  clandestine  activities.90  Many  of  these  procedural 
proposals  were  made  with  the  understanding  that  they  should  be  in- 
corporated in  the  treaty  or  convention  establishing  the  Authority.  The 
following  concluding  statement  may  serve  as  a  general  comment  on 
the  character  of  the  inspection  envisioned  by  the  UNAEC  in  its  sec- 
ond report: 

In  summary,  the  proposals  contained  in  this  chapter  pro- 
vide very  extensive  powers  of  inspection  and  search  which 
enable  the  agency  to  visit  any  accessible  place  and  provide 
appropriate  procedures  applicable  in  certain  specified  circum- 
stances. It  has  to  be  recognized  that,  in  addition  to  these  pro- 
posed procedural  requirements  and  limitations,  the  good  sense. 
as  well  as  the  budget,  of  the  agency  will  themselves  be  limita- 
tions on  the  exercise  of  powers  given  to  the  agency  and  that, 
by  virtue  of  the  prospective  functions  of  the  agency  which 
have  been  proposed  in  previous  chapters,  the  amount  or  inspec- 
tion required  and  t  he  attendant  interferences  will  be  much  less 
than  would  be  necessary  under  a  control  system  which  sought 
to  depend  on  inspection  alone.1'1 

With  regard  to  declared  facilities,  the  Soviets  woidd  agree  only  to 
"periodic  inspections."  or  to  inspections  "carried  out  at  definite  inter- 

» Ibid.,  p.  56. 

■  The  main  categories  of  these  proposals  were  the  following:  (1)  requirement  of  war 
rants  or  special  consenl  ;  cj  i  granting  of  special  consent  :  (3)  resorl  to  domestic  or  inter 
national  court,  body,  or  official;  (i>  domestic  •■,,urts.  bodies,  or  officials  required  to  issue 
warrants  upon  showing  of  probable  or  reasonable  cause;  (5)  International  court,  body,  or 
official  required  to  issue  warrants  upon  showing  of  probable  or  reasonable  cause:  and  (6) 
scope  of  warrants.  Complete  details  of  these  proposals  <;m  be  found  in  United  Nations 
Atomic  Energy  Commission,  "The  International  Control  of  Atomic  Energy,  The  Second 
Report  to  the  Security  Council",  pp.  54—55. 

«  Ibid.,  p.  50. 


93 


vals,"  but  opposed  permanent  stationing  of  inspectors  in  countries. 
Soviet  proposals  on  this  subject,  though  more  detailed  than  others, 
were  considered  by  the  majority  of  the  Commission  as  failing  to  pro- 
vide 

an  adequate  basis  for  the  development  *  *  *  of  specific 

proposals  for  an  effective  system  of  international  control  of 

atomic  energy.92 

The  U.S.  interpretation  of  the  Soviet  proposals  on  inspection  was  that 
it  was  "concerned  chiefly  with  bookkeeping  and  reports."93  As  far  as 
investigation  of  clandestine  activities  was  concerned,  the  Commission 
reported  that  in  the  "minority"  (Soviet)  position,  "inspection  as  to 
clandestine  or  unreported  facilities  is  virtually  ignored."  94  As  was  the 
case  with  international  ownership,  the  extent  of  agreement  on  details 
achieved  by  a  considerable  number  of  UNAEC  members  was  nullified 
by  Soviet  opposition  to  the  basic  principles  behind  the  proposals  on 
inspection. 

In  commenting  on  the  impasse  in  the  negotiations,  the  third  report 
of  the  UNA  EC  seemed  to  focus  on  how  the  inspection  issue,  and  the 
agreed  technological  requirements  of  control,  challenged  national  at- 
titudes toward  security,  secrecy,  and  sovereignty.  It  said  : 

*  *  *  Secrecy  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy  is  not  compat- 
ible with  lasting  international  security.  Cooperative  develop- 
ment and  complete  dissemination  of  information  alone  prom- 
ise to  remove  fears  and  suspicion  that  nations  are  conducting 
secret  activities  *  *  *. 

The  majority  of  the  Commission  is  fully  aware  of  the  im- 
pact of  its  plan  on  traditional  prerogatives  of  national  sov- 
ereignty. But  in  the  face  of  the  realities  of  the  problem  it  sees 
no  alternative  to  the  voluntary  sharing  by  nations  of  their 
sovereignty  in  this  field  to  the  extent  required  by  its  proposals. 
It  finds  no  other  solution  which  will  meet  the  facts,  prevent 
national  rivalries  in  this  most  dangerous  field,  and  fulfill  the 
Commission's  terms  of  reference.95 

Moreover,  the  third  report  placed  the  issue  in  a  larger  perspective 
when  it  expressed,  if  perhaps  too  f acilely,  the  hope  that : 

The  new  pattern  of  international  co-operation  and  the  new 
standards  of  openness  in  the  dealings  of  one  country  with  an- 
other that  are  indispensable  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy 
might,  in  practice,  pave  the  way  for  international  co-operation 
in  broader  fields,  for  the  control  of  other  weapons  of  mass  de- 
struction, and  even  for  the  elimination  of  war  itself  as  an 
instrument  of  national  policy.96 

The  Issue  of  Stages  of  Transition  to  International  Control 

A  second  major  problem  for  U.S.  policy  and  for  the  negotiations  in- 
volved the  manner  in  which  an  international  control  Authority  would 
assume  its  responsibilities,  or  the  stages  by  which  there  would  be  a 

82  Proposals  and  Recommendations  of  the  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
Sec.  2,  "Report  and  Recommendations  of  the  Third  Report  of  the  United  Nations  Atomic 
Energy  Commission,  adopted  May  17,  194S."  pp.  77-78,  as  quoted  in  Bechhoefer,  Post- 
war Negotiations,  p.  66. 

93  State  Department,  Polici)  at  the  Crossroads,  p.  137. 

91  U.S.  Participation  in  the  U.N.,  Report  1047,  p.  103,  as  quoted  in  Bechhoefer,  Postwar 
Xeriotiations,  p.  66. 

95  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  "Third  Report  to  the  Security  Council," 
pp.  4-5. 

98  Ibid.,  p.  5. 


94 


transition  from  the  existing  U.S.  control  of  atomic  energy  to  a  system 
of  international  control.  The  issue  of  these  transitional  stages  involved 
partly  the  practical  steps  by  which  the  international  Authority  would 
arrive  at  its  position  of  complete  control  over  atomic  energy,  but  it 
also  concerned  the  underlying  assumption  that  this  transition  would 
have  to  proceed  in  such  a  way  that  the  control  system  would  be  made 
reliable  before  it  could  assume  responsibility  for  the  information  and 
facilities  associated  with  the  dangerous  uses  of  atomic  energy. 

Without  jeopardizing  its  own  military  security  or  that  of  the  other 
nations  of  the  world,  thereby  fulfilling  its  responsibility  as  keeper  of 
the  "sacred  trust''  over  atomic  energy,  the  United  States  had  to  deter- 
mine its  policy  regarding  the  sequence  and  timing  of  the  transfer  of 
information  and  facilities  to  an  international  Authority.  For  other 
countries,  the  issue  of  the  transitional  stages  raised  questions  regard- 
ing whether  and  when  the  United  States  would  relinquish  its  monopoly 
over  atomic  energy7  and  thus  give  up  what  appeared  to  be  a  command- 
ing military  advantage.  Thus,  U.S.  policy  had  to  be  framed  to  satisfy 
multiple  and  conflicting  purposes.  Important  related  questions  for 
policymakers  of  the  United  States  and  other  countries  were,  when 
would  the  United  States  stop  its  production  of  atomic  bombs,  and 
what  would  become  of  its  stockpiles  ? 

THE  POLITICAL  BASIS  FOR  PROCEEDING  BY  STAGES 

The  concept  of  stages  for  the  release  of  information  and  transfer  of 
facilities  had  its  foundations  in  early  U.S.  policy  on  international  con- 
trol of  atomic  energy  and  in  those  international  agreements  which  com- 
mitted the  United  States  to  seek  such  control.  Initial  Administration 
pronouncements  regarding  atomic  energy  included  assurances  that 
the  "secret"  of  weapons  manufacture  would  not  be  released  in  the  ab- 
sence of  international  control.  In  his  October  1945  message  to  Congress, 
which  concentrated  primarily  on  national  control.  President  Truman, 
in  speaking  on  the  problem  of  international  control,  pledged  that 
international  discussions  would  "not  be  concerned  with  disclosures  re- 
lating to  the  manufacturing  processes  leading  to  the  production  of 
the  atomic  bomb  itself,"  and  that  they  would  "constitute  an  effort  to 
work  out  arrangements  covering  the  terms  under  which  international 
collaboration  and  exchange  of  information  might  safely  proceed." 
Although  the  President  did  not  specifically  mention  transitional  stages, 
his  comments  indicate  an  effort  to  avoid  any  implication  that  the  im- 
pending discussions  might  lead  to  dissemination  of  information  on 
atomic  energy,  before  control  of  its  destructive  uses  had  been  achieved. 
As  later  developed  in  U.S.  policy,  this  goal  became  one  of  the  primary 
purposes  for  devising  transitional  stages. 

The  Three  Nation  Agreed  I  >eclaration  of  November  1945  offered  an 
"exchange  of  fundamental  scientific  information  *  *  *  for  peaceful 
ends  with  any  nation  that  will  fully  reciprocate," bul  added  that  much 
of  the  information  on  practical  applications  of  atomic  energy  would 
become   available  "just  as  soon  as  effective  enforceable  safeguards 


"Harry  s  Truman,  "Special  Message  to  the  Conpn>ss  on  Atomic  Energy,  October  3, 
I'M.".  /  ublic  Papers  of  th(  President  of  tin  United  States,  1945  (Washington,  D.C. :  u.b. 
Gove'rnmenl  Printing  Office,  1961  >,  i>.  366. 


95 


against  its  use  for  destructive  purposes  can  be  devised."  98  Moreover, 
the  statement  recommended  that  the  proposed  U.N.  Commission  pro- 
ceed "by  separate  stages,  the  successful  completion  of  each  one  of  which 
will  develop  the  necessary  confidence  of  the  world  before  the  next  stage 
is  undertaken."  "  The  same  phrase  was  incorporated  in  the  Moscow 
Declaration  and  in  the  resolution  which  established  the  UNAEC.  At 
the  Moscow  Conference,  the  provision  that  the  work  of  the  Commission 
should  proceed  by  stages  had  been  strongly  supported  by  the  United 
States;  Russian  agreement  was  obtained  primarily  in  exchange  for 
Western  agreement  to  Soviet  insistence  on  the  close  relationship  of  the 
Commission  with  the  U.N.  Security  Council.100 

The  idea  that  the.  proposed  Commission  should  proceed  by  stages 
may  have  made  it  appear  to  the  United  States  that  its  participation 
in  the  proposed  organization  would  involve  the  release  of  information 
on  atomic  weapons  either  for  the  purposes  of  negotiation  or  to  set  up 
the  system  of  international  control.  Thus,  even  before  taking  part  in 
the  negotiations  on  the  substantive  issues  of  control  the  United  States 
felt  it  necessary  to  seek  assurance  that  atomic  weapons  information 
would  be  protected  in  the  absence  of  international  control,  and  this 
concern  was  carried  over  into  the  negotiations  themselves,  as  it  applied 
to  the  transition  from  U.S.  to  international  control. 

INSISTENCE   BY   ACHESON   COMMITTEE   ON    STEP-BY-STEP  APPROACH 

Origins  of  the  discussion:  The  idea  of  transitional  stages  in  the 
Aeheson-Lilienthal  report  originated  in  the  attitude  among  the  mem- 
bers of  Acheson's  committee  that  the  security  of  the  United  States 
had  to  be  protected  before  and  during  the  transition  to  effective  inter- 
national control.  Some  committee  members  expressed  concern  lest  in- 
formation and  facilities  associated  with  manufacturing  the  atomic 
bomb  be  released  by  the  United  States  before  a  reliable  system  of  in- 
ternational control  had  been  established.  The  Board  of  Consultants 
did  not  set  out  initially  to  devise  such  stages.  They  viewed  their  basic 
task  as  to  conceive  a  "workable  system  of  international  control,"  and 
tended  to  disregard  devising  the  steps  to  achieve  it.  It  was  only  at 
the  insistence  of  the  Acheson  committee  that  the  Board  resigned  itself 
to  modifying  its  report  to  include  a  general  discussion  of  stages.  The 
finished  form  of  the  Aeheson-Lilienthal  report,  however,  avoided 
going  into  considerable  detail,  on  the  grounds  that  specific  schedules 
would  have  to  be  negotiated  in  the  UNAEC,  and  that  decisions  on  the. 
timing  of  the  release  of  information  and  facilities  by  the  United  States 
should  be  left  to  the  highest  policymakers  in  the  Government. 

Although  the  political  basis  for  the  concept  of  stages  had  been  es- 
tablished in  the  policy  approved  by  the  President,  the  Board  of  Con- 
sultants apparently  preferred  to  omit  explicit  discussion  of  this  sub- 
ject, even  though  Conant  had  earlier  mentioned  to  the  Board  the  need 
for  transitional  stages.101  In  the  Board's  original  report  to  Acheson's 
committee,  the  Consultants  did  not  deal  with  the  issue  of  transitional 


98  state  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  p.  25. 
m  Ibid. 

100  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  216. 

101  Hewlett   and    Anderson,   History  of  the   United  States  Atomic  Energy   Commission, 
p.  534. 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.   1-8 


96 


stages  beyond  the  assertion  that  a  necessary  first  step  would  be  a  raw 
materials  survey.  This  consideration  was  primarily  an  operational 
requisite  of  the  international  Authority.  When  the  plan  was  submitted 
to  the  committee,  Conant,  Bush,  and  Groves  were  the  principal  ex- 
ponents of  the  political  and  military  arguments  for  determining  the 
transitional  stages  for  the  release  of  information  and  transfer  of 
material. 

Bush  based  his  position  on  the  recognition  that  rapid  demobiliza- 
tion of  U.S.  military  manpower  had  resulted  in  a  U.S.  dependence  on 
the  atomic  bomb  as  its  primary  source  of  military  power,  while  the 
Soviet  Union  had  retained  its  large  armies.  If  the  international  con- 
trol system  should  be  established  in  one  step,  and  the  United  States 
relinquished  its  monopoly,  Bush  argued,  the  Soviets  would  be  left  in  a 
superior  military  position. 

Acheson's  comments  on  the  stages  centered  on  two  considerations. 
First,  while  he  granted  that  the  plan  should  go  into  effect  as  quickly 
as  possible,  he  appeared  to  envision  the  transitional  period  as  one 
which  would  reveal  whether  other  nations  would  adhere  to  a  system 
of  international  control.  Acheson's  remarks  have  been  described  as  fol- 
lows :  "As  soon  as  the  organization  had  completed  the  first  transitional 
phase  and  everyone  was  'playing  pool,'  it  would  turn  to  the  next.  If 
the  first  phase  revealed  bad  faith,  further  progress  was  out  of  the 
question."  102  Acheson's  second  point  was  that  the  United  States  should 
be  prepared  for  crises  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  that  a  variety  of 
issues,  whether  connected  with  the  plan  or  not,  could  sabotage  the 
whole  effort.  Therefore,  U.S.  preeminence  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy 
should  not  be  forfeited  immediately,  in  the  event  that  steps  to  set  up 
the  international  Authority  failed. 

Moreover,  support  for  the  idea  of  stages  was  based  on  the  commit- 
tee's general  view  of  the  complete  plan  for  international  control.  Both 
Acheson  and  Conant  described  the  plan  primarily  as  a  "warning  de- 
vice" whereby  the  United  States  and  other  nations  of  the  world  would 
become  aware  when  a  country  embarked  on  its  own  program  to  de- 
velop nuclear  weapons,  and  could  take  preventive  or  punitive  action. 
Given  this  attitude  toward  the  fully  operational  control  system,  it  is 
understandable  that  the  committee  should  have  sought  to  retain  for 
the  United  States  the  highest  degree  of  military  preparedness  in  the 
event  of  a  breakdown  as  the  system  was  being  established,  while  at  the 
same  time  preventing  other  nations  from  developing  their  own  nuclear 
weapons. 

Committee  members  differed  as  to  the  extent  to  which  a  detailed 
schedule  of  transition  could  be  specified.  Bush  suggested  that  the 
stages  would  have  to  be  defined  clearly  enough  to  insure  acceptability 
of  the  plan,  perhaps  on  the  grounds  that  such  definition  would  serve 
to  strengthen  the  confidence  of  other  nations  in  U.S.  intentions  to  re- 
linquish its  monopoly.  lie  recognized,  however,  that  the  fine  details 
could  not  be  determined  at  that  point,  a  task  which  rightly  belonged 
to  the  American  negotiator.  This  position  was  supported  by  Acheson. 
Throughout  the  deliberations  between  the  Board  and  the  committee, 
General  Groves  supported  the  idea  of  setting  forth  the  most  explicit 
stages  possible,  to  show  "where  the  American  people  would  come  out 

«»  Ibid.,  p.  548. 


97 


if  someone  suddenly  doublecrossed  them."  103  It  was  finally  agreed 
that  the  Board  would  add  a  section  to  its  report  to  deal  with  stages, 
but  only  in  a  "speculative  way."'  The  purpose  of  the  new  section  was 
"to  give  the  report  the  ring  of  reasonableness."  104 

During  the  discussions  with  the  committee,  Lilienthal  had  ques- 
tioned the  group's  competence  to  set  down  the  transitional  stages.  In 
a  meeting  following  the  presentation  of  their  first  report  to  the  com- 
mittee, the  Board  members  were  apprehensive  about  the  idea,  appar- 
ently because  of  its  political  implications.  One  source  has  described  the 
meeting  as.follows : 

All  had  serious  misgivings  about  adding  a  section  on  stages. 
It  was  not  that  they  had  any  illusions  about  Russia.  They 
recognized  that  the  shift  to  international  control  must  come 
in  orderly  steps.  But  they  considered  it  bad  tactics  to  write 
in  an  implied  distrust  of  other  nations.  Their  report  assumed 
the  good  faith  of  Russia.  It  permitted  the  concept  of  stages  to 
evolve  during  the  negotiations.  It  avoided  giving  the  plan  a 
made-in- America  stamp  that  would  prejudice  others  against 
it.  Yet  what  could  the  consultants  do  ?  If  they  refused  to  write 
the  fourth  section,  someone  else  would.  Perhaps  they  ought  to 
stick  with  the  task  and  see  it  done  well.  Distinctly  unhappy, 
fearing  they  were  blighting  the  spirit  of  the  work,  they  de- 
cided to  undertake  the  revision.105 

Final  version — some  technological  considerations :  In  keeping  with 
the  concern  expressed  by  Acheson's  committee,  the  main  thrust  of  the 
discussion  in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  on  transition  to  interna- 
tional control  was  the  effect  which  the  transition  process  would  have 
on  U.S.  facilities  and  information,  and  thus  on  the  status  of  U.S. 
military  security.  The  report  stated  that  two  different  kinds  of  sched- 
ules needed  to  be  considered.  One  would  include  "indispensable  re- 
quirements for  the  adoption  and  the  success  of  the  plan  itself"  and 
these  steps  were  "fixed  by  the  plan  itself."  106  The  second  kind  of  sched- 
ules consisted  of  a  number  of  options  which  were  considered  "compat- 
ible with  the  operability  of  the  plan  and  affecting  primarily  its  accept- 
ability to  the  several  nations."  107  The  task  of  choosing  from  these  op- 
tions involved  the  acceptance  of  the  parties  concerned.  Therefore,  it 
should  be  left  to  the  international  negotiations.  In  dealing  with  these 
two  kinds  of  schedules,  the  report  divided  the  nature  of  the  releases 
by  the  United  States  into  two  categories:  material  and  information.. 

The  discussion  of  the  release  of  fissionable  materials  cited  the  two 
kinds  of  schedules  mentioned  above.  In  discussing  those  material  ac- 
quisitions by  the  Authority  which  were  viewed  as  "fixed  by  the  plan  it- 
self," the  report  treated  only  the  initial  operations  of  the  Authority. 
The  first  step,  regarded  as  "an  essential  prerequisite  for  all  further 
progress,"  was  for  the  Authority  to  obtain  "cognizance  and  control 
over  the  raw  materials  situation."  Various  other  steps  were  listed  re- 
garding initial  operations  of  the  Authority,  but  none  would  affect 
U.S.  weapons  production  facilities.  The  report  left  the  determination 

103  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  257. 

lf'4  Hewlett  and  Anderson.  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
p.  549. 

m  Ibid.,  p.  547. 

106  State  Department,  "Acheson-Lilienthal  report,"  p.  45. 

10T  Ibid. 


98 


of  the  schedules  for  the  transfer  of  these  facilities  for  later  negotiation. 
The  same  treatment  was  given  to  disclosures  of  information.  Nego- 
tiators would  need  some  kinds  of  information  to  gain  an  adequate 
understanding  of  atomic  energy,  and  thus  contribute  to  effective  nego- 
tiation of  control.  In  making  a  case  for  these  disclosures,  the  report 
cited  an  earlier  study  of  classified  information,  prepared  by  a  group 
in  the  Manhattan  project,  which  delineated  various  groups  of  infor- 
mation which  could  be  released  or  which  had  to  be  retained.  The 
Acheson-Lilienthal  report  noted  that  this  earlier  report  had  been  able 
to  identify  certain  categories  of  information  which  could  be  released  in 
the  absence  of  international  control  without  jeopardizing  national  se- 
curity. In  appealing  for  the  release  of  certain  kinds  of  information, 
the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  pointed  out  that  all  of  this  information 
fell  into  releasable  categories.108 

The  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  suggested  that  the  timing  and  se- 
quence of  the  release  of  more  sensitive  information  would  depend  on 
the  negotiated  stages  whereby  the  international  Authority  would  as- 
sume its  operations.  Some  of  this  information  would  be  required  to 
enable  the  international  Authority  to  undertake  its  initial  operations. 
Another  portion,  particularly  that  on  atomic  weapons,  would  not  have 
to  be  released  until  such  time  as  the  Authority  was  allowed  to  pursue 
research  in  this  field,  presumably  during  some  later  stage  of  transition. 
The  report  did  emphasize  that  when  the  Authority  was  prepared  to 
take  over  an  operation,  the  United  States  and  other  countries  would 
be  obliged  to  release  to  the  Authority  all  information,  practical  and 
theoretical,  pertinent  to  that  activity.  The  report  also  added  that  in 
order  to  take  over  some  activities,  the  Authority  would  have  to  carry 
on  planning  in  advance,  and  that  for  these  purposes,  information 
might  have  to  be  released  prior  to  actual  operations  by  the  Authority. 
In  discussing  the  need  to  negotiate  many  of  the  schedules  for  the  as- 
sumption of  control  by  the  international  Authority,  the  consultants 
commented  on  the  demands  this  practical  requirement  for  informa- 
tion release  placed  on  U.S.  policy : 

The  extent  to  which  special  precautions  need  to  be  taken  to 
preserve  present  American  advantages  must  be  importantly 
influenced  by  the  character  of  the  negotiation  and  by  the 
earnestness  which  is  manifested  by  the  several  nations  in  an 
attempt  to  solve  the  common  problems  of  international  con- 
trol. These  questions  lie  in  the  domain  of  highest  national 
policy  in  international  relations.109 
The  release  of  both  fissionable  material  and  atomic  information  was 
discussed  in  the  report  in  relation  to  U.S.  security;  in  both  areas,  the 
report  declared  that  the  position  of  the  United  States  would  continue 

»°*The  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  described  the  product  of  the  Declassification  Committee 
as  follows:  "It  recommended  against  declassification  at  the  present  time  oi  a  very  con- 
sidernble  body  Of  technical,  technological,  industrial,  and  ordnance  information,  that  is 
information   bearing  directly  on   the  manufacture  of  weapons  and   the  design   and  operation 

of  production  plants.  Bit*  it  recommended  the.  prompt  declassification  of  a  large  Dortyot 

.'      ..^         S_  -.      '        j      -n     J.--T.-I i     i—e „t:„„     «*     ,,..,,    ,.,-H  I. >iil     nntllro     find     W   (IP    n  III)   lea  111    1 IV. 


furtherlngTffoSn  lo^I-tera  muT.rnaT^cirrit^in  the  absence  of  International  measures. 
Ibid.,  pp.  53  54. 

we  Ibid.,  p.  49. 


99 


to  be  a  favorable  one  during  the  stages  of  transition.  As  far  as  facil- 
ities were  concerned  during  the  transition,  all  operating  facilities 
would  be  located  in  the  United  States;  and  if  a  breakdown  in  the  con- 
trol system  occurred,  this  country  would  have  the  advantage.  Sim- 
ilar assurances  were  given  with  regard  to  the  release  of  information. 
As  noted  above,  information  necessary  for  release  during  the  nego- 
tiations met-  the  security  requirements  set  down  in  the  earlier  study  by 
the  Manhattan  District  Group.  Moreover,  the  report  explained,  the 
items  of  information  it  advocated  were  "of  a  theoretical  and  descrip- 
tive nature  and  have  in  large  part  to  do  with  the  constructive  applica- 
tions of  atomic  energy  [and]  involve  almost  nothing  of  know-how."  110 
The  report  contended  that  a  major  source  of  U.S.  superiority  in  atomic 
energy  rested  in  the  actual  experience  of  working  with  the  facilities. 
Thus,  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  relied  in  part  on  certain  tech- 
nological considerations  to  meet  some  of  the  political  demands  associ- 
ated with  the  transfer  of  U.S.  information  or  facilities.  (One  example 
is  the  assertion  that  selective  release  of  technical  information  would 
not  jeopardize  U.S.  security.)  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  Consult- 
ants pointed  out  that  many  political  decisions  would  have  to  be  made 
in  order  to  determine  U.S.  policy  on  the  arrangements  for  the  transi- 
tion to  international  control.  These  decisions  would  be  governed  partly 
by  the  general  trend  of  the  negotiations,  but  would  have  to  define  the 
circumstances  under  which  the  United  States  was  willing  to  relin- 
quish those  atomic  energy  facilities  associated  with  its  destructive  ap- 
plications and  which  were  then  viewed  as  temporarily  the  exclusive 
property  of  the  United  States.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  on  this 
latter  point,  the  letter  of  transmittal  of  the  report  to  Secretary  Byrnes, 
written  by  Acheson,  discusses  the  stages  at  length,  and  calls  for  fur- 
ther study  and  decisions  to  support  U.S.  policy  on  transitional  stages. 
Indeed,  the  letter  even  comments  on  the  question  of  U.S.  production  of 
bombs,  but  does  not  take  a  position  : 

The  development  of  detailed  proposals  for  such  scheduling 
will  require  further  study  and  much  technical  competence  and 
staff.  It  will  be  guided,  of  course,  by  basic  decisions  of  high 
policy.  One  of  these  decisions  will  be  for  wThat  period  of  time 
the  United  States  will  continue  the  manufacture  of  bombs. 
The  plan  does  not  require  that  the  United  States  shall  dis- 
continue such  manufacture  either  upon  the  proposal  of  the 
plan  or  upon  the  inauguration  of  the  international  agency. 
At  some  stage  in  the  development  of  the  plan  this  is  required. 
But  neither  the  plan  nor  our  transmittal  of  it  should  be  con- 
strued as  meaning  that  this  should  or  should  not  be  done  at 
the  outset  or  at  any  specific  time.  That  decision,  whenever 
made,  will  involve  considerations  of  the  highest  policy  affect- 
ing our  security,  and  must  be  made  by  our  Government  under 
its  constitutional  processes  and  in  the  light  of  all  the  facts  of 
the  world  situation.111 

INCONCLUSIVE  TREATMENT  OF  THE  TRANSITION  ISSUE  BY  UNAEC 

The  U.S.  policy  on  stages,  as  enunciated  in  Baruch's  speech  and  in 
the  memoranda  which  elaborated  the  U.S.  position,  did  not  develop 

u°Ibid.,  p.  52. 
v*  Ibid.,  p.  vi. 


100 


the  concept  beyond  the  level  of  detail  contained  in  the  Acheson- 
Lilienthal  report.  Indeed,  very  little  was  said  regarding:  the  relation- 
ship between  the  need  for  stages  and  U.S.  security.  In  his  remarks 
to  the  opening  session  of  the  UNAEC,  Baruch  mentioned  stages  only 
in  regard  to  what  would  seem  to  be  a  procedural  matter.  He  merely 
asserted  that  full  control  of  atomic  energy  would  ''have  to  come  into 
effect  in  successive  stages,"  and  that  the  transition  should  be  set 
forth  in  the  charter  creating  the  Authority.  Baruch  recalled  the 
language  of  the  resolution  creating  the  UNAEC  as  the  basis  for  this 
provision. 

Baruch  did  mention  the  U.S.  role  during  the  transitional  stages, 
with  regard  to  the  release  of  both  information  and  facilities,  in  terms 
which  obviously  offered  few.  if  any,  immediate  concessions  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States.  As  far  as  information  was  concerned. 
Baruch  outlined  basically  the  procedure  recommended  in  the  Aeheson- 
Lilienthal  report,  stating  that  only  the  information  necessary  to  an 
understanding  of  atomic  energy  in  the  negotiations  would  be  revealed 
by  the  United  States  until  a  successful  conclusion  was  reached.  Further 
disclosures  would  depend  "in  the  interests  of  all.  upon  the  effective 
ratification  of  the  treaty,"  and  would  be  carried  out  when  the  inter- 
national Authority  Avas  prepared  to  assume  certain  functions.  In  his 
comments  on  U.S.  facilities,  he  said  that,  "The  United  States  was 
prepared  to  yield,  to  the  extent  required  by  each  stage,  national  control 
of  activities  in  this  field  to  the  Authority."  112 

The  first  U.S.  memorandum  expanded  somewhat  on  Baruch's  state- 
ment that  the  charter  establishing  the  international  Authority  would 
specify  the  sequence  and  timing  of  the  transition  from  the  existing 
conditions  to  international  control.  Besides  citing  this  requirement, 
the  memo  stated  that  the  charter  also  should  specify  "the  time  when 
and  the  conditions  under  which  the  national  and  private  possession, 
manufacture,  and  use  of  atomic  weapons  shall  be  outlawed."113 
Nevertheless,  U.S.  policy  on  the  specific  question  of  the  timing  for  the 
disposal  of  existing  weapons,  a  major  question  dining  the  negoti- 
ations, was  not  mentioned.  The  second  U.S.  memorandum  treated  the 
question  of  transit  ional  stages  in  a  similar  manner  and  did  not  provide 
any  additional  elaboration  of  the  U.S.  position,  particularly  concern- 
ing its  own  contributions  during  the  transitional  process. 

Soviet  policy  on  the  question  of  stages  was  concerned  primarily 
with  the  timing  of  the  destruction  of  existing  atomic  weapons.  It  called 
for  the  establishment  of  international  control  following  an  agreement 
on  the  prohibition  and  destruction  of  atomic  weapons.  This  sequence 
was  never  accepted  by  the  majority  during  the  negotiations: 

While  it  is  generally  agreed  that  atomic  weapons  must  be 
eliminated  from  national  armaments,  the  majority  have  con- 
cluded that  such  elimination  should  come  at  that  stage  in  the 
development  of  the  international  control  system  which  would 
clearly  signify  to  the  world  that  the  safeguards  then  in  op- 
eration provided  security  for  all  participating  states.114 

Indeed,  the  Soviet  Union  itself  recognized  that  there  could  be  no  guar- 
antee that  a  second  agreement  establishing  a  control  system  would  be 


u*  State  Department,  drouth  of  a  Policy,  p.  146. 
'"Thirl      p    14!) 

u* U.S.  Participation   in   the  U.N.,  Report  1047.  p.   103,  as  quoted  in  Bechhoefer,  Post- 
war  Negotiations,  \>.  I 


101 


concluded  following  conclusion  of  an  agreement  to  prohibit  and  de- 
stroy atomic  weapons.115  Apparently,  Soviet  skepticism  regarding  the 
sincerity  of  U.S.  pledges  to  destroy  its  bombs  after  the  institution  of 
international  control  contributed  to  the  persistence  of  the  Soviets  in 
standing  by  their  own  proposals.  Probably  they  saw  advantage  also  in 
delay.  It  seems  a  strong  probability,  moreover,  that  the  progress  of 
their  own  development  of  atomic  energy  may  have  reinforced  the  de- 
termination of  the  Soviets  to  maintain  their  position.  (The  Soviet 
negotiators  may  not  have  been  aware  of  that  progress,  but  those  from 
whom  they  received  their  policy  directives  presumably  were  fully 
informed.) 

In  regard  to  negotiation  of  the  transitional  stages,  the  issue  was 
probably  reduced  to  the  question  of  when  the  United  States  would 
relinquish  its  monopoly  over  atomic  energy,  or  more  specificially,  its 
bombs  and  the  facilities  for  producing  them.  The  Soviets  asked  what 
assurance  there  was  that  destruction  actually  would  be  carried  out. 
During  the  negotiations,  U.S.  policy  on  this  particular  question  was 
not  defined  beyond  the  pledge  that  destruction  of  existing  stockpiles 
would  take  place  when  effective  safeguards  had  been  established.  Ef- 
forts by  the  UNAEC  to  settle  this  question  in  more  precise  terms  were 
unable  to  reach  an*  agreement  satisfactory  to  the  Soviets. 

The  question  of  U.S.  cessation  of  bomb  production  in  relation  to  in- 
ternational control  had  been  raised  during  the  deliberations  which 
resulted  in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report.  Despite  Acheson's  assertion 
in  the  letter  of  transmittal  that  the  report  had  not  taken  a  position 
on  the  timing  for  a  halt  of  U.S.  weapons  manufacture,  the  treatment 
of  the  issue  in  the  report  has  been  interpreted  as  follows : 

*  *  *  the  report  took  no  definite  position,  implying  there- 
fore, that  atomic  weapons  would  continue  to  be  built.  Bomb- 
making  would  have  to  stop  sometime,  but  that  was  a  ques- 
tion for  the  President  to  determine  consistent  with  consti- 
tutional processes  and  in  the  light  of  the  world  situation.116 

In  a  speech  before  Freedom  House  in  October  1946,  Baruch  pledged 
the  intention  of  the  United  States  to  destroy  its  bombs  "if  the  world 
would  join  in  a  pact  to  insure  the  world's  security  from  atomic  war- 
fare." His  comments  on  destroying  U.S.  weapons  prior  to  establish- 
ment of  the  system  posed  the  question : 

Why  should  America  alone  be  asked  to  make  sacrifices  by 
way  of  unilateral  disarmament  in  the  cause  of  good  will?  If 
equality  of  sacrifice  be  needed  then  each  should  participate.117 

Truman  himself  had  written  to  Baruch  the  previous  July : 

We  should  not  under  any  circumstances  throw  away  our 
gun  until  we  are  sure  the  rest  of  the  world  can't  arm  against 
us.1 


In  discussing  the  negotiations,  Bechhoefer  describes  this  question  as 
"perhaps  the  most  fundamental  divergence  between  the  Soviet  posi- 
tion and  that  of  the  West."  To  Soviet  questions  on  when  bombs  would 
be  eliminated,  the  U.S.  response  was  that  the  majority  had  concluded 

115  Ibid. .  p.  71. 

ua  Laeberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  258. 
117  State  Department,  Groirth  of  a  Policy,  p.  90. 

118Hnrrv   S.   Truman.   Memoirs,  vol.   2.    Years  of   Trial  and   Hope.    (Garden   City,   N.Y.  : 
Doubleday,  1956),  p.  11. 


102 


that  weapons  should  be  eliminated  "at  that  stage  in  the  development  of 
the  international  control  system  which  would  clearly  signify  to  the 
world  that  the  safeguards  then  in  operation  provided  security  for  all 
participating  States."  119 

Bechhoefer  cites  one  discussion  during  the  second  year  of  the  negoti- 
ations which  illustrates  the  "indecisive  nature"  of  the  negotiations  on 
the  question  of  stages.  The  Soviet  Union  had  proposed  an  amendment 
to  the  first  report  which  simply  called  for  destruction  of  manufactured 
and  unfinished  weapons.  The  first  UNAEC  report  had  proposed  dis- 
posal of  bombs,  an  expression  which  meant  the  elimination  of  the  bomb 
mechanism  and  the  peaceful  use  of  the  nuclear  fuel  from  the  dis- 
mantled weapons.  The  Soviet  amendment  had  omitted  any  provision 
for  use  of  the  nuclear  fuel,  which  posed  the  real  danger  following  de- 
struction of  the  bomb  mechanism,  although  they  agreed  that  the  fuel 
should  not  be  destroyed.  During  discussion  of  the  amendment,  the 
U.S.  representative  raised  the  point  that  the  real  issue  was  not  destruc- 
tion of  the  weapons  but  control  of  the  nuclear  fuel  from  dismantled 
weapons.  In  response,  the  Soviet  representative  insisted  that  the 
issue  of  control  could  not  be  discussed  apart  from  destruction  of  weap- 
ons. Attempts  to  settle  this  question  in  the  form  of  a  resolution  were 
fruitless,  when  the  group  could  not  even  agree  on  a  definition  of  the 
term  "'destruction."  References  to  the  term  could  not  be  separated  from 
the  issue  of  stages,  which  comprised  the  basic  source  of  disagreement 
between  the  positions  expressed  by  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union.120 

In  the  face  of  this  impasse,  a  section  on  the  majority  plan  for  control 
in  the  third  report  of  the  UNAEC  included  the  following  statement 
regarding  stages,  which  had  been  retained  verbatim  from  the  recom- 
mendations in  the  first  report : 

The  treaty  should  embrace  the  entire  programme  for  put- 
ting the  international  system  of  control  into  effect  and  should 
provide  a  schedule  for  the  completion  of  the  transitional  proc- 
ess over  a  period  of  time,  step  by  step,  in  an  orderly  and 
agreed  sequence  leading  to  the  full  and  effective  establish- 
ment of  international  control  of  atomic  energy.  In  order  that 
the  transition  may  be  accomplished  as  rapidly  as  possible, 
and  with  safety  and  equity  to  all,  the  United  Nations  Atomic 
Energy  Commission  should  supervise  the  transitional  proc- 
ess, as  prescribed  in  the  treaty,  and  should  be  empowered  to 
determine  when  a  particular  stage  or  stages  have  been  com- 
pleted and  subsequent  ones  are  to  commence.1'-'1 

The  final  report  recognized  that  more  details  would  be  desirable,  but 
stated  that  it  would  serve  no  useful  purpose  to  attempt  to  elaborate  on 
this  and  other  questions  "until  agreement  on  the  basic  principles  of 
control  has  been  reached."  122 

Thus,  it  would  appear  that  efforts  to  determine  the  sequence  and 
t  imingof  the  assumption  of  control  by  the  international  Authority  may 
have  originated  in  the  negotiations  simply  as  a  question  of  tin1  pro- 

1W  I*  S     Participation  in   the  U.N.,  report  1947,  p.  10.1  as  quoted  in  Beehhoofer,  Postwar 
\  egotiations,  p.  74, 
<-*'  For  ;i  il.'iailod  discussion  of  this  particular  point,  see  ibid.,  i>i».  72-74. 

121  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission^  "Third  Report  to  the  Security  Council", 
p.  17    is 

122  Ibid.,  p.  3. 


103 


cedural  steps  necessary  for  setting  up  the  control  system.  However,  the 
negotiations  soon  became  preoccupied  with  the  political  implications 
of  stages,  which  were  important  to  the  security  interests  of  both 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union ;  that  is,  the  question  of  when 
the  United  States  would  no  longer  be  the  sole  power  in  possession  of 
atomic  weapons. 

The  Issue  of  Enforcement :  Sanctions  and  the  Veto 

The  third  important  issue  in  the  effort  to  establish  international 
control  of  atomic  energy  was  that  of  imposition  of  sanctions  on  viola- 
tors. The  question  of  whether  violators  of  international  control  should 
be  punished  grew  out  of  Baruch's  advocacy  of  the  idea.  He  succeeded 
in  having  it  adopted  as  part  of  the  U.S.  proposal.  During  the  negotia- 
tions, the  question  of  the  procedural  arrangements  to  deal  with  sanc- 
tions— specifically,  whether  the  veto  power  in  the  U.N.  Security  Coun- 
cil could  be  exercised  over  decisions  on  them — represented  a  major 
obstacle  to  agreement. 

DETERMINING   U.S.    POLICY   ON    SANCTIONS 

Conant  had  cautioned  the  Board  of  Consultants  at  the  outset  that 
the  issue  of  sanctions  was  a  matter  for  the  Security  Council  to  con- 
sider ;  and  during  later  discussions,  one  member  of  the  Board  pointed 
out  that  it  would  have  been  presumptuous  for  a  group  of  technical 
consultants  to  comment  or  make  recommendations  on  such  a  political 
subject.  During  its  deliberations,  the  Board  foresaw  war  as  the  prob- 
able outcome  in  case  of  a  violation,  but  needless  to  say  it  did  not  enter 
into  the  subject  of  the  organizational  mechanism  that  would  be  em- 
ployed to  initiate,  conduct,  and  coordinate  the  war.  This  was  a  political 
problem,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Board,  and  there  was  no  discussion  of  it 
in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report. 

Baruch's  idea  of  establishing  sanctions  to  enforce  the  control  system 
was  discussed  at  the  time  the  U.S.  proposal  was  being  developed.  At  a 
meeting  between  Baruch's  group  and  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  groups, 
opposition  by  the  latter  to  the  idea  of  sanctions  was  unanimous,  ap- 
parently on  the  grounds  that  they  did  not  consider  the  concept  work- 
able under  existing  political  circumstances.  In  turn,  the  members  of 
Baruch's  delegation  to  the  UNAEC  viewed  the  Acheson-Lilienthal 
plan  as  offering  merely  a  warning  device  and  less  than  a  secure  system 
to  guarantee  control  of  the  destructive  uses  of  atomic  energy.  Although 
Lilienthal  granted  that  the  plan  was  only  a  warning  device,  he, 
Acheson,  and  other  members  of  their  groups  argued  that  absolute 
security  was  unattainable,123  Nonetheless,  Baruch  felt  strongly  that  the 
plan  did  not  provide  an  adequate  measure  of  security  and  continued  to 
press  Secretary  Byrnes  for  a  policy  which  included  penalties.  Baruch's 
position  on  penalties  has  been  described  as  follows : 

It  was  important  to  *  *  *  show  the  necessity  of  enforcing 
the  engagements  of  the  nations.  Baruch  considered  penalties 
the  sine  qua  non.  He  was  quite  aware  this  might  bring  the 

123  Later,  Baruch  called  upon  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  to  comment  on  the  plan  for  atomic 
energy  control.  Both  General  Dwisrht  Eisenhower  and  Admiral  Chester  Nimitz  voiced  doubts 
on  the  effectiveness  and  acceptability  of  sanctions,  while  General  Carl  Spaatz  supported  the 
idea.  Although  Baruch  sought  the  advice  of  the  military,  their  views  did  not  enter  into  the 
discussions  which  determined  policy.  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  United  States 
Atomic  Energy  Commission,  pp.  575— 576. 


104 


United  States  ""athwart  of  the  veto  power."  for  war,  the  ulti- 
mate penalty,  might  be  necessary.  *  *  *  Penalties  means  im- 
mediate punishment  and  elimination  of  any  veto  of  it.  *  *  * 
As  for  the  warning  elements  in  the  plan,  the  American  people 
should  know  how  little  it  amounted  to.124 

Eventually,  Baruch  obtained  approval  from  President  Truman  of 
both  the  idea  of  sanctions  and  the  provision  that  the  veto  power  of  the 
Security  Council  would  not  apply  to  the  decision  to  administer  them. 
Two  days  before  the  opening  of  the  UNAEC,  Baruch  briefed  the  Sen- 
ate Special  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  on  the  U.S.  proposals,  and 
the  members  appeared  to  welcome  the  plan  approved  by  the 
President.1-"' 

U.S.    POLICY   ON    THE   VETO  :   ITS   RELATION   TO  ENFORCEMENT 

Because  U.S.  policy  on  the  veto  over  sanctions  was  a  principal  target 
of  Soviet  opposition,  and  a  major  hindrance  in  the  negotiations,  a 
discussion  of  this  question  might  be  useful  to  an  understanding  of  the 
principal  issues  of  this  study.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  principle 
of  unanimity — that  is,  the  veto  power — among  the  permanent  mem- 
bers of  the  Security  Council  on  security  matters  had  been  a  contro- 
versial issue  during  negotiation  of  the  U.N.  Charter.  Strong  U.S.  sup- 
port for  the  veto  power  has  been  explained  as  follows : 

*  *  *  The  Western  powers  *  *  *  realized  that  the  veto  privi- 
lege placed  a  premium  on  inaction  at  precisely  the  most  criti- 
cal point  of  great-power  disagreement.  Long  and  fruitless  ef- 
forts were  therefore  made  by  American  experts  *  *  *  to  de- 
vise some  method  of  decisionmaking  on  security  issues  that 
would  allow  the  Council  to  override  the  negative  vote  of  at 
least  one  permanent  member.  All  such  formulae,  however, 
collapsed  before  the  dominating  political  fact  that  the  ad- 
ministration was  not  prepared  to  allow  American  armed 
forces  to  be  ordered  into  some  unknown  future  military  action 
without  U.S.  consent.  Even  had  Executive  officials  felt  less 
strongly  on  the  question,  they  would  never  have  assumed  that 
Congress  could  be  persuaded  to  relinquish  so  much  authority 
to  an  untried  international  organization.1-" 

Thus,  the  policy  of  the  United  States  on  the  veto,  as  it  applied  to 
the  question  of  enforcement  of  atomic  energy  control,  represented  a 
significant  departure  from  its  earlier  policy  on  the  veto  within  the 
general  framework  of  the  United  Nations.  Although  the  question  of 
sanctions  and  its  relationship  with  the  veto  power  was  primarily  a 
political  matter,  a  number  of  technological  factors  associated  with 
atomic  energy  control  may  have  influenced  the  United  States  in  its 
policy  decisions  on  these  subjects. 

This  change  in  US.  policy  was  probably  attributable  to  the  nature 
of  atomic  weapons  and  the  destructive  force  which  they  represented  to 
policymakers,  a  perception  epitomized  in  Baruch's  opening  address  to 
the  [TNAEC: 

Science  has  torn  from  nature  a  secret  so  vast  in  its  poten- 
tialities that  our  minds  cower  from  the  terror  it  creates.  Yet 


121  Ibid.,  pp.  .-,7.",  574. 
'=■'•  [bid.,  pp.  565  574 

120 Emphasis  added,   itnth   B.   Russell,  The  United  Nations  <m<l  United  States  Security 
Policy.  (Washington,  D.C.  :  Brookings,  1968),  i>.  51. 


105 


terror  is  not  enough  to  inhibit  the  use  of  the  atomic  bomb.  The 
terror  created  by  weapons  has  never  stopped  men  from  em- 
ploying them.  For  each  new  weapon  a  defense  has  been  pro- 
duced, in  time.  But  now  we  face  a  condition  in  which  adequate 
defense  does  not  exist.  *  *  *  The  search  of  science  for  the 
absolute  weapon  has  reached  fruition  in  this  country.127 

In  light  of  the  fact  that  the  atomic  bomb  inspired  such  awe,  it  is 
not  difficult  to  understand  how  an  important  U.S.  political  stance  could 
experience  such  a  drastic  modification  in  the  form  of  the  proposal 
that  the  veto  power  should  not  be  exercised  over  sanctions  for  viola- 
tions of  atomic  energy  control.128 

Another  technological  consideration  which  may  have  had  a  bearing 
on  U.S.  policy  toward  the  veto  question  concerned  the  "warning  de- 
vice" aspect  of  the  plan  in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report.  Policy  dis- 
cussions revealed  that  the  Board  had  not  envisioned  any  international 
stockpile  of  bombs.  Thus,  if  a  nation  decided  to  embark  on  an  atomic 
weapons  development  program  by  seizing  production  facilities  of  the 
international  Authority,  the  sequence  of  technological  processes  of 
producing  atomic  weapons  would  take  considerable  time.  The  Board 
estimated  that  it  would  be  approximately  1  year  before  enough  atomic 
weapons  could  be  produced  to  constitute  a  significant  threat.  During 
the  drafting  of  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report,  one  member  of  the 
group  envisioned  the  following  situation  in  the  event  of  a  violation  of 
the  international  control  system : 

Supposing  denatured  material  had  been  allocated  to  a  plant 
which  is  located  in  Ruritania,  and  the  Ruritanian  Pooh-Bah 
decides  to  wTelsK  on  the  Atomic  Development  Authority  by 
removing  the  denaturants.  The  •Authority's  representatives, 
made  up  of  people  of  many  nationalities,  try  to  check  on  the 
plant,  on  the  watch  for  just  such  a  move.  So  the  Pooh-Bah 
sends  soldiers  to  get  the  ADA  people  out  of  the  way  and  seize 
the  factory.  Assuming  that  the  Pooh-Bah  has  the  scientists 
working  for  him,  it  will  still  take  him  in  the  neighborhood  of 
a  year  to  turn  out  a  bomb.  While  he's  at  it,  the  member  coun- 
tries of  the  Authority,  having  received  no  satisfactory  answer 
to  what's  become  of  their  inspectors,  go  to  war  with  Ruritania 
*  *  *  the  war  would  have  to  be  along  conventional  lines. 
Naturally,  the  atomic  plant  would  be  the  first  target  for  the 
attacking  planes.129 
Presumably,  the  Board  considered  that  the  warning  device  aspect 
of  the  plan  satisfied  the  technological  requirements  of  security.  How- 
ever, this  conception  was  not  shared  by  all  of  those  involved  in  U.S. 
policy  deliberations.  One  source  states  that  Baruch's  position  on  this 
question  was  that  the  Board's  plan  provided  "no  more  of  a  warning 
than  S3  months  to  a  year,' "  although  the  origin  of  his  estimate  is  not 
clear.  Moreover,  Baruch  added  that  technological  developments  could 
shorten  even  that  amount  of  time.130  These  estimates  may  account  for 


127  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  pp.  138-139. 

12R  Nonetheless,  it  should  be  recalled  that  this  was  not  the  first  occasion  when  this  line 
of  thinking  on  the  destructive  potential  of  atomic  energy  affected  policy,  for  it  had  played 
an  important  role  in  inflnpncinc  nations,  including  the  United  States,  to  take  the  initial 
steps  ;  for  example,  the  Three  Nation  Agreed  Declaration,  et  cetera,  toward  seeking  agree- 
ment on  international  control  of  atomic  energy. 

1=0  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  247.  n~m~.i<,oin*, 

130  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
p.  573. 


106 


the  sense  of  urgency  with  which  Baruch  treated  the  veto  question  in 
his  opening  speech  to  the  UNAEC : 

*  *  *  There  must  be  no  veto  to  protect  those  who  violate 
their  solemn  agreements  not  to  develop  or  use  atomic  energy 
for  destructive  purposes. 

The  bomb  does  not  wait  upon  debate.  To  delay  may  be  to 
die.  The  time  between  violation  and  preventive  action  or 
punishment  would  be  all  too  short  for  extended  discussion  as 
to  the  course  to  be  followed.131 

It  is  unlikely,  however,  that  these  factors  alone  can  account  for 
Baruch's  adamant  position  on  penalties  and  the  veto  question.  Early 
in  the  policy  deliberations  following  Baruch's  appointment,  the  elder 
statesman  had  raised  the  possibility  to  Secretary  Byrnes  and  others 
that  the  negotiations  of  the  UNAEC  might  provide  a  forum  for  the 
attainment  of  world  disarmament,  encompassing  all  weapons.  One 
writer  labelled  Baruclrs  notion  as  "an  expression  of  his  idealism  and 
expansive  self-image."  132  although  his  position  was  supported  by  Eber- 
stadt  and  Hancock.  When  Hancock  learned  that  the  Secretary  of  State 
was  not  enthusiastic  about  Baruch's  idea,  one  source  describes  his  reac- 
tion :  "As  Hanock  sized  up  the  situation,  Byrnes  was  trying  to  simplify 
the  job  by  limiting  it  to  atomic  energy."  133  The  exchange  on  the  subject 
between  Baruch  and  Byrnes  has  been  described  as  follows: 

*  *  *  Byrnes  would  have  none  of  this  vision.  It  would  be 
"a  serious  mistake,"  he  said,  to  attempt  to  cover  these  other 
weapons  as  part  of  Baruch's  present  assignment.  Baruch  was 
equally  strong  in  response :  "The  problem  of  atomic  energy  is 
a  problem  of  the  hearts  of  men — no  plan  so  far  proposed  gives 
any  guarantee  of  assurance."  Only  total  disarmament  offered 
such  a  guarantee.  Byrnes  was  unmoved.134 

News  of  Baruch's  proposal  for  total  disarmament  prompted  one 
member  of  the  Senate  Special  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  to  admon- 
ish him  to  "stick  to  his  knitting."  l35  Thus,  since  Baruch's  idea  of  a  com- 
prehensive disarmament  proposal  had  been  thwarted,  it  is  understand- 
able, perhaps,  that  if  his  efforts  had  to  be  confined  to  atomic  energy, 
he  might  seek  a  control  system  which  would  be  as  secure  as  possible. 
by  providing  "immediate,  swift,  and  sure  punishment  of  those  who 
violate  the  agreements  that  are  reached  by  the  nations."130 

In  addition.  Baruch's  insistence  on  removal  of  the  veto  as  a  vital 
component  of  the  proposed  system  of  punishments  may  have  l>cen 
prompted  by  the  -rowing  U.S.  attitude  of  mistrust  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  belief  was  strong  that  violations  most  likely  would  origi- 
nate with  the  Soviet  Union  or  one  of  its  allies.  Moreover,  the  Soviet 
Union's  performance  during  the  first  months  of  the  United  Nations, 
which  was  characterized  by  frequent  use  of  the  veto  in  the  Security 
Council,  fortified  the  impression  that  Moscow  would  have  recourse 
to  the  veto  to  avoid  the  consequences  of  its  violations.137 

*»  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  pp.  142-143. 
"3  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  277. 

Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  p.  569. 
■  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  mni  the  Tarantula,  p.  290. 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  o)  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  p.  o7G. 
i«  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  p.  138. 

«i  During  ii..-  meetings  of  the  iNAI'c  itself,  a  resolution  was  Introduced  In  tbe  General 
Assembly,  calling  for  an  investigation  of  Soviet  abuse  of  the  veto.  Bechhoefer,  Postwar 
Negotiations,  p.   57. 


107 


Thus,  by  proposing  sanctions  to  achieve  "an  international  law  with 
teeth  in  it,"  Baruch  may  have  compensated  for  losing  the  personal  op- 
portunity to  propose  and  negotiate  a  comprehensive  disarmament  plan. 
He  may  also  have  sought  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  a  control  system 
which  he  believed  the  emerging  political  relationships  of  the  atomic  age 
demanded. 

POLITICAL     UNACCEPTABILITY     OF     VETO-FREE      CONTROL     IN      THE 

NEGOTIATIONS 

At  issue  during  the  negotiations,  sanctions  and  the  veto  became  in- 
volved with  the  political  arguments  associated  with  the  general  issue 
of  the  veto  power  in  the  United  Nations.  In  order  to  understand  how 
this  issue  contributed  to  the  failure  of  the  negotiations,  it  might  be 
helpful  to  examine  briefly  the  course  of  the  issue  and  U.S.  policy  during 
the  international  discussions  of  international  control  of  atomic  energy. 

During  the  negotiations,  the  third  U.S.  memorandum  provided  a 
vehicle  to  answer  the  various  legal  questions  arising  from  the  rela- 
tionship between  the  proposed  international  Authority  and  the  United 
Nations,  and  an  important  part  of  this  issue  was  sanctions.  The  memo- 
randum listed  those  activities  which  if  pursued  by  an  individual  na- 
tion would  constitute  a  serious  threat  to  the  peace.  These  included 
virtually  every  possible  breach  of  the  control  arrangement.138 

The  memorandum  proposed  that  the  Security  Council  would  deter- 
mine the  response  to  these  violations.  In  defending  the  provision  to 
exclude  these  matters  from  the  veto,  the  U.S.  position  was  that  it  did 
not  impair  the  principle  of  unanimity  in  the  United  Nations,  because 
nations  would  enter  into  this  particular  arrangement  freely.  It  also 
emphasized  that  the  proposal  to  exclude  the  veto  applied  only  to  the 
question  of  atomic  energy.  An  additional  point  raised  by  the  memo- 
randum was  that  the  question  of  sanctions  could  not  be  discussed 
without  considering  the  provisions  of  Article  51  of  the  U.N.  Charter, 
which  recognized  the  "inherent  right  of  individual  or  collective  self- 
defense  if  an  armed  attack  occurs  against  a  Member  of  the  United 
Nations."  Besides  noting  that  an  attack  with  atomic  weapons  would 
justify  a  response  under  Article  51,  the  memorandum  suggested  that 
a  broader  definition  of  "armed  attack"  might  be  included  in  the  treaty 
for  the  Authority,  to  include  certain  preliminary  steps  to  such  action. 

Baruch  was  unyielding  on  the  veto  question  during  the  negotiations, 
and  his  perseverance  was  matched  by  the  adamant  opposition  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  One  example  of  the  Soviet  position  on  this  question  is 
in  a  speech  by  Gromyko  in  July  1946 : 

We  believe  that  it  would  be  wrong,  and  perhaps  fatal,  to 
undermine,  in  practice  to  abandon,  the  principle  of  unanimity 

i3s  inegal  possession  or  use  of  an  atomic  bomb ;  illegal  possession,  or  separation,  of 
atomic  material  suitable  for  use  in  an  atomic  bomb  ;  seizure  of  any  plant  or  other  property 
belonging  to,  or  licensed  by,  the  Authority  ;  willful  interference  with  the  activities  of  the 
Authority  ;  creation  or  operation  of  dangerous  projects  in  a  manner  contrary  to,  or  in  the 
absence  of,  a  license  granted  by  the  Authority.  The  U.S.  proposal  also  granted  that  admin- 
istrative decisions  would  be  made  and  carried  out  only  by  the  international  Authority,  and 
that  the  Authority  could  make  decisions  on  other  matters,  which  were  not  serious  threats 
to  the  peace.  The"  latter  could  be  enforced  by  the  Security  Council  as  procedural  matters, 
a  process  which  did  not  involve  the  veto.  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  pp. 
161-163. 


108 


of  the  permanent  members  of  the  Security  Council  *  *  *  We 
cannot  accept  any  proposal  which  would  undermine  in  any 
degree  the  principle  of  unanimity  of  the  permanent  members 
of  the  Security  Council  on  all  questions  relating  to  the  main- 
tenance of  peace  and  security.139 

Bechhoefer  notes  that  Baruch  attempted  "to  soften  the  impact  of 
his  position"  by  recalling  that  the  proposal  to  eliminate  the  veto  would 
apply  only  to  the  control  of  atomic  energy.  He  also  points  out  that  in 
terms  of  the  legality  of  the  provision,  it  would  not  affect  the  veto 
power  as  established  by  the  U.N.  Charter.  But,  in  Bechhoefer's  view, 
because  the  proposal  "ran  counter  to  the  basic  concept  of  the  continued 
unity  of  the  great  powers  as  embodied  in  the  Charter,"  it  indicated  to 
the  Soviet  Union  "a  U.S.  decision  to  attack  the  underlying  basis  of 
postwar  settlements."  14° 

Baruch  was  so  firmly  convinced  of  the  correctness  of  his  stance 
on  the  veto  that  he  may  have  missed  an  opportunity  to  bargain  with 
the  Soviets  on  the  issue,  or  at  least  to  place  them  in  a  position  where 
they  would  be  called  upon  to  reveal  further  details  of  their  proposals. 
Bechhoefer  cites  an  instance  in  1947,  when  the  Soviet  Union  proposed 
an  amendment  that  the  Authority  "should  carry  out  their  control  and 
inspection  functions,  acting  on  the  basis  of  their  own  rules,  which 
should  provide  for  the  adoption  of  decisions,  in  appropriate  cases, 
by  the  majority  vote".141  The  Soviet  Union  was  willing  to  grant  the 
majority  vote  of  the  Authority  "in  appropriate  cases,"  a  term  which 
could  have  been  explored.  Nonetheless,  discussion  of  this  amendment 
would  have  "shifted  the  question  from  the  problem  of  a  veto  to  the 
issue  of  the  authority  of  the  control  commission,  which  was  politically 
far  less  sensitive."  However,  Baruch  would  accept  nothing  less  than 
his  original  proposal.142 

While  U.S.  policy  on  the  veto  had  its  foundations  in  both  techno- 
logical and  political  factors,  it  would  appear  that  the  underlying  po- 
litical relations  of  the  great  powers  in  the  United  Nations  provided  a 
major  source  of  the  difficulty  in  the  negotiations.  Indeed.  Bechhoefer 
concludes  that  Baruch's  position  on  the  veto  gave  the  Soviets  the  op- 
portunity to  oppose  the  U.S.  proposals  "'for  the  wrong  reason."  The 
basis  for  this  assertion  is  that  disagreement  over  the  veto  involved  basic 
political  differences  between  the  two  countries  rather  than  the  substan- 
tive, technical  aspects  of  control.143 

Recap'/tiihiflon  of  the  Three  Issues  of  Atomic  Control 

Thus,  the  United  States  brought  before  the  United  Nations  three 
issues  making  up  a  program  of  international  control  of  atomic  energy. 
The  first  involved  the  control  institution  itself.  This  called  for  a 
scheme  of  international  ownership  and  regulation,  with  considerable 
intimate  interaction  with  national  programs  of  atomic  energy  develop- 
ment. Possibly  the  newly-formed  United  Nations  would  have  been  un- 
equal to  the  large  task  of  managing  such  a   program.   But  the  tech- 


"■  [bid.    p.  B2. 

'hhoefer,  Postwai    Negotiations,  pp.  .~>7   58. 

1,1  State  Department,  Policy  >ii  the  Crossroads,  p.  ~f>. 

"■'  Emphasis  added.  Bechhoefer,  Postwar  Negotiations,  p.  59. 

'"  [bid.,  pp.  59  '''<> 


109 


nical  orientation  of  the  design  of  the  proposed  institution  left  un- 
answered many  political  questions,  and  after  long  debate  in  the  United 
Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  the  scheme  was  tabled. 

The  issue  of  the  transition  from  U.S.  monopoly  to  international  con- 
trol met  the  same  fate.  Lacking  agreement  on  the  what,  it  was  hard  to 
design  the  hoir  of  a  plan.  After  much  deliberation,  the  UNAEC  came 
reluctantly  to  this  conclusion. 

The  question  of  what  should  be  done  to  preserve  world  security  in 
the  event  of  a  violation  of  an  international  atomic  control  agreement 
likewise  went  unresolved.  This  question  went  to  the  heart  of  the  issue 
of  collective  security  versus  national  sovereignty.  But  even  though  it 
came  at  a  time  when  only  one  nation  possessed  atomic  weapons  cap- 
ability, the  quest  for  agreement  went  unsatisfied. 


V.  Some  Distinctive  Features  of  the  Negotiations 

It  appears  as  though  the  negotiations  came  to  nothing  because  the 
control  plans  advanced  by  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States 
were  each  based  upon  their  perceptions  of  a  desirable  world  order 
and  the  defense  of  their  respective  national  interests.  In  the  cir- 
cumstances of  that  period,  these  views  and  the  plans  based  on  them 
were  not  reconcilable.  The  reasoning  and  perceptions  underlying  Soviet 
policy  decisions  at  that  juncture  are  not  known  with  certainty  25  years 
later,  and  clearly  were  less  well  perceived  at  that  time.  The  fact  that 
many  of  the  following  observations  relate  mainly  to  U.S.  policy  is  not 
intended  to  be  solely  a  comment  on  this  country's  approach  to  atomic 
energy  control.  That  such  observations  are  useful  arises  from  the  fact 
that  basically  it  was  the  U.S.  plan  which  was  accepted  by  the  majority 
in  the  international  negotiations.  Therefore,  an  important  part  of  an 
inquiry  into  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations  lies  in  the  origins  of  U.S. 
policy  and  inputs  of  U.S.  scientists  and  diplomats.144 

Excessive  U.S.  Reliance  on  Technical  Control  Plan 

One  characteristic  of  the  efforts  to  achieve  control  of  atomic  energy 
which  may  have  contributed  to  their  failure  was  the  tendency  on  the 
part  of  U.S.  policymakers  and  of  the  majority  of  the  negotiators  in 
the  UNAEC  to  accept  the  constraints  developed  out  of  technological 
considerations  as  the  basis  for  their  proposals  for  a  control  arrange- 
ment. The  foundations  for  the  concrete  proposals  by  the  United  States 
were  the  technological  studies  of  the  Board  of  Consultants,  and  when 
the  first  signs  of  impasse  appeared  in  the  UNA  EC,  in  1946,  the  negotia- 
tors chose  to  await  a  report  from  the  Scientific  and  Technical  Commit- 
tee before  proceeding  with  the  negotiations.  However,  each  scientific 
group,  Lilienthal's  and  the  UNAEC  committee,  divorced  itself  from 
any  responsibility  for  considering  the  political  factors  involved  in  a 
control  arrangement.  And  the  diplomats  and  politicians,  in  addressing 
themselves  to  the  basic  political  problems  which  were  preventing  agree- 
ment, chose  to  seek  a  firm  basis  for  their  proposals  in  what  were  con- 
sidered to  be  the  undeniable  technological  facts  of  the  situation. 

When  it  was  evident  that  there  was  little  hope  for  agreement,  the 
basic  assertion  from  the  UNAEC  was  that  a  minority  had  failed  to 
recognize  the  compelling  technical  factors  needed  to  shape1  an  ade- 
quate control  system.145  But  there  appears  to  have  been  a  larger  failure 


of  the  i    \    can  only  be  .'i  matter  for  speculation 


(110) 


Ill 


of  the  participants  on  both  sides  to  appreciate  that  even  as  powerful 
a  scientific  and  technological  event  as  the  discovery  and  decisive  mili- 
tary use  of  atomic  energy  could  not  of  itself  prompt  so  radical  a  re- 
ordering of  diplomacy  as  to  reconcile  the  overwhelming  political 
stakes  at  issue  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  Spe- 
cifically, this  was  a  failure  to  reconcile  (a)  the  basic  technological 
fact  that  any  effective  international  control  system  would  have  to  cope 
with  the  difficulty  of  separating  peaceful  from  military  activities,  and 
(b)  the  fundamental  diplomatic  reality  that  any  such  system  would 
have  to  accommodate  both  the  Soviet  Union's  traditional  fear  of  for- 
eign intrusion  and  the  U.S.  fear  of  becoming  an  inferior  military 
power.  In  retrospect,  it  is  hard  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  con- 
cessions necessary  on  all  sides  to  establish  a  workable  arrangement 
for  international  nuclear  control  were  beyond  the  scope  of  traditional 
international  behavior.  A  profound  change  in  concepts  of  sovereignty 
and  security  would  have  been  required  to  insure  the  success  of  the 
negotiations.  Possibly  this  principle  remains  as  unappreciated  today  as 
it  was  at  the  time  the  Baruch  plan  was  being  considered. 

LACK  OF  U.S.  ATTENTION  TO  SOVIET  REQUIREMENTS 

Based  upon  U.S.  perceptions  of  Soviet  motives  and  of  Soviet  capa- 
bility for  nuclear  development,  acceptability  of  the  U.S.  plan  for 
atomic  energy  control  was  secondary  to  requirements  for  an  effective 
control  system.  As  early  as  the  U.S.  preparations  for  the  Truman- 
Attlee-King  meetings,  before  the  Soviet  Union  had  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  participate  in  any  forum  on  the  atomic  energy  question,  the 
intent  of  U.S.  policy  was  to  devise  a  workable  system  of  control  with- 
out special  regard  for  acceptability  of  the  plan  to  any  other  parties.14* 
Similarly,  throughout  the  deliberations  between  Achesoivs  committee 
and  Lilienthal's  group,  very  little  was  said  regarding  the  possibility 
of  or  the  requirements  for  Soviet  acceptance  of  the  plan,  although 
there  was  some  recognition  of  the  prevalent  political  facts  of  life, 
largely  mutual  suspicion,  which  would  characterize  United  States- 
Soviet  relations  during  the  early  postwar  period.  But  an  awareness 
of  these  factors  did  not  prompt  active  consideration  of  whether  the 
Soviet  Union  would  accept  the  plan.  Rather,  it  became  the  goal  of 
U.S.  policy  to  devise  the  necessary  arrangements  to  prevent  violation 
of  a  control  system,  and  eventually,  with  Baruclvs  policy  on  punish- 
ments and  the  veto,  a  guaranteed  course  of  action  in  the  event  of  viola- 
tion. To  the  United  States,  the  most  likely  target  of  its  policy  toward 
thwarting  or  punishing  violators  was  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  suspicious  and  negative  attitude  in  the  "West  toward  the 
Soviet  penchant  for  secrecy  was  undoubtedly  reinforced  by  the  ex- 
pansionist actions  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  East  European  countries 
following  the  war.  Yet  Soviet  expansionism  has  been  explained  as 
an  effort  to  buffer  that  country  from  foreign  incursions,  a  traditional 
fear  which  had  been  exacerbated  by  the  devastating  Soviet  experience 

148  Indeed,  Secretary  Byrnes  approached  the  negotiations  for  international  control  of 
atomic  energy  with  a  negative  attitude,  which  was  carried  over  into  a  policy  paper  which 
Bush  prepared  for  the  meeting.  In  characterizing  a  conversation  with  Ryrnes  on  the  issue. 
Bush  commented  to  Conant  that  "we  were  discussing  carefully  ways  and  means  toward  an 
effective  accord  [i.e..  one  which  was  without  risk  to  the  United  States]  rather  than 
merely  struggling  with  the  question  of  whether  any  accord  is  possible."  Bush  to  Conant. 
Xov.  8,  1945,  in  the  Bush  Papers,  as  quoted  in  Liebernian,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Taran- 
tula, p.  167. 

96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1-9 


112 


during  World  War  II.147  The  question  of  how  this  particular  ex- 
planation of  Soviet  actions  at  that  time  might  have  justified  Soviet 
foreign  policy  in  general  is  a  political  problem  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
study.  Still,  it  may  be  worth  noting  that  this  observation,  as  a  pos- 
sible explanation  of  Soviet  expansionism,  has  been  offered  to  account 
for  Soviet  rejection  of  certain  elements  of  the  Baruch  plan.148  In  the 
Soviet  view,  these  proposed  arrangements  would  have  made  the  Soviet 
Union  vulnerable  by  admitting  foreig]  rs  to  the  Soviet  Union  in  posi- 
tions of  authority.  Apart  from  the  ideological  trauma  of  this  foreign 
penetration,  their  presence  might  enable  potential  enemies  of  the 
Soviets  to  detect  sources  of  strength  to  attack  and  evidences  of  weak- 
ness to  exploit.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  United  States  had  recog- 
nized Eastern  Europe  as  a  Soviet  sphere  of  influence,  the  same 
argument  continues,  this  gesture  may  have  represented  enough  of  a 
concession  by  the  West  to  contribute  to  obtaining  a  Soviet  concession : 
modification  of  its  stand  on  the  presence  of  foreign  inspectors.  To 
some  extent,  a  certain  amount  of  outside  inspection  probably  would 
have  been  necessary  for  effective  control,  and  obviously  a  change  in 
the  Soviet  position  was  essential  to  reaching  agreement.149 

SOVIET   CALCULATION'   OF  U.S.   POSITION 

The  Soviet  Union's  calculation  of  the  motives  of  the  United  States 
probably  encountered  uncertainty  with  regard  to  the  place  which 
atomic  weapons  held  in  the  overall  defense  posture  of  the  United 
States.  While  the  Soviets  had  retained  their  large  forces  of  manpower 
following  the  war,  the  United  States  had  undergone  rapid  demobili- 
zation of  its  armies.  The  extent  of  U.S.  dependence  on  the  atomic  bomb, 
and  thus  any  demonstration  of  its  willingness  to  relinquish  it.  were 
governed  by  basic  U.S.  security  considerations.  In  turn,  the  fact  that 
the  atomic  weapon  had  become  such  an  integral  part  of  the  U.S.  de- 
fense posture  only  complicated  its  own  efforts  to  devise  an  equitable 
policy  on  a  system  of  international  control  without  jeopardizing  U.S. 
or  world  security.  Indeed,  Bechhoefer  points  out  that  "By  January 
1947  *  *  *  it  had  been  ascertained  that  *  *  *  United  States  de- 
mobilization had  reached  the  stage  where  Soviet  acceptance  |  of  the 
U.S.  plan]  would  leave  the  United  States  naked."  Bechhoefer  be- 
lieves this  might  account  for  l.S.  failure  to  explain  t  ransitional  stages 
in  detail,  including  the  stage  for  elimination  of  the  bomb,  although 
he  does  not  explicitly  question  the  sincerity  of  U.S.  motives.1™ 

The  principle  behind  the  declarations  by  the  United  States  that  it 
would  hold  atomic  energy  in  a  "sacred  trust"  in  the  absence  of  inter- 
national control  raises  an  additional  point  which  might  explain  Soviet 
skepticism  toward  the  U.S.  plan.  This  point  concerns  the  moral  force 
which  US.  officials  attached  to  their  pronouncements  bearing  on  the 
U.S.  position  in  the  negotiations.  It  would  seem  that  merely  by  stat- 
ing its  aims  and  responsibilities  in  atomic  energy,  these  officials  may 
have  expected  other  count  lies  to  accept  the  U.S.  pledges  without  ques- 
tion. For  example,  during  a  policy  discussion  of  stages,  Acheson's  re- 

147  Lieberman.  The  Scorpion  and  tin-  Tarantula,  j>  402. 
"s  [bid.,  p.  404. 

""  iMii  ,  p    mi    Lieberman'a  Interpretation  Is,  however,  o  hypothesis  which  it  is  impos- 
Bible  id  prove  or  disprove  nl  tin-  present  time. 
uo  Bechhoefer,  Postwar  Vegotiationa,  p.  11. 


113 


marks  are  described  in  one  source  as  follows:  "When  the  United 
States  presented  its  plan,  it  would  have  to  explain  the  process  of  tran- 
sition. Then  the  nations  would  establish  an  international  authority. 
*  *  *  The  United  States  would  not  give  everything  away  the  day  it 
agreed  to  institute  the  plan ;  rather,  it  would  promise  to  do  so."  151  Cer- 
tain actions — e.g.,  the  atomic  test  at  Bikini  in  July  1946,  less  than  one 
month  following  the  opening  of  the  UNAEC,  or  the  U.S.  failure  in  the 
UNAEC  negotiations  to  define  the  specific  control  conditions  which 
would  determine  when  it  would  relinquish  its  atomic  weapons — 
might  well  have  cast  doubt  on  those  pledges,  particularly  in  the  eyes 
of  the  Soviet  Union. 

Thus,  both  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  acted  in  the 
negotiations  primarily  to  meet  their  individual  needs  of  security,  based 
on  their  own  particular  perceptions  of  the  existing  threat.  Some  of 
these  perceptions  may  have  been  less  than  accurate.  Nevertheless,  as 
a  result,  a  basic  element  in  each  country's  policy  toward  atomic  energy 
control,  which  could  not  be  ignored  or  superseded  by  technological 
requirements,  was  to  avoid  an  arrangement  which  would  have  sub- 
jected one  party  to  the  suspected  goal  of  domination  by  the  other. 
For  the  most  part,  there  is  little  evidence  that  a  substantial  effort  was 
made  to  combine  or  reach  a  compromise  between  those  technological 
and  diplomatic  elements  which  were  necessary  to  reach  agreement  on 
international  control.  By  and  large,  representatives  from  each  field 
retained  their  parochial  interests,  especially  in  light  of  the  attitudes 
of  representatives  of  one  field  toward  the  other,  and  approached  the 
problem  of  atomic  energy  control  accordingly.  In  short,  once  the  diplo- 
mats had  grasped  the  import  of  the  possibility  of  a  facile  solution 
offered  by  the  technical  experts,  they  began  to  mistrust  it.  For  their 
part,  the  technical  experts  had  probably  underestimated  the  political 
difficulties  in  implementing  the  solution.  And  finally,  the  tasks  of 
both  groups  were  made  difficult  by  the  many  previous  commitments 
to  allies  and  other  countries  and  to  the  American  people. 

One  Attempt  at  Technical-Diplomatic  Coordination 

One  example  of  an  attempt  to  combine  technological  and  political 
factors  of  atomic  energy  control  may  be  evident  in  the  proposal  of  the 
groups  led  by  Acheson  and  Lilienthal  to  assign  a  research  and  develop- 
ment function  to  the  international  Authority.  Recognizing  the  nega- 
tive human  response  to  police  methods  of  inspection,  they  hoped  that 
the  purposes  of  security  could  be  served  in  two  ways  through  research 
in  atomic  energy.  First,  because  some  national  activity  would  be  re- 
tained in  this  area,  the  potential  for  national  rivalries  would  be  chan- 
neled into  constructive  purposes.  Second,  this  function  of  the  interna- 
tional Authority  would  keep  the  supranational  body  technically  ad- 
vanced in  terms  of  detecting  activities  which  were  illegal  under  the 


151  Hewlett  and   Anderson,  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
p.  548. 


114 


terms  of  the  agreement.  The  research  carried  on  by  the  international 
Authority  would  serve  as  a  beneficial  source  of  consultation  for  the  na- 
tional efforts;  periodic  inspections  would  not  be  solely  investigative, 
in  the  sense  of  arousing  suspicions,  which  would  only  threaten  the 
entire  system  of  control.  Rather,  as  envisioned  by  the  Board,  inspec- 
tions would  provide  an  opportunity  for  individual  nations  to  receive 
guidance  in  their  efforts  through  the  knowledge  of  the  inspectors,  and 
inspections  would  be  less  intrusive  because  of  the  generally  beneficial 
expertise  developed  in  the  inspectors  by  the  Authority.  Thus,  the  pur- 
poses of  security  would  be  served  through  methods  which  met  the 
needs  of  the  technology  and  the  less  tangible  human  factors  inherent 
in  international  control.  However,  obstacles  to  agreement  were  so 
weighty  in  relation  to  the  total  effort  to  agree  on  a  system  of  interna- 
tional control  that  this  element  of  the  U.S.  plan  exercised  no  positive 
influence  on  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations. 

Underlying  Misconceptions  in  U.S.  Policy 

A  number  of  misconceptions  and  miscalculations  during  the  U.S. 
policymaking  process  on  matters  pertaining  to  both  the  technology 
and  the  politics  of  atomic  energy  control  may  have  influenced  the  out- 
come of  the  negotiations.  U.S.  policy  in  the  negotiations  may  possibly 
have  been  conditioned  by  an  attitude  that  possession  of  the  bomb  pro- 
vided great  leverage  for  the  United  States  to  press  for  acceptance  of 
its  proposals. 

This  attitude  rested  on  a  number  of  technological  assumptions, 
which  eventually  proved  incorrect.  First,  U.S.  estimates  regarding  the 
Soviet  Union's  ability  to  develop  its  own  atomic  weapons  ranged  any- 
where from  5  to  25  years,  whereas  the  first  Soviet  atomic  explosion 
occurred  in  IUV.),  just  3  years  following  the  opening  of  the  UNAEC. 
This  development  changed  the  entire  character  of  the  atomic  energy 
control  problem.  Although  negotiations  on  the  Baruch  plan  continued 
until  the  early  1950's.  Soviet  possession  of  atomic  weapons — some 
sources  reason — necessitated  a  different  approach  to  arms  control,  and 
perhaps  even  made  the  Baruch  proposals  obsolete. 

The  length  of  time  during  which  the  United  St#es  could  expect 
to  maintain  its  supremacy  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy  posed  a  dilemma 
for  U.S.  policy.  On  the  one  hand,  there  was  the  assumption,  based  on 
historically  valid  technological  considerations,  that  the  loss  of  the  U.S. 
monopoly  was  inevitable.  This  recognition  contributed  greatly  to  the 
U.S.  commitment  to  seek  international  control  of  atomic  energy.  On 
the  other  hand,  erroneous  technological  intelligence  estimates  which 
favored  the  U.S.  position  appear  to  have  prompted  a  further — and  as 
it  proved,  unwarranted — U.S.  assumption  that  it  could  attain  interna- 
tional control  on  its  own  terms,  and  that  it  could  afford  to  insist  on 
certain  points  in  its  proposals.  This  attitude  was  interpreted  as  "atomic 
diplomacy"  by  critics  of  U.S.  proposals,  and  was  justified  by  propo- 
nents of  U.S.  policy  as  fulfillment  of  the  U.S.  responsibility  for  the 
"sacred  trust"  over  atomic  energy. 

An  additional  technological  misconception  which  may  have  played 
at  least  a  minor  role  in  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations  concerned  the 
extent  to  which  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy  would  be  made  readily 
available  to  benefit  a  large  number  of  countries.  Much  of  the  scientific 
and   technological    information    which   would   have   contributed   sub- 


115 


stantially  to  development  of  the  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy  could 
not  be  released  in  the  absence  of  international  controls,  as  such  peace- 
ful development  was  so  closely  connected  with  the  information  neces- 
sary for  development  of  an  atomic  weapon.  Thus,  the  hope  of  sharing; 
the  knowledge  for  beneficial  uses  of  atomic  energy  became  an  incentive 
for  the  Lilienthal  Board  to  devise  an  effective  control  system.  Such 
hopes  apparently  influenced  both  U.S.  policymakers  and  the  other 
negotiators  in  the  UNAEC  to  believe  that  the  control  plan  offered 
something  more  than  a  rein  on  the  destructive  forces  of  atomic  energy. 
Although  present-day  development  of  atomic  energy  for  peaceful 
uses — a  quarter-century  later — is  advancing  at  a  substantial  pace,  the 
predictions  of  1945  regarding  the  imminent  development  of  peaceful 
uses  seem  overly  optimistic.  Notwithstanding  the  optimism,  however, 
security  factors  so  overshadowed  all  other  issues  in  the  negotiations 
that  the  drive  by  individual  countries  for  active  international  coopera- 
tion in  peaceful  development  failed  to  develop  real  momentum  at  that 
time. 

These  technological  factors  tended  to  limit  the  ontions  of  the  non- 
nuclear  countries  participating  in  the  negotiations.  Essentially,  for 
any  such  country  there  were  only  two  options :  development  of  its  own 
atomic  bomb,  at  considerable  industrial  effort  and  economic  cost,  or 
controlled  access  to  the  technology  through  acceptance  of  a  plan  for  in- 
ternational control,  defined  by  the  only  country  which  possessed  the 
ultimate  weapon.  To  supporters  of  the  U.S.  proposals,  perhaps  suffici- 
ent confidence  existed  between  them  and  the  United  States  that  its 
pledges  and  its  control  plan  seemed  reasonable.  Moreover,  many  coun- 
tries, recovering  from  their  massive  war  efforts,  lacked  the  reserves  of 
resources  to  develop  their  own  atomic  weapons.  The  promise  of  the 
potential  benefits  of  atomic  energy  for  national  purposes,  however 
limited,  which  the  control  plan  offered  may  have  provided  additional 
incentive  for  approval  of  the  U.S.  proposals. 

It  is  doubtful  that  the  Soviets  experienced  a  similar  reaction.  In 
commenting  on  the  plan  proposed  by  the  Board  of  Consultants,  one 
source  speculates  on  the  Soviet  reaction  as  follows : 

*  *  *  The  members  of  the  Lilienthal  Board  were  con- 
vinced that  adoption  of  their  plan  by  the  Soviet  Union  would 
cause  no  less  than  another  revolution  in  Russian  society — a 
revolution  which  was  to  be  accomplished  apparently  in  re- 
turn for  Russian  involvement  in  atomic  development.  This 
could  not  have  seemed  a  very  desirable  quid  pro  quo  to  the 
Russians,  who  knew  that  they  were  capable  of  building 
atomic  weapons  themselves  in  three  or  four  years.152 

A  political  miscalculation  by  the  United  States  affecting  the  negotia- 
tions can  be  identified  in  light  of  U.S.  experience  in  its  relations  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  One  source  has  expressed  the  possible  Soviet  percep- 
tion of  the  Baruch  plan  as  follows:  "The  clear  advantage  offered  the 
U.S.S.R.  was  relief  from  an  'out  of  the  blue'  American  atomic  air 
attack,  but  at  a  price  of  forgoing  any  early  moves  toward  nuclear 
equality."  153  An  almost  axiomatic  reflex  of  the  Soviet  approach  to 
arms  control  negotiation  has  been  the  notion  that  the  Soviet  Union 
will  not  negotiate  from  an  inferior  military  position.  One  explanation 

152  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  409. 

163  George  H.  Quester.  Nuclear  Diplomacy:  the  First  25  Tears  (New  York  :  Dunellen  Co., 
1970),  p.  20. 


116 


for  the  delay  in  the  opening  of  recent  negotiations  on  strategic  arms 
limitation  has  been  Soviet  reluctance  to  bargain  until  it  had  attained 
"parity"  with  the  United  States  in  strategic  weapons.154 

A  fuller  appreciation  of  this  Soviet  attitude  during  the  UNAEC 
negotiations  might  have  broadened  the  perspective  of  U.S.  policy. 
Moreover,  if  U.S.  policymakers  had  been  aware  of  the  fact  that  the 
Soviet  Union  had  been  working  assiduously  on  its  own  atomic  weapons 
during  the  negotiations,  a  different  approach  might  have  been  used. 
Two  cabinet  members,  Secretary  Stimson,  and  the  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce, Henry  Wallace,  suggested  that  the  Soviet  Union  be  treated  in  a 
more  open  manner  on  atomic  energy  questions.  Stimson,  who  left  the 
Administration  in  September  1945,  suggested  including  the  Soviets  in 
atomic  energy  development  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  war.  Such  a 
move,  he  believed,  would  avert  Soviet  suspicions  regarding  U.S.  inten- 
tions and  would  mark  a  first  step  toward  the  necessary  internationali- 
zation of  atomic  energy,  without  giving  rise  to  an  arms  race.  During 
the  UNAEC  negotiations,  Wallace  publicly  encouraged  more  active 
cooperation  with  the  Soviet  Union,  to  the  point  where  his  remarks  be- 
came a  source  of  embarrassment  to  the  Administration;  to  Baruch  the 
vigorous  expression  of  the  Wallace  position  was  undermining  the  U.S. 
position  at  the  UNAEC.  As  a  result,  Truman  asked  Wallace  to  leave 
his  cabinet.  Obviously,  the  suggestions  of  both  Stimson  and  Wallace 
fell  on  deaf  ears  of  those  in  power,  who  felt  it  necessary  to  adopt  a 
defensive  position  toward  the  Soviet  Union.155 

One  source  declares  that  a  major  weakness  of  the  U.S.  policy  on 
atomic  energy  was  its  diplomatic  timing.  Details  of  U.S.  policy  on  in- 
ternational control  remained  unclear  for  a  few  months  after  the  first 
atomic  weapon  was  used.  And  the  approach  to  the  Soviet  Union  at 
the  Moscow  conference  was  made  only  after  consultations  with  the 
British  and  the  Canadians,  a  move  which  one  source  sees  as  an  indica- 
tion to  the  Soviets  of  a  conspiracy  against  them.156 

Another  issue  in  the  negotiations  which  may  have  represented  a  po- 
litical miscalculation  by  the  United  States  concerned  its  policy  on 
eliminating  the  veto  over  sanctions.  Bechhoefer  concludes  that  U.S. 
insistence  on  this  provision  gave  the  Soviets  the  wrong  reason  for 
opposing  the  U.S.  control  plan,  since  it  presented  an  issue  which  was 
unrelated  to  the  substantive  problems  of  control.157  In  light  of  the  way 
U.S.  policy  on  the  veto  developed  just  two  years  after  the  opening  of 
the  UNAEC,  the  political  impact  of  Baruch's  attitude  toward  the  veto 
in  atomic  energy  matters  does  not  seem  to  have  been  noticed  by  other 
policymakers  at  the  time  of  the  UNAEC  meetings.  Indeed,  U.S.  policy 
toward  the  veto  soon  developed  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  inconsistent  with 
the  position  which  Baruch  was  striving  to  maintain.  The  Vandenberg 
resolution,  passed  by  the  U.S.  Senate  in  July  1948,158  recommended 

,M  For  example.  Dr.  Mnrshnll  Shulman.  Director  of  the  Russian  Institute  at  Columbia 
University,  recently  testified  to  a  Senate  committee  that  "Perhaps  one  reason  for  the  delay 
in  the  Soviet  response  was  the  desire  to  wait  until  deployments  then  planned  had  made 
their  appearance,  so  thai  negotiations  could  lie  conducted  on  the  hasis  of  equality."  U.S. 
Congress,  Senate.  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  Subcommittee  on  Arms  Control,  Inter- 
national Law  and  Organization.  Arms  Control  Implications  of  Current  Defense  Budget. 
Hearings,  June  and  July,  1971,  92d  Cong.,  first  scss.  (Washington,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office.  l!»71 1.  n  246. 

163  For  detailed  accounts  of  the  positions  taken  by  Stimson  and  Wallace,  see  Lleberman, 
The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  pp.  138-155  and  pp.  334-358,  respectively. 

>'■"  Ibid.,  p.    in:, 

inT  Bechhoefer,  Postwar  Negotiations,  pp.  59-60. 

«»For  a  complete  texl  o1  tin  Vandenberg  resolution,  see  U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  Sub- 
committee on  the  t " n i t <<t  Nations  Charter.  Review  <>f  tin  United  Nations  Charter,  t  Col- 
lection of  Documents.  83d  Cong.,  Second  scss.,  January  7,  1954.  (Washington.  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  1956),  pp.  140-141. 


117 


that  the  United  States  supports  "voluntary  agreement  to  remove  the 
veto  from  all  questions  involving  pacific  settlements  of  international 
disputes  and  situations,  and  from  the  admission  of  new  members." 
(These  were  areas  most  hindered  by  Soviet  use  of  the  veto  in  the  Se- 
curity Council.)  However,  consideration  of  the  resolution  may  have 
reinforced  the  U.S.  position  of  maintaining  its  veto  power  over  mat- 
ters of  enforcement,  particularly  those  involving  the  use  of  armed 
force.  The  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  report  stated : 

Some  advocates  of  Charter  revision  contend  that  the  veto 
should  be  stripped  from  decisions  involving  enforcement  ac- 
tion and  the  use  of  armed  forces  by  the  Security  Council.  It 
should  be  pointed  out,  however,  that  such  a  proposal  would 
be  vigorously  opposed  by  all  the  great  powers,  who  remain 
unwilling  to  permit  their  troops  to  be  thrown  into  action 
without  their  consent,  and  by  many  other  members  of  the 
United  Nations  as  well.  Moreover,  it  is  significant  that  it  is  not 
enforcement  action  in  a  single  instance  which  has  been  blocked 
by  the  veto.159 

Through  this  resolution,  the  Senate  helped  to  clarify  U.S.  policy  on 
enforcement  in  the  United  Nations,  but  these  principles  represented 
a  divergence  from  Baruch's  position  on  atomic  energy  questions. 

The  Vandenberg  resolution  also  paved  the  way  for  the  United  States 
to  take  an  active  part  in  engineering  collective  defense  arrangements 
such  as  NATO,  under  the  terms  of  Article  51  of  the  U.N.  Charter.  The 
fact  that  the  United  States  sought  this  kind  of  vehicle  to  ensure  its 
security  and  that  of  its  allies  marked  a  recognition  by  the  United 
States  of  a  need  for  alternatives  to  the  Security  Council  in  this  regard. 
As  expressed  in  the  UNAEC  negotiations,  the  U.S.  position  on  the 
security  arrangements  of  atomic  energy  control  placed  a  great  deal  of 
emphasis  on  the  Security  Council  as  the'  principal  organ  to  deal  with 
questions  of  this  nature.  However,  this  position  toward  the  machinery 
for  security  matters  seemed  to  undergo  a  transition,  as  indicated  by 
subsequent  U.S.  participation  in  collective -defense  arrangements.  The 
development  of  collective  security  arrangements  may  or  may  not  rep- 
resent a  possible  alternative  which  was  neglected  in  the  effort  to  set  up 
machinery  for  security  under  atomic  energy  control.  But  it  may  in- 
dicate a  general  trend  which  was  casting  the  Security  Council  in  a  dif- 
ferent role  from  that  which  seemed  to  govern  the  atomic  energy 
proposals.  And  as  involvement  of  the  Security  Council  demanded, 
resolution  of  the  question  of  how  the  veto  would  be  used,  the  emphasis 
on  that  body  may  have  contributed  to  the  failure  of  the  negotiations. 

Given  the  existing  political  conditions  at  the  time,  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult in  retrospect  to  determine  whether  a  change  of  one  or  several  fac- 
tors or  developments  might  have  altered  the  results  of  the  negotiations. 
The  complexity  of  the  relationships  among  science,  technology,  and 
diplomacy  is  abundantly  illustrated  through  an  examination  of  these 
first  efforts  to  control  atomic  energy.  It  is  clear,  from  the  perspective 
of  this  study,  that  elements  of  both  the  diplomatic  and  technological 
aspects  of  atomic  energy  contributed  to  the  failure  of  the  initial  inter- 
national efforts  to  control  it. 


159  Ibid.,  p.  135. 


VI.  Concluding  Observations 

The  discovery  of  nuclear  fission  and  its  subsequent  military  appli- 
cation by  the  United  States  altered  the  balance  of  power  among  the 
major  nations  of  the  world  and  gave  to  the  United  States  a  few  brief 
years  of  exclusive  possession  of  a  military  weapon  of  truly  revolution- 
ary potency.  During  this  transitional  period  and  until  the  present  era 
of  nuclear  stalemate,  American  diplomacy  was  able  to  function  from 
a  position  of  great  military  strength  with  little  need  to  make  conces- 
sions. 

One  of  the  first  impacts  of  the  discovery  upon  American  diplomacy 
was  the  task  accepted  by  U.S.  diplomats  of  doing  what  they  could  to 
bring  the  nations  of  the  world  into  sufficient  agreement  to  establish 
the  international  control  of  nuclear  energy.  Examination  of  their  un- 
successful attempt  to  do  so  suggests  several  observations  about  the  im- 
pact of  science  and  technology  upon  American  diplomacy  and  inter- 
national relations. 

In  this  examination,  it  is  necessary  to  be  aware  of  a  distinction  be- 
tween two  questions  associated  with  international  control  of  atomic 
energy  and  the  issue  of  the  interplay  among  science,  technology,  and 
diplomacy.  First  one  can  examine  the  events  surrounding  the  Baruch 
plan  as  they  exemplify  the  impact  on  diplomacy  of  an  unprecedented 
technological  achievement,  the  atom  bomb.  The  second  consideration 
arises  from  the  fact  that  there  were  certain  technological  principles  of 
atomic  energy  which  determined  the  necessary  technological  character- 
istics of  the  control  system.  One  might  call  this  area  the  "technology 
of  control.'*  Thus,  the  second  question  to  consider  is  the  interaction 
between  the  technology  of  control  and  the  conduct  of  the  diplomatic 
negotiations  to  establish  a  control  system.  A  recognition  of  this  distinc- 
tion in  terms  of  the  scope  of  this  study  is  important  to  an  understand- 
ing of  the  following  discussion. 
I  in  pact  of  New  Technologies  on  I nt,  motional  Relations 

In  light  of  the  way  the  discoveries  associated  with  atomic  energy  gal- 
vanized U.S.  diplomacy  and  stimulated  an  extended  and  global  diplo- 
matic effort,  this  case  suggests  that  the  creation  and  application  of 
new  technologies  arising  from  scientific  discoveries  may  so  change  re- 
lations among  nations  that  a  system  of  international  control  of  that 
technology  becomes  desirable  to  one  or  more  parties.  Nuclear  en- 
ergy is  neither  the  first  nor  the  last  example  of  a  technological  innova- 
tion suggesting  the  desirability  of  international  machinery  and  proce- 
dures for  controlling  it.  Hut  it  is  probably  the  most  dramatic  example 
to  date."" 

On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  the  diplomatic  effort  arose  out  of 
the  discovery  of  fission,  a  radical  development  in  itself,  did  not  change 
the  basic  function  of  diplomacy  or  the  behavior  of  diplomats.  The  U.S. 

""Other  examples  would  include  aviation,  warships,  supertankers,  ami  communications 

satellites. 

( us) 


119 


experience  suggests  the  venerable  aphorism :  "Plus  ca  change,  plus 
c'est  la  meme  chose."  The  idealism  of  science  and  its  traditions  for  in- 
ternational cooperation  were  not  strong  enough  to  overcome  interna- 
tional political  differences.  Not  even  an  awareness  of  the  awesome  de- 
structive force  of  the  atomic  bomb  provided  sufficient  incentive  to 
nations  to  agree  on  a  secure  form  of  control  over  atomic  energy.  In  the 
face  of  a  new  weapon  which  drastically  altered  traditional  concepts  of 
war,  intense  rivalries  among  different  national  interests  prevented  a 
movement  toward  common  ground  on  international  control  of  atomic 
energy. 

While  exclusive  possession  of  a  new  technology  stemming  from  a 
scientific  discovery  may  give  a  nation  an  advantage  in  international 
affairs,  that  advantage  is  likely  to  shrink  quickly.  In  the  case  of  nuclear 
energy,  the  principal  disadvantaged  country  was  able  to  duplicate  the 
discovery  of  fission  and  to  create  a  rudimentary  initial  technology 
sufficient  to  permit  detonation  of  a  nuclear  device  while  the  negotia- 
tions were  still  in  progress.  Yet  during  this  time  U.S.  negotiators  ap- 
parently assumed  that  secrecy  could  preserve  their  advantage  for  a 
comfortably  long  period  of  diplomatic  accommodation.  Thus,  another 
lesson  from  this  study  is  that  it  is  unrealistic  to  rely  on  secrecy,  once 
the  application  of  a  new  technology  has  been  forcefully  demonstrated 
before  the  world  as  in  the  case  of  the  atomic  bombs,  to  prevent  other 
nations  from  acquiring  or  recreating  this  technology. 

In  approaching  the  problem  which  the  new  atomic  energy  technology 
imposed  on  U.S.  diplomacy,  there  was  recognition  of  the  need  to  com- 
bine elements  of  both  areas  to  achieve  a  solution  to  the  problem.  While 
this  principle  was  easily  accepted  by  diplomats  and  scientists  alike, 
members  of  each  profession  were  not  successful  in  putting  the  principle 
into  practice.  To  a  considerable  extent,  the  differences  between  men 
like  Lilienthal  and  Baruch  were  founded  on  a  certain  lack  of  apprecia- 
tion on  each  side  for  the  manner  in  which  the  members  of  the  other 
side  approached  the  problem  of  the  international  control  of  atomic 
energy.  Perhaps  this  case  indicates  that  for  science  and  diplomacy  to 
work  together  efficiently,  the  members  of  each  field  must  express  their 
respective  points  of  view  fully  and  in  terms  which  can  be  understood 
and  applied  by  members  of  the  other  field.  At  the  same  time,  there 
must  be  a  special  receptivity  by  members  of  each  field  and  a  special 
willingness  to  accommodate  to  the  outlook  of  the  other,  in  order  to 
attain  the  ultimate  goal. 

Not  only  were  mistakes  made  in  the  course  of  the  interaction  of 
science  and  diplomacy,  but  there  were  also  a  number  of  miscalcula- 
tions by  the  experts  in  their  respective  fields,  as  described  in  the  previ- 
ous section.  Whether  or  to  what  extent  these  particular  elements, 
contributed  to  the  failure  of  the  negotiations  would  be  difficult  to  deter- 
mine. Total  accuracy  on  the  part  of  either  scientists  or  diplomats  may 
be  too  much  to  expect,  but  certainly  in  areas  basic  to  the  solution  of 
critical  problems,  a  high  degree  of  accuracy  would  seem  to  be  a  reason- 
able and  necessary  goal. 

The  Diplomatic  Task :  Combining  Effectiveness  and  Acceptability 

The  second  major  portion  of  this  conclusion  deals  with  the  tech- 
nology of  control  and  the  diplomatic  efforts  to  cope  with  it.  This  ques- 
tion breaks  down  further  into  two  features  of  a  control  system  in  which 
science,  technology,  and  diplomacy  became  involved:  effectiveness  and 


120 


acceptability.  The  first  concerns  those  characteristics  required  of  an 
effective  system,  that  is,  one  which  merely  fulfilled  the  function  of  con- 
trol. For  the  most  part,  these  could  be  found  primarily  in  the  area  of 
science  and  technology  of  atomic  energy,  although  certain  political 
factors  were  thought  to  be  essential  to  a  workable  plan.  The  second  has 
to  do  with  the  acceptability  of  the  plan,  those  technological  and  polit- 
ical characteristics  of  the  plan  which  would  lead  to  agreement  among 
nations.  In  turn,  those  aspects  of  the  plan  which  promoted  its  capacity 
for  effectiveness  or  acceptability  interacted  in  ways  which  may  have 
contributed  to  the  failure  of  the  negotiations. 

During  negotiation  of  the  Baruch  plan,  one  can  detect  two  absolute 
factors  which  were  peculiar  to  the  efforts  to  attain  an  effective  system 
of  international  control  over  atomic  energy:  a  technological  reality 
and  a  political  reality  created  by  the  discovery  and  use  of  atomic 
energy.  In  turn,  both  of  these  realities  created  substantial  problems 
for  the  negotiations,  and  thus  for  the  acceptability  of  the  plan. 

The  predominant  political  characteristic  of  atomic  energy  was  the 
fact  that  the  keeper  of  the  military  use  of  the  atom  represented  an 
absolute  power  for  a  finite  period  of  time.  Thus,  the  control  system  had 
to  be  effective  in  such  a  way  as  to  exercise  adequate  control  over  this 
tremendous  military  force.  The  primary  problem  this  presented  for 
the  United  States  was  the  fact  that  international  control  affected  the 
very  heart  of  its  military  security.  To  the  Soviet  Union,  the  political 
impact  of  the  United  States  as  sole  owner  of  the  bomb  strengthened  the 
impression  of  a  very  real  threat  to  Soviet  military  security.  More 
assurance  of  an  end  to  that  threat  would  have  been  necessary  in  ex- 
change for  Soviet  renunciation  of  its  own  efforts  to  develop  a  bomb 
and  accept  international  control. 

The  technological  reality  of  atomic  energy  which  was  important  to 
the  negotiations  was  the  fact  that  the  processes  associated  with  the 
peaceful  and  military  uses  of  atomic  energy  were  approximately  the 
same.  And  it  appeared  from  the  outset  that  the  security  of  a  control 
system  would  have  to  be  maintained  through  inspections  of  an  exceed- 
ingly intrusive  character.  The  Soviet  Union  was  faced  with  this  pe- 
culiar attribute  of  the  technology  of  atomic  energy  which  weighed 
heavily  on  the  choices  of  a  control  system  and  which  seriously  chal- 
lenged the  closely  guarded  society  of  that  country.  To  the  United 
States,  a  major  consideration  influenced  by  this  technological  fact  of 
life  was  how  to  penetrate  the  rigid  secrecy  of  the  Soviet  Union  in 
order  to  prevent  or  detect  its  expected  violation  of  the  control  system. 
Perhaps  also,  to  some  indeterminate  degree,  this  penetration  of  Soviet 
society  was  regarded  in  the  United  States  as  an  intrinsically  desirable 
goal,  apart  from  considerations  of  atomic  control. 

Thus,  during  the  negotiations  to  devise  a  control  system,  both  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  I'liion  were  faced  with  certain  political 
and  technological  absolutes  which  were  directly  opposite  to  certain 
fundamental  features  of  their  respective  countries.  These  features 
were  integral  to  meeting  what  each  country  considered  the  require- 
ments for  maintenance  of  its  national  security.  The  negotiations  ne- 
glected to  reconcile  these  requirements  with  these  dominating  techno- 
logical and  political  factors  of  atomic  energy  in  order  to  attain 
adequate  and  acceptable  international  control. 


121 


On  the  whole,  the  technology  of  atomic  energy  seems  to  have  deter- 
mined the  parameters  of  the  proposals  and  therefore  set  the  tone  of  the 
negotiations.  When  obstacles  arose  in  the  policymaking  process  and  in 
the  negotiations,  the  consensus  was  that  there  had  been  a  failure  to 
recognize  the  technological  factors  which  supported  the  proposal  for 
the  international  control  system.  Yet  little  effort  was  made  by  the 
diplomats  to  come  to  terms  with  some  of  the  political  problems  which 
contributed  significantly  to  the  impasse.  At  the  same  time,  scientists 
who  were  in  a  position  to  influence  policymakers  in  the  United  States 
and  in  the  UNA  EC  refused  to  accept  any  responsibility  for  comment- 
ing on  the  political  feasibility  of  control  or  the  political  elements  of  a 
possible  control  system. 

Perhaps  a  guiding  assumption  among  policymakers  and  negotiators 
alike  was  that  the  technological  necessities  of  effective  control  would 
force  acceptance  of  that  control.  But  in  reality,  the  drive  to  devise 
effectiveness  in  the  control  system  seems  to  have  ignored,  if  not  to  have 
defied,  the  need  for  special  diplomatic  efforts  to  achieve  acceptability. 

The  area  of  acceptability  received  little  if  any  consideration  in  U.S. 
policy  discussions.  The  basis  for  the  U.S.  approach  may  be  found  in 
several  considerations:  a  moralistic  attitude  which  characterized  the 
U.S.  negotiating  technique,  arrogance  generated  by  the  notion  of  U.S. 
leverage,  or  prejudice  toward  Soviet  science  and  technology  which  led 
to  overly  hopeful  estimates  of  the  life  expectancy  of  the  U.S.  monopoly 
over  atomic  weapons. 

It  is  clear  that  while  science  and  technology  alone  could  devise  a 
control  system  which  would  be  efficient  in  its  task,  and  diplomacy 
could  provide  the  fundamentals  for  an  acceptable  system  to  protect 
national  security,  only  a  combination  of  the  elements  from  science, 
technology,  and  diplomacy  could  be  expected  to  devise  a  workable 
system  for  control  which  would  be  acceptable  to  the  leading  nations 
of  the  world. 

Underlying  many  of  the  conclusions  on  acceptability  is  an  assump- 
tion that  all  parties  entered  the  UNAEC  negotiations  in  good  faith, 
and  were  prepared  to  bargain  diligently  for  a  goal  which  represented 
the  promise  of  assured  security  for  all.  It  would  be  virtually  impossible, 
of  course,  to  determine  accurately  what  were  in  fact  the  motives  of 
each  country  as  it  entered  the  negotiations.  But  it  is  reasonably  certain 
that  the  tone  of  the  initial  proposals  could  have  helped  shape  the  sub- 
sequent behavior  of  the  countries  in  the  negotiations.  As  it  was,  the 
initial  proposals  may  have  lessened  the  force  of  the  drive  which  was 
necessary  to  sustain  the  bargaining  process  successfully. 

In  light  of  the  fact  that  the  Soviets  were  not  far  from  developing 
their  own  atomic  weapon,  one  might  infer  alternatively  that  the  So- 
viets entered  the  negotiations  simply  for  propaganda  value  and  were 
not  genuinely  interested  in  achieving  a  system  of  international  con- 
trol of  atomic  energy.  Whether  or  not  this  was  the  case,  not  everything 
possible  was  done  by  the  West  to  create  an  atmosphere  of  trust  or  a 
spirit  of  compromise  which  would  seem  to  be  basic  ingredients  to 
meaningful  negotiation.  This  fact  could  cast  doubts  on  the  intentions 
of  the  West.  On  the  whole,  one  cannot  discount  entirely  the  possibility 
of  some  measure  of  reluctance  on  the  part  of  both  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  to  accept  the  idea  of  international  control  of 
atomic  energy,  a  sentiment  which  would  inevitably  have  influenced 
their  behavior  in  the  negotiations. 


122 


U.S.  Attitudes  in  the  Conduct  of  the  Negotiations 

Diplomats  were  clearly  the  focus  of  action,  with  scientists  in  an 
advisory  capacity.  No  radically  new  participation  of  scientists  was 
observed  in  these  international  negotiations. 

The  interplay  between  science  and  technology  and  diplomacy  was 
not  so  continuous  or  extensive  as  to  require  direct  participation  by 
scientists  in  the  negotiations.  Rather,  the  advice  and  analysis  from 
science  advisers  served  mainly  to  set  the  stage  for  the  diplomats  and 
their  negotiations. 

At  a  time  when  scientists  enjoyed  the  peak  of  postwar  public  esteem 
for  their  contribution  to  the  victory  in  World  War  II,  their  normal 
role  in  the  Baruch  plan  negotiations  did  not  extend  beyond  technical 
advice.  Apparently,  the  scientific  approach  with  its  emphasis  upon 
objective,  experimentally  demonstrable  fact  did  not  provide  a  useful 
paradigm  for  the  international  negotiators. 

The  characteristics  of  the  proposed  control  plan,  as  enunciated  by 
the  scientists  of  the  Lilienthal  Board  and  those  of  the  UNAEC  Scien- 
tific and  Technical  Committee,  suggest  that  the  authors  were  thinking 
in  terms  of  an  ideal  situation.  Many  of  the  features  of  this  plan,  while 
considered  necessary  to  an  effective  control  system,  presented  notions 
which  were  totally  unacceptable  to  the  Soviet  Union.  A  possible  al- 
ternative in  the  U.S.  policymaking  process  might  have  been  to  deter- 
mine the  basic  technological  and  political  requirements  for  an  effective 
control  system  which  each  side  would  accept,  and  then  to  try  to  estab- 
lish some  common  ground  between  the  two  positions.  With  this  process 
as  a  starting  point  for  the  negotiations,  perhaps  the  discussions  could 
have  proceeded  to  elaborate  on  the  control  system  in  such  a  way  as  to 
explore  a  variety  of  proposals  and  arrive  at  the  proper  combination 
of  technological  and  political  characteristics  which  would  provide  both 
an  effective  system,  and  one  reasonably  acceptable  to  all  concerned.  A 
willingness  to  proceed  on  this  basis  might  at  least,  in  the  Baruch  plan 
negotiations,  have  emphasized  good  faith  and  signalled  an  understand- 
ing that  each  side  had  its  special  political  problems  to  resolve. 


Chapter    4 — Commercial    Nuclear    Power    In 

Europe:  The  Interaction  of  American 

Diplomacy  With  a  New  Technology 


CONTENTS 


Page 

I.  Reasons,  Purpose,  and  Scope 131 

Some  Reasons  for  the  Study 131 

Scope  and  Limitations  of  the  Study 131 

Sources  of  Information 133 

II.  Some  Facts  About  Nuclear  Power 134 

Fission  and  Fusion:  Two  Sources  of  Nuclear  Energy 134 

Breeding   or   the    Conversion   of   Useless   Atoms    Into    Useful 

Nuclear  Fuel 134 

Natural  and  Enriched  Uranium  as  Nuclear  Fuel 134 

Plutonium:  A  Manmade  Nuclear  Fuel 135 

Commercial  Nuclear  Power 136 

The  Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle 137 

Fusion  Power:  An  Expectation  Yet  To  Be  Fulfilled 138 

Safeguards :  Ways  To  Assure  Discovery  of  Unauthorized  Diver- 
sion of  Fissionable  Materials 139 

Some  Limitations  of  Safeguards 140 

III.  From  Hiroshima  to  Atoms  for  Peace:  Postwar  Trends  in  Regional 

Multinational  Cooperation  in  Europe 141 

An  Initial  Prohibition  of  International  Cooperation 141 

Initial  Pessimism  Toward  Nuclear  Power 142 

Changing  Technology  and  Diplomacy 143 

Interest  in  International  Collaboration 143 

The  Evolving  Scene:  1945-1953 144 

The  Postwar  Struggle 144 

The  Marshall  Plan 145 

The  Truman  Doctrine 145 

Unification  in  Europe 146 

The  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community 146 

The  European  Economic  Community 146 

Common  Organs  of  the  European  Communities 147 

The  Commission  of  the  European  Communities 147 

The  Council  of  Ministers 147 

The  European  Parliament 147 

The  Economic  and  Social  Committee 147 

The  Court  of  Justice 148 

Financing  the  Communities 148 

The  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development.  148 

U.S.  Attitude  Toward  European  Unity 148 

IV.  Atoms  for  Peace:  A  Presidential  Initiative 150 

Origins  of  Atoms  for  Peace 150 

President  Eisenhower's  U.N.  Address : 150 

Implications  for  Nuclear  Power  in  Europe 152 

Legislation  for  Atoms  for  Peace 152 

The  Eisenhower  Proposal  to  Congress 153 

The  Congressional  Response 153 

International  Cooperation  and  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1954_  154 

Some  Questions  From  the  Scientific  Community 156 

Accomplishments  of  Atoms  for  Peace 156 

V.  Bilateral  Agreements  for  U.S.  Technical  Assistance  to  Commercial 

Nuclear  Energy  in  Europe 158 

Legislation  for  Technical  Cooperation  in  Nuclear  Energy 158 

AEC  Organization:  The  Division  of  International  Programs —  160 

The  First  Bilateral  Agreements  for  Nuclear  Cooperation 161 

Pressures  To  Promote  Nuclear  Power  Abroad 161 

(125) 


126 

V.  Bilateral  Agreements,  etc. — Continued  Pase 

Providing  Working  Experience  With  Nuclear  Energy 164 

The  Research  Reactor  Program 164 

Some  Doubts  and  Insights 164 

Fuel  for  Research  Reactors 165 

The  Power  Reactor  Program 165 

The  Bilateral  Agreement  Situation  in  1971 167 

Additional  Measures  To  Stimulate  Foreign  Interest  in  Nuclear 

Power 168 

Allocation  of  Nuclear  Fuel  Materials 168 

Establishing  Prices  for  Nuclear  Fuel  Materials 169 

Financial  Assistance  for  Foreign  Nuclear  Powerplants 170 

Fuel  Reprocessing  and  Waste  Disposal 171 

Authority  for  the  U.S.  Nuclear  Industry  To  Provide  Nu- 
clear Products  and  Assistance 172 

A  Reluctance  To  Export  Technology 172 

Safeguarding   Nuclear   Materials   Supplied   Through   Bilateral 

Agreements 173 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 174 

VI.  Creating  an  International   Organization:  The  International  Atomic 

Energy  Agency 176 

The  IAEA:  A  Brief  Description 176 

Changing  Goals  and  Situations 177 

The  Fruits  of  Negotiation 178 

The  Role  of  Scientists  in  the  Negotiations 179 

Some  Insights  From  Congressional  Review 179 

Limitations  Upon  the  U.S.  Commitment 181 

Warnings  of  Consequences  of  Failure  To  Ratify 182 

The  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  Participation  Act  of 

1957 182 

Bilateral  Agreements  and  the  IAEA 183 

A   Bilateral   Agreement   With   the   IAEA   and    Three    Policy 

Questions 184 

U.S.  Participation  in  the  IAEA 185 

Initial  U.S.  Support 185 

Trends  in  U.S.  Support 186 

A  Hardheaded  Approach  to  IAEA  Functions 187 

A  Stronger  Role  for  the  IAEA:  The  Smyth  Report  of  1962 188 

A  State  Department  Commentary 189 

An  AEC  Reaction 190 

A  Pessimistic  Postscript 

The  Decline  of  the  Supply  Function 191 

International  Standards  for  Nuclear  Safety 192 

International  Safeguards  for  Nuclear  Materials 194 

Congressional  Interest  in  IAEA  Safeguards 195 

Bilateral  Versus  IAEA  Safeguards 197 

Evolution  of  IAEA  Safeguards:  A  Brief  Chronology 198 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 201 

VII.  Creating  a  Regional  Nuclear  Organization:  The  European  Atomic 

Energy  Community  (Euratom) 203 

Origins  of  Euratom 203 

Advice  for  the  Decisionmakers 204 

A  Target  for  Euratom 204 

U.S.  Support  for  European  Nuclear  Integration 205 

Soviet  Opposition  to  Euratom 206 

Three  Policy  Issues  of  Euratom 207 

Whether  Euratom  Should  Manufacture  Enriched  Uranium.  207 

Whether  To  Include  Military  Activities  in  Euratom 208 

Whether  Euratom  Should  Have  a  Monopoly  of  Nuclear 

Materials 208 

A  Treaty  for  Euratom 208 


127 

Page 
VII.  Creating  a  Regional  Nuclear  Organization — Continued 

Establishing  the  Infrastructure  for  European  Nuclear  Power...  209 
Financing    and    Operating    Commercial    Nuclear    Power- 
plants 210 

Creating  a  Nuclear  Common  Market 210 

Joint  Enterprises:  An  Innovation  in  International  Organi- 
zation   210 

Early  Changes  in  Euratom  Objectives 211 

Research  for  Nuclear  Power 211 

Funding  of  Euratom  Research 212 

In-House  Research  and  Development  for  Euratom 212 

Dissension,  Crisis,  and  Delay  in  Euratom's  Programs 213 

The  First  5- Year  Plan  (1958-1962) 214 

The  Second  5- Year  Plan  (1963-1967) 214 

Failure  To  Adopt  a  Third  5- Year  Plan 215 

Plutonium  for  Fast  Breeder  Research 216 

The  Supply  and  Control  of  Nuclear  Materials 216 

Supranational  Ownership  of  Nuclear  Fuel  Materials 217 

Supplying  Nuclear  Materials 217 

Euratom  Manufacture  of  Enriched  Uranium 217 

Some  Difficulties  of  the  Supply  Agency 218 

Safeguarding  Nuclear  Fuel  Materials 218 

Euratom  Safeguards  and  U.S.  Policy 220 

Euratom  and  Nuclear  Safety 220 

Euratom  and  Environmental  Effects  of  Nuclear  Power.  . 221 

Duplication  and  Dilution  of  Effort 221 

Proposals  for  New  Research  Functions  for  Euratom 222 

The  McKinney  Report  Recommendations  of  1959 222 

Views  of  the  EEC 223 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 223 

VIII.  Joint  United  States-Euratom  Research  and  Development 226 

U.S.  Interest  in  Euratom  Demonstration  of  Nuclear  Power 227 

Initiation  of  the  Joint  Programs 228 

The  United  States-Euratom  Agreement  of  1958 229 

The  Joint  Boards:  An  Organizational  Innovation 230 

A  Note  on  the  Environment  of  the  Negotiations 230 

The  Euratom  Cooperation  Act  of  1958 231 

A  Bilateral  Agreement  With  Euratom 232 

The  Joint  Power  Program 233 

The  First  Invitation  To  Participate 233 

The  Second  Round  of  Invitations 235 

Financing  the  Demonstration  Plants 235 

The  Fuel  Guarantee  Authority 235 

The  Joint  Research  Program 236 

The  First  5- Year  Plan  (1959-1964) 236 

The  Second  5- Year  Plan  (1965-1969) 237 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 237 

IX.  The    Nuclear    Energy    Agency:    Another    Regional    Approach    to 

International  Organization  for  Nuclear  Energy 239 

Origins  of  the  Nuclear  Energy  Agency 239 

NEA  Functions 239 

Some    NEA    Innovations    in    Organization    of    International 

Projects 240 

The  Halden  Project  in  Norway 240 

The  Dragon  Project  in  the  United  Kingdom 241 

The  Eurochemic  Project  in  Belgium 242 

Building  the  Infrastructure  for  Nuclear  Power 242 

NEA  and  Safeguards  for  Nuclear  Materials 243 

U.S.  Participation  in  NEA  Activities 243 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 244 

X.  U.S.  Fuel  for  European  Nuclear  Power 246 

The  Enriched  Uranium  Business 246 

Requirements  for  Enriched  Uranium  and  Enrichment  Services.  247 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1 


128 

X.   U.S.  Fuel  for  European  Nuclear  Power — Continued  Page 

U.S.  Supply  Policy 248 

Advantages  to  the  United  States 248 

Disadvantages  to  the  United  States 249 

Evolution  of  U.S.  Supply  Policy 249 

Special  Conditions  for  Euratom 250 

Toll  Enrichment 251 

Financing  Nuclear  Fuel  Inventories 252 

The  Deferred  Payment  Plan 252 

Pricing  Uranium  Enrichment  Service 253 

European  Opposition  to  U.S.  Enrichment  Monopoly 253 

The  U.S.S.R.  as  an  Alternative  Source  of  Supply 254 

Supply  Policy  Alternatives 255 

Maintaining  the  Competitive  Position  of  the  United  States  in 

the  World  Enrichment  Market 255 

Enrichment  Requirements 256 

The  Prospects  for  Expanding  U.S.  Enrichment  Capacity.  _  257 

Sharing  the  U.S.  Monopoly 258 

Some  Views  of  the  Joint  Committee 261 

The  Gas  Centrifuge:  A  Technical  Perturbation  for  U.S.  Policy?.  261 

The  Centrifuge  and  Proliferation 262 

Breaking  the  Secrecy  Barrier 263 

The  French  Drive  for  a  European  Diffusion  Plant 263 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 264 

XI.  The  Nonproliferation  Treat y  and  Safeguards 266 

New  Urgency  for  Safeguards 266 

The  Four  Functions  of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty 267 

U.S.  Ratification  and  Support  of  the  Treaty.. 268 

U.S.  Support  for  Safeguards 269 

Safeguards  Provisions  of  the  Treaty 270 

Elements  of  the  IAEA  Safeguards  System 271 

Negotiation  of  IAEA  Safeguards  Agreements:  The  IAEA 

Safeguards  Committee 272 

Some  Facets  of  the  Negotiations 272 

Protection  of  Commercial  Interests 273 

Inspections  and  Their  Scheduling 273 

"Strategic  Points" 274 

Enforcement  of  Safeguards 274 

U.S.  Support  of  the  Safeguards  Committee 275 

The  Soviet  View 275 

Criticisms  of  IAEA  Safeguards 275 

Some  Congressional  Doubts 276 

Costs  of  Safeguards 277 

Financing  Safeguards  Under  the  Treaty 278 

A  Joint  Committee  Reservation 279 

Physical  Security  of  Nuclear  Materials 279 

Nonproliferation  and  Euratom 280 

Euratom  Concern 281 

A  Recent  Development 282 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 282 

XII.  Some  Issues  Recapitulated 285 

Nuclear  Power  for  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 286 

Sustaining  U.S.  Technological  Leadership  in  the  1970s 286 

Reducing  European  Dependence  Upon  Imported  Energy.  286 

Controlling  the  Possibilities  for  Proliferation 287 

Demonstrating  the  Practicability  of  Inspection  for  Arms 

Control 287 

Improving  the  U.S.  Position  in  World  Trade 287 

A  Potential  Limitation   Upon  Nuclear  Power  for  Foreign 

Policy 288 


129 

Page 
XII.  Some  Issues  Recapitulated — Continued 

Foreign  Policy  for  Nuclear  Power 288 

Maintaining  the  Competitive  Position  of  the  U.S.  Nuclear 

Industry  in  the  World  Market 288 

Further  Development  and  Demonstration  of  U.S.  Nuclear 

Technology  Abroad 288 

Expediting    the    Solution    of    Environmental    Effects    of 

Nuclear  Power 289 

Establishment    of    International    Standards    for    Nuclear 

Power 289 

Protecting  the  U.S.  Position  in  Uranium  Enrichment 289 

Glossary 290 

TABLES 

I.  Status  of  Agreements  for  Cooperation  as  of  April  1,  1958 163 

II.  International  Agreements  in  1970 168 

III.  U.S.    Contributions   to   the   International   Atomic   Energy   Agency, 

Calendar  Years  1960-73 187 

IV.  Appropriations  for  Euratom  Research  and  Training  Programs  From 

1958  to  1971 213 

V.  AEC    Contracts    for    Toll    Enrichment    With    Foreign    Customers, 

November  1970 252 

VI.  Total  Manpower  and  Cost  Estimates  for  IAEA  Safeguards 278 

VII.  Summary  of  Nuclear  Facilities  in  Non weapons  States 278 

FIGURES 
I.  The  Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle 138 


i 


t 
i 

* 

4 


>H VjV 


Garigliano  Nuclear  Power  Plant    (SENN),   Scauri,   Italy.  This   160,000  KW. 
station  began  commercial  operation  in  November  1964. 


CHAPTER  4— COMMERCIAL  NUCLEAR  POWER  IN  EU- 
ROPE: THE  INTERACTION  OF  AMERICAN  DIPLO- 
MACY WITH  A  NEW  TECHNOLOGY 

I.  Reasons,  Purpose,  and  Scope 

The  interaction  between  American  diplomacy  and  the  new  tech- 
nology of  unclear  power  during  the  past  three  decades  illustrates  how 
the  development  of  nuclear  power  has  been  a  resource  for  U.S.  diplo- 
macy and.  conversely,  how  diplomacy  has  helped  the  domestic  devel- 
opment of  nuclear  power  in  the  United  States.  The  purpose  of  this  re- 
port is  to  describe  this  interaction  and  to  identify  issues  that  may  need 
attention  during-  the  1970s. 

Some  Reasons  for  the  Study 

One  of  the  most  dramatic  scientific  discoveries  of  our  time  is  that 
of  atomic  energy.  During  the  brief  span  of  30  years  from  the  first 
demonstration  of  a  nuclear  chain  reaction  in  1942  to  date,  a  whole  new 
technology  has  been  developed,  demonstrated,  and  brought  into  practi- 
cal use  in  such  widely  divergent  applications  as  enormously  destruc- 
tive military  weapons,  naval  propulsion,  generation  of  commercial 
electricity,  and,  most  recently,  the  possible  civil  use  of  nuclear  ex- 
plosives in  engineering,  mining,  ancl  recovery  of  natural  gas.  There 
exist  today  38  working  nuclear  power  stations  in  Europe  in  comparison 
with  28  operable  nuclear  power  stations  in  the  United  States.1 

The  applications  of  this  new  science  and  technology  by  public  and 
private  bodies  have  inevitably  interacted  with  American  diplomacy. 
On  the  one  hand,  American  preeminence  in  military  and  civil  use 
of  nuclear  power  has  provided  certain  advantages  ancl  leverages  for 
U.S.  diplomatic  action.  On  the  other  hand,  U.S.  foreign  policy  deci- 
sions have  been  made  to  further  the  progress  of  domestic  use  of  nu- 
clear power  in  the  United  States.  These  decisions  have  led  to  the 
creation  of  not  only  one  but  three  international  organizations  and 
to  the  establishment  of  a  complex  network  of  bilateral  agreements 
for  technical  assistance  by  the  United  States  to  its  allies  and  friends 
to  promote  use  of  nuclear  energy. 

As  the  United  States  and  the  industrial  nations  of  the  world  stand 
on  the  threshold  of  an  anticipated  massive  deployment  of  civil  nuclear 
power  during  the  coming  years,  further  issues  for  diplomacy  merit 
attention  before  the  pace  of  events  so  accelerates  that  there  will  be  no 
time  for  unhurried  decisions. 

Scope  and  Limitations  of  the  Study 

The  immediate  impact  of  nuclear  energy  upon  American  diplomacy 
following  World  War  II  is  to  be  found  in  the  fruitless  efforts  of  the 
United  States  and  the  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission 
to  bring  about  the  international  control  of  this  new  science  and  tech- 
nology. Although  the  UXAEC  was  to  continue  in  existence  until  Janu- 
ary 1952,  it  had  for  all  practical  purposes  ceased  to  function  in  1949 

1  These  nuclear  power  stations  are  distributed  among  the  nations  of  Europe  as  follows: 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  .">,  France  S,  Italy  3,  Netherlands  1,  Spain  2,  Sweden  2, 
Switzerland  3.  and  the  United  Kincdom  14 

Note  :  This  chapter  was  prepared  in  1972  by  Warren  H.  Donnelly. 

(131), 


132 


and  with  its  demise  died  the  hope  that  atomic  energy  could  be  put 
under  international  ownership  and  control.  An  analysis  of  this  inter- 
action of  atomic  energy  and  American  diplomacy  is  to  be  found  in 
a  companion  study  of  the  Congressional  Research  Service  :  Tht  Baruch 
Phi n  :  U.S.  Diplomacy  Enters  the  Nuclear  Age.2 

The  subsequent  interaction  between  U.S.  diplomacy  and  nuclear 
power  is  the  subject  of  the  present  study.  Since  the  first  use  of  nuclear 
weapons  terminated  the  war  with  Japan  in  1945,  U.S.  diplomacy  and 
nuclear  energy  have  been  closely  and  continually  intertwined.  The  re- 
lationships have  changed  over  the  years  from  the  early  postwar  period 
when  the  United  States  possessed  the  great  military  advantage  of  the 
atom  bomb  to  back  its  foreign  policy  and  diplomacy  to  the  situation 
today  when  the  possession  of  enormously  destructive  nuclear  arma- 
ments by  the  superpowers  of  the  world  has  brought  a  period  of  nu- 
clear stalemate.  While  large-scale  armed  conflict  between  major  nations 
has  not  occurred  since  1945,  the  many  smaller  wars  and  conflicts  have 
prevented  the  postwar  years  from  being  an  era  of  peace. 

The  starting  point  for  this  examination  of  American  diplomacy  and 
commercial  nuclear  power  for  Europe  is  President  Eisenhower's 
Atoms  for  Peace  Plan  of  1953.  This  initiative,  together  with  the  sub- 
sequent rewriting  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  in  1954,  opened  the  way 
to  accelerated  development  of  commercial  nuclear  power  in  the  United 
States,  and  to  greater  technical  assistance  to,  and  cooperation  with, 
other  countries  and  with  international  organizations  in  nuclear  power. 
Against  this  background,  the  bilateral  technical  assistance  arrange- 
ments of  the  United  States  are  described  and  also  the  U.S.  relations 
with  the  three  international  organizations  set  up  to  foster  use  of  nu- 
clear power  in  the  free  world:  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  Euratom,  and  the  Nuclear  Energy  Agency.  Next  follows  in- 
formation on  U.S.  policy  and  programs  for  supplying  nuclear  fuel  to 
Europe.  The  next-to-last  section  deals  with  the  Xonprolifcration 
Treaty,  and  the  safeguards  which  it  would  impose  on  civil  use  of 
nuclear  fuel  materials  in  Europe.  The  study  concludes  with  a  reca- 
pitulation of  the  issues  and  a  look  to  the  future. 

Commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe  presents  an  instructive  case  of 
major  interaction  between  technology  and  foreign  policy  for  two  rea- 
sons. First,  the  strengthening  of  Europe  during  and  since  the  era  of 
the  cold  war  has  been  a  keystone  of  U.S.  foreign  policy;  Second. 
Europe  is  the  only  area  other  than  North  America  where  commercial 
development  of  nuclear  power  has  attained  any  prominence.  Further- 
more, during  the  late  L950's  the  economics  oi  the  European  energy 
market  were  more  attractive  for  the  early  demonstration  and  appli 
cation  of  commercial  nuclear  power  than  were  those  of  the  United 
States  with  its  then  abundant  and  cheap  energy  supplies  of  coal,  oil, 
and  natural  gas. 

No  attention  is  given  in  this  report  to  commercial  nuclear  power 
in   the   developing   nations  of  the    world   because   the  technology   for 

nuclear  power  has  not  evolved  in  this  direction.  Nuclear  power  tech- 
nology so  far  has  been  characterized  by  high  capital  costs,  rcquire- 

* Lenelce  N.  Wu.  The  Baruch  Plan:  U.S.  Diplomacy  Enters  the  Xuclcar  Age,  A  report 
prepared  fur  the  Subcommittee  mi  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific  Developments  of 
tiir  House  Committee  mi  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  Foreign  Affairs  Division,  Congressional 
Research  Service,  Library  of  Congress  (Washington,  D.C. :  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  1972),  67  p. 


133 


ments  for  a  sophisticated  infrastructure  of  supporting  technical  and 
industrial  products  and  services,  a  need  for  highly  trained  personnel, 
and  dependence  upon  the  United  States  for  nuclear  fuel  supplies.  The 
combination  of  these  factors  has  made  nuclear  power  less  attractive 
to  developing  countries  than  had  been  hoped  for  by  early  proponents 
of  nuclear  power.  Thus  the  commercial  use  of  nuclear  power  is  con- 
centrated largely  in  the  United  States,  Canada,  Europe,  Japan,  and 
the  Soviet  Union.  During  the  period  covered  by  this  study,  Europe 
has  been  a  principal  theater  of  interaction  between  American  diplo- 
macy and  nuclear  technology — both  civil  and  military.  For  this  reason, 
and  for  the  sake  of  manageability,  this  examination  is  limited  to 
commercial  or  civil  use  of  nuclear  power  in  Western  Europe. 

This  analysis  is  not  intended  to  be  a  definitive  account  of  the  domes- 
tic nuclear  power  program  of  the  United  States,  nor  of  the  nuclear 
programs  of  the  several  international  organizations  that  were  created 
to  further  the  peaceful  use  of  this  new  technology.  Rather  it  is  intended 
to  illustrate  typical  interactions  between  a  rapidly  evolving,  science- 
based  technology  and  diplomacy,  and  to  suggest  some  issues  for  Amer- 
ican diplomacy  that  may  be  anticipated  as  the  evolution  of  nuclear 
power  continues. 

Sources  of  Information 

The  principal  sources  of  information  used  in  this  study  include  the 
hearings  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  the  annual  reports 
of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  and  hearings  before  the  foreign 
relations  committees  of  the  House  and  the  Senate.  Additionally  it 
draws  upon  publications  of  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry,  notably  Nuclear 
Industry,  which  is  the  monthly  magazine  of  the  Atomic  Industrial 
Forum,  and  Nucleonics  Week,  a  commercial  weekly  newsletter;  also 
used  were  Nuclear  Science  and  Engineering,  which  is  a  commercial 
British  journal,  and  the  monthly  bulletins  of  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  and  Euratom.  Several  books  on  nuclear  energy  which 
have  been  useful  for  this  analysis  include  those  of  Nieburg,  Polach, 
Kramish,.  Scheinman,  and  Willrich.3  The  report  does  not  attempt  an 
exhaustive  examination  of  all  of  the  literature,  but  rather  seeks  to 
select  materials  that  illustrate  interaction  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  and 
domestic  policy  with  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe. 

■ 

3  Harold  L.  Nieburg,  Nuclear  Secrecy  and  Foreign  Policy  (Washington,  D.C.  :  Public 
Affairs  Press,  1964),  255  pp. 

Jaroslave  G.  Polach,  Euratom:  Its  Background,  Issues  and  Economic  Implications 
(Dobbs  Ferry,  New  York  :  Oceana  Publications.  Inc.,  1964),  232  pp. 

Arnold  Kramish,  The  Peaceful  Atom  in  Foreign  Policy  (New  York:  Harper  &  Row. 
Publishers.  1963).  276  pp. 

Lawrence  Scheinman,  Atomic  Energy  Policy  in  France  Under  the  Fourth  Republic 
(Princeton,  New  Jersey  :  Princeton  University  Press.  1965),  259  pp. 

Mason  Willrich,  ed..  Civil  Xuclear  Power  and  International  Security  (New  York: 
Praeger  Publishers.  1971).  124  pp. 

Non-Proliferation  Treaty:  Framework  for  Nuclear  Arms  Control  (Charlottesville, 

Va.  :  The  Mlchie  Company,  1969),  341  pp. 


II.  Some  Facts  About  Nuclear  Power 

The  discovery  that  useful  energy  could  be  obtained  from  uranium 
atoms  initially  attracted  more  academic  than  commercial  interest,  and 
the  first  Government  interest  in  its  use  was  for  naval  propulsion  rather 
than  commercial  application.4  This  discovery,  together  with  earlier 
speculations  that  the  enormous  energy  of  the  sun  also  originated  in  a 
different  nuclear  reaction,  laid  the  foundation  for  the  peaceful,  com- 
mercial use  of  nuclear  power,  and  for  employment  of  this  new  tech- 
nology as  an  element  of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 

Fission  and  Fusion :  Two  Sources  of  Nuclear  Energy 

The  two  basic  processes  for  the  release  of  nuclear  energy  are  fission 
and  fusion.  Fission  is  a  demonstrated  and  practical,  although  poten- 
tially dangerous,  source  of  energy.  Fusion  remains  to  be  demonstrated 
as  a  controlled  source  of  useful  energy,  although  its  proponents  expect 
that  this  capacity  will  be  achieved  before  the  end  of  this  century.5 

Fission  refers  to  the  splitting  apart,  or  fissioning,  of  atoms  of  ura- 
nium and  plutonium  accompanied  by  the  release  of  energy  and  the  pro- 
duction of  intensely  radioactive  wastes.  For  present  nuclear  tech- 
nology, the  nuclear  fuel  in  general  use  is  atoms  of  uranium  of  atomic 
weight  235,  or  the  U-235  isotope.  In  nature,  for  each  1,000  atoms  of 
uranium,  7  are  U-235  and  the  other  993  are  the  uranium  isotope  of 
weight  238  (U-238)  which  is  not  directly  useful  for  nuclear  fuel. 

Breeding,  or  the  Conversion  of  Useless  Atoms  into  Useful  Nuelear 
Fuel 

In  the  fission  process  in  a  working  nuclear  power  reactor,  some  atoms 
of  U-238  or  thorium  can  be  transformed  into  useful  nuclear  fuel, 
namely,  atoms  of  plutonium  and  U-233  respectively.  If  more  of  these 
'"fertile"  materials  are  transformed  into  nuelear  fuel  than  are  consumed 
by  the  reactor,  the  process  is  known  as  "breeding. "  Through  breeding 
it  is  possible,  in  principle, to  use  all  of  the  U-23S  and  thorium  in  nature 
as  a  nuclear  fuel.  As  a  practical  matter,  it  is  estimated  that  successful 
demonstration  of  breeder  technology  would  multiply  the  energy  re- 
coverable from  uranium  resources  at  least  fifty-fold,  would  virtually 
make  nuclear  power  independent  of  the  costs  of  mining  uranium  ores, 
and  would  add  the  nuclear  energy  of  world  thorium  deposits  to  world 
energy  reserves. 

Natural  and  Enriched  Uranium  as  Nucleai  Fuel 

In  some  types  of  nuclear  power  reactors,  the  uranium  obtained  from 
nature  can  be  used  as  a  fuel.  This  was  tin1  approach  favored  by  the 
I  nited  Kingdom  and  France  during  the  l!>50's  and  well  into  the  L960'& 


'The  lirst  U.S.  Government  Interest  was  at  the  Naval  Research  Laboratory  of  the 
Department  of  the  Navy  where  research  was  proposed  to  explore  the  potential  use  of 
nuclear  energy  fur  naval  propulsion, 

8  Details  about  tli«'  scientific  anil  technological  aspects  of  nuclear  power  are  available  in 
such  sources  as  Samuel  Glasstone's  two  definitive  imoks  :  Sourcebook  on  Atomic  Energy 
(New  York:  I)  Van  Nostrand  Company,  Inc.,  1967);  and  .\miinr  Reactor  Engineering 
(New  York  :  I >.  Van  Nostrand  Company,  inc.,  1963) 

(134) 


135 


The  natural  uranium  reactors  offered  the  advantage  that  a  country 
possessing  uranium  deposits  could  have  nuclear  power  without  having 
to  build  its  own  enrichment  facilities  or  obtain  enrichment  from 
abroad.  On  the  other  hand,  for  technical  reasons,  this  type  of  reactor 
is  larger  and  more  expensive  than  reactors  of  other  types.  To  get  the 
same  power  out  of  smaller,  less  expensive  reactors  it  is  necessary  to 
process  the  uranium  fuel  to  increase  the  relative  proportion  of  U-235 
atoms  from  the  0.7  percent  in  nature  to  perhaps  3  percent.  This  de- 
sired "enrichment"  can  be  obtained  by  several  processes.  The  process 
in  general  use  is  the  gaseous  diffusion  process  in  which  a  gaseous  form 
of  uranium — uranium  hexaHuoride — is  diffused  through  a  porous 
ceramic  barrier.  Each  time  the  gas  passes  through  such  a  barrier,  there 
is  a  slight  separation  of  the  lighter  U-235  atoms  from  the  heavier 
U-238  atoms.  Many  hundreds  of  diffusion  stages,  even  a  thousand  or 
more  for  a  large  plant,  are  needed  to  manufacture  material  sufficiently 
enriched  in  U-235  for  use  in  weapons.  Another  enrichment  process 
that  has  strong  proponents  today  is  the  gas  centrifuge  process.  Here 
the  uranium  hexaHuoride  is  whirled  rapidly  about  with  the  heavier 
atoms  being  forced  outward  by  centrifugal  force.  As  with  gaseous  dif- 
fusion, a  series  or  cascade  of  centrifuges  is  required,  for  the  separa- 
tion at  each  stage  is  slight.  Of  the  two  processes,  the  gaseous  diffusion 
process  requires  a  large  industrial  facility  and  a  large  supply  of  elec- 
tricity. In  principle,  centrifugal  separation,  if  it  is  demonstrated  to  be 
economically  feasible,  should  permit  building  of  smaller  plants  at  less 
capital  investment  and  with  less  demand  for  electricity. 

Because  enriched  uranium  has  been  available  in  the  United  States 
from  the  three  plants  that  were  built  to  make  materials  for  weapons 
and  for  naval  propulsion,  and  because  of  advantages  of  enriched 
uranium  as  fuel,  it  was  natural  for  the  infant  nuclear  industry  to 
apply  its  military  experience  with  enriched  uranium  to  commercial 
nuclear  power  plants.  As  a  result,  the  principal  path  of  evolution  for 
U.S.  nuclear  power  technology  has  been  the  use  of  slightly  enriched 
fuels.  Now,  at  the  outset  of  the  1970's,  this  technology  has  become 
dominant  for  much  of  commercial  nuclear  power  in  the  United  States, 
in  the  Soviet  bloc  nations,  and  in  Europe.  Even  in  the  United  Kingdom 
and  France  it  appeal's  that  many  future  nuclear  power  plants  are 
likely  to  use  enriched  fuels. 

Plutonium :  a  Manmade  Nuclear  Fuel 

Nuclear  power  reactors  fueled  with  natural  or  slightly  enriched 
uranium  also  produce  plutonium  as  a  byproduct.6  While  some  of  the 
plutonium  atoms  are  fissioned,  enough  remain  in  the  used  fuel  when  it 
is  removed  from  a  reactor  to  make  recovery  of  this  byproduct  nuclear 
fuel  economically  feasible.  The  recovered  plutonium  can  be  used  for 
weapons  or  as  fuel  for  other  nuclear  reactors.  This  dual  utility  of  plu- 
tonium is  troublesome  for  world  peace :  As  nuclear  power  grows,  so 
will  the  stocks  of  plutonium,  which  some  observers  fear  may  increase 
the  risk  of  theft  or  undetected  diversion  of  this  material  to  clandestine 
manufacture  of  nuclear  weapons.  Fortunately,  the  operation  of  a  nu- 
clear reactor  for  power  produces  a  mixture  of  plutonium  isotopes, 
plutonium-239  and  plutonium-240.  The  longer  uranium  fuel  is  ex- 

0  U-238  atoms  capture  neutrons  emitted  by  the  fissioning  U-235  atoms  and  are  trans- 
formed into  plutonium. 


136 


posed  to  the  fission  reaction,  the  higher  the  proportion  of  plutonium- 
240  (Pu-240).  The  more  Pu-240  is  present,  the  less  usetul  the  ma- 
terial is  for  weapons  because  it  makes  the  behavior  of  the  material  less 
controllable.  On  the  other  hand,  limiting  the  exposure  of  uranium 
fuel  in  a  power  reactor  limits  the  amount  of  plutonium-240  and  makes 
the  recovered  material  more  suitable  for  weapons. 

When  nuclear  power  reactors  are  operated  to  produce  the  cheapest 
electricity,  the  plutonium  they  produce  as  a  by-product  is  not  suitable 
for  very  efficient  nuclear  weapons  because  of  the  Pu-240  present. 
"Weapon  grade"  plutonium  should  contain  no  more  than  10  percent 
of  these  non-fissionable  isotopes  and  preferably  less.7 

One  way  in  which  nuclear  power  reactors  could  be  used  to  produce 
weapons  grade  plutonium  would  be  to  limit  the  time  the  fuel  spends 
in  the  reactor  to  a  few  weeks,  which  is  about  a  tenth  of  the  normal 
exposure  time  for  economic  nuclear  power.  However,  even  though  con- 
taminated with  up  to  30  percent  of  plutonium-240,  the  by-product 
plutonium  normally  produced  in  present  nuclear  power  reactors  would 
still  be  usable  as  the  explosive  material  for  primitive  but  still  effective 
nuclear  weapons.8 

When  the  breeder  reactors  favored  by  the  United  States  are  commer- 
cially deployed  during  the  1980's,  they  will  produce  more  plutonium 
than  the  nuclear  fuel  they  consume.  Use  of  this  technology  will  allow 
many  more  nations  to  become  self-sufficient  in  the  production  of  nu- 
clear fuel.  Any  nation  with  sufficient  deposits  of  natural  uranium  can 
then  achieve  a  nuclear  fuel  cycle  independent  of  other  nations  provided 
it  has  enough  enriched  uranium  or  plutonium  to  start  the  cycle.  From 
the  point  of  view  of  preventing  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons,  it 
should  be  noted  that  the  preferable  fuel  for  fast-breeders  will  be  the 
same  as  that  for  efficient  nuclear  weapons,  namely,  plutonium  con- 
taining little  of  the  isotope  plutonium-240.  The  problem  of  preventing 
the  diversion  of  fissionable  material  seems  likely  to  become  more  dif- 
ficult as  fast-breeder  reactors  come  into  widespread  commercial  use.9 

Commercial  Nuclear  Power 

The  large-scale  generation  of  electricity  from  steam-electric  power 
plants  requires  access  to  an  industrial  base  that  can  supply  the  furnaces, 
boilers,  turbines,  generators,  switchgear,  and  other  electrical  apparatus. 
Additionally,  it  requires  access  to  transportation  facilities  to  move 
huge  amounts  of  fossil  fuels — coal,  oil,  and  natural  gas.  To  introduce 
commercial  nuclear  power  requires  access  to  industries  that  can  design, 
manufacture,  install,  and  service  the  components  of  nuclear  power 
reactors,  fabricate  and  reprocess  uranium  fuels,  and  indefinitely  store 
the  residual  radioactive  wastes.  Of  these  industrial  capabilities,  prob- 
ably the  most  unusual  are  those  for  enriching  uranium  and  for  reproc- 
essing used  nuclear  fuels.  The  other  facilities  are  not  greatly  different 
from  those  to  be  found  in  an  industrialized  country. 

The  enrichment  plants  that  have  been  built  to  date  by  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet    Union  are  verv   large   industrial   installations 


i  Stockho'm   International    Pence   Research   Institute.    World    Armaments  and   Disarma- 
ment: 8IPR1  Yearbook  t:>: l  (New  fork:  Humanities  Press,  1972),  p.  366. 
-  Loc,  -it. 
0  ll.i.l  .  p.  290. 


137 


representing  capital  investment  thought  to  be  beyond  the  resources  of 
most  countries.  The  United  Kingdom  and  France  have  small  enrich- 
ment plants  which  were  built  to  make  highly  enriched  uranium-235 
for  weapons,  but  these  are  not  large  enough  to  supply  fuel  for 
commercial  nuclear  power.  Enrichment  plants  now  in  operation  use  a 
process  known  as  ''gaseous  diffusion"  and  sometimes  are  referred  to  as 
gaseous  diffusion  plants.  Recently  there  has  been  revived  European 
interest  in  the  gas  centrifuge,  and  work  is  in  progress  to  demonstrate 
the  feasibility  of  this  process  as  an  alternative  to  gaseous  diffusion  for 
the  manufacture  of  enriched  uranium. 

Fuel  reprocessing  plants  are  unusual  industrial  facilities.  They  must 
be  designed,  built,  and  operated  to  process  intensely  radioactive  mate- 
rials. Because  the  required  equipment,  processes,  and  personnel  are  not 
readily  available  from  other  industries,  the  construction  and  operation 
of  a  fuel  reprocessing  plant  is  costly  and  does  not  offer  possibilities  of 
conversion  to  other  uses  if  the  markets  for  fuel  reprocessing  should  not 
meet  expectations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  scale  of  financial  and  indus- 
trial effort  should  be  within  the  capability  of  most  industrial  countries. 

An  undesired  and  troublesome  waste  from  fuel  reprocessing  is  the 
radioactive  materials  produced  when  uranium  or  plutonium  atoms  are 
fissioned.  The  radioactivity  of  these  wastes  decreases  slowly,  and  the 
wastes  remain  dangerous  for  centuries.  While  proponents  of  nuclear 
power  assert  that  these  wastes  can  be  made  inert  and  be  safely  stored 
for  many  years,  some  critics  fear  their  ultimate  release  to  the  environ- 
ment with  disastrous  results.  After  some  25  years  of  research  and 
development  for  nuclear  power,  the  United  States  has  yet  to  demon- 
strate on  a  working  scale  the  technology  for  the  indefinite  storage  of 
these  wastes. 

At  present,  only  a  few  industrialized  countries  now  have  the  indus- 
trial capabilities  to  supply  all  the  special  materials,  products,  and 
services  for  commercial  nuclear  power.  But  many  countries  are  plan- 
ning to  build  their  own  fuel  fabricating  and  fuel  reprocessing  plants 
to  service  their  nuclear  power  plants.  The  International  Atomic  En- 
ergy Agency  expects  that  by  the  late  1970 's  several  additional  countries 
will  possess  the  industrial  base  necessary  for  nuclear  power.  At  pres- 
ent these  countries  are  limited  to  Canada,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  the 
United  Kingdom,  the  United  States,  West  Germany,  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  But  of  these  only  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
a  large-scale  capability  to  produce  enriched  uranium  for  nuclear  fuel. 
The  Japanese  are  exploring  with  the  United  States  and  France  the 
possibilities  of  some  form  of  joint  international  enrichment  project, 
while  the  French  also  have  been  seeking  partners  to  build  an  inter- 
national enrichment  facility  in  Europe. 

The  Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle 

From  the  preceding  notes  on  vital  aspects  of  nuclear  energy,  it  is 
apparent  that  the  construction  and  operation  of  nuclear  power  plants, 
in  contrast  to  conventional  hydro  or  steam  electric  power  plants  that 
burn  oil,  coal,  or  natural  gas,  is  only  one  step  in  a  long  and  complex 
sequence  of  technological  activities  that  are  necessary  for  the  genera- 


138 


THE  NUCLEAR  FUEL  CYCLE 


URANIUM  MINES 
1  MILLS 


CONVERSION 

TO  UF6 


RECOVERED 
URANIUM 


ENRICHING 


CONVERSION 
TO  FUEL 


REP10CESSIN6 


WASTE  STORAGE       - 


BY-PROMCTS 


J 


Figure  1 

tion  of  nuclear  power.  The  entire  sequence  is  called  the  nuclear  fuel 
cycle  and  is  illustrated  in  Figure  I.  In  summary,  the  major  parts  of 
the  nuclear  fuel  cycle  are  as  follows : 

(1)  Mining  and  milling  of  uranium ; 

(2)  Refining  of  uranium  and  conversion  to  uranium  hexafluo- 
ride; 

(3)  Enrichment  of  uranium ; 

(4)  Conversion  of  enriched  uranium  into  fuel  material ; 

(5)  Fabrication  of  fuel  elements  for  the  nuclear  power  re- 
actors ; 

(6)  Use  of  the  fuel  elements  in  working  nuclear  power  plants; 

(7)  Reprocessing  of  spent  fuel  to  recover  useful  nuclear  fuel 
materials;  and 

(8)  Perpetual  storage  of  intensely  radioactive  waste's  from  the 
fission  process. 

Fusion  Power:  an  Expectation  Yet  to  be  Fulfilled 

In  the  fusion  process,  atoms  of  light  elements,  primarily  hydrogen, 
are  fused  together  with  a  resultant  release  of  energy.  The  uncon- 
trolled fusion  process  is  the  basis  for  the  hydrogen  bomb  which  has 
so  revolutionized  foreign  relations  and  national  security  in  the  20th 
century.  If  a  controlled  fusion  process  could  be  achieved  and  demon- 
strated to  be  technologically  and  economically  feasible  for  generation 
of  elect  licit  v.  the  world  would  have  a  literally  inexhaustible  supply  of 
energy.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  United  States,  the  Soviet  Union, 
and  many  other  countries  are  engaged  in  fusion,  or  "controlled  ther- 
monuclear," research. 

As  ;in  environmental  benefit,  fusion  would  not  produce  the  enormous 
amounts  of  radioactive  wastes  characteristic  of  lission,  and  could  offer 


139 


the  prospect  of  more  efficient  conversion  of  energy  into  electricity ;  a 
fusion  powerplant  would  discharge  less  waste  heat  to  the  environ- 
ment than  its  fission  counterpart,  thus  easing  problems  of  thermal 
pollution. 

At  least  three  major  technical  obstacles  stand  in  the  way  of  a  demon- 
stration of  a  workable  controlled  fusion  reaction.  Optimists  expect 
these  can  be  overcome  within  the  next  few  decades.  On  the  other  hand, 
until  a  demonstration  is  actually  achieved,  national  energy  policies 
cannot  assume  that  fusion  will  in  fact  be  available  to  supply  energy 
needs  of  the  21st  century. 

Safeguards :  Ways  to  Assure  Discovery  of  Unauthorized  Diversion  of 
Fissionable  Materials 

The  nuclear  age  brought  a  new  meaning  to  the  word  "safeguards" 
in  international  relations.  Safeguards  are  measures  to  guard  against 
the  diversion  of  nuclear  fuel  material  from  uses  permitted  by  law  or 
international  agreement  and  to  give  timely  indication  of  possible  diver- 
sion or  assurance  that  diversion  has  not  occurred.10  Safeguards  are  a 
means  of  detecting  but  not  preventing  diversion. 

Diversion  of  plutonium  produced  in  nuclear  power  plants  is  con- 
sidered to  be  the  chief  danger  to  national  security  from  commercial 
nuclear  power.  A  fundamental  goal  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  is  to  dis- 
courage nations  which  now  lack  nuclear  weapons  from  building  fa- 
cilities to  produce  nuclear  materials  to  make  weapons.  The  expected 
installation  of  nuclear  power  plants  in  many  of  these  countries  will 
make  available  large  amounts  of  plutonium  with  an  attendant  risk 
of  diversion.  The  Internationa]  Atomic  Energy  Agency  estimates  that 
by  1980  the  daily  accretion  to  the  world's  stock  of  nuclear  fuel  mate- 
rials will  be  sufficient  to  manufacture  10  nuclear  weapons  a  day.11 

Some  observers  expect  that  from  300,000  to  450,000  kilograms  of 
plutonium  will  be  accumulated  by  1980  in  civil  nuclear  power  pro- 
grams throughout  the  world.12  As  for  slightly  enriched  uranium,  while 
it  cannot  be  used  directly  in  weapons,  it  could  be  further  processed  to 
increase  its  enrichment  to  weapons  grade. 

Fortunately  for  international  security,  the  plutonium  produced  in 
commercial  operation  of  nuclear  power  plants  is  not  ideal  for  use  in 
weapons.  Nonetheless,  it  would  be  possible  in  principle  to  operate 
some  nuclear  power  plants  to  produce  plutonium  better  suited  for 
weapons  materials.  "With  present  nuclear  technology,  this  action  would 
require  the  plants  involved  to  be  shut  down  frequently,  which  would 
be  a  conspicuous  signal  of  suspicious  behavior. 

All  safeguards  systems  depend  upon  two  elements:  (1)  the  main- 
tenance and  review  of  records  showing  the  receipt,  production,  con- 
sumption, transfer,  and  storage  of  nuclear  materials:  and  (2)  the 
undertaking  of  on-site  inspections  to  determine  the  validity  of  these 
records.  Physical  inspection  is  necessary-  to  verify  the  amount  of  safe- 
guarded materials  actually  on  hand.  An  inspector  must  have  access 
to  the  materials  to  take  measurements  and,  in  some  cases,  take  samples 
for  analvsis. 


10  The  Department  of  State  used  this  definition  in  :  U.S.  Congress.  Senate,  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  Hearings,  Xonprolifcratinn  Treat;/.  90th  Cong.  2d  Sess.,  196S,  p.  50. 

11  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  IAEA  Safeguards,  (circa  1968)  p.  7. 

12  Mason  Willrich.  "The  Nature  of  the  Problem,"  in  Mason  Willrieh.  ed.,   Civil  Nuclear 
Power  and  International  Security  (New  York  :  Praeger  Publishers,  19T1),  p.  3. 


140 


Some  Lim  itations  of  Safeguards 

Control  of  nuclear  materials,  both  because  of  their  monetary  value 
and  for  their  utility  to  make  nuclear  weapons,  would  seem  to  require  a 
combination  of  accounting  and  physical  controls  and  protection.  This 
double  control  is  not  now  in  practice.  Safeguards  systems  do  not 
extend  to  physical  protection  against  theft  or  diversion,  but  are 
designed  only  to  detect  such  theft  or  diversion.  The  hope  for  safe- 
guards is  that  their  detection  capability  will  deter  a  would-be  diverter 
by  his  risk  of  early  detection  and  unmasking  in  the  world  community. 
This  limitation  of  safeguards  has  important  consequences.  It  means 
that  assuring  the  physical  security  of  nuclear  materials  is  a  separate 
responsibility  of  the  possessing  nation. 

A  second  limitation  of  safeguards  is  technical  and  statistical.  Ex- 
perience indicates  that  large  users  and  producers  of  nuclear  materials 
can  never  know  precisely  how  much  materials  they  have ;  there  can  be 
no  assurance  of  the  detection  of  every  slight  diversion.  Unavoidable 
process  losses  and  statistical  errors  in  sampling  and  measurement  set 
limits  on  accuracy.  These  limitations  do  not  mean  that  safeguards 
cannot  achieve  a  high  level  of  effectiveness.  They  do  mean  that  some 
margin  of  error  is  inescapable  which  might  mask  some  small  diver- 
sions. The  diversion  of  substantial  amounts  of  plutonium  or  highly  en- 
riched uranium-235  would  probably  be  detected,  but  there  remains  the 
nagging  possibility  that  enough  materials  might  be  diverted  without 
detection  to  make  a  few  nuclear  weapons.  The  possession  of  a  few  illicit 
weapons  by  a  smaller  nation,  or  possibly  a  non-national  organization 
which  might  obtain  the  nuclear  materials  on  a  nuclear  black  market,  is 
a  real  disadvantage  of  nuclear  power  to  be  weighed  when  considering 
the  balance  of  cost  and  benefit  from  a  policy  of  promoting  its  world 
use.  Moreover,  the  higher  the  rate  at  which  atomic  fuel  is  used,  re- 
processed, and  increased  by  breeding,  the  larger  will  be  the  margin 
of  uncertainty  attributable  to  statistical  error  and  the  greater  the 
chance  of  undetected  diversion. 


III.  From  Hiroshima  to  Atoms  for  Peace:  Postwar  Trends  in 
Regional  Multinational  Cooperation  in  Europe 

Nuclear  power  is  capable  of  both  military  and  peaceful  applica- 
tions. While  the  first  research  aimed  at  application  of  nuclear  power 
was  for  ship  propulsion,  the  first  actual  application  was  a  bomb.  It 
was  the  latter  use  that  colored  the  impact  of  the  atom  upon  U.S. 
diplomacy  for  the  later  1940's  and  well  into  the  1950's. 

The  first  postwar  impact  of  nuclear  power  upon  American 
diplomacy  was  evident  in  the  unsuccessful  struggle  of  diplomats  to 
achieve  international  control  of  atomic  energy  through  the  United 
Nations  and  the  U.N.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  As  the  effort  failed, 
the  diplomats  had  to  grapple  with  the  implications  of  possession  of 
atomic  bombs  by  the  Soviet  Union.  And  even  as  diplomacy  was  learn- 
ing to  accommodate  to  the  military  implications  of  atomic  energy, 
scientists  and  engineers  were  adding  a  new  factor  as  their  research 
and  development  led  to  the  expectation  of  early  commercial  use  of 
nuclear  power.  By  the  early  1950's  this  optimism  began  to  affect  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  United  States,  as  its  diplomats  and  scientists 
undertook  initiatives  that  ultimately  led  to  the  creation  of  two  regional, 
multinational  organizations  to  coordinate  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear 
energy,  a  military  alliance  for  its  military  use,  a  worldwide  interna- 
tional atomic  energy  organization,  a  network  of  bilateral  agreements 
by  the  United  States  with  other  countries  for  technical  assistance 
with  nuclear  energy,  and  a  treaty  to  prevent  proliferation  of  new 
national  capabilities  to  manufacture  nuclear  weapons.  These  develop- 
ments evidence  the  impact  of  the  discovery  of  fission  upon  American 
diplomacy. 

In  addressing  the  interaction  between  American  diplomacy  and 
programs  to  foster  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe,  this  study 
gives  limited  attention  to  the  role  of  the  United  Kingdom.  While  the 
British  were  a  principal  partner  of  the  United  States  in  the  wartime 
development  of  the  atomic  bomb,  this  special  relationship  was  dis- 
solved by  the  restrictions  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946.  There- 
after the  United  Kingdom's  government  moved  vigorously  to  estab- 
lish a  civil  nuclear  power  program  both  to  supply  energy  for  domestic 
use  and  in  hopes  of  increasing  future  export  trade.  This  they  did 
independently  of  the  United  States  and  also  of  the  nations  that  were 
later  to  form  the  European  Common  Market.  The  British  tradition 
of  separation  from  and  independence  of  Europe  has  persisted  until 
recently.  Clearly  the  separation  efforts  of  the  British  caused  diplo- 
matic interactions  between  the  governments  of  the  United  Kingdom 
and  the  United  States.  However,  an  analysis  of  these  interactions  is 
not  within  the  scope  of  this  study. 

An  Initial  Prohibition  of  International  Cooperation 

To  maintain  nuclear  secrecy,  Congress,  in  the  Atomic  Energy  Act 
of  1946,13  terminated  nuclear  collaboration  with  the  wartime  allies 


13  Public  Law  79-585,  60  Stat.  755. 

(141) 


142 


of  the  United  States.  The  Act  stipulated  that  until  Congress  should 
declare  by  joint  resolution  that  effective  and  enforceable  international 
safeguards  against  the  use  of  atomic  energy  for  destructive  purposes 
had  been  established,  there  could  be  no  exchange  of  information  with 
other  nations  for  the  use  of  atomic  energy  for  industrial  purposes. 
Xo  such  joint  resolution  has  ever  been  introduced. 

As  the  cold  war  intensified,  the  United  States  began  to  favor  the 
sharing  of  some  nuclear  information  to  strengthen  its  NATO  allies. 
To  this  end,  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946  was  amended  in  1951  14 
to  authorize  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission  (AEC)  under  cer- 
tain conditions  to  enter  into  arrangements  with  allies  of  the  United 
States  to  give  them  certain  nuclear  information.15 

In  congressional  debate  on  this  amendment  many  Members  indi- 
cated their  belief  that  such  nuclear  cooperation  should  be  entered  into 
only  for  reasons  so  compelling  as  to  overbalance  the  preference  for 
secrecy  of  the  original  legislation.  Clearly,  the  1951  amendment  was 
intended  to  strengthen  military  alliances  rather  than  to  foster  commer- 
cial use  of  nuclear  energy  in  Europe. 

The  restrictions  of  the  194G  atomic  energy  legislation  upon  U.S. 
technical  cooperation  with  other  nations  are  notable  for  attitudes  they 
represent.  During  the  war  years,  close  collaboration  of  scientists  and 
engineers  of  the  allies  had  produced  the  atom  bomb  within  the  short 
span  of  six  years  from  the  initial  observation  of  fission  in  uranium. 
Once  atomic  energy  had  entered  the  arena  of  international  relations 
the  attitude  changed  from  cooperation  to  secrecy.  One  early  task  of 
U.S.  diplomacy  was  to  reconcile  the  nuclear  interests  of  U.S.  allies 
with  this  legislative  constraint  upon  international  cooperation  and 
communication  of  information  for  nuclear  energy. 

Initial  Pessim  ism  To  travel  Nuclear  Power 

Early  postwar  preoccupation  with  military  use  of  nuclear  energy 
and  initial  pessimism  as  to  the  commercial  utility  of  nuclear  power 
concentrated  the  impact  of  atomic  energy  upon  American  diplomacy. 
With  the  rapid  expansion  of  the  U.S.  nuclear  arsenal,  particularly 
after  perfection  of  the  hydrogen  bomb,  U.S.  diplomats  for  many  years 
operated  from  a  unique  position  of  strength  that  offset  the  rapid  post- 
war reduction  of  the  Nation's  armed  forces. 

That  commercial  nuclear  power  would  soon  be  feasible  seemed  un- 
likely in  the  late  1940's.  A  leading  theoretician  of  nuclear  power,  Dr. 
Walter  Zinn,  in  draft  ing  the  firsl  program  for  nuclear  power  in  1947. 
called  attention  to  the  shortage  of  nuclear  fuel.  Existing  stocks  of 
uranium  ores  were  judged  scarcely  large  enough  to  sustain  produc- 
tion of  a  modes!  number  of  weapons,  but  inadequate  to  supply  fuel 
for  future  nuclear  power  plants.  Zinn  concluded  that  the  only  hope 
for  nuclear  power  lay  in  successful  perfection  of  the  breeder.  Trans- 


"  Public  Law  82  235,  05  Stat.  692. 

u The  Act  amended  Section  10. (a)  (3)  it  required  unanimous  action  by  the  five  ('mn- 
ioners  on  such  an  agreement  and  provided  further  that  certain  Information  about 
weapons  nut  be  communicated  ;  thai  no  such  arrangement  be  entered  into  with  any 
nation  "threatening  the  sccuritj  of  the  United  States";  thai  the  data  involved  ".  .  .  shall 
he  limited  ami  circumscribed  i"  the  maximum  degree  consistent  with  the  common  defense 
ami  Miu ri t y  .  .  ." ;  thai  the  Presidenl  gel  written  recommendations  of  the  National 
Security  Council  ami  incorporate  these  in  a  determination  that  the  arrangement  would 
".  .  .  substantial]}  promote  ami  would  not  endanger  tin'  common  defense  ami  security  of 
the  United  States   .   .  ami  that   before  tin'  arrangement    was  consummated,   the  Joint 

Committi  i'  "a  Atomic  Energj  should  be  Informed  ami  thirtj  days  pass. 


143 


luting  the  breeder  concept  into  practice  appeared  to  be  extremely 
difficult  and  in  1947  the  chances  for  successful  breeding  were  said  to 
be  marginal  at  best.10 

The  General  Advisory  Committee17  shared  Zinn's  pessimism.  On 
November  23,  11)47,  the  committee  expressed  doubt  that  it  would  be 
possible  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances  for  any  considerable 
portion  of  the  power  supply  of  the  world  to  be  replaced  by  nuclear 
fuel  within  20  years.18 

Subsequent  history  confirmed  their  observation.  Even  by  the  early 
1970s,  nuclear  power  accounts  for  only  a  small  percentage  of  electrical 
power  generation  in  the  United  States  and  of  the  world.  However,  by 
the  1990s  it  is  expected  to  supply  half  of  the  electricity  needs  of  the 
United  States  and  a  quarter  of  U.S.  total  energy  needs. 

Changing  Technology  mid  Diplomacy 

During  the  late  1940's  and  early  1950's  diplomats  struggled  toward 
international  control  of  atomic  energy.  Efforts  of  the  United  Nations 
Atomic  Energy  Commission  resulted  in  diplomatic  frustration.  Mean- 
while, scientists  and  engineers  were  progressing  toward  commercial 
nuclear  power,  and  the  initial  pessimism  about  commercial  nuclear 
power  shifted  to  optimism,  an  optimism  that  was  soon  to  affect  Amer- 
ican diplomacy.  For  example,  in  June  1952  a  Canadian  leader  in 
nuclear  energy,  J.  Lome  Gray  of  Atomic  Energy  of  Canada,  Ltd., 
said : 19 

We  are  convinced,  even  with  our  present  incomplete  knowledge  of  this  tech- 
nology, that  fission  of  natural  uranium  will  produce  energy  that  can  and  will 
compete  economically  with  coal  or  oil.  We  are  thinking  at  this  stage  of  quite  large 
control  power  stations. 

A  few  months  later,  AEC  Commissioner  Eugene  M.  Zuckert 
wrote : 20 

Study  of  the  development  of  atomic  energy  from  1942  leads  me  to  feel  that  the 
strides  the  engineers  and  scientists  are  making  are  so  great  that  "power  only" 
reactors  may  be  nearer  than  we  dare  hope  for,  even  though  we  are  still  in  the 
early  phases  of  research  and  development. 

By  December  1952,  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  had 
concluded  that  atomic  power  for  industrial  purposes  was  technically 
feasible,  and  that  the  only  problem  was  its  cost.21 

Interest  in  International  Collaboration 

If  this  optimism  was  to  be  justified,  prototype  nuclear  power  plants 
had  to  be  designed,  built,  and  put  into  operation  to  provide  engineering 
and  operating  experience  for  the  nuclear  industries  and  the  electric 
utilities.  The  AEC  wished  to  get  on  with  this  demonstration,  but 
its  nuclear  power  program  became  caught  up  in  the  controversy  of 
public  versus  private  generation  of  electricity.  One  pragmatic  solution 
was  to  build  demonstration  plants  overseas.  Arranging  such  demon- 


16  Richard  G.  Hewlett  and  Francis  Duncan.  Atomic  Shield,  1947/1952  (University  Park, 
Pa.  :  The  Pennsylvania  State  University  Press.  1969).  p.  29. 

17  The  General  Advisory  Committee  to  the  USAEC  was  created  by  the  Atomic  Energy 
Act  of  1946  and  for  almost  a  decade  had  a  powerful  influence  within  the  Commission. 

18  Hewlett  and  Duncan,  op.  cit..  p.  116. 

19  U.S.  Congress.  Joint  Committee  on  .Atomic  Energy.  Atomic  Poirer  anil  Private  Enter- 
prise, 82nd  Cong..  2d  Hess..  December  1952    (Joint  Committee  print),  p.  3. 

20  Loc.  cit.  Reference  to  "power  only''  reactors  is  important,  for  previously  many 
observers  hwl  argued  that  at  best  nuclear  power  could  be  economically  competitive  only  as  a 
byproduct  from  manufacture  of  plutonium  for  bombs. 

=l  Loc.  cit. 

96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  11 


144 


strations  became  the  task  of  the  diplomats.  The  AEC  supported  the 
idea  of  building  demonstration  plants  abroad.  In  1952,  AEC  Com- 
missioner T.  Keith  Glennan  forecast  an  increasing  demand  abroad 
for  nuclear  power:  "This  demand  naturally  will  arise  first  where 
present  costs  of  electrical  energy  are  high  and  this  suggests  that  such 
a  program  may  have  an  important  place  in  a  future  Point  Four  pro- 
gram," J2  Europe  was  a  likely  location  because  it  needed  electricity  and 
costs  of  European  electricity  were  higher  than  in  the  United  States. 
thus  setting  an  easier  economic  goal  for  the  designers  and  engineers. 
AEC  Commissioner  Henry  D.  Smyth  endorsed  the  idea  that  the 
nuclear  power  stations  might  be  built  abroad  with  U.S.  financial  help 
through  Point  Four  funds.  He  too  pointed  out  that  since  power  pro- 
duction in  the  United  States  was  much  cheaper  than  in  other  countries, 
the  economic  incentive  for  nuclear  power  would  be  greater  abroad. 

By  the  early  1950's  nuclear  power  had  begun  to  attract  the  interest  of 
the  makers  and  executors  of  foreign  policy.  Still  it  remained  of  limited 
import  as  the  governments  and  diplomatic  services  of  the  United 
States  and  its  allies  struggled  to  assure  the  survival  of  a  free  Western 
Europe.  The  experience  then  with  a  massive  outpouring  of  U.S.  fi- 
nancial and  technical  aid  through  multinational  organizations  was  to 
point  the  way  for  later  multinational  ventures  in  nuclear  power. 

The  Evolving  Scene:  191^5-1953 

Eight  years  elapsed  between  the  end  of  fighting  in  Europe  and 
President  Eisenhower's  Atoms  for  Peace  plan  of  195)1  The  events  and 
trends  of  these  years  generated  pressures  upon  the  United  States  to 
take  new  diplomatic  initiatives.  One  initiative  was  the  President's  plan 
to  foster  the  peaceful  use  of  nuclear  energy  throughout  the  world  by 
means  which  included  construction  and  operation  of  demonstration 
nuclear  power  plants  in  Europe. 

These  8  years  saw  the  initial  recovery  of  Europe,  the  start  of 
the  cold  war.  the  onset  of  economic  stagnation  in  Europe,  the  mount- 
ing of  the  Marshall  plan  and  the  related  establishment  of  the  Or- 
ganisation for  European  Economic  Co-operation  (OEEC),  creation 
of  the  .North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO),  the  Korean 
"War.  U.S.  pronouncement  of  the  doctrine  of  massive  retaliation,  and 
the  formation  of  two  multinational  European  organizations  for  eco- 
nomic cooperation.23 

I  UK    POSTWAR    STRUGGLE 

Fighting  ended  in  Europe  on  May  5,  L945.  The  enormous  devasta- 
tion on  the  continent  and  in  the  British  Isles  made  survival  and 
restoral  ion  of  commerce  and  industry  the  imperatives  of  the  day.  Yet 
despite  this  devastation,  the  United  Nations  Economic  Commission 
for  Europe  estimated  that  Western  Europe  had  by  1946  regained  its 
prewar  levels  of  industrial  production.  Unfortunately,  the  extremely 
harsh  winter  of  1946  17  impeded  this  initial  recovery,  which  came  to 
a  halt  altofrtherin  L947. 


-Ihi.l  .  p.  25 

M  While  an  examination  <>r  r.s  Soviet  relations  In  Europe  lies  outside  the  scop.'  of  this 
paper,  there  were  i"  be  interactions  between  these  power  blocs  with  respeel  ii>  nuclear 
power,  for  background  on  the  general  relations,  the  reader  may  wish  to  consult  Thomas 
\Volfe,  Soviet  Power  and  Europe:  1915  t970  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press, 
L970). 


145 


With  the  cessation  of  hostilities  in  Europe  and  the  elimination  of 
the  Nazi  threat,  the  Soviet  Union  gave  priority  to  its  historical  strug- 
gle  with  the  capitalist  world,  the  leading  member  of  which  was  the 
United  States.  By  1047.  Eastern  Europe  was  under  full  Soviet  domi- 
nation :  the  Soviet  Union's  subsequent  refusal  to  accept  Marshall  plan 
aid  for  herself  and  her  satellites  decisively  ended  the  wartime  alliance 
and  there  began  the  period  known  as  the  cold  war.  The  subsequent 
struggle  short  of  war  pervaded  all  sectors  of  society  in  both  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  including  the  scientific  and  technical 
communities,  as  the  two  opponents  attempted  to  prove  the  superiority 
of  their  respective  systems. 

The  Soviet  threat  to  Western  Europe,  together  with  the  threat  of 
economic  breakdown  and  resulting  political  instability,  led  to  Presi- 
dent Truman's  initiatives  of  the  Marshall  plan  and  the  Truman 
doctrine.  These  moves  were  deemed  necessary  because  conditions  in 
Western  Europe  presented  a  power  vacuum  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union.  The  United  States  feared  that  Soviet  forces 
would  enter  Western  Europe,  especially  through  Germany,  where  they 
already  had  a  foothold.  Consequently,  U.S.  diplomatic  objectives 
were  aimed  at  strengthening  Western  Europe  politically  and  eco- 
nomically until  this  power  vacuum  could  be  filled. 

THE   MARSHALL   PLAN 

The  concepts  of  the  Marshall  plan  were  announced  by  Secretary 
of  State  George  C.  Marshall  on  June  5,  1947.  The  basic  principle  of 
American  foreign  policy  was  to  foster  closer  collaboration  among 
European  nations.  Further  help  from  the  United  States  therefore 
should  be  given  only  after  these  nations  had  agreed  together  upon 
their  basic  needs  and  had  organized  to  make  effective  use  of  aid  from 
the  United  States.  Such  aid  was  in  the  U.S.  national  interest,  said 
Secretary  Marshall,  because  the  modern  system  of  industrial  division 
of  labor  in  Europe  was  in  danger  of  breaking  down  with  a  consequent 
demoralizing  effect  on  the  world,  the  generation  of  disturbances,  and 
undesirable  consequences  for  the  U.S.  economy. 

The  Marshal]  plan  continued  in  operation  until  1951.  In  addition 
to  the  financial  support  it  provided,  the  plan  also  stimulated  European 
nations  to  organize  for  economic  development  through  the  Organisa- 
tion for  European  Economic  Co-operation.  By  the  end  of  this  remark- 
able venture  in  international  aid.  the  industrial  outputs  of  the  United 
Kingdom.  West  Germany.  France,  and  other  nations  of  Western 
Europe  had  increased  substantially  over  the  levels  of  1947,  ranging 
from  an  increase  of  35  percent  for  the  United  Kingdom  to  334  per- 
cent for  West  Germany. 

THE    TRUMAN    DOCTRINE 

On  November  17.  1947,  President  Truman  announced  to  a  joint  ses- 
sion of  Congress  that  he  would  propose  a  long-range  European  re- 
covery program  to  support  the  freedom-loving  countries  of  West- 
ern Europe  in  their  endeavors  to  remain  free.  A  few  weeks  later  in 
his  foreign  aid  message  of  December  19.  1947.  the  President  proposed 
major  U.S.  aid  to  Europe,  coupling  this  with  the  Marshal  plan  con- 


146 


cept  of  European  joint  action  and  also  to  the  national  interests  of  the 
United  States. 

Unification  in  Europe 

Alter  the  crisis  of  initial  survival  had  passed,  the  remaining 
problems  facing  the  governments  of  Western  Europe  were  three- 
fold : 

(1)  To  develop  an  effective  system  of  collective  security; 

(2)  To  sustain  economic  stability ;  and 

( :; )  To  foster  further  industrial  development, 
U.S.  foreign  policy  toward  European  recovery  received  another, 
largely  unanticipated,  technological  shock  in  1949  when  the  Soviet 
Union  detonated  its  first  atomic  explosive.  Four  years  later  the 
U.S.S.R.  tested  its  first  hydrogen  bomb.24  As  the  Soviet  Union  began 
to  acquire  a  nuclear  arsenal,  the  nations  of  Western  Europe,  saw  rea- 
son to  seek  unity  in  their  future  dealings  with  the  Soviet  bloc.  A  uni- 
fied or  federated  Western  Europe  also  might  hope  to  emerge  as  an 
independent  global  power,  capable  of  exercising  substantia]  influ- 
ence in  world  affairs  independently  of  the  United  States  or  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  European  approach  to  unity  featured  the  creation  of  three 
international  communities:  a  coal  and  steel  community,  a  common 
market,  and  a  nuclear  power  community. 

The  European  Coal  mid  Steel  Com  in  mi  ity 

A  major  step  toward  the  goal  of  European  unity  was  taken  when 
West  Germany,  France.  Italy,  and  the  Benelux  countries  (  Belgium, 
Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands)  ratified  the  Treaty  of  Paris  on 
July  25,  L952,  and  brought  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community 
(  EUSC)  into  force  as  an  independent  multinational  organization.  The 
treaty  required  that  the  six  members  remove  all  tariff  and  other  bar- 
riers to  the  free  movement  of  coal,  iron  ore,  and  steel  within  two  years, 
and  abolish  all  discrimination  against  imports  from  other  members. 
Max  Beloff  of  the  Brookings  Institution  sees  the  importance  of  this 
multinational  organization  in  the  impetus  it  gave  to  Western  Euro- 
pean cooperation  and  integration  in  political  and  defense  matters.25 

Tin-  Euro/"  mi  Economic  Community 

Within  a  few  years  the  example  of  the  Coal  and  Steel  Community 
led  to  the  formation  of  two  additional  communities:  a  European  com- 
mon market .  and  an  atomic  energx  community. 

The  starting  point  for  these  ventures  was  a  conference  of  the  for- 
eign ministers  of  the  ECSC  nations  at  Messina  in  June  1955,  shortly 
before  the  opening  of  the  United  Nation's  first  international  confer- 
ence on  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy.  Two  years  later  the  Treaty 
of  Rome  was  signed,  on  March  25,  L957,  establishing  the  European 
Economic  Community  (EEC),  commonly  known  as  the  Common 
Market.  The  treaty  came  into  force  on  January  1.  l!>f>8. 

The  aims  of  the  Common  Market  are  to  promote  a  harmonious 
development  of  economic  activity  and  cooperation  among  its  members 
through  gradual  elimination  of  financial  and  physical  restrictions  on 
the  free  movement  of  goods,  capital,  and  workers  among  member 
countries:  the  harmonization  of  economic  policies;  and  the  consolida 

«  December  R,  1953 

!»M:i\    Beloff,    77"    United   States   <m<!   th<    Unity   of   Europe    (Washington,   D.C. :    The 

Brook i n gs  Institution.  1963),  p.  »'■  1 


147 


tion  of  a  single  external  tariff.  By  the  close  of  1961,  internal  tariffs 
among  members  had  been  reduced  by  40  percent  on  industrial  goods 
and  by  30  percent  on  farm  products.  Quotas  on  industrial  goods  had 
been  abolished,  and  the  EEC  was  working  toward  a  common  external 
tariff  intended  to  be  20  percent  below  the  average  of  The  national 
tariffs.  Complete  internal  free  trade  was  to  be  established  on  July  1, 
1907.  Quotas  on  trade  were  removed  and  national  tariffs  toward  non- 
member  countries  were  aligned  toward  the  common  external  tariff, 
effective  July  1968. 

The  second  community  originating  at  the  Messina  conference  was 
the  European  Atomic  Community  (Euratom).  This  multinational 
supranational  organization  of  six  nations  to  foster  use  of  nuclear 
energy  is  treated  in  detail  in  sections  VII  and  VIII. 

COMMON    ORGANS    OF   THE    EUROPEAN    COMMUNITIES 

The  parallel  membership  and  organization  of  the  Coal  and  Steel 
Community,  the  Economic  Community,  and  Euratom  led  to  an  agree- 
ment in  1965  to  combine  them  under  a  single  system  of  executive, 
legislative,  and  judicial  bodies.  This  agreement  took  effect  on  July  1, 
l'.MlT.  and  the  three  communities  now  share  in  common  a  Commission 
of  Member  States,  a  Council  of  Ministers,  a  European  Parliament, 
an  Economic  and  Social  Committee,  and  a  Court  of  Justice. 

The  Commission  of  the  European  Communities:  The  Commission 
consists  of  nine  members :  two  each  from  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, France,  and  Italy,  and  one  each  from  the  Netherlands,  Belgium, 
and  Luxembourg.  It  implements,  administers,  and  enforces  the  Treaties 
of  Paris  and  Rome.  The  Commission  works  on  the  principle  of  col- 
legiate responsibility  for  respective  sectors.  Energy  is  identified  as 
one  such  sector,  which  in  1970  was  the  responsibility  of  the  member 
from  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.26 

The  Council  of  Ministers:  A  Council  of  Ministers  represents  the 
interests  of  member  states,  with  one  representative  from  each  member. 
Usually  the  representative  is  the  minister  concerned  with  the  subject 
before  the  Council,  but  the  foreign  affairs  ministers  participate  in 
the  most  important  sessions.  The  work  of  the  Council  is  prepared  by 
a  Committee  of  Permanent  Representatives  of  the  member  states. 

The  European  Parliament :  The  legislative  arm  of  the  common  or- 
ganization is  the  European  Parliament,  which  supervises  the  execu- 
tive organs  of  the  communities  and  debates  their  annual  reports.  It 
has  the  power  by  vote  of  censure  of  a  two-thirds  majority  to  dismiss 
the  executives  of  the  communities.  The  Parliament  maintains  12  stand- 
ing committees  to  follow  the  work  of  the  three  communities.  One  of 
these  committees  deals  with  energy,  research,  and  atomic  affairs.  While 
the  Commission  need  not  defer  to  the  Parliament,  in  practice  it  tries 
to  shape  its  proposals  to  attain  approval  by  a  majority.27 

The  Economic  and  Social  Committee:  An  Economic  and  Social  Com- 
mittee of  101  members  represents  employers,  trade  unions,  and  the  gen- 
eral interest.  Its  function  is  advisory. 


:G  The  13  sectors  which  have  been  identified  are:  external  relations,  external  trade,  eco- 
nomic and  financial  affairs,  industry,  internal  market  and  regional  policy,  competition, 
budget  and  information,  agriculture,  energy,  social  affairs,  transport,  research  and  tech- 
nology, and  development  aid. 

»  The  U.S.  Department  of  State  Fact  Book  of  the  Countries  of  the  World  (New  York: 
Crown  Publishers,  Inc.,  1970),  p.  785. 


148 


TIk  Court  of  Just i,-e:  A  supreme  court  of  seven  judges  sits  in 
Luxembourg  with  power  to  decide  whether  acts  of  the  communities, 
member  governments,  and  private  organizations  are  compatible  with 

the  treaties.  The  Court  can  annul  acts  of  the  Commission  and  the 
( Jouncil  of  Ministers.  Its  decisions  are  directly  binding  upon  all  parties 
and  are  not  subject  to  appeal.  The  seven  justices  are  appointed  for 
terms  of  six  years  by  the  member  governments.  Through  1968  some 
56<  i  cases  had  been  brought  before  the  Court. 

Financing  the  communities:  The  communities  are  financed  by  na- 
tional contributions,  much  as  was  the  federal  government  of  the  United 
States  during  the  era  of  the  Continental  Congress.  From  Janu.  ry  1, 
1975.  the  communities  are  scheduled  to  have  their  own  independent 
financial  resources  derived  from  :  (1)  variable  levies  on  farm  imports: 
(2)  customs  duties:  and  (3)  proceeds  of  up  to  1  percent  of  a  value 
added  tax. 

The  general  budget  of  the  communities  in  1969  came  to  about  $2.7 
million  and  was  financed  by  the  member  governments  in  the  following 
proportions:  France,  West  Germany  and  Italy,  28  percent  each:  Bel- 
gium and  the  Netherlands,  7.1)  percent  each:  and  Luxembourg  0.2 
percent. 

The  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Dt  velojmu  nt 

Interest  in  European  cooperation  extended  beyond  the  communities 
of  the  six  nat  ions  and  led  to  establishment  of  a  European  multinational 
organization  that  quickly  developed  a  parallel  interest  in  nuclear 
energy.  On  December  14.  1960,  the  Organisation  for  European  Eco- 
nomic Co-operation,  which  had  been  set  up  in  1948  to  coordinate  efforts 
to  restore  Europe's  economy  under  the  Marshall  plan,  was  reorganized 
into  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development 
(OECD).  England,  which  was  not  a  member  of  the  Common  Market, 
was  a  member  of  OECD.  One  fundamental  purpose  of  OECD  was 
"to  achieve  the  highest  sustainable  growth  and  employment  and  a 
rising  standard  of  living  in  member  countries,  while  maintaining 
financial  stability  and  thus  to  contribute  to  the  development  of  the 
world  economy."  This  objective  was  to  be  accomplished  in  part  by 
efforts  to  reduce  or  abolish  obstacles  in  exchange  of  goods  and  services 
and  by  the  maintenance  and  liberalization  of  capital  movement  between 
countries.  A  new  major  goal  was  coordination  of  economic  aid  to  less 
developed  count  ries. 

The  OECD  in  the  mid-1950's  became  interested  in  nuclear  energy 
and  established  a  Nuclear  Energy  A.gency.  OECD  interests  extend  to 
peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy,  science  policy  research  cooperation, 
scientific  and  technical  personnel,  indust  rial  matters,  and  energy  prob- 
lems. The  OECD  is  headed  by  a  council  composed  of  representatives 
of  t  he  member  count  lies. 

/  .S.Attitudt  Toward  European  Unity 

Every  I'.S.  administration  of  the  postwar  period  has  supported 
European  unity  and  has  looked  to  the  institutions  of  the  European 
communities  as  the  most  promising  way  of  achieving  that  unitv.  An 
early  example  of  the  I'.S.  attitude  appears  in  President  Truman's 
pledge  in  L948  that  the  consolidated  effort  of  the  free  countries  of 
Europe  to  protect  themselves  would  be  matched  by  the  I'.S.  determi- 
nation to  help  them  do  so.  Support  by  Congress  for  European  unity 


149 


was  also  evident  in  Senate  Resolution  239,  sponsored  by  Senator  Van- 
denberg,  adopted  by  a  vote  of  64  to  4  on  June  11,  1948.  The  resolution 
urged  t  be  President  to  pursue  ". . .  progressive  development  of  regional 
and  other  collective  arrangements  for  individual  and  collective  self 
defense."  It  called  for  "association  of  the  United  States,  by  constitu- 
tional process,  with  such  regional  and  other  collective  arrangements 
as  are  based  on  continuous  and  effective  self-help  and  mutual  aid,  and 
as  affects  its  national  security."  28 

The  Congress  further  endorsed  unification  and  integration  in  Europe 
through  the  Mutual  Security  Acts  of  1951  and  1952.  In  the  former, 
Congress  specified  as  an  objective  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  the  economic 
unification  and  political  integration  of  Europe.29  During  1951,  the 
Department  of  State  apparently  decided  that  the  political  unification 
should  be  more  actively  encouraged,  and  at  a  meeting  between  Mem- 
bers of  Congress  and  the  Council  of  Europe  the  U.S.  representatives 
pressed  hard  in  that  direction.  The  Mutual  Security  Act  of  1952 
included  a  forthright  statement  of  support  for  European  unity : 30 

The  Congress  welcomes  the  recent  progress  in  political  federation,  military 
integration  and  economic  unification  in  Europe  and  reaffirms  its  belief  in  the 
necessity  of  further  vigorous  efforts  towards  these  ends  as  a  means  of  building 
strength,  establishing  security,  and  preserving  peace  in  the  North  Atlantic  area. 
In  order  to  provide  further  encouragement  to  such  efforts,  the  Congress  believes 
it  essential  that  this  act  should  be  so  administered  as  to  support  concrete  meas- 
ures for  political  federation,  military  integration  and  economic  unification  in 
Europe. 

Through  the  late  1940's  and  into  the  early  1950's  the  principal 
impact  of  nuclear  science  and  technology  upon  American  diplomacy 
was  the  temporary  military  advantage  it  gave  to  the  United  States  in 
relation  to  the  European  Community.  Although  the  United  Kingdom 
and  France  had  some  knowledge  of  nuclear  weapons  they  lacked  the 
industrial  base  to  make  them.  Possession  of  nuclear  weapons  initially 
enabled  American  diplomats  to  extend  to  allies  of  the  United  States 
an  umbrella  of  protection  against  attack. 

But  the  exclusive  military  advantage  was  short-lived  as  scientists 
and  engineers  of  the  Soviet  Union  developed  their  own  nuclear 
weapons.  By  the  mid-1950's  the  realization  that  the  Soviet  Union 
would  acquire  large  nuclear  weapons  plus  the  optimism  of  U.S. 
scientists  and  engineers  as  they  surveyed  the  initial  results  of  the  first 
few  years  of  work  to  produce  commercially  useful  nuclear  power, 
had  set  the  scene  for  a  major  new  diplomatic  initiative:  President 
Eisenhower's  Atoms  for  Peace  plan  of  1953. 

A  new  scientific  and  technological  achievement  was  soon  to  divert 
interest  from  nuclear  energy.  With  the  Soviet  Union's  successful 
launching  of  Sputnik  on  October  4,  1957,  the  attention  of  the  world 
became  directed  toward  outer  space.  Facing  technological  rivalry  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  the  United  States,  while  still  giving  some  attention 
to  nuclear  power,  began  its  efforts  (which  are  still  continuing)  to  get 
Europe  to  cooperate  in  space  programs. 

28  Congressional  Record,  vol.  04.  June  11,  194S  p.  7791 

29  The  Mutual  Security  Act  of  1951,  P.I,.  82-165.  65  Stat.  373. 

30  The  Mutual  Security  Act  of  1952,  P.L.  82-400,  66  Stat   141. 


IV.  Atoms  for  Peace:  A  Presidential  Initiative 

"Atoms  for  Peace"  is  the  name  of  a  presidential  exercise  of  diplo- 
matic powers  to  foster  foreign  use  of  the  science  and  technology  of 
nuclear  energy.  It  signaled  the  start  of  U.S.  diplomatic  efforts  to  cre- 
ate an  international  atomic  energy  agency;  American  encouragement 
to  two  European  regional,  multinational  agencies  for  nuclear  energy: 
establishment  of  a  network  of  bilateral  agreements  between  the  United 
States  and  individual  nations  for  technical  assistance  in  nuclear  en- 
ergy: and  a  treaty  to  establish  international  safeguards  over  nuclear 
fuel  materials.  These  diplomatic  ventures  sought  to  foster  civil  use  of 
nuclear  energy  abroad,  ranging  from  applications  of  radioisotopes 
for  research  and  for  diagnosis  and  treatment  in  medicine  to  the  demon- 
stration of  nuclear  power  for  the  generation  of  electricity.  I  underlying 
the  publicized,  idealistic  purpose  of  sharing  U.S.  nuclear  science  and 
technology  were  pragmatic,  practical  considerations  of  advantages  to 
the  United  States.  In  this  way.  the  idealism  of  American  nuclear 
scientists  and  engineers  was  coupled  effectively  to  the  support  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy  objectives. 

Three  basic  goals  of  I'.S.  policy  and  interest  in  Europe  have  re- 
mained constant  since  the  end  of  World  War  II:  integration  of  the 
nations  of  Western  Europe,  the  defense  of  I  '.S.  security,  and  the  quest 
for  East-West  detente.  '  Atoms  for  Peace  was  to  have  implications 
for  all  three  goals. 

Origins  of  Atoms  for  Peoxn 

Atoms  for  Peace  grew  out  of  a  frustrating  era  for  United  States 
diplomacy.  The  Soviet  Union  had  exploded  an  atomic  bomb  in  1949, 
an  unexpectedly  early  date.  Military  forces  of  North  Korea  had  in- 
vaded South  Korea  in  1950.  The  attempts  in  Europe  to  establish  a 
European  Defense  Community  had  failed  and  international  dis 
armament  negotiations  were  deadlocked.  One  U.S.  response  was  a 
policy  that  threatened  "massive  retaliation"  with  nuclear  weapons 
against  Communist  aggression.  Another  was  the  President's  Atoms  for 
Peace  proposals  as  an  alternative  to  the  arms  race. 

president  Eisenhower's  ct.n.  address 

By  1953,  President  Eisenhower  was  persuaded  thai  the  world  was 
courting  disaster  in  the  continuing  armaments  race  and  that  something 
had  to  be  done  to  put  n  brake  on  its  momentum.  lie  sought  "any  kind 
of  an  idea  thai  could  bring  the  world  to  look  at  the  atomic  problem 
in  a  broad  and  intelligent  way  and  -till  escape  the  impasse  to  action 
created  by  Russian  intransigence.  .  .  ." :rj  After  discussion  with  Prime 

*'  l  ;on1  recent  discussion  of  U.S.  interests  find  objectives  In  Western  Europe  from 

the  standpoint   of  n   diplomat,  see  the  speech  of  I»;i\i<l   B.   Bolen,   First    Secretary   of  the 
American  Ei  In  Bonn,  in  the  Congressional  Record,  September  20,  1971,  pp.  S14589 

14592 

'Dwiffht   l>    Elsenhower,  Mandate  for  Change:   1953    1956   (Garden  City,  N.Y.  :  Double 
day,  1963  I,  p.  252 

(150) 


151 


Minister  Churchill  at  the  Bermuda  conferences  of  1953,  and  receiving 
British  encouragement,  President  Eisenhower  offered  his  Atoms  for 
Peace  proposal  in  an  address  to  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United 
Nations,  December  8, 1953. 33 

Speaking  first  of  the  destructive  potential  of  nuclear  weapons,  the 
President  emphasized  two  atomic  realities  of  the  day :  (1)  knowledge 
of  atomic  power  which  some  nations  then  possessed  would  eventually 
be  shared  by  others;  and  (2)  even  a  vast  superiority  in  numbers  of 
nuclear  weapons  would  not  prevent  the  damage  and  toll  of  human 
lives  that  could  be  inflicted  by  surprise  aggression.  Even  against  the 
most  powerful  defense,  he  said,  an  aggressor  having  enough  atomic 
bombs  for  a  surprise  attack  could  probably  inflict  hideous  damage  on 
chosen  targets.  What,  then,  should  be  done?  The  consequences  of  in- 
action were  too  forbidding  to  accept.  He  said : 3i 

To  pause  there  would  be  to  confirm  the  hopeless  finality  of  a  belief  that  two 
atomic  colossi  are  doomed  malevolently  to  eye  each  other  indefinitely  across  a 
trembling  world.  To  stop  there  would  be  to  accept  helplessly  the  probability  of 
civilization  destroyed — the  annihilation  of  the  irreplaceable  heritage  of  mankind 
handed  down  to  us  from  generation  to  generation — and  the  condemnation  of  man- 
kind to  begin  all  over  again  the  age  old  struggle  upward  from  savagery  toward 
decency,  and  right,  and  justice. 

The  President  proposed  to  promote  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  power 
as  a  way  to  reverse  the  trend  of  atomic  military  buildup.  Nuclear  ma- 
terials committed  to  peaceful  purposes  would  not  be  available  for 
weapons.  To  this  end,  he  proposed  that  the  nuclear  nations  of  the 
world,  primarily  the  United  States  and  U.S.S.K.,  contribute  fissionable 
materials  to  an  international  pool  that  would  be  administered  by  an 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  This  pool  would  provide  fuel 
for  abundant  electrical  energy  to  the  power-starved  areas  of  the  world. 
The  initial  contributions  to  the  pool  would  be  small.  However,  the  pro- 
posal had  the  great  virtue,  said  the  President,  that  it  could  be  under- 
taken without  the  irritations  and  mutual  suspicions  incident  to  any 
attempt  to  set  up  a  system  of  worldwide  inspection  and  control.  Elabo- 
rating on  his  proposal,  the  President  said : 35 

The  Atomic  Energy  Agency  could  be  made  responsible  for  the  impounding, 
storage,  and  protection  of  the  contributed  fissionable  and  other  materials.  The 
ingenuity  of  our  scientists  will  provide  special  safe  conditions  under  which  such 
a  bank  of  fissionable  material  can  be  made  essentially  immune  to  surprise 
seizure. 

The  more  important  responsibility  of  this  Atomic  Energy  Agency  would  be  to 
devise  methods  whereby  this  fissionable  material  would  be  allocated  to  serve  the 
peaceful  pursuits  of  mankind.  Experts  would  be  mobilized  to  supply  atomic 
energy  to  the  needs  of  agriculture,  medicine,  and  other  peaceful  activities.  A 
special  purpose  would  be  to  provide  abundant  electrical  energy  in  the  power- 
starved  areas  of  the  world. 

The  President  specifically  invited  participation  of  the  Soviet  Union 
and  committed  himself  to  seek  the  legislation  necessary  for  the  United 
States  to  carry  out  its  part  of  the  proposals. 

Within  the  United  Nations,  the  response  to  the  Atoms  for  Peace 
proposal  was  instantaneous  and  favorable.  The  speech  was  scored  as 
a  victory  for  the  United  States  in  international  affairs  by  undercut- 

m  "Address  bv  the  President  before  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly,"  Congressional 
Record,  vol.  100.  January  7,  1954,  pp.  61-63. 

34  Ibid.,  p.  62. 

35  Loc.  cit. 


152 


ting  a  persuasive  Communist  propaganda  offensive  that  represented 
the  United  States  as  motivated  by  "atomic  imperialism'"  and  aimed 
at  monopolizing  the  benefits  of  nuclear  technology  through  its  policy 
of  atomic  secrecy.  James  J.  Wadsworth,  later  to  become  U.S.  am- 
bassador to  the  conference  that  was  to  create  the  international  agency, 
wrote  that  the  United  States  had  gained  a  diplomatic  advantage  over 
the  Soviet  Union  by  making  the  first  overture  to  the  world  commu- 
nity for  the  peaceful  use  of  nuclear  energy.36 

Implications  for  Nuclear  Power  in  Europe 

From  the  point  of  view  of  Western  Europe,  the  main  implications 
of  the  Atoms  for  Peace  message  were  threefold : 

(1)  In  principle  it  would  be  possible  to  obtain  from  the  United 
States  enriched  uranium  and  scarce  materials  such  as  heavy  water, 
for  development  of  nuclear  power,  subject  to  agreements  for  ex- 
change of  technical  information  and  control  of  the  materials 
supplied ; 

(2)  The  United  Nations  would  be  entrusted  with  supply  and 
safeguards  functions  via  the  proposed  international  agency : 

(3)  A  great  amount  of  scientific  and  technical  information  and 
data  on  nuclear  energy  would  be  released  to  the  world. 

This  latter  was  significant  for  until  then  much  of  the  technology 
for  nuclear  power  was  kept  secret  in  the  United  States. 

The  first  tangible  result  of  the  message  was  an  international  confer- 
ence on  atomic  energy  sponsored  by  the  United  Nations  in  Geneva  in 
1955.  In  retrospect,  the  conference  was  a  unique  event.  None  of  the 
three  subsequent  U.N.  conferences  released  at  one  time  so  much  scien- 
tific and  technical  information  in  such  an  exhilarating  atmosphere.  But 
the  United  States,  which  was  the  principal  participant  in  the  confer- 
ence, tended  to  oversell  atomic  energy,  which  many,  if  not  all,  countries 
looked  to  as  a  symbol  of  modernity  and  greatness.  The  year  1955 
marked  the  launching  of  all-out  nuclear  programs  in  many  countries, 
with  attendant  overestimating  of  promised  benefits  and  underestimat- 
ing of  the  technical  and  economic  problems  of  nuclear  power.37 

Legislation  for  Atoms  for  Peace 

A  complete  redrafting  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946  legislation 
quickly  followed  President  Eisenhower's  Atoms  for  Peace  proposals 
to  clear  the  way  for  private  development  of  civil  nuclear  power  in  the 
United  State-  and  to  open  opportunities  for  nuclear  cooperation  with 
other  nations  and  with  international  bodies.  The  modifications  em- 
bodied in  the  1954  legislation,88  while  permitting  expanded  interna- 
tional cooperation,  also  included  provisions  to  insure  that  this  coopera- 
t  ion  would  promote,  not  compromise,  national  security. 

m  James  .1  Wadsworth.  "Atoms  for  Peace  "  hi  J,  Stoessinger  and  A.  Westin,  eds.,  Power 
and  Order  (New  York:  Harcourt,  Brace  and  World.  Inc.,  1964),  p.  35. 

This  aspeel  of  "over  ell"  is  emphasized  by  Jules  Queron,  former  general  director  of 
research  ; i ml  development  for  Euratom,  In  liis  essay.  "Atomic  Energy  In  Continental 
Western  Europe,"  in  Richard  L.  Lewis  and  Jane  Wilson,  eds..  Mamooonin  Pins  Twenty- 
Yeara  (New  York  :  The  Viking  Press,  t.iti  I  p.  146 
••Public  Law  83  703,  68  Stat.  919,  approved  August  30,  1!»r>4.  The  vote  In  the  House  was 
231  for.  154  against,  'i  present,  and  4.".  not  voting;  in  the  Senate  it  was  r.7  for,  28  against, 
nnd  11  not  vrot  inc. 


153 


THE   EISENHOWER   PROPOSAL  TO   CONGRESS 

Scarcely  two  months  after  his  Atoms  for  Peace  message,  President 
Eisenhower  on  February  17,  1954  proposed  revision  of  the  Atomic 
Energy  Act  of  1946.39  He  called  for  expanded  international  cooperation 
in  atomic  energy,  but  was  silent  as  to  the  proposed  international  atomic 
energy  agency.  The  changes  he  recommended  were  to : 

Widen  cooperation  with  U.S.  allies  in  certain  atomic  energy 
matters ; 

Improve  procedures  for  the  control  and  dissemination  of  atomic 
energy  information ;  and 

Encourage  broadened  participation  in  the  development  of  peace- 
time uses  of  atomic  energy  in  the  United  States.40 
These  recommendations,  the  President  observed,  were  separate  from 
his  proposal  to  seek  a  new  basis  for  international  cooperation  in  atomic 
energy  as  outlined  in  his  Atoms  for  Peace  address.  Consideration  of 
additional  legislation  which  might  be  needed  for  that  proposal  should 
await,  he  said,  the  outcome  of  discussions  with  other  nations.41  But  no 
subsequent  message  ever  came. 

THE   CONGRESSIONAL   RESPONSE 

The  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  in  May  and  June  1954  held 
extensive  hearings  on  the  proposed  revisions  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Act.  Administration  witnesses  supported  international  cooperation  for 
its  benefits  to  the  United  States.  AEC  Commissioner  Smyth  testified 
that  the  requested  amendments  would  contribute  substantially  to  world 
peace,  strengthen  the  national  defense  and  the  defense  and  economy  of 
the  free  world,  and  assure  the  continued  leadership  of  the  United 
States  in  atomic  energy.42  Commissioner  Thomas  Murray  further  de- 
veloped the  case : 

Industrially  underdeveloped  countries,  whose  future  economic  growth  is  being 
hampered  by  inadequate  or  high-cost  fuels  and  electric  energy,  might  benefit 
significantly  if  the  technical  and  financial  problems  can  be  overcome.  For  the 
industrially  advanced  nations,  encountering  difficulty  in  continuing  to  secure 
adequate  supplies  of  cheap  fuel  and  electric  energy  in  the  face  of  diminished 
reserves  and  mounting  costs  for  local  or  imported  fuel,  nuclear-power  develop- 
ment may  prove  to  be  a  key  element  in  future  industrial  growth.43 


39  Atomic  Energy  Art  of  1946 — Message  from  the  President.  (H.  Doc.  No.  32S)  Con- 
gressional Record,  Vol.  100.  February  17,  1954,  pp.  1921-1924. 

40  Elaborating  tbe  reasons  for  international  cooperation,  the  President  spoke  of  the 
need  for  authority  to  provide  certain  information  and  also  nuclear  materials  to  foreign 
countries  : 

In  the  development  of  peaceful  uses  for  atomic  energy,  additional  amendments  are 
required  for  effective  United  States  cooperation  with  friendly  nations.  Such  coopera- 
tion requires  the  exchange  of  certain  "restricted  data"  on  the  industrial  applications 
of  atomic  energy  and  also  the  release  of  fissionable  materials  in  amounts  adequate 
for  industrial  and  research  use.  I  therefore  recommend  that  the  Atomic  Energy  Act 
be  amended  to  authorize  such  cooperation.  Such  amendments  should  prescribe  that 
before  the  conclusion  of  any  arrangement  for  the  transfer  of  fissionable  material  to 
a  foreign  nation,  assurances  must  be  provided  against  its  use  by  the  recipient  nation 
for  military  purposes.  Ibid.,  p.  1922. 

41  Loc.  cit. 

42  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energv,  Hearings,  8.  SS2S  and  H.R.  8862,  to 
Amend  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  191,6,  83d  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1954,  part  II,  p.  562. 

43  Ibid.,  p.  574.  This  point  was  made  by  EEC  Commissioner  Murray,  an  industrialist. 


154 


Secretary  of  State  Dulles,  after  underscoring  Soviet  military  nuclear 
progress,  concluded  that  the  strict  secrecy  requirements  of  the  1946 
Act  no  longer  represented  the  wisest  international  policy  for  the  United 
States.  He  identified  three  circumstances  that  had  combined  to  create 
the  need  to  relax  the  original  limits  on  international  cooperation: 
(1)  the  developing  Soviet  nuclear  program,  (2)  U.S.  dependence  on 
foreign  uranium  to  manufacture  nuclear  weapons,  and  (3)  legitimate 
hopes  for  nuclear  power  abroad.  Arguing  the  benefits  to  U.S.  self-in- 
terest,44 Secretary  Dulles  supported  the  legislation,  in  part,  so  that  the 
United  States  could  stay  ahead  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  providing 
knowledge  of  peaceful  applications  of  atomic  energy.45 

Replying  to  a  question  as  to  international  implications  of  failure 
to  enact  the  proposed  amendments.  Secretary  Dulles  claimed  that  it 
would  be  quite  disastrous  for  the  United  States.46 

Some  members  of  the  Joint  Committee  expressed  concern  lest  the 
proposed  amendments  be  regarded  as  an  international  "giveaway"  of 
U.S.  secrets,  technology,  and  materials.  These  fears  were  countered 
by  Representative  TV.  Sterling  Cole,  then  chairman  of  the  Joint  Com- 
mittee on  Atomic  Energy.  He  minimized  the  significance  of  the  pro- 
posed relaxation  of  controls  over  exchange  of  scientific  information 
with  other  countries.  He  observed  that  in  comparison  with  the  Atomic 
Energy  Act  of  1946,  the  new  proposals  made  only  one  addition  to 
information  that  could  already  be  exchanged.  This  was  dissemination 
of  information  on  industrial  and  other  applications  of  nuclear  energy 
for  peaceful  purposes.  This,  he  said,  was  no  giveaway. 

So  when  you  hear  talk  that  this  bill  proposes  to  give  vital  information  away 
to  the  peoples  of  the  world,  to  foreigners,  to  enemies  as  well  as  friends,  just  tell 
those  people  who  talk  that  way  to  look  at  the  record.  The  bill  does  no  such 
thing.  It  scarcely  enlarges  the  field  of  the  exchange  of  information  beyond  what 
is  presently  authorized  by  law.  .  .  ." 

Interna  fi  oh  ill  Coopcrat'ton  and  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1954 

The  overhauling  of  the  Nation's  basic  atomic  energy  legislation  in 
l!>r>4  greatly  expanded  the  scope  of  possible  international  relations 
to  encourage  commercial  use  of  nuclear  energy  abroad.  In  doing 
so  it  placed  new  demands  upon  U.S.  diplomacy.  For  this  reason  it 
is  pertinent  to  identify  provisions  of  the  new  law  that  affected  move- 
ment of  scientific  information,  technology,  and  materials  of  nuclear 
energy  from  the  United  States  to  other  nations. 

41  For  example,  be  sa  id  : 

In  extending  abroad,  under  proper  security  safeguards,  the  evolving  technology  of 
atomic  energy  for  peaceful  purposes,  we  shall  tighten  the  lion, is  thai   tie  our-  friends 

abroad  to  us,  we  Bhall  assure  materials  resources  that  we  need,  and  we  shall  maintain 
world  leadership  In  atomic  energy — leadership  which  today  is  such  a  large  clement  of 
our  national  prestige.  Ibid.,  p.  685. 

*»  He  said   : 

Other  countries  an-  making  progress  In  atomic-power  technology.  There  Is  n  crowing 
tendency  for  certain  raw  materials  supplying  nations  which  are  not  industrially  well 
advanced,  to  turn  to  such  other  countries  for  nuclear  power  information  because  they 

have  l n  disappointed  by  our  Inability  to  give  them  significant  help.  It  is  clear  to  me 

that  if  this  trend  continues,  ihe  interests  of  the  United  states  will  be  seriously  and  det- 
rimentally affected  There  is  no  need  lure  to  emphasize  how  Important  It  Is  for  us  in 
■tay    ahead   of   the   U.S.S.R.    In    providing   knowledge    of    how    to    put    atomic    energy    to 

peaceful  uses.  ibid.,  p.  <;85. 

M  lie  said  : 

I  would  lie  sorry  if  (lie  international  aspect  of  this  hill  failed  .  .  .  because  I  do  want 
to  emphasize  with  the  greatest  earnestness  of  which  I  am  capable  that   I  believe  it 

would  be  quite  a  disastrous  thing  fi.r  the  United  States  If  these  foreign  policy  aspects 
of  the  hill  were  1 1 ■ . i  adopted. 

It  would  gravely  Interfere  in  my  opinion  with  our  ability  to  get  indispensable 
quantities  of  source  material  which  we  have  to  get  from  foreign  markets  and  which  I 
do  not  think  we  can  continue  to  get  except  on  a  basis  of  exchange  of  Information, 
piTlng  of  information,  which  is  more  liberal  than  that  which  Is  permitted  by  the  present 

I. or.    eil. 

♦7  Congressional  Records  vol    lno,  July  23,  1954,  p.  11656. 


155 


The  Congress  declared  that  development,  use,  and  control  of  atomic 
energy  should  be  so  directed  as  to  "promote  world  peace,  improve  the 
general  welfare,  increase  the  standard  of  living,  and  strengthen  free 
competition  in  private  enterprise."  To  attain  this  goal,  the  Act  speci- 
fied a  program  to : 

.  .  .  promote  the  common  defense  and  security  and  to  make  available  to  co- 
operating nations  the  benefits  of  peaceful  applications  of  atomic  energy  as  widely 
as  expanding  technology  and  considerations  of  the  common  defense  and  security 
will  permit. 

In  support  of  this  program,  the  Act  authorized  the  AEC  to  cooperate 
with  any  nation  by  distributing  nuclear  fuel  and  source  materials,  and 
certain  artificial  radioisotopes.48  International  nuclear  cooperation 
would  be  effected  through  bilateral  agreements  for  cooperation  with 
individual  nations  or  with  a  regional  defense  organization.  These 
agreements  departed  from  conventional  practice.  Instead  of  being 
treaties,  they  were  agreements  negotiated  by  the  AEC  which  were 
simpler  to  negotiate  and  did  not  require  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate  for  their  ratification.  This  arrangement  was  judged  appropriate 
because  of  the  many  foreign  nations  that  were  expected  to  wish  to 
benefit  from  U.S.  nuclear  science  and  technology. 

Congress  did  place  some  limitations  upon  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  and  the  State  Department  in  negotiating  such  agreements. 
Section  123  of  the  Act  required  that  each  such  agreement  include: 

(1)  The  terms,  conditions,  duration,  nature,  and  scope  of  the 
cooperation; 

(2)  A  guaranty  by  the  cooperating  party  that  security  safe- 
guards and  standards  agreed  upon  would  be  maintained ; 

(3)  A  guaranty  by  the  cooperating  party  that  any  material  to 
be  transferred  pursuant  to  an  agreement  would  not  be  used  for 
atomic  weapons,  or  for  research  or  development  for  weapons,  or 
for  any  other  military  purposes ;  and 

(4)  A  guaranty  by  the  cooperating  party  that  any  material 
and  any  restricted  data  to  be  transferred  would  not  be  transferred 
to  unauthorized  persons  or  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  cooperat- 
ing party  except  as  specified  in  the  agreement. 

Section  123  further  required  the  President  to  approve  each  agree- 
ment for  cooperation  and  to  make  a  written  determination  that  the 
proposed  agreement  would  promote  rather  than  constitute  an  unrea- 
sonable risk  of  the  common  defense  and  security.  Finally,  Congress 
preserved  for  itself  the  option  to  intervene  by  requiring  that  a  pro- 
posed agreement  for  cooperation  together  with  the  Presidential  ap- 
proval and  determination  must  lie  before  the  Joint  Committee  for  30 
days  while  Congress  is  in  session. 

The  expanded  legislative  charter  for  AEC  to  foster  use  of  nuclear 
power  abroad  prohibited  transfer  of  information  on  design  and  fabri- 
cation of  atomic  weapons  and  limited  the  exchange  of  restricted  data 
for  peaceful  uses  to  six  categories.40 

Since  1954.  this  framework  of  legislative  policy,  program,  and  au- 
thorization has  been  the  basis  for  U.S.  cooperation  with  European 

<q  Section  54  authorized  forelcn  distribution  of  special  nuclear  materials  ;  section  64  distri- 
bution of  source  materials  ;  and  section  82  distribution  of  byproduct  materials. 

19  The  six  categories  included  in  Section  144(a)  of  the  Act  are  (1)  Refining,  purification, 
and  subsequent  treatment,  of  source  material:  (2)  Reactor  development:  (3)  Production  of 
special  nuclear  material:  (4)  Health  and  safety;  (5)  Industrial  and  other  applications  of 
atomic  energy  for  peaceful  purposes;  and  (6)  Research  and  development  relating  to  the 
foregoing. 


156 


nations — singly  and  in  organizations — to  foster  commercial  applica- 
tion of  nuclear  power.  It  furnished  the  point  of  departure  for  the 
diplomats  who  worked  to  create  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  Euratom,  the  European  Nuclear  Energy  Agency,  the  network 
of  bilateral  and  multilateral  agreements  subsequently  negotiated  by 
the  United  States,  and  the  Nonprolife  ration  Treaty.  Before  1954, 
the  diplomats  had  to  deal  mainly  with  the  military  impacts  of  the  dis- 
covery of  nuclear  energy.  Thereafter,  their  responsibilities  were  ex- 
panded to  include  the  negotiations  and  other  diplomatic  activities 
intended  to  secure  for  the  United  States  the  greatest  advantages  from 
cooperating  Avith  and  encouraging  the  development  of  commercial 
nuclear  energy  in  Europe,  and  elsewhere. 

Some  Questions  from  the  Scientific  Community 

Some  scientists  saw  the  Atoms  for  Peace  plan  as  raising  serious  ques- 
tions. One  such  scientist  was  physicist  Ralph  Lapp,  who  had  served  in 
tin'  wartime  bomb  project.  In  1956  he  posed  five  questions  about  inter- 
national promotion  of  the  use  of  nuclear  power  which  two  decades 
later  remain  largely  unanswered.  He  wrote : 50 

President  Eisenhower's  atomic  plan  raises  some  very  serious  questions  along 
the  following  lines : 

(1)  Is  nuclear  power  technically  capahle  of  aiding  foreign  nations? 

(2)  Can  adequate  safeguards  be  devised  to  keep  account  of  nuclear  fuel  and 
prevent  nn  atomic  power  plant  from  becoming  a  bomb  producer? 

(3)  Is  the  United  States  prepared  to  implement  its  plan  by  sharing  technical 
know-how  with  other  nations? 

(4)  Will  tie  demand  of  power  plants  for  nuclear  fuel  be  great  enough  in  the 
near  future  to  siphon  off  bomb  material  from  military  uses? 

(5)  "What  is  the  danger  that  we  will  accelerate  the  nuclear  arms  race  (the 
fourth-power  problem)  by  aiding  other  nations  in  nuclear  technology? 

Accomplishments  of  Atoms  for  Peace 

The  initial  objectives  of  Atoms  for  Peace  were  to  help  contribute 
to  a  more  stable  and  peaceful  world  by  sharing  with  other  nations  the 
benefits  of  nuclear  science  and  technology,  to  improve  U.S.  relations 
with  other  nations  through  such  sharing,  and  to  minimize  pressures  for 
independent  and  potentially  hazardous  nuclear  programs  by  cooperat- 
ing in  peaceful  uses  under  conditions 'which  would  discourage  diversion 
of  atomic  materials  and  equipment  to  military  purposes. 

In  recent  hearings  before  the  House  Subcommittee  on  International 
Cooperation  in  Science  and  Space  of  the  House  Committee  on  Science 
and  Astronautics,  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission  observed  that 
these  objectives  continue  to  bo  valid.  With  the  passage  of  years,  addi- 
tional objective-,  have  taken  on  increased  importance.  For  example. 
the  Atoms  for  Peace  program  has  enabled  the  United  States  to  take 
part  in  the  rapidly  expanding  world  market  for  nuclear  noods  and 
service.  The  program  is  also  "providing  an  invaluable  mechanism  for 
a  worldwide  approach  to  health,  safetv,  and  environmental  problems 
which  transcend  national  boundaries."  r'' 


60  R.'ili>Ji  B,  Lapp,  Atoms  and  People   (Now  York:  Harper  k  Brothers,  Publishers,  1950), 
p.  182. 

Statement  of  Myron  B.  Kratzer,  Director,  Division  of  International  Affairs,  TT.S. 
Atomic  Energy  Commission,  In  U.S.  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Science  and  Astro- 
nautics,   Rubcommltl i    International    Cooperation   in   Science  and   Space,   Hearings,  A 

General  Review  of  International  Cooperation  m  Science  ami  space,  02d  Cong.,  1st  Sess., 
1971,  p,  :::::: 


157 


Atoms  for  Peace  has  been  unique  as  a  form  of  international  coopera- 
tion. While  cooperation  across  national  boundaries  has  occurred  in 
many  scientific  fields,  international  cooperation  in  the  peaceful  uses  of 
nuclear  energy  came  about  as  the  result  of  deliberate  decisions  and  spe- 
cific actions  of  governments,  rather  than  of  scientific  communities,  to 
share  the  benefits  of  an  important  new  science  and  technology. 

The  basic  concept  of  Atoms  for  Peace  was  to  draw  on  two  major 
U.S.  assets:  (1)  the  knowledge  of  peaceful  applications  of  nuclear 
energy;  and  (2)  the  industrial  capacity  of  the  United  States  to  pro- 
duce in  large  quantities,  and  at  reasonable  cost,  the  essential  materials 
of  the  nuclear  age,  especially  enriched  uranium. 

The  costs  to  the  United  States  of  undertaking  Atoms  for  Peace  were 
to  be  minimal,  inasmuch  as  the  technology  to  be  made  available  was 
under  development  for  domestic  use,  while  the  plants  and  equipment  al- 
read}*  existed  to  supply  the  essential  materials.  Most  of  the  capital  in- 
vestment in  special  factories,  laboratories,  and  test  sites  had  already 
been  made;  thus,  the  U.S.  contribution  of  nuclear  resources  to  Atoms 
for  Peace  was  limited  largehT  to  costs  of  materials  and  labor. 

In  retrospect  over  15  years,  Atoms  for  Peace  has  involved  only  mod- 
est financial  aid  by  the  United  States.  U.S.  cooperation  has  been  flexi- 
ble, designed  to  meet  the  needs  and  capabilities  of  countries  at  various 
stages  of  technological  and  economic  development.  With  the  develop- 
ing countries,  Atoms  for  Peace  cooperation  has  tended  to  center  on  non- 
power  uses  of  nuclear  energy,  particularly  use  of  radioisotopes  in  medi- 
cine and  agriculture.  With  the  advanced  countries,  particularly  in 
Europe,  nuclear  power  has  been  the  dominant  theme  of  cooperation.52 

Not  everyone  has  been  sanguine  about  Atoms  for  Peace.  W.  Sterling 
Cole,  after  his  experience  as  the  first  Director-General  of  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency,  was  pessimistic.  In  the  early  1960's  he 
judged  that  the  Atoms  for  Peace  program  no  longer  existed;  that  the 
United  States  gave  only  lip  service.to  the  concepts  of  Atoms  for  Peace; 
that  it  was  not  a  distinct  entity ;  and  that  it  had  become  submerged  in 
foreign  aid  along  with  other  types  of  U.S.  foreign  assistance.  He  hoped 
that  the  President  would  revive  and  rejuvenate  Atoms  for  Peace  by 
setting  it  apart  as  a  special  type  of  assistance.53  Whether  Atoms  for 
Peace  has  fared  as  poorly  as  this  is  a  subjective  question.  As  Cole  has 
said,  no  separate  agency  was  ever  given  the  clearcut  responsibility  for 
carrying  out  the  Atoms  for  Peace  program.  The  AEC  may  have  in- 
herited the  responsibility,  but  it  did  not  receive  a  specific  legislative 
charter  to  take  a  strong  promotional  position. 

62  II. id.,  p.  334. 

M  Testimony  of  W.  Sterling  Cole.  In  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Fnertrv, 
Hearing*,  United  States  Policy  Toward  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Aaencu  S7th 
Cong  ,  2.1.  Sess.,  1962,  p.  :;:;. 


V.  Bii-ateral  Agreements  for  U.S.  Technical  Assistance  to 
Commercial  Nuclear  Energy  in  Europe 

Realization  of  the  ambitious  goals  for  Atoms  for  Peace  by  other 
nations,  particularly  in  Europe,  required  U.S.  technical  assistance  in 
nuclear  energy.  Two  well  established  methods  for  pursuing  this  policy 
were  available.  The  United  States  could  provide  technical  assistance 
directly  to  individual  countries  or  it  could  also  support  and  work 
through  regional  or  international  organizations.  Each  method  had  its 
advantages.  Direct  assistance  was  quicker,  credit  for  successes  would  go 
to  the  donor  nation,  and  there  were  the  prospects  of  influence  or  lover- 
age  for  the  donor  in  dealing  with  the  recipients.  International  bodies, 
on  the  other  hand,  had  a  traditional  function  of  setting  standards 
and  providing  a  neutral  ground  for  exchange  of  information  and  coop- 
eration between  nations  of  divergent  policies  and  interests.  In  the  case 
of  atomic  energy,  both  methods  were  employed.  The  United  States 
through  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  has  entered  into  many  coun- 
try-to-country agreements — more  commonly  known  as  bilateral  agree- 
ments. It  also  has  cooperated  with  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
munity (Euratom)  and  with  the  Nuclear  Energy  Agency  of  the 
Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD) 
to  open  American  nuclear  technology  to  Europe,  and  is  a  principal 
member  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  which  also  has 
technical  assistance  functions. 

This  section  examines  direct  technical  assistance  from  the  United 
States  through  the  mechanism  of  bilateral  agreements  with  individual 
countries.  It  relies  heavily  upon  two  reports  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  which  were  submitted  to  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy  in  1960  during  that  committee's  review  of  the  international 
atomic  policies  and  programs  of  the  United  States.54 

Legislation  for  Technical  Cooperation  in  Nuclear  Energy 

At  the  time  of  the  Atoms  for  Peace  message,  the  authority  of  the 
Government  to  provide  technical  assistance  to  foreign  nations  to 
encourage  their  use  of  nuclear  power  was  severely  limited.  While  the 
Atomic  Energy  Act  of  194C> 55  provided  for  a  program  to  share  with 
other  countries,  on  a  reciprocal  basis,  information  concerning  the  prac- 
t  ical  indusl  rial  applications  of  atomic  energy,  this  could  not  be  imple- 
mented before  ".  .  .  effective  and  enforceable  safeguards  against  its  use 
for  destructive  purposes  [could]  be  devised." 56  With  the  failure  of  the 
U.S.  proposal  for  the  international  control  of  atomic  energy,  this  con- 
dition was  never  fulfilled  and  the  restriction  ended  the  notable  col- 


423     I'M. 

P  L.  585,  79th  Cong.,  60  Stat.  7.r,r,  7:.. 
id  .  section  I. (b)(2). 


(158) 


159 


laboration  of  the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  Canada,  and  Bel- 
gium which  had  characterized  the  wartime  atom  bomb  project.  The 
only  cooperation  remaining  after  1946  was  in  exploration  for  and  pro- 
curement of  uranium  ores  needed  for  the  continuing  nuclear  weapons 
program  of  the  United  States.  The  restrictions  on  technical  assistance 
were  relaxed  slightly  in  1951  by  an  amendment  to  the  Act 57  which 
authorized  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  to  exchange  certain  infor- 
mation with  other  countries  about  the  "refining,  purification  and  sub- 
sequent treatment  of  source  materials,  reactor  development,  production 
of  fissionable  material,  and  research  and  development  related  to  the 
foregoing."  Canada  was  a  primary  beneficiary  of  this  amendment.  The 
Canadians  had  continued  to  transmit  information  on  nuclear  energy  to 
the  United  States  despite  U.S.  restrictions  upon  information  in 
exchange.  After  this  amendment,  the  United  States  was  able  to  provide 
information  to  friendly  nations  that  were  beginning  to  show  an  interest 
in  civil  nuclear  energy.  Notable  among  these  countries  was  Belgium, 
which  still  controlled  large  uranium  deposits  in  the  Belgian  Congo. 

In  this  amendment,  the  Congress  laid  down  four  principles  for  U.S. 
technical  assistance  in  nuclear  energy,  principles  that  were  to  be  in- 
fluential when  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  was  rewritten  in  1954.  These 
were : 

(1)  A  prohibition  against  communications  of  weapons  design 
and  fabrication  data ; 

(2)  A  requirement  for  adequate  security  standards  in  countries 
receiving  classified  information ; 

(3)  A  determination  by  the  President  that  the  arrangements 
would  promote  and  would  not  endanger  the  common  defense  and 
security;  and 

(4)  A  requirement  that  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy 
be  informed  of  the  arrangement  30  days  prior  to  its  consum- 
mation. 

The  specification  of  these  principles  indicates  ways  the  United 
States  can  control  its  technical  assistance  to  and  cooperation  with 
other  countries,  ways  which  would  not  be  possible  were  such  assist- 
ance to  be  channeled  exclusively  through  an  international  organization. 
The  last  principle  also  is  of  interest  for  it  asserts  congressional  interest 
in  arrangements  for  furnishing  technical  assistance  to  nuclear  indus- 
tries abroad.  During  the  early  years  of  the  technical  assistance  pro- 
gram, the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  closely  examined  the 
individual  agreements  and  their  administration.  The  Joint  Commit-, 
tee  on  Atomic  Energy  held  hearings  on  international  agreements  in 
1964, 1965,  and  1966. 

Congress  gave  fresh  recognition  to  international  cooperation  in 
nuclear  energy  when  it  revised  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  in  1954.5S  One 
of  six  statutory  programs  and  objectives  specified  in  the  Act  was  a 
"program  of  international  cooperation  to  promote  the  common  de- 
fense and  security  and  to  make  available  to  cooperating  nations  the 
benefits  of  peaceful  applications  of  atomic  energy  as  widely  as  expand- 
ing technology  and  considerations  of  the  common  defense  and  secu- 
rity will  permit."  59 

57  Public  Law  82-235,  65  Stat.  692. 
68  Public  Law  83-703.  68  Stat.  919. 
68  Sec.  3e.  of  P.L.  83-703. 

96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  12 


160 


Additionally,  the  1954  revision  defined  limits  and  procedures  for 
technical  cooperation  with  other  nations  and  provided  for  certain 
forms  of  cooperation  to  be  conducted  under  executive  agreements,  or 
"Agreements  for  Cooperation,"  commonly  known  as  '"bilateral  agree- 
ments." Under  the  revised  act,  the  United  States  could  encourage 
foreign  use  of  atomic  energy  and  nuclear  power  through  various  in- 
centives, which  included : 

1.  Supplying  nuclear  fuel  materials  for  research  and  power 
reactors ; 

2.  Providing  assistance  in  the  design  and  construction  of  these 
reactors ; 

3.  Exchange  of  certain  scientific  and  technical  information  after 
mutually  agreeable  controls  for  sensitive  materials  and  secret  in- 
formation had  been  agreed  upon. 

The.  Congress  specified  detailed  conditions  and  limitations  on  nego- 
tiation of  the  agreements.  Section  123  of  the  Act  states  that  no  co- 
operation with  any  national  or  regional  defense  organization  shall  be 
undertaken  until : 

a.  the  Commission,  has  submitted  to  the  President  the  proposed  agreement  for 
cooperation,  together  with  its  recommendation  thereon,  which  proposed  agree- 
ment shall  include  (1)  the  terms,  conditions,  durations,  nature,  and  scope  of 
the  cooperation:  (2)  a  guaranty  by  the  cooperating  party  that  security  safe- 
guards and  standards  as  set  forth  in  the  agreement  for  cooperation  will  be  main- 
tained ;  (3)  a  guaranty  by  the  cooperating  party  that  any  material  to  be  trans- 
ferred pursuant  to  such  agreement  will  not  be  used  for  atomic  weapons,  or  for 
research  on  or  development,  of  atomic  weapons,  or  for  any  other  military  pur- 
poses: and  (4)  a  guaranty  by  the  cooperating  party  that  any  material  or  any 
Restricted  Data  to  lie  transferred  pursuant  to  the  agreement  for  cooperation 
will  not  be  transferred  to  an  unauthorized  person  or  beyond  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  cooperating  party,  except  as  specified  in  the  agreement  for  cooperation: 

b.  The  President  has  approved  and  authorized  the  execution  of  the  proposed 
agreement  for  cooperation,  and  has  made  a  determination  in  writing  that  the 
performance  of  the  proposed  agreement  will  promote  and  will  not  constitute  an 
unreasonable  risk  to  the  common  defense  and  security  :  and 

c.  The  proposed  agreement  for  cooj>eration.  together  with  the  approval  and 
the  determination  of  the  President,  has  been  submitted  to  the  Joint  Committee 
and  a  period  of  thirty  days  has  elapsed  while  Congress  is  in  session  (in  com- 
puting such  thirty  days,  there  shall  he  excluded  the  days  on  which  either  House 
is  not  in  session  because  of  an  adjournment  of  more  than  .".  days) . 

The.  Act  further  specified  that  the  communication  of  Restricted 
Data.00  the  export  of  facilities  to  produce  of  use  nuclear  fuel  materials, 
and  the  distribution  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  to  another  country  could 
occur  only  pursuant  to  an  Agreement  for  Cooperation.  U.S.  citizens 
and  companies  were  prohibited  from  directly  ot-  indirectly  engaging 
in  the  production  of  any  nuclear  fuel  materials  outside  of  the  United 
States,  except  under  an  Agreement  for  Cooperation  or  an  AEC  au- 
thorization. Tn  this  way.  the  Act  out  control  of  cooperation  between 
the  domestic  nuclear  industry  and  private  industries  of  other  coun- 
tries firmly  into  the  hands  of  (  he  A  EC. 

AEC  Organization:  the  Division  of  International  Programs 

In  response  lo  the  new  positive  outlook  for  international  technologi- 
cal collaboration  authorized  by  the  Atomic  Enersrv  Act  of  1054,  the 
AEC  established  a   Division  of   [international   Affairs  in  November 


••Tlif  term  "Restricted  Data"  Is  defined  to  menu  "nil  dnta  concerning  (1)  design,  mnnu- 
f.-K-ii"-,.    ,,r  utilization  of  ntomle  weapons :   ('Ji    the  production  of  special  nuclear  material 
or  i  •"■  i  the  use  of  special  nuclear  material  In  the  production  of  energy,  bul  shall  not  include 
data  declassified  or  removed   from  1 1  n-  Restrict**'!   Data   category.   .  .  ." 


161 


1955.  Its  function  was  to  develop  and  direct  a  program  of  international 
cooperation  for  peaceful  applications  of  atomic  energy.  The  division's 
responsibilities  included  coordination  of  AEC  activities  relating  to 
various  types  of  agreements  for  international  cooperation;  assistance 
with  negotiations  for  an  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency;  and 
liaison  with  the  State  Department,  including  direct  participation  with 
the  State  Department  in  preparing  proposals  to  be  presented  to  the 
United  Nations.61  In  a  subsequent  AEC  reorganization,  the  division 
was  renamed  the  Division  of  International  Programs. 

The  First  Bilateral  Agreements  for  Nuclear  Cooperation 

The  AEC  moved  quickly  to  use  its  new  authority  by  opening  nego- 
tiations with  27  countries  for  bilateral  agreements.  By  the  end  of  1955, 
agreements  with  22  countries  had  been  comj^leted. 

The  first  agreements  negotiated  were  those  with  the  three  wartime 
nuclear  collaborators  of  the  United  States.  Each  agreement  reflected 
the  special  and  close  relationship  that  had  developed  between  the 
United  States  on  one  hand  and  the  United  Kingdom,  Canada,  and 
Belgium  on  the  other.  The  differences  among  these  agreements  also  re- 
flected the  stages  of  development  of  the  nuclear  science  and  technology 
of  the  countries  involved. 

PRESSURES  TO  PROMOTE   XTJCLEAR  POWER  ABROAD 

The  mid-1950s  witnessed  increased  pressure  to  promote  demonstra- 
tion of  U.S.  nuclear  power  technology  abroad.  One  example  of  this 
pressure  was  a  report  of  the  Panel  on  the  Impact  of  the  Peaceful  Uses 
of  Atomic  Energy,  which  was  appointed  by  the  Joint  Committee  on 
Atomic  Energy  in  1955 62  63  and  was  chaired  by  newspaper  pub- 
lisher Robert  M.  McKinney.  It  urged  vigorous  measures  to  encourage 
the  use  of  atomic  energy  abroad.  The  measures  included  convening  a 
series  of  regional  conferences  with  bilateral  partners  of  the  United 
States  to  establish  realistic  goals  for  nuclear  power;  U.S.  supplying  of 
nuclear  fuels  and  technological  assistance  for  installation  of  at  least 
1000  megawatts  of  nuclear  power  capacity  outside  the  United  States 
by  I96064;  furnishing  financial  assistance  through  normal  govern- 
mental and  private  channels;  and  applying  of  safeguards  to  such 
powerplants.65 

The  anticipated  returns  from  encouraging  foreign  nuclear  power 
were  seen  as  substantial  for  U.S.  world  leadership  and  also  for  the 
domestic  nuclear  industry.  According  to  the  McKinney  panel :  66 

61  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Major  Activities  in  the  Atomic  Energy  Programs, 
July-December  1955  ( Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1956),  p.  85. 

w  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Report  of  the  Panel  on  the  Impact 
of  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy,  S4th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  January  1956.  (Joint  Com- 
mittee print  i .  155  p. 

84  One  of  the  four  principal  instructions  to  the  Panel  was  to  "consider  also  the  effects 
of  the  application  of  atomic  energy  upon  economies  and  industries  abroad."  The  Joint 
Committee  instructed  the  panel  to  take  into  account  the  interlocking  effects  that  such 
development  and  application  abroad  might  have  on  the  United  States  economy  and 
industries.  Ibid.,  p.  v. 

81  More  specifically,  the  Panel  recommended  that  the  United  States,  In  issuing  invita- 
tions to  such  conferences,  "announce  that  it  Is  prepared  to  furnish  nnclear  fuels,  provide 
necessary  technological  assistance  and  permit  contracts  for  the  installation  of  at  least 
1  million  kilowatts  of  atomic  generating  capacity  outside  the  United  States  as  soon  as 
possible — we  hope  by  1960.  The  attention  of  the  world  should  be  called  to  the  fact  that 
such  a  program  would  parallel  and  possibly  exceed  the  capacity  installed  during  the  same 
period  at  home."  Ibid.,  p.  8. 

65  Loc.  cit. 

66  Ibid.,  p.  95. 


162 


...  In  the  uncommitted  areas  of  the  world,  American  leadership  in  making 
atomic  power  available  could  be  a  strong  influence  in  guiding  these  areas  toward 
a  course  of  freedom.  In  this  sense,  atomic  power  acquires  great  importance  in 
international  relations.  This  consideration  should  strongly  influence  our  national 
policy  as  to  the  rate  at  which  the  development  of  atomic  power  suitable  for  such 
purposes  is  pressed.  There  is  urgency  for  the  development  in  the  United  States 
of  atomic  powerplants  suited  to  the  needs  of  the  other  nations  of  the  free- 
world.  .  . 

This  urgency  which  exists  for  foreign  atomic  power  has  domestic  benefits 
as  well.  The  growth  of  an  atomic  power  program  will  probably  not  become  signifi- 
cant before  1965.  A  gap  may  occur  for  the  power  equipment  manufacturing 
industry  between  present  domestic  interest  in  atomic  power  reactors  and  actual 
sales  in  substantial  volume.  If  the  equipment  manufacturers  .  .  .  are  to  be 
expected  to  carry  forward  research  and  development  directed  toward  making 
atomic  power  competitive  in  the  United  States,  the  foreign  market  for  power 
reactors  with  its  high  near  term  growth  potential  may  offer  a  solution  to  bridg- 
ing this  gap.  The  potential  demand  may  represent  a  $30  billion  market. 

But  this  sense  of  urgency  was  not  strong  enough  to  warrant  U.S. 
incentives  to  the  European  electricity  industry  that  went  beyond  those 
offered  by  the  AEC  to  the  domestic  nuclear  power  industry.  The 
McKinney  Panel  avoided  proposals  to  supply  nuclear  fuel  without 
charge,  or  to  pay  repurchase  prices  for  byproduct  plutonium  from 
European  power  plants  higher  than  those  paid  to  domestic  nuclear 
power  producers.  Also,  no  special  financial  arrangements  were  pro- 
posed. Instead,  the  panel  preferred  the  normal  channels  of  U.S.  foreign 
financial  assistance.  "Any  other  course  will  complicate  to  the  point 
of  un  workability  what  should  be  a  straightforward  comprehensive 
policy  covering  international  activities  of  the  United  States."  r,r 

In  reference  to  the  domestic  concerns  that  byproduct  plutonium 
from  nuclear  power  might  lead  to  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons, 
the  McKinney  Panel  opted  for  a  two-pronged  approach  to  safeguards. 
It  called  for  inspection  rights  under  the  bilateral  agreements  plus 
reprocessing  of  the  used  European  fuel  in  the  United  States.88 

By  April  1,  1958,  the  AEC  had  in  effect  30  agreements  for  coopera- 
tion in  nuclear  research  and  11  for  nuclear  power  with  39  countries. 
Four  more  research  agreements  and  three  power  agreements  with  an 
additional  four  countries  were  signed  and  being  ratified.09  Table  I  lists 
these  agreements. 


•"Ibid.,  p.  06. 

«T1ic  panel  said:  "We  believe  the  United  States  should  pet  on  with  making  atomic 
power  available  now  to  these  nations.  We  believe  that  this  can  and  should  be  done  on 
an  Interim  basis  with  bilateral  agreements  permitting  appropriate  Inspection,  providing 
for  earmarking  Of  plutonium  and  uranium  233  thus  recovered  exclusively  for  further 
peaceful  uses.  Other  control  mechanisms  for  a  broader  nature  can  be  devised  and  agreed 
upon  later."  Ibid.,  p.  96. 

"•U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy.  Hearings,  Development,  Grotrth 
and  State  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Industry,  85th  Cong..  '2d   Sees.,   1958,  p.  79. 


163 


TABLE  I— STATUS  OF  AGREEMENTS  FOR  COOPERATION  AS  OF  APRIL  1,  1958 


Cumulative 
number  of 
countries    Country 


Scope  of  exchange 


Effective  date 


1  Argentina 

2  Australia 

3  Austria 

4  Belgium... 

5  Brazil 

6  Canada 

7  Chile 

8  China,  Republic  of 

9  Colombia - 

10  Cuba 

11  Denmark 

12  Dominican  Republic 

13  Ecuador 

14  France 

15  Germany,  Federal  Republic  of. 
Germany:  City  of  West  Berlin. 

16  Greece. 

17  Guatemala 

18  Israel 

19  Italy.... 

20  Japan 

21  Korea,  Republic  of 

22  Lebanon 

23  Netherlands 

24  New  Zealand 

25  Nicaragua 

26  Norway 

27  Pakistan 

28  Peru 

29  Philippines 

30  Portugal 

31  South  Africa 

32  Spain 

33  Sweden.. 

34  Switzerland... 

Switzerland 

35  Thailand 

36  Turkey 

37  United  Kingdom 

38  Uruguay.. 

39  Venezuela 


Research 

Research  and 

Research 

Research  and 

Research 

Research  and 

Research 

do 


power, 
power, 
power. 


.do. 
.do. 
.do. 


do 

do 

Research  and 
do 


power. 


Research. 

do... 

do... 


.do. 
.do. 
.do. 


.do 

do... 

Research  and 
Research 

.do 


power. 


Research  and 

Research 

do 


power. 


do 

do 

Research  and 
do 


power. 


Research 

do. 

Power 

Research 

do 

Research  and 

Research 

do 


power. 


July 

29. 

May 

28 

July 

13. 

July 

21, 

Aug. 

3 

July 

21 

Aug. 

8 

July 

18 

July 

19 

Oct. 

10 

July 

25 

Dec. 

21 

Feb. 

6 

Nov. 

20 

Aug. 

7 

Aug. 

1 

Aug. 

4 

Apr. 

22 

July 

12 

July 

2H 

Dec. 

2/ 

Feb. 

3 

July 

18 

Aug. 

8 

Aug. 

29 

Mar. 

/' 

June 

10 

Aug. 

11 

Jan. 

2b 

July 

27 

July 

21. 

Aug. 

22. 

Keb. 

12, 

Jan. 

18. 

July 

18. 

Jan. 

29. 

Mar. 

13. 

June 

10, 

July 

21, 

Jan. 

13 

July 

21 

,1955 
,1957 
,1956 
,1955 
,1955 
,1955 
,1955 
,1955 
1955 
,1957 
,1955 
,1956 
,1958 
,1956 
,1957 
,1957 
,1955 
.1957 
,1955 
,1955 
,1955 
,1956 
,1955 
,1957 
,1956 
,1958 
,1957 
.1955 
,1956 
,1955 
.1955 
,1957 
,1958 
,1956 
,1955 
,1957 
,1956 
,1955 
,1955 
,1956 
,1955 


SIGNED  AND  IN  RATIFICATION  PROCESS  AS  OF  APR.  1,  1958 


Brazil.. Power 

40  Costa  Rica... ._ Research 

41  Iran _ ._ do 

42  Iraq do 

43  Ireland do 

Italy Research  and  power. 

Peru do 


July  21,1957 
May  18,1956 
Mar.  5,1957 
June  7,1957 
Mar.  16,1956 
July  3, 1957 
July   19,1957 


Source:  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  hearings,  "Development,  Growth  and  State  of  the  Atomic 
Energy  Industry,"  85th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  1958,  p.  79. 


164 


Providing  Working  Experience  with  Nuclear  Energy 

For  the  United  States  to  share  the  benefits  of  nuclear  energy  with 
other  countries,  particularly  those  of  Europe,  required  a  growing  cadre 
of  trained  scientists  and  engineers  in  those  countries.  One  way  to  ex- 
pose these  technologists  to  U.S.  nuclear  technology  was  for  them  to  be 
trained  at  and  work  in  the  laboratories  of  the  AEC.  Arrangements 
to  this  end  were  included  in  the  bilateral  agreements  for  cooperation. 
Another  way  was  to  encourage  the  installation  and  use  of  nuclear  re- 
actors abroad  which  would  provide  still  more  experience  for  local 
scientists  and  engineers.  Arrangements  to  this  end  were  negotiated 
by  the  AEC  and  the  Department  of  State  with  many  countries.  Some 
agreements  provided  for  help  in  obtaining  research  reactors,  others 
extended  to  demonstration  nuclear  power  plants.  The  latter  were  to  be 
of  particular  importance  for  fostering  commercial  nuclear  energy  in 
Europe. 

THE   RESEARCH    REACTOR   PROGRAM 

U.S.  efforts  to  get  research  reactors  into  the  hands  of  scientists  and 
engineers  abroad  began  November  5,  1054.  At  that  time  Ambassador 
Henry  Cabot  Lodge  announced  to  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  that  the 
United  States  was  prepared  to  negotiate  bilateral  agreements  with 
other  nations.  These  agreements  would  commit  the  United  States  to 
supply  technical  assistance  and  nuclear  fuel  materials  for  the  construc- 
tion and  operation  of  research  reactors.  By  the  end  of  1955,  the  AEC 
reported  that  agreements  for  the  exchange  of  information  on  design, 
const  ruction,  and  operation  of  research  reactor-  included  the  couut  ries 
Japan,  Lebanon,  Netherlands,  Pakistan,  the  Philippines,  Portugal, 
the  Republic  of  China,  Spain.  Switzerland.  Turkey,  and  Venezuela/0 

On  June  11.  1955,  President  Eisenhower  at  Pennsylvania  State  Uni- 
versity outlined  new  programs  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  U.S.  assistance 
to  other  nations  in  development  of  research  and  power  reactor  projects 
under  agreements  with  other  nations  or  through  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency.  For  research  reactors  the  President  proposed 
that  the  United  States* would  contribute  half  the  cost  and  furnish  the 
nuclear  fuel  needed.  lie  said  : 71 

We  propose  to  offer  research  reactors  to  the  people  of  free  nations  who  can 
use  them  effectively  for  die  acquisition  of  the  skills  and  understanding  essential 
to  peaceful  atomic  progress.  The  United  states,  in  the  spirit  of  partnership  that 
moves  as.  will  contrihute  half  the  cost.  We  will  also  furnish  the  acquiring  na- 
tion the  unclear  material  needed  to  fuel  the  reactor. 

To  keep  the  commitment  within  bounds,  the  arrangements  for  fi- 
nancing  set  a  limit  of  $350,000  upon  the  U.S.  contribution,  which  was 
to  he  paid  in  dollars  to  the  cooperating  nation  after  it  had  completed 
the  project  and  certified  the  completion.  By  the  end  of  1!K>7.  six  re- 
search reactors  of  US.  manufacture  were  in  operation  abroad  and  10 
others  were  under  construction  or  on  order.  The  total  US.  commitment 
at  thai  time  was  $2.4  million  for  the  research  reactor  projects. 

Some  doubts  and  insights:  Several  years  later,  in  1964,  the  Joint 
( Jommittee  \  oiced  some  reserval  ions  as  to  the  accomplishments  of  the 

7"  r  s.  Atomic  Energv  Commission,  Major  ictirities  in  the  Itomic  Energy  Programs, 
.lulu   December   1955    (Washington,   D.C. :  U.'S.  Government    Printing  Office,   1956),   p.   85. 

71  r.S  atomic  Energy  Commission,  Eighteenth  Semiannual  Report  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission    (Washington,   D.C. :   r.s.  Government    Printing  Office,   1055),  p.   13. 


165 


research  reactor  program.  By  then  a  total  of  26  grants  had  been  made 
to  12  countries  which  had  established  atomic  energy  programs.  While 
the  initial  purpose  of  this  program  had  been  to  provide  scientists  with 
working  experience  with  nuclear  reactors,  some  nations  sought  posses- 
sion of  a  research  reactor  as  a  symbol  of  national  prestige  although 
they  lacked  the  trained  scientists  to  operate  them.  The  AEC  was 
faced  with  a  touchy  international  issue.  Rather  than  offend  some  na- 
tions by  refusing  them  research  reactors,  the  AEC  often  installed  them 
in  countries  that  could  not  use  them  effectively.72 

Today  there  is  little  mention  of  these  research  reactors.  For  the  in- 
dustrial  countries,  they  have  served  their  initial  purpose  and  have 
been  bypassed  by  more  modern  reactors  for  experimentation  and  the 
training  of  nuclear  scientists  and  engineers:  for  the  developing  coun- 
tries the  reactors,  while  perhaps  a  mark  of  prestige,  did  not  appre- 
ciably accelerate  the  use  of  atomic  energy.  In  retrospect,  the  research 
reactor  program  raises  the  question  of  how  far  a  highly  industrialized, 
technological  nation  should  go  in  providing  sophisticated  equipment 
to  countries  lacking  the  personnel  or  the  industrial  base  to  use  it  effec- 
tively. There  is  also  the  question  of  the  extent  to  which  scientific  and 
technical  manpower  assigned  to  these  research  reactors  in  the  develop- 
ing nations  could  have  been  more  profitably  assigned  to  other  work  of 
greater  short  term  benefits. 

Fuel  for  research  reactors :  Initially  the  United  States  limited  its 
offer  to  supply  nuclear  fuel  for  research  and  test  reactors  to  material 
of  20  percent  enrichment  or  less,  which  could  not  be  readily  used  for 
clandestine  manufacture  of  nuclear  weapons.  By  1956,  the  desire  of 
the  industrial  nations  for  improved  research  and  test  reactors  had 
caused  the  United  States  to  announce  a  major  revision  in  policy  which 
permitted  the  export  of  uranium  enriched  up  to  90  percent  for  use  in 
special  testing  reactors.  This  raised  the  safeguards  issue.  The  United 
States  required  the  recipient  nations  to  accept  comprehensive  controls 
and  safeguards. 

Two  years  later,  in  1958,  this  policy  was  liberalized  when  the 
AEC  announced  that  highly  enriched  fuel  could  be  supplied  for 
research  as  well  as  test  reactors.  The  following  year,  in  1959,  the 
AEC  announced  its  intention  to  lease  such  materials  to  foreign 
countries  either  through  the  International  Agency  or  through  bilat- 
eral agreements. 

THE    POWER    REACTOR    PROGRAM 

If  the  United  States  wished  to  demonstrate  the  use  of  U.S.  nuclear 
power  technology  in  Europe,  it  had  to  attract  the  interest  of  European 
utilities.  The  "power  agreements"  were  the  means  to  this  end.  In  his 
June  11, 1955  announcement,  President  Eisenhower  said : 73 

72  The  USAEC  commented  on  this  as  follows  : 

During  the  recent  hearings  on  our  agreements  for  cooperation,  we  discussed  the  matter 
of  follow-up  on  the  research  reactor  grants  which  had  been  made  to  developing  countries. 
Information  on  these  grant  reactors  is  received  from  a  variety  of  sources  such  as  reports 
by  our  AEC  scientific  representatives,  reports  by  IAEA  technical  teams  and  consultants, 
and  reports  by  United  States  scientists.  From  these  reports  we  are  able  to  obtain  an 
idea  of  the  extent  to  which  these  reactors  arc  being  utilized.  In  general,  we  have  con- 
cluded that  these  reactors  are  making  a  contribution  to  the  scientific  program  of  the 
country  but  they  are  also  capable  of  being  used  to  a  greater  degree.  Cf.  U.S.  Congress, 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  International  Agreements  for  Cooperation, 
88th  Cong.,  1st  Sess..  1964,  p.  127. 

73  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Eighteenth  Semiannual  Report  of  the  Atomic 
Energy  Commission,  January-June  1955,  op.  cit.,  p.  13. 


166 


Within  prudent  security  considerations,  we  propose  to  make  available  to  the 
peoples  of  such  friendly  nations  as  are  prepared  to  invest  their  own  funds  in 
power  reactors,  access  to  and  training  in  the  technological  processes  of  construc- 
tion and  operation  for  peaceful  purposes. 

By  the  end  of  1955,  several  countries  had  initiated  negotiations  in 
response  to  this  invitation.  Early  in  1956,  negotiations  were  concluded 
with  the  governments  of  Australia,  the  Netherlands,  and  Switzerland 
for  the  iirst  bilateral  agreements  for  power  reactor  projects.  The  agree- 
ments provided  for  the  transfer  of  Restricted  Data  74  and  special  nu- 
clear materials.  They  also  provided  for  sale  of  nuclear  fuel  materials 
to  each  country,  with  the  United  States  retaining  an  option  to  the  plu- 
tonium  produced  and  the  right  to  approve  the  transfer  of  such  pluto- 
nium  to  any  other  nation  or  to  an  international  organization  if  the 
United  States  decided  not  to  exercise  its  option.  Additionally,  subject 
to  limitations  of  available  space,  facilities,  and  personnel,  the  United 
States  and  its  bilateral  partners  agreed  to  open  their  specialized  nu- 
clear research  facilities  to  each  other. 

The  first  bilateral  agreement  for  nuclear  power  development  also 
opened  the  way  for  direct  relations  between  representatives  of  the  U.S. 
nuclear  industry  and  private  individuals  and  organizations  in  the 
cooperating  nations,  thus  removing  the  AEC  as  a  direct  participant  in 
commercial  dealings.  Other  provisions  of  the  bilateral  arrangements 
provided  for:  75 

(1)  Patent  arrangements  covering  inventions  or  discoveries 
resulting  from  the  exchange  of  Restricted  Data; 

(2)  Security  and  safeguards  arrangements  to  protect  classified 
information  and  equipment  and  nuclear  materials; 

(3)  Future  consultation  about  transfer  of  rights  or  responsibil- 
ities of  the  agreement,  particularly  those  relating  to  safeguards 
to  the  International  Atomic  Energy  as  might  be  mutually  agreed 
upon,  and 

(4)  Disclaiming  of  any  warranty  by  the  communicating  Party 
on  the  accuracy  and  completeness  of  information,  material,  equip- 
ment or  devices  transferred  under  the  agreement  and  of  its  suit- 
ability for  any  particular  use  or  application. 

74  At  that  time  exchange  of  Restricted  Data  was  significant,  for  much  of  nuclear  power 
technology  was  still  classified  ami  unavailable  In  open  literature.  The  Restricted  Data  to 
lie  exchanged  Included:  (1)  general  Information  on  research  reactors,  experimental  and 
demonstration  power  reactors;  (2)  technical  Information  as  mighl  lie  agreed  upon  for 
specific  research  ami  demonstration  power  reactors;  and  (3)  the  exchange  of  classified 
information  on  reactor  materials,  specifications,  physics  and  engineering,  and  also  of 
environmental  safety  information.  Restricted  Data  of  military  Significance  were  not  to  be 
exch.i  aged. 

"  It  should  he  noted  that  this  disclaimer  was  also  used  by  the  UISAEC  for  information, 
materials,  devices,  services,  etc.,  that  It  supplied  to  the  domestic  nuclear  Industry  and 
so  was  not  unique  to  the  bilateral  agreements. 


167 


The  term  of  each  of  the  first  bilateral  agreements  was  10  years. 

By  l(.>r>7.  advancing  technology  of  nuclear  power  led  several  Euro- 
pean countries  to  the  initiation  of  negotiations  with  the  United  States 
for  the  transfer  of  large  quantities  of  nuclear  fuel  for  specific  power 
projects.  Such  arrangements  were  requested  by  the  governments  of 
France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Italy,  and  the  Union  of 
South  Africa.  Subsequent  bilateral  agreements  with  the  European 
nations  were  considered  as  interim  measures  pending  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Euratom  Supply  Agency. 

A  decade  later,  nuclear  power  was  so  far  advanced  in  Europe  that 
availability  of  nuclear  fuel  to  cover  long-term  requirements  for  nu- 
clear power  programs  became  a  subject  for  negotiation.  New  bilateral 
power  agreements  were  negotiated  which  committed  the  United  States 
to  supply  nuclear  fuel  over  a  term  of  30  years  to  Switzerland  and 
Sweden,  and  for  10  years  to  the  United  Kingdom.  These  agreements 
also  reflected  an  amendment  to  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  in  1064  76 
which  permitted  private  ownership  of  nuclear  fuel  materials,  opening 
the  way  for  wholly  commercial  transactions  between  companies  in  the 
U.S.  nuclear  industry  and  customers  abroad  in  countries  having  bi- 
lateral agreements  with  the  United  States.  These  new  agreements  also 
specified  that  the  IAEA  would  promptly  be  requested  to  assume  re- 
sponsibility for  applying  safeguards  to  the  material  transferred  under 
agreements.  In  addition,  the  agreements  committed  the  United  States 
to  supply  nuclear  fuel  materials  to  these  governments,  or  to  enrich 
uranium  supplied  by  them. 7? 

The  Bilateral  Agreement  Situation  in  1971 

At  the  end  of  1971,  the  AEC  had  in  effect  34  Agreements  for  Coop- 
eration in  Civil  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy  between  the  United  States 
and  other  nations  or  groups  of  nations.  These  agreements  covered  co- 
operation and  technical  assistance  in  the  development  of  peaceful  uses 
of  atomic  energy,  and  provided  for  the  supply  of  nuclear  materials, 
the  exchange  of  scientific  and  technical  information,  and  for  the  safe- 
guarding of  U.S.-supplied  nuclear  materials.  Table  II  listing  these 
agreements  as  of  1970  is  the  latest  list  published  by  the  AEC. 

■«  Public  Law  88-489,  78  Stat.  602. 

77  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Major  Activities  in  the  Atomic  Energy  Programs, 
January-December  1966  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1967), 
p.  263. 


168 


TABLE  II— INTERNATIONAL  AGREEMENTS  IN  1970 
BILATERAL  AGREEMENTS  FOR  COOPERATION  IN  THE  CIVIL  USES  OF  ATOMIC  ENERGY 

Effective      Termination 
Scope  date  date 

Country: 

Argentina Research  and  power ___ July  25,1969  July   24,1999 

Australia ...do... May  28,1957  May  27,1997 

Austria... do Jan.  24,1970  Jan.   23,2000 

Brazil Research... Nov.  9,1966  Aug.    2,1975 

Canada     .       Research  and  power July  21,1955  July   13,1980 

China,  Republic  of Research ...July  18,1955  July   17,1974 

Colombia do Mar.  29,1963  Mar.  28,1977 

Denmark do. July  25,1955  July   24,1973 

Finland Research  and  power July  7,1970  July     6,2000 

Greece           Research Aug.  4,1955  Aug.    3,1974 

India Power Oct.  25,1963  Oct.    24,1993 

Indonesia Research... Sept.  21,1960  Sept.  20, 1980 

Iran ..do Apr.  27,1959  Apr.  26,1979 

Ireland do July  9,1958  July     8,1978 

Israel do July  12,1955  Apr.   11,1975 

Italy      . Research  and  power Apr.  15,1958  Apr.   14,1978 

Japan do July  10,1968  July     9,1998 

Korea. Research Feb.  3,1956  Feb.     2,1976 

Norway Research  and  power... June    8,1967  June    7,1997 

Philippines ....do..    July  19,1968  July    18,1998 

Portugal. Research .July  19,1969  July    18,1979 

South  Africa. Research  and  power Aug.  22,1957  Aug.  21,1977 

Spain do Feb.  12,1958  Feb.  11.1988 

Sweden do... _ Sept.  15,1966  Sept.  14, 1996 

Switzerland do Aug.  8,1966  Aug.    7,1996 

Thailand Research Mar.  13,1956  Mar.  12,1975 

Turkey    do June  10,1965  June    9,1971 

United  Kingdom..- ....do July  21,1955  July   20.1976 

United  Kingdom.. Power July  15,1966  July   14,1976 

Venezuela.. Research  and  power .• Feb.  9,1960  Feb.     8.1980 

Vietnam Research July  1,1959  June  30.1974 

Special  arrangement: 

United  States-U.S.S.R... Memorandum  on  cooperation  on  the  peace-     Feb.  10,1970  Oec.  31,1971 

ful  uses  of  atomic  energy. 

United  States-Romania do Jan.  1,1969  Dec.  31,1970 

AGREEMENTS  FOR  COOPERATION  WITH  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS 

Organization: 

European    Atomic    Energy   Community    Joint  nuclear  power  program Feb.  18,1959     Dec.  31,1985 

(Euratom). 

Euratom Additional    agreement    to    joint    nuclear    July   25,1960     Dec.  31,1995 

power  program. 

International    Atomic    Energy    Agency    Supply  of  materials,  etc Aug.    7,1959    Aug.    6,1979 

(IAEA). 

Source:  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  for  1970,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1971,  appendix  6. 

Additional  N<  asures  to  Stimulate  Foreign  Inti  n  st  in.  Nuch  ar  Pan-,  r 
The  bilateral  power  agreements  provided  incentives  to  European, 
and  other  governments  to  push  ahead  with  use  of  nuclear  power.  I*.  S. 
measures  to  foster  this  interest  through  these  agreements  included 
allocations  of  fuel  materials,  firm  pricing  policies,  financial  aid  for 
purchase  of  nuclear  fuel,  authority  for  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  to 
deal  with  its  foreign  counterparts,  and  declassification  of  nuclear 
power  teclmology.  These  are  briefly  discussed  below. 

ALLOCATION  OF  NUCLEAR  II  EL  MATERIALS 

On  February  22,  L956,  at  the  recommendation  of  the  4EC  and  with 
the  Departments  of  State  nnd  Defense  concurring,  President  Eisen- 
hower announced  that  the  Government  would  make  available  40.000 
kilograms  of  uranium-235  t->  assist  industrial  power  development  and 
research  within  the  United  States  and  abroad.  Of  this  material,  20,000 


169 


kilograms  were  allocated  for  foreign  bilateral  partners  of  the  United 
States.  The  President  also  committed  the  AEC  to  recommend  alloca- 
tion of  additional  supplies  as  further  projects  undertaken  by  the 
domestic  nuclear  industry  and  by  other  nations  might  require.78  AEC 
Chairman  Strauss  described  this  action  as  the  most  important  step 
toward  peaceful  use  of  atomic  energy  since  revision  of  the  Atomic 
Energy  Act  in  1954.  Concurrently,  he  noted  that  the  action  affirmed 
the  United  States  intention  to  make  fuel  available  for  the  expected 
working  lifetime  of  bilateral  power  reactor  projects.79 

A  year  later,  in  July  1957,  the  President  approved  an  additional 
allocation  of  uranium-235  for  domestic  and  foreign  use,  bringing  the 
total  to  100,000  kilograms.  Of  this,  50,000  kilograms  were  allocated  for 
foreign  use.  Based  on  then  current  prices,  the  nuclear  fuel  allocated 
for  foreign  use  was  worth  about  $850  million.  The  AEC  has  been  care- 
ful to  emphasize  that  the  supplying  of  this  nuclear  material  was  not  a 
gift  and  that  payment  would  be  required. 

ESTABLISHING  PRICES  FOR  NUCLEAR  FUEL  MATERIALS 

If  the  commercial  nuclear  power  industry  in  Europe  was  to  use  U.S. 
nuclear  fuel  and  U.S.  nuclear  power  technology,  the  European  users 
had  to  know  what  they  would  have  to  pay  for  enriched  uranium.  The 
first  U.S.  announcement  of  prices  came  at  the  opening  of  the  first 
international  conference  on  atomic  energy  in  Geneva  on  August  8, 
1955.  There  the  AEC  announced  a  price  for  enriched  uranium  and 
also  prices  for  natural  uranium  and  for  heavy  water.80 

The  Geneva  announcement,  however,  was  indefinite  on  many  details. 
To  minimize  these  uncertainties,  the  President  announced  on  Novem- 
ber 18,  1956,  detailed  terms  and  conditions  for  U.S.  supply  of  nuclear 
fuel  materials.  In  a  subsequent  amplification  of  the  President's 
announcement,  AEC  Chairman  Strauss  said  that  this  measure  to 
accelerate  foreign  use  of  nuclear  power  under  Atoms  for  Peace 
included : 81 

(1)  Establishment  of  a  schedule  of  charges  for  uranium-235 
which  were  to  be  the  same  as  those  for  the  domestic  nuclear 
industry. 

(2)  Adoption  of  a  policy  of  assurances  to  bilateral  partners  of 
the  United  States  that  the  Commission  was  prepared  to  furnish 
uranium-235  in  quantities  based  on  estimated  fuel  requirements 
for  specific  nuclear  power  plants  for  periods  longer  than  10  years. 

(3)  Establishment  of  prices  that  the  Commission  would  pay 
for  plutonium  and  uranium  233  produced  in  foreign  nuclear  power 
reactors  which  used  United  States  fuel.  The  United  States  would 
use  nuclear  materials  so  acquired  only  for  peaceful  purposes. 

78  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Twentieth  Semiannual  Report  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  (Washington,  D.C  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1971),  p.  ix. 
78  Loc.  clt. 

80  The  price  set  for  uranium  enriched  up  to  20  percent  was  placed  at  $25  per  grnm  of 
uranium-235  contained  ;  natural  uranium  metal  was  priced  at'  $40  a  kilogram  ;  and  heavy 
water  at  $28  a  pound.  Cf.  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Major  Activities  in  Atomic 
Energy  Programs,  J uly-Decemher  1955  (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  1056).  p.  80. 

Heavy  water  at  the  time  was  a  key  material  for  one  kind  of  nuclear  power  re.ictor 
which  offered  improved  prospects  for  using  natural  uranium  for  fuel.  This  technology 
Is  currently  being  developed  and  used  by  the  Canadian  nuclear  power  Industry. 

81  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Radiation  Safety  and  Major  Activities  in  Atomic 
Energy  Programs,  July-December  1956  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  1057),  p.  339. 


170 


(4)  Reaffirmation  of  the  earlier  Commission  decision  to  pur- 
chase all  plutonium  and  uranium  233  produced  in  foreign  nuclear 
power  plants  from  fuel  supplied  by  the  United  States  through 
June  30, 1963,  subject  to  availability  of  appropriations. 

FINANCIAL  ASSISTANCE  FOR  FOREIGN   NUCLEAR  POWERPLANTS 

In  extending  special  incentives  to  encourage  foreign  use  of  nuclear 
power,  the  U.S.  Government  faced  a  dilemma.  On  the  one  hand  it  was 
well  established  that  the  AEC  should  treat  domestic  and  foreign  users 
of  nuclear  power  alike.  On  the  other,  special  incentives  were  seen  nec- 
essary to  induce  foreign  utilities  and  governments  to  risk  investment 
in  demonstration  nuclear  power  plants.  For  example,  it  would  have 
been  advantageous  to  lease  nuclear  fuel  to  foreign  users,  which  would 
have  offered  the  incentive  of  a  lessened  capital  outlay.  However,  at  that 
time  the  domestic  nuclear  industry  was  evolving  rapidly  toward  self- 
sufficiency  and  the  AEC  required  it  to  buy  enriched  uranium  outright 
rather  than  lease  it.  Likewise,  while  the  AEC  would  fund  research 
and  development  for  domestic  nuclear  power  demonstrations,  it  would 
not  share  in  the  requisite  capital  investment. 

The  dilemma  was  resolved  in  October  1956  by  providing  special 
assistance  to  foreign  nuclear  power  projects  through  a  different  chan- 
nel which  was  not  available  to  the  domestic  nuclear  industry.  The  AEC 
and  the  Export-Import  Bank  agreed  upon  joint  action  to  help  finance 
the  construction  of  nuclear  power  plants  in  nations  having  bilateral 
agreements  with  the  United  States.  This  arrangement  was  judged  nec- 
essary because  of  the  still  undemonstrated  economics  of  nuclear  power 
and  the  known  higher  capital  investment  required  for  nuclear  power 
plants  in  comparison  with  conventional  fossil  fueled  power  plants.  The 
Bank  announced  its  willingness  to  consider  applications  for  loans  to 
cover  the  capital  costs  of  nuclear  power  plants  for  privately  owned,  but 
not  state  owned,  utilities  abroad.  The  announcement  indicated  that  the 
terms  for  such  loans  would  be  similar  to  those  for  the  financing  of  con- 
ventional power  plants  for  which  equipment  and  technical  services 
were  obtained  from  the  United  States.  The  Bank  indicated  that  it 
would  require  the  following  for  a  nuclear  power  project:82 

(1)  A  comprehensive  engineering  survev  : 

(2)  A  technical  report  by  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy 
Commission; 

(3)  An  arrangement  for  supply  of  the  nuclear  fuel  for  the 
term  of  the  loan: 

(I)  Evidence  of  overall  financial  and  economic  soundness: 

(5)  Evidence  of  availability  of  funds  to  defray  the  costs  which 
must  be  met  with  local  currency :  and 

(6)  Assurance  as  to  the  ability  of  the  country  to  service  the 
dollar  debt  involved. 

The  Bank  made  clear  that  funds  so  loaned  could  be  used  only  to  buy 
equipment,  materials,  and  technical  services  from  the  U.S.  nuclear 
industry. 


-is     Atomic    Energy    Commission.    Radiation    Safety    and    Major    Activities    in    the 
Atomic  Pneryy  Programs,  July-December  J956,  op.  cit.,  p.  15. 


171 


FUEL    REPROCESSING    AND    WASTE    DISPOSAL 

Commercial  use  of  nuclear  energy  requires  many  auxiliary  technical 
services  and  products.  One  such  service,  the  reprocessing  of  used  nu- 
clear fuels,  received  special  attention  during  efforts  of  the  United 
States  to  stimulate  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe.  Since  a  key 
U.S.  incentive  was  the  offer  to  repurchase  plutonium  or  residual  ura- 
nium-235  from  European  power  reactors,  there  naturally  arose  the 
question  of  who  would  reprocess  these  fuel  materials.  The  question 
was  made  somewhat  more  complex  by  the  domestic  policy  of  the 
United  States,  which  sought  to  establish  a  self-sufficient  nuclear  in- 
dustry. During  the  1950s  one  missing  link  in  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry 
was  a  capability  to  reprocess  used  fuels  and  to  store  the  intensely  radio- 
active wastes  separated  from  the  used  nuclear  fuels. 

Domestic  policy  was  announced  by  the  AEC  on  February  18,  1957, 
when  it  committed  itself  to  contract  with  domestic  reactor  operators  to 
reprocess  their  fuel  through  June  30,  1967.  However,  as  the  AEC  at 
that  time  lacked  statutory  authority  to  extend  this  offer  to  foreign  re- 
actor operators,  there  remained  a  gap  in  the  technical  services  needed 
to  promote  nuclear  power  in  Europe.  In  1957  the  Commission  pro- 
posed to  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  that  the  Atomic 
Energy  Act  be  amended  to  authorize  the  Commission  to  enter  into  con- 
tracts to  reprocess  nuclear  fuels  from  foreign  power  reactors,  provided 
that  comparable  services  were  available  to  the  domestic  nuclear  in- 
dustry. The  Joint  Committee,  in  favorably  reporting  this  legislation, 
amended  it  to  require  that  the  term  of  such  reprocessing  contracts  be 
limited  to  the  term  of  the  bilateral  agreement  in  effect,  or  to  compa- 
rable periods  offered  to  the  domestic  nuclear  power  plants.  In  recom- 
mending this  action,  the  Joint  Committee  underscored  the  principle 
that  while  the  United  States  could  offer  technical  aid  and  assistance 
through  the  Commission,  it  could  not  offer  special  terms  and  conditions 
unavailable  to  the  domestic  nuclear  industry.83 

The  new  authority  was  not  used  until  after  nearly  5  years,  when 
the  first  return  shipment  of  used  nuclear  fuel  arrived  from  Sweden 
and  was  sent  to  the  AEC's  Idaho  Chemical  Processing  Plant.  The 
costs  of  processing  and  shipping  were  paid  by  Sweden,  which  in  turn 
received  credit  for  the  plutonium  and  residual  uranium-235  recovered 
from  the  fuel.84  The  intensely  radioactive  wastes  left  over  from  the  re- 
covery were  stored  at  the  Idaho  plant  with  similar  wastes  from  do- 
mestic fuel. 

Later,  when  commercial  nuclear  fuel  reprocessing  plants  began  to 
be  built,  the  AEC  negotiated  bilateral  agreements  wherein  it  had  the 
option  to  decide  whether  the  reprocessing  would  be  done  in  its  facilities 
or  in  those  of  the  domestic  nuclear  industry.  In  this  way  the  AEC 
hoped  to  expand  the  market  for  the  U.S.  fuel  reprocessors. 

While  much  was  made  of  the  arrangements  for  fuel  reprocessing 
during  the  late  1950's,  the  unexpectedly  slow  growth  of  nuclear  power 
in  Europe  and  the  high  cost  of  shipping  the  intensely  radioactive, 
used  nuclear  fuels  combined  to  limit  their  return  flow  to  the  United 


83  The  new  authority  was  given  to  the  Commission  in  Public  Law  85-681,  72  Stat.  632. 

H  U.S.   Atomic  Energv   Commission.   Annual  Report   to   Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 

Commission  for  1963   (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1964),  p.  236. 


172 


States.  These  factors,  in  turn,  have  limited  the  market  of  the  U.S. 
nuclear  fuel  reprocessors  and  also  have  kept  in  Europe  the  radioactive 
wastes  associated  with  the  used  fuels. 

AUTHORITY   FOR   THE   U.S.    NUCLEAR    INDUSTRY   TO    PROVIDE    NUCLEAR 

PRODUCTS    AND    ASSISTANCE 

Under  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946,  private  firms  of  the  infant 
U.S.  nuclear  industry  could  not  deal  directly  with  potential  customers 
in  Europe  but  had  to  work  through  the  AEC.  This  cumbersome  proc- 
ess was  not  suited  to  the  promotional  attitude  of  the  U.S.  industry. 
Soon  after  revision  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  in  1954,  the  AEC  an- 
nounced a  general  authorization  to  American  firms  and  individuals 
to  engage  in  any  unclassified  atomic  energy  activity  with  friendly 
countries  without  having  to  obtain  prior  AEC  approval.  This  au- 
thorization greatly  simplified  cooperation  between  the  domestic  nu- 
clear industry  and  its  potential  customers.  Specific  AEC  authoriza- 
tion was  still  required,  however,  before  an  American  firm  could  do 
anything  which  directly  or  indirectly  constituted  production  of  any 
special  nuclear  material  in  countries  of  the  Soviet  bloc.85  This  re- 
straint, in  effect,  precluded  export  of  technical  assistance,  products, 
or  power  plants  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

A  RELUCTANCE  TO  EXPORT  TECHNOLOGY 

The  essence  of  Atoms  for  Peace  was  a  commitment  to  share  the 
benefits  of  atomic  energy,  including  atomic  power,  with  friendly  na- 
tions. This  purpose  occasionally  has  come  into  conflict  with  the  prin- 
ciple that  certain  U.S.  nuclear  technologies  should  not  be  exported  be- 
cause of  potential-  threats  to  national  security  or  to  world  peace. 
Obviously  there  is  no  disagreement  over  control  of  weapons  technology, 
or  that  for  peaceful  nuclear  explosives.  But  borderline  cases  do  arise. 
One  example  is  to  be  found  in  the  export  of  unclassified  technology 
and  apparatus  for  the  reprocessing  of  used  nuclear  fuels.  Countries 
interested  in  large  scale  use  of  nuclear  power  inevitably  must  reprocess 
their  own  fuel  or  arrange  for  this  service  elsewhere.  However,  if  they 
build  their  own  reprocessing  facilities  there  arises  the  possibility  of 
unknown  or  illicit  diversion  of  recovered  nuclear  materials  to  weap- 
ons use,  or  into  a  black  market  for  stolen  nuclear  materials.  This  issue 
came  to  a  head  in  L966  when  foreign  interests  inquired  of  a  U.S.  com- 
pany about  fuel  reprocessing  technology.  The  company  provided  some 
information.  When  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  learned 
of  t  he  inquiry,  it  was  critical  of  t  he  transact  ion.  (  Jommittee  ( Ihairman 
Chet  Ilolilield  wrote  to  the  AEC  to  urge  that  no  non-nuclear  nation 
should  he  assisted  in  obtaining  information  and  technical  know-how 
on  reprocessing  technology  unless  that  nation  first  agreed  to  place  under 
IAKA  safeguards  any  fuel  reprocessing  facility  that  it  might  build.8' 

Responding  to  i  he  cril  icism,  A  E( '  <  Ihairman  Seaborg  agreed  on  the 
importance  of  bringing  reprocessing  facilities  abroad  under  IAEA 
safeguards.  He  informed  the  Joint  Committee  thai  the  AEC  was  un- 


i    S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Major  Activities  in  Atomic  Energy  Programs,  .July- 
Dec  mbt  r  1  95  5,  "p.  '-if ..  p   93. 

''  V  s.  Congress,  .Toinl  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  International  Agreements 
for  Cooperation — l'jcc,  89th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1966,  p.  187. 


173 


dertaking  a  study  to  determine  how  technical  assistance  by  private 
U.S.  firms  could  be  controlled  to  assure  that  safeguards  would  be  ap- 
plied to  the  facility  involved.  However,  such  information  was  unclas- 
sified and  AEC  regulations  for  years  had  permitted  its  export  to  coun- 
tries outside  of  the  Soviet  bloc.  He  suggested  that  the  AEC  might  find 
some  specialized  technical  items  needed  for  fuel  reprocessing  plants 
which  by  regulation  could  be  supplied  by  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry 
only  if  there  was  agreement  that  safeguards  would  be  applied.87 

The  most  recent  manifestation  of  this  conflict  in  purposes  came  in 
July  1972  when  the  AEC  published  new  regulations  that  forbade  U.S. 
companies  to  do  business  abroad  in  three  fields  of  nuclear  power-re- 
lated technology  unless  AEC  approved.88  The  new  rules  prohibited 
"directly  or  indirectly"  engaging  in  overseas  production  of  heavy 
water,  chemical  reprocessing  of  used  fuels,  or  enrichment  of  uranium. 
Xo  reasons  for  choosing  these  three  nuclear  technologies  were  given 
in  the  announcement. 

Safeguarding  Nuclear  Materials  Supplied  Through  Bilateral  Agree- 
ments 
U.S.  technical  assistance  for  nuclear  power  inevitably  involved  the 
supplying  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  to  foreign  countries.  Since  the 
technical  assistance  program  began  well  before  the  IAEA  came  into 
being,  there  was  the  question  of  how  the  United  States  would  assure 
itself,  and  the  world,  that  materials  it  supplied  would  be  adequately 
safeguarded  against  diversion.  The  question  was  answered  by  includ- 
ing provisions  for  U.S.-conducted  safeguards  in  the  bilateral  agree- 
ments and  also  a  provision  calling  for  consultation  with  the  United 
States  on  transferring  safeguards  of  U.S.  materials  to  an  international 
agency  when  it  was  formed.  U.S.  policy  for  control  over  U.S.  sup- 
plied nuclear  materials  was  established  by  the  AEC  in  consultation 
with  the  Department  of  State.  The  policy  provided  that : S9 

(1)  The  United  States  would  give  assistance  and  advice  to  the 
recipient  country  in  establishing  a  national  system  of  control 
over  materials  and  equipment,  including  adequate  materials  ac- 
countability and  physical  control  measures ; 

(2)  The  system  would  be  subject  to  audit,  appraisal,  and  verifi- 
cation by  United  States  personnel ; 

(3)  The  specific  measures  applied  in  auditing  and  verifying  the 
system  would  depend  upon  the  type  and  complexity  of  the  facili- 
ties involved  and  the  type  and  quality  of  the  material  involved; 
and 

(4)  AEC  staff  would  provide  assistance  and  guidance  to  co- 
operating countries. 

To  indicate  the  range  of  U.S.  safeguards  activities  for  its  bilateral 
agreements,  the  AEC  reported  that  in  1969  it  had  made  52  inspections 
of  facilities  in  five  countries.  These  inspections  included  the  first  in- 
spection of  the  unloading  of  fuel  from  a  reactor,  witnessing  the  first 
seals  to  be  applied  to  a  power  reactor,  and  inspection  of  a  reactor  fol- 
lowing a  radiation  incident.90 


"Ibirt.,  p.  187. 

*8  Federal  Register,  vol.  37.  July  26,  1972.  pp.  14870-1. 

"■'  T'.s.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Major  Actiritics  in  the  Atomic  Energi)  Programs, 
J a nn a rp -December  1959  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  OHice,  I960), 
p.  110. 

90  U.S.  Atomic  Energv  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1969    (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,   1970),  p.   60. 


174 


In  retrospect,  negotiation  and  administration  of  the  safeguards  pro- 
visions of  the  U.S.  nuclear  bilateral  agreements  has  proven  to  be  a 
unique  and  extraordinary  achievement  in  international  relations.  The 
technological  promise  of  nuclear  power,  reinforced  bv  incentives  and 
pressures  of  foreign  policy,  gave  the  United  States  the  unusual  right 
to  send  its  own  inspectors  into  foreign  jurisdiction  to  inspect  and 
verify  the  use  and  holding  of  U.S.  supplied  nuclear  materials.  That 
no  major  confrontation  has  arisen  from  the  administration  of  the 
safeguard  provisions  of  the  bilateral  agreements  gives  reason  for  some 
optimism  in  the  future  of  international  relations.  For,  despite  the 
arguments  and  analyses  of  those  who  consider  sovereign  rights  un- 
alterable, there  can  be  pragmatic  yieldings  and  accommodations  when 
this  is  sufficiently  in  a  nation's  interest, 

The  safeguards  provisions  of  the  U.S.  bilateral  agreements  were 
notable  also  in  that  they  prepared  the  way  for  giving  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency  practical  experience  in  administration 
of  safeguards.  While  details  are  given  in  later  sections  of  this  chapter, 
it  is  worth  noting  here  that  this  IAEA  experience  was  certainly  an 
important  factor  in  the  subsequent  negotiations  of  the  Xonp  ml  itera- 
tion Treaty  with  its  provisions  for  international  safeguards  to  be 
applied  by  the  IAEA. 

Conclusion  and  Current  Issues 

One  of  the  first  assignments  resulting  from  the  effects  of  the  dis- 
covery of  nuclear  fission  for  American  diplomacy  was  to  negotiate  and 
administer  a  web  of  bilateral  agreements  for  U.S.  technical  assistance 
to  foreign  nations.  Though  of  lesser  status  than  treaties  or  executive 
agreements,  they  nonetheless  obtained  for  the  United  States  unusual 
rights  not  available  through  the  more  traditional  and  presumably 
more  potent  and  durable  instruments  of  international  relations. 

The  bilateral  agreements  were  created  to  provide  special  technical 
assistance  to  foster  civil  use  of  nuclear  energy  abroad.  These  research 
and  power  agreements  demonstrated  an  effectiveness  for  supplying 
information,  materials,  equipment,  services,  training,  and  advisers  to 
nations  that  were  interested  in  nuclear  power.  The  power  agreements 
also  were  notable  in  the  rights  they  obtained  for  the  United  States  for 
control  and  safeguarding  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  and  certain  equip- 
ment. In  the  participating  nations,  inspectors  of  the  United  States  had 
access  to  the  places  where  U.S.  nuclear  materials  were  being  used  to  in- 
spect them  and  to  verify  their  quantities.  In  addition,  because  of  fore- 
thought of  U.S.  policy  and  the  work  of  the  diplomats  and  negotiators, 
the.  bilateral  agreements  had  provisions  which  ultimately  were  to  en- 
able the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  to  gain  useful  experi- 
ence with  working  safeguards. 

The  success  of  the  U.S.  bilateral  agreements,  however,  worked 
against  one  major  goal  of  Atoms  for  Peace.  Because  the  agreements 
provided  many  advantages  to  the  other  countries,  and  because  this  web 
of  agreements  obtained  for  the  United  States  influence  and  leverage 
that  it  otherwise  might  not  have  had,  there  has  been  a  reluctance  to 
shift  the  channel  for  U.S.  technical  assistance  for  nuclear  power  in 
Europe  and  elsewhere,  from  country-to-country  agreements  to  the 
International  Atomic.  Energy  Agency.  From  a' global  viewpoint,  it 
might  be  seen  that  the  United  States  and  other  world  leaders  in  nuclear 
power  are  in  competition  with  the  International  Agency  when  they 


175 


deal  directly  with  other  countries  in  supplying  technical  assistance. 
There  is  an  implied  balancing  of  advantages  to  goals  of  individual 
nations  versus  the  anticipated  advantages  of  a  strengthened  Interna- 
tional Agency. 

Assuming  that  it  is  in  the  best  interests  of  the  United  States  and 
world  peace  to  see  the  Xonproliferation  Treaty  operate  at  full  effec- 
tiveness, it  may  now  be  time  for  the  United  States  to  reexamine  the 
present  roles  of  bilateral  agreements  and  of  the  International  Agency 
as  the  means  for  furnishing  future  technical  assistance  and  incentives 
for  nuclear  power.  Channeling  more  U.S.  aid  through  the  IAEA  could 
be  expected  to  strengthen  the  agency.  However,  to  deemphasize  the 
present  network  of  bilateral  agreements  with  individual  nations  and 
with  multinational  bodies  such  as  Euratom  would  lose  for  the  United 
States  the  benefits  associated  with  direct  dealings. 

The  United  States  supplying  of  technical  assistance  in  nuclear 
energy  through  direct  agreements  between  the  United  States  and  other 
nations,  and  groups  of  nations,  has  been  successful  and  might  well 
provide  a  model  for  measures  to  accelerate  research  and  development 
for  fusion  and  other  new  sources  of  energy. 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1-13 


VI.  Creating  an  International  Nuclear  Organization:  The 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 

The  discovery  and  application  of  nuclear  energy  led  to  the  creation 
of  several  international  and  regional  organizations.  The  one  associated 
with  Atoms  for  Peace  is  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA).  This  section  of  the  study  has  to  do  with  the  diplomatic 
efforts  that  culminated  in  creation  of  the  new  International  Agency, 
and  in  the  evolution  of  U.S.  support  for  its  activities. 

IAEA  was  the  offspring  of  a  Wilsonian  idealism  reflected  in  Presi- 
dent Eisenhower's  proposal.  That  the  subsequent  evolution  of  the 
Agency  in  the  real  world  of  Bismarckian  relationships  falls  short  of 
these  ideals  should  not  mask  the  fact  that  of  all  the  participating 
nations,  the  United  States  has  cared  the  most  and  worked  the  hardest 
to  create  this  new  Agency,  and  that  the  burden  of  this  effort  has  been 
carried  on  by  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  and  the  Department 
of  State. 

The  International  Agency  is  open  to  virtually  all  the  nations  of  the 
world,  including  the  People's  Republic  of  China.91  Tt  has  been  shaped 
by  political  relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
as  well  sis  their  working  relationship  within  the  Agency.  These  rela- 
tions at  times  reflected  some  of  the  adversary  tensions  of  the  cold  war. 
and  fit  other  times  some  of  a  partnership  friendliness  of  "have" 
nations  in  relations  with  the  "have-not"  members  of  the  Agency. 

Still  evolving  are  the  relations  of  the  IAEA  with  the  Nuclear  Energy 
Agency  of  OECD  and  with  Euratom.  The  ultimate  fate  of  these  three 
bodies  and  their  roles  vis-a-vis  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe 
remain  to  be  determined.  Certainly  the  foreign  policy  decisions  and 
actions  of  the  United  States,  whether  passive  or  active,  will  influence 
their-  futures  and  thereby  the  future  of  nuclear  power  in  Europe. 

The  f .  I  /-.'- 1  /  a  Brief  Description 

The  Intel-national  Atomic  Energy  Agency  was  established  July  20, 
l!>r>7.  to  promote  the  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy.  It  is  an  inter- 
national organization  within  the  family  of  the  United  Nations,  report- 
ing annually  to  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  and.  in  appro- 
priate cases,  to  the  Security  Council  and  to  the  Economic  and  Social 
Council.  It  has  concluded  relationship  agreements  with  five  other 
specialized  agencies  of  the  United  Nations.  By  September  1!>7-_\  the 
number  of  member  states  in  IAEA  totalled  103;  they  included  all  of 
the  Common  Market  nations  and  other  nations  of  industrial  conse- 
consequence. 

-el  out   in  the  Statute,  the  principal  organs  of  the  Agency  are  a 
( reneral  (  inference,  t  he  Board  of  ( rovernors,  and  a  Secretariat  headed 

w  Countries  not  members  of  tlio  IAEA  are  North  Korea,  North  Vietnam,  .-ind  tlm  People's 
Republic  of  Germany,  which  are  nol  recojrnized  by  the  United  States.  A^  for  Chinn.  in 
.T un<-  1972  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  IAEA  recognized  mainland  China  as  the  definitive 
government,  thus  displacing  Taiwan.   Mainland  China   has  yet  to  apply  for  recognition. 

i  L76) 


177 


by  a  Director  General.  The  General  Conference  includes  representa- 
tives of  all  member  states.  The  Board  of  Governors  consists  of  25  mem- 
bers designated  by  the  outgoing  board  or  elected  by  the  General 
Conference.92 

Regular  expenses  of  the  Agency  are  met  out  of  assessed  contributions 
of  member  states.  The  revised  regular  budget  for  1972  rose  to 
$16,561,000.  There  are  also  voluntary  contributions  from  members  to 
finance  IAEA  technical  assistance.  In  1972  these  pledges  totalled 
$3,375,000.  The  United  States  furnishes  about  36  percent  of  the 
voluntary  f  imds. 

Changing  Goals  and  Situations 

President  Eisenhower's  plan  to  reduce  the  international  threat  of 
nuclear  weapons  would  divert  nuclear  explosive  materials  to  an  inter- 
national pool  of  materials  to  be  used  for  peaceful  purposes,  and  would 
create  an  international  agency  to  maintain  custody  of  that  pool  and 
to  enforce  a  credible  system  of  safeguards.  This  dramatic  and  innova- 
tive concept  of  nuclear  disarmament  did  not  long  survive.  One  observer, 
Harold  L.  Nieberg,  says  the  Atoms  for  Peace  initiative  quickly  became 
transformed  into  a  means  of  enlisting  the  support  of  the  U.S.S.R. 
to  dissuade  other  nations  from  manufacturing  their  own  nuclear 
materials  while  imposing  upon  them  (but  not  upon  the  two  principals) 
a  system  of  international  inspection  and  control  over  nuclear  power.93 

During  the  3%  years  of  diplomatic  and  legislative  effort  that  went 
into  creating  IAEA,  commercial  interest  in  nuclear  power  declined  as 
nations  realized  it  was  not  a  quick  and  easy  way  to  supply  energy  to 
Europe,  and  the  hope  of  diverting  substantial  quantities  of  nuclear 
materials  from  military  to  peaceful  uses  evaporated.  Nonetheless  in 
1957  AEC  Chairman  Lewis  Strauss  told  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  that  had  the  President  not  proposed  the  Inter- 
national Agency,  we  "should  be  at  pains  now  to  invent  it."  The  follow- 
ing excerpt  of  his  testimony  summarized  the  changes  which  had  so 
diminished  the  prospects  for  the  IAEA.  He  said : 94 

What  has  changed  in  3x/2  years  is  that  there  has  been  indefinable  improve- 
ment in  outlook,  a  revival  of  hope  for  a  future  in  which  an  atomic  cataclysm 
need  not  be  inevitable.  That  change  began  with  the  announcement  of  the  plans 
for  this  Agency.  It  is  built  upon  the  expectation  that  the  Agency  will  come  into 
being.  The  still-birth  of  the  Agency  can  plunge  the  world  back  into  darkness. 

There  is  another  change  that  has  come  about  in  the  same  period.  In  19.".°, 
uranium  was  still  a  rare  commodity.  A  few  nations  controlled  practically  all 
there  was  of  it,  so  far  as  we  then  knew.  Discoveries  of  large  new  deposits  have 
demonstrated  that  uranium  is  far  more  plentiful  and  more  widely  distributed 
than  we  ever  imagined. 

This  availability  of  fissionable  material  and  the  extraordinary  progress  i'i 
engineering  for  power  development  has  brought  other  nations  besides  the 
United  Kingdom,  Soviet  Russia  and  ourselves  into  the  atomic  power  situation 
and  will  continue  to  do  so. 

As  a  result  of  this,  I  would  submit  that,  had  the  President  never  proposed  the 
International  Agency,  we  should  be  at  pains  now  to  invent  it.  Let  me  be  spe- 
cific. With  time  the  operation  of  atomic  reactors  all  over  the  world  is  inevitable. 
It  can  no  more  be  prevented  than  one  could  restrict  or  prohibit  the  use  of  fire. 


82  In  1972  an  amendment  was  proposed  to  the  charter  to  increase  the  number  on  the 
Board  of  Governors  to  33.  The  amendment  was  awaiting  ratification  at  the  time  of 
writing. 

93  Harold  I,.  Xifherjr.  Nuclear  Seereeu  and  Foreign  Pollen  (Washington,  D.C  :  The  Public 
Affairs  Press,  1964).  p.  19. 

61  U.S.  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  Senate  Members  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Enercry,  Hearings,  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  85th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1957,  p.  84. 


178 


The  Fruits  of  Negotiation 

After  more  than  3  years  of  intense  U.S.  diplomatic  effort,  an  inter- 
national statute  was  produced  which  the  President  approved  on 
July  27,  1957.  This  effort  witnessed  the  unequal  interplay  between  the 
idealism  and  the  pragmatic  imperatives  of  international  relations.  The 
outcome  was  an  international  agency  that  reflected  only  modestly  the 
ambitious  and  idealistic  goals  expressed  by  some  groups  of  scientists 
for  Atoms  for  Peace.  In  December  1953  President  Eisenhower  had 
proposed  an  international  body  with  the  following  four  major  pur- 
poses : 95 

First — encourage  world-wide  investigation  into  the  most  effective  peacetime 
uses  of  fissionable  material,  and  with  the  certainty  that  they  had  ail  the  mate- 
rials needed  for  the  conduct  of  all  experiments  that  were  appropriate  ; 

Second — begin  to  diminish  the  potential  destructive  power  of  the  world's 
atomic  stockpiles ; 

Third — allow  all  peoples  of  all  nations  to  see  that,  in  this  enlightened  age,  the 
great  powers  of  the  earth,  both  of  the  East  and  of  the  West,  are  interested  in 
human  aspirations  first,  rather  than  in  building  up  the  armaments  of  war  ; 

Fourth — open  up  a  new  channel  for  peaceful  discussion  and  initiate  at  least 
a  new  approach  to  the  many  difficult  problems  that  must  be  solved  in  both  private 
and  public  conversations  if  the  world  is  to  shake  off  the  inertia  imposed  by  fear, 
and  is  to  make  positive  progress  toward  peace. 

In  1957  the  negotiations  produced  an  International  Statute  which 
specified  a  limited  goal  for  the  IAEA.  Article  II  specified  that : 

The  Agency  shall  seek  to  accelerate  and  enlarge  the  contribution  of  atomic 
energy  to  peace,  health,  and  prosperity  throughout  the  world.  It  shall  ensure, 
so  far  as  it  is  able,  that  assistance  provided  by  it  or  at  its  request  or  under  its 
supervision  or  control  is  not  used  in  such  a  way  as  to  further  any  military 
purpose. 

As  "military  purpose7'  is  nowhere  defined  in  the  Statute,  t  ho  mission 
of  the  International  Agency  is  general  enough  to  accomplish  as  little 
or  as  much  as  the  member  nations  might  desire. 

Arnold  Kramish,  an  observer  of  the  peaceful  atom  in  foreign  policy, 
notes  that  the  U.S.  negotiators  had  decided  early  in  the  negotiations 
to  postpone  the  idea  of  a  workable  pool  of  nuclear  materials.  De- 
emphasis  of  this  arms-control  function  of  the  Agency  also  deempha- 
sized  the  initial  safeguards  function.  Instead,  negotiators  began  to 
talk  of  a  "clearing-house"  function,  meaning  that  in  some  unspecified 
way  materials  for  future  bilateral  agreements  would  somehow  be 
channeled  through  the  International  Agency,  but  not  be  controlled  by 
it.  Ambassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge  gave  an  economic  reason  for  this 
change  in  role.  Interviewed  at  the  United  Nations  on  Noveml>er  6, 
1954.  he  said:  "Since  the  resources  of  the  Agency  obviously  will  be 
limited,  it  seems  more  useful  to  us  to  use  the  resources  available  to 
the  Agency  for  additional  programs  than  for  expensive  custodial 
arrangements."96  At  the  same  time,  he  said  that  the  United  States 
would  proceed  independently  with  its  bilateral  agreements  with  other 
countries,  rather  than  channel  them  through  the  new  Agency. 

Despite  the  limited  goals  finally  established  for  the,  International 
Agency,  the  official  U.S.  assessment  of  the  negotiations  was  optimistic. 
Secretary  Dulles  assured  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 
that  the  I  'nited  States  had  achieved  its  diplomatic  objective  of  obtain- 

"Dwlpht  D.  EiRenhower,  The  Atom  for  Progress  and  Pence.  Department  of  State  Publi- 
cation No.  5103  (Washington.  DC.  :  T'.S    Government  Printing  Office,  1954). 

99  The  New  York  Times,  November  6,  1054,  p.  6. 


179 


ing  the  adoption  of  the  U.S.-originated  draft  statute  without  substan- 
tial alteration  and  with  the  widest  possible  international  support. 
Despite  the  widely  differing  political  attitudes  and  stages  of  economic 
development  of  the  negotiating  nations  and  the  need  to  reconcile  their 
divergent  interests,  U.S.  negotiators  had  "kept  intact  every  element  of 
the  President's  proposals  without  sacrifice  of  substance  or  principle."  97 
U.S.  Ambassador  James  Wadsworth,  who  had  headed  the  U.S.  nego- 
tiations, concurred  in  Secretary  Dulles'  assessment.  Speaking  of  the 
statute  produced  by  the  U.S.  negotiators,  he  said : 98 

.  .  .  Functionally,  it  will  make  possible  an  Agency  with  broad  authority  to 
assist  in  research  and  development  in  the  peaceful  uses  field ;  possess  and  dis- 
tribute nuclear  materials ;  carry  out  the  pooling  of  such  materials  at.  the  request 
of  member  states  as  proposed  by  the  President:  establish  and  operate  its  own 
facilities:  organize  and  apply  a  system  of  minimum  safeguards  on  request  to 
bilateral  or  multinational  arrangements  or  the  atomic  energy  activities  of  a  mem- 
ber state ;  conduct  its  financial  management  on  a  flexible  but  business-like  basis 
in  the  interest  of  the  entire  membership ;  establish  an  appropriate  relationship 
with  the  United  Nations  and  other  international  organizations;  and  take  into 
consideration  recognized  standards  of  international  conduct  in  connection  with 
the  admission  of  new  members. 

THE  ROLE   OF  SCIENTISTS  IN  THE   NEGOTIATIONS 

Although  the  International  Agency  evolved  out  of  the  discovery  of 
fission  by  scientists,  the  scientific  community  had  relatively  little  part 
in  the  negotiations.  Individual  atomic  scientists  were  members  of  dele- 
gations to  the  negotiations  and  advised  the  diplomats.  Lacking,  how- 
ever, were  substantial  organized  attempts  by  the  scientific  community 
to  shape  the  functions  and  activities  of  the  Agency.  The  European 
nuclear  scientist.  Professor  Gunnar  Banders,  complained  in  I960." 

Scientists  do  not  generally  know  what  an  enormous  effort  lies  behind  the  cre- 
ation of  a  full-fledged  international  agency.  They  also  do  not  know  what  an 
irresistible  momentum  lies  in  international  organizations.  It  may  be  difficult  to 
create  one,  but  it  is  practically  impossible  to  terminate  one  in  peacetime.  It  is 
therefore  only  a  question  of  the  degree  of  usefulness  of  these  indestructible  giants 
which  can  be  influenced.  And  here  is  a  point  of  criticism  of  ourselves,  the  scien- 
tists and  technologists  of  the  world — we  have  not  as  a  group  realized  the  potential 
power  of  the  instrument  created,  and  have  failed  to  follow  up  with  action  our 
decade  of  speaking  and  writing  about  the  duty  of  scientists. 

With  few  exceptions,  we  have  not  even  tried  to  influence  the  selection  of  rep- 
resentatives of  our  countries  for  important  positions  in  the  Agency  organs.  No 
organized  attempt  by  scientists  has  been  made  to  make  the  Agency  promote  the 
ideas  or  the  programs  about  which  we  have  talked  and  written.  Scientists  who 
have  gone  there  have  usually  done  so  without  any  knowledge  of  the  real  purpose 
of  the  Agency.  Most  scientists  do  not  know  whether  the  Agency  needs  top-notch 
scientific  specialists  or  scientific  organizers  and  administrators.  The  last  question 
would  probably  be  answered  50-50,  one  way  or  the  other,  even  by  the  present 
Board  of  Governors. 

Some  Insights  From  Congressional  Review 

President  Eisenhower  sent  the  International  Statute  for  the  Inter- 
national Atomic  Energy  Agency  to  Congress  on  March  21,  1957.  The 
Senate  gave  its  advice  and  consent  to  ratification  on  June  18,  1957.  The 
arguments  and  reasons  advanced  in  support  of  the  International  Stat- 

97  U.S.  Senate.  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  Senate  Members  of  the  Joint  Com- 
mittee on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency, 
op.  eit,  p.  4. 

9RIbid.,  p.  46. 

"°  Gunnar  Randers  "The  Scientist's  View,"  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists  (April,  1960), 
p.  164. 


180 


ute  gave  further  insight  into  what  was  expected  of  the  IAEA  and 
what  benefits  were  expected  by  interests  of  the  United  States.  The 
Statute  was  the  subject  of  hearings  before  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  with  the  invited  participation  of  the  Senate  Mem- 
bers of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy. 

Secretary  Dulles,  Ambassador  Wadsworth  and  Chairman  Strauss 
of  the  AEC  carried  the  burden  of  advocacy  and  defense.  Their 
testimony  gives  many  insights  into  the  diplomatic  initiatives  of  the 
United  States,  and  into  U.S.  policy  for  commercial  nuclear  power  in 
Europe,  as  illustrated  in  the  following  sampling. 

In  terms  of  foreign  policy  advantages  to  the  United  States  Chairman 
Strauss  and  Secretary  Dulles  outlined  reasons  for  congressional  ap- 
proval of  the  International  Statute.  Approval  would :  10° 

(1)  Accelerate  nuclear  progress:  The  Agency  would  provide  a 
forum  for  the  exchange  of  discovery  and  invention  among  all 
nations. 

(2)  Provide  safeguards:  Provide  an  effective  system  of  safe- 
guards to  insure  the  development  of  atomic  energy  with  security. 

(3)  Enhance  nuclear  health  and  safety:  Protect,  through  in- 
ternational codes,  the  health  and  safety  of  those  increasing  num- 
bers of  persons  who  would  work  with  or  live  near  nuclear  estab- 
lishments. 

(4)  Improve  manpower  utilization:  Establish  a  pool  of  man- 
power resources  which  otherwise  could  be  a  limiting  factor  for 
the  peaceful  use  of  the  atom. 

(5)  Strengthen  control  of  nuclear  weapons:  Demonstrate  the 
feasibility  of  international  controls  and  safeguards  which  could 
have  a  constructive  impact  upon  negotiations  for  the  regulation 
and  reduction  of  armaments. 

(6)  Reduce  pressure  for  proliferation :  By  opening  the  develop- 
ment of  nuclear  power  to  international  scrutiny,  the  Agency  could 
reduce  internal  pressure  within  nations  to  develop  their  own  nu- 
clear weapons  because  of  suspicion  of  the  nuclear  activities  of 
their  neighbors. 

(7)  Improve  the  climate  of  international  r<  1  at  ions:  Initiate  co- 
operation with  the  Soviet  Union  which  could  have  a  favorable 
impact  upon  the  climate  of  international  relations.  "The  splitting 
of  the  atom  might  conceivably  lead  to  a  unifying  of  the  now  di- 
vided world."  1(il 


™  Ibid.,  pp.  4-5 


181 


In  his  summation  of  these  advantages  Secretary  Dulles  described 
the  potential  of  the  proposed  Agency  : 

.  .  .  for  economic  development  of  large  areas  of  the  world  ;  for  cooperation  with 
other  nations,  including  the  Soviet  Union,  in  ways  which  will  reduce  interna- 
tional tension  and  promote  the  practice  of  peaceful  and  constructive  collabora- 
tion ;  for  encouraging  peaceful  use  of  the  atom  and  averting  the  spread  of  nu- 
clear military  potential  to  additional  countries ;  and  for  giving  the  nations  ex- 
perience with  a  system  of  international  safeguards  which  could  build  confidence 
and  further  the  prospects  of  disarmament.102 

LIMITATIONS  UPON"  THE  U.S.  COMMITMENT 

Assurances  were  also  offered  that  U.S.  commitment  of  support  was 
small.  Secretary  Dulles  emphasized  that  the  Agency  would  not  be  a 
"giveaway  organization"  for  U.S.  nuclear  fuel  materials.  Countries 
receiving  materials  from  the  Agency  would  have  to  pay  for  them. 
Moreover,  there  was  no  U.S.  commitment  in  the  Statute  to  supply 
nuclear  materials.  The  supply  of  materials,  services,  or  equipment  was 
a  voluntary  matter,  and  the  Agency  had  no  authority  to  require  a 
member  to  supply  anything.  Also,  the  United  States  would  pay  no 
more  than  its  share  of  the  administrative  expenses  of  the  Agency. 
Neither  would  the  IAEA  become  a  giveaway  organization  for  U.S. 
atomic  secrets.  It  would  distribute  only  that  information  on  nuclear 
energy  which  was  free  of  security  restrictions.  Finally,  any  nuclear 
fuel  materials  distributed  would  be  unsuitable  for  weapons. 

As  a  gesture  of  U.S.  support  for  the  International  Statute,  Chairman 
Strauss  at  the  closing  session  of  the  United  Nations  conference  on  the 
final  draft  Statute  delivered  a  message  from  President  Eisenhower 
announcing  that  the  United  States  would  make  available  (but  not 
give)  to  the  International  Agency  5,000  kilograms  of  uranium-235, 
an  amount  sufficient  to  fuel  three  to  five  nuclear  power  plants  for  their 
working  lifetime.  Furthermore,  the  United  States  offered  to  match 
additional  allocations  of  nuclear  materials  to  the  Agency  by  all  other 
member  nations.103 

The  offers  received  close  congressional  scrutiny  to  make  sure  they 
did  not  constitute  a  subsidy  to  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe. 
Senator  Hickenlooper  questioned  Secretary  Dulles  pointedly,  inquir- 
ing where  the  recipient  countries  would  get  the  money  to  pay  for 
this  fuel  material.  Mr.  Dulles  speculated  that  recipients  might  find 
the  money  in  the  foreign  exchange  they  would  otherwise  have  to 
spend  to  import  fuel.  In  any  event,  there  was  nothing  in  the  Inter- 
national Statute  which  directly  or  indirectly  committed  the  United 
States  to  finance  the  costs  of  the  uranium.  The  recipient  countries 
would  have  to  pay.104  Chairman  Strauss  was  even  more  emphatic : 105 

The  United  States  has  not  offered  to  make  a  gift  of  those  materials  to  the 
Agency.  The  President's  statement  explicitly  speaks  of  "terms"  to  be  agreed 
upon.  Articles  9,  II,  and  13  of  the  Agency  statute  likewise  provide  specifically 
for  reimbursement.  In  any  event,  the  advice  and  authorization  of  Congress  would, 
of  course,  be  sought  before  any  gift  were  made  to  the  Agency,  or  to  any  nation  or 
group  of  nations,  should  such  a  gift  appear  advisable  at  some  future  date. 


182  Ibid.,  p.  6. 

103  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Radiation  Safety  and  Major  Activities  in  the  Atomic 
Energy  Programs,  July-December  1956,  op.  cit.,  p.  12. 

104  U.S.  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  Senate  Members  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  op.  cit..  ».  49. 


Agency,  op.  cit..  p.  49. 
105  Ibid.,  p.  92. 


182 


WARNINGS  OF  CONSEQUENCES  OF  FAILURE  TO  RATIFY 

Secretary  Dulles  advised  Congress  that  failure  to  ratify  the  Inter- 
national Statute  would  be  disastrous.  The  injury  to  the  prestige  and 
influence  of  the  United  States  in  the  world  would  be  of  ''incalculable 
proportions."  106 

Failure  to  adopt  the  Statute  would  pass  the  atomic  initiative  to  the 
Soviet  Union  or,  more  likely,  destroy  the  project.  He  said : 107 

This  is  essentially  a  made-in-America  project.  It  is  one  which  has  caught  the 
imagination  of  the  peoples  of  the  world,  and  for  us  to  he  the  nation  that 
rejected  it  would  have  very  fateful  consequences  indeed. 

Whether  or  not  the  project  would  survive  that  I  douht.  The  only  nation  that 
could  make  it  survive  would  be  the  Soviet  Union  which  is  the  only  other  nation 
which  has  sufficient  quantities  of  this  material  to  make  it  a  viable  project. 

The  Soviet  Union,  recognizing  that  this  was  a  project  which  greatly  enhanced 
the  prestige  of  the  United  States,  sought  for  about  2  years  to  block  it  and 
thwart  it.  They  finally  saw  it  was  going  ahead  anyway,  and  then  apparently 
adopting  the  old  political  slogan  "If  you  can't  lick  'em,  join  'em,"  they  have 
now  become  very  active  in  trying  to  join  up  and  to  try  to  give  a  certain  leadership 
of  its  own  to  the  movement. 

I  think  however,  if  we  did  not.  ratify  the  treaty,  the  whole  effort  would 
collapse  and  the  responsibility  for  that  collapse  would  of  course  be  clearly 
pinned  on  to  us,  and  it  would  involve  a  blow  to  our  prestige  and  influence  in 
the  world  of  almost  incalculable  proportions. 

The  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  Participation  Act  of  1957 

The  resolution  giving  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  to  the 
ratification  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  was  adopted 
by  the  Senate  on  June  18,  1957.  On  June  19,  a  bill  to  provide  for  the 
participation  of  the  United  States  in  the  activities  of  the  Agency  was 
introduced.  Hearings  began  on  July  2  by  the  Joint  Committee  on 
Atomic  Energy,  which  were  held  to  complement  hearings  of  the 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  when  it  acted  on  the  resolution  recom- 
mending that  the  Senate  give  its  advice  and  consent  to  the  ratification 
of  the  statute. 

The  participation  Act,  Public  Law  85-177  (71  Stat.  453)  is  similar 
to  the  participation  Act  providing  for  representation  of  the  United 
States  at  the  United  Nations  and  also  at  other  specialized  interna- 
tional agencies.  The  Act  permits  the  President  to  name  the  repre- 
sentatives and  deputy  representatives  of  the  United  States  to  the 
IAEA  Board  of  Governors  and  the  General  Conference,  and  to  the 
other  organs  of  the  Agency.  The  representatives  and  deputy  repre- 
sentatives are  appointed  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate. 
The  represental  ives  are  to  vote  and  act  in  accordance  with  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  President.  The  Act  also  authorizes  the  payments  of  the 
United  States  share  of  the  annual  budget  of  the  Agency  and  included 
provisions  to  encourage  Federal  employees  to  go  with  the  Agency.108 

To  be  sure  that  the  nuclear  materials  distributed  to  the  Agency  are 
not  a  ''giveaway.'1  they  are  required  to  be  paid  for  at  no  less  than  the 
charges  established  for  domestic  use.  While  the  President's  offer  of 
5,(  K)0  kilograms  of  \  235,  together  with  matched  amounts  of  materials 
that  might  be  made  available  to  the  Agency  by  other  members,  was 

w»Ibid.,  pp.  14   15. 
'"■  Ibid.,  p.  i  t 

""•  Federal    employees    serving   with    tlio    IAEA    .ire    given    3-year    prntootlon    on    Civil 
Service  retirement,  life  Insurance,  and  reinstatement  r i^u < s  in  tnelr  positions. 


183 


authorized  by  the  Act,  these  materials  must  be  distributed  to  the 
Agency  under  agreements  for  cooperation.  These  provisions  pre- 
vented the  AEC  from  furnishing  nuclear  materials  wholesale  to  IAEA 
which  might  then  act  as  ia  broker  and  finance  its  fuel  supply  function 
by  charging  a  brokerage  fee  while  still  keeping  the  price  paid  by 
the  recipient  no  more  than  would  have  been  charged  for  direct  purchase 
from  the  United  States.  There  was  one  exception.  The  AEC  could 
assist  and  encourage  research  on  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy  or 
medical  therapy  by  distributing  without  charge  during  any  year 
material  valued  at  not  more  than  $10,000  in  the  case  of  one  nation, 
or  $50,000  for  any  group  of  nations.  Foreign  distribution  of  nuclear 
materials  exceeding  the  5,000  kilograms  ottered  by  President  Eisen- 
hower would  require  congressional  approval. 

The  Act  required  the  President  to  report  annually  to  Congress  on 
the  International  Agency  and  U.S.  participation ;  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  AEC  were  directed  to  keep  the  Joint  Committee  on 
Atomic  Energy  and  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  cur- 
rently informed.109  To  prevent  unacceptable  changes  in  the  Interna- 
tional Statute,  the  Act  required  that  in  the  event  of  an  amendment 
which  the  Senate  disapproved  by  a  formal  vote,  all  authority  for 
U.S.  participation  would  terminate. 

Bilateral  Agreements  and  the  IAEA 

When  Congress  authorized  U.S.  participation  in  the  International 
Agency,  the  AEC  had  had  almost  three  years  of  experience  with 
negotiating  and  administering  bilateral  agreements  to  foster  the  civil 
use  of  nuclear  energy.  Considering  that  the  International  Agency,  in 
its  watered-down  version,  was  to  serve  in  part  as  a  clearing  house, 
would  the  United  States  shift  its  emphasis  from  the  bilateral  agree- 
ments and  deal  with  other  countries  through  the  Agency  ?  This  the 
United  States  chose  not  to  do. 

When  Congress  approved  U.S.  participation  in  the  IAEA,  the 
United  States  already  had  bilateral  agreements  with  some  40  coun- 
tries. Most  of  these  were  for  nuclear  research  with  a  few  for  nuclear 
power.110  Secretary  Dulles  and  the  State  Department  were  inclined 
toward  channeling  U.S.  aid  through  the  International  Agency.  Sec- 
retary Dulles  advanced  three  reasons  for  this: 

(1)  Although  the  bilateral  agreements  included  adequate  pro- 
visions for  safeguards,  unless  there  was  an  international  agree- 
ment on  common  standards,  future  competition  among  supplying 
nations  for  the  nuclear  fuel  market  would  almost  certainly  erode 
the  safeguards  of  the  bilateral  agreements; 

(2)  Nations  with  bilateral  agreements  with  the  United  States 
for  development  of  nuclear  power  would  not  indefinitely  accede 
to  U.S.  inspection  of  the  nuclear  powerplants.  "They  will  accept 
international  supervision  indefinitely,  but  they  will  not,  I  think, 
indefinitely  accept  mere  inspection  by  another  nation." 11X  and. 

109  This  annual  reporting  requirement  was  terminated  In  1965  by  Public  Law  S9-34S. 
79  Stat.  1310. 

110  At  that  time,  negotiation  with  4S  nations  had  produced  44  agreements  for  cooperation 
with  42  nations.  Of  these,  34  were  in  force — 29  for  research  and  5  for  power.  The  remaining 
10  agreements  were  awaiting  completion.  Fifteen  of  the  participating  nations  were  Euro- 
pean, with  all  of  the  Common  Market  nations  represented. 

111  U.S.  Congress.  Senate,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  Senate  Members  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  op.  cit.,  p.  66. 


184 


(3)  The  United  States  lacked  adequate  technical  personnel  to 
meet  all  potential  needs  for  inspection.  It  would  be  preferable  to 
avoid  this  drain  by  sharing  the  task  with  others. 

While  the  State  Department  testimony  indicated  that  the  United 
States  would  probably  continue  to  use  bilateral  agreements,  it  sug- 
gested also  that  bilateral  agreements  should  not  be  made  a  more  attrac- 
tive source  of  these  materials  than  the  International  Agency.  The 
United  States  had  a  moral  obligation  to  be  a  good  member  of  the 
Agency  and  to  try  not  to  undermine  it.112 

Chairman  Stra'uss  clearly  favored  use  of  bilateral  agreements.  The 
United  States,  he  testified,  should  not  abandon  these  direct  agreements 
with  other  countries  when  the  Agency  came  into  existence,  or  at  any 
time  in  the  foreseeable  future.  He  anticipated  that  the  Agency  would 
stress  activities  in  which  many  nations  had  a  direct  interest  and  in 
which  the  greatest  progress  could  be  made  by  a  multinational  ap- 
proach. At  the  same  time,  the  United  States  through  bilateral  agree- 
ments would  be  able  to  extend  to  individual  countries  nuclear  coopera- 
tion which  .  .  .  conforms  more  precisely  to  our  traditional  and  spe- 
cial relationship  with  those  particular  countries."  113  He  did  acknowl- 
edge possibilities  of  some  resistance  to  bilateral  agreements.  Some 
countries,  he  said,  had  not  responded  to  U.S.  overtures  to  enter  into 
bilateral  agreements  with  them.  However,  these  nations  had  shown 
their  willingness  to  accept  from  an  international  agency  limitations 
on  their  sovereignty  unacceptable  from  the  United  States.114 

A  Bilateral  Agreement  With  the  IAEA  and  Three  Policy  Question* 
As  authorized  by  the  IAEA  Participation  Act,  the  AEC  began  to 
negotiate  a  bilateral  agreement  with  the  International  Agency.  The 
negotiations  took  almost  2  years.  An  agreement  for  cooperation  was 
finally  signed  at  Vienna  on  May  11,  1959,  and  entered  into  force  on 
August  7, 1959. 

During  the  negotiations  IAEA  became  aware  that  it  had  no  major 
role  in  the  development  of  nuclear  power.  Its  first  Director  General. 
W.  Sterling  Cole,  who  had  resigned  from  his  post  as  Chairman  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  to  take  this  post,  strove  to  carve 
out  roles  for  the  Agency  as  a  channel  for  atomic  energy  aid.  and  as  a 
proponent  of  international  safety  codes  and  standards  and  interna- 
tional controls  for  nuclear  fuel  materials.  When  the  United  States  did 
not  respond  to  his  vision  of  a  strong  International  Agency,  he  became 
a  strong  critic  of  U.S.  policy  toward  the  Agency. 

One  example  of  Mr.  Cole's  ideas  serves  to  illustrate  the  gap  between 
expectations  and  performance  for  IAEA.  On  March  9,  1959,  before  a 
conference  of  the  American  Association  for  the  United  Nations,  Direc- 
tor General  Cole  asked  three  questions  of  policy  which  indicated  both 
his  vision  of  what  the  Agency  should  Ik>,  and  the  shortfall  from  his 
hopes.  He  asked  : 115 

Shall  tlif  atomic  energy  contribution  of  the  technologically  advanced  and  ma- 
terially endowed  nations  to  other  countries  in  the  world  be  given  and  applied 
through  truly  International  channels;  or  shall  we  continue  to  channel  such  aid 


"-  Ibid.,  p.  165. 

»»  Ibid.,  p.  86. 

"*  Ibid.,  i».  116. 

118 Quoted  l>y  Senator  Clinton  Anderson,  Jn  U.S.  Oonpross,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy,  Hearings,  Agreement  for  Cooperation  Between  th<-  united  states  and  the  Inter- 
national Mnmic  Energy  Agency,  86th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1959,  pp.  8-10. 


185 


through  networks  of  bilateral  agreements  for  selective  nation-to-nation  exchange 
without  benefit  of  the  balance  wheel  of  international  considerations? 

Shall  the  peacetime  production  and  utilization  of  nuclear  materials  around 
the  world  be  carried  out  under  international  codes  and  standards  for  health  and 
safety,  or  shall  we  permit  the  peaceful  exploitation  of  atomic  energy  under  vary- 
ing, perhaps  conflicting,  and  certainly  confusing,  and  only  partially  effective,  na- 
tionally imposed  standards  for  health  and  safety? 

Shall  the  nations  seek  in  unison  to  establish  and  maintain  uniform,  prac- 
tical rules  to  prevent  the  diversion  for  military  purposes  of  nuclear  materials 
supplied  for  peaceful  use,  or  shall  we  dangerously  and  foolishly  let  any  and  all 
supplying  countries  of  such  nuclear  materials  make  their  own  rules  and  apply 
them  as  they  deem  desirable  under  unpredictable  conditions  of  international 
competition? 

In  1959  Senator  Anderson  of  the  Joint  Committee  put  these  ques- 
tions to  the  AEC  during  hearings  on  the  bilateral  agreement  with  the 
IAEA,  but  received  inconclusive  answers.  State  Department  witnesses 
addressed  only  the  issue  of  bilateral  agreements,  and  defended  their 
continued  use  because  other  countries  asked  for  them.116 

In  1972,  with  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe  and  elsewhere 
apparently  ready  for  substantial  growth,  Director  General  Cole's  sec- 
ond and  third  questions  assume  greater  relevance. 

U.S.  Participation  in  the  IAEA 

As  with  other  international  organizations  in  the  years  following 
"World  War  II,  the  United  States  has  been  the  largest  single  contribu- 
tor to  the  funding  of  the  International  Agency,  regularly  financing 
about  one-third  of  its  administrative  costs,  and  much  higher  percent- 
ages of  voluntary  operational  funding.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether 
the  present  scale  of  IAEA  operations  will  be  adequate  for  the  future 
when  its  international  safeguards  responsibilities  under  the  Nonpro- 
life ration  Treaty  become  fully  operational.  There  already  have  been 
some  signs  of  concern  that  the  United  States  will  be  expected  to  finance 
much  of  this  increase  in  costs  in  the  future,  as  it  has  many  U.N.  field 
activities. 

INITIAL  U.S.  SUPPORT 

At  the  first  IAEA  General  Conference  in  1957  AEC  Chairman 
Strauss  announced  that  the  AEC  was  preparing  a  program  of  detailed 
assistance  and  cooperation  which  might  include  offering  to  IAEA  a 
research  reactor,  an  isotopes  laboratory,  and  a  comprehensive  technical 
library.  In  addition  to  formal  restatement  of  President  Eisenhower's 
offer  of  5,000  kilograms  of  uranium-235,  Chairman  Strauss  announced 
that  the  AEC  would  match  offers  of  20  kilograms  of  U-235  made  by 
the  United  Kingdom,  50  kilograms  made  by  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
100,000  kilograms  of  normal  uranium  oxide  concentrate  made  by 
Portugal.  Subsequently,  at  the  first  meeting  of  the  IAEA  Board  of 
Governors  in  January  1958,  the  United  States  summarized  its  prof- 
fered support  as  follows : 

(1)  Cost-free  services  for  limited  periods  of  20  to  30  expert  con- 
sultants for  use  in  the  Agency's  surveys  of  programs  in  member 
countries. 


116  A  State  Department  spokesman  commented  : 

When  we  get  requests  from  countries  to  enter  into  bilateral  agreements,  we  acknowledge 
those  requests  and  we  attempt  to  accommodate  them.  We  cannot  very  well  spurn  the 
Approaches  of  other  countries  when  they  come  to  us  seeking  bilateral  agreements.  So  that, 
whereas  we  continue  to  enter  into  them  when  we  are  requested,  I  think  it  is  fair  to  say 
that  it  is  not  our  policy  to  push,  so  to  speak,  bilateral  agreements  at  the  present  time. 
On  the  contrary,  we  attempt  wherever  possible  to  direct  other  countries  to  and  through 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  Ibid.,  p.  9. 


186 


(2)  Grants  matching  contributions  of  other  member  nations 
up  to  $125,000  for  an  IAEA  fellowship  fund ; 

(3)  Approximately  120  fellowships,  at  an  estimated  cost  of 
$840,000,  over  the  following  two  years,  for  education  and  training 
in  nuclear  science  in  the  United  States ; 

(4)  Two  mobile  radioisotope  training  laboratories ; 

( 5 )  A  research  reactor ; 

(6)  An  isotopes  laboratory.117 

TRENDS   IN   U.S.    SUPPORT 

For  the  10  calendar  years  1960  through  1970,  the  United  States 
contributed  $28  million,  or  about  one-third  of  the  IAEA's  adminis- 
trative budget,  and  $10.5  million,  or  about  one-half  of  its  voluntary, 
special  programs  budget.  Details  of  U.S.  funding  appear  in  Table  III. 

By  way  of  comparison,  the  U.S.  shares  in  the  costs  of  United  Na- 
tions operations  through  assessed  payments,  which  amount  to  31.5 
percent  of  the  total,  and  voluntary  contributions,  which  vary  from 
10  to  55  percent  of  the  total  of  individual  programs  and  agencies. 
Assessed  payments  are  authorized  and  appropriated  to  the  Department 
of  State  and  voluntary  contributions  are  authorized  by' the  Foreign 
Assistance  Act  and  are  separately  appropriated. 

At  the  time  of  writing,  the  matter  of  determining  what  is  a  "fair 
share"  of  U.S.  costs  in  international  organizations  is  a  matter  of 
congressional  debate,  both  as  to  assessed  dues  and  to  contributions. 
The  Senate  Appropriations  Committee,  for  example,  recently  ex- 
pressed its  views  that  U.S.  share  of  such  costs  should  amount  to  20 
to  :>0  percent  of  the  total.  A  sense  of  the  Senate  amendment  to  the 
Foreign  Aid  and  Assistance  Act  for  FY  1072  called  for  the  total  U.S. 
contribution  to  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  including 
in  kind  contributions,  not  to  exceed  31.5  percent  of  the  total,  world- 
wide contribution.  The  Senate  Appropriations  Committee  in  1072 
expressed  a  hope,  that  other  countries  would  increase  their  contribu- 
tions to  international  organizations  coupled  with  a  more  realistic 
effort  on  their  part  to  provide  for  their  multilateral  and  their  in- 
dividual defense.118 

The  Senate  Appropriations  Committee  while  calling  for  redis- 
tribution of  support  for  international  agencies  among  member  states, 
with  a  smaller  U.S.  share,  recognized  the  advantages  of  multi- 
lateral assistance  programs.  It  mentioned  the  following,  saying:  119 

As  justified  to  the  committee  multilateral  assistance  programs  have  a  number 
of  advantages : 

They  promote  a  wider  sharing  of  the  burden  of  development  assistance  : 

They  reduce  the  political  friction  that  can  arise  from  reliance  on  bilateral 
contacts  in  the  most  sensitive  affairs  of  nations,  such  as  population  and  family 
planning,  the  production  of  and  traffic  in  dangerous  drugs,  and  surveys  of  min- 
erals with  strategic  implications  ; 

They  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the  world  development  effort  by  providing 
for  the  pooling  of  knowledge  and  expertise  for  solving  development  problems  : 

They  can  operate  in  areas  of  political  tension  such  as  the  Middle  East,  where 
Individual  nations  are  often  unable  to  function,  even  in  providing  essential 
humanitarian  assistance. 


117  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Research  from  Power  from  Fusion  and  Other 
Major  Activities  in  the  Atomic  Energy  Program*,  January— June  1958,  op.  cit.,  p.  25. 

•"U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  Committee  on  Appropriations,  Foreign  Assistance  and  Related 
Programs  Appropriations  Pill,  19T3,  92d  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1972,  Sen.  Rept.  92    1231.  p.  42. 

119  Loc.  cit. 


Amount 

Percent 

Amount 

Percent 

$1,900 

32.51 

$500 

50.00 

1,942 

32.43 

631 

50.00 

1,775 

32.27 

690 

50.00 

2,157 

32.02 

1,192 

50.00 

2,238 

31.93 

1,179 

50.00 

2.338 

31.84 

990 

45.00 

2,519 

31.91 

903 

40.00 

2.813 

31.87 

984 

37.50 

3.294 

31.86 

1,000 

35.00 

3,  374 

31.57 

1,000 

32.50 

3,673 

31.50 

1,400 

40.00 

4,104 

31.45 

1,521 

36.00 

4.882 

31.7 

1,550 

35.00 

5,421 

31.8 

1,750 

35.00 

187 


TABLE  lll.-U.S.  CONTRIBUTIONS  TO  THE  INTERNATIONAL  ATOMIC  ENERGY  AGENCY,  CALENDAR  YEARS 

1960-73 

[In  thousands  of  dollars] 

Regular  budget  (assessed)       Special  programs  (voluntary) 
Year 

I960.... 

1961 

1952 

1963.. 

1964 

1965 

1966.... : 

1967 

1968 _ 

196S 

1970 

1971... 

1972  (estimate) _ _. 

1973  (proposed). _ 

SOURCES 

1960-70  information  from  statement  of  Samuel  de  Palma,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  International  Organization 
Affairs.  In  U.S.  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Government  Operations,  "Economy  and  Efficiency  of  U.S.  Participation  in 
International  Organizations,"  91st  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  1970,  pp.  15-17. 

1971-73  information  on  regular  budgrtfrnro  In'erns'ional  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  "The  Agency's  Programme  for  1973-78 
end  Budget  for  1973,"  IAEA  document  GC(XVI)/485,  1972,  pp.  13,  15,  203. 

Energy  Agency,  "Scale  of  Members'  Contributions  for  1973,"  1972,  IAEA  report  GC(XVI)  486,  p.  4. 

1971-73  Information  on  voluntary  contributions  from  U.S.  Congress  Senate,  Committee  on  Appropriations, 
"Foreign  Assistance  and  Related  Programs  Appropriation  Bill,  1973,"  92d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  1972,  Senate  report 
92— 12 jl ,  p.  43,  and  also  personal  inquiry  of  the  Department  of  State. 

NOTE:  Because  the  Ag3ncy  uses  a  revolving  fund,  the  budget  figures  shown  are  not  always  the  same  as 
those  in  other  IAEA  or  other  U.S.  documents. 

A   HARDHEADED   APPROACH   TO   IAEA   FUNCTIONS 

The  Joint  Committee's  1959  inquiry  into  the  agreement  between 
the  AEC  and  the  International  Agency  gave  the  AEC  an  opportunity 
to  enlarge  upon  its  explanation  of  the  concept  of  what  the  IAEA 
should  be  doing.  Commissioner  Harold  S.  Vance  of  the  AEC,  after 
arguing  against  a  nuclear-materials  supply  role  or  a  role  in  demon- 
stration of  nuclear  power  for  the  IAEA,  asserted  there  were  many 
other  tilings  for  it  to  do.120 

.  .  .  There  are  problems  that  do  not  respect  national  boundaries  in  the  field  of 
health,  safety,  safeguards,  waste  disposal  and  so  forth.  I  believe  that  if  the 
Agency  will  address  itself  to  those  problems  and  do  it  a  little  more  vigorously 
and  forget  this  business  of  trying  to  be  a  broker  for  fuel,  that  in  the  long  run 
they  will  be  a  lot  more  productive  than  they  would  otherwise. 

He  proposed  four  unique  services  for  IAEA : 121 

(1)  Resolution  of  problems  of  health  and  safety  which  tran- 
scend national  borders; 

(2)  Creation  of  international  security  safeguards  and  controls 
over  worldwide  usage  of  fissionable  materials ; 

(3)  Expansion  of  East-West  cooperation  in  peaceful  uses  of 
atomic  energy;  and 

(4)  Pooling  of  resources  to  meet  the  technical  assistance  needs 
of  underdeveloped  countries. 


la  U.S.,  Congress,  Jo:nt  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearing,  Agreement  for  Coopera- 
tion Between  the  United  States  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  86th  Cong., 

121  Ibid.,  p.  28. 


188 


As  for  the  first  of  these  services,  Commissioner  Vance  reported 
there  was  already  widespread  recognition  of  the  IAEA  health  and 
safety  role.  What  he  said  in  1959  has  a  contemporary  sound : 122 

Concerning  the  general  problem  of  safe  usage,  all  countries  with  atomic  energy 
programs  have  a  mutual  concern  in  minimizing  accidental  or  inadvertent  con- 
tamination of  property  and  personal  injury  through  adequate  health  and  safety 
standards.  International  transport  of  radioactive  materials,  waste  disposal  at 
sea,  and  safe  operation  of  reactors  sited  near  national  boundaries  are  examples 
of  problems  predominantly  international  in  nature  that  can  best  be  resolved 
through  a  single  technically  competent  world  organization.  The  Agency  provides 
both  a  forum  and  the  implementing  mechanism  for  fulfilling  the  common  inter- 
ests of  all  nations. 

As  for  the  second  opportunity  for  services,  Commissioner  Vance 
saw  a  strong  safeguards  function  for  the  IAEA  as  consonant  with  U.S. 
foreign  policy  objectives.  In  his  view,  the  recognition  in  U.S.  bilateral 
agreements  of  the  ultimate  desirability  of  transfer  of  safeguards  re- 
sponsibilities to  the  IAEA  was  evidence  of  U.S.  support  for  this  func- 
tion. He  did  not  elaborate  on  the  third  and  fourth  points. 

A  Stronger  Role  for  the  IAEA:  The  Smyth  Report  of  19G2 

Whether  IAEA  should  be  given  some  real  international  operating 
functions  was  a  question  before  the  State  Department,  the  AEC,  and 
the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  in  1962.  The  State  Department 
in  1961  had  called  for  a  competent  general  review  of  the  Agency  in 
terms  of  U.S.  foreign  policy,  technology,  administration,  and  finance. 
To  this  end  the  State  Department,  in  agreement  with  the  AEC, 
established  an  Advisory  Committee  chaired  by  Dr.  Henry  D.  Smyth  of 
Princeton  University.123  His  committee  reported  in  1962.124 

The  Advisory  Committee  concluded  that  peaceful  uses  of  atomic 
energy  ought  to  play  an  important  role  in  future  foreign  policy  and 
that  active  support  of  IAEA  would  further  this  policy.  Development 
of  nuclear  power  was  the  key  issue  in  determining  the  usefulness  of 
IAEA.  Because  nuclear  power  was  becoming  economically  attractive 
in  many  parts  of  the  world,  it  would  be  advantageous  for  the  United 
States  to  encourage  the  Agency  to  participate  in  this  development.  Five 
of  the  Smyth  Committee's  six  recommendations  were  pertinent  to  U.S. 
foreign  policy : 125 

(1)  The  United  States  [should]  reaffirm  and  constructively 
support  its  policy  for  furthering  the  utilization  of  atomic  energy 
for  peaceful  purposes  throughout  the  world. 

(2)  The  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  [should]  be  rec- 
ognized as  the  most  effective  means  by  which  the  United  States 
can  carry  out  that  policy.  To  that  end,  activities  now  being  con- 
ducted under  existing  bilateral  agreements  should  be  transferred 
to  Agency  auspices  wherever  practical. 

"» Ibid.,  p.  28. 

123  Dr.  Smyth  was  the  author  of  the  notable  wartime  "Smyth  Report"  on  the  Manhattan 
Project.   A  lending  nuclear  scientist,  he  was  in  1902  the  U.S.  representative  to  the  IAEA. 

134  Report  of  the  Advisory  Committee  on  U.S.  Policy  Toward  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency.  In  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  United 
States  Policy  Toward  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  87th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1962, 
pp.  37-62. 

128  In  the  opinion  of  the  Committee,  these  functions  should  be  to  : 

a.  Provide  the  best  attainable  assurance  against  diversion  of  material  and  equip- 
ment to  military  purposes. 

b.  Establish  uniform  health  and  safety  standards. 

c.  Provide  technical  assistance. 

(1.   Reconcile  liability  and  indemnification  practices. 

e.  Conduct  international  research  projects. 

f .  Promulgate  International  waste  management  standards. 


189 


(3)  The  United  States  [should]  take  the  lead  in  securing  inter- 
national agreement  that  the  Agency  be  recognized  as  the  instru- 
ment most  appropriate  for  carrying  out  certain  important  func- 
tions in  the  field  of  atomic  energy. 

(4)  A  detailed  study  [should]  be  made  within  the  United  States 
Government  of  the  steps  to  be  taken  to  further  the  foreign  policy 
objectives  in  the  field  of  atomic  power.  We  believe  that  such  a 
study  will  show  that  an  effective  program  need  not  be  costly. 

(5)  The  United  States  Government  [should]  continue  to  sup- 
port actively  the  programs  of  the  Agency  in  the  fields  listed  above 
by  providing  financial  assistance,  by  supplying  experts  for  special 
assignment,  and  by  encouraging  competent  technical  men  to  serve 
upon  the  Agency  staff. 

The  Smyth  Committee  extended  its  study  to  include  two  primary 
questions  affecting  atomic  energy  and  foreign  policy : 126 

( 1 )  Did  atomic  energy  occupy  a  unique  position  in  science  and 
technology  at  that  time  ?  and, 

(2)  Did  the  past  and  present  achievements  of  the  United  States 
in  atomic  energy  give  this  country  a  unique  opportunity  and  obli- 
gation to  promote  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy  ? 

The  Committee's  answer  to  each  question  was  yes. 

As  for  the  future  of  nuclear  power  and  the  IAEA,  Professor  Smyth 
posed  three  questions  of  policy  for  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy : 

( 1 )  Did  the  United  States  wish  to  support  the  development  of 
nuclear  power  around  the  world  ? 

(2)  How  important  were  safeguards  ? 

(3)  Was  the  United  States  really  going  to  use  IAEA,  or  would 
it  continue  to  work  largely  through  bilateral  or  regional  groups  ? 

A    STATE   DEPARTMENT    COMMENTARY 

In  comment  before  the  Joint  Committee  on  the  Smyth  report,  Mr. 
Harlan  Cleveland,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  International  Or- 
ganization Affairs,  foresaw  that  expansion  of  nuclear  power  was 
likely  to  be  important  to  foreign  policy  planning  from  two  points  of 
view:  safeguards,  and  assistance  to  developing  countries.  Of  this 
he  said : 127 

First,  we  are  concerned  that  adequate  safeguards  be  maintained  to  guard 
against  military  applications  of  a  proliferating  nuclear  technology.  Second,  the 
prospect  of  increasing  use  of  nuclear  energy  for  power  as  well  as  research  makes 
it  important  to  help  the  newly  developing  nations  to  develop  the  new  technical 
people  who  can  handle  the  new  technology. 

But  he  discouraged  the  idea  that  the  IAEA  should  be  a  channel 
for  financial  aid  for  nuclear  power  or  that  the  United  States  should 
increase  its  proportional  support  of  the  Agency.128  He  anticipated 
some  undefined  third-party  role  of  the  Agency  in  relation  to  U.S. 
bilateral  agreements. 


12a  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  United  States  Policy 
Toward  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  op.  cit.,  pp.  2,  3. 

127  Ibid.,  p.  14. 

128  Elaborating  on  this  point,  he  said  :  "We  do  not,  however,  believe  that  the  IAEA  or 
any  of  the  other  technical  agencies  of  the  United  Nations  complex  should  be  used  as 
channels  for  major  inputs  of  financial  aid.  The  IAEA  is  not  a  bank.  We  continue  to  believe 
that  the  international,  regional,  and  national  financing  institutions  are  better  equipped 
for  this  purpose,"  Ibid.,  p.  14. 


190 


As  for  the  State  Department's  ideas  about  the  future  of  the  Agency, 
it  preferred  that  IAEA  concentrate  on  technical  service  functions : 129 

We  most  explicitly  agree  that  the  Agency  is  the  most  appropriate  instrument 
for  establishing  uniform  health  and  safety  standards,  for  working  out  uniform 
rules  for  liability  and  indemnification  for  atomic  accidents;  for  developing  and 
publishing  international  standards  for  waste  management;  and  for  conducting 
research  and  calling  scientific  conferences  on  problems  which  require  interna- 
tional planning  and  coordination. 

Queried  about  Dr.  Smyth's  three  policy  questions,  Mr.  Cleveland  in 
reply  raised  questions  of  his  own.  He  said : 130 

.  .  .  Sure,  the  United  States  wants  to  support  the  development  of  nuclear  power 
around  the  world.  But  do  we  want  to  build  into  our  aid  program  a  preference 
for  nuclear  power  as  opposed  to  other  forms  of  power  in  power  development? 
This  is  a  more  complex  and  difficult  and  interesting  question  that  really  has  to 
be  looked  at  in  terms  of  the  economic  program  country  by  country. 

How  important  does  the  United  States  consider  safeguards?  Very.  This  is  in- 
deed the  most  important  single  aspect  as  we  look  into  the  future  of  the  Inter- 
national Agency's  program.  This  is  more  than  any  one  thing  the  raison  d'etre  of 
an  international  agency. 

la  the  United  States  really  going  to  use  the  Agency?  Yes,  we  are  going  to  use 
the  Agency.  But  whether  we  will  use  it  in  a  particular  case,  given  all  the  con- 
ditions in  that  case,  can  only  be  determined  when  you  look  at  the  case.  That 
is  a  complicated  answer  to  some  simple  looking  questions,  but  Dr.  Smyth  knows 
how  complicated  his  questions  are. 

Cleveland's  own  questions  went  unanswered  at  the  hearings  and  re- 
main largely  unanswered  today.  This  difference  between  Professor 
Smyth  who  wished  to  channel  U.S.  nuclear  technical  assistance  though 
the  IAEA  and  the  Department  of  State  which  saw  a  continuing  utility 
in  bilateral  as  well  as  international  channels  illustrates  the  difference 
in  approach  of  an  announced  advocate  of  an  international  agency  and 
measures  to  strengthen  it  in  contrast  with  the  pragmatic  approach  of 
U.S.  diplomacy  which  views  both  bilateral  and  international  arrange- 
ments as  useful  for  U.S.  purposes.  This  same  pattern  of  bilateral  and 
multilateral  arrangements  for  technical  assistance  and  cooperation  has 
appeared  in  the  space  program.  There  too  the  United  States  uses  bi- 
lateral and  multilateral  agreements.  Able  to  use  either  approach,  U.S. 
diplomacy  is  not  tied  to  the  success  or  failure  of  one  method  or  the 
other,  but  can  choose  the  combination  that  best  fits  its  interests. 

AN    AEC   REACTION" 

Commissioner  Leland  J.  Haworth  welcomed  the  Smyth  Commit- 
tee's reaffirmation  of  a  policy  of  strong  support  for  the  International 
Agency,  for  use  of  atomic  energy  as  an  element  of  U.S.  foreign  policy, 
and  for  support  of  the  Agency  as  a  means  to  advance  U.S.  policy.131 
He  agreed  that  one  way  to  develop  the  competence  of  the 
Agency  was  to  transfer  to  it  as  many  as  possible  of  the  AEC  activities 
then  being  carried  out  through  bilateral  agreements.  But  the  AEC 
was  not  ready  to  commit  itself  to  this  idea.  As  to  safeguards,  the  Com- 
mission endorsed  the  need  for  a  continued  effort  to  obtain  a  uniform, 
worldwide,  effective  system,  ideally  to  be  administered  by  the  IAEA. 
But  the  Agency's  system  could  apply  only  to  materials  received 
through  the  Agency  or  to  those  voluntarily  placed  under  its  system. 

"•Ibid.,  p.  1". 
«*>Ibld.,  pp.  1S-19. 
131  Ibid.,  p.  19. 


191 


Thus  IAEA  safeguards  could  not  be  global  in  scope.  Nevertheless,  the 
Agency's  system  provided  a  means  to  bring  a  few  nuclear  facilities 
under  safeguards  and  could  set  a  desirable  example  of  a  workable  in- 
ternational safeguards  system  for  the  future.  "For  these  reasons", 
j>aid  Commissioner  Haworth,  "the  AEC  judged  the  Agency's  safe- 
guards function  to  be  the  most  important  of  its  activities."  132 

As  for  the  supply  function,  the  AEC  demurred.  While  any  of  the 
bilateral  partners  of  the  United  States  could  at  any  time  utilize  the 
Agency,  and  it  was  AEC  policy  to  encourage  them  to  do  so,  Commis- 
sioner Haworth  gave  assurance  that  many  countries  trusted  and  pre- 
ferred the  bilateral  code : 133 

.  .  .  Important  as  it  may  be  to  the  Agency  for  it  to  serve  as  a  supplier  of  ma- 
terials (a  question  on  which  there  have  been  different  opinions)  it  is  even  more 
important  that  Agency  safeguards  become  generally  applied.  It  is,  therefore,  of 
great  significance,  in  the  interests  of  strengthening  the  safeguards  function  of 
the  Agency,  that  greater  emphasis  be  given  to  the  voluntary  application  of  IAEA 
safeguards  to  bilateral  transactions. 

The  idea  that  the  IAEA  should  become  involved  in  financing  nuclear 
power  also  was  minimized  by  the  AEC.  There  were  other  financial  in- 
stitutions. Moreover,  a  financial  role  for  the  IAEA  could  lead  to  an 
unbalancing  of  its  functions.  It  would  not,  in  Ha  worth's  opinion,  bene- 
fit either  the  Agency  or  the  United  States  for  this  country  to  use  the 
Agency  as  a  broker  to  finance  construction  of  a  nuclear  power  plant  at 
an  expenditure  level  several  times  as  large  as  the  Agency's  entire 
budget.134 

A  PESSIMISTIC  POSTSCRIPT 

The  year  following  the  Smyth  Committee  report,  one  observer  cau- 
tioned that  IAEA  remained  weak  and  lacking  in  direction.  As  seen 
by  Arnold  Kramish,  the  Agency  was  not  the  idealistic  mechanism  en- 
visioned by  the  President  in  1953  to  diminish  the  potential  destruc- 
tive power  of  the  world's  nuclear  stockpiles,  nor  had  it  provided  a  new 
channel  for  peaceful  international  discussion.  If  the  Agency's 
members  wished  to  develop  it  for  that  purpose,  they  would  have  to 
strengthen  its  support.135 

Likewise  in  1966,  Sterling  Cole  was  to  comment  that  the  IAEA  was 
still  being  avoided  or  circumvented,  and  that  "not  a  single  nuclear 
power  plant  capable  of  producing  by-product  weapon  material  has 
come  under  the  Agency  control  .  .  .,  except  for  psychological  ges- 
tures or  demonstrations.136 

The  Decline  of  the  Supply  Function 

If  the  International  Agency  was  to  have  a  viable  supply  function, 
the  appropriate  time  to  establish  it  was  in  1959  when  the  AEC  received 
legislative  authority  to  cooperate  with  the  Agency.  But  this  brokerage 
function  that  was  so  important  for  the  plans  and  hopes  of  Director 
General  Cole  was  discounted  and  minimized  by  the  AEC.  Appear- 
ing before  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  in  1959,  Commis- 
sioner Vance  of  the  AEC  ruled  out  the  possibility  that  the  United 
States  supplying  nuclear  materials  to  the  International  Agency  on 

132  Ibid.,  p.  20. 

133  Ibid.,  p.  20. 

134  Ibid.,  p.  21. 

133  Kramish.  op.  cit..  p.  77. 

"'Sterling  Cole.  "Needed:  A  Rebirth  of  the  IAEA,"  Nuclear  News,  vol.  9    (September 
1966) ,  p.  19. 

96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  14 


192 


special  terms  which  would  enable  it  to  be  a  competitive  supplier  in  the 
world  market.  As  he  analyzed  the  situation,  unless  other  governments 
volunteered  to  become  suppliers,  countries  wishing  to  obtain  uranium- 
235  had  two  options.  They  could  deal  directly  with  the  United  States, 
or  go  to  the  International  Agency.  He  anticipated  they  would  prefer 
the  former,  which  he  too  preferred  as  in  the  best  interests  of  the  United 
States.  He  said  : 137 

...  if  they  deal  with  us  under  an  individual  bilateral  agreement,  we  have 
some  control  over  where  this  material  goes  and  for  what  purpose  it  is  used,  and 
we  do  not  have  that  if  it  is  channeled  through  the  International  Agency.  There- 
fore. I  think  the  present  arrangement  is  a  good  one  from  our  standpoint. 

He  opposed  Director  General  Cole's  proposition  that  the  United 
States  supply  nuclear  materials  to  it  at  a  discount  of  3  to  5  percent : 13S 

...  I  believe  that  this  possible  function  of  the  International  Agency  which 
Mr.  Cole  laid  great  stress  on  in  his  speech  in  March  has  been  greatly  overem- 
phasized in  his  mind  and  in  the  minds  of  a  lot  of  other  people.  I  do  not  believe  that 
it  is  one  of  the  principal  functions  of  the  International  Agency  to  act  as  a  broker 
between  the  countries  who  make  U-235  or  enriched  uranium  and  the  countries 
who  require  it. 

That  same  year  AEC  Commissioner  John  Floberg  told  the  third  ses- 
sion of  the  IAEA  General  Conference  that  the  United  States  saw  for 
the  Agency  a  continuing  and  important  role  as  a  supplier  of  source  and 
special  nuclear  materials.139  Asked  why,  in  view  of  the  AEC's  attitude, 
a  bilateral  agreement  with  the  International  Agency  was  necessary  at 
all,  Commissioner  Vance  said  it  would  provide  the  machinery  for  sup- 
plying nuclear  fuel,  even  though  the  amount  to  be  delivered  might  be 
nominal.  "We  have  gone  this  far,  we  should  go  on  to  the  point  where 
nobody  can  accuse  us  of  pulling  back  the  offer  that  was  made."' 140 

So  although  Atoms  for  Peace  proposed  a  strong  supply  function  for 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  within  a  few  years  this 
function  had  atrophied.  U.S.  policy  prevented  the  Agency  from 
obtaining  nuclear  materials  from  the  United  States  at  a  wholesale  or 
discount  price  for  resale  to  other  members.  Whether  the  Agency 
would  in  fact  have  been  strengthened  by  a  more  favorable  policy  is 
now  academic,  for  other  supply  channels  are  now  well  established  and 
it  is  unlikely  that  they  would  be  abandoned  now  in  favor  of  the 
International  Agency. 

International  Standards  for  Nuclear  Safety 

One  little-developed  function  of  IAEA  which  could  have  affected 
commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe  was  the  setting  of  international 
safety  standards  for  nuclear  power.  Commissioner  Vance  and  others 
had  called  attention  to  this  function  and  the  Department  of  Stale 
and  AEC  had  both  emphasized  the  importance  they  assigned  to  it. 
During  hearings  on  the  International  Statute,  Secretary  Dulles  justi- 


137  V  K.  Concress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Enortr.v.  Hearings,  Agreement  for  Co- 
operatinn  Between  the  United  States  and  the  International  Atornie  Energy  Agency,  op. 
clt.,  p   -•• 

"R  IMd.,  p.  21. 

""  r  s  Atomic  Knprpy  Commission,  Major  Activities  in  Atomic  Energy  Programs, 
January— December  jf>5.9,op.  clt.,  p.  104. 

'"t'S.  Congress,  Join!  Committee  on  Atomic  Kncrpy,  Hearings,  Agreement  for  Co- 
operation  Between  the  United  States  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  op.  clt., 
p.   25. 


193 


fied  ratification  by  the  United  States  because  of  what  the  International 
Agency  could  do  to  control  the  dangers  of  nuclear  power.  He  said: 141 

.  .  .  people  are  becoming  more  aware  of  some  of  the  dangers  inherent  in  this 
progress.  When  power  is  produced  by  nuclear  energy  .  .  .  such  production  also 
creates  waste  products  which  could  imperil  health  and  safety.  Today,  the  need 
is  even  more  imperative  for  protection  against  the  inevitable  byproducts  of  the 
atomic  age. 

The  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  is  designed  to  fill 
this  need.  .  .  . 

Chairman  Strauss  was  quite  frank  about  the  hazards.  He  testified 
that : 142 

A  byproduct  of  reactors  is  radioactive  waste.  This  byproduct  will  probably 
some  day  be  valuable,  but  presently  and  for  the  foreseeable  future,  it  presents 
a  huge  disposal  problem.  Solution  of  the  problem  is  necessary  for  public  health 
and  safety. 

If  these  wastes  are  indiscriminately  dumped  at  sea,  they  could  spread  around 
the  world.  If  they  are  indiscriminately  buried  in  the  earth  they  may  migrate  along 
the  plunging  contours  of  subterranean  strata  with  no  regard  whatever  for  the 
political  boundaries  that  men  and  nations  have  scratched  on  the  earth's  surface. 

The  only  way  we  can  safeguard  our  own  health  and  safety  is  by  securing 
world  health  and  safety.  And  that  can  only  be  achieved  by  a  uniform  international 
agreement  on  standards  of  health  and  safety  applicable  to  atomic  energy. 

The  United  States  was  ready  to  support  the  concept  of  voluntary 
international  safety  standards.  However,  it  was  unready  to  accept 
the  application  of  such  standards  by  an  international  agency  to  its 
own  nuclear  activities.  In  1959  while  discussing  IAEA  Director 
General  Cole's  ideas  about  the  IAEA,  a  State  Department  witness, 
Chad  wick  Johnson,  Office  of  Special  Assistant  for  Disarmament  and 
Atomic  Energy,  declined  to  take  a  position  on  this  question,  as  indi- 
cated in  the  following  colloquy : 143 

Mr.  Johnson.  I,  of  course  believe  it  is  a  generally  good  thing  for  the  Inter- 
national Atomic  Energy  Agency  to  establish  rigid  standards  of  health  and 
safety  for  possible  adoption  by  other  countries  with  which  the  agency  works. 

Senator  Anderson.  For  adoption  by  other  countries.  Why  not  for  adoption  by 
the  principal  country  that  started  it,  the  United  States?  .  .  . 

Mr.  Johnson.  Being  a  member  of  the  Department  of  State,  I  believe  that  I 
cannotfully  answer  your  question  on  this  matter  of  health  and  safety. 


The  IAEA  itself  has  not  been  able  to  move  very  far  to  establish 
international  standards  for  safety  in  design,  construction  and  oper- 
ation of  nuclear  power  plants.  It  did  convene  a  Panel  on  Safe  Opera- 
tion of  Critical  Assemblies  and  Research  Reactors  which  prepared 
an  international  safety  manual  and  subsequently  assisted  in  setting 
up  safety  procedures  for  a  few  small  research  reactors.  But  the  IAEA- 
went  no  further  despite  the  fact  that  the  nuclear  power  technology 
is  potentially  dangerous,  and  effects  of  accidents  with  nuclear  power 
plants  could  cross  national  boundaries  and  affect  other  countries. 

Shortly  after  the  issuance  of  the  Smyth  report,  Arnold  Kramish 
suggested  that  adoption  and  enforcement  by  members  of  the  IAEA 
of  international  safety  standards  promulgated  and  monitored  by  that 

141  U.S.  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  Senate  Members  of  the 
Jo'nt  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  op.  eit.,  p.  3. 

142Jbid.,p.  84. 

143  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Agreement  for  Coopera- 
tion Between  the  United  States  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  op.  clt., 
p.  10. 


194 


body  could  also  contribute  to  international  control  of  nuclear  mate- 
rials. Safety  procedures  for  such  hazardous  materials  and  other  safety 
concerns  are  intimately  related  to  the  measures  for  an  effective  inter- 
national safeguards  system.144 

Despite  these  statements  attesting  to  the  importance  of  a  nuclear 
safety  function  for  the  IAEA,  there  remains  a  confusing  proliferation 
and  apparent  overlap  of  radiation  safety  guides  and  standards.  In 
Europe,  there  are  standards  issued  by  the  IAEA  and  standards  pro- 
mulgated by  Euratom.  The  United  Nations  has  continued  its  Scientific 
Committee  on  the  Effects  of  Atomic  Radiation,  rather  than  transfer 
the  functions  of  that  U.N.  committee  to  IAEA.  Meanwhile,  the  role 
of  the  International  Agency  in  setting  standards  for  construction  and 
operation  of  nuclear  power  plants  is  now  dormant.  If  commercial  nu- 
clear power  expands  in  Europe,  as  optimists  are  beginning  to  antic- 
pate,  the  issue  of  international  standards  for  safety  and  to  control 
environmental  effects  can  be  expected  to  revive.  If  and  when  it  does, 
U.S.  diplomats  are  likely  to  be  faced  with  the  question  to  what  extent 
and  in  what  way  should  such  standards  apply  to  domestic  nuclear 
power  plants?  Should  the  United  States  voluntarily  agree  to  apply 
such  standards  to  the  domestic  industry?  Should  the  United  States 
voluntarily  permit  inspection  of  design,  construction,  and  operation 
of  commercial  nuclear  power  plants?  What  would  be  the  effect  on 
the  Intel-national  Agency  were  the  United  States  to  refuse  to  acknowl- 
edge the  applicability  of  these  standards?  Then  too,  what  might 
such  a  conflict  do  to  the  competitive  position  of  the  U.S.  nuclear 
industry  in  the  world  market  ? 

In  ternational  Safeguards  for  Nuclear  Materials 

Of  all  the  negotiating  issues  faced  by  the  diplomats  and  their 
scientific  advisors  in  drafting  the  IAEA  statute,  the  most  intrac- 
table was  the  safeguarding  of  nuclear  material?.  U.S.  negotiators  were 
caught  between  (a)  the  demand  for  credible  inspection  and  control 
of  nuclear  materials  to  reduce  the  chances  of  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons,  and  (b)  the  reluctance  of  the  non-nuclear  nations  to  sur- 
render any  sovereign  rights  to  permit  inspection.  In  these  negotiations, 
the  Soviet  Union  chose  to  emphasize  the  issue  of  sovereign  rights  and 
to  oppose  international  inspection.  The  final  compromise  reached  at  the 
United  Nations  Conference  Avas  to  restrict  safeguards  to  IAEA  proj- 
ects or  to  those  projects  voluntarily  placed  under  IAEA  safeguards. 
Thus  hopes  were  dashed  for  a  worldwide  safeguards  system  that 
would  apply  to  all  nuclear  materials  and  facilities  in  peaceful 
applications. 

On  paper,  the  Statute  specifies  an  impressive  array  of  power  and 
responsibility  for  the  Agency  in  enforcing  safeguards  for  its  projects, 
or  projects  assigned  to  it  by  member  states.  The  International  Statute 
requires  that  such  arrangements  include  provisions  for  IAEA 
examination  of  design  of  nuclear  equipment,  including  power 
reactors:  that  IAEA  health  and  safety  measures  be  observed:  that 
records  be  maintained  for  nuclear  materials  produced  or  used;  and 


***  Kramish,  op.  clt.,  pp.  r>n-CO. 


195 


that  the  Agency  can  send  inspectors  into  the  member  states  to  check 
nuclear  materials  that  it  supplies.145 

CONGRESSIONAL  INTEREST  IN   IAEA   SAFEGUARDS 

The  questions  of  what  safeguards  would  entail,  why  they  were 
needed,  and  how  they  would  work  were  of  continuing  interest  to  both 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  the  Joint  Committee 
on  Atomic  Energy.  Safeguards  offered  two  sets  of  benefits :  a  means 
to  make  disarmament  more  palatable,  and  a  means  to  improve  world 
security  in  an  area  of  nuclear  energy. 

In  sending  the  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
to  the  Senate,  President  Eisenhower  reassured  Congress  that  the  safe- 
guards would  be  adequate  and  that  the  security  of  the  United  States 
would  not  be  endangered  by  nuclear  materials  made  available  to  or 
through  the  IAEA.  Said  the  President: 146 

To  achieve  the  confidence  essential  to  cooperation  among  members  of  the 
International  Atomic  Agency,  great  care  has  been  exercised  to  insure  that  fis- 
sionable material  will  be  safeguarded  to  prevent  its  diversion  to  any  military 
purpose.  A  comprehensive  safeguard  system  is  provided  by  the  statute.  This 
will  apply  to  all  aspects  of  the  Agency's  activity  involving  nuclear  materials. 
A  key  part  of  this  system  is  a  plan  for  thorough  international  inspection.  The 
United  States  will  provide  fissionable  materials  for  Agency  projects  only  as 
the  safeguard  system  is  put  into  effect.  I  am  satisfied  that  the  security  of  the 
United  States  will  not  be  endangered  by  materials  made  available  to  or  through 
this  Agency. 

In  the  hearings  which  followed,  Chairman  Strauss  described  the 
International  Agency  as  prospectively  providing  a  practical,  working 
model  of  an  inspection  system  for  disarmament.  He  said : 147 

The  Agency  will  not,  of  course,  achieve  atomic  disarmament,  nor  was  it  con- 
ceived to  attempt  that.  However,  it  can  promote  United  States  objectives  in 


115  Article  XII  specifies  that  the  Agency  shall  have  the  following  rights  and  responsi- 
bilities for  safeguarding  its  own  proierts  or  those  of  member  states  : 

1.  To  examine  the  design  of  specialized  equipment  and  facilities  including  nuclear 
reactors  and  to  approve  it  only  from  the  viewpoint  of  assuring  that  it  will  not  further 
any  military  purpose,  that  it  complies  with  applicable  health  and  safety  standards, 
and  that  it  will  permit  effective  application  of  the  safeguards  provided  for  in  this 
art'c'e  ; 

2.  To  require  the  observance  of  any  health  and  safety  measures  prescribed  by  the 
Agency  ; 

3.  To  require  the  maintenance  and  production  of  operating  records  to  assist  in 
ensuring  accountability  for  source  and  special  fissionable  materials  used  or  produced 
in  the  nroi'e^t  or  arrangement : 

4.  To  call  for  and  receive  progress  reports  : 

r>.  To  approve  the  means  to  he  used  for  the  chemical  processing  of  irradiated  mate- 
rials solely  to  ensure  that  this  chemical  processing  will  not  lend  itself  to  diver- 
sion .   .   .  and  will  comply  with  anplicable  health  and  safety  standards.   .   .   .  : 

6.  To  send  into  the  territory  of  the  recipient  State  or  States  inspectors,  designated 
by  the  Agency  after  consultation  with  the  State  or  States  concerned,  who  shall  have 
access  at  all  times  to  all  places  and  data  and  to  any  person  ...  as  necessary  to 
account  for  source  and  fissionable  materials  supplied  and  fissionable  products  and  to 
determine  whether  there  is  compliance  with  the  undertaking  against  use  in  further- 
ance of  any  military  purpose  .  .  .  with  the  health  and  safety  measures  referred  to  in 
.  .  .  tbis  article,  and  with  any  other  conditions  prescribed  in  the  agreement  between 
tbe  Agency  and  the  State  or  States  concerned.  Inspectors  designated  by  the  Agency 
shall  be  accompanied  by  representatives  of  the  authorities  of  the  State  concerned,  if 
that  State  so  requests,  provided  that  the  inspectors  shall  not  thereby  be  delayed  or 
otherwise  impeded  in  the  exercise  of  their  functions  ; 

7.  In  the  event  of  non-compliance  and  failure  by  the  recipient  State  or  States  to 
take  requested  corrective  steps  within  a  reasonable  time,  to  suspend  or  terminate 
assistance  and  withdraw  any  materials  and  equipment  made  available  by  the  Agency  or 
a  member.   .   .   . 

na  •"The  State  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agencv."  Message  from  the  President 
of  tbe  United  States.  S5th  Cong..  1st  sess.,  March  21,  1957    (Senate  Executive  I),  p.  2. 

147  U.S.  Congress.  Senate,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  Senate  Members  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  op.  cit,  p.  87. 


196 


the  field  of  disarmament  by  creating  a  practical  working  model  of  an  inspection 
system,  and  a  climate  of  international  opinion  in  support  of  our  objectives.  This 
we  may  hope,  will  facilitate  establishment  of  the  broader  controls  needed  for 
a  successful  disarmament  agreement. 

Sterling  Cole,  then  chairman  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy,  strongly  supported  the  safeguards  function  of  the  IAEA  for 
its  implications  for  disarmament.  In  a  statement  to  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  he  cited  its  potential  for  "outstanding  accom- 
plishment." He  said : 148 

This  will  be  a  period  of  learning  about  all  of  the  problems— technical,  legal, 
psychological — of  international  inspection  and  control.  The  Agency  was  suggested 
at  a  time  when  neither  the  United  States  nor  Russia  were  able  to  agree  on  an 
inspection  and  control  plan  for  themselves  for  disarmament  purposes.  The 
Agency's  operations  can  produce  that  technology  and  that  confidence  in  inter- 
national control  which  will  lead  to  complete  international  control  of  atomic 
energy  at  an  appropriate  time  later  on.  Since  the  Soviet  Union  has  been  the 
country  principally  opposed  to  international  inspection  of  atomic  arms,  perhaps 
it  will  learn  that  international  inspection  will  not  be  as  unpalatable  as 
anticipated. 

The  State  Department  underscored  the  importance  of  international 
safeguards.  In  reply  to  a  question  as  to  why  the  desired  safeguards 
could  not  be  had  equally  well  through  bilateral  agreements,  Secretary 
Dulles  replied : 149 

.  .  .  while  in  theory  you  could  have  the  same  degree  of  inspection  under  bi- 
laterals  as  you  have  under  the  International  Agency,  ...  in  fact  there  would  be 
competition  between  the  countries — there  is  already  evidence  of  that  now — as  to 
who  would  want  to  sell  this  material.  One  result  would  be  dropping  these 
standards  of  inspection,  so  that  in  fact  we  would  not  be  able  to  maintain  our 
own  standards  as  the  era  of  plenty  arrives  in  this  field. 

Secondly  ....  there  is  objection  to  continuing  inspection  just  by  one  nation 
as  against  an  international  system. 

Thirdly  .  .  .  ,  we  do  not  have  the  manpower  to  do  it  adequately  as  the  need 
increases. 

Strauss  foresaw  that  within  a  few  years  other  nations  would  be 
offering  nuclear  materials  on  the  world  market  and  that  without  the 
International  Agency  the  United  States  could  not  then  be  sure  that 
these  other  nations  would  impose  equally  stringent  safeguards.  Accord- 
ing to  Strauss,  the  Agency  could  establish  standards  for  safeguards 
more  effectively  than  any  system  of  agreements  between  individual 
countries.  Such  standards  had  to  be  set  up  at  the  outset  of  the  growth 
of  a  world  nuclear  power  industry.  It  would  be  too  late  to  attempt  it 
"after  the  contaminants  have  been  broadcast."  150 

AEC  Commissioner  Thomas  Murray  saw  IAEA  as  the  only  means 
of  avoiding  international  nuclear  anarchy.  He  said : 151 

In  no  field  does  the  need  for  international  order  exist  more  imperatively  than 
in  the  field  of  nuclear  energy.  In  the  concept  of  order  I  include  a  whole  set 
of  notions — regulation,  control,  supervision,  commonly  accepted  standards  of 
health  and  safety,  and  above  all  the  institution  of  free  and  orderly  procedures  of 
cooperation  among  nations.  You  have  heard  statements  about  the  danger  of 
our  gradually  drifting  into  a  state  of  atomic  anarchy.  This  is  a  good  phrase  in 
which  to  describe  the  state  in  which  we  already  find  ourselves.  Surely  this  is 
true  in  the  field  of  nuclear  weapons.  Each  of  the  nations  engaged  in  their 
development  and  production  is  acting  as  a  law  unto  itself. 


14SIMd..  p.  171. 
uu  Ibid.,  p.  69. 
'  '  [bid.,  p.  87. 
161  Ibid.,  p.  175. 


197 


There  are  no  common  norms  or  standards  binding  on  all ;  there  are  no  common 
agreements  accepted  by  all.  The  result  is  international  lawlessness  or  anarchy 
which  shows  itself  chiefly  in  the  ungoverned — and  for  the  moment  seemingly 
ungovernable — race  for  nuclear  armaments. 

This  international  situation  is  not  simply  the  road  to  anarchy.  It  is  itself  anar- 
chy. Unless  and  until  this  anarchy  is  resolved  into  some  decent  measure  of  order, 
neither  America  nor  the  world  at  large  could  enjoy  even  that  basic  security  that 
consisted  in  the  assurance  of  continued  national  existence. 

BILATERAL  VS.   IAEA   SAFEGUARDS 

Since  U.S.  bilateral  agreements  provide  for  U.S.  safeguards,  it 
might  be  asked  what  difference  does  it  make  whether  U.S.  nuclear 
materials  are  safeguarded  under  the  bilateral  agreements  or  through 
the  International  Agency.  This  question  was  probed  by  the  Joint 
Committee  in  1964.  Dr.  Henry  Smyth,  speaking  both  as  the  U.S.  repre- 
sentative to  the  IAEA  and  as  an  adviser  to  the  State  Department  and 
the  AEC,  outlined  three  major  advantages  of  international  safe- 
guards :  credibility,  uniformity,  and  expense.  He  said : 152 

First  of  all,  we  believe  that  international  safeguards  may  be  viewed  as  more 
credible  than  bilateral  safeguards.  That  is,  if  the  U.S.  Government,  or  any 
other  government,  for  that  matter,  is  conducting  safeguards  inspections  in  the 
nuclear  installations  of  a  very  close  ally,  some  question  might  arise  in  the  minds 
of  people  at  large  as  to  the  thoroughness  and  efficacy  of  such  inspections.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  those  same  inspections  are  conducted  by  an  international 
inspectorate  in  which  a  variety  of  countries  is  represented,  no  one  in  the  world 
can  doubt  their  thoroughness  and  objectivity. 

Second,  we  believe  that  it  is  important  that  the  safeguards  applied  to  various 
countries  be  uniform.  If  10,  11,  or  more  countries  set  up  their  own  individual 
inspection  systems,  it  may  well  turn  out  that  one  country  has  a  vigorous 
system  and  that  another  country  has  a  lenient  one.  If  transferred  materials  and 
equipment,  whatever  their  source,  are  subjected  to  the  same  inspection  under  an 
international  organization,  there  will  be  complete  uniformity  -  of  safeguards 
standards. 

Third,  we  believe  it  is  far  more  expensive  for  many  different  countries  to 
establish  inspection  systems  than  if  one  international  secretariat  representing 
the  governments  both  of  the  supplying  countries  and  the  receiving  countries 
undertakes  this  whole  job. 

The  AEC  itself  outlined  five  reasons  favoring  replacement  of  bi- 
lateral safeguards,  with  those  of  the  IAEA.  It  testified  that : 153 

1.  The  most  effective  safeguards,  the  United  States  believes,  are  those  carried 
out  by  an  international  organization.  While  bilateral  safeguards  provide  adequate 
assurances  to  the  supplier  against  diversion  of  materials  supplied  by  them, 
only  internationally  applied  safeguards  are  capable  of  giving  equivalent  as- 
surances to  the  world  at  large  that  nuclear  material  supplied  by  one  country 
to  another  is  not  being  diverted  to  military  uses. 

2.  Application  of  safeguards  by  an  international  organization  develops  the 
experience  and  competence  in  an  international  staff  which  can  serve  as  an  im- 
portant precedent  for  international  inspection  in  connection  with  any  future 
disarmament  agreement. 

3.  International  safeguards  would  be  uniformly  applicable  and,  therefore, 
would  minimize  tendencies  toward  discriminatory  treatment  which  might  reduce 
arrangements  to  the  level  which  the  least  strict  bilateral  arrangements  required. 

4.  Relying  upon  the  IAEA  to  carry  out  the  safeguards  function  enhances  the 
prestige  and  increases  the  responsibilities  of  the  IAEA  and  thereby  makes  it  a 
more  effective  instrument  in  all  of  its  fields  of  endeavor. 

5.  Many  supplying  countries  will  probably  find  it  difficult  if  not  impossible  to 
undertake  bilateral  safeguards  on  nuclear  materials  which  they  supply.  Effective 


102  U.S.   Congress,  Joint   Committee  on   Atomic  Energy,   Hearings,  International  Agree- 
ments tor  Cooperation,  S8th  Cong.,  1st  and  2d  Sess.,  1965,  p.  141. 
153  Ibid.,  p.  140. 


198 


safeguards  on  these  exports  can  be  realized  only  if  an  international  organization 
has  developed  a  capability  for  applying  safeguards  and  recipient  nations  are  pre- 
pared to  accept  them. 

EVOLUTION  OF  IAEA   SAFEGUARDS  :  A   BRIEF   CHRONOLOGY 

U.S.  support  of  IAEA  safeguards  has  been  and  is  a  curious  mixture 
of  innovation,  generosity,  and  unusual  voluntary  actions,  offset  by  a 
reluctance  to  commit  the  United  States  to  reliance  upon  IAEA  safe- 
guards and  an  unreadiness  to  obtain  for  the  International  Agency  the 
financial  and  technical  support  it  will  need  to  carry  out  its  expanded 
safeguards  responsibilities  under  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty.  The 
evolving  nature  of  U.S.  participation  is  illuminated  in  the  following 
chronology  of  developments  in  IAEA  safeguards. 

Toward  the  end  of  1957,  the  AEC  was  working  on  ways  to  help 
the  IAEA  carry  out  its  safeguards  functions.  In  addition  to  assuring 
that  U.S.  supplied  nuclear  materials  would  be  used  only  for  peaceful 
purposes,  administration  of  the  safeguards  was  expected  to  accumu- 
late technical  and  administrative  experience  that  would  be  useful  for 
future  IAEA  operations.154 

In  1959,  Director  General  Cole  attempted  to  expedite  IAEA  action 
for  a  safeguards  system.  He  pleaded  with  the  Board  of  Governors 
to  do  so.  The  nuclear  nations  represented  should  demonstrate  for  the 
"have-not"  nations  that  inspection  and  other  safeguards  were  not  an 
unreasonable  invasion  of  national  sovereignty.  But  the  Soviet  repre- 
sentatives were  not  cooperative.  They  challenged  IAEA  safeguards 
as  unacceptable  intervention  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  sovereign 
states— a  position  U.S.S.R.  representatives  had  taken  during  negotia- 
tion of  the  International  Statute— and  argued  that  IAEA  safeguards 
would  establish  the  domination  of  the  strong  over  the  weak  states. 
Apparently  U.S.  representatives  and  their  supporters  were  able  to 
counter  the  Soviet  position,  for  during  1959  the  Board  provisionally 
approved  principles  for  drafting  a  safeguards  system.  These  principles 
were  never  published. 

In  May  1960,  the  Director  General  sent  a  draft  of  a  proposed  safe- 
guards agreement  to  70  governments.  It  provided  for  inspection  by 
IAEA  inspectors  of  facilities  using  nuclear  materials  obtained 
through  the  Agency,  IAEA  approval  of  reactor  designs,  and  Agency 
supervision  of  records  of  reactor  operations.  In  September,  this  draft 
was  debated  and  adopted  at  the  fourth  General  Conference.  In  19G0 
the  AEC  took  a  first  step  toward  providing  the  IAEA  with  practical 
working  experience  with  safeguards.  At  the  Agency's  General  Con- 
ference^ it  and  several  of  its  bilateral  partners  announced  their  will- 
ingness to  transfer  to  the  Agency  the  administration  of  safeguards 
for  U.S. -supplied  materials.  In  that  year  the  United  States  volun- 
teered to  place  four  nuclear  reactors  under  Agency  safeguards.155 
Full  IAEA  safeguards,  principles,  and  procedures  would  apply, 
including  inspection  and  verification  of  records  and  accounts.156 


1M 

Decern 
The. 


V  S    Atomic  Encrev  Commission.  Proprcss  in  Peaceful  Tines  of  Atomic  Encroy.July- 
mhe'r   1957    (Washington.  DC.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office    lOr.S),  p.   196. 
The  four  reactors  Included  two  research  reactors  at  the  AECVFropkhaven  National 

Laboratory,   an   experimental   power  reactor  at   the  AEC's  Argonne  National   Laboratory. 

and  a  small  de ostration  power  plant  In  an  electric  utility  at  Plqua,  Ohio. 

•"""T'S    Atomic  Enerpv  Commission.   Annual  Heport   to   Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 

Commission  for  1960   (Washington,  DC.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  1961).  p.  205. 


199 


In  1961  the  International  Agency  adopted  guidelines  for  a  safe- 
guards system.  The  AEC  in  turn  adopted  these  principles  and  pro- 
cedures to  be  applied  under  its  bilateral  agreements,  and  the  countries 
involved  indicated  their  willingness  to  consult  with  the  United  States 
about  future  transfer  of  safeguards  for  U.S. -supplied  materials  to  the 
IAEA.157  During  1962  the  IAEA  and  AEC  completed  negotiations 
for  application  of  Agency  safeguards  to  the  four  reactors,  and  two  trial 
inspections  were  carried  out  by  IAEA  inspectors  at  these  reactors.158 

In  1963  the  AEC  and  a  bilateral  partner  completed  an  agreement 
to  transfer  to  the  IAEA  the  function  of  safeguarding  U.S. -supplied 
material.  While  most  of  the  nuclear  power  bilateral  agreements  of  the 
United  States  were  with  European  countries,  the  first  such  agreement 
was  executed  with  Japan.  Entering  into  force  on  November  1,  1963, 
this  trilateral  agreement  of  the  United  States,  Japan,  and  the  Inter- 
national Agency  provided  for  the  Agency  to  safeguard  any  nuclear 
material,  equipment,  and  facilities  supplied  to  Japan  by  the  United 
States.  It  also  specified  that  Agency  safeguards  would  apply  to  any 
fissionable  material  produced  in  the  Japanese  facilities  upon  its 
return  to  the  United  States  for  reprocessing  unless  the  U.S.  substi- 
tuted an  equivalent  quantity  of  like  material  in  Japan.159  This  pro- 
vision was  doubly  innovative:  it  recognized  the  idea  that  IAEA 
safeguards  should  follow  the  return  flow  of  safeguarded  material  from 
a  recipient  country  to  the  country  where  it  was  processed  or  used; 
and  it  provided  a  way  for  the  supplying  nations  to  break  the  chain 
of  safeguards  simply  by  substituting  a  like  amount  of  material  at 
the  recipient  country.  By  this  device,  a  supplier  country  like  the  United 
States,  or  the  U.S.S.R.  or  the  United  Kingdom  could  avoid  IAEA 
inspection  of  nuclear  material  sent  by  a  third  party. 

The  IAEA  Board  of  Governors  in  1963  provisionally  approved  a 
system  of  safeguards  for  small  power  reactors  and  the  Seventh  General 
Conference  that  year  adopted  a. U.S. -proposed  resolution  endorsing 
the  Board's  action.  AEC  Chairman  Seaborg  recommended  to  the 
Conference  that  the  Agency  consider  extending  safeguards  to  facilities 
for  fabricating  and  for  reprocessing  nuclear  fuel ;  also  that  the  Agency 
compile  and  publish  an  international  registry  of  ocean  disposal  sites 
for  radioactive  wastes  and  undertake  the  development  of  international 
or  regional  wastes  burial  grounds.160 

In  1964  IAEA  safeguards  were  expanded  to  include  power  reactors 
of  any  size.  At  this  time,  many  members  of  the  Agency  called  for 
clarification  and  simplification  by  revising  the  whole  safeguards  sys- 
tem. A  start  was  made  in  that  year. 

In  1965  the  IAEA  Board  of  Governors  provisionally  approved  a 
clarification  and  simplification  of  the  Agency's  safeguards  system. 
The  General  Conference  that  year  adopted  a  U.S.-proposed  resolu- 
tion to  approve  this  revision  and  the  Board  of  Governors  effectuated 
the  revised  system  on  September  28,  1965.161  The  State  Department 


157  U.S.  Atomic  Unersrv  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1961   (Washington,  DC.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  1002),  p.  2::3. 

^U.S.  Atomic  Enerjrv  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1962   (Washington,  D.C.  :  TT.S.  Governmpnt  Printing  Office,  196^),  p.  296. 

1C8U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1963   (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1964),  p.  2:!4. 

160  Ibid.,  p.  233. 

161  U.S.  Atomic  Energv  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1965    (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1960),  p.  254. 


200 


supported  the  revision  before  the  Joint  Committee,  describing  it  as 
intelligible,  comprehensive,  and  likely  to  provide  a  mechanism  for 
effective  safeguards  on  peaceful  nuclear  programs  around  the  world.162 
Also  in  1965  the  United  States  expanded  its  original  four  reactors 
offer  by  voluntarily  putting  under  IAEA  safeguards  the  175  megawatt 
Yankee  nuclear  power  plant  at  Rowe,  Massachusetts.  This  action 
provided  IAEA  inspectors  with  practical  experience  with  a  larger, 
regularly  operating,  nuclear  power  plant  and  was  expected  to  confirm 
the  U.S.  position  that  safeguards  would  not  interfere  with  efficient 
operations  of  nuclear  facilities.  During  1965  IAEA  inspectors  made 
10  inspections  of  the  reactors  under  voluntary  safeguards.163 

By  the  end  of  1965  two  other  supplying  countries  also  were  using 
trilateral  agreements  that  involved  the  IAEA.  One  was  among  the 
IAEA,  Canada,  and  Japan;  and  others  were  among  the  IAEA, 
the  United  Kingdom  and  Japan,  and  Denmark,  respectively. 

In  1966  President  Johnson  pledged  full  U.S.  support  for  the 
Agency's  safeguards  system,  which  he  characterized  as  one  of  the 
principal  instruments  for  preventing  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons. 
In  a  message  to  the  10th  General  Conference,  he  said : 164 

.  .  .  the  Agency  has  a  crucial  responsibility  to  see  that  the  vast  beneficial 
uses  of  nuclear  energy  are  not  diverted  for  military  purposes.  I  cannot  say 
often  enough  that  the  prevention  of  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  is  one  of  the 
most  important  tasks  of  our  times.  We  look  on  the  Agency's  safeguards  system 
as  one  of  the  principal  instruments  for  accomplishing  this  task.  The  U.S.  Govern- 
ment fully  supports  the  Agency  system  and  we  will  do  all  in  our  power  to  support 
the  continued  growth  and  technical  effectiveness  of  the  system. 

To  show  its  support,  the  United  States  voluntarily  permitted  appli- 
cation of  safeguards  to  a  commercial  nuclear  fuel  reprocessing  facil- 
ity. That  April,  at  the  18-Nation  Disarmament  Conference  in  Geneva, 
the  United  States  offered,  in  cooperation  with  the  company  con- 
cerned,165 to  make  the  fuel  reprocessing  plant  available  to  the  IAEA 
to  develop  and  test  safeguards  techniques  and  to  gain  experience  and 
training  for  its  inspectors.  During  1966,  IAEA  inspectors  made  10 
inspections  of  the  Yankee  plant,  including  4  unannounced  visits  to  test 
provisions  of  IAEA  inspection  procedures  for  access  at  all  times  to 
power  reactors. 

In  1967  the  United  States  suggested  at  the  11th  General  Conference 
of  the  IAEA  that  the  Agency's  systems  extend  to  fuel  fabrication 
plants.166  Far  more  important,  on  December  2,  1967,  President  John- 
son announced  that  when  safeguards  were  applied  under  a  nonpro- 
liferation  treaty  for  nuclear  weapons,  the  United  States  would  volun- 
tarily permit  the  International  Agency  to  apply  its  safeguards  to  all 
nuclear  activities  in  this  country,  excluding  only  those  with  direct 
national  security  significance.167 

In  1968  IAEA  safeguards  were  extended  to  cover  facilities  for  cer- 
tain chemical  processing  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  and  for  fabrication 


103  Statement  of  Charles  W.  Thomas.  Office  of  International  Scientific  Affairs,  Donart- 
iii.nt  df  State.  In  D.S.  Congress,  lolnt  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  International 
Agreements  for  Cooperation,  89th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1965,  p.  14. 

>*'<  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1965,  op.  clt.,  p.  2.r>7. 

184  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Major  Activities  in  Atomic  Energy  Programs, 
.latuinry-December  1966  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1967), 
p.   201. 

ln"'  Nuclear  Fuel  Services,  Inc.,  of  West  Valley,  New  York. 

1MU.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  the  Congress  on  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1967    (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1968),  p.  210. 

ia,7Ibld.,  p.  216. 


201 


of  these  materials  into  fuel  elements  for  nuclear  power  plants.  Also 
in  1968,  the  Treaty  for  Nonproliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons  was 
opened  for  signature.  Under  Article  III  of  the  Treaty,  IAEA  would 
be  called  upon  to  provide  assurance  that  nuclear  energy  programs  in 
non-nuclear-weapons  states  adhering  to  the  Treaty  were  not  diverted 
to  the  manufacture  of  nuclear  weapons  or  other  nuclear  explosive 
devices.  To  support  IAEA  safeguards,  the  AEC  provided  the  services 
of  technical  experts,  shared  results  of  its  research  and  development, 
and  provided  safeguards  training  opportunities  for  the  Agency's 
staff.168 

On  March  5,  1970,  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  entered  into 
force.  In  keeping  with  Article  III  which  required  each  non-weapons 
state  to  accept  safeguards  by  agreement  with  the  International  Agency, 
representatives  of  the  United  States  and  47  other  IAEA  member 
states,  including  the  nuclear  power  states  of  Europe,  met  twice 
during  1970  to  consider  the  character  of  such  safeguards  agreements, 
the  procedures  to  be  included,  and  the  methods  of  financing  the 
safeguards. 

The  "Four  Reactor  Agreement"  of  the  United  States  expired  on 
July  31,  1970.  To  continue  its  cooperation  with  the  IAEA  in  develop- 
ing effective  safeguards,  the  United  States  arranged  for  IAEA 
personnel  to  take  part  in  safeguards  exercises  at  certain  U.S.  facilities. 
This  was  intended  as  an  interim  arrangement  until  such  time  as 
President  Johnson's  offer  of  1967  to  submit  all  U.S.  peaceful  nuclear 
activities  to  IAEA  safeguards  was  implemented.169 

In  December  1970,  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  in  its 
annual  report  noted  that  members  and  staff  of  the  Committee  had 
visited  the  International  Agency  to  discuss  safeguard  inspection  pro- 
cedures. The  Joint  Committee  reported  that  it  was  mindful  of  the 
importance  of  safeguards,  ".  .  .  but  is  looking  very  cautiously  at  the 
growing  safeguards  program  and  what  could  develop  into  a  need  for 
increased  funding  to  support  the  numbers  of  personnel  which  may  be 
suggested  as  necessary  to  run  the  IAEA  safeguards  program."  17° 

However,  the  Joint  Committee's  report  for  1971  had  little  to  say 
about  safeguards. 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 

Had  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  evolved  in  the  di- 
rection indicated  by  President  Eisenhower's  idealistic  Atoms  for 
Peace  proposal,  it  could  have  had  a  major  influence  upon  develop- 
ment of  commercial  nuclear  energy  in  Europe  as  a  channel  for 
technical  assistance  and  nuclear  materials.  However,  the  tensions  of 
the  cold  war  effectively  precluded  such  a  role.  While  the  United 
States  was  the  most  generous  contributor  to  the  IAEA,  it  chose  not 
to  promote  the  Agency  as  a  distributor  of  nuclear  materials  or  the 
custodian  of  a  pool  of  such  materials.  Nor  did  the  United  States 
support  an  international  regulatory  or  standard-setting  function  for 
the  IAEA  for  design  and  operation  of  nuclear  power  plants.  On  the 

1WU.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1968   (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1969>,  p.  204. 

199  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1970    (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office),  1973,  p.  129. 

170  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy.  "Activity  and  Accomplishments 
of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  During  the  Second  Session  of  the  91st  Congress," 
Congressional  Record,  vol.  lltf,  December  31,  1970,  p.  44324. 


202 


other  hand,  the  Agency  provided  an  arena  wherein  U.S.  and  Soviet 
representatives  could  meet  in  an  atmosphere  where  political  differ- 
ences were  less  pronounced  than  for  other  cold  war  circumstances. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  IAEA,  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R. 
as  the  two  principal  "have"  nations  in  the  world's  nuclear  com- 
munity were  pushed  together  in  their  participation  in  the  Agency's 
activities  by  the  pressures  of  the  other  largely  "have-not"  nations. 
These  circumstances  engendered  some  mutual  interest  and  the  result- 
ing experience  demonstrated  the  possibilities  for  cooperation  between 
the  two  governments  in  diplomatic,  legal,  and  technical  matters  relat- 
ing to  nuclear  energy.  While  such  cooperation  has  become  common  in 
1972.171  it  was  most  unusual  during  the  formative  years  of  the  IAEA. 
The  IAEA  provided  a  sheltered  field  wherein  member  states  belong- 
ing to  widely  differing  world  power  blocs  could  cautiously  experiment 
with  new  relations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  variety  of  viewpoints  and 
national  desires  represented  among  the  members  of  the  Agency  on 
occasion  led  to  strained  relations  within  the  IAEA's  governing  bodies 
and  has  tended  to  limit  the  Agency  to  a  lowest  common  denominator 
of  inoffensive  activities. 

The  IAEA  has  been  a  useful  test-bed  to  demonstrate  a  limited  form 
of  international  inspection,  a  demonstration  that  can  be  important 
for  U.S.  interests  if  international  limitations  upon  armaments  are 
agreed  upon.  The  IAEA,  with  strong  U.S.  backing,  has  demonstrated 
on  a  small  scale  how  international  safeguards  for  nuclenr  materials 
can  work.  Perhaps  more  important,  it  has  done  so  without  generating 
any  insoluble  problem  of  national  sovereignty.  Whether  the  United 
States  and  other  nations  will  now  be  willing  to  provide  the  financial 
and  technical  support  required  by  the  Agency  to  expand  its  safeguards 
functions  enough  to  adequately  implement  the  Nonproliferation 
Treaty  remains  to  be  seen. 

Several  specific  questions  relating  to  the  IAEA  are  likely  to  con- 
front U.S.  diplomats  and  policymakers  in  the  future.  These  questions 
can  be  expected  to  bear  upon : 

(1)  Establishing  and  enforcing  international  standards  and 
guides  for  the  design,  construction,  and  operation  of  nuclear 
power  plants,  nuclear  fuel  reprocessing  plants,  and  perpetual 
radioactive  waste  storage  facilities ; 

(2)  Establishing  and  enforcing  international  regulations  for 
the  shipment  of  highly  radioactive  materials ; 

(3)  Assessment  of  environmental  effects  of  nuclear  facilities 
located  so  near  to  national  boundaries  that  such  effects  could 
be  expected  to  extend  across  national  borders ; 

(4)  Supplying  nuclear  fuel  materials; 

(5)  Providing  for  the  perpetual  storage  of  radioactive  wastes 
from  nuclear  power ; 

(0)  Safeguarding  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  for  commercial 
nuclear  power; 

(7)  Possible  future  relations  with  the  regional  nuclear  energy 
agencies  of  the  Soviet  bloc  nations. 


171  The  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  slimed  an  agreement  on  scientific  find  technological 
cooperation  on  May  24.  1072,  that  poos  hoyond  the  usual  eTehantre  of  Ideas  and  opens  the 
way  to  scientific  Joint  research  undertakings  and  cooperative  projects.  It  estahlished  for 
the  first  time  a  U.S. -Soviet  Joint  Commission  on  Scientific  and  Technical  Cooperation.  Cf. 
Claire  R.  Geler.  The  U.B.-Boviet  Aqrrcmcvt  in  Science  anrl  Technology  (Washington,  P.P.  : 
The  Library  of  Congress,  Congressional  Research  Service,  August  10,  1972,  report  No. 
72-179  SP. 


VII.  Creating  A  Regional  Nuclear  Organization  :  The  European 
Atomic  Energy  Community  (Euratom) 

Of  the  international  organizations  arising  out  of  the  discovery  of 
nuclear  fission,  the  most  ambitious,  but  perhaps  the  most  disappoint- 
ing, has  been  the  multinational,  regional  organization  known  as 
Euratom.  Established  in  1958,  the  purpose  of  the  European  Atomic 
Energy  Community  was  to  create  conditions  necessary  for  the  speedy 
establishment  and  growth  of  nuclear  power  within  the  European  Eco- 
nomic Community,  whose  members  then  included  Belgium,  France, 
the  German  Federal  Republic,  Italy,  Luxembourg  and  the  Nether- 
lands. The  goal  of  Euratom  was  also  expected  to  further  the  eco- 
nomic integration  of  Europe,  which  was  a  long  standing  objective  of 
U.S.  diplomacy.  The  support  and  collaboration  of  the  United  States 
with  Euratom  has  been  directly  instrumental  in  demonstrating  U.S. 
nuclear  power  technology  in  Europe,  and,  for  a  while,  provided  U.S. 
diplomacy  with  special  leverage  in  relations  with  Euratom. 

This  section  outlines  the  origins  of  Euratom,  its  functions  and 
activities,  and  the  disappointments  of  its  research  and  development 
program.  The  nature  and  scale  of  U.S.  support  are  mentioned  and 
show  that  U.S.  participation  in  Euratom  has  been  greater  than  U.S. 
participation  in  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  or  the 
Nuclear  Energy  Agency  of  the  OECD.  The  joint  U.S.-Euratom  re- 
search and  reactor  programs  are  described  in  section  VIII. 

Origins  of  Euratom, 

The  impetus  for  European  economic  and  military  integration  that 
followed  World  War  II,172  and  problems  with  oil  supplies  were  con- 
tributing factors  to  the  idea  of  a  European  atomic  energy  community. 
There  was  the  three-year  suspension  of  Iranian  oil  production  fol- 
lowing nationalization  in  1951  and  the  closing  of  the  Suez  Canal  in 
1956-57.173  The  initial  impetus  for  Euratom  appeared  in  the  mid  1950's 
when  statesmen  took  note  of  the  expectations  of  nuclear  scientists 
and  engineers  that  economically  competitive  nuclear  power  was  close 
at  hand.  In  June  1955  the  foreign  ministers  of  the  six  members  of 
the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  met  at  Messina,  Italy  and 
decided  that  commercial  nuclear  power  could  provide  a  desired 
additional  spur  for  European  integration.  The  ministers  had  in  mind 
a  vertical  integration  of  a  new  European  nuclear  industry  which  prom- 
ised quick  returns  to  the  participating  nations,  with  negligible  in- 
terference with  established  commercial  interests.  WTith  the  European 

172  Cf .  section  III. 

173  Oil  supply  interruptions  were  to  occur  again  with  the  closing  of  the  Suez  Canal  in 
1967.  the  Libyan  embargo  and  the  Tapline  rupture  and  cutoff  in  1970.  The  interruptions 
of  the  1950's  took  place  at  a  time  when  the  United  States  was  a  relatively  modest  oil 
importer  and  still  possessed  sufficient  excess  producing  capacity  to  contribute  a  portion 
of  the  oil  to  make  up  the  interrupted  supply  of  other  major  Western  oil  consuming 
countries.  However,  of  recent  years  the  United  States  has  become  a  substantial  importer 
of  oil  and  it  appears  unlikely  that  the  United  States  could  come  to  the  rescue  for  future 
interruptions  of  European  oil  supplies. 

(203) 


204 


nuclear  industry  in  its  infancy,  vested  interests  were  few  and  still 
fluid. 

The  exciting  early  purpose  of  -Euratom  was  to  create  a  European 
nuclear  technology  and  a  European  nuclear  power  industry,  which,  it 
was  hoped,  would  be  able  to  compete  with  the  nuclear  industries  of 
the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States.174 

ADVICE  FOR  THE  DECISIONMAKERS 

The  foreign  ministers  decided  at  Messina  to  seek  the  advice  of  the 
technological  community.  In  November  1956  they  commissioned  three 
prominent  Europeans  to  report  on  the  early  production  of  nuclear 
power  within  the  six  member  countries.  The  three  were  Louis  Armand 
of  France,  Franz  Etzel  of  West  Germany,  and  Francesco  Giordani  of 
Italy.175  Dubbed  "the  three  wise  men"  in  the  public  press,  these  three 
were  well  versed  in  science,  technology,  administration,  and  diplomacy, 
but  their  advice  and  interests  focused  more  upon  politics  and  economics 
than  upon  science.176 

A  TARGET  FOR  EURATOM 

The  product  of  "the  three  wise  men"  was  a  report,  A  Target  for 
Euratom,171  delivered  May  4,  1957,  after  the  treaties  for  atomic  inte- 
gration had  been  signed.  The  substance  of  the  proposals,  however,  was 
well  known  beforehand,  for  in  January  1957,  the  authors  had  ex- 
pounded their  ideas  in  a  public  conference. 

A  Target  for  Euratom  combined  the  factors  of  energy  and  economic 
policy  into  a  compelling  argument  for  European  atomic  integration. 
With  the  Suez  crisis  still  fresh  in  mind,  they  observed  that  a  future 
stoppage  of  oil  could  be  an  economic  calamity  for  Europe,  and  that  ex- 
cessive dependence  upon  an  oil  supply  from  an  unstable  region  might 
lead  to  serious  political  trouble  throughout  the  world.  Estimating 
that  future  energy  requirements  of  the  economic  community  would 
increase  by  83  percent  between  1955  and  1975,  they  advised  that  the 
economic  growth  of  the  six  countries  was  in  danger  of  being  seriously 
hampered  by  lack  of  another  source  of  energy.  They  warned  that 
without  such  a  new  source  imports  of  fuel  would  rise  to  intolerable 
amounts,  doubling  in  the  next  decade  and  tripling  within  two  decades. 
The  authors  recommended  that  the  Common  Market  nations  install 
15,000  megawatts  of  nuclear  power  by  1967.  For  perspective,  at  that 

"*  For  more  detailed  insight  into  the  orlpins  of  Euratom,  Cf.  Rene  Foche,  Europe  and 
Technology:  A  Political  View  (Paris:  The  Atlantic  Institute,  1970),  p.  23. 

178  Louis  Armand  was  then  director  general  of  the  French  State  Railways  and  president 
of  the  Industrial  Equipment  Commission  of  the  French  Commissariat  a  l'Energle  Atomique 
(CEA).  By  profession  he  was  an  engineer  and  an  administrator.  Franz  Etzel  was  a  senior 
vice  president  of  the  Coal  Community.  A  lawyer  and  an  economist,  he  was  also  leader  of  the 
Christian  Democratic  Party  in  Germany.  Francesco  Giordani  was  president  of  the  Italian 
National  Rfs^arch  Council.  A  professor,  nuclear  scientist  and  chemist,  he  was  a  leading 
European  authority  on  nuclear  science. 

w  Professor  Warren  B.  Walsh  of  the  international  relations  program  of  the  Maxwell 
School,  University  of  Syracuse,  underscored  this  point  In  his  observation  that  : 

".  .  .  the  principal  architects  of  Euratom  were  specialists  In  politics  and  economics, 
especially  tne  former,  rather  than  scientists  ....  The  genesis  of  Euratom  owed 
more  to  the  Impact  of  politics  and  public  affairs  than  the  other  way  around." 

Cf.  Warren  B.  Walsh,  Science  and  International  Publio  Affairs  (New  York  :  Maxwell 
School  of  Syracuse  University,  1967),  p.  79. 

177  A  Target  for  Euratom.  Reprinted  in  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom  Agreements,  85th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1958,  pp.  38-64. 


205 


time  a  powerplant  of  250  electrical  megawatts  output  was  considered 
large,  so  the  goal  was  equivalent  to  60  new  such  powerplants.178 

The  authors  asserted  that  the  Common  Market  nations  could  not 
achieve  this  goal  without  pooling  their  resources  and  obtaining  help 
from  the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  Canada.  The  target 
was  admittedly  ambitious ;  of  the  six  members  of  the  Community,  at 
that  time  only  France  had  any  practical  experience  with  nuclear  power. 
In  summation,  the  authors  presented  an  optimistic  picture  of  the  bene- 
fits obtainable  from  nuclear  integration.  They  wrote : 179 

.  .  .  Euratom  will  create  new  opportunities.  It  will  pool  the  scientific  as  well 
as  the  industrial  resources  of  our  six  countries  and  their  varied  skills.  A  common 
market  for  nuclear  equipment  to  be  set  up  within  a  year  will  promote  industrial 
specialization.  Further,  Euratom  will  represent  our  nations  as  a  single  unit 
vis-a-vis  other  states,  and  will  be  far  better  placed  to  obtain  full  cooperation  from 
them  than  our  countries  separately. 

The  authors  highlighted  reasons  for  American  support  and  partici- 
pation. For  example,  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  could  expect  benefits 
from  experience  with  nuclear  power  plants  built  in  Europe.  Their 
report  stated : 180 

...  No  amount  of  research  can  be  a  substitute  for  the  practical  knowledge  to 
be  gained  by  large-scale  industrial  application  of  atomic  power.  Europe  could 
make  this  experience  available  to  the  United  States.  Our  talks  in  Washington 
convinced  us  that,  on  the  healthy  basis  of  a  two-way  traffic,  a  close  partnership 
as  equals  can  be  built  up  between  the  United  States  and  Euratom  and  their 
respective  industries. 

What  forms  could  this  cooperation  take  ?  The  advisors  had  definite 
ideas,  which  they  expressed  as  follows : m 

.  .  .  The  United  States  would  make  available  the  necessary  fissionable  mate- 
rials and  the  technical  knowledge  to  set  our  industries  going.  Once  Euratom  is 
established,  a  task  force  composed  of  some  of  America's  most  able  men  would  be 
at  our  disposal  to  continue  studying  with  European  experts  the  many  technical 
problems  posed  by  our  programme.  America  would  provide  training  facilities  for 
our  scientists  and  technicians.  Joint  projects,  for  instance  to  improve  and  adapt 
reactors,  can  be  envisaged  between  American  and  European  industries,  as  well  as 
between  the  American  and  European  Atomic  Energy  Commissions. 

U.S.  Support  for  European  Nuclear  Integration 

The  joint  communique  issued  from  the  White  House  at  the  end  of  a 
visit  by  the  three-man  Euratom  Committee  to  the  United  States  indi- 
cated strong  U.S.  support.  It  said : 182 

The  U.S.  Government  welcomes  the  initiative  taken  in  the  Committee's  proposal 
for  a  bold  and  imaginative  application  of  nuclear  energy.  .  .  .  The  United  States 
anticipates  active  association  in  the  achievement  of  the  Committee's  objective, 
and  foresees  a  fruitful  two-way  exchange  of  experience  and  technical  develop- 
ment, opening  a  new  area  for  mutually  beneficial  action  on  both  the  governmental 
and  the  industrial  level  and  reinforcing  solidarity  within  Europe  and  across  the 
Atlantic. 

But  U.S.  support  for  Euratom  was  not  unqualified.  Secretary 
Dulles  made  it  clear  that  the  United  States  wished  Euratom  to  con- 
centrate exclusively  on  development  of  nuclear  power  and  not  aspire 

178  That  this  target  was  overly  ambitions  Is  evident  In  the  situation  of  1967.  In  that 
year  the  six  Euratom  nations  had  between  them  16  nuclear  power  reactors  with  a  total 
electrical  generating  capacity  of  2.094  megawatts. 

179  A  Tarqet  for  Euratom,  op.  cit.,  p.  47. 
18°  Ibid.,  p.  50. 

181  Loc.  cit. 

183  Department  of  State  Bulletin,  vol.  36  (February  25.  1957),  p.  307. 


206 


to  such  greater  goals  as  the  economic  welfare  of  the  European  Com- 
munity or  the  fostering  of  greater  political  unity  among  its  member 
states.  While  some  European  proponents  of  Euratom  looked  to  it  to 
restore  the  influence  of  the  six  nations  in  world  affairs,  the  Washington 
view  was  the  opposite.  The  communique  at  the  end  of  the  "wise  men's" 
visit  said  that  the  parties  agreed  that  Euratom  should  be  solely  the 
stimulus  to  realize  the  objectives  for  nuclear  power.183 

In  its  assessment  of  U.S.  policy  for  international  development  of 
nuclear  energy,  the  American  Assembly  reflected  the  optimism  of  the 
times.  It  saw  many  benefits  for  the  United  States  from  encouraging  the 
use  of  this  new  power  technology  in  Europe : 1S4 

A  major  effort  on  the  part  of  American  industry  and  government  would  provide 
the  American  atomic  power  program  with  vitality  and  purpose  and  accelerate  the 
development  of  power  at  home.  While  it  can  be  expected  that  highly  industrialized 
countries  such  as  those  in  Europe  will  ultimately  establish  their  own  facilities  for 
building  their  atomic  power  plants,  Euratom  can  provide  American  industry  with 
experience  as  well  as  a  market  for  its  products  and  technology.  Such  an  effort 
would  assist  the  aims  of  American  foreign  policy  in  developing  the  economic 
strength  of,  and  American  ties  with,  the  Western  European  community,  and  .  .  . 
would  provide  experience  in  the  operation  of  large-scale  reactors  of  great  and 
immediate  benefit  to  our  own  development  program. 

Soviet  Opposition  to  Euratom 

International  rivalries  quickly  raised  diplomatic  difficulties  for 
Euratom.  The  Soviet  Union  declared  both  Euratom  and  the  Economic 
Community  to  be  instruments  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Orga- 
nization and  labeled  Euratom  a  scheme  to  rearm  Germany  with  atomic 
weapons.  The  Soviet  Union  sent  warning  notes  to  each  of  the  six 
Common  Market  nations,  urging  them  to  accept  instead  the  Soviet 
plan  for  Pan-European  economic  and  atomic  integration.  While  this 
warning  was  abortive,  the  Soviet  Union  was  more  successful  in  block- 
ing later  Euratom  efforts  to  establish  a  close  relationship  with  the  In- 
ternational Atomic  Energy  Agency. 

An  example  of  the  Soviet  Union's  position  is  a  statement  of  the 
U.S.S.R.  Foreign  Ministry  issued  March  16,  1957.  After  agreeing  that 
economic  cooperation  in  Europe  would  help  to  restore  disrupted  trade 
and  scientific  and  technical  connections,  the  Soviet  Union  opposed  both 
the  Euratom  and  the  Common  Market  as  in  contradiction  to  those 
aims  and  likely  to  increase  the  rift  in  Europe : 185 

However,  the  plans  for  creating  Euratom  and  the  Common  Market  are  in 
manifest  contradiction  with  these  aims.  The  first  thins  that  strikes  the  eye 
is  that  all  those  taking  part  in  Euratom  and  the  Common  Market  are  members 
of  the  military  NATO  grouping.  It  is  obvious  that  the  activities  of  Euratom  and 
the  Common  Market  will  be  subjugated  to  NATO  aims,  the  aggressive  character 
of  whieh  Is  widely  known. 

Under  the  circumstances,  the  creation  of  Euratom  and  the  Common  Market 
would  inevitably  lead  to  a  further  widening  of  the  rift  in  Europe,  to  an 
aggravation  of  tensions  in  Europe,  which  would  complicate  the  establishment 
of  economic  and  political  cooperation  on  a  European  basis  and  give  rise  to  fresh 
difficuties  in  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  European  security. 


Ma  For  further  discussion  of  this  point,  Cf.  Klaus  E.  Knorr.  "American  Forelcn  Policy 
and  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy."  Atoms  for  rower,  United  States  Policy  in 
Atomic  Bnergy  Development  (New  York  :  The  American  Assembly,  Columbia  University, 
1957),  pp.  100   12fl  nnd  In  particular  pp.  123-127. 

1S*  Atoms  for  Power,  op.  clt,  p.  157.  _  _  .    _ 

"■U.S.  <  onfrress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Enerpy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom. 
Agreements,  op.  clt.,  p.  28. 


207 


Three  Policy  Issues  of  Euratom 

Three  issues  in  the  final  international  negotiations  for  Euratom 
further  illustrate  the  problems  that  may  arise  out  of  a  national  decision 
to  foster  application  of  a  new  technology  for  the  benefit  of  American 
diplomacy.  While  the  U.S.  role  is  not  clearly  visible  in  the  working 
out  of  these  issues,  it  seems  plausible  that  much  encouragement  and 
influence  flowed  eastward  across  the  Atlantic. 

The  three  major  issues  central  to  establishment  of  Euratom  were : 

(1)  Whether  Euratom  should  manufacture  enriched  uranium; 

(2)  Whether  member  states  should  be  precluded  from  military 
use  of  atomic  energy ;  and 

(3)  Whether  Euratom  should  have  a  monopoly  over  nuclear 
materials.  These  questions  shared  a  common  root ;  to  what  extent 
was  Euratom  to  be  an  instrument  to  achieve  economic  inde- 
pendence and  political  and  military  independence  for  Europe  ?  1S6 

WHETHER  EURATOM   SHOULD   MANUFACTURE  ENRICHED  URANIUM 

Until  January  1957,  European  proponents  of  Euratom  had  pre- 
sumed that  the  new  organization  would  give  top  priority  to  building 
facilities  to  enrich  uranium.  It  seemed  clear  that  such  a  facility  would 
be  needed  to  reduce  the  dependence  of  Euratom  states  upon  nuclear  fuel 
imported  from  the  United  States.  But  this  expectation  was  dashed 
early  in  1957  when  the  Germans  proposed  that  the  plan  be  studied 
further.  Although  the  French  pressed  for  immediate  construction 
the  forces  of  delay  prevailed. 

The  issue  impinged  directly  upon  U.  S.  interests  for  at  that  time 
the  United  States  did  not  favor  foreign  production  of  enriched 
uranium.  The  thought  of  an  enriched  uranium  facility  upon  the  Con- 
tinent near  Soviet-occupied  territories  and  the  possibilities  that  nuclear 
materials  might  be  illicitly  diverted  from  such  a  plant  moved  the 
United  States  to  assure  the  Euratom  nations  of  a  supply  of  nuclear 
fuel.  Louis  Armand  let  it  be  known  that  while  he  still  favored  the 
ultimate  construction  of  an  enrichment  plant  in  Europe,  he  rejected 
it  as  an  immediate  objective  for  Euratom.187 

The  publication  of  A  Target  for  Euratom  defused  the  issue.  Noting 
that  until  recently  the  construction  of  a  plant  had  seemed  the  only 
way  to  obtain  enriched  uranium,  the  authors  noted  a  changed  condi- 
tion :  "But  there  is  now  no  doubt  that  our  countries  can  obtain  en- 
riched uranium  from  the  United  States  in  the  necessary  quantities,  and 
at  low  published  prices."  188  They  estimated  that  enriched  uranium 
produced  in  Europe  would  probably  cost  two  to  three  times  as  much. 
Furthermore,  they  anticipated  the  early  reuse  of  plutonium  produced 
as  a  byproduct  from  other  nuclear  plants,  the  use  of  natural  uranium  as 
a  fuel,  and  the  prompt  development  of  the  breeder  reactor  would 
reduce  European  needs  for  enriched  uranium.  In  the  face  of  this 
advice,  the  proposal  to  immediately  build  an  enrichment  plant  dropped 

i8e  Tije  discussion  that  follows  draws  heavily  upon  an  analysis  of  Euratom  published 
in  1964  by  Jeroslav  G.  Polach,  a  diplomat  and  later  an  economist  with  Resources  for 
the  Future.  Inc.,  who  was  interested  in  energy  and  Euratom.  Cf.  Jeroslav  G.  Polach, 
Euratom,  Its  Background,  Tssues,  and  Economic  Implications  (Dobbs  Ferry,  New  York  : 
Oceana  Publications,  Inc.,  1964),  pp.  61-66. 

187  Cf.  Le  Monde.  February  20.  1957  :  also,  Polach,  op.  cit,  p.  62. 

188  A  Target  for  Euratom,  op.  cit.,  p.  56. 


96-525  O  -  T7  -  vol.    1-15 


208 


from  sight,  not  to  reappear  for  more  than  a  decade.  So  the  United 
States  retained  its  enrichment  monopoly. 

WHETHER  TO  INCLUDE  MILITARY  ACTIVITIES  IN   EURATOM 

Central  to  Atoms  for  Peace  was  the  thought  of  dissuading  nations 
from  making  atomic  weapons.  This  concept  was  evident  in  proposals 
during  negotiation  of  the  Euratom  treaty  that  the  signatories  be 
barred  from  military  use  of  nuclear  energy.  This  proposed  restriction 
generated  strong  opposition  in  France,  which  at  that  time  was  the 
only  one  of  the  six  Euratom  states  with  the  ability  to  make  weapons. 
In  July  1956  during  debate  of  the  proposed  European  nuclear  com- 
munity in  the  French  National  Assembly,  the  Gaullists,  Radicals, 
Independents,  and  some  members  of  the  Catholic  Party  solidly  op- 
posed any  limitation  to  France's  right  to  produce  and  use  atomic 
weapons.  When  it  became  clear  to  Prime  Minister  Guy  Mollet  that 
there  was  no  chance  for  Euratom  if  he  persisted  in  his  advocacy  of 
limiting  European  use  of  nuclear  energy  to  peaceful  purposes,  he 
yielded  to  legislative  pressure.  Before  the  Assembly  would  approve 
French  participation  in  preparing  the  treaties,  he  had  to  assure  it  that 
his  Government  would  satisfy  itself  that  France's  participation  in 
Euratom  would  restrict  neither  her  national  atomic  program  nor  her 
right  to  produce  and  use  atomic  weapons  for  national  security.189  Thus 
the  idea  that  Euratom  could  serve  to  prevent  nuclear  armament  in 
Europe  was  stillborn. 

WHETHER  EURATOM  SHOULD  HAVE  A  MONOPOLY  OF  NUCLEAR  MATERIALS 

A  key  issue  of  the  international  negotiations  that  culminated  in 
Euratom  was  whether  this  multinational,  regional  organization  should 
have  title  to  all  nuclear  fuels  within  the  members  states,  or  whether 
member  states  could  individually  own  these  materials.  The  negotiators 
had  before  them  the  example  of  the  United  States  which  in  the 
Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946  took  title  to  all  nuclear  materials  in  the 
Nation  and  forbade  their  private  ownership.  The  French  representa- 
tives argued  that  a  Euratom  monopoly  was  imperative  to  ensure  non- 
discriminatory access  of  the  members  to  nuclear  supplies.  For  them 
the  principles  of  monopoly  and  of  equal  access  were  fundamental 
to  European  atomic  integration.  The  German  representatives  opposed 
such  a  monopoly  as  incompatible  with  the  German  free-market  econ- 
omy. To  settle  the  issue,  French  Prime  Minister  Mollet  called  a  con- 
ference of  the  six  nations  in  February  1957.  The  final  communique 
from  this  Paris  meeting  announced  that  ownership  of  fissionable 
materials  would  be  vested  in  Euratom,  except  for  those  held  for 
military  purposes.100 

A  Treaty  for  Euratom 

The  treaty  establishing  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community 
was  si gned  in  Rome  on  March  25, 1957. 

Its  stated  aim  was  to  contribute  to  the  raising  of  the  standard  of 
living  in  member  states  and  to  development  of  commercial  exchanges 

1SBPolach.  op.  clt.,p.  64. 

190  For  a  discussion  of  this  meeting,  cf.  Polach,  op.  clt.,  p.  66. 


209 


with  other  countries  by  creation  of  conditions  for  the  speedy  estab- 
lisliment  and  growth  of  nuclear  industries.191 

Article  2  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  specifies  eight  functions  of  Euratom. 
These  are  to  : 

(1)  Develop  research  and  ensure  dissemination  of  technical 
knowledge. 

(2)  Establish,  and  ensure  the  application  of  uniform  safety 
standards. 

(3)  Facilitate  investment  and  ensure,  particularly  by  encourag- 
ing business  enterprise,  and  the  construction  of  the  basic  facilities 
required  for  the  developing  of  nuclear  energy  within  the  Com- 
munity. 

(4)  Ensure  a  regular  and  equitable  supply  of  ores  and  nuclear 
fuels  to  all  users  in  the  Community. 

(5)  Guarantee,  by  appropriate  measures  of  control,  that  nuclear 
materials  are  not  diverted  for  purposes  other  than  those  for  which 
they  are  intended. 

(6)  Exercise  the  property  rights  conferred  upon  it  in  respect 
to  special  fissionable  materials. 

(7)  Ensure  extensive  markets  and  access  to  the  best  technical 
means  by  the  creation  of  a  common  market  for  specialized  mate- 
rials and  equipment,  by  the  free  movement  of  capital  for  nuclear 
investment,  and  by  freedom  of  employment  for  specialists  within 
the  Community. 

(8)  Establish  with  other  countries  and  with  international  orga- 
nizations any  contacts  likely  to  promote  progress  in  the  peaceful 
uses  of  nuclear  energy. 

As  finally  approved,  Euratom's  functions  did  not  include  control  of 
military  uses  of  nuclear  energy,  thus  yielding  to  the  wishes  of  the 
French. 

The  initial  members  of  Euratom  were  Belgium,  France,  the  Federal 
German  Republic,  Italy,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands.  Later 
the  United  Kingdom  applied  for  entry  but  was  excluded  by  the  posi- 
tion in  1963  of  General  de  Gaulle.  Now  that  the  United  Kingdom  is 
to  become  a  member  of  the  Common  Market,  presumably  membership 
in  Euratom  will  soon  follow. 

Establishing  the  Infrastructure  for  European  Nuclear  Power 

Much  of  Euratom's  functions  had  to  do  with  establishing  the  in- 
dustrial and  regulatory  infrastructure  for  commercial  use  of  nuclear 
energy  in  Europe.  Its  research  and  development  programs  supple- 
mented those  of  France,  Italy,  and  West  Germany.  It  created  a  nuclear 
common  market  within  the  European  Economic  Community.  It  helped 
lay  the  regulatory  groundwork  of  standards  to  regulate  the  radiologi- 
cal effects  of  nuclear  power  plants.  However,  its  functions  stopped 
short  of  financing  the  construction  of  operating  nuclear  power  plants. 

wi  jn  comparison  with  the  other  two  European  communities,  Euratom  has  the  most 
limited  aim.  The  European  Economic  Community  has  the  widest,  its  objective  being  to 
promote  harmonious  development  of  economic  activities,  a  continuous  and  balanced 
expansion,  increased  stability,  accelerated  raising  of  the  living  standards,  and  closer  rela- 
tions among  the  member  states.  Compared  with  that,  the  aims  of  the  Coal  and  Steel 
Community  are  more  restrietively  associated  with  its  contribution  to  economic  expansion, 
development  of  employment  and  raising  of  living  standards. 


210 


FINANCING  AND  OPERATING  COMMERCIAL  NUCLEAR  POWER  PLANTS 

The  economic  uncertainties  of  nuclear  power  in  the  1950s  and  its  high 
capital  costs  in  comparison  with  conventional  fossil-fuel  power  plants 
caused  supporters  of  Euratom  to  urge  that  it  become  directly  involved 
in  financing  and  management  of  commercial  nuclear  power  plants.  The 
concept  that  Euratom  might  become  the  European  equivalent  of  a 
Tennessee  Valley  Authority,  however,  did  not  survive  in  the  Treaty 
of  Rome.  The  Treaty  limited  Euratom's  scope  to  facilitating  invest- 
ment and  ensuring  the  construction  of  basic  facilities  for  nuclear 
power.  Euratom  is  authorized  to  collect  and  analyze  investment  in- 
formation for  its  members.  But  it  has  no  authority  over  the  decisions 
of  the  national  electricity  industries  and  their  investors.  This  limita- 
tion made  it  politically  acceptable  for  the  United  States  to  work  with 
Euratom.  For  the  United  States  Government  to  have  offered  technical 
assistance  and  other  support  to  a  foreign  body  dedicated  to  state 
generation  of  electricity  probably  would  have  raised  opposition  because 
of  the  predominance  of  private  enterprise  in  the  U.S.  electric  power 
industry.  Thus,  Euratom's  role  evolved  in  the  direction  of  a  broker 
rather  than  a  prime  mover  in  the  commercial  use  of  nuclear  energy  in 
Europe. 

CREATING  A   NUCLEAR  COMMON   MARKET 

Commercial  nuclear  energy  in  Europe  needed  an  internal  market 
large  enough  to  justify  the  requisite  investment  of  economic,  human, 
and  physical  capital.  Proponents  of  Euratom  expected  it  to  create  a 
nuclear  common  market  which  would  permit  a  more  economic  alloca- 
tion of  resources,  and  the  use  of  the  most  modern  techniques  of  special- 
ization and  mass  production.  The  resulting  increase  in  productivity 
of  capital  and  labor  was  expected  to  contribute  to  higher  living  stand- 
ards, to  general  economic  growth,  and  to  facilitation  of  social  changes 
in  Europe. 

The  Treaty  of  Rome  laid  the  basis  for  such  a  market.  It  provided  for 
the  unhindered  commerce  of  certain  goods  and  the  free  movement 
of  labor,  capital,  and  services  for  nuclear  energy.  Items  to  move  with- 
out tariffs,  taxes  or  quantitative  restrictions  included  nuclear  ores, 
fissionable  materials,  radioactive  isotopes,  and  goods  peculiar  to  the 
nuclear  industry.  Likewise,  free  movement  of  labor  seeking  employ- 
ment in  the  European  nuclear  industry  was  to  be  assured  to  properly 
qualified  nationals  of  the  six  Common  Market  nations. 

JOINT  ENTERPRISES  I   AN   INNOVATION   IN   INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  drafters  of  Euratom  hoped  to  create  a  nuclear  industrv  which 
could  compete  against  those  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the*  United 
States  in  world  markets.  To  avoid  the  limitations  of  fragmentation 
among  many,  relatively  small  industrial  concerns,  the  Treaty  of  Rome 
provided  for  joint  enterprises  to  carry  out  "undertakings  of  outstand- 
ing importance  to  the  development* of  the  nuclear  industry  in  the 

Community ""'Joint  Enterprise  status  confers  special  advantages 

including  recognition  as  a  legal  personality,  and  exemptions  from  cer- 
tain taxes,  duties,  and  charges.  In  return,  a  Joint  Enterprise  is  re- 

»•  Article  45. 


211 


quired  to  provide  Euratom  with  information  on  the  construction  and 
operation  of  its  facilities.  All  non-patented  information  communicated 
to  Euratom  might  be  disseminated  by  it.  Joint  Enterprise  status  might 
be  conferred  under  varying  terms,  but  could  be  annulled  when  eco- 
nomic conditions  permit.  To  date,  four  of  the  early  nuclear  power 
plant  ventures  in  Europe  have  been  designated  as  Joint  Enterprises. 
These  include  three  nuclear  powerplants  in  "West 'Germany  and  one 
joint  Franco-Belgian  project. 

Early  Changes  in  Euratom  Objectives 

What  an  international  organization  does  and  what  it  becomes  de- 
pends in  part  upon  its  foundation  in  international  law,  and  upon  the 
perception  of  its  functions.  Euratom  soon  began  to  give  less  priority 
to  the  immediate  building  of  nuclear  power  plants  than  to  its  research 
and  service  function.  Euratom's  first  three  annual  reports  reveal  this 
trend  clearly  and  suggest  that  in  many  ways  the  work  of  diplomats 
had  only  just  begun  when  the  treaty  was  completed.  The  first  annual 
report  emphasized  an  urgent  need  for  nuclear  power  in  the  Com- 
munity and  its  optimistic  outlook  for  the  economic  competitiveness 
of  this  new  energy  source.  Other  fields  of  nuclear  activity  received 
lesser  priority.  Euratom's  role  as  a  middleman,  a  broker,  was  em- 
phasized : 193 

The  Commission  is  entrusted  by  the  Euratom  Treaty  with  the  task  of  creating 
conditions  necessary  for  the  establishment  and  growth  of  nuclear  industries.  It 
stimulates  initiative  and  encourages  cooperation,  follows  the  progress  being  made 
in  various  fields,  guides  investment  and  endeavors  in  every  sphere  and  at  all 
levels  to  achieve  its  aim  of  building  up  the  independent  nuclear  industry. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Commission  sought  to  avoid  "systematic  in- 
tervention," and  "any  semblance  of  authoritarianism"  or  of  "isolation- 
ist paths." 

Euratom's  second  annual  report,  for  1959,  marked  a  shift  away  from 
immediate  application  of  nuclear  power  toward  priority  for  nuclear 
research.  While  Euratom's  nuclear  power  program  continued,  its  sense 
of  urgency  and  immediacy  was  gone.  Top  priority  was  assigned  to  es- 
tablishment of  a  Euratom  university — a  concept  that  won  no  support. 
In  its  third  annual  report,  for  1960,  the  change  in  Euratom's  goals 
was  marked  by  a  transition  from  short  to  long  term  goals.  By  then 
Euratom  was  asserting  that  a  condition  for  its  success,  and  for  that  of 
the  whole  European  integration,  was  to  overcome  traditional  attitudes 
of  governments,  civil  servants,  and  organizations.  The  Commission 
assigned  the  highest  priority  to  ".  .  .  marshalling  all  the  resources  at 
its  command  to  foster  a  European  spirit."  194  This  goal  and  the  closely 
related  proposal  for  a  Euratom  university,  became  a  recurring  theme 
in  atomic  integration  debates. 

Research  for  Nuclear  Power 

A  principal  function  of  Euratom  was  to  coordinate  nuclear  research 
among  the  six  nations.  To  this  end,  the  Treaty  directed  Euratom  to 
invite  member  states,  persons,  or  enterprises  to  inform  it  of  their  nu- 

183  European  Atomic  Energy  Community.  First  General  Report  on  the  Activities  of  the 
Community,  1958  (Brussels-Luxembourg,  1959).  p.  55. 

1B*  European  Atomic  Energy  Communitv.  Third  General  Report  on  the  Activities  of  the 
Communities,  1969  (Brussels-Luxembourg,  February  1970),  pp.  7-14. 


212 


clear  research.  Euratom  would  advise  on  each  program  to  avoid  un- 
necessary duplication  and  guide  research  of  member  states  toward 
subjects  receiving  insufficient  attention.  However,  the  Treaty  forbade 
Euratom  to  publish  any  such  programs  without  consent. 

The  Treaty  provided  Euratom  four  means  of  influencing  the  nuclear 
research  of  its  member  states  and  their  nuclear  establishments. 
Euratom  could : 

(1)  Furnish  financial  assistance  for  research ; 

(2)  Supply  nuclear  source  materials  and  enriched  uranium  or 
plutonium  at  its  disposal ; 

(3)  Place  facilities,  equipment,  or  expert  assistance  at  the  dis- 
posal of  member  states,  persons,  or  enterprises,  either  against  pay- 
ment or  free  of  charge ;  and 

(4)  Initiate  joint  financing  by  member  states,  persons,  or  enter- 
prises concerned. 

These  features  of  the  treaty  were  intended  to  give  Euratom  some  in- 
fluence over  research  in  the  national  establishments  of  the  member 
states.  But  Euratom  was  not  authorized  to  direct  the  nuclear  research 
establishments  of  its  members  or  their  nuclear  industries.  It  could,  of 
course,  direct  the  research  and  development  done  with  its  funds  in  its 
own  establishments  or  in  other  organizations.  Equipped  with  these 
powers,  Euratom  in  principle  could  have  greatly  influenced  the  Euro- 
pean nuclear  industry.  But  because  of  dissension  among  its  members, 
these  powers  were  not  to  be  fully  exercised. 

FUNDING  OF  EURATOM  RESEARCH 

Euratom  is  financed  by  two  budgets :  one  for  operations,  the  other 
for  research  and  investment.  Member  states  contribute  to  each.  The 
prevailing  pattern  has  been  for  France,  Germany,  and  Italy  each  to 
fund  28  percent  of  the  operating  budget,  Belgium  and  Holland  7.9 

Sercent  each,  and  Luxembourg  0.2  percent.  As  for  the  research  and 
evelopment  budget,  the  pattern  has  been  for  France  and  West  Ger- 
many to  finance  30  percent  each,  Italy  23  percent,  Belgium  9.9  per- 
cent, the  Netherlands  6.9  percent,  and  Luxembourg  0.2  percent. 

Funds  for  Euratom  research  for  the  period  1958  through  1971 
totaled  $823.4  million.  Table  IV  shows  the  breakdown  of  this  budget 
according  to  component  programs.195 

IN-HOUSE  RESEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT  FOR  EURATOM 

Euratom's  facilities  perform  long-term,  basic  research  remote  from 
large  scale  commercial  application  of  nuclear  power  by  industrial 
concerns.  Euratom  also  furnishes  technological  services,  scientific  and 
technical  information,  testing,  and  standardization  of  measurements. 
The  Treaty  provided  Euratom  with  its  own  in-house  research  facil- 
ities. It  specified  establishment  of  a  Joint  Research  Center,196  which 

196  "Spondins  by  Euratom,"  Nuclear  News,  vol.  14  (April,  1971),  p.  43. 
"•  Article  8  laid  down  three  conditions  for  the  Joint  Research  Center  : 

(1)  The  Center  shall  ensure  the  implementation  of  the  research  programs  and  of 
any  other  tasks  entrusted  to  it  by  Euratom. 

(2)  The  Center  shall  also  ensure  the  establishment  of  uniform  nuclear  terminology 
and  a  standard  system  of  measurements. 

(3)  The  Center  could  be  composed  of  separate  establishments  for  geographical  or 
operational  reasons. 


213 


TABLE  IV.-APPROPRIATIONS  FOR  EURATOM  RESEARCH  AND  TRAINING  PROGRAMS  FROM  1958  TO  1971 

[In  millions  of  units  of  account  (US$)1 


1958-68'  1969  1970  1971  Totals 


Technological  research  connected  with  reactor  de- 
velopment: 

Fast  reactors 97.3                1.4                1.5  1.8  102.0 

High-temperature  gas  reactors 50.5                3.2                3.2  3.7  60.6 

Heavy-water  reactors 176.2                9.4                9.9  11.4  206!  9 

Proven-type  reactors 66.2 '  66  2 

Othertypes 16.3 '."" 16  3 

Technological  problems )  97  n  (             1.6                1.7  2.6)  .„',, 

Nuclear  materials J  u.v  \             2. 3                2.6  3.0)  40- l 

Reactor  physics _)  ln  R  (               .6                  .6  .7)  ,.  - 

Direct  conversion.. ]  \               .6                  .7  .8  J  14"6 

Irradiated  fuel  recycling 6.9 6.9 

Waste  processing 3.0 _ """  3!  0 

Plutonium  and  transplutonium  elements 41.3                4.0                4.5  5.1"  54.9 

Total  technological  research 495.3               23.1               24.7  28.5  571.6 


Public  service: 

Nuclear  measurements  and  standards 22.7  2.9  3.2  3.8  32.6 

Data  processing  and  computer  center 15.8  3.3  3.9  4.3  27  3 

High-flux  irradiations 40.1  3.8  4.2  4.7  52^8 

Biology  and  health  protection 20.5  3.-5  3.8  4.1  31.9 

Radioisotope  applications 4.9  .1  —(2)  —(J)  5^0 

Training 3.9  .5  .5  .6  5.5 

Dissemination  of  information 12.2  1.7  —  Q)  —(a)  13.9 

Total,  public  service 

Oriented  basic  research : 

Fusion  and  plasma  physics 

Condensed  state  physics 

Total,  oriented  basic  research 


120.1 

15.8 

15.6 

17.5 

169.0 

45.4 

6.1 
2.0 

6.   4 

2.3 

6.6 

3.4 

64  5 

10.6 

18.3 

56.0 

8.1 

8.7 

10.0 

82.8 

Grand  total 671.4  47.0  49.0  56.0  823.4 


'  Two  5-year  programs. 

J  As  from  1970  the  appropriations  for  the  radioisotope  applications  program  and  the  dissemination  of  information 
program  are  not  included  in  the  research  budget. 

Source:  Nuclear  News,  vol.  14  (April  1971),  p.  43. 

•was  brought  into  instant  existence  by  transfer  of  laboratories  from 
four  of  the  member  states.197 

Dissension,  Crisis,  and  Delay  in  Euratom's  Programs 

Early  hopes  that  Euratom  would  become  the  prime  mover  for  a 
coherent,  integrated  European  approach  to  development  of  nuclear 
power  technology  were  dashed  by  dissension,  crisis,  and  delay.  Eura- 
tom's  research  and  development  has  been  threatened  with  disruption 
and  in  the  eyes  of  some  observers  has  been  weak  and  fragmented.  The 
rivalry  between  Euratom  and  national  nuclear  technology  programs 
appeared  at  an  early  stage  and  has  since  afflicted  Euratom's  program. 
Member  states  seem  to  have  acted  on  the  principle  that  a  national 
nuclear  development  effort  must  necessarily  precede  or  accompany 

197  The  Ispra  center. — The  first  and  largest  of  the  Euratom  research  centers  Is  that  at 
Ispra,  Italy.  Begun  as  an  Italian  nuclear  research  establishment  in  1959,  it  was  transferred 
to  Euratom  in  March  1961  under  a  99  year  arrangement.  Much  of  Euratom's  nuclear  tech- 
nology work  has  been  done  here.  Ispra  also  contains  a  scientific  data  processing  center  that 
performs  computer  calculations  for  the  European  community. 

The  Petten  center. — The  Petten  Nuclear  Research  Establishment  is  located  adjacent  to 
Holland's  Reactor  Centrum  Nederland  at  Petten,  on  the  North  Sea  some  36  miles  north  of 
Amsterdam.  Work  at  Petten  focuses  on  nuclear  measurements.  Ai  large  materials-testing 
reactor  that  was  built  by  the  Dutch  Government  was  transferred  to  Euratom  in  1962. 

The  Gecl  center. — A  Central  Office  for  Nuclear  Measurements  for  Euratom  Is  located 
close  to  the  Belgian  National  Nuclear  Research  Center  at  Mol,  north  of  Brussels  and  near 
the  Dutch  border. 

The  Karlsruhe  center. — A  European  Institute  for  Transuranic  Elements  is  located  adja- 
cent to  West  Germany's  Karlsruhe  Nuclear  Center.  It  is  concerned  primarily  with  research 
on  plutonium. 


214 


multinational  technological  cooperation  in  Europe.  They  were  unwill- 
ing to  subordinate  national  development  in  a  community-wide  effort. 
Rene  Foche,  an  international  civil  servant,  describes  this  principle  as 
false  because  it  implies  that  every  European  state  has  an  equal  right 
to  develop  every  form  of  advanced  technology  within  its  own  borders, 
which  is  the  antithesis  of  the  concept  of  regional  specialization  charac- 
teristic of  a  true  common  market.198 

The  experience  of  Euratom  illustrates  a  diplomatic  reality.  The  po- 
litical cohesion  of  members  in  an  international  technological  under- 
taking is  a  prerequisite  for  success,  not  a  desirable  byproduct  from  it. 
The  troubles  of  Euratom's  research  and  development  programs  show 
also  that  the  cohesive  force  of  internationalism  in  science  was  not 
strong  enough  to  withstand  the  divisive  forces  of  national  commercial 
interests. 

A  tenet  of  modern  management,  private  or  public,  is  that  an  organ- 
ization must  plan  ahead,  particularly  organizations  that  seek  to  create 
and  apply  new  technologies.  The  Treaty  of  Rome  recognized  this 
principle  by  providing  for  five-year  research  programs.  The  first 
five-year  plan  (1958-1962),  concentrated  upon  organizing  Euratom's 
research,  particularly  at  its  Joint  Research  Center.  The  second  five-year 
plan  (1963-1967)  was  soon  wracked  by  dissension  and  budget  troubles. 
The  third  five-year  plan  (1968-1972)  was  not  authorized  and  Eura- 
tom's research  is  now  funded  annually. 

THE   FIRST    5-YEAR   PLAN    (1958-1962) 

Research  programs  for  the  first  5-year  plan  were  specified  in 
detail  in  an  annex  to  the  treaty.  It  was  devoted  mainly  to  equipping 
the  establishments  of  the  Joint  Research  Center  and  to  organizing 
contract,  research.  For  the  first  5-year  plan  $215  million  was  al- 
located. This  amount  proved  to  be  more  than  enough  because  of  a 
slow  start  and  there  was  a  surplus  in  1962  to  carry  forward.  "While  the 
$215  million  spent  for  the  first  5-year  plan  was  a  considerable 
sum,  it  corresponded  approximately  to  the  amount  spent  on  nuclear 
research  in  one  year  by  the  United  Kingdom. 

Even  the  first  5-year  plan  suffered  from  dissent  arising  out  of 
divergent  national  approaches  to  nuclear  power  technology.  The 
French  argued  that  Euratom  research  should  focus  upon  reactors 
using  natural  uranium  as  a  fuel,  thus  reducing  European  dependence 
upon  imported  enriched  fuels,  while  the  Italians  preferred  research 
on  uses  of  enriched  fuels. 

THE   SECOND    5-YEAR   PLAN    (1903-1967) 

The  second  5-year  plan  started  off  ambitiously,  with  the  Euratom 
Council  unanimously  approving  a  budget  of  almost  $450  million.  In 
1965  an  additional  $5.6  million  was  allocated.  But  the  plan  soon  was 
in  difliculty.  As  interests  of  the  member  states  continued  to  diverge, 
they  jockeyed  for  the  advantage  of  having  Euratom  develop  the 
particular  nuclear  power  technology  they  favored.  Inflation  also 
became  a  strain  and  increased  the  costs  of  research,  particularly  at 


1    Foche,  op.  cit.,  p.  24. 


215 


Ispra  in  Italy  where  about  one-third  of  Euratonrs  own  research  was 
concentrated. 

The  French  continued  to  criticize  Euratom's  research.  They  opposed 
research  on  the  enriched  fuel  technology  favored  in  the  United  States, 
arguing  that  there  was  little  future  for  expansion  of  the  European 
nuclear  industry  if  its  power  plants  would  have  to  depend  upon  the 
United  States  for  fuel.  As  an  alternative,  France  offered  to  put  infor- 
mation and  experience  of  its  own  nuclear  power  technology  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Community.  This  was  the  first  time  such  as  offer  had 
been  made,  and  some  observers  questioned  whether  it  was  seriously 
meant.199 

The  issue  of  which  reactor  technology  to  choose  became  so  con- 
troversial that  it  went  to  the  Euratom  Council  for  decision  when 
Euratom  requested  a  $38  million  increase  in  funding  to  carry  out  the 
plan.  The  French  and  Belgians  lined  up  in  favor  of  a  few  projects  that 
would  concentrate  on  natural  uranium  reactors,  breeder  reactors,  and 
fusion.  Other  members  agreed  that  this  concentration  would  be  help- 
ful, but  not  at  the  expense  of  a  major  revision  of  the  ongoing  Euratom 
research.  In  a  final  compromise,  the  Council  allocated  an  additional 
$5.6  million  for  the  five-year  plan.  Research  for  "proven-type"  reactors, 
a  term  which  meant  the  U.S. -type  reactors,  was  cut  20  percent. 

FAILURE   TO   ADOPT   A   THIRD    5 -YEAR   PLAN 

Although  Euratom's  third  5-year  plan  for  research  was  scheduled 
to  start  in  1968,  by  September  1967  the  dissension  had  become  so  great 
that  Euratom  abandoned  hope  for  agreement.  Instead,  Fritz  Hellwig, 
the  Common  Market  commissioner  responsible  for  Euratom  research, 
proposed  a  one  year  "transitional  program,"  which  was  adopted  as  a 
stopgap  measure,  but  funded  at  half  the  1967  level.  As  Euratom  en- 
tered 1968  it  faced  this  severe  cut  in  research  funds,  aimed  particularly 
at  contract  research,  as  well  as  isolation  from  the  mainstream  of  nu- 
clear development  in  Europe.  The  national  nuclear  industries  did  not 
want  Euratom  working  on  technology  that  was  ripe  for  commercial 
application.  That  year  saw  repeated  debates  about  Euratom  in  the 
EEC  Council,  as  representatives  of  the  major  members  questioned  the 
practicability  of  a  true  nuclear  energy  community.  More  specifically, 
they  asked  what  kind  of  research  Euratom  should  sponsor  to  win 
support  of  member  states.  Could  Euratom  be  an  effective  future  force 
for  building  an  integrated  European  nuclear  energy  industry?  No 
clear  answers  emerged  and  the  decision  on  the  future  of  Euratom  re- 
search was  tabled.200 

The  delay  and  dissension  led  Commissioner  Hellwig  to  warn  Eura- 
tom that  its  members  either  had  to  work  out  a  joint,  long-range  pro- 
gram of  research  or  forfeit  all  hope  of  getting  into  the  nuclear  power 
race.  He  warned  too  that  prolongation  of  the  Euratom  budget  crisis 
would  jeopardize  plans  for  a  Common  Market  research  policy.201 

The  crisis  went  to  the  European  Parliament.  By  unanimous  resolu- 
tion it  observed  that  the  European  nuclear  community  needed  common 

1OT  Michael  Palmer,  John  Lambert  and  others.  A  Handbook  of  European  Organizations 
(New  York  :  Frederick  A.  Praeger,  19GS).  p.  305. 

200  Nuclear  Industry,  vol.  15  (January,  196S),  p.  20. 

201  Nucleonics  Week,  vol.  9 (October  24,  196S) ,  p.  8. 


216 


policies  for  research  and  technological  progress ;  that  it  did  not  have 
them ;  and  that  this  lack  would  condemn  Western  Europe  to  a  per- 
manent economic  and  political  inferiority  vis-a-vis  the  rest  of  the 
world.  In  a  parallel  policy  paper,  the  EEC  Commission  warned  that 
if  member  states  could  not  find  a  way  to  advance  together,  they  would 
give  up  the  hope  of  making  a  good  showing  in  the  race  for  the  nuclear. 
market.202 

Through  1970  the  future  of  Euratom's  research  remained  uncertain. 
A  restructuring  which  could  have  been  affected  by  a  simple  majority 
vote  in  the  EEC  Council  was  nullified  when  the  French  objected.203 
The  situation  was  no  better  in  1971  when  initially  the  European  Par- 
liament refused  to  approve  Euratom's  draft  research  and  investment 
budget  because  it  was  likely  to  prolong  stagnation  and  absence  of 
decision.204 

PLUTONIUM  FOR  FAST  BREEDER  RESEARCH 

Another  example  of  Euratom's  difficulties  in  carrying  out  a  multi- 
national program  of  nuclear  research  was  triggered  by  a  domestic 
decision  of  the  United  States.  Euratom's  early  research  emphasized 
the  breeder  reactor,  and  was  concentrated  in  France  and  West  Ger- 
many. For  the  experimental  work  to  go  forward,  plutonium  was 
needed.  Euratom  had  planned  to  borrow  this  material  from  the  United 
States  and  so  had  budgeted  only  for  use-charges.  When,  in  1967,  the 
United  States  decided  as  a  matter  of  policy  to  sell  rather  than  loan 
the  plutonium  to  Euratom,  the  price  was  set  at  $8  million.  This  cost 
caused  a  financial  crisis  in  Euratom,  which  asked  France  to  provide 
40  percent  of  the  U.S.  sales  price.  France  refused,  saying  that  it  was 
up  to  Euratom  to  supply  the  material.  Euratom  capitulated  and  ulti- 
mately took  the  funds  from  other  parts  of  its  budget.  Italy  then 
complained  that  France  was  monopolizing  the  most  commercially 
promising  work  while  the  other  partners  shared  only  in  the  costs.205 

The  Supply  and  Control  of  Nuclear  Materials 

Two  institutional  prerequisites  of  nuclear  power — supply  and  con- 
trol of  nuclear  fuel  materials — were  the  basis  for  granting  suprana- 
tional authority  to  Euratom.  The  Treaty  of  Rome  specified  Euratom's 
ownership  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  used  for  peaceful  purposes,  and 
vested  in  Euratom  supranational  rights  of  inspection  for  safeguards. 

The  supply  function  has  not  grown  as  originally  expected.  The  safe- 
guards function,  in  contrast,  has  been  performed  effectively  and  has 
demonstrated  the  practicability  of  international  inspection.  It  remains 
to  be  seen  what  will  happen  to  Euratom's  safeguards  function  with  the 
advent  of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  and  its  emphasis  on  the  safe- 
guards function  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency. 

203  "Call  to  Preserve  Euratom,"   Nuclear  Engineering  International,  vol.    14    (January, 

1  y  oH ) ,  p.  8. 

,J^"F'"r;ltom  I)lHP"te  Drags  On,"  Nuclear  Engineering  International,  vol.  15  (December 
1970) .  p.  064. 

sot  "Euratom  Budget  Blow,"  Nuclear  Engineering  International,  vol.  16  (Januarv/ 
February,  1971),  p.  8. 

at  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  this  event,  see  Daniel  Greenberg.  "Euratom  :  Atomic 
Agency  Foundering  Amidst  Squabbles  of  Its  Partners,"  Science,  vol.  163  (February  7,  1969), 


217 


SUPRANATIONAL  OWNERSHIP   OF   NUCLEAR   FUEL  MATERIALS 

The  Treaty  of  Rome  gave  Euratom  exclusive  right  of  ownership  to 
enriched  uranium  and  plutonium  within  the  Community,  except  for 
materials  for  military  purposes,  and  also  gave  Euratom  a  first  option 
to  buy  ores  and  unprocessed  nuclear  fuel  materials.  Euratom's  exclu- 
sive ownership  extends  to  all  nuclear  fuel  materials  whether  produced 
in  the  Community  or  imported  into  it,  except  for  weapons  materials.206 
Under  the  Treaty,  Euratom  has  authority  to:  (1)  exercise  security 
control  over  the  use  of  nuclear  fuel  materials;  (2)  direct  the  appropri- 
ate storage  of  such  materials;  and  (3)  forbid  their  export  whenever 
contrary  to  Community  interests. 

SUPPLYING  NUCLEAR  MATERIALS 

If  nuclear  power  was  to  become  a  commercial  reality  in  Europe  and 
to  attain  the  goals  in  A  Target  for  Euratom,  there  had  to  be  reliable 
arrangements  for  supply  of  nuclear  fuel  materials.  To  this  end  the 
Treaty  authorized  creation  of  an  autonomous  Euratom  Supply  Agency 
under  the  control  and  direction  of  the  Euratom  Commission.207  Estab- 
lished on  June  1,  1960,  the  Supply  Agency's  primary  function  is  to  as- 
sure equal  access  to  nuclear  fuel  for  all  users  within  the  Community. 
The  Agency  is  headed  by  a  director  general  appointed  by  Euratom. 
With  an  initial  capital  investment  of  $2.4  million,  the  Agency  operates 
on  commercial  principles  as  a  public  utility.  It  has  a  right  of  option  to 
buy  all  ores  and  manufactured  fuel  materials  produced  in  the  Com- 
munity and  an  exclusive  right  to  contract  for  the  supply  of  nuclear  fuel 
materials,  whether  originating  in  the  Community  or  imported.  Prices 
for  its  products  are  expected  to  reflect  normal  supply  and  demand, 
although  the  Commission  can  propose  price  fixing  with  EEC  approval. 
Discriminatory  pricing  is  forbidden  within  the  Community.  The 
Agency  also  maintains  records  and  accounts  of  nuclear  fuel  materials 
used  or  transferred  within  the  Community. 

The  potentially  powerful  supply  functions  of  the  agency  have  not 
been  fully  exercised.  Contributing  factors  include  the  glut  of  uranium 
upon  the  world  market  of  the  1960's,  France's  independent  manufac- 
ture of  enriched  uranium  for  its  nuclear  weapons,  and  the  failure  to 
build  Euratom  facilities  to  produce  enriched  uranium.  The  effect  of 
these  factors  was  to  confine  the  Supply  Agency  to  a  middleman  func- 
tion of  negotiating  arrangements  with  non-Community  countries  to 
supply  nuclear  fuel  materials. 

EURATOM  MANUFACTURE  OF  ENRICHED  URANIUM 

Early  expectations  that  Euratom  would  build  and  operate  its  own 
enrichment  plant  to  supply  part  of  the  nuclear  fuel  for  Europe  were 
disappointing.  U.S.  policy,  which  was  to  discourage  this  venture,  ap- 
parently was  influential  at  first.  However,  by  the  later  1960s  the  Com- 
munity was  restive  over  its  dependence  upon  the  United  States  as  a 

206  Articles  84  and  86.  But  a  dispute  between  France  and  Euratom,  infra,  indicates  inter- 
pretation of  these  articles  is  not  without  ambiguity. 

207  Articles  54-76. 


218 


sole  source  of  supply.  For  example,  the  EEC  in  its  report  for  1969,  ob- 
served that  the  setting  up  of  a  uranium  enrichment  facility  in  the 
Community  before  1980  would  help  to  achieve  an  aim  of  the  EEC, 
namely,  to  assure  secure  supplies  of  enriched  uranium  at  stable  prices.208 
But  reaching  a  policy  decision  to  build  an  enrichment  plant  was  not 
easy  for  Euratom.  The  plant  would  require  a  large  capital  investment, 
and  a  large  supply  of  electricity,  and  might  be  uneconomical  to  operate 
without  subsidy  should  the  United  States  decide  to  cut  its  prices  for 
enriching  services.  Complicating  the  decision  for  Euratom  also  were 
the  uncertain  estimates  for  future  use  of  nuclear  power  in  Europe. 
Forecasts  of  expansion  in  nuclear  capacity  ranged  from  10,000  mega- 
watts in  1970 — including  the  nuclear  power  plants  of  the  United  King- 
dom— to  100,000  megawatts  by  1980,  and  to  perhaps  twice  this  by 
1985,209  but  these  estimates  were  so  qualified  as  to  provide  a  shaky  basis 
for  raising  the  necessary  capital. 

SOME  DIFFICULTIES  OF  THE   SUPPLY  AGENCY 

The  monopoly  of  the  Supply  Agency  was  challenged  by  the  French 
and  Italian  Governments.  In  1965  the  Euratom  Commission  decided  to 
revise  the  charter  of  the  Supply  Agency.  A  now  text  Avas  submitted  to 
the  Euratom  Council  and  to  the  European  Parliament.  But  the  Coun- 
cil failed  to  agree  and  the  revision  was  shelved.  Five  of  Euratom's 
member  states  regarded  the  previous  Supply  Agency's  statute  as 
remaining  in  force,  but  France  did  not.  Thereafter  the  French  Govern- 
ment entered  into  bilateral  transactions  with  other  countries  and  sup- 
plied nuclear  fuel  materials  directly  to  them  as  later  did  Italy,  in  seem- 
ing violation  of  the  Supply  Agency's  charter. 

The  EEC  Commission  in  October  1970  attempted  to  reassert  the  con- 
trol of  the  Supply  Agency.  Reportedly,  it  sent  an  ultimatum  to  France 
to  respect  the  fuel  supply  provisions  of  the  Treaty.  Barring  compli- 
ance, the  Commission  would  bring  the  alleged  violations  before  the 
EEC  Court  of  Justice.  The  French  countered  with  a  proposal  to  end 
the  Agency's  control  over  nuclear  fuel  arrangements  except  in  time  of 
nuclear  fuel  scarcity.  France  was  said  to  have  West  German  support 
for  its  position  that  EEC  member  states  be  permitted  to  contract  inde- 
pendently for  their  own  nuclear  fuel  supplies.210 

1 1  ere  again  is  an  example  of  the  divisive  forces  of  nationalism. 

SAFEGUARDING  NUCLEAR  FUEL  MATERIALS 

For  nuclear  power  to  help  resolve  Europe's  energy  problems  with- 
out, unacceptably  increasing  (lie  risk  of  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons,  there  had  to  be  credible  assurance  that  diversion  of  nuclear 
fuel  materials  would  be  promptly  detected.  In  assigning  a  safeguards 
functions  to  Euratom,  the  Treaty  of  Rome  made  a  notable  innovation 

*»  European  Atomic  Energy  Community,  Third  General  Report  on  the  Activities  of  the 
Communities,  1969,  op.  pit.,  p.  253. 

**  Uranium  Resources,  Production  and  Demand.  A  joint  report  by  the  European  Nuclear 
Energy  Agency  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Ajrency  (Paris:  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development,  September  1970) .  p.  43. 

"o  Nucleonics  Week,  vol.  11  (October  29,  1970),  p.  6.  The  EEC  Commission's  ultimatum 
followed  a  scries  of  alleged  violations  by  France  which  Included  loan  of  uranium  to  the 
Italian  government,  cut-rate  purchase  of  plutonlum  from  Canada,  and  failure  to  report 
uranium  prospecting  and  marketing  plans. 


219 


in  international  relations.  By  the  Treaty,  the  Common  Market  nations 
yielded  some  of  their  sovereignty  to  this  multi-national,  regional  orga- 
nization, and  granted  to  Euratom  supranational  rights  of  inspection 
and  independent  verification  of  holdings  of  nuclear  fuel  materials. 

The  Treaty  provided  that  the  Euratom  Commission — now  the  EEC 
Commission — shall  satisfy  itself  that  in  the  territories  of  the  member 
states : 

(a)  ores,  source  materials,  and  special  fissionable  materials  are 
not  diverted  from  their  intended  uses  as  stated  by  the  users; 

(b)  the  provisions  concerning  supplies  and  any  special  under- 
taking concerning  measures  of  control  entered  into  by  the  Com- 
munity in  an  agreement  concluded  with  a  third  country  or  an 
international  organization  are  observed. 

This  provision  was  to  cause  some  difficulty  for  the  United  States,  which 
would  have  preferred  to  send  its  own  inspectors  into  the  Euratom 
member  states  rather  than  rely  upon  Euratom's  inspectors. 

Considering  that  safeguarding  of  nuclear  materials  was  also  to  be 
a  function  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  it  woidd  have 
been  logical  when  establishing  Euratom  to  put  this  function  within 
the  IAEA.  However,  at  that  time  the  Soviet  Union  opposed  the 
creation  of  Euratom  and  had  used  its  influence  within  the  IAEA  to 
prevent  any  cooperative  relation  between  the  two  agencies.  Thus,  the 
negotiators  had  no  choice  but  to  equip  Euratom  with  its  own  safe- 
guards function. 

The  Treaty  provided  Euratom  with  plenary  authority  to  carry  out 
safeguards.  Any  organization  setting  up  or  using  facilities  for  the 
production,  separation,  or  use  of  nuclear  materials,  or  for  the  process- 
ing of  used  nuclear  fuels,  first  has  to  declare  to  Euratom  the  technical 
details  of  such  facilities  to  the  extent  necessary  for  safeguards.  Proce- 
dures for  the  processing  of  used  fuels  are  also  subject  to  Euratom 
approval.  Records  are  to  be  kept  to  account  for  nuclear  materials  re- 
ceived, used,  produced,  or  sent  out.  In  addition,  Euratom  requires  that 
any  excess  inventory  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  be  deposited  with  it,  or 
in  a  storage  place  controlled  by  it. 

A  vital  innovation  of  the  Treaty  is  the  right  accorded  Euratom  to 
send  its  inspectors  into  the  territories  of  member  states  to  verify  the 
accuracy  of  information  reported  to  it.  On  presentation  of  their  creden- 
tials, these  inspectors  are  to  have  access  at  all  times  to  all  places  and 
data  and  to  any  person  to  the  extent  necessary  to  "control  ores,  source 
materials,  and  special  fissionable  materials  and  to  satisfy  themselves 
concerning  the  observation  of  safeguards."  Inspectors  of  Euratom  are' 
to  be  accompanied  by  representatives  of  the  state  concerned,  if  that 
state  so  requests. 

Should  a  Euratom  inspector  be  denied  access,  the  matter  would  go 
to  the  EEC  Commission  which  could  apply  to  the  EEC  Court  of 
Justice  for  a  warrant  to  enforce  the  carrying  out  of  the  inspection. 
If  there  is  danger  in  delay,  the  Treaty  authorizes  Euratom  itself  to 
issue  a  written  order  that  the  inspection  be  carried  out.  After  serving 
of  such  a  warrant  or  decision,  the  national  authorities  of  the  state 
concerned  are  expected  ".  .  .  to  ensure  access  by  the  inspectors  to  the 
places  named  in  the  warrant  or  decision."  This  power  of  Euratom  has 
yet  to  be  tested  in  practice. 


220 


Should  a  member  state  resist  inspection,  Euratom  is  authorized  to 
impose  sanctions.  In  order  of  severity,  possible  penalties  include : 

(1)  a  warning; 

(2)  withdrawal  of  special  advantages,  such  as  financial  or  tech- 
nical assistance; 

(3)  placing  the  enterprise  under  the  administration  of  a  person 
or  board  appointed  jointly  by  the  Commission  and  the  state  hav- 
ing jurisdiction  over  the  enterprise;  and 

(4)  complete  or  partial  withdrawal  of  nuclear  fuel  materials. 
Tadate,  no  penalties  have  been  imposed,  no  discrepancies  have  been 

detected,  and  member  governments  have  cooperated  with  inspections. 

EURATOM  SAFEGUARDS  AND  U.S.  POLICY 

Once  Euratom  was  established,  the  United  States  negotiated  a 
bilateral  agreement  with  it.  One  issue  was  safeguards.  The  United 
States  wanted  a  direct  voice  in  the  application  of  safeguards 
to  U.S.-supplied  materials,  including  the  right  of  inspection  by  U.S. 
inspectors.  Euratom  would  not  agree.  Ultimately  the  United  States 
and  Euratom  compromised  as  the  United  States  agreed  to  rely  upon 
Euratom's  system  and  inspectors,  but  with  the  right  to  audit  com- 
pliance with  standards  set  out  in  the  agreement.  Congressional  sen- 
sitivity on  this  compromise  is  suggested  by  the  following  exchange 
between  Senator  Anderson  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy 
and  AEC  Commissioner-John  Floberg  in  1958 : 211 

Senator  Anderson :  Mr.  Floberg,  does  the  language  of  the  agreement  as  you 
see  it  give  this  government  the  right  to  inspect  facilities  erected  by  Euratom? 

Mr.  Floberg:  I  don't  know  if  I  have  your  question  completely  in  mind,  Sen- 
ator, but  the  agreement  and  the  exchange  of  letters  explaining  the  agreement 
seem  to  give  us  the  right  to  audit,  for  want,  of  a  better  word,  the  compliance  with 
the  standards  set  forth  in  the  agreement. 

Senator  Anderson :  You  used  the  term  "audit" ;  do  you  think  it  gives  us  a  right 
to  look  at  the  books? 

Mr.  Floberg :  It  certainly  does,  and  it  gives  us  the  right  to  weigh,  assay,  and 
count  and  otherwise  verify.  I  apologize  for  that  word  "audit."  It  is  not.  a  very 
good  one.  But  I  think  it  is  comprehensive  enough  if  you  don't  take  it  too  literally. 

Euratom  and.  Nuclear  Safety 

The  generation  of  nuclear  power,  reprocessing  of  used  nuclear  fuels, 
and  perpetual  storage  of  radioactive  wastes  from  these  fuels  are  in- 
herently dangerous  activities.  This  fact  caused  the  negotiators  of  the 
Treaty  of  Rome  to  vest  another  supranational  power  in  Euratom : 
to  set  basic  standards  for  the  protection  of  workers  and  the  general 
public  from  these  hazards  of  nuclear  power.212  Signatories  of  the 
Treaty  committed  themselves  to  enact  national  legislation  to  ensure 
compliance  with  the  basic  standards  determined  by  Euratom  and  to 
take  necessary  measures  with  regard  to  instruction,  education,  and 
professional  training  for  radiological  health  hazards.  Member  states 
in  whose  territories  nuclear  experiments  of  a  particularly  dangerous 
nature  may  take  place  are  committed  to  take  additional  health  pre- 
cautions with  Euratom's  advice.  Consenting  opinion  of  Euratom  is 

111  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom 
Agreements,  85th  Cong.,  2d  Seas.,  1958,  p.  200. 

n»  Articles  80-83.  The  term  "basic  standards"  Is  defined  In  the  Treaty  to  mean:  (a) 
the  maximum  radiation  doses  compntlhle  with  adequate  safety  :  (b)  the  maximum  permis- 
sible decree  of  exposure  and  contamination  ;  and  (c)  the  fundamental  principles  governing 
the  medical  supervision  of  workers. 


221 


required  also  when  such  experiments  are  likely  to  affect  the  territories 
of  other  member  states. 

As  for  the  disposal  of  radioactive  wastes,  each  signatory  is  obligated 
to  submit  to  Euratom  "such  general  data  concerning  any  plan  for  the 
disposal  of  any  kind  of  radioactive  waste  as  will  enable  the  Commission 
to  determine  whether  the  implementation  of  such  plan  is  likely  to 
involve  radioactive  contamination  of  the  water,  soil  or  airspace  of 
such  member  states."  213 

Euratom  has  used  its  authority  to : 214 

(1)  establish  regulations  providing  for  uniform  safety  radia- 
tion standards  throughout  the  Community ; 

(2)  standardize  and  coordinate  methods  for  the  measurement 
and  control  of  environmental  radioactivity ; 

(3)  review  plans  for  reactor  installations  and  their  radioactive 
waste  disposal  systems ;  and 

(4)  study  the  movement  of  radioactive  substances  in  the  en- 
vironment and  safety  aspects  of  nuclear  marine  propulsion. 

Euratom  and  Environmental  Effects  of  Nuclear  Power 

The  Treaty  of  Rome  is  silent  on  the  issue  of  environmental  protec- 
tion, a  matter  of  growing  U.S.  and  European  concern  since  the  late 
1960s.  Euratom  has  no  statutory  functions  of  ascertaining  and  con- 
trolling the  environmental  effects  of  nuclear  power  and  fuel  reprocess- 
ing plants.  Should  the  public  in  Europe  show  the  same  interest  and 
concern  in  environmental  quality  as  has  been  shown  in  the  United 
States,  there  could  be  proposals  to  extend  Euratom's  authorkv^  accord- 
ingly. Such  a  development  could  pose  a  troublesome  issue  for  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Recognition  of  Euratom's  authority  as  an  international 
body  to  examine  and  approve  design,  construction  and  operation  of 
nuclear  power  plants  within  its  member  states  could  set  a  precedent 
for  international  control  that  might  be  embarassing  were  continental 
neighbors  of  the  United  States  to  seek  such  review  of  U.S.  nuclear 
plants  built  near  their  common  borders  with  this  country.  For  example, 
it  could  point  the  way  for  continental  neighbors  of  the  United  States 
to  request  some  voice  in  the  siting,  design,  construction,  and  operation 
of  domestic  nuclear  power  plants  near  U.S.  national  boundaries  or  on 
rivers  and  bodies  of  water  shared  with  neighboring  countries.  Con- 
ceding such  a  voice  to  neighbor  states  would  mark  a  shift  in  U.S. 
foreign  policy,  a  shift  likely  to  be  opposed  by  those  who  attach  great 
importance  to  preserving  the  sovereign  powers  of  the  United  States. 

Duplication  and  Dilution  of  Effort 

Euratom,  the  Nuclear  Energy  Agency  of  the  OECD  (see  section 
IX),  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  overlap  in  many 
of  their  interests  and  activities.  The  Common  Market  nations  and  Eura- 
tom itself  are  members  of  the  OECD's  Nuclear  Energy  Agency.  Com- 
ing into  existence  in  1958  one  month  after  Euratom,  the  NEA  was 
organized  to  promote  international  nuclear  cooperation  rather  than 
supranational  nuclear  integration.  The  Nuclear  Energy  Agency  was 
supported  by  the  British  as  a  counter-project  to  make  atomic  integra- 
tion of  the  Six  less  attractive.  It  is  interesting,  in  this  context,  that  the 
first  European  plant  for  chemical  reprocessing  of  used  nuclear  fuels 

213  \rticle  37. 

214  Compilation  of  National  and  International  Standards.  Oak  Ridge,  Tenn. :  Oak  Ridge 
National  Laboratory,  Nuclear  Safety  Information  Center,  Report  No.  ORNL-NSIC-78, 
(October,  1970),  t>.  44. 


222 


was  put  into  operation  by  NEA  and  not  by  Euratom,  despite  the  fact 
that  the  plant  was  built  at  Mol,  Belgium,  within  a  Euratom  state  to 
process  fuel  from  Euratom  projects.215 

Duplication  in  nuclear  activities  between  the  NEA  and  Euratom 
extends  to  many  areas  including  safety  regulations,  research,  rules  for 
third  party  liability,  and  maritime  nuclear  propulsion.  In  maritime 
nuclear  propulsion,  however,  NEA  was  not  successful  and  in  1962 
abandoned  that  field  to  Euratom.  On  the  other  hand,  NEA  became 
a  useful  direct  channel  of  communication  between  Euratom  and  other 
European  countries,  particularly  the  United  Kingdom.  The  NEA's 
international  joint  undertakings,  the  Halden  and  Dragon  projects, 
provided  Euratom  with  its  first  opportunities  for  nuclear  research. 

It  would  appear  that  Euratom's  usefulness  is  handicapped  by  the 
dispersion  of  its  member  states'  human  and  financial  resources  between 
its  own  programs  and  those  of  the  NEA  and  the  IAEA. 

Proposals  for  New  Research  Functions  for  Euratom 

As  nuclear  energy  in  Europe  has  moved  more  into  the  industrial 
sector  for  the  design  and  manufacture  of  nuclear  powerplants  and 
nuclear  fuel,  the  laboratories  of  Euratom  have  had  less  demand  for 
their  services.  Instead,  the  final  stages  of  development  of  competitive 
nuclear  power  technologies  have  occurred  in  the  laboratories  of  indus- 
trial firms  behind  barriers  of  trade  secrecy.  What  then  will  become 
of  Euratom's  laboratories  ?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  still  evolving, 
and  can  have  significance  for  American  diplomacy.  For  example,  a 
successful  redeployment  of  Euratom's  scientific  and  technical  assets  to 
resolve  the  problems  of  energy  supply  and  conservation  might  not 
only  reduce  Europe's  dependence  upon  uncertain  energy  imports,  but 
also  bring  European  manufacturers  into  a  world  market  which  the 
United  States  hopes  to  dominate.  Additionally,  the  success  or  failure 
of  efforts  to  redeploy  Euratom's  laboratories  may  provide  useful  in- 
sights for  the  United  States  in  dealing  with  its  own  problems  of  recon- 
version of  technological  personnel  and  facilities  from  aerospace  and 
defense  to  other  civil  functions.  One  function  for  American  diplomacy 
will  be  to  obtain  current  information  on  these  evolutionary  features  of 
Euratom  for  the  benefit  of  U.S.  policy  makers. 

THE    m'kINNEY   REPORT   RECOMMENDATIONS    OF    10  5  9 

An  early  proposal  that  Euratom  extend  the  scope  of  its  technologi- 
cal activities  into  non-nuclear  fields  is  to  be  found  in  the  1950  report 
of  Robert  McKinney  to  the  Joint.  Committee  on  Atomic  Energv.  Not- 
ing how  Europe's  need  for  nuclear  power  had  by  then  receded,  he 
questioned  whether  nuclear  power  for  the  sake  of  technological  pres- 
tige carried  as  much  weight  in  the  post-Sputnik  era  as  it  had  previ- 
ously. Tailing  attention  to  a  wide  and  growing  scientific  and  tech- 
nological disparity  between  Western  Europe  and  the  United  States, 
he  speculated  as  to  what  European  scientists  could  accomplish  within 
a  more  broadly  based  scientific  community.  A  new  course  of  action 
for  Euratom  might  be  to  emphasize  collective  creation  of  new  sci- 

*™  Folneh,  op.  clt,  p.  130. 


223 


entific  and  technological  resources  by  a  regional  integration  of  the 
European  scientific  and  technological  community.216 

To  this  end,  Euratom  could  be  reconstituted  into  a  European  Sci- 
entific and  Technical  Community.  Its  laboratories  would  then  be 
open  to  all  of  the  nations  of  the  Atlantic  Alliance.  Their  function 
would  be  to  advance  science  and  technology  upon  a  broad  front.  Ac- 
cording to  McKinney,  the  United  States  should  continue  to  give  as- 
sistance including  the  funding  of  non-nuclear  research.  Although  the 
McKinney  report  produced  no  immediate  movement  in  this  direc- 
tion, it  foreshadowed  the  future  emergence  of  this  issue. 

VIEWS  OF  THE  EEC 

The  idea  of  opening  Euratom's  facilities  to  non-nuclear  research 
was  revived  in  1967  when  a  resolution  of  the  EEC  Council  laid  down 
the  guideline  that  wherever  legally  possible  Euratom  research  might 
also  encompass  non-nuclear  activities.  Two  years  later,  in  December 
1969,  the  Council  elected  to  permit  use  of  the  Joint  Research  Center 
facilities  for  non-nuclear  work.217  In  this  action  the  Council  recog- 
nized that  as  nuclear  energy  moved  toward  commercial  application,  the 
research  was  shifting  from  public  institutions  to  laboratories  of  pri- 
vate nuclear  industries.  Thus  Euratom  came  face  to  face  with  the  is- 
sues of  conversion  that  were  soon  to  plague  the  Government  and  pri- 
vate laboratories  of  the  U.S.  aerospace  and  defense  industries. 

More  recently,  in  November  1970,  the  EEC  Commission  proposed 
a  transformation  of  Euratom's  research  capabilities  into  a  Research 
and  Development  Agency  for  the  Common  Market.  Euratom's  Joint 
Research  Center  would  be  merged  into  the  Agency.  By  this  proposal, 
the  EEC  Commission  sought  to  bring  new  fields  of  research  into  the 
sphere  of  community  action,  including  research  for  new  materials, 
medicine,  meteorology,  oceanography,  and  environmental  control.218 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 

Now  well  into  the  second  decade  of  its  existence,  Euratom  presents 
a  mixed  picture  of  success  and  failure.  Its  various  agreements  with  the 
United  States  have  allowed  Euratom  to  supply  European  nuclear 
power  programs  with  considerable  enriched  uranium  and  plutonium 
under  its  own  safeguards  system.  The  United  States  cooperated  by 
regrouping  its  bilateral  agreements  with  Euratom  members  into  a 
single  agreement  with  Euratom.  The  Agency  has  created  an  effective 
European  research  capability  for  nuclear  energy. 

On  the  other  hand,  these  encouraging  moves  toward  European  unity 
have  been  steadily  eroded  by  a  wave  of  nuclear  nationalism.  Since 
1961,  a  marked  trend  toward  nationalism  in  the  nuclear  industries  of 


218  Robert  McKinney.  A  New  Look  at  Euratom.  Statement  to  the  Joint  Committee  on 
Atomic  Energy.  May  20,  1959.  In  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy, 
Background  Material  for  the  Review  of  the  International  Atomic  Policies  and  Programs 
of  the  United  States,  S6th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  3  960,  vol.  4,  p.  1258.   (Joint  Committee  print.) 

317  The  Council  decided  on  December  6,  1969  that  the  facilities  of  the  Joint  Research 
Center  might  be  used  for  scientific  and  technological  research  other  than  nuclear.  In 
keeping  with  this  decision,  the  Council  also  agreed  to  enter  without  delay  into  close 
cooperation  with  the  EEC  Commission  on  the  study  and  choice  of  subjects  for  such 
research.  Cf.  European  Atomic  Energy  Community,  Third  General  Report  on  the  Activities 
of  the  Communities — 1969,  op.  cit.,  p.  210. 

218  "Makings  of  a  New  Structure,"  Nature,  vol.  228,   (November  28,  1970),  p.  796. 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  16 


224 


the  member  nations  has  nearly  drowned  Euratom,  leaving  it  since  1968 
without  a  5-year  program,  with  sharply  reduced  funding  and, 
perhaps  worst  of  all,  without  an  involvement  in  application  of  nuclear 
power  technology  in  Europe.  Political  difficulties  have  blocked  cooper- 
ation with  Euratom's  supply  function  for  nuclear  materials  and  with 
plans  to  develop  a  European  enrichment  capability. 

Euratom's  successes  have  come  in  activities  which  were  distantly 
linked  to  the  competitive  status  of  the  national  nuclear  industries  of 
France,  Italy,  and  West  Germany.  These  included  model  legislation 
to  encourage  uniformity  in  national  regulation  of  radiological  effects 
of  nuclear  power,  research  into  subjects  without  immediate  com- 
mercial application,  and  safeguarding  nuclear  materials.  But  Eura- 
tom has  not  been  able  to  weld  together  the  separate  national  nuclear 
industries  of  its  members.  Euratom  research  and  development  which 
approached  commercial  application  has  been  opposed  and  was  ulti- 
mately terminated.  The  differing  ideas  of  France,  Italy,  and  West 
Germany  as  to  which  kind  of  nuclear  power  technology  to  exploit 
created  tensions  that  on  several  occasions  all  but  paralyzed  Euratom's 
research  and  development  programs  and  led  to  the  charge  that  some 
member  nations  were  benefiting  disproportionately  at  the  expense  of 
others.  The  inability  to  form  a  common  European  approach  to  nu- 
clear technology  has  proved  advantageous  to  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry 
and  in  the  1970's  the  use  of  U.S.  nuclear  power  technologv  is  well  estab- 
lished in  Europe,  having  overmatched  the  alternative  favored  by  the 
French.  Among  the  Euratom  members  there  is  increasing  use  of  joint 
venturas  between  companies  in  the  several  national  European  nuclear 
industries  as  an  alternative  to  working  through  Euratom.  There  are 
signs  also  that  Euratom's  laboratories  may  have  outlived  their  useful- 
ness and  now  face  the  problem  of  what  to  do  with  their  human  and 
physical  resources.  Steps  to  open  Euratom's  facilities  to  non-nuclear 
research  and  development  are  one  indication  of  the  situation.  What  can 
be  learned  from  this  trend  to  convert  Euratom's  research  installations 
into  general  research  facilities  for  the  European  Economic  Com- 
munity can  be  of  interest  to  the  United  States  for  two  reasons.  First, 
a  successful  transition  of  a  substantial  part  of  Euratom's  research 
capabilities  to  non-nuclear  research  could  strengthen  the  competitive- 
ness of  European  high-technology  goods  and  services  in  the  world 
markets  vis-a-vis  those  of  the  United  States.  Second,  a  successful 
transition  might  well  provide  useful  insights  into  the  problems  of 
conversion  of  existing  scientific  and  technical  institutions  into  new 
fields  as  their  original  field  becomes  worked  out,  or  as  changes  in 
national  priorities  and  programs  make  them  redundant.  This  transi- 
tion, of  course,  is  the  problem  of  the  U.S.  defense  and  aerospace  in- 
dustries with  the  continuing  unemployment  of  highly  skilled  scientists, 
engineers,  and  technicians. 

Several  issues  for  United  States  foreign  policy  and  Euratom  that 
may  need  future  attention  include  : 

(1)  To  what  extent  should  the  United  States  encourage  Eur- 
atom to  build  and  operate  a  uranium  enrichment  plant  in  Europe? 

(2)  In  supplying  XLS.  enrichment  technology,  if  this  is  done,  to 
what  extent  should  the  United  States  attempt  to  recoup  the  do- 
mestic investment  in  developing  that  technology  through  licensing 
fees  or  royalties  ? 


225 


(3)  Considering  forecasts  that  the  United  States  will  soon  have 
to  decide  whether  to  fund  expansion  of  its  domestic  enrichment 
plants,  what  would  be  the  effect  upon  U.S.  foreign  policy  of  a 
limitation  or  termination  of  the  longstanding  U.S.  commitment 
to  supply  enriched  uranium  to  Euratom  for  commercial  nuclear 
power  in  Europe  ? 

(4)  What  voice  should  the  United  States  seek  in  Euratom's 
setting  of  standards  governing  the  environmental  effects  of  nu- 
clear power  plants,  and  standards  for  review  and  approval  of  the 
siting,  design,  and  construction  of  nuclear  power  plants?  In  ex- 
porting nuclear  power  plants,  will  the  commercial  interests  of  the 
U.S.  nuclear  industry  be  sufficiently  protected  by  a  U.S.  policy  of 
non-intervention  ? 

(5)  Considering  the  perplexing  status  of  technology  for  long 
term  storage  of  the  intensely  radioactive  wastes  from  nuclear 
power,  in  what  ways  would  domestic  interests  of  the  United  States 
benefit  from  measures  to  stimulate  Euratom  work  in  this  field  ? 

(6)  Considering  the  priority  being  given  to  development  and 
demonstration  of  the  breeder  reactor  in  the  United  States  and  the 
considerable  interest  among  Common  Market  countries  in  breeder 
technology,  to  what  extent  should  U.S.  foreign  policy  attempt  to 
influence  European  breeder  research  in  the  direction  of  the  tech- 
nology favored  by  the  United  States?  Conversely,  considering 
criticisms  of  the  U.S.  breeder  program  for  concentrating  too  much 
on  only  one  breeder  concept,  to  what  extent  might  U.S.  foreign 
policy  attempt  to  guide  European  breeder  research  toward  other 
potentially  competing  breeder  concepts  as  insurance  against  an 
unexpected  setback  or  failure  in  the  U.S.  domestic  program? 


VIII.  Joint  United  States-Euratom  Research  and  Development 

U.S.  diplomatic  efforts  and  interest  which  helped  bring  about  the 
creation  of  Euratom  led  naturally  to  the  proposition  that  the  United 
States  should  work  closely  with  this  new  multinational  body.  As 
analyzed  in  retrospect  by  Jules  Gueron,219  the  following  was  the  ra- 
tionale for  a  10-year  period  of  direct  technical  cooperation  between 
Euratom  and  the  United  States.  Europe  had  to  import  an  ever- 
increasing  proportion  of  its  conventional  fuel ;  therefore,  atomic  power 
could  become  competitive  in  Europe  earlier  than  in  the  United  States, 
and  Europe  could  benefit  economically  and  technically  from  being  a 
testing  ground  for  United  States  atomic  technology.  At  the  same  time 
the  United  States  would  aid  European  unification.220  This  theme  is 
examined  and  confirmed  in  the  following  discussion. 

The  United  States-Euratom  program  was  launched  in  1958  and  had 
as  its  target  the  construction  by  1965  of  5,000  megawatts  of  electrical 
generating  capacity  in  nuclear  power  plants  based  on  U.S.  technology. 
It  offered  low  interest  loans  from  the  Export-Import  Bank,  lease  of 
fuel  by  the  AEC,  and  guarantees  on  supply  of  fissile  material  and  per- 
formance of  nuclear  fuel  supply  bv  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry.  In  addi- 
tion, the  United  States  agreed  to  Euratom  control  of  nuclear  fuel  ma- 
terials instead  of  direct  U.S.  control,  and  to  a  joint  program  of  research 
and  development  in  support  of  the  joint  reactor  program.  Neverthe- 
less, it  proved  impossible  to  reach  the  5,000  megawatt  target,  and  only 
with  difficulty  were  three  nuclear  power  plants  initiated  that  had  a 
combined  output  of  750  megawatts. 

In  Europe,  these  U.S.  incentives  were  supplemented  by  advantages 
provided  bv  the  Euratom  Treaty  to  "common  enterprises,''  and  bv  the 
"participation"  assistance  especially  devised  by  the  Euratom  Com- 
mission. Parenthetically,  France  opposed  the  whole  scheme  as  a  sell- 
out to  the  United  States,  while  influential  voices  in  the  United  States 
branded  the  joint  programs  as  a  giveaway.221 

The  joint  United  States-Euratom  programs  were  a  disappoint- 
ment. Their  shortfall  from  original  goals  was  the  result  in  part  of  an 
unanticipated  easing  of  the  energy  supply  crisis  in  Europe,  of  unex- 
pectedly slow  progress  in  nuclear  technology,  and  probably  an  over- 
estimation  of  the  willingness  of  European  private  utilities  to  risk  sub- 
stantial capital  investments  in  demonstration  nuclear  powerplants.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  two  joint  programs  did  culminate  in  several  work- 
ing demonstrations  of  nuclear  power;  moreover,  they  provided  10 
years  of  practical  working  experience  of  collaboration  with  a  multi- 
national organization  to  develop  and  demonstrate  a  new  technology. 

From  1959  to  1909,  the  United  States  provided  technical  and  other 
forms  of  assistance  and  incentives  through  Euratom  for  construction 
of  three  demonstration  nuclear  power  plants  in  Europe;  it  spent  some 

sl*  FormpT  rpnprnl  rltrpptor  of  rpsparph  for  Euratom. 
120  Gupron,  op.  pit.,  p.  149. 
421  Loc.  cit. 

(226) 


227 


$37  million  for  further  development  of  technology  for  these  demon- 
stration plants;  and  it  offered  many  indirect  incentives  to  stimulate 
initial  commercial  use  of  U.S.  nuclear  power  technology  in  Europe. 

U.S.  Interest  in  Euratom  Demonstration  of  Nuclear  Power 

Even  as  the  international  negotiations  for  creation  of  Euratom  were 
Hearing  completion,  AEC  Chairman  Strauss  was  asserting  the  tech- 
nological feasibility  of  nuclear  power.  In  1957,  five  experimental 
nuclear  power  plants  at  AEC  laboratories  successfully  provided  a 
proof  of  principle  for  five  different  technological  approaches.  But  the 
demonstrations  were  too  small  to  provide  cost  and  operational  data 
which  would  enable  the  domestic  electric  companies  to  decide  upon 
their  commercial  use.  The  next  step  for  the  U.S.  domestic  nuclear 
power  program  was  to  build  larger,  engineering  prototypes  that  would 
work  as  part  of  a  commercial  utility.222  Such  demonstration  plants 
were  needed  to  provide  reliable  engineering,  operational,  and  cost  in- 
formation for  the  designers  and  the  customers  of  commercial  nuclear 
power.  However,  the  U.S.  demonstration  power  program  was  slow  in 
starting  and  some  observers  feared  that  the  Nation's  nuclear  power 
program  would  falter  if  engineering  prototypes  were  not  quickly  built 
and  put  into  operation.  At  this  juncture,  U.S.  collaboration  with 
Euratom  offered  a  solution  because  economic  conditions  in  Europe 
were  more  favorable  for  practical  demonstration  of  nuclear  power 
than  were  those  in  the  United  States. 

AEC  Commissioner  Vance  promptly  endorsed  this  objective.  In 
1958  he  informed  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  that  the 
AEC's  foreign  objectives  for  nuclear  power  were  twofold : 323 

To  achieve  competitive  nuclear  power  in  friendly  foreign  na- 
tions during  the  next  5  years  through  a  comprehensive  program 
of  assistance  clearly  defined  and  vigorously  pursued. 

To  fortify  the  position  of  leadership  of  the  United  States  in  the 

eyes  of  the  world  in  the  peaceful  applications  of  atomic  energy, 

particularly  with  regard  to  power. 

Also  in  1958,  the  AEC  informed  the  Joint  Committee  of  conditions 

that  would  have  to  be  achieved  in  Europe  to  demonstrate  nuclear 

power.  These  were : 224 

(1)  That  the  economic  feasibility  of  nuclear  power  be  proven, 
not  by  theory  and  calculation,  not  by  extrapolation  from  pilot 
plant  operation,  but  by  the  full-scale  operation  of  power  produc- 
ing units  on  a  scale  large  enough  to  assure  statistical  reliability  of 
the  data ; 

(2)  That  the  utilities  into  whose  grid  the  power  from  these 
nuclear  plants  must  flow  become  familiar  with  the  technical  and 
management  problems  of  operating  nuclear  stations  and  accept, 
with  confidence,  nuclear  powerplants ; 

(3)  That  European  equipment  manufacturers  gain  knowledge 
and  competence  in  the  production  of  reactor  components ;  and 

222  By  having  the  utilities  build,  own,  and  operate  demonstration  plants  with  the  AEC 
providing  research  and  development,  special  service  and  materials,  and  training  of  per- 
sonnel, the  Commission  hoped  to  avoid  further  entanglement  in  the  public  versus  private 
power  controversy.  Proposals  that  the  Commission  itself  build  and  operate  large  nuclear 
power  plants  did  not  gain  acceptance. 

223  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energv,  Hearings,  AEC  Authorizing  Legis- 
lation, Fiscal  Year  1959,  85th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  195R,  p.  215. 

12i  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom 
Agreements,  op.  cit.,  p.  226. 


228 


(4)   That  the  various  service  industries,  such  as  fuel  production 
and  fabrication,  scrap  recycle,  irradiated  fuel  reprocessing,  etc., 
be  developed  as  economic  operations. 
The  AEC  recognized  that  special  incentives  would  be  needed  to  at- 
tract interest  and  participation  of  European  utilities  because  nuclear 
power  and  its  economics  were  not  then  well  enough  established  to  war- 
rant the  requisite  capital  investment  by  a  traditionally  conservative 
electric  it  v  industry.  The  Commission  informed  the  Joint  Committee 
that:225"6 

Traditionally  conservative  and  bound  by  rate  ceilings,  tbe  utilities  are  not 
prepared  to  take  excessive  risks  or  to  invest  large  amounts  of  capital  in  plants 
in  which  the  costs  of  energy  produced  may  well  be  above  that  of  conventional 
stations. 

The  fact  that  there  is  not  already  under  way  a  program  which  would  accom- 
plish the  objectives  of  the  joint  program  speaks  for  itself.  Discussions  with 
Euratom  and  European  utility  personnel  indicate  that  the  estimated  high  cost 
of  nuclear  power  from  even  proven  type  reactors  and  particularly  the  uncertain 
ties  of  these  costs  could  preclude  a  program  under  which  1  million  EKW  of 
American  type  reactors  would  be  installed  by  1963,  unless  additional  incentives 
are  provided. 

The  scale  of  the  joint  program,  said  the  Commission,  had  to  be  large 
enough  that : 227 

(1)  The  data  produced  would  come  from  a  sufficiently  large 
number  of  power  reactors  to  be  useful ; 

(2)  A  significant  number  of  European  industries  would  have 
an  opportunity  to  participate  in  construction ;  and 

(3)  A  sufficiently  large  number  of  operating  utilities  would  be 
brought  into  the  program  to  assure  that  the  management  of  this 
industry  would  be  ready  to  accept  nuclear  energy  and  enter  the 
longer  range  nuclear  program  with  enthusiasm. 

Initiation  of  the  Joint  Programs 

Within  three  months  after  creation  of  Euratom  in  1058,  a  joint 
U.S.-Euratom  working  party  was  at  work.  By  June  23,  1958.  negotia- 
tions and  arrangements  were  far  enough  along  for  President  Eisen- 
hower to  request  urgent  approval  of  Congress  for  arrangements  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Euratom,  and  to  seek  legislation  author- 
izing AEC  participation  with  Euratom  in  the  joint  programs  of 
demonstration  and  development  and  research.  The  joint  programs 
anticipated  the  building  within  the  Common  Market  nations  of  six 
nuclear  power  plants  by  1965  with  a  total  electrical  output  of  1,000 
megawatts.228 

European  sources  were  expected  to  finance  the  capital,  then  esti- 
mated at  about  $350  million,  and  operating  costs,  while  the  United 
States  would  finance  research  and  development  and  other  incentives. 

President  Eisenhower  saw  dual  benefits  for  the  United  States. 
Nuclear  power  in  Europe  would  provide  both  a  needed  new  source  of 
energy  for  those  nations  and  also  an  impetus  toward  European  unity. 
As  for  European  unity,  he  said  :  *" 

tat  Loc.  fit. 

22,1 1  million  EKW  (electric  kilowatts)  Is  l.ooo  megawatts  of  elc^ti-lcnl  capacity. 

a*  Ibid.,  p.  93. 

■w  By  way  of  comparison,  some  single  nuclear  power  plants  now  being  built  in  the  United 
Stntiv  nave  electrical  outputs  ereater  than  1,000  MW. 

331  U.S..  Conprcss,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom 
Agreements,  op.  clt.,  p.  10. 


229 


.  .  .  One  motivation  which  has  therefore  led  to  the  creation  of  this  new  Com- 
munity is  the  growing  sense  of  urgency  on  the  part  of  Europeans  that  their 
destiny  requires  unity  and  that  the  road  toward  this  unity  is  to  be  found  in  the 
development  of  major  common  programs  such  as  Euratom  makes  possible.  .  .  . 

As  for  other  benefits,  he  said : 

.  .  .  Another  important  motivation  is  the  present  and  growing  requirements  of 
Europe  for  a  new  source  of  energy  in -the  face  of  rapidly  increasing  requirements 
and  limited  possibilities  of  increasing  the  indigenous  supply  of  conventional 
fuels.  The  Europeans  see  atomic  energy  not  merely  as  an  alternative  source  of 
energy  but  as  something  which  they  must  develop  quickly  if  they  are  to  continue 
their  economic  growth  and  exercise  their  rightful  influence  in  world  affairs. 

To  initiate  arrangements  for  the  joint  programs  with  Euratom, 
President  Eisenhower  transmitted  to  Congress  three  documents  which 
required  congressional  assent.  These  were:  (1)  an  agreement  for  co- 
operation which  recognized  Euratom  as  a  body  with  which  the  U.S. 
Government  could  negotiate ;  (2)  a  draft  of  legislation  to  authorize  the 
AEC  participation  in  the  joint  programs  and  to  authorize  appropria- 
tions; and  (3)  a  draft  of  a  bilateral  agreement  between  the  AEC  and 
Euratom.*30 

THE   UNITED  STATES-EURATOM   AGREEMENT  OF   1958 

The  Agreement  for  Cooperation  between  Euratom  and  the  United 
States  was  signed  in  Brussels  on  November  8,  1958.  Congress  had  pre- 
viously approved  the  agreement  on  August  20,  1958.  The  Agreement 
proved  to  be  important  to  Euratom.  Looking  back  with  the  benefit  of 
5  years  hindsight.  Federico  Consolo,  an  advisor  to  the  Euratom 
Commission,  wrote  of  the  political  importance  of  the  agreement : 3Sl 

...  In  addition  to  its  intrinsic  value  from  the  scientific  technical,  industrial 
and  financial  standpoint,  the  Agreement  was  of  considerable  political  importance, 
since,  from  the  very  outset  Euratom  was  able  to  benefit  by  the  assistance  of  the 
world's  major  nuclear  power. 

Pierre  Kruys,  of  Euratom,  saw  this  Agreement  as :  ^ 

...  A  proof  of  U.S.  support  for  the  Community  organizations  as  the  corner- 
stone of  the  new  united  Europe.  [The  Agreement]  also  paved  the  way  for  the 
establishment  of  the  first  contacts  of  the  technical  departments  of  the  Euratom 
Commission  with  nuclear  centers  and  industrial  concerns  in  the  Community 
countries,  as  well  as  for  the  achievement  of  a  certain  number  of  concrete  aims. 

The  Agreement  provided  for  two  well-defined,  closely  related  joint 
programs  between  the  United  States  and  Euratom : 

(1)  Construction  of  power  reactors  of  a  proven  American 
type,  for  a  total  of  1,000  megawatts  electrical  capacity,  to  go  into 
operation  before  the  end  of  1963,  except  for  two  plants  sched- 
uled for  operation  before  the  end  of  1965 ;  and 

(2)  Research  and  development  on  the  types  of  reactors  ac- 
cepted under  the  power  reactor  program.  The  budget  for  the 
joint  research  program  was  specified  at  $50  million  for  each 
partner  for  the  first  five  years,  with  the  funds  to  be  spent  at  home. 

^The  text  of  these  documents  appears  In  U.S.,  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom  Agreements,  op.  cit.,  pp.  11-18. 

431  Federico  Consolo,  "The  US/Euratom  Agreement  for  Co-operation,"  Euratom,  No.  1. 
(1963),  p.  2. 

232  Pierre  Kruys,  "The  Joint  US/Euratom  Research  and  Development  Programme,  Eura- 
tom,So.  1  (1963),  p.  8. 


230 


The  United  States  also  agreed  to  supply  Euratom  with  30  tons  of 
contained  U-235.283  Deferred  payment  was  provided  for  the  nuclear 
fuel,  and  favorable  conditions  were  also  offered  for  the  processing  of 
irradiated  nuclear  fuel  and  for  the  repurchase  by  the  United  States 
of  the  plutonium  produced.234  Additionally,  the  U.S.  Government 
through  the  Export-Import  Bank,  extended  long-term  credit  of  $135 
million  to  Euratom,  which  Euratom  could  in  turn  loan  to  partici- 
pants in  its  power  reactor  program.  Finally,  the  U.S.  Government 
recognized  Euratom's  value  as  an  organ  of  inspection  by  conceding 
to  it  the  right  of  control  over  fissionable  materials  supplied  by  the 
United  States.  Until  then,  in  other  bilateral  agreements  the  United 
States  had  directly  exercised  such  control.  , 'u 

THE    JOINT   BOARDS  :   AN    ORGANIZATIONAL  INNOVATION 

One  problehi  for  American  diplomacy  was  to  arrange  some  form 
of  organization  which  would  permit  a  joint  program  to  go  forward 
while  retaining  substantial  control  over  U.S.  funds.  The  climate  of 
the  late  1950's  did  not  favor  the  supplying  by  the  United  States  of 
unrestricted  funds  to  Euratom.  The  solution  Was  to  form  two  joint 
boards  wherein  the  United  States  and  Euratom  each  controlled  their 
own  funds,  rather  than  putting  them  into  a  common  pool. 

A  Joint  Reactor  Board  was  established  to  examine  proposals  sub- 
mitted for  the  construction  of  power  reactors  and  to  report  its  rec- 
ommendations to  the  Euratom  Commission  and  to  the  AEC.  The 
Board  was  presided  over  by  a  chairman  from  Euratom  235  and  a  vice- 
chairman  from  the  United  States 236  with  voting  rights,  and  an  equal 
number  of  Euratom  and  American  experts  without  voting  rights. 

A  Joint  Research  and  Development  Board,  similarly  organized, 
was  established  to  examine  proposals  for  research,  and  to  recommend 
action  to  Euratom  and  to  the  AEC.237  Despite  administrative  com- 
plications, it  appears  that  the  joint  boards  functioned  satisfactorily, 
thanks  to  the  cooperative  and  cordial  attitude  on  both  sides.238 

A   NOTE   ON  THE  ENVIRONMENT  OF  THE   NEGOTIATIONS 

The  bilateral  agreement  was  negotiated  in  an  atmosphere  of  con- 
cern in  Europe  as  to  the  possible  consequences  of  the  Suez  crisis  and 
at  a  time  when  nuclear  power  was  expected  to  offer  early  competition 
with  conventional  sources  of  energy.  But  once  the  initial  upsurge  of 
enthusiasm  for  the  joint  programs  had  slackened,  and  after  the  situa- 
tion for  conventional  power  supply  in  Europe  had  returned  to  normal, 
there  were  observers  who  thought  the  Agreement  had  overreached 
itself  in  favor  of  industry,  while  at  the  same  time  being  too  limited 
for  research.  These  considerations  were  to  spark  criticisms  in  Europe 
that  the  Agreement  had  subordinated  Euratom  to  U.S.  domestic  policy 
and  had  invested  Euratom  with  excessive  powers."36 

*«  Of  this  29  tons  was  for  the  power  reactor  program  for  fuel,  and  1  ton  for  research 
add  development.  I 

»*In  comparison,  for  the  period  1958  through  1961,  the  United  States*  commitment 
to  supply  uranium  under  Atoms  for  Peace  was  a  total  of  50  tons  of  Uranlum-235. 

*«  Eurn tom'8  Director  General  for  Industry  and  Economy. 

288  The  head  of  the  nuclear  section  of  the  U.S.  Mission  to  the  Communities. 

*"  Eum  torn  s  Director  General  for  Research  and  Training,  and  the  Head  of  the  Nuclear 
Section  of  the  U.S.  Mission  to  the  Communities. 

m  Consolo,  op.  cit.  p.  3. 

■•  Ibid.,  p.  4. 


231 


The  Eur  atom  Cooperation  Act  of  1958 

During  congressional  consideration  of  the  President's  request  for 
authority  to  enter  into  the  joint  programs  with  Euratom,  spokesmen 
for  the  administration  supported  the  proposed  Euratom  Cooperation 
Act  in  glowing  terms.  Under  Secretary  of  State  C.  Douglas  Dillon 
outlined  the  benefits  of  strengthened  European  unity,  Western  leader- 
ship in  nuclear  power,240  and  meeting  the  Soviet  challenge.241 

Leaders  of  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  supported  U.S.  cooperation 
with  Euratom.  One  executive  spoke  of  the  choice  before  the  United 
States :  either  to  let  the  European  nuclear  industry  evolve  at  a  pace 
governed  by  normal  commercial  considerations  or  to  accelerate  it. 
If  the  first  policy  were  chosen,  he  thought  it  would  be  probably  20 
years  before  nuclear  power  would  be  commercially  competitive.  Un- 
der the  second  policy  it  would  be  sooner.  The  joint  program  would 
meet  the  needs  for  acceleration,  give  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  an 
immediate  market,  and  give  European  utilities  a  ceiling  on  costs  of 
fuel  for  nuclear  power.242  Benefits  to  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  were 
cited,  although  there  was  some  doubt  that  helping  Euratom  would 
speed  the  time  when  a  European  nuclear  industry  would  compete 
with  its  U.S.  counterpart.243 

Some  doubt  about  the  joint  program  was  expressed  by  members 
of  the  Joint  Committee.  One  member  saw  it  as  a  step  to  head  off 
capture  of  the  nuclear  power  market  by  the  United  Kingdom  244  and 
warned  that  there  were  limits  to  what  the  proposed  joint  program 
could  accomplish.245 

Such  doubts  notwithstanding,  the  Joint  Committee  reported  favor- 
ably the  proposed  Euratom  Cooperation  Act,  expressing  its  belief  that 
a  vigorous  program  of  cooperation  by  the  United  States  with  foreign 

mo  "Of  strengthening  European  unity.  Under  Secretary  Dillon  said*:  The  agreement  repre- 
sents the  confluence  of  two  important  historic  developments  :  first,  the  peaceful  application 
of  atomic  energy,  a  policy  high  among  the  objectives  of  this  Government ;  second,  European 
unity,  a  result  of  European  inspiration  and  a  development  on  which  the  United  States  has 
looked  with  great  interest  and  favor.  Proposed  Euratom  Agreement,  op.  cit.,  p.  23. 

Of  the  leadership  advantages  he  said  :  .  .  .  Euratom  is  unique  in  having  a  political 
status,  including  certain  sovereign  attributes  of  the  state,  which  permits  us  to  deal  with  it 
unilaterallv.  Combined  with  this  political  status  is  the  scientific,  industrial,  and  financial 
potential  of  six  of  the  most  developed  nations  in  Europe.  The  successful  implementation  of 
the  program  will  help  maintain  Western  leadership  in  the  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy. 
The  continuing  attacks  on  Euratom  by  the  Soviet  Union  would  seem  to  indicate  that  they 
draw  the  same  conclusions.  Ibid.,  p.  23. 

241  On  meeting  the  Soviet  technological  challenge,  he  said  :  Recently  demonstrated  evi- 
dences of  advanced  Soviet  scientific  and  engineering  capability  have  caused  a  serious  and 
healthy  reappraisal  within  the  Atlantic  Community  of  the  extent  to  which  the  Western 
countries  have  been  exploiting  to  the  full  their  potential  scientific  strength  and  whether 
this  strength  is  being  mobilized  through  the  most  effective  cooperative  arrangements. 
Voices  in  Europe  have  queried  whether  the  historic  position  of  the  United  States  in  the 
fiel''  of  science,  engineering,  and  general  industrial  development  is  not  being  overtaken  by 
the  Soviet  Union.  Atomic  energy  is  rightfully  considered  a  bellwether  of  scientific  and 
industrial  accomplishment.  Ibid.,  p.  25. 

242  Ibid.,  p.  267. 

243  A  spokesman  for  one  company  in  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  anticipated  that  the 
proposed  program  would  be  mutually  beneficial  to  the  United  States  nuclear  industry  in 
greatly  increasing  practical  experience.  Ibid.,  p.  314.  Another  spokesman  cautioned  that 
enabling  Euratom  to  develop  its  own  industrial  capacity  more  quickly  than  would  be  the 
case  without  American  aid  would  undoubtedly  reduce  the  time  in  which  American  equip- 
ment could  be  sold  in  Europe.  Ibid.,  p.  329. 

241  At  that  time  the  United  Kingdom  was  vigorously  pursuing  its  national  program  of 
building  large  nuclear  powerplants  fueled  with  natural  uranium  and  there  was  some 
concern  lest  the  British  dominate  the  world  market  with  this  technology. 

245  Representative  Craig  Hosmer  observed  that :  In  considering  this  legislation  the 
Congress  should  be  under  no  delusion  that  it  will  capture  the  entire  European  reactors 
market  for  the  U.S.  suppliers.  Although  there  are  some  that  will  disagree  with  me  t 
is  my  personal  feeling  that  the  bill  goes  no  further  than  making  us  competitive  in  this 
market  with  the  British.  The  British  atomic  industry  can  be  loosely  described  as  a  govern- 
ment monopoly.  They  give  fuel  guarantees  and  other  incentives  that  would  prevent  us  from 
competing  in  the  European  market  at  all  without  such  legislation  as  this  before  us  today. 
Cf.  his  remarks,  Congressional  Record,  vol.  104,  August  20,  1958,  p.  187S9. 


232 


nations  in  nuclear  power  was  desirable.246  The  Joint  Committee 
summed  up  the  anticipated  benefits  of  U.S.  participation  in  the  joint 
programs  as  follows : 247 

.  .  .  The  State  Department  has  testified  as  to  the  role  Euratoni  will  play  in  Un- 
economic integration  of  Europe,  and  this  is  recognized  as  an  important  part  of  our 
foreign  policy.  Euratom  will  become  increasingly  important  to  Europe  as  a  sup- 
plement to  its  growing  energy  requirements  in  a  period  when  its  oil  supply  from 
the  Middle  East  is  in  danger. 

Moreover,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  United  States  atomic  energy  program,  the 
proposed  Euratom  arrangements  offer  an  opportunity  to  develop  and  construct 
United  States  type  reactors  abroad.  There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  testimony  that 
it  is  possible  to  achieve  atomic  power  in  Europe  sooner  than  in  the  United  States 
because  conventional  power  costs  in  Europe  are  considerably  higher  than  in  the 
United  States. 

Perhaps  of  greatest  interest  to  the  United  States  is  the  opportunity  in  the 
Euratom  joint  program  to  demonstrate  United  States  leadership  in  atomic  energy 
development,  an  objective  which  the  Joint  Committee  considers  to  be  of  the  high- 
est importance. 

Representative  Holifield  of  the  Joint  Committee  was  not  impressed 
by  the  argument  that  nuclear  power  could  help  resolve  Europe's  energy 
problems. 

On  this  point,  he  said  in  debate  on  the  bill : 248 

.  .  .  The  claim  put  forward  by  the  more  enthusiastic  proponents  of  the  original 
Euratom  sponsors,  that  this  program  would  solve  the  dependence  of  the  Euro- 
pean countries  on  Middle  East  oil,  is  of  course  unrealistic.  The  six  countries  com- 
prising the  Euratom  group  have  an  installed  kilowatt  capacity  of  some  60  million 
units.  The  pending  atomic-power  program  will  amount  to  1  million,  or  one-sixtieth 
of  the  total  capacity. 

Despite  these  misgivings  the  bill  was  passed  and  the  Euratom  Co- 
operation Act  became  law  on  August  28,  1958,  as  Public  Law  85-840 
(72  Stat.  1084). 

A  BILATERAL  AGREEMENT  WITH  EURATOM 

While  Congress  quickly  assented  to  the  initial  agreement  for  co- 
operation and  to  the  authorizing  legislation,  it  did  not  move  as  quickly 
upon  the  bilateral  agreement.  The  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy 
held  hearings  on  the  agreement 249  and  insisted  on  changes,  particu- 
larly for  the  safeguarding  of  nuclear  materials  to  be  furnished  by  the 
United  States.  After  these  changes  had  been  worked  out  with  Eura- 
tom, President  Eisenhower  approved  a  final  version  on  November  6, 

1958,  which  was  signed  in  Brussels  2  days  later.  On  January  14, 

1959,  the  bilateral  agreement  with  Euratom  was  laid  before  the  Joint 
Committee  25°  and  when  no  objection  was  raised,  it  took  effect  on 
February  18,  1959. 

The  only  significant  disagreement  in  the  negotiations  was  over 
U.S.  inspection  rights  and  safeguards  for  nuclear  materials  supplied 

348  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Euratom  Cooperation  Act  of  1938, 
Sen.  Rept.  2370.  August  14,  195S. 

947  Loc.  clt.  Note,  the  text  of  this  report  is  also  published  in  U.S.  Code,  Congressional 
and  Administrative  News,  85th  Cong.,  2d  Sees.,  1958,  vol.  3.  The  excerpt  appears  at  p.  4307. 

M"Cf.  his  remarks.  Congrea*ional  Record,  vol.  104,  Ausrust  20,  1958.  p.  18794. 

■»•  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Agreement  for  Coopera- 
tion with  Euratom,  8Rth  Cong:.,  l«t.  Sess.,  19>59,  150  p. 

*°  Before  submitting  the  agreement  to  the  Joint  Committee,  the  President,  as  required  by 
the  Atomic  Energy  Act,  made  a  determination  that  the  "performance  of  the  proposed 
agreement  will  promote  and  will  not  constitute  an  unreasonable  risk  to  the  common  defense 
and  security  of  the  United  States."  The  emphasis  was  upon  security,  not  upon  economic 
benefit. 


233 


by  the  United  States.  The  U.S.  negotiators  sought  the  right  to  send 
inspectors  into  nuclear  facilities  of  Euratom  member  states.  The 
Euratom  negotiators  refused.  A  resulting  compromise  was  for  Eura- 
tom to  establish  a  safeguard  system  for  U.S.-supplied  materials  in 
accordance  with  principles  accepted  by  the  United  States,  and  to  allow 
U.S.  assistance  in  establishing  the  sj^stem  and  to  frequent  consulta- 
tions and  visits.  Both  parties  agreed  to  verification,  by  mutually 
approved  scientific  methods,  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  safeguard  and 
control  system.  But  the  agreement  was  silent  on  inspection  by  U.S. 
personnel.  Euratom  agreed  in  the  bilateral  agreement  to  consult  with 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  to  assure  that  its  system 
would  be  reasonably  compatible  with  that  of  the  IAEA.  The  agree- 
ment also  provided  that  should  the  International  Agency  establish 
an  international  safeguard  and  control  system,  the  United  States 
and  Euratom  would  consult  with  the  IAEA  regarding  its  assump- 
tion of  these  functions.251 

With  the  IAEA  now  responsible  for  such  a  safeguards  and  control 
system  under  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty,  it  will  be  interesting  to 
see  how  the  Agency's  functions  will  impact  upon  Euratom  safeguards. 

The  Joint  Power  Program 

The  initial  target  of  the  joint  power  program  was  the  construction 
of  six  nuclear  power  plants  in  Europe  with  a  combined  electrical  out- 
put of  1,000  megawatts.  These  were  to  use  U.S.  nuclear  technology. 
The  goal  was  partially  achieved.  By  the  time  the  joint  power  program 
ended,  three  nuclear  power  plants  with  a  combined  output  of  597  MW 
had  been  built  and  put  into  operation,  employing  two  different  tech- 
nological approaches. 

The  joint  program  was  put  into  motion  by  two  invitations  for  pro- 
posals. Some  details  of  these  invitations  are  pertinent  as  illustrations 
of  measures  to  promote  foreign  use  of  a  new  technologj^. 

THE   FIRST   INVITATION   TO   PARTICIPATE 

On  April  13,  1959,  Euratom  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to  Euratom  in- 
vited proposals  from  would-be  contractors  to  build  nuclear  power 
plants  to  be  completed  by  the  end  of  1963,  and  to  operate  for  at  least 
10  years.  To  attract  the  interest  and  participation  of  the  conserva- 
tive European  electricity  industry,  the  invitations  offered  five 
inducements : 252 

(1)  Financial  guarantees  for  a  10-year  operating  period  for 
the  cost  of  fabrication  and  the  integrity  of  the  nuclear  fuel.253 

(2)  Long-term  assurance  of  an  adequate  supply  of  nuclear  fuel 
at  prices  comparable  to  those  offered  to  industry  within  the  United 
States.  The  U.S.  agreed  to  furnish  Euratom  with  up  to  30,000 
kilograms  of  U-235  on  credit  at  4  percent  interest. 

(3)  Assurance  for  10  years  of  a  defined  market  for  the  pluto- 
nium  recovered  from  the  used  fuel. 


811  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom 
Agreement,  op.  cit.,  p.  9. 

262  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Agreement  for  Coopera- 
tion with  Euratom,  op.  cit.,  p.  21. 

™  During:  the  late  1950's  the  technology  for  fabrication  of  nuclear  fuel  was  still  evolving 
rapidly  and  there  was  little  experience  to  .indicate  how  well  it  would  perform  in  practice, 
or  that  estimated  costs  of  fabrication  could  be  held  down.  For  these  reasons,  financial 
guarantees  to  the  electric  utilities  for  cost  of  fabrication  and  minimum  performance  were 
considered  to  be  important  incentives. 


234 


(4)  Long-term  capital  loans  to  cover  part  of  the  cost  of  con- 
struction. 

(5)  Long-term  assurance  by  the  United  States  that  reprocessing 
of  used  fuel  would  be  available  to  the  joint  program  reactors 
under  terms  comparable  to  those  offered  to  nuclear  power  reactor 
operators  in  the  United  States. 

Selection  among  the  proposals  was  to  be  made  by  a  U.S.-Euratom 
reactor  board  according  to  the  following  criteria : 

(1)  The  extent  to  which  the  proposed  nuclear  powerplant  was 
expected  to  approach  conventional  power  costs  at  the  time  of  its 
completion,  and  its  potential  for  subsequent  improvement. 

(2)  The  extent  to  which  the  project  would  draw  upon  the  funds, 
materials  and  services  available  for  the  joint  program. 

(3)  The  extent  to  which  the  proposal  would  contribute  to  the 
advancement  of  nuclear  power  technology  and  to  a  diversity  of 
plant  types  and  designs. 

(4)  The  extent  to  which  the  project  would  contribute  to  a  strong 
and  competitive  atomic  equipment  industry  in  the  United  States 
and  Europe. 

In  addition,  Euratom  would  consider  the  need  to  arrive  at  a  reason- 
able geographic  distribution  of  the  projects  among  the  member  states 
of  the  Community.254 

The  invitation  made  it  clear  that  information  was  expected  in  return 
for  the  inducements,  specifying  that : 255 

...  In  return  for  the  benefits  received,  the  participants  in  the  program  will  be 
required  to  make  available  information  developed  on  the  design,  plans,  and 
specifications,  constructions  and  operating  costs,  operations  and  economics. 

However,  the  participants  were  not  obliged  to  disclose  manufactur- 
ing "know-how"  or  techniques.  Subsequent  experience  indicated  that 
European  companies  tended  to  treat  as  commercially  confidential 
much  information  that  in  the  U.S.  domestic  nuclear  power  program 
would  have  been  freely  published. 

The  response  to  the  first  invitation  was  disappointing.  Although 
letters  of  interest  were  received  from  six  Euratom  utilities,  by  the 
deadline  of  the  invitation  only  one  proposal  was  in  hand.  The  Joint 
Committee  became  concerned  and  questioned  AEC  Commissioner 
Floberg,  after  his  visit  to  the  Euratom  countries  in  1959,  about  reports 
that  European  business  was  disgusted  and  worried  about  Euratom. 
In  his  reply,  Floberg  carefully  distinguished  between  Euratom  and 
the  governments  of  its  member  states  and  their  business  sector.  The 
governments  remained  optimistic.  It  was  the  utilities,  said  Floberg, 
whose  interest  had  waned.  He  attributed  this  changed  attitude  to  a 
number  of  factors : 256 

The  fact  of  50  million  tons  of  coal  on  the  surface  of  the  ground  and  the  fact 
of  a  $5  or  so  drop  in  the  price  of  coal  in  Europe,  and  the  fact  of  reduced  shipping 
rates  on  American  coal  to  Europe,  and  the  fact  of  oil  discoveries  in  the  Sahara, 
and  the  fact' of  what  they  call  stability  in  the  Middle  East  .  .  .  and  the  fact 
of  new  sources  of  natural  gas  to  Europe — have  all  accumulated  together  with  the 
failure  of  the  rate  of  power  consumption  to  increase  at  the  predicted  rate,  to 
change  the  attitude  toward  the  urgency  of  nuclear  power  in  Europe.  There  just 
is  not  any  question  about  that. 


a*  Ibid.,  p.  27. 
a*  Ibid.,  p.  22. 

**  U.S.    Congress,    Joint    Committee    on    Atomic    Energy,    Hearings,    AEC    Authorizing 
Legislation,  Fiscal  Year  1961,  86th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  I960,  p.  101. 


235 


When  I  talk  about  the  changing  attitude  toward  urgency,  I  am  talking  about 
the  attitude  of  the  utilities.  I  believe  the  attitude  of  the  European  governments 
has  not  changed,  and  I  am  sure  the  attitude  of  the  Euratom  organization  has 
not  changed. 

...  As  far  as  the  utilities  are  concerned — the  ones  who  are  the  potential  cus- 
tomers— there  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  there  has  been  some  dilution  in  their 
feeling  of  urgency. 

THE   SECOND   ROUND   OF  INVITATIONS 

Despite  the  disappointing  response  to  the  first  invitations  and  the 
criticism  of  the  Joint  Committee,  AEC  Chairman  McCone  in  1960 
decided  to  j>roceed  with  a  second  round  of  invitations.257  Accordingly, 
on  September  2,  1961,  the  AEC  and  Euratom  tried  again.  This 
time  the  invitation  solicited  construction  of  nuclear  power  plants  that 
would  come  into  operation  no  later  than  the  end  of  1965.  As  with  the 
first  invitation,  plants  were  to  be  built,  owned,  and  operated  by  orga- 
nizations of  the  electricity  industries  of  the  Community.  The  invitation 
also  stated  that  in  order  to  qualify  for  AEC  inducements,  the  nuclear 
reactors  had  to  be  of  a  type  which  had  reached  an  advanced  stage 
of  development  in  the  United  States. 

FINANCING  THE  DEMONSTRATION    PLANTS 

The  demonstration  power  plants  were  expected  to  require  a  greater 
capital  investment  than  corresponding  conventional  plants.  Since  Eu- 
ratom itself  had  no  funds  for  the  extra  capital  costs,  the  United  States 
arranged  for  loans  through  the  Export-Import  Bank  to  provide  $135 
million  to  finance  them.  The  basis  for  this  figure  was  explained  by 
the  Department  of  State  as  follows:258 

Assuming  a  total  cost  of  $350  million,  we  can  say  that  the  electricity  com- 
panies will  normally  be  able  to  contribute  out  of  their  own  sources  or  otherwise, 
around  $150  million,  that  is  the  cost  of  conventional  powerplants  with  the  same 
capacity.  The  loan  to  come  from  the  United  States  Government  being  estimated 
at  $135  million,  there  remains  a  gap  of  $65  million  to  be  found  from  other  sources. 

This  was  a  reasonable  estimate  of  the  dollar  value  of  the  nuclear 
equipment  and  services  to  be  purchased  from  the  United  States.259 

However,  by  the  time  the  money  was  needed,  the  interest  rate  in 
Europe  had  dropped  enough  so  that  European  capital  was  used. 

THE   FUEL   GUARANTEE   AUTHORITY 

The  invitations  for  the  joint  power  program  offered  a  guarantee  on 
fuel  performance  as  an  inducement.  Authority  for  the  AEC  to 
provide  such  guarantee  was  included  in  the  Euratom  Cooperation  Act 
of  1958  because  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  was  not  then  ready  to  offer 
the  desired  guarantee.  Yet,  only  a  year  later  the  picture  had  changed 
and  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  was  offering  guarantees  of  performance 
that  met  or  exceeded  those  in  the  invitations.  Commissioner  Floberg 
attributed  this  change  to  the  Euratom  joint  program.  The  U.S.  fabrica- 
tors began  to  offer  their  own  guarantees  because  they  wished  to  avoid 
use  of  the  AEC's  authority,  which  would  have  required  private  indus- 

257  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings.  AEC  Authorizing 
Legislation.  Fiscal  Year  1961.  86th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1960,  p.  101. 

sa'U.'S.   Congress,   Joint  Committee  on   Atomic   Energy,   Hearings.  Proposed   Euratom 
Agreements,  op.  cit,  p.  111. 
,   *»  Ibid.,  p.  234. 


236 


try  to  divulge  proprietary  information  about  performance  of  its 
products.260 

The  second  invitation  resulted  in  two  demonstration  projects.  One 
was  a  210-megawatt  nuclear  power  plant  for  the  Societe  d'Energie 
Nuclearire  Franco-Beige  des  Ardennes  (SENA)  built  near  Givet, 
France,  close  to  the  France-Belgian  border.  The  second  was  a  237 
megawatt  nuclear  power  plant  of  a  "West  German  firm,  Kernkraft- 
werk-RWE-Bayerwerk  (KRB)  at  Gundremmingen,  Bavaria.  For 
both  projects,  a  U.S.  firm  was  the  designer  and  supplier  for  the  nu- 
clear reactor. 

The  Joint  Research  Program 

The  joint  research  program  of  the  United  States  and  Euratom  was 
initially  planned  for  an  expenditure  of  $200  million  over  10  years. 
At  the  end  of  the  program  in  1969,  the  AEC  had  spent  about  $37  mil- 
lion and  Euratom  about  the  same.  For  the  first  5  years,  the  U.S. 
funds  were  authorized  annually  as  a  separate  item  in  the  AEC's  au- 
thorizations. For  the  second  5  years,  congressional  interest  in  the 
joint  program  had  diminished  and  AEC  funding  for  it  was  merged 
with  other  AEC  requests  for  research  and  development. 

THE  FIRST   5 -YEAR  PLAN    (1959-1964) 

The  goal  of  the  joint  research  program  was  to  improve  the  per- 
formance of  U.S.  types  of  nuclear  power  reactors.  The  joint  program 
began  on  December  23,  1958,  when  Euratom  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
Euratom  announced  the  formation  of  a  Joint  Research  and  Develop- 
ment Board  and  solicited  proposals  for  research  and  development.  The 
function  of  the  board  was  to  choose  among  proposals.  Criteria  for  se- 
lection included  the  potential  contribution  of  the  proposed  research  to 
the  goals  of  the  joint  program,  the  technical  competence  of  the  research, 
the  anticipated  costs,  and  the  willingness  of  the  proposer  to  participate 
in  the  exchange  of  technical  personnel.  The  chosen  proposals  were  re- 
ferred to  Euratom  or  to  the  AEC  for  negotiation  and  administra- 
tion. Proposals  from  European  organizations  went  to  Euratom,  and 
those  from  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  and  universities  went  to  the 
AEC.  In  this  way,  there  was  no  combining  of  AEC  and  Euratom 
funds  and  each  organization  was  in  control  of  the  research  funded 
by  it. 

The  response  to  the  invitation  was  enthusiastic.  By  the  end  of  1959 
more  than  340  proposals  and  letters  of  intent  had  been  received.  Of 
some  250  definitive  proposals,  half  were  from  European  and  half  were 
about  equally  divided  between  U.S.  organizations  and  joint  proposals 
of  U.S.  and  European  concerns.  But  the  selecting  among  these  pro- 
posals and  the  negotiating  of  contracts  went  slowly.  Two  years  later, 
in  1962,  only  15  had  been  authorized  for  contracts  in  the  United  States 
and  38  for  Europe. 

One  problem  was  funding.  The  Euratom  Cooperation  Act  had  au- 
thorized an  initial  appropriation  of  $3  million  and  the  AEC  re- 
?uested  an  additional  $14  million  for  fiscal  year  1960.  But  the  Joint 
Committee  cut  the  request  to  $5  million,  which  caused  Commissioner 
Floberg  to  ask  the  Committee  for  reconsideration  and  restoration.  He 

480  U.S.  ConfcreRR.  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Enerpy,  Hearings,  AEC  Authorizing 
Legislation,  Fiscal  Tear  1960,  op.  clt.,  p.  657. 


237 


expressed  his  fears  that  the  cut  would  be  a  "body-blow"  to  the  future 
of  the  whole  Euratom  joint  program  and  could  even  cause  its  demise. 
At  that  time  the  AEC  had  in  hand  proposals  from  the  U.S.  nuclear 
industry  for  research  totalling  $25  million.  The  Joint  Committee  sub- 
sequently increased  the  authorization  by  another  $7-  million,  bringing 
the  total  to  $12  million. 

THE    SECOND    5 -TEAR  PLAN    (196  5-1969) 

If  the  first  5-year  program  of  joint  U.S. -Euratom  research  was  dis- 
appointing in  terms  of  research  begun,  the  second  was  even  more  so. 
Originally  planned  at  $100  million  by  both  parties,  by  the  start  of  the 
second  5-year  plan,  the  AEC  called  for  only  $15  million  each  for 
the  United  States  and  Euratom.  The  reasons  for  this  reduction  were 
twofold.  First,  the  joint  power  program  had  produced  proposals  for 
only  two  reactor  types  instead  of  the  five  or  six  originally  expected,  so 
less  research  and  development  was  needed.  Second,  there  had  been  un- 
expected technological  advance  in  the  U.S.  domestic  nuclear  power 
program.  The  AEC's  director  of  reactor  development  explained  the 
situation  to  the  Joint  Committee  as  follows : 261 

If  you  will  recall,  in  the  first  place  when  we  went  in  with  this  Euratom  pro- 
gram we  expected  to  have  five  reactors.  We  had  three  instead  of  five.  There 
were  two  types  of  reactors  that  actually  came  under  the  joint  program  and 
as  we  have  looked  at  the  type  of  progress  that  has  been  made  since,  it  just 
didn't  seem  that  we  could  carry  out  a  sensible  research  and  development  pro- 
gram of  water  reactors  because  they  have  gotten  so  far  toward  commercial- 
ity  in  the  meantime.  I  think  we  didn't  anticipate  when  we  went  into  this  pro- 
gram originally  that  water  reactors  would  have  gotten  as  far  along  during  this 
period  as  they  have. 

The  pace  of  the  second  5-year  program  slowed  so  much  that  in 
1966  the  AEC  requested  no  additional  funds.  Indeed,  in  August  of 
that  year  it  proposed  to  Euratom  that  both  parties  reduce  their  level 
of  participation  for  the  entire  10  years  to  about  $33  million  each. 
Furthermore,  the  AEC  proposed  that  Euratom  accept  certain  research 
already  funded  under  the  AEC's  domestic  reactor  program  as  ful- 
filling*the  United  States'  commitment  to  the  joint  research  program. 
The  cutback  and  financial  pressure  within  the  AEC  stemmed  from 
assigning  higher  priority  to  research  on  reactor  types  other  than  those 
of  interest  to  the  joint  program.262  The  situation  was  as  bad  in  Eura- 
tom. There,  the  General  Advisor  to  the  Euratom  Commission  for  Ke- 
searcli  stated  that  in  view  of  Euratom's  current  budget  crisis,  the 
Euratom  Commission  would  be  unable  to  consider  matching  additional 
research  proposed  by  the  United  States.  He  advised  further  that  the 
Euratom  budget  for  1968  contained  no  funds  to  start  new  projects 
under  the  joint  research  program.263  Consequently,  the  joint  research 
program  came  to  a  halt  and  ultimately  faded  away. 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 

American  diplomacy  was  able  to  arrange  with  Euratom  for  joint 
programs  of  demonstration  and  research  and  development,  but  could 

201  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  AEC  Authorizing 
Legislation,  Fiscal  Year  1965,  88th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  1964,  p.  370. 

262  U.S.  Congress.  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  AEC  Authorizing 
Legislation,  Fiscal  Year  1968,  90th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1967,  p.  908. 

283  U.S.  Congress.  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  AEG  Authorizing 
Legislation,  Fiscal  Year  1969, 90th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1968,  p.  366. 


238 


not  assure  the  impetus  needed  to  reach  the  desired  goals.  The  negoti- 
ators did  not  produce  a  truly  joint  undertaking,  but  rather  two  paral- 
lel, closely  coordinated  programs  in  which  each  party  controls  its 
own  funds. 

The  diplomatic  effort  did  produce  several  working  nuclear  power 
plants  in  Europe  that  demonstrated  U.S.  nuclear  technology  both  for 
European  and  domestic  U.S.  nuclear  markets.  The  joint  programs 
did  provide  experience  in  the  operation  of  joint  boards,  experience 
that  could  be  useful  for  future  multinational  ventures.  It  may  be 
worth  inquiring  how  much  of  this  experience  has  been  recorded  and 
analyzed  for  future  reference. 

The  diplomatic  effort  of  organizing  the  joint  programs  did  bene- 
fit the  US.  nuclear  industry,  which  had  the  opportunity  to  build 
several  more  working  power  plants  than  would  otherwise  have  been 
possible.  On  the  other  hand,  the  prqgram  never  measured  up  to  the 
initial  expectations  and  suffered  from  long  delays.. 

As  the  United  States  moves  into  the  mid-19  <0's  in  the  face  of  grow- 
ing national  and  international  imbalances  in  supply  and  demand  for 
energy,  it  maj  wejll^e  useful  to  inquire  what  can  be  learned  from 
the  joint  programs.  There,  was  a  working  together  of  government 
agencies,  universities,  and  industrial  organizations  in  several  countries 
and  useful  'research  wa,s  perfprjned.  Perhaps  the  experience  with  the 
joint  programs  could  point  the  way  toward  future  ventures  to  de- 
velop new  energy  sources,  such  as  large-scale  use  of  solar  energy,  or 
toward  conservation  of  energy  through  expedited  development  of 
nifignei;6h^dt6^yh4irii6'§  (JlffiD),  Both  the  strengths  and  weaknesses 
of  the  Euratom  venture  could  he,  instructive  in  planning  such  new  de- 
velopments on  an  international  basis. 


!< 


'i         ■■' 


>  ■      • 


IX.    The    Nuclear    Energy    Agency:    Another    Regional    Ap- 
proach to  International  Organization  for  Nuclear  Energy 

Another  indication  of  the  impact  of  the  discovery  of  fission  upon 
U.S.  diplomacy  is  to  be  found  in  the  creation  of  the  Nuclear  Energy 
Agency  (NEA)  of  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and 
Development.  With  Euratom,  NEA,  and  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  all  having  functions  of  one  kind  or  another  relating 
to  nuclear  power  in  Europe,  it  appears  that  diplomatic  responses  of 
the  United  States  and  European  governments  have  created  a  complex 
web  of  interrelationships.  While  Euratom  during  its  early  years 
enjoyed  substantial  financial  support  of  the  United  States,  NEA  did 
not  attract  equivalent  support.  The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  de- 
scribe the  origins,  purposes  and  activities  of  the  NEA,  and  to  explore 
the  reasons  for  this  difference. 

Origins  of  the  Nuclear  Energy  Agency 

As  was  the  case  for  Euratom,  the  initial  impetus  for  the  creation  of 
the  NEA  came  from  European  fears  of  a  fuel  shortage.  The  then 
Organisation  for  European  Economic  Co-operation  (OECC)  re- 
quested Louis  Armand  of  France  to  survey  the  situation.  Armand 
was  one  of  the  "three  wise  men"  who  were  so  instrumental  in  the  crea- 
tion of  Euratom  and  who  had  argued  for  Euratom  as  a  way  to  ease 
foreseen  increases  in  costs  and  growing  shortages  of  energy  for  the 
economy  of  Europe.  Armand's  report  to  OEEC  reflected  this  theme  of 
anticipated  energy  shortage,  which  was  repeated  in  1955  by  a  com- 
mittee of  experts  led  by  Sir  Harold  Hartley.  The  latter  committee 
observed  that  Europe's  energy  deficit,  which  then  amounted  to  about 
20  percent  of  the  energy  used,  was  expected  to  exceed  one-third  of  its 
energy  demand  by  the  year  1975.  These  predictions  led  to  two  OEEC 
responses:  The  promotion  of  an  overall  energy  policy  for  member 
nations:  and  the  organization  of  joint  European  action  to  develop  the 
production  and  use  of  nuclear  energy.  The  Nuclear  Energy  Agency 
was  the  outcome  of  the  latter. 

NEA  Functions 

The  Nuclear  Energy  Agency  was  established  in  1957  by  an  inter-, 
national  statute  which  entered  into  force  on  February  1,  1958.  NEA's 
assigned  objective  is  to  "  .  .  .  further  the  development  of  the  produc- 
tion and  uses  of  nuclear  energy  for  peaceful  purposes  by  the  partic- 
ipating countries."  NEA's  scientific  and  technological  activities 
include : 

(1)  Promotion  of  nuclear  technological  developments; 

(2)  Interchange   of   specialist   knowledge   and   provision   of 
specialist  information  services ;  and 

(3)  Studies  of  reactor  characteristics,  fuel  supplies,  and  other 
factors  affecting  the  future  of  nuclear  power. 

(239) 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  17 


240 


Other  NEA  functions  concern  the  administrative  and  regulatory 
aspects  of  nuclear  energy  and  the  development  of  a  uniform  legal 
system  in  Europe  governing  such  matters  as  compensation  for  damages 
from  a  nuclear  accident. 

Member  states  in  the  NEA  include  the  European  members  of  the 
OEEC — which  later  became  the  OECD — plus  Canada,  Japan,  and 
the  United  States.  Originally  named  the  European  Nuclear  Energy 
Agency  (ENEA),  the  Agency  was  renamed  the  Nuclear  Energy 
Agency  to  reflect  the  participation  of  non-European  members. 

Like  its  parent  organization,  the  OECD,  the  NEA  is  a  forum 
rather  than  an  operational  agency.  Within  the  functions  outlined 
above,  its  strong  point  has  been  coordination  and  program  confronta- 
tion rather  than  direct  operation.  The  Agency  has  led  its  members  into 
agreements  on  radiation  health  and  safety  standards,  and  on  nuclear 
insurance.  By  contrast,  Euratom  is  an  operating  organization  as  well 
as  an  agency  involved  in  establishing  an  industrial  structure  for 
nuclear  power  in  Europe. 

Some  NEA  Innovations  in  Organization  of  International  Projects 

In  carrying  out  research  and  development  in  nuclear  energy  for  its 
member  states,  the  NEA  has  made  several  noteworthy  innovations 
in  organization.  The  Agency  has  three  international  projects :  an  ex- 
perimental nuclear  reactor  in  Norway,  one  in  England,  and  a  nuclear 
fuel  reprocessing  plant  in  Belgium.  The  innovations  of  NEA  in 
organizing  these  projects  are  instructive  for  future  international 
ventures  of  limited  scale  and  specific  scope  and  purpose. 

THE  HALDEN   PROJECT  IN   NORWAY 

In  the  early  1950s  the  Norwegian  Institute  for  Atomic  Energy  built 
an  experimental  power  reactor  in  southwest  Norway  at  the  town  of  Hal- 
den.  While  this  reactor  does  not  produce  electricity,  it  produces  about  25 
megawatts  of  heat  output  which  can  be  used  to  make  process  steam  for 
an  adjoining  paper  factory.  In  1958.  through  a  trilateral  arrangement 
involving  the  Institute,  NEA  and  Euratom,  the  project  became  an 
NEA  undertaking:,  with  the  Institute  acting  as  an  operating  con- 
tractor. The  AEC  subsequently  entered  into  a  bilateral  agreement 
with  the  Institute  for  exchange  of  technical  information. 

The  Halden  Project  is  modest  in  comparison  with  nuclear  projects 
in  the  United  States.  At  the  end  of  1969  its  professional  staff  totalled 
43,  of  whom  13  were  seconded  by  signatories  other  than  Norway.  Its 
research  program  for  1967-69  was  about  $5.3  million,  and  its  budp-et 
for  1970-72  a  bit  less.  By  the  end  of  1972  the  total  financing  of  the 
project  is  expected  to  amount  to  $14.5  million.264  The  Institute  owns, 
manages,  and  operates  the  project  for  the  signatories  with  the  gui- 
dance of  a  board  of  management  and  an  operating  committee.265 

«•  Eurona  Yearbook,  1970   < London  :  Europa  Publications,  Ltd..  1070),  p.  309. 

•*  The  Halden  Board  of  Management  consists  of  one  member  designated  by  each  signa- 
tory. Its  principal  functions  are  annually  to  approve  the  joint  progrnm  of  research  and 
experiments  and  the  budget  for  the  program.  The  Board  designates  Its  own  chairman 
and  vice-chairman.  It  is  reaulred  to  meet  at  least  twice  yearly.  A  representative  of  the 
NEA  mny  attf-nd  In  an  advisory  capacity. 

The  Operating  Committee  is  composed  of  one  senior  technical  specialist  designated  by 
each  signatory.  It  assists  the  Board  in  formulating  the  joint  program,  and  supervises 
the  carrying  out  of  the  joint  program  by  the  Institute.  The  committee  approves  large 
contracts  and  approves  the  conditions  for  the  scientific  and  technical  personnel,  who 
are  paid  from  the  common  budget. 


241 


THE  DRAGON  PROJECT  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 

The  second  experimental  nuclear  power  reactor  is  the  high  tem- 
perature reactor  project  at  the  Winfrith  establishment  of  the  United 
Kingdom  Atomic  Energy  Authority  (UKAEA)  in  Dorset.  Known  as 
the  Dragon  Project,  this  reactor,  which  was  originally  built  by  the 
UKAEA  as  part  of  its  reactor  program,  became  an  international 
project  of  the  NEA  through  an  agreement  of  March  23, 1959.  While  the 
initial  charter  of  the  project  emphasized  research,  development,  and 
demonstration,  its  objectives  were  modified  in  1969  to  permit  the 
project  to  assist  the  nuclear  industries  of  participating  countries  in 
their  exploitation  of  this  particular  nuclear  power  technology. 

As  with  the  Halden  Project,  the  Dragon  Project  is  modest  in  size. 
At  the  end  of  March  1970,  its  staff  included  ill  secured  from  the 
signatory  countries.  Project  expenditures  for  the  year  ending  March  31, 

1970  were   about   $5.6   million,   while  the   budget   for   fiscal    years 

1971  through  1973  was  projected  at  about  $17.3  million.  Over  the  14 
years  of  its  operation,  the  total  funding  of  the  project  amounted  to 
$95  million. 

The  administrative  arrangements  of  the  Drasron  Project  are 
characterized  by  flexibility  in  professional  staffing.  The  UKAEA  acts 
as  operating  contractor  to  the  NEA.  The  international  character  of 
the  project  is  emphasized  by  selection  of  staff  from  all  participating 
countries.  Only  minor  difficulties  have  been  experienced  in  assembling 
the  research  team,  and  the  working  relations  between  persons  of  very 
different  backgrounds  is  reported  to  be  good.  The  administrative  sys- 
tem enjoys  the  advantage  that  new  persons  with  new  ideas  can  readily 
join  the  project,  but  it  suffers  from  a  comparatively  high  turnover  rate 
in  its  staff.266 

Overall  control  of  the  project  is  exercised  by  a  Board  of  Manage- 
ment 267  which  determines  the  work  program  and  budget  for  each 
year.  Day-to-day  operation  of  the  project  is  entrusted  to  a  Chief 
Executive  who  together  with  other  senior  staff,  is  appointed  by  the 
Board.  The  arrangement  whereby  the  UKAEA  acts  as  the  legal 
agent  for  the  project  seems  compatible  with  control  of  the  project's 
affairs  by  the  signatories  and  the  arrangement  has  been  found  to 
be  an  entirely  workable  solution  to  a  difficult  problem.268 

The  United  States  is  involved  in  the  Dragon  Project  through  an 
Agreement  for  Cooperation  between  the  AEC  and  NEA  under  which 
information  from  the  project  is  made  available  to  the  United  States 
in  exchange  for  information  arising  from  the  AEC's  research  on  this 
type  of  reactor. 

Results  from  the  project  are  distributed  to  the  signatories  who  may 
disclose  the  information  to  persons  and  undertakings  in  their  own 
territories,  but  not  to  others  except  with  the  agreement  of  all  the 
signatories. 

The  international  character  of  the  Dragon  Project  has  been  em- 
phasized in  its  staffing,  in  the  policies  for  carrying  out  its  tasks,  and 
in  its  arrangements  for  the  placing  of  contracts.  As  an  international 

283  C.  A.  Ronnie.  G.  E.  Loekett  and  R.  E.  Reynolds.  "The  Dragon  Project."  Proceed- 
ings of  the  Third  International  Conference  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy  (New 
York  :  United  Nations.  196.rO.  vol.  1.  p.  319. 

287  The  Board  consists  of  representatives  from  all  the  signatories  and  from  the  NEA. 

2S8Rennie.  Loekett  and  Reynolds,  op.  clt,  p.  318. 


242 


organization,  the  project  has  enabled  the  participants,  some  of  whom 
could  not  readily  afford  so  large  an  effort,  to  take  an  active  part  in  a 
major  investigation  of  a  potentially  important  type  of  power  reactor. 
It  has  also  enabled  the  project  to  benefit  from  the  knowledge  and 
specialist  facilities  available  throughout  a  large  part  of  Europe.  An 
optimistic  assessment  by  several  of  the  Dragon  staff  asserts  the  proj- 
ect's experience  has  shown  that : 269 

.  .  .  cooperation  between  individuals,  firms  and  other  organizations  in  a 
number  of  countries  can  be  established  to  mutual  benefits,  and  that  the  coordina- 
tion of  the  efforts  of  many  and  widespread  contractors  in  both  research  pro- 
grams and  in  complex  engineering  tasks  can  be  achieved.  The  creation  of  an 
integrated  scientific,  technical  and  administrative  staff  with  clearly  defined 
objectives,  within  a  fixed  time  scale  and  within  a  fixed  budget,  has  engendered 
the  necessary  feeling  of  unity  of  purpose  and  concern  for  the  early  achievement 
of  the  tasks  on  an  economical  basis. 

THE  EUROCHEMIC  PROJECT  IN   BELGIUM 

Of  the  three  international  nuclear  energy  agencies,  only  the  Nuclear 
Energy  Agency  has  a  working  fuel  reprocessing  plant.  This  facility, 
may,  however,  be  shut  down  in  the  face  of  competition  from  France, 
the  United  Kingdom,  and  West  Germany,  who  have  banded  together 
in  a  trilateral  arrangement  to  use  their  own  reprocessing  capacity. 
The  implications  of  this  change  for  commercial  nuclear  energy  in 
Europe  and  for  American  policy  vis-a-vis  the  European  nuclear  power 
industry  are  not  yet  apparent. 

The  NEA  fuel  reprocessing  plant  is  located  at  Mol  in  Belgium.  It 
is  owned  and  operated  by  Eurochemic,  an  international  company  with 
a  $38  million  paid  capital  whose  shares  are  held  by  governments, 
public  or  semi-public  bodies,  and  private  industry  of  NEA  countries. 
Eurochemic  was  established  in  July  1959  under  a  Diplomatic  Con- 
vention signed  in  December  1957.  At  the  time  its  reprocessing  plant 
came  into  service  in  1966,  it  was  probably  one  of  the  most  versatile  in 
the  world,  designed  to  accept  nuclear  fuels  of  virtually  any  composition 
and  manufacture.  It  has  made  substantial  contributions  to  the  tech- 
nology for  reprocessing  used  nuclear  fuels.270 

In  1971,  it  was  reported  that  France  and  Germany,  who  dominate 
Eurochemic,  had  decided  to  cut  off  their  financial  support  for  its 
commercial  reprocessing  after  1974.271  Then  in  mid-October  1971,  it 
was  further  reported  that  the  French  and  British  Government  nuclear 
organizations  had  agreed  with  a  West  German  consortium  to  set  up 
Europe's  first  multinational  nuclear  fuel  reprocessing  company — 
United  Reprocessors  GmbH— in  Frankfurt.  Deprived  of  its  market  by 
this  venture,  Eurochemic  is  tentatively  scheduled  to  stop  commercial 
reprocessing  in  1974  except  to  service  small  research  reactors,  and 
possibly  to  carry  on  some  new  research. 

Building  the  Infrastructure  for  Nuclear  Power 

In  addition  to  its  research  and  development  functions,  NEA  has 
worked  to  create  the  infrastructure  of  regulations  and  other  arrange- 
ments required  for  the  commercial  deployment  of  nuclear  energy  in 
Europe.  It  has  been  active  in  development  of  regulations  for  nuclear 

«*  Ih1<1..  p.  323. 

*">  "Work  of  the  European  Nuclear  Energy  Agency,"  Science  Policy  Newt,  vol.  2  (Sep- 
tember 1970).  p.  18. 

•"  Nucleonics  Week,  vol.  12  (September  16,  1971),  p.  10. 


243 


health  and  safety,  and  for  transport  of  radioactive  materials.  NEA 
has  also  been  a  prime  mover  in  defining  and  limiting  liabilities  in  case 
of  a  major  nuclear  accident. 

Basic  norms  developed  by  the  Agency  for  protection  against  ioniz- 
ing radiations  were  developed  by  an  NEA  Health  and  Safety  Com- 
mittee in  liasion  with  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  These 
were  adopted  by  NEA  member  countries  in  1959.  Application  of  these 
norms  to  specific  circumstances  are  subject  to  separate  recommenda- 
tions by  the  Agency,  usually  in  collaboration  with  the  IAEA  and  other 
international  bodies  such  as  the  World  Health  Organisation.  A  deci- 
sion to  establish  an  emergency  warning  system  in  case  of  an  increased 
environmental  radioactivity  was  adopted  November  23, 1963. 

As  for  limitation  of  liability  on  the  part  of  the  owners  of  nuclear 
power  plants,  in  1960  an  OECD  Convention  on  Third  Party  Liability, 
was  developed  in  Paris  under  the  auspices  of  the  Agency.  Signed  by 
most  NEA  members,  the  convention  came  into  force  in  April  1968.  It 
defines  the  underlying  principles  of  all  international  agreements  on 
nuclear  liability,  and  is  the  basis  for  most  national  legislation  in 
Europe  for  this  purpose. 

NEA  and  Safeguards  for  Nuclear  Materials 

An  NEA  Convention  on  Security  Control,  which  took  effect  on 
July  22,  1959,  established  a  safeguards  system  of  inspection  and  con- 
trol for  the  movement  and  use  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  within  the 
Agency's  jurisdiction.  A  Control  Bureau  adopted  rules  applicable 
to  nuclear  facilities  using  nuclear  materials  recovered  or  obtained  in  an 
NEA  venture.  The  rules  cover  materials  from  all  NEA  undertakings. 
The  future  of  this  NEA  function  after  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty 
takes  effect  remains  to  be  seen. 

United  States  Participation  in  NEA  Activities 

U.S.  participation  in  NEA  activities  has  been  much  closer  to  tradi- 
tional types  of  international  cooperation  in  scientific  ventures  than 
has  been  its  participation  in  Euratom.  AEC's  annual  reports  since 
1960  describes  U.S.  participation  in  terms  of  information  exchange, 
cooperation,  and  participation  in  special  projects — but  with  no 
mention  of  U.S.  funding  of  such  projects.  A  typical  description  ap- 
pears in  the  AEC's  annual  report  for  1968,  which  said : 272 

The  AEC  continued  its  participation  in  joint  projects  with  the  European 
Xuclear  Energy  Agency  (ENEA),  including  the  Halden  Heavy  Boiling  Water 
Reactor  in  Norway,  the  Dragon  High  Temperature  Reactor  Project  in  England, 
Eurochemic  in  Belgium,  and  the  International  Food  Irradition  Project  at  Seibers- 
dorf,  Austria.  Information  exchanges  on  the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy 
and  participation  in  related  study  groups  and  symposia  continued. 

An  earlier  annual  report,  that  for  1963,  gives  more  detail  about 
U.S.  participation  in  the  Dragon  Project,  which  began  in  1959  under 
an  exchange  agreement  between  the  Dragon  Project  signatories  and 
the  AEC.  It  reported  that  AEC  cooperation  with  the  Dragon  Project 
had  been  carried  out  through  exchanges  of  technical  reports  and 
correspondence,  semiannual  conferences,  visits,  long-term  personnel 
exchanges  and  a  cooperative  materials  testing  program.273 

272  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1968,  op.  clt.,  p.  205. 

273  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  196S,  op.  cit.,  p.  239. 


244 


Since  both  the  NEA  and  Euratom  were  created  to  foster  commercial 
use  of  nuclear  energy  in  Europe,  and  since  the  membership  of  NEA 
represented  until  recently  a  larger  potential  market  for  the  U.S.  nu- 
clear power  industry  than  the  six  Euiatom  members,  it  seems  curious 
that  U.S.  support  to  Euratom  has  so  exceeded  that  for  NEA.  For  the 
latter  there  are  no  joint  undertakings  with  U.S.  funding.  One  signif- 
icant difference  between  the  two  multinational  organizations  may 
explain  the  difference  in  U.S.  suppoit.  This,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
writer,  was  the  presence  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  NEA  but  not  in 
Euratom.  During  the  mid-1950s  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  was  con- 
cerned that  the  United  Kingdom  with  its  strongly  backed  government 
program  for  development  and  application  of  nuclear  power  would  be 
able  to  capture  much  of  the  world's  nuclear  power  market.  For  the 
United  States  to  have  funded  NEA  projects  may  well  have  seemed  to 
give  a  principal  competitor  in  the  international  nuclear  market  still 
greater  advantage.  In  these  circumstances,  U.S.  suppoit  could  not 
appear  to  benefit  nuclear  power  research  and  development  of  interest 
to  the  United  Kingdom. 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 

The  comparative  freedom  from  crises  of  the  OECD's  Nuclear 
Energy  Agency  provides  a  marked  contrast  to  the  trials  and  difficulties 
of  Euratom.  What  accounts  for  this  difference?  It  may  well  be  that 
the  fundamental  differences  between  the  organiaztions  provide  an 
answer.  NEA  appears  as  the  traditional  kind  of  international  under- 
taking, being  more  of  a  confederation  of  member  states  than  a  separate, 
supernational  organization.  Perhaps  relations  with  the  NEA  have  been 
easier  in  that  the  Agency  is  clearly  a  working  tool  of  the  members 
rather  than  a  form  of  international  government.  Perhaps,  also,  less  was 
expected  of  the  NEA.  For  example,  its  charter  was  not  to  create  a 
European  nuclear  industry  but  rather  to  help  with  technical  assistance. 
Whatever  the  reasons,  the  history  of  the  NEA  has  shown  more  co- 
operation and  less  friction  among  participating  members  than  was 
the  case  with  Euratom.  Future  planners  of  international  technological 
ventures  may  benefit  from  an  identification  and  analysis  of  the  factors 
that  have  caused  this  difference. 

The  relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  NEA  on  one  hand 
and  the  United  States  and  Euratom  on  the  other  are  also  different.  The 
United  States  cooperated  substantially  with  Euiatom  in  an  ambitious 
joint  research  program,  but  has  preferred  a  more  conventional  role  in 
its  relations  to  the  NEA,  limiting  its  participation  largely  to  exchange 
of  information  about  projects  of  mutual  interest.  That  the  United 
Kingdom  was  a  member  of  NEA  but  not  of  Euratom  may  have  been  a 
factor  in  the  difference  in  U.S.  participation.  In  the  formative  period 
of  the  NEA,  the  United  States  was  concerned  with  nuclear  competi- 
tion from  the  United  Kingdom,  which  had  begun  a  large-scale  deploy- 
ment of  nuclear  power  well  before  the  United  States  and  appeared  to 
be  a  formidable  future  competitor  in  the  world  nuclear  market.  U.S. 
financial  support  to  NEA  could  have  been  seen  as  fostering  a  competi- 
tive British  nuclear  technology,  while  U.S.  finaneial  support  to  Eura- 
tom enjoyed  the  advantage  of  being  earmarked  for  projects  explicitly 
beneficial  to  U.S.  nuclear  technology. 

With  the  United  Kingdom  and  other  European  nations  now  joining 
the  Common  Market,  the  membership  of  NEA  and  Euratom  will 
further  overlap.  In  turn,  this  raises  the  question  about  the  separate 


245 


functions  of  these  organizations,  and  also  their  relationship  to  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  Should  all  three  continue  as 
now  constituted?  Should  the  NEA  be  combined  into  Euratom?  Should 
Euratom  be  permitted  to  fade  away  and  its  scientific  resources  be 
transformed  into  a  general  European  scientific  capability,  leaving 
nuclear  technology  to  the  NEA  ?  How  would  such  changes  affect  U.S. 
interests  ?  These  are  some  questions  that  seem  likely  to  occur  if  nuclear 
power  in  Europe  is  to  fulfill  the  role  projected  for  it. 


X  U.S.  Fuel  for  European  Nuclear  Power 

Another  effect  of  the  scientific  discovery  of  fission  was  to  engage  the 
United  States  Government  in  the  enrichment  of  uranium,  a  large  scale 
industrial  process  that  until  now  has  provided  the  United  States 
with  a  strong  bargaining  position  in  international  nuclear  affairs.  As 
the  United  States  enters  the  1970's,  it  enjoys  a  virtual  monopoly  in  the 
non-Communist  world  market  for  the  supply  of  enriched  unranium  or 
enrichment  services.  Within  the  next  few  years,  however,  interacting 
decisions  of  domestic  and  foreign  policy  will  have  to  be  made  that  will 
affect  this  U.S.  predominance,  thereby  influencing  the  foreign  policy 
leverage  conferred  by  this  position  in  the  nuclear  fuel  market. 

The  1970's  are  likely  to  see  new  diplomatic,  economic,  and  technologi- 
cal initiatives  by  European  and  other  nations  to  reduce  their  depend- 
ence upon  U.S.  supply  of  enriched  uranium,  while  the  United  States, 
in  turn,  appears  inclined  to  preserve  its  competitive  position.  As  the 
U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission  sees  the  situation,  supplying  uranium 
enrichment  services  offers  the  possibility  for  a  great  expansion  in 
international  cooperation  between  the  United  States  and  Europe,  even 
though  the  supply  function  is  attended  by  many  complex  problems 
for  U.S.  foreign  policy.274  Whatever  the  outcome  of  still-changing  U.S. 
policy,  the  results  inevitably  will  affect  the  future  of  commercial  nu- 
clear power  in  Europe. 

The  Enriched  Uranium  Business 

When  Congress  revised  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  in  1954,  it.  retained 
the  original  government  monopoly  of  enriched  uranium;  there  were 
no  private  facilities  to  produce  nuclear  fuel.  Accordingly,  the  develop- 
ing nuclear  industries  at  home  and  abroad  leased  these  materials  from 
the  AEC.  When  the  Act  was  later  revised  to  permit  private  owner- 
ship of  enriched  uranium,  the  AEC  changed  its  policies  to  permit 
customers  to  supply  their  own  normal  uranium  which  the  Commission 
would  then  enrich.  Enrichment  service,  rather  than  sale  of  enriched 
uranium,  is  now  the  predominant  pattern  of  AEC  operation  in 
nuclear  fuel  supply. 

Today  in  the  United  States  all  but  two  industrial  services  required 
for  the  construction  and  operation  of  commercial  nuclear  power  plants 
are  available  from  domestic  nuclear  industry.  The  two  exceptions  are 
the  enrichment  of  uranium  and  the  indefinite  storage  of  radioactive 
products  from  the  used  nuclear  fuel.  The  administration's  policy  is  to 
t  ransfer  these  two  functions  to  the  private  nuclear  industry,  but  when 
and  how  this  will  be  done  is  still  uncertain.  Of  the  two,  the  enrichment 
of  uranium  is  by  far  the  larger  industrial  activity  in  terms  of  capital 

271  This  idea  was  developed  by  Myron  B.  Kratzer.  then  Assistant  Ocneral  Manager  of 
the  AEC  for  International  Activities,  In  his  testimony  before  the  House  Committee  on 
Science  and  Astronautics,  May  1971.  Of.  U.S.  Congress,  House.  Committee  on  Science  and 
Astronautics.  Hearings,  A  General  Revietc  of  International  Conjuration  in  Science  and 
Space,  92d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1971,  p.  £35. 

(246) 


247 


investment,  costs  of  operation,  and  demand  for  electricity.  It  also 
appears  to  have  the  most  far-reaching  implications  for  foreign  policy. 

Provision  of  uranium  enriching  services  by  the  United  States  to 
domestic  and  to  foreign  customers  has  gone  hand  in  hand  with  the 
development  and  marketing  of  U.S.  nuclear  power  technology  by 
the  private  nuclear  power  industry.  Through  1970  more  than  40  nuclear 
power  reactors  of  U.S.  design  and  technology  were  in  foreign  operation, 
being  built  or  on  order  from  abroad.275  While  other  major  industrial 
nations,  particularly  in  Europe,  are  competing  with  the  U.S.  in  the 
world  market  for  nuclear  power  plants,  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry 
appears  to  hold  a  dominant  position.  United  States  nuclear  reactor 
sale**  abroad;  already  have  totaled  more  than  $1  billion,  mostly  financed 
by  the  Export-Import  Bank.  These  sales  are  expected  to  increase 
several  fold  in  the  future  *76  Adding  to  these  sales  of  nuclear  power 
plants  will  be  sales  of  U.S.  enriching  services. 

The  cost  of  enrichment  of  uranium  accounts  for  about  a  third  of  the 
cost  Of  nuclear  fuel,  which  makes  enrichment  the  single  largest  item  of 
cost  in  the  whole  fuel  cycle  and  an  important  determinant  of  the 
ultimate  cost  of  nuclear  power.  In  the  eyes  of  the  AEC,  the  importance 
of  having  an  adequate  supply  of  enriching  capacity  available  when 
needed  and  at  a  reasonable  cost,  coupled  with  the  high  cost  of  process 
development  and  construction  for  enrichment  facilities  justifies  the 
closest  possible  cooperation  and  communications  among  the  users  and 
suppliers  of  enrichment  services.277 

At  present,  the  three  enrichment  plants  owned  by  the  AEC  constitute 
virtually  the  sole  source  of  enrichment  services  to  non-Communist 
countries.278  A  similar  facility  exists  in  the  Soviet  Union,  a  compara- 
tively small  plant  at  Capenhurst  in  England,  a  small  facility  at  Pierre- 
latte,  France,  and  one  of  unknown  size  in  China.  The  Union  of  South 
Africa  is  reported  to  be  building  an  enrichment  plant  based  upon  a 
secret  process.  The  facilities  in  the  U.S.S.R.,  England,  and  France 
were  built  to  manufacture  highly  enriched  uranium  for  military 
purposes. 

Requirements  for  Enriched  Uranium  and  Enrichment  Services 

To  remain  the  major  supplier  of  uranium  enrichment  service  for 
commercial  nuclear  power  in  the  non-Communist  world,  the  United 
States  must  be  prepared  to  supply  this  service  for  domestic  and  foreign 
orders.  For  the  foreign  market,  U.S.  readiness  and  ability  to  supply 
this  service  must  be  credible  to  foreign  officials  who  are  responsible  for 
their  countries'  nuclear  power  programs. 

The  demand  for  enrichment  services  is  expected  to  grow  substan- 
tially over  the  next  few  decades  as  commercial  use  of  nuclear  power 
expands.  For  the  United  States  alone,  nuclear  power  plants  are  ex- 
pected to  increase  in  total  electrical  generating  capacity  from  5,000 
megawatts  in  1970  to  15,000  megawatts  in  1980  and  to  300,000  mega- 
watts by  1985.  The  AEC  estimates  that  by  1980,  29  percent  of  the 

875  Kratzer,  op.  cit.,  p.  335. 

276  Loc.  cit. 

277  Remarks  of  ABC  Commissioner  Wilfrid  E.  Johnson  in  U.S.  Papers  for  the  Fourth 
United  Nations  International  Conference  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy  (Wash- 
ington, D.C  :  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  1971),  vol.  I,  p.  2.5-2. 

278  These  production  plants  for  enriched  uranium  are  located  at  Oak  Ridge,  Tennessee ; 
Paducah,  Kentucky ;  and  Portsmouth,  Ohio.  Together  they  represent  a  U.S.  capital  invest- 
ment of  over  $2.3  billion. 


248 


electricity  generated  in  the  United  States  will  come  from  nuclear 
power  plants,  and  in  the  1990s  about  half.  As  for  foreign  nuclear 
power,  the  AEC  estimates  that  nuclear  power  plants  in  foreign  mar- 
kets accessible  to  the  United  States  will  represent  a  total  electrical 
generating  capacity  of  from  70,000  to  100,000  megawatts  by  1980. 
Taking  into  account  that  some  enriching  services  will  be  furnished  from 
foreign  sources,  the  AEC  projects  that  foreign  and  domestic  nuclear 
powerplants  requiring  U.S.  enrichment  services  will  total  about  225,- 
000  megawatts  in  1980.279 

The  value  of  the  enrichment  market  is  estimated  to  be  about  $1  bil- 
lion annually  by  1980,  and  $1.5  billion  by  1985.  The  AEC  already  has 
signed  long-term  contracts  for  enriching  services  of  30  years  dura- 
tion. These  contracts  have  an  aggregate  potential  demand  of  about 
$3  billion,  including  some  $800  million  from  abroad.280 

United  States  Supply  Policy 

To  foster  foreign  interest  in  its  nuclear  power  technology,  the 
United  States  has  assured  foreign  users  of  a  reliable  supply  of  enriched 
uranium.  This  assurance  is  necessary  because  other  nations  would  not 
be  willing  to  make  large  capital  investments  in  nuclear  power  plants 
fueled  from  an  external  monopoly  without  strong  assurance  of  the 
long-term  availability  of  enriched  uranium.  Thus,  the  cornerstone  of 
U.S.  supply  policies  has  been  a  long-term  assurance  of  supply,  com- 
mensurate with  the  reasonable  economic  life  of  foreign  nuclear  power 
plants,  on  non-discriminatory  terms  and  conditions,  and  including 
charges  comparable  to  those  for  the  domestic  nuclear  industry.  U.S. 
supply  policy  has  been  characterized  by  repeated  assurances  of  the 
dependability  of  nuclear  fuel  supply  through  export  allocations  of 
enriched  uranium  to  signatories  of  bilateral  agreements,  and  through 
enrichment  services  contracts. 

The  sucesss  of  this  policy  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  most  nuclear 
power  reactors  sold  in  international  trade  to  date  have  been  of  U.S. 
design,  using  enriched  uranium.  For  the  period  of  July  1962  through 
December  30, 1970,  the  revenues  from  the  sale  of  enriching  services  and 
nuclear  materials  to  foreign  users  came  to  $207  million.281 

ADVANTAGES  TO  THE  UNITED   STATES 

Supplying  fuel  to  nuclear  power  plants  in  Europe  offers  advantages 
to  the  United  States.  The  AEC  identifies  them  as  follows:282 

National  security :  U.S.  supply  of  enriched  uranium  for  civil  pur- 
poses abroad  under  safeguards  assures  that  the  plutonium  produced 
in  these  reactors  will  not  be  available  for  military  use.  The  avail- 
ability of  enriched  uranium  from  the  United  States  on  attractive 
terms  also  serves  U.S.  non-proliferation  objectives  by  reducing  the 
incentive  for  other  countries  to  develop  their  own  enriching  capacity. 

Strong  international  ties:  By  supplying  enriched  uranium,  the 
United  Slates  encourages  the  formation  of  strong  and  mutually  bene- 
ficial economic  ties. 


^"Johnson,  op.  clt.,  p.  2.5   2. 

280  U.S.    Congress.    Joint    Committee    on    Atomic    Energy,    Hearings,    AEC    Authorizing 
Legislation,  Firsal  Year  1072,  op.  clt.,  p.  22'M. 

281  U.S.  Concress.   Joint  Committee  on   Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,   Uranium   Enrichment 
Pricing  Criteria,  92d  Cong.,  1st  SeSS.,  1971.  part  2.  p.  29. 

*8=U.S.    Congress,    Joint    Committee    on    Atomic    Energy,    Hearings.    Future    Ownership 
the  AEC's  Gaseous  Diffusion  Plant",  91st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1969,  p.  48. 


249 


Economic  benefits:  Important  economic  benefits  are  realized  from 
the  sale  of  enriched  uranium  abroad.  While  prices  charged  by  the 
United  States  do  not  include  profit,  they  are  calculated  to  recover  all 
costs  of  production  including  amortization,  interest  on  the  govern- 
ment's investment,  and  a  factor  for  contingencies.  The  foreign  sales 
have  helped  to  provide  a  cash  benefit  to  the  U.S.  Treasury  and  to 
amortize  facilities  built  initially  for  defense  purposes. 

Foreign  exchange:  Foreign  sales  provide  an  important  source  of 
foreign  exchange.  To  help  redress  a  serious  balance-of-payments 
deficit,  the  United  States  must  look  to  the  export  of  products  based 
on  advanced  technology  and  heavy  capital  investment  where  U.S. 
superiority  cannot  be  easily  offset  by  labor  cost  differentials  and  other 
factors  favoring  foreign  products. 

DISADVANTAGES  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES 

.:  ■      .■•■:■■  ;  v  .    :  '  -      -      .  -  '.  ;  •  :-,..;• ■•  •:■:  o*  *■ 

Supplying  enrichment  services  to  foreign  customers  also  has  several 
dra  wfoacks :  ' 

Commitment  of  public  capital:  Enrichment  technology  is  very  ex- 
pensive in  capital  -investment.' A  policy  of  long  terni  commitfnertt  to 
supply  enrichment  services  to  foreign  customers  carries  with  it  an 
implied  obligation  to  make  whatever  future  public  or  private  invest-' 
ment  will  be  necessary  to  expand  or  build  new  enrichment  plants. 

Commitment  of  fossil  fuel:  Enrichment  plants  in  the  U.S.  require 
large  amounts  of  electricity,  most  of  which  is  generated  in  conven- 
tional powerplants  that  burn  fossil  fuels.283  Not  only  is  this  fuel  in 
essence  exported,  but  additional  land  is  strip  mined  in  the  United 
States  for  the  benefit  of  electricity  users  abroad. 

Implied  responsibility  for  misuse  of  exported  fuel:  Although  en- 
riched uranium  suitable  for  fuel  for  most  contemporary  commercial 
nuclear  power  plants  cannot  be  used  directly  to  fabricate  an  atomic 
explosive,  it  would  be  a  very  desirable  material  for  clandestine  enrich- 
ment facilities  to  process  into  weapons  grade  materials.  If  the  United 
States  freely  supplies  enrichment  services  in  the  world  market,  what 
would  be  its  responsibilities  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  were  some  of  that 
material  to  be  illicitly  diverted  to  weapons  manufacture  ?  In  Section  V 
it  was  noted  that  materials  were  supplied  according  to  the  terms  of 
bilateral  agreements  which  initially  gave  the  United  States  unusual 
authority  to  inspect  use  of  materials  supplied  by  it.  Later  this  author- 
ity was  transferred  through  trilateral  agreements  to  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency.  Presumably,  once  the  Nonproliferation 
Treaty  is  fully  implemented,  the  IAEA  will  have  full  responsibility 
for  safeguarding  nuclear  fuel  materials,  including  enriched  uranium, 
as  discussed  in  Section  XI.  Nonetheless,  if  enriched  uranium  supplied 
by  the  United  States  does  find  its  way  into  wrong  hands,  will  it  be 
sufficient  for  the  U.S.  to  simply  shift  the  responsibility  to  the  IAEA  ? 

."-"'       EVOLUTION  OP  U.S.  SUPPLY  POLICY 

A  point  of  departure  for  the  U.S.  nuclear  fuel  supply  policy  was 
established  on  August  8, 1955.  On  that  date,  the  opening  day  in  Geneva 

283  Admiral  Rickover,  who  heads  the  AEC's  nuclear  power  program  for  naval  propulsion, 
estimates  that  the  enrichment  services  required  for  a  nuclear  fuel  loading  requires  about 
600  million  kilowatt  hours  of  electricity,  which  would  require  about  500,000  tons  of  coal 
to  generate. 


250 


of  the  first  United  Nation's  Conference  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of 
Nuclear  Energy,  the  AEC  announced  a  price  for  enriched  uranium 
to  nations  which  had  bilateral  agreements  with  the  United  States. 
"Within  the  year,  on  February  22,  1956,  at  the  recommendation  of  the 
AEC  and  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Departments  of  State  and 
Defense,  President  Eisenhower  announced  that  the  United  States 
would  make  available  40,000  kilograms  of  uranium-235  to  assist  in- 
dustrial nuclear  power  development  and  research  within  the  United 
States  and  to  enable  friendly  countries  to  develop  the  peaceful  uses  of 
atomic  energy.  Of  the  uranium-235  thus  allocated,  20,000  kilograms 
was  for  domestic  use  and  20,000  for  cooperating  countries.284  By  im- 
plication, as  additional  nuclear  projects  were  undertaken,  additional 
supplies  of  nuclear  fuel  would  be  made  available.  In  a  parallel  state- 
ment, Chairman  Strauss  added  that  the  AEC  would  provide  uranium- 
235  to  support  nuclear  power  development  for  the  expected  life  of 
nuclear  power  projects  abroad. 

Although  these  announcements  committed  the  United  States  to 
supply  nuclear  fuels,  there  remained  uncertainty  as  to  terms  and  con- 
ditions of  supply.  To  minimize  these  uncertainties,  the  President  on 
November  18, 1956,  announced  details  of  terms  and  conditions  of  sup- 
ply. His  announcement  permitted  nuclear  power  plant  operators 
abroad  to  estimate  more  accurately  the  costs  of  nuclear  power.  The 
announcement  also  emphasized  the  U.S.  desire  to  sell  rather  than  lease 
nuclear  fuel  for  foreign  nuclear  power  plants,  and  set  out  the  formal 
criteria  under  which  it  would  receive  and  enrich  foreign  owned 
uranium.286 

To  reassure  foreign  users  of  a  reliable  supply,  the  AEC  in  1968  an- 
nounced that  it  would  deliver  supplies  of  enriched  uranium  for  periods 
as  long  as  five  years  in  advance  of  actual  use  so  that  the  users  could 
have  an  inventory  in  hand.  Furthermore,  proposals  for  foreign  inven- 
tories of  enriched  uranium  for  even  longer  periods  would  be 
considered.286 

SPECIAL  CONDITIONS  FOR  EURATOM 

When  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  was  revised  in  1954,  a  special  limita- 
tion was  included  to  control  distribution  of  special  nuclear  materials 
to  any  group  of  nations.  Section  54  required  specific  authorization  by 
the  Congress  for  such  distribution.  The  Euratom  Cooperation  Act  of 
1958  subsequently  authorized  the  transfer  of  specified  amounts  of 
uranium-235  and  plutonium.  This  initial  authorization  has  subse- 
quently increased  from  time  to  time  by  legislation.  The  latest  increase 
occurred  in  1967  by  Public  Law  90-190,  which  authorized  transfer 
of  up  to  215,000  kilograms  of  contained  uranium-235.  In  reporting 

"•D.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Twentieth  Semiannual  Report  of  Atomic  Energy 
Gomminnion   (Washington,  D.C. :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,   1956),   p.   vlll. 

""U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Annual  Report  to  the  Congress  of  Atomic  Energy 
Commission,  January-December  1966,  op.  clt.,  p.  274. 

"•U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission,  1968   (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1969),  p.  210. 


251 


this  legislation  to  Congress,  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy 
underscored  the  need  to  assure  Europe  of  an  adequate  fuel  supply  for 
its  nuclear  power  plants.  According  to  the  Joint  Committee,  a  survey 
of  uranium-235  needs  for  the  Community  had  indicated  that  the 
earlier  ceiling  would  be  insufficient  to  meet  the  long-term  fuel 
requirements  for  nuclear  power  plants  which  were  expected  to  be 
in  operation  or  under  construction  in  the  near  future.  Additional  ura- 
nium-235 would  be  necessary  to  fuel  an  installed  nuclear  power  plant 
capacity  of  13,000  electrical  megawatts  (Mwe)  that  Euratom  ex- 
pected to  have  in  operation  or  under  construction  by  1972.  The  Joint 
Committee  observed  that  this  increase  represented  a  logical  continua- 
tion of  the  U.S  Government's  previous  uranium  supply  policies. 
Assuming  that  all  of  the  additional  uranium-235  was  supplied  to 
Euratom  through  U.S  uranium  enrichment  services,  the  revenues  to 
the  United  States  would  be  about  $500  million.  There  could  also  be 
additional  revenue  to  the  domestic  nuclear  industry  through  sale  of 
uranium  concentrates,  conversion  services,  and  reactor  equipment.287 

TOLL  ENRICHMENT 

Beginning  January  1,  1969,  the  industrial  role  of  the  AEC  changed 
when  the  United  States  began  to  offer  "toll  enrichment"  to  European 
users  of  nuclear  power.288  The  AJEC  processes  customer-supplied 
uranium  in  its  diffusion  plants  to  increase  the  U-235  content  and 
returns  to  the  consumer  the  desired  enriched  fuel,  plus  the  residual 
uranium  that  has  been  depleted  of  its  normal  U-235  content.  For  this 
enriching  service,  the  AEC  charges  a  toll  based  on  the  amount  of 
separative  work  needed  to  produce  the  desired  enrichment. 

To  provide  toll  enriching  service  to  Euratom,  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  needed  special  legislative  authorization.  This  was  pro- 
vided in  1967  through  Public  L&w  90-190  (81  Stat.  575). 

Through  November  1970,  the  AEC  had  signed  31  contracts  with 
foreign  customers  to  supply  enrichment  services  worth  $688  million, 
based  on  a  charge  of  $26  per  separate  work  unit.  In  comparison,  at  that 
time  AEC's  enrichment  commitments  to  the  domestic  nuclear  industry 
totaled  $1.6  billion.  Of  the  foreign  commitments,  those  with  Euratom 
totaled  $124  million.  Table  V  gives  the  details  of  the  United  States 
foreign  commitments. 

In  estimating  enrichment  requirements,  each  nuclear  power  plant  of 
1,000  Mwe  generating  capacity  represents  a  demand  of  over  a  30- 
year  working  life  of  about  $110  million,  based  on  AEC  prices  in  effect 
in  November  1970.  OECD  estimates  that  the  nuclear  power  market  of 
the  non-Communist  world  may  reach  610,000  installed  megawatts  by 
1985.  If  so,  the  market  for  toll  enrichment  could  approach  §2.5  billion 
annually.289 

*"  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Atomic  Energy  Acta — Amend- 
ments, 90th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1967.  Sen.  Kept.  No.  743. . 

888  With  toll  enrichment,  the  customer  furnishes  his  own  natural  uranium  and  thus  can 
sav»  the  initial  dollar  cost  of  this  material. 

288  Robert  L.  Loftness.  "Nuclear  Power  Abroad  :  A  Time  of  Change,"  Combustion,  vol.  113 
(August  1971),  p.  13. 


252 


TABLE  V.-AEC  CONTRACTS  FOR  TOLL  ENRICHMENT  WITH  FOREIGN  CUSTOMERS,  NOVEMBER  1970 

Value  of 

Number  of  contracts 

Customer  contracts  (millions) 


Euratom - If  $124.3 

Japan - —  8  335.3 

Switzerland. - 2  83.3 

Sweden 2  139.1 

Spain , -  1  •» 

Total - 31  688.4 

Source:  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  press  release  N-206,  Nov.  24,  1970. 

FINANCING  NUCLEAR  FUEL  INVENTORIES 

Throughout  the  later  1950s,  one  question  for  U.S.  foreign  nuclear 
policy  was  what  financial  assistance,  if  any,  should  be  given  to  foreign 
countries  purchasing  U.S.  nuclear  fuel  materials.  Shouldthe^ U.S.  sell 
them,  lease  them,  or  loan  money  to  buy  them?  The  final  decision  was 
in  favor  of  direct  sale  for  the  following  reasons :  290 

(1)  The  cost  of  the  fuel  inventory  was  considered  part  of  the 
capital  cost  of  the  facility  and  hence  one  that  should  be  borne 
by  the  owner  of  the  facility. 

(2)  The  material  was  expensive  and  the  total  value  of  the  fuel 
inventory  in  the  aggregate  could  reach  billions  of  dollars  when 
atomic  power  came  into  general  use ;  and 

(3)  It  would  be  unwise  for  the  Commission  to  establish  a  prece- 
dent that  might  lead  to  its  financing  very  large  sums  of  money 
overseas  (which  more  appropriately  was  a  banking  function). 

THE  DEFERRED  PAYMENT  PLAN 

AEC  policy  of  sale  rather  than  lease  had  its  drawbacks,  partic- 
ularly for  cooperation  with  Eurotom.  The  initial  heavy  capital  outlay 
for  enriched  fuel  could  be  an  obstacle  in  financing  nuclear  power 
projects  of  interest  to  the  United  States.  To  reduce  this  obstacle,  the 
AEC  announced  on  February  2,  1959,  that  it  would  supply  enriched 
uranium  fuel  on  a  deferred  payment  basis  to  countries  and  interna- 
tional organizations  that  had  bilateral  agreements  of  cooperation  with 
the  United  States. 

Under  this  arrangement,  a  foreign  reactor  operator  could  use  the 
fuel  for  ten  years  before  beginning  payments  on  principal,  which 
would  be  spaced  over  the  following  10  years.  Interest  on  the  unpaid 
balance  was  the  same  as  the  use  charge  for  such  materials  in  effect  for 
the  domestic  nuclear  industry.  Fuel  consumed  was  to  be  paid  for  as 
consumed.  Tl>e  effect  of  this  policy  was  to  defer  repayment  of  a  major 
capital  cost  until  the  productive  period  after  a  nuclear  power  plant 
had  been  built  and  brought  into  operation. 

To  be  eligible  for  deferred  payment,  the  power  reactors  had  to-  be 
scheduled  for  operation  before  June  30,  1964,  and  had  to  use  U.S. 
designs  and  a  substantial  portion  of  U.S.  components. 

280  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Background  Material  for  the 
Review  of  the  International  Atomic  Policies  and  Programs  of  the  United  States,  86th 
Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1960,  vol.  2,  p.  392.  (Joint  Committee  print.) 


253 


By  early  1964,  the  AEC  and  Euratom  had  signed  two  deferred  pay- 
ment agreements  for  two  Italian  projects,  and  during  that  year  a  third 
arrangement  was  concluded  with  Euratom  for  fuel  for  a  French  nu- 
clear powerplant.291 

PRICING  URANIUM   ENRICHMENT  SERVICE 

A  potential  divergence  between  domestic  and  foreign  policy  for 
nuclear  energy  arose  in  1971  following  two  successive  increases  in  the 
AEC  price  for  uranium  enrichment.  The  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy  held  hearings  at  which  AEC  Commissioner  Ramey  dissented 
from  this  price  increase.292  He  argued  for  a  policy  of  stability  in 
pricing  to  retain  the  U.S.  position  as  a  fuel  supplier,  and  to  discourage 
foreign  construction  of  enrichment  plants.  He  said:*93 

Because  of  the  AEC's  unique  position  as  the  supplier  of  enriching  services,  to 
the  United  States  and  most  of  the  free  world,  I  believe  it  has  a  responsibility 
to  maintain  a  stable  price  for  the  vital  enrichment  services  which  domestic 
and  foreign  utilities  and  equipment  companies  must  purchase.  .    '  ,  •    l  ! 

.  .  .:the  inteijnatiqijial  implicatipns  Qfr  tbe;  price  increase  cap  be,  serious.  Our 
foreign  customers,  botjh  present  and  potential,  are  going  to  be  concerned  by  the 
two  price  increases  in  rapid  Succession.  They  are  certainly  going  to  want  an 
alternative 'Supply of  enriching  services.  This  will  serve  to' reduce  the  demand 
on. our  .capacity  and  to  ^further  the  construction  of- enrichment  plants  in  other 
countries,  .  :     r.      ;     \      '  '        ■  .  .  r 

While  this.  latter  faction  is  already  underway  or  being  seriously  considered  in 
several  countries,  this  proposed  pricing  action  will  discourage  either  the  use 
ef  United  States  technology  of  a  partnership  with  the  United  States  rh  con- 
structing the  new  capacity.  A  proliferation  of  enrichment  facilities  abroad  is 
not  in  anybody|s  best  interest.  ......  i-       .--..•.,. 

So  domestic  policy  decisions  to  increase  the  charge  for  enrichment  had 
unfavorable  implications  for  U.S.  foreign  policy.  -  . 

Apropos  of  foreign  policy,  the  AEC  did  not  consult  the  State  De- 
partment about  these  pricing  actions.  An  AEC  representative  advised 
the  Joint  Committee  that  it  was  a  domestic  decision : 294 

.  .  ^.  This  was  a  decision  that  was  taken  by  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
and  the  State  Department  was  not  consulted  in  advance.  I  think  that  while 
this  is  a  very  important  consideration,  the  policy  we  followed  is  to  establish 
our  price  primarily  on  the  basis  of  the  whole  power  industry,  of  which  the  do- 
mestic industry  is  the  greater  part,  and  then  try  to  treat  everybody  on  a  non- 
discriminatory basis.  While  thought  was  given  to  the  implications  on  the  foreign 
business,  we  did  not  consult  outside  of  the  agency  on  this  subject. 

The  AEC  did,  however,  inform  the  Department  of  State  shortly 
before  announcing  the  price  increases  so  that  the  news  could  be  "prop- 
erly communicated  to  our  embassies  and  our  customers  abroad."  295 

European  Opposition  to  U.S.  Enrichment  Monopoly 

Through  the  late  1960's,  whether  Europe  might  produce  its  own  en- 
riched uranium  for  nuclear  power  was  a  speculative  but  not  imminent 
question.  During  this  time  the  French  and  the  British  sought  to 
develop  commercially  competitive  nuclear  powerplants  fueled  with 
natural  uranium.  While  the  joint  U.S. -Euratom  program  did  result 

281  TT.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress,  J96i  (Washington,  D.C.  : 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  1965),  p.  202. 

283  U.S.  Congress.  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Uranium  Enrichment 
Pricing  Criteria,  on.  cit.,  p.  13. 

288  Ibid.,  pp.  13-14. 

284  Ibid.,  n.  21. 
286  Loc.  cit. 


254 


in  construction  of  three  prototype  plants  of  prevailing  U.S.  design 
and  fueled  with  enriched  uranium,  the  outcome  of  the  competition 
between  natural  and  enriched  uranium  fuel  cycles  was  still  open. 
Then,  in  the  late  1960's  both  France  and  the  United  Kingdom  became 
interested  in  enriched  fuel,  which  the  West  Germans  and  Italians  had 
used  from  the  outset.  The  decision  of  the  French  in  1969  to  turn  from 
natural  to  enriched  uranium  brought  with  it  renewed  interest  in  con- 
struction of  a  European  facility  to  supply  this  material.  A  parallel 
proposal  that  the  AEC  sell  its  gaseous  diffusion  plants  to  the  American 
nuclear  industry  seems  to  have  shaken  European  assumptions  as  to  the 
long-term  reliability  of  U.S.  supply. 

The  European  enrichment  idea  took  on  new  life  in  mid- 1970  when 
the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  argued  that  the  setting 
up  of  a  European  uranium  enrichment  capacity  must  form  part  of 
the  overall  scheme  of  the  Community  and  European  efforts  towards 
industry  oriented  scientific  and  technological  development.298 

In  May  1972  the  technical  and  economic  problems  involved  in  the 
enrichment  of  uranium  were  considered  at  a  meeting  of  the  EEC 
Parliamentary  Committee  on  Energy,  Research,  and  Atomic  Prob- 
lems. There,  experts  reviewed  and  confirmed  the  Commission's  fore- 
casts of  enriched  uranium  requirements.  According  to  these  fore- 
casts, which  covered  the  whole  of  Western  Europe,  separative  require- 
ments would  double  every  5  years.  It  appeared  to  them  impossible 
to  obtain  a  firm,  long-term  undertaking  from  the  United  States  to 
supply  the  necessary  materials,  and  therefore  the  experts  urared  the 
community  to  build  its  own  enrichment  plants.  However,  the  con- 
ference was  marked  by  differences  of  opinion  as  to  the  enrichment 
technologv  to  be  adopted.297  298 

The,  U.SjS.R.  as  an  Alternative  Source  of  Supply 

Since  the  Soviet  Union  also  possesses  the  industrial  facilities  to 
enrich  uranium  for  fuel,  presumably  it,  too.  could  become  a  supplier 
of  enriched  uranium  or  toll  enrichment  services  in  the  world  market. 
The  U.S.S.R.  has  indeed  indicated  interest  in  supplying  nuclear  fuel 
for  European  power  reactors.  For  example,  in  March  1971  the  French 
Government  announced  it  had  signed  a  short  term  contract  with  the 
U.S.S.R.  for  toll  enrichment  of  80  tons  of  French  materials.  The 
contract  was  between  the  French  national  atomic  energy  organization 
and  the  Soviet  agency,  Technab  Export.  It  called  for  delivery  of  the 
feed  material  by  the  French  in  1973  with  return  of  enriched  product 
in  1973  and  1974  at  a  guaranteed  price  of  between  $5.6  and  $7.2  million. 
In  comparison,  AEC  policy  is  to  bill  customers  at  the  price  in  force  at 
time  of  delivery.  The  enriched  Soviet  uranium  is  fuel  for  a  new  French 
power  reactor  being  built  with  U.S.  technology. 

Speaking  of  this  contract,  an  aide  to  the  French  Minister  of  Industry 
commented  that  it  might  force  the  Americans  to  think  twice  about 
more  price  increases  for  enrichment  services.  The  Soviet  price  was  less 
than  the  AEC's  price  and  was  not  subject  to  escalation.  Whether  the 

»•  "uropean  Enrichment."  Nuclear  Engineering  International,  vol.  15  (July/ August 
1970).  p.  556. 

■»  h      '"ar  Engineering  International,  vol.  17  (July.  1972),  p.  516. 

"•  Three  separative  processes  were  proposed  :  gas  centrifuge,  gas  diffusion,  and  nozzle 
separation.  The  French  favor  diffusion,  the  Dutch  and  English  favor  the  centrifuge,  and 
the  West  Germans  favor  the  nozzle  process. 


255 


Soviet  Union  is  willing  to  offer  toll  enrichment  services  on  a  long  term 
basis  over  the  life  of  a  power  plant  remains  to  be  seen.299 

The  French  emphasized  that  they  were  buying  enrichment  services 
from  the  Soviet  Union  on  a  trial  basis.  An  advantage  for  France  was 
the  absence  from  the  contract  for  any  requirement  that  the  material 
supplied  by  the  Soviet  Union  be  placed  under  safeguards.  France  has 
steadily  maintained  that  because  it  is  a  nuclear  weapons  power,  apply- 
ing safeguards  to  nuclear  fuel  imported  by  its  nuclear  industry  is 
meaningless.  The  Soviet  Union  apparently  agrees  with  the  French 
position.  Had  the  French  placed  the  enrichment  contract  with  the 
AEO  under  the  AEC-Euratom  bilateral  agreement,  Euratom  safe- 
guards would  have  applied  to  the  material.  Moreover,  the  Euratom 
Supply  Agency,  whose  jurisdiction  the  French  have  challenged,  would 
have  been  an  intermediary  to  the  transaction.  By  contrast,  the  Soviet 
supply  contract  bypassed  Euratom.300 

It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  these  preliminary  signs  of  a  Soviet 
interest  in  supplying  enriched  uranium  or  enrichment  services  outside 
of  the  Soviet  bloc  signal  a  future  drive  by  the  U.S.S.R.  to  penetrate  the 
free  world  nuclear  fuel  market.  If  the  Soviets  were  to  do  so,  the  United 
States  would  be  faced  with  troublesome  diplomatic  decisions  as  to 
what  extent  and  in  what  way  it  would  counter  such  a  Soviet  move. 

Supply  Policy  Alternatives 

If  present  AEC  projections  for  the  growth  of  nuclear  power  in  the 
United  States  and  abroad  are  correct,  the  United  States  can  expect 
to  maintain  its  dominant  position  in  the  world  market  for  enriched 
uranium  and  uranium  enriching  services  through  the  1970's  with  its 
present  facilities.  If  foreign  policy  interests  of  the  United  States 
warrant  preservation  of  a  favorable  position  in  world  nuclear  com- 
merce, this  country  within  the  next  few  years  will  have  to  make 
several  basic  policy  decisions  and  commitments.  For  example,  will  the 
United  States  decide  to  make  the  capital  investment  in  new  produc- 
tion capability  needed  to  sustain  its  position  ?  Will  the  United  States 
continue  its  present  policies  of  full  cost  recovery  for  its  enriching 
services,  or  will  it,  if  necessary,  adopt  competitive  pricing  to  compete 
in  the  market,  or  to  discourage  other  nations  from  building  their  own 
enriching  facilities?  These  are  some  questions  that  will  have  to  be 
answered  within  the  next  few  years. 

Maintaining  the  Competitive  Position  of  the  United  States  in  the 
World  Enrichment  Market 
Whatever  may  be  the  ultimate  position  of  the  United  States  in  the 
world's  enrichment  market,  present  AEC  thinking  anticipates  that 
this  country  will  retain  a  dominant  position  well  into  the  1980's. 
Commissioner  Johnson  at  Geneva  in  1971  reported  estimates  that 
foreign  enrichment  would  supply  perhaps  5  percent  of  the  market 
by  1975  and  rise  to  about  one-third  by  1985,  still  leaving  two-thirds 
of  the  market  for  the  United  States.  He  was  confident  the  United 
States  would  meet  these  demands : S01 


m  Nucleonics  Week,  vol.  12  (March  18,  1971),  p.  2. 

saa'Nuc1ear  Industry  (April  1971),  pp.  40—41.  The  Soviet  Union  also  has  agreed  to  supply 
nuclear  fuel  to  Finland  and  has  opened  enrichment  talks  with  Sweden  and  West  Germany. 

301  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  U.S.  Claims  Capability  to  Meet  Crowing  Demands 
for  Uranium  Enrichment  Services,  AEC  Press  Release  No.  0-152,  September  8,  1972,  p.  1. 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  18 


256 


...  We  are  confident  that  by  pre-producing  some  enriched  uranium,  by  im- 
proving the  efficiency  and  increasing  the  capacity  of  our  existing  plants,  and  by 
optimizing  their  operating  modes,  we  can  meet  all  of  our  domestic  and  foreign 
enriching  requirements  until  about  1982 — even  if  no  new  plant  is  brought  into 
operation  before  that  date. 

Two  U.S.  policies  affected  the  planning  for  these  increases.  First 
was  the  Presidential  policy  for  eventual  transfer  of  uranium  enrich- 
ment to  the  private  sector.  Second  was  the  AEC  announcement  in 
June  1971  of  a  program  to  give  U.S.  companies  full  access  to  the 
enriching  process  technology  so  that  they  might  decide  what  role  they 
would  play  in  providing  commercial  enrichment  services.  If  govern- 
ment plants  are  transferred  to  the  private  sector,  there  will  be  the 
questions  of  arrangements  between  the  AEG  and  the  private  owners 
.to  fulfill  the  foreign  commitment  of  the  United  States. 

-      ?or' :    ■•   '  ■         .  ENRICHMENT  REQUIBEMENTS 

,  Assuming  enriched  uranium  will  fuel  much  of  the  non-Communist 
world's  nuclear  power  plants  unt^l  .nuclear,  breeders  are  introduced  in 
'#i©_  Jateij  1980's,  and  that  the  demand  far  enriched  uranium  and  enriqh- 
ing .services  will  continue  to.gw>w(until  then,302  there  arises  the  question 
of  the  U.S.  ability  to  deliver  during  the  l&JOV  That  ability  will  depend 
upon  the  production  capacity  of  U.S.  industrial  plants,  the  availa- 
bility of  electricity  to  operate,  the  separation  process,  and  the  cost  of 
that  electricity.  To  put  the 'capital  and  the  electrical  power  require- 
ments of  a  large  diffusion  plant  into  perspective  in  relation  to  nuclear 
power  plants  they  serve,  each  megawatt  of  electrical  power  supply 
committed:  to  operation  at  the  enrichment  plants  will  produce  enough 
enriched  uranium  to  fuel  from  24  to  45  megawatts  of  nuclear  power 
plant  output.303 

.  Viewed  another  way,  the  U.S.  commitment  to  supply  uranium  en- 
richment services  for  foreign  users  of  nuclear  power  calls  for  a  power 
plant  with  an  electrical  power  output  of  1,000  megawatts  for  each 
additional  24  to  45  nuclear  power  plants  of  comparable  power  output 
to  be  fueled  with  enriched  uranium.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether 
the  commitment  of  this  much  generating  capacity  in  the  United  States 
for  the  benefit  of  electricity  industries  abroad  is  acceptable  at  a  time 
when  the  United  States  is  itself  facing  the  prospect  of  electricity 
shortage.  The  issue  will  certainly  require  the  balancing  of  foreign 
policy  and  domestic  policy  considerations. 

Three  means  are  at  hand  to  meet  these  commitments.  The  AEC 
can  bring  its  present  production  plants  up  to  full  capacity;  it  can 
modify  present  plants  to  increase  their  productivity;  and  it  can 
build  new  plants.  Complicating  these  options  is  the  administration's 
policy  that  the  government's  uranium  enrichment  plants  should  be 
sold  to  private  industry. 

AEC  Commissioner  Johnson  discussed  these  options  at  Geneva 
in  1971.  Considering  the  present  separation  capabilities,  he  observed 
that  the  AEC's  three  enrichment  plants  during  the  fiscal  year  1972 
had  operated  at  about  half  their  production  level,  and  that  even  at 
these  reduced  levels  the  AEC  was  still  producing  enriched  uranium 

aoafThese  assumptions  could  be  upset   by  challenges  of  the  breeder  programs   by   some 
environmentalist  croups,  or  by  delays  In  the  demonstration  of  this  technology. 
*»  Ibid.,  p.  2.5-7. 


257 


in  excess  of  current  requirements.  AEC's  operating  plans  call  for 
continuing  "pre-production"  of  enriched  uranium  for  nuclear  fuel, 
with  the  present  pre-production  inventory  large  enough  to  satisfy 
nuclear  power  needs  for  about  the  next  two  years.  As  domestic  and 
foreign  demands  increase,  the  AEC  plans  to  return  the  existing  three- 
plant  complex  to  full  output  by  1978.  Parenthetically,  this  will  require 
the  AEC  to  find  an  electrical  power  supply  of  about  3,400  megawatts, 
equivalent  to  about  three  large  new  power  plants,  at  a  time  when 
construction  of  such  plants  has  been  delayed. 

Concerning  expansion  of  the  present  plant  capacity,  planned  im- 
provements would  substantially  increase  the  output  of  enriched 
uranium  for  the  same  electrical  input  at  an  estimated  capital  cost  of 
$500  to  $600  million.  If,  in  addition,  the  electrical  power  supply  for 
the  three  plants  can  be  increased  by  about  one-sixth,  from  6,100  mega* 
watts  to  7,400  megawatts  (an  increase  equivalent  to  the  output  of  a 
large,  modern  electrical  generating  plant),  and  an  additional  invest- 
ment of  $200-$300  million  be  made,  the  United  States  enrichment 
capacity  could  be  sufficiently  increased  to  meet  AEC  estimates  for 
foreign  and  domestic  requirements  for  the  1970's. 

Looking  into  the  early  1980's  and  beyond,  and  assuming  present 
forecasts  are  valid,  one  can  estimate  that  the  needs  for  enrichment 
will  exceed  the  capability  of  the  present  U.S.  complex,  even  after 
modification  and  increased  power  supply.  New  production  plants  will 
be  needed,  together  with  electric  power  plants  if  the  United  States  is 
to  hold  its  dominant  position  as  a  world  supplier  of  enriched  uranium. 

The  AEC  estimates  that  the  latest  date  for  a  firm  decision  to  build 
new  production  capacity  is  1975.  If  the  present  output  is  not  expanded, 
then  a  decision  will  have  to  be  made  no  later  than  1973  to  build  new 
production  capacity.  Beyond  these  dates,  assuming  present  demand 
estimates  are  correct,  without  additional  capacity  this  country  will 
be  unable  to  meet  combined  domestic  and  foreign  demands  for  en- 
riched uranium.304 

THE  PROSPECTS  FOR  EXPANDING  U.S.  ENRICHMENT  CAPACITY 

While  the  AEC  was  optimistic  at  the  last  Geneva  conference  on 
atomic  energy  that  it  would  obtain  funds  to  increase  the  productivity 
of  its  existing  enrichment  plants,  some  members  of  the  Joint  Com- 
mittee on  Atomic  Energy  were  less  optimistic.  In  opening  a  hearing 
in  March  1971  on  uranium  enrichment  programs,  Congressman  Chet 
Holifield  said  the  Joint  Committee  agreed  that  the  AEC  should  im- 
prove its  production  plants,  and  that  this  should  be  done  before  other 
U.S.  alternatives  were  considered  for  enrichment  supply  such  as 
sharing  U.S.  technology  with  foreigners.  But,  he  observed,  the  ad- 
ministration over  the  three  preceding  years  had  not  requested  the 
funds  for  these  improvements  and  the  Office  of  Management  and 
Budget  was  even  withholding  some  $16  million  aDproDriated  for  this 
purpose.  The  Joint  Committee  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  United 

804  As  this  report  was  being  completed,  there  were  Indications  In  the  trade  press  of  the 
nuclear  industry  that  shortages  of  U.S.  enrichment  capacity  would  appear  by  1985.  How- 
ever, there  was  disagreement  as  to  how  soon  to  begin  work  to  avert  this  problem.  The 
Atomic  Industrial  Forum  released  a  study  in  October  1972  in  which  an  AIF  committee  saw 
no  way  of  avoiding  a  future  shortfall  in  uranium  separative  work  capacity  unless  plans  for 
the  first  major  increment  in  new  plant -capacity  are  Initiated  before  the  end  of  1972.  On  the 
other  hand,  AEC  spokesmen  were  Quoted  as  saying  that  a  decision  on  Increased  capacity 
need  not  be  made  before  1976.  Cf.  Nucleonics  Week,  vol.  13  (October  19,  1972),  p.  1. 


258 


States  should  keep  itself  ahead  in  this  important  technological  market 
instead  of  helping  other  nations  to  become  competitors.305 

Sharing  the  U.S.  Monopoly 

If  other  nations  acquire  their  own  enrichment  capabilities,  either 
individually  or  through  a  multinational  organization,  there  arises  the 
foreign  policy  question  whether  the  United  States  should  seek  to  in- 
fluence such  foreign  ventures  and,  if  so,  by  what  means. 

While  the  European  Economic  Community  has  the  ability  to 
develop  and  build  enrichment  plants,  for  these  to  have  a  reasonable 
chance  of  economic  success  they  must  be  economically  competitive 
with  the  United  States  and,  possibly,  the  U.S.S.R.  One  major  cost  for 
a  European  plant  would  be  the  duplicating  of  research,  development, 
and  experience  of  the  United  States.  That  cost  could  be  minimized 
were  the  United  States  to  supply  the  technical  information,  and  per- 
haps certain  critical  materials  and  components.  In  return  for  such 
assistance,  the  United  States  would  expect  some  voice  in  the  organiza- 
tion and  its  operations.  A  U.S.  policy  decision  to  supply  its  technology 
could  hasten  the  end  of  the  American  monopoly  in  enrichment  serv- 
ices and  perhaps  increase  the  risk  of  undesirable  proliferation  of  the 
world's  capability  to  make  nuclear  weapons  materials.306 

The  proffering  of  U.S.  enrichment  technology  was  broached  before 
the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  in  1969.  Some  members  viewed 
it  as  a  way  to  reduce  the  scale  of  the  future  government  commitment 
to  expand  the  AEC's  production  plants.  Representative  Craig 
Hosmer  was  impatient  with  foreign  complaints  about  the  realibility 
of  the  United  States  as  a  supplier  of  enriched  uranium.  He  remarked 
with  some  asperity  that : 307 

I  am  personally  sick  and  tired  of  hearing  them  complain  about  the  un- 
reliability of  the  United  States.  As  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  want  to  make  it 
clear  I  don't  care  who  enriches  this  stuff.  I  think  that  the  proliferation  feature 
can  be  taken  care  of.  Where  our  danger  exists  is  that  a  bunch  of  people  are 
going  out  and  installing  more  capacity  in  an  unrelated  fashion  to  the  existing 
capacity  and  growing  demand  so  that  we  reach  the  point  where  the  demand 
for  enriched  uranium  goes  down  and  we  have  a  lot  of  unamortized  plants  on  our 
hands  somewhere  in  the  world,  and  I  hope  that  they  are  in  Europe  and  Japan. 

The  following  year,  after  some  speculation  in  the  newspapers  that 
the  United  States  was  planning  to  share  enrichment  technology 
abroad.308  Commissioner  Johnson  sooke  about  this  possibility  and  indi- 
cated the  AEC  would  be  open-minded  to  foreign  inquiry.309 

so"  The  hearing  inouired  Into  the  AEC's  ability  to  meet  future  domestic  and  foreign  com- 
mitments. Of.  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  AEC  Author- 
izina  Lcaislation  Fiscal  Year  1972,  92d  Coner.,  1st  Sees.,  1971.  part  4,  p.  2238. 

3ns  While  the  separation  plantR  themselves  probably  would  not  produce  weapons  grade 
materials,  the  slightly  enriched  uranium  they  would  produce  would  be  n  convenient  feed 
material  for  the  clandestine  manufacture  of  highly  enrlcbed  uranium  for  weapons. 

807  U.S.  Congress.  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy.  Hearings,  Future  Ownership  of  the 
AEC's  Oaseous  Diffusion  Plants,  91st  Cone.,  1st  Sess..  1969.  p.  55. 

•""The  Washington  Post  of  October  23,  1970,  carried  a  feature  article  about  a  plan  to 
share  secret  American  nuclear  technology  with  foreign  countries  as  being  recommended  by 
the  AEC  and  the  State  Department.  One  major  reason  for  the  proposition  was  that  at  least 
six  other  countries  were  on  the  verge  of  producing  their  own  enriched  uranium.  The  Wall 
Street  Journal  of  October  26.  1970,  reported  that  the  Administration  was  weighing  an 
AEC  proposal  that  United  States  Interest*  would  benefit  from  the  sharing  of  its  uranium 
enrichment  technology  with  friendly  nations. 

809  Wilfrid  E.  Johnson,  "Uranium  enrichment — U.S.  Policy,  Requirements  and  Capabili- 
ties," AEC  Press  Release  S-38-70,  November  17,  1970. 


259 


Early  in  January  1971,  Representative  Hosmer  enumerated  the 
advantages  to  the  United  States  of  a  European  diffusion  plant  based 
upon  U.S.  technology.  These  were : 310 

United  States  is  relieved  from  financing  this  increment  of  enrichment  capacity. 

United  State.s  conserves  its  irreplaceable  energy  fuels. 

United  States  stands  to  receive  royalty  income. 

All  parties  gain  more  time  for  centrifuge  R.  &  D. 

Slowdown  of  centrifuge  development  postpones  its  possible  contributions  to- 
ward proliferation. 

A  cooperative  international  pattern  is  established  for  dovetailing  enrichment 
capacity  to  enrichment  requirements. 

Precedent  may  be  created  for  effective  IAEA  controls  over  enriched  uranium. 

Other  countries  are  relieved  from  dependence  on  the  United  States  for  uranium 
enrichment  services. 

If  the  deadline  for  decision  is  missed,  Mr.  Hosmer  cautioned,  these 
advantages  will  be  lost  and  the  United  States  and  other  countries  will 
be  forced  to  make  other  arrangements  for  post-1980  enrichment 
capacity. 

In  his  second  foreign  policy  message  to  Congress  on  February  25, 
1971,  President  Nixon  called  attention  to  U.S.  preeminence  in  technol- 
ogy and  posed  the  policy  question :  How  far  should  the  United  States 
share  the  fruits  of  its  research  and  technology  ?  Taking  nuclear  energy 
as  an  example,  he  announced  that  the  administration  had  undertaken 
consultations  with  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  concerning 
ways  in  which  the  United  States  could  assist  its  allies  to  construct  a 
multinational  uranium  enrichment  plant.311 

In  a  separate  statement  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  for  a  technological 
age,  Secretary  of  State  William  P.  Rogers,  restated  the  question  of 
whether  the  United  States,  with  adequate  safeguards,  should  offer 
to  share  uranium  enrichment  technology  with  other  nations.  He 
said : 312 

The  current  situation  with  respect  to  enriched  uranium  fuels  offers  signifi- 
cant opportunities  for  furthering  international  cooperation  in  the  peaceful 
uses  of  nuclear  energy.  Because  of  its  advanced  technology  and  plant  capacity 
the  United  States  has  been  in  effect  the  only  exporter  of  enriched  uranium  fuel 
for  power  reactors.  Indeed,  our  export  earnings  from  sales  of  nuclear  power 
plants,  fuels,  and  related  services  are  over  $1  billion  now  and  are  expected  to 
reach  $5  billion  by  1975. 

But  worldwide  demand  for  this  fuel  continues  to  grow,  and  it  is  clear  that  other 
nations  intend  to  diversify  their  sources  of  supply.  But  we  are  now  considering 
whether,  with  adequate  safeguards,  we  should  offer  to  share  our  uranium 
enrichment  technology  with  other  nations  building  a  civil  industry. 

Going  further,  Secretary  Rogers  saw  the  sharing  of  uranium  enrich- 
ment technology  as  an  example  of  opportunities  open  for  scientific 
cooperation  when  political  cooperation  may  not  be  feasible : 313 

Because  the  problems  dealt  with  by  science  usually  have  a  low  specific  gravity 
in  political  terms,  scientific  cooperation  is  often  possible  where  political  co- 
operation is  not. 

The  habit  of  cooperation  is  a  good  one  to  keep.  If  it  is  kept,  it  surely  will  have 
spillover  effect  in  increasing  the  constructive  role  of  international  organizations 


310  Remarks  of  Congressman  Craig  Hosmer,  Congressional  Record,  vol.  116,  January  2. 
1971,  n.  44805. 

311  "United  States  Foreign  Policy  for  the  1970s  :  Building  for  Peace,"  Weekly  Compila- 
tion of  Presidential  Documents,  vol.  7  (March  1,  1971),  p.  374. 

812  Cf.  William  P.  Rogers,  "U.S.  Foreign  Policy  in  a  Technological  Age."  An  address 
by  .  .  .  Department  of  State  publication  8571,  General  Foreign  Policy  Series  252  (March 
1971),  p.  11-12. 

313  Loc.  cit. 


260 


in  establishing  new  patterns  of  international  cooperation,  and  in  strengthening 
observance  of  international  law. 

As  to  whether  U.S.  foreign  policy  interests  preferred  a  multina- 
tional venture  or  separate  national  ventures,  the  AEC  said  it  was 
preferable  for  the  Europeans  to  go  to  the  multinational  route  and  build 
a  plant  under  adequate  safeguards.  Commissioner  Ramey  agreed  that 
cooperation  could  help  rationalize  the  future  expansion  of  U.S.  and 
foreign  enrichment  capacity  and  would  provide  the  United  States 
with  revenues  that  would  otherwise  be  lost  through  the  establishment 
of  completely  independent  foreign  efforts.  He  said : 314 

It  is  worthy  of  npte  that  the  French  have  recently  announced  plans  to  initiate 
detailed  economic  and  technical  studies  on  construction  of  a  diffusion  plant  .  .  . 
and  planned  for  operation  in  the  late  1970s.  If  such  a  plant  were  constructed 
as  a  multinational  effort,  it  might  fit  into  our  plans  in  this  program,  and  I  gather 
that  the  French  would  be  interested  in  exploring  possible  cooperation  along 
these  lines  with  the  United  States. 

Clearly,  other  countries  are  determined  to  acquire  an  independent  enrichment 
capability  and  will  be  successful  to  some  degree  in  this  effort.  Thus,  under  a 
sound  businesslike  arrangement,  I  believe  we  stand  more  to  gain  than  to  lose  by 
joining  these  foreign  developments  rather  than  by  remaining  outside. 

The  State  Department  confirmed  the  U.S.  interest  in  the  multi- 
national approach,  advising  the  Joint  Committee  that : 315 

First,  we  assume  that  the  cost  of  the  gaseous  diffusion  plant  is  such  that  it 
probably  would  be  more  attractive  to  a  multinational  group  than  it  would  be  to 
a  single  nation.  Secondly,  we  feel  our  interest  would  be  better  served  if  the 
enrichment  facilities  are  built  by  a  multinational  group  rather  than  under  the 
control  of  a  single  country.  So  the  whole  approach  we  have  tin  mind  is  to  en- 
courage the  multinational  approach. 

Most  recently,  the  AEC  reported  at  Geneva  in  1971  that  the 
United  States  had  notified  certain  nations  of  Europe  and  the  Pacific 
Basin  of  its  willingness  to  enter  into  exploratory  discussions  on  the 
possibility  of  a  multinational  uranium  enrichment  project.  To  support 
such  a  venture,  the  United  States  would  be  prepared  to  make  avail- 
able, for  fair  compensation,  the  advanced  gaseous  diffusion  tech- 
nology and  know-how  of  the  AEC  for  the  establishment  of  one  or 
more  multinational  projects  for  the  construction  of  separations  plants 
of  substantial  capacity,  subject  to  appropriate  controls.319 

According  to  the  nuclear  trade  press,  AEC  and  State  Depart- 
ment officials  met  informally  at  Geneva  with  representatives  of  10 
nations  and  the  European  Economic  Community  to  define  earlier 
announcements  that  the  AEC  was  ready  to  talk  about  sharing  U.S. 
enrichment  technology.  The  United  States  reportedly  sought  to  es- 
tablish whether  the  EEC  was  absolutely  determined  to  build  its  ura- 
nium enrichment  plant  in  Europe  or  whether  it  would  consider  another 
site  that  might  have  economic  advantages  of  lower  power  costs.317 

In  separate  messages  during  August,  the  EEC  nations  and  the 
United  Kingdom  expressed  varying  degrees  of  enthusiam  for  estab- 
lishing a  multinational  gaseous  diffusion  plant  with  U.S.  technology, 
and  called  on  the  EEC  to  conduct  formal  talks  with  the  United  Stales 
on  their  behalf.  The  EEC  message,  expressing  a  noncommittal  will- 
ingness to  talk,  noted  the  AEC/s  diffusion  data  would  be  included  in 

31«T\S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  1EG  luthorteing  Legis- 
lation Finrnl  fear  1972,  op.  rit.,  p.  2247. 

w  Ibid.,  p.  2267. 

*i«U.S.  Atomic  Bnerpv  Commission,  U.S.  Claims  Capability  to  Meet  droning  Demands 
for  Uranium  Enriching  Services,  op.  Hi.,  p.  2. 

'"Nucleonics  Week,  vol.  12  (September  9,  1971),  p.  0 


261 


a  comparative -study  of  the  merits  of  otheV  processes  $  or  manuf  aefcu*^ 

ingen^iched  uranium.318  ■  rYniavi 

r.«T!      .  •   •>  '  .        ■-■  ■  •  .  '  ?y   •  .•    ■         ;  • ..'    mmu 

!  ■  • 

SOME    VIEWS    OF   THE    JOINT    COMMITTEE 

The 'Joint  ■•Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  has  closely  followed  pro-: 
posals  to'sell  U.S.  diffusion  technology.  Considering  the  close  relation 
between  the  Joint  Committee  and  the  AEC,  and  its  insistence  upon 
being  Currently  informed  of  the  Commission's  activities,  the  Commit- 
tee's views  must  be  taken  into  account  by  U.S.  diplomats  seeking  to 
arrange  ior  export  of  this  technology. 

•  In  1969  the  Joint  Committee  was  not  convinced  that  the  United 
State*'  should  encourage  the  building  of  a  European  enrichment 
capacity.  One  member  of  the  Conimittee  bluntly  warned  other  conn-' 
tries  that  onee  they  established  their  own  enrichment  capacity,  there 
was  not  a  single,  solitary  reason  for  the  United  States  to  retain  the 
"incredibly  generous"  terms  of  its  toll-enriehment  contracts.  Should 
the  Europeans  persist  with  their  plans  to  build  their  own  facilities, 
he  said,  then  the  United  StatesI  should  consider  alternatives.  For  in- 
stance, the  United  States  might  sell  enriched  uranium  at  competitive 
prices  in  the  world  market  .rather  than  at  production  costs.  Were  this 
to  be  done,  the  capacity  of  the  U.S.  production  plants  and  their  operat- 
ing efficiencies  would  permit  sale  of  enriched  uranium  at  prices  well 
below  those  feasible  for  a  European  plant.  While  such  a  policy  might 
increase  AEC's  domestic  operating  expenses,  it  could  substantially 
help  alleviate  the  U.S.  balance-of -payments  deficit  in  word  trade.319 
The  Joint  Committee  kept  pressing  the  administration  for  details 
about  the  export  or  sharing  of  U.S.  diffusion  technology.  For  example, 
on  September  16,  1970,  it  met  in  executive  session  with  the  Atomic 
Energy  Commission  to  express  its  concern  that  the  executive  branch 
did  not  have  specific  and  detailed  plans  to  propose.  The  Committee 
clearly  regarded  possible  export  of  enrichment  technology  as  a  signif- 
icant and  fundamental  change  in  U.S.  policy  for  international  atomic 
energy.  At  the  close  of  the  91st  Congress,  in  December  1970,  it  an- 
nounced its  intention  to  take  a  hard  look  at  any  proposal  that  this 
technological  asset  be  provided  to  foreign  entities;  The  Committee 
said  it  would  examine  the  question  not  only  from  the  "giveaway" 
aspects,  friit  also  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  possible  effects  on  na- 
tional security  and  obligations  of  the  United  States  Under  the  Non- 
Prolrferation  Treaty.380 

The  Gas  Centrifuge:  A  Technical  Perturbation  for  U.S.  Policy? 

3y  early  1972,  three  European  nations  were  working  together  to 
perfect  and  demonstrate  the  gas  centrifuge  m  process  for  enriching 
uranium.  They  saw  this  as  an  alternative  to  depending  upon  the 
United  States  for  enrichment  service,  or  for  gaseous  diffusion  tech- 
nology. If  the  gas  centrifuge  development  is  proven  to  be  technologi- 
cally and  economically  successful,  the  subsequent  deployment  of  this 
process  could  raise  problems  for  U.S.  diplomacy.  Even  now,  there  is 

«*  Loc.  cit  .  . 

*»Xu(teo*lC9  Week,  vol.  10  (April  17,  19«0),  p.  5. 

8ao  U.S.  .Cj>ngressk  Joint  Committee  011  Atomic  Energy,  "Activtty  and  Accomplishments  of 
the  Joint  Gomnrtttee  on  Atomic  Energy  during  the  Second  Session  of  the  Olst  Congress," 
Congressional  Record,  vol.  116,  p.  44324. 

881  Cf.  Section  II  for  a  description  of  the  «as  centrifuge  process. 


262 


question  regarding  U.S.  efforts  to  discourage  development  of  the 
centrifuge  process  at  home  and  abroad  because  of  possible  effects 
upon  the  U.S.  position  in  the  world  enrichment  market,  and,  perhaps 
more  importantly,  because  of  the  implications  of  centrifuge  tech- 
nology for  nonproliferation.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  commercial 
use  of  the  centrifuge  enrichment  process  appears  to  be  inevitable, 
what  could  U.S.  diplomacy  do  to  influence  the  use  and  control  of  that 
technology  ? 

The  centrifugal  process  is  not  a  new  technological  surprise.  It  was 
one  option  open  to  the  Manhattan  Project  during  World  War  IT  and 
some  research  and  development  has  been  carried  on  since  then.  What 
is  new  now  is  the  concerted  effort  of  several  European  states  to  develop 
the  process  as  an  alternative  to  that  now  used  by  the  United  States, 
the  U.S.S.R.,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  France. 

The  new  work  is  being  carried  on  by  Dutch  and  German  groups. 
Not  committed  by  past  technological  decisions  and  investments,  these 
groups  in  the  early  1950's  revived  work  on  the  centrifuge  to  enrich 
uranium.  The  United  States  also  kept  some  centrifuge  work  alive  at 
Oak  Ridge,  but  did  not  deploy  it.  By  the  late  1950's,  enough  progress 
had  been  made  in  West  Germany  for  the  British  to  reopen  their  centri- 
fuge studies  and  later  in  the  1960's,  the  first  steps  were  taken  toward 
multinational  development  of  a  working  uranium  enrichment  capa- 
bility using  this  process  outside  the  framework  of  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency,  the  European  Nuclear  Energy  Asrencv,  or 
Euratom. 

THE    CENTRIFUGE    AND    PROLIFERATION 

In  addition  to  significant  technological  differences  between  the  gas 
centrifuge  and  the  gaseous  diffusion  process  for  enrichment  of  ura- 
nium, there  are  other  economic  and  security  differences  of  international 
concern.  Whereas  the  gaseous  diffusion  process  of  the  United  States 
requires  major  capital  investment  in  large  facilities  and  great  amounts 
of  electricity,  both  of  which  are  difficult  to  conceal,  the  gas  centrifuge 
process  in  principle  can  be  employed  on  a  much  smaller  scale,  at  less 
capital  investment,  with  considerably  less  demand  for  electricity  for 
each  kilogram  of  enriched  uranium  produced ;  all  these  make  it  easier 
to  conceal.  Gas  centrifuge  factories  offer  flexibility  in  construction 
and  operation;  additional  units  can  be  readily  added,  which  means 
that  plant  investment  can  be  closely  geared  to  actual  growth  of  the 
nuclear  fuel  market,  and  the  capital  investment  can  be  spread  out  in 
time.  Of  course,  the  smaller  the  installation  the  less  the  rate  of  produc- 
tion  for  enriched  uranium.  On  the  other  hand,  the  centrifuge  process 
should  in  principle  be  able  to  produce  weapons  grade  materials  as 
well  as  nuclear  fuel  material.  Existing  enriched  nuclear  fuel  from 
other  sources  might  be  illegallv  diverted  to  gas  centrifuge  factories, 
thus  making  the  production  of  weapons  quality  material  easier  and 
more  feasible  in  smaller  facilities. 

For  these  reasons,  the  construction  of  gas  centrifuge  plants  would 
>aiso  questions  about  the  effectiveness  of  safeguards.  It  would  be  pos- 
sible in  practice  for  smaller  nations  to  join  the  "nuclear  club"  by 
building  concealed  centrifuge  enrichment  plants  which  might  use 
for  their  feed  materials  enriched  uranium  ostensibly  obtained  to  fuel 
nuclear  power  reactors. 


263 


BREAKING    THE    SECRECY    BARRIER 


As  a  result  of  U.S.  actions  to  inhibit  work  and  publication  of  in- 
formation on  the  centrifugation  process,322  foreign  centrifuge  research 
proceeded  in  secret  and  little  was  heard  of  it  until  an  announcement 
in  1968  by  the  Dutch,  West  Germans,  and  the  British  suggesting  that 
a  tripartite  arrangement  to  build  a  centrifuge  enrichment  plant  was 
under  discussion.  Notably  absent  from  the  initial  discussions  were  the 
French  who  had  been  emphatic  in  their  desire  to  reduce  their  de- 

gmdence  upon  the  United  States  for  uranium  enrichment  services, 
arenthetically,  the  French  several  years  earlier  had  opposed  a  British 
proposal  that  European  countries  join  with  Britain  in  expanding  its 
diffusion  plant.323 

Accordingly,  on  March  4, 1970,  a  tripartite  agreement  of  collabora- 
tion on  developement  of  the  gas  centrifuge  process  was  concluded 
by  the  Netherlands,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  and  the  United 
Kingdom.  A  few  months  later,  in  August,  the  tripartite  members 
offered  associate  membership  to  Belgium  and  Italy.  The  three  govern- 
ments claim  the  centrifuge  process  can  provide  cheaper  enrichment  for 
Europe  than  can  other  processes. 

The  British  Minister  of  Technology,  Mr.  Anthony  Wedgwood  Benn, 
at  the  signing  of  the  tripartite  agreement,  spoke  of  the  enterprise  as 
a  cornerstone  of  United  Kingdom  technological  collaboration  with 
other  countries  in  Western  Europe  which,  he  hoped,  could  lead  to 
fuller  economic  and  political  cooperation  of  the  European  Economic 
Community.324 

The  French  Drive  for  a  European  Diffusion  Plant 

In  February  1971  the  French  Government  complicated  the  diplo- 
matic aspects  of  the  enrichment  market  by  its  decision  to  promote  con- 
struction of  a  diffusion  plant  in  Europe.  Apparently  this  action  was  in 
part  a  reaction  to  the  tripartite  centrifuge  undertaking.  Subsequently, 
on  March  11,  1971,  the  Commissariat  a  L'Energie  Atomique  (CEA) 
announced  that  it  was  ready  to  build  a  commercial  diffusion  plant 
with  or  without  partners.  The  proposed  French  plant  may  also  nave 
been  in  response  to  the  Algerian  decision  to  take  over  French  oil  inter- 
ests. Later,  French  President  Georges  Pompidou  anounced  that  his 
nation's  sixth  development  plan  for  the  years  1971  to  1975  would  in- 
clude construction  of  8,000  megawatts  of  nuclear  electric  generating 
capacity,  to  be  fueled  with  enriched  uranium.  This  announcement 
underscored  the  seriousness  of  French  interest  in  a  European  gaseous . 
diffusion  plant.  • 

a23  Centrtfugation  separation  is  defined  by  AEC  regulations  (10  CFR  25,  Appendix  A) 
to  be  Secret  Restricted  Data  under  the  Atomic  Energy  Act.  Under  this  regulation,  no  one 
may  have  access  to  this  Information  unless  the  applicant  fulfills  several  stringent  conditions 
and  also  gives  the  United  States  an  Irrevocable  license  to  use  or  have  used  any  U.S.  patent 
on  an  Invention  relating  to  this  process  made  by  the  access  permit  holder.  In  addition, 
the  permittee  Is  required  to  grant  the  AEC  the  right  to  use  any  technical  information 
or  data  of  a  proprietary  nature  developed  during  the  permit  and  for  1  year  thereafter. 
Finally,  the  permittee  has  to  make  quarterly  reports  to  the  AEC  on  its  work,  even  though 
the  research  is  funded  wholly  from  private  sources.  Cf.  10  CFR  25.23. 

328  Of  this  omission,  a  British  nuclear  journal  commented  : 

...  It  will  no  doubt  interest  the  political  commentators  to  speculate  on  the  reasons 
for  leaving  out  of  the  initial  discussions  other  countries  who  have  been  particularly 
active  in  this  field,  notably  France  and  Japan.  From  the  technical  point  of  view,  it  is  a 
pity  that  greater  efforts  were  not  made  to  overcome  the  present  political  high  temperatures 
to  include  France.  .  .  .  Cf.  "Centrifugal  Feelers,"  Nuclear  Engineering  International, 
vol.  14  (January  1969).  p.  5. 

324  "Gas  Centrifuge  Agreement  Signed,"  Atom,  No.  162  ( April  1970) ,  p.  62. 


264 


By  19V0  the  French  Government  was  planning  for  an  enrichment 
facility  with  a  capacity  about  three  times  the  estimated  need  for 
1980.  The  substantial  excess  capacity  would  be  available  to  sell  on  the 
world  enrichment  market.  As  for  competition  with  the  United  States, 
the  planned  sales  price  would  be  less  than  that  currently  charged  by 
the  AEC.  The  proposed  facility  would  be  financed  two-thirds  by  loans, 
leaving  $200  million  to  be  raised  through  direct  capital  investment  of 
$40  million  a  year,  a  sum  which  would  be  well  within  French  means. 
French  technology  would  be  used,  which  the  French  consider  equal 
to  that  of  the  United  States  and  superior  to  Britain's.  However,  they 
would  like  access  to  U.S.  technology,  if  this  access  is  not  top  expensive. 

An  interesting  aspect  about  the  French  plan  was  its  circumvention 
of  normal  diplomatic  channels  and  government-to-government  negoti- 
ations. Instead,  the  French  invitation  was  informally  addressed  to 
European  industry  with  the  thought  of  securing  participation  by 
corporations  rather  than  governments.  While  the  latter  may  have  been 
preferred,  the  French  reportedly  had  grown  tired  of  diplomatic  de- 
lays. Also,  an  appeal  directly  to  industrial  firms  could  permit  in- 
direct support  from  governments  publicly  committed  to  the  gas 
centrifuge  project.  France  apparently  hoped  that  Britain,  the  Nether- 
lands, and  West  Germany  can  be  attracted  to  join  in  a  diffusion  plant 
venture  and  to  abandon  their  centrifuge  project.  From  the  standpoint 
of  the  U.S.  interest,  the  French  proposal  of  a  single,  multinational 
enrichment  plant  would  be  preferable  to  a  possible  proliferation  of 
nationally-owned,  gas  centrifuge  plants.  Time  for  a  final  decision  is 
beginning  to  run  out.  One  must  be  made  by  1973  if  Western  Europe  is 
not  to  risk  a  shortage  of  nuclear  fuel.325 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 

During  1970-71.  diplomacy  and  diplomats  were  involved  with,  or 
affected  by,  a  number  of  initiatives  taken  by  European  governments 
to  secure  for  themselves  a  role  in  uranium  enrichment.  Taken  as  a 
whole,  these  initiatives  suggest  that  the  forces  of  fragmentation 
within  the  European  nuclear  community  remained  strong.  They  re- 
flected also  U.S.  desires  to  encourage  multilateral  construction  and 
operation  of  a  large  enrichment  plant  in  Europe  as  an  alternative  to 
a  proliferation  of  smaller  separate  facilities.  The  initiatives  included : 

(1)  A  declaration  by  the  EEC  of  the  need  to  construct  a  Eu- 
ropean enrichment  facility ; 

(2)  A  tripartite  agreement  among  Britain,  West  Germany, 
and  Holland  to  develop  the  gas  centrifuge  for  enrichment  of 
uranium; 

(  3 )  A  decision  by  the  French  Government  to  plan  construction 
of  an  enrichment  plant  in  Europe ; 

(4)  A  French  decision  to  study  construction  of  an  enrichment 
facility  by  means  of  collaboration  of  technical  companies; 

(5)  The  announced  AEC  intention  to  permit  a  limited  number 
of  American  companies  to  have  access  to  secret  enrichment  tech- 
nology ;  and 

(6)  An  AEC  offer  to  help  foreign  countries,  particularly  Eu- 
ropean, to  build  an  enrichment  plant. 

»*Nucleonic8  Week,  vol.  12  (March  18,  i:iTn,  pp.  1-2;  Nuclear  Industry  (April  1971), 
p.  40  ;  Wall  St  net  Journal  (March  12,  1971),  p.  5. 


265 


Although  the  United  States  had  built  its  uranium  enrichment  plants 
to  produce  nuclear  materials  for  weapons,  these  facilities  have  become 
an  important  economic  asset  for  the  United  States  and  for  its  nuclear 
foreign  policy.  Because  of  these  facilities,  the  United  States  has  been 
able  to  offer  long-term  commitments  to  supply  enriched  uranium  for 
nuclear  power  plants  in  Europe.  For  the  next  few  years,  these  plants 
have  sufficient  capacity  to  do  so.  But  within  this  decade,  decisions 
must  be  made  that  will  decide  the  future  competitive  standing  of  the 
United  States  in  the  enriched-uranium  market.  Some  related  issues 
include  the  following : 326 

Will  the  United  States,  for  reasons  of  economic  and  foreign 
policy,  seek  to  preserve  its  position  as  the  world's  leading  supplier 
of  enriched  uranium  and  enrichment  services  ? 

What  measures  should  the  United  States  consider  if  other  na- 
tions, singly  or  in  concert,  attempt  to  break  the  long-standing  U.S. 
enrichment  monopoly  by  building  their  own  enrichment  facility  ? 
Is  the  further  development  of  gas  centrifuge  technology  in 
Europe  likely  to  lead  to  a  technological  surprise  for  the  United 
States,  should  the  economic  and  technological  feasibility  of  this 
technology  be  demonstrated  ? 

What  measures  can  or  should  the  United  States  consider  to 
discourage  further  development  of  the  gas  centrifuge  ? 

What  diplomatic  options  are  open  to  the  United  States  should 
the  Soviet  Union  seriously  enter  the  world  enriched-uranium 
market  ? 

Since  supplying  enrichment  services  requires  the  use  of  large 
amounts  of  electricity  which,  in  the  United  States,  comes  from 
coal-burning  powerplants,  and  considering  present  air  pollution 
problems  of  the  United  States  and  the  environmental  impacts 
of  mining  coal,  do  the  foreign  policy  benefits  of  supplying  en- 
richment services  to  foreign  customers  balance  the  energy  and 
environmental  costs  to  America  ? 


328  As  this  case  study  went  to  press,  two  events  underscored  the  possibilities  for  change 
in  the  role  of  the  AEC  in  furnishing  enrichment  services  for  foreign  and  domestic  customers. 
On  December  6,  1972,  the  AEC  gave  notice  of  a  temporary  suspension  of  new  contracts  for 
enrichment  services  except  for  (1)  firm  quantity  type  contracts  under  negotiation  on  that 
date,  (2)  contracts  which  have  been  submitted  to  customers  for  execution,  and  (3)  new 
short-term  contracts  to  provide  firm  quantities  of  enriching  services  needed  by  domestic 
and  'foreign  customers  to  cover  near-term  requirements.  The  Commission  imposed  this 
temporary  suspension  to  permit  time  to  complete  its  review  of  alternative  methods  of 
contracting  and  to  establish  ".  .  .  such  modified  method  as  will  provide  greater  assurance 
that  the  needed  enrichment  capacity  at  the  Commission's  plants  will  be  available  on  a 
timely  basis.  .  .  ."  Another  reason  was  to  provide  further  assurance  of  ".  .  .  augmenta- 
tion of  available  enriching  capacity  in  the  1980's  and  beyond  by  private  resources."  Cf. 
Federal  Register,  voL  37,  December  8,  1972,  pp.  26145-26146. 

The  second  event  was  an  AEC  announcement  of  December  6,  1972  which  stated  that  it 
is  not  the  intention  of  the  Commission  to  construct  new  enrichment  plants  to  meet  growing 
requirements  since  it  believes  that  the  private  sector  can  undertake  to  provide  the  required 
capacity  on  a  timely  basis.  The  AEC,  however,  will  remain  in  a  position  to  furnish  enrich- 
ment services  to  the  private  sector  to  the  extent  of  its  available  capacity.  To  stimulate  the 
requisite  private  effort,  the  AEC  announced  proposed  modifications  to  its  regulations  which 
would  make  the  government's  enrichment  technology  available.  (Cf.  Federal  Register, 
vol.  37,  December  9,  1972,  pp.  26345-26348.)  At  a  press  conference,  AEC  Chairman  Schles- 
singer  said  that  If  industry  does  hot  do  the  job,  the  government  must  do  it.  He  also  said 
that  a  vigorous  industry  could  maintain  the  "clear"  U.S.  advantage  in  exporting  nuclear 
power  technology  and  by  the  1980's  might  produce  $3.5  billion  a  year  in  foreign  sales 
compared  With  $900  million  In  1972.   (Cf.  Washington  Post,  December  9.  1972,  p.  A-3.) 


XI.  The  Noxproliferation  Treaty  and  Safeguards 

A  recent  impact  of  the  scientific  discovery  of  fission  upon  American 
diplomacy  and  foreign  policy  is  to  be  found  in  the  Treaty  on  Non- 
proliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons  (NPT).  Thirty  years  after  scien- 
tists correctly  interpreted  the  meaning  of  small  light  pulses  upon  a 
cathode  ray  screen,  the  U.S.  Senate,  on  March  13, 1969,  gave  its  advice 
and  consent  to  ratification  of  an  unprecedented  concept  in  interna- 
tional relations:  a  general  commitment  to  international  inspection 
within  national  borders.  The  concept  is  radical  in  two  respects :  first, 
it  divides  nations  into  two  classes — those  which  have  the  atom  bomb 
and  those  which  do  not ;  second,  it  commits  the  non-weapons  signatories 
to  the  Treaty  to  yield  up  some  of  their  sovereignty  to  international  in- 
spections, in  return  for  which  they  are  assured  against  the  dangers  of 
undetected  diversion  by  their  neighbors  of  nuclear  materials  to  manu- 
facture nuclear  weapons.  The  Treaty  is  unusual,  too,  in  its  operative 
provisions  which  bind  the  non- weapons  countries  to  negotiate  bilateral 
safeguards  agreements  with  the  IAEA.  Whether  this  commitment  to 
agree  will  prove  effective,  or  whether,  as  some  critics  claim,  it  will 
prove  to  be  worthless;  whether  IAEA  safeguards  can,  in  fact,  provide 
sufficient  assurance  to  alleviate  international  fear  of  clandestine 
diversion  on  nuclear  materials  to  weapons — these  are  presently  un- 
answerable questions. 

The  entry  into  force  of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  on  March  5, 
1970  has  put  into  motion  a  whole  host  of  new  international  negotiations 
between  the  IAEA  and  the  non-nuclear  weapons  countries,  and  also 
negotiations  with  those  nuclear  weapons  powers  which  would  volun- 
tarily place  their  civil  nuclear  activities  under  IAEA  safeguards. 
Complicating  the  diplomatic  effort  is  the  refusal  of  France  and  the 
People's  Republic  of  China,  which  both  possess  their  own  nuclear 
weapons,  to  sign  the  Treaty,  and  its  rejection  by  India  which  appears 
technologically  capable  of  making  such  weapons. 

New  Urgency  for  Safeguards 

Discussion  of  safeguards  is  timely  now  because  the  amounts  of  nu- 
clear materials  present  in  the  fuel  cycles  of  commercial  nuclear  energy 
remain  modest.  Before  the  end  of  the  decade  of  the  1970's,  however,  this 
situation  is  expected  to  change.  Amounts  involved  by  then  will  present 
a  tempting  target  to  those  who  may  wish  to  obtain  fissionable  material 
for  weapons.  By  the  end  of  the  1970's  many  countries  are  likety  to 
be  generating  significant  amounts  of  nuclear  energy  with  concurrent 
production  of  plutonium,  and  thus  possess  a  potential  for  making 
nuclear  weapons  in  quantity. 

The  Stockholm  International  Peace  Research  Institute  in  its  1972 
yearbook  <>n  world  armaments  warns  that  the  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons  would  lead  to  a  totally  new  situation  in  military  and  strategic 
affairs.  According  to  SIPRI,  the,  main  factor  behind  the  anticipated 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons  technology  is  that  for  most  environments 
nuclear  power  reactors  provide  the  cheapest  means  of  producing  elec- 
tricity. While,  some  energy  analysts  are  not  this  optimistic,  pro- 
ponents of  nuclear  power  anticipate  its  widespread  use  within  the 
next  two  decades. 

(266) 


267 


SIPRI  points  out  that  in  1971,  16  countries  had  128  nuclear  power 
reactors  in  operation  with  a  total  generating  capacity  of  35,000  mega- 
watts. By  1977,  32  countries  are  expected  to  have  325  working  nuclear 
power  plants  with  a  total  output  of  174,000  megawatts.  By  1980,  the 
world  nuclear  capacity  estimated  by  SIPRI  will  probably  exceed 
350,000  megawatts. 

These  nuclear  power  plants  will  produce  plutonium  as  a  by-product. 
SIPRI  estimates  that  13  tons  will  be  produced  in  1972,  increasing  to 
65  tons  annually  in  1977  and  to  130  tons  in  1980.  By  1980,  about  one- 
third  of  this  plutonium  will  be  owned  by  countries  which  do  not  now 
have  nuclear  weapons.  This  amount  of  plutonium,  in  theory,  might 
supply  nuclear  explosives  to  manufacture  100  weapons  per  week  of 
the  size  dropped  on  Hiroshima.327 

In  SIPRI's  analysis  of  the  potentialities  for  proliferation,  it  identi- 
fies 15  countries  capable  of  developing  nuclear  weapons  within  the 
short-  or  medium-term  future.  Therefore  the  attitudes  of  these  coun- 
tries toward  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  are  of  intrinsic  interest.328 

The  Four  Functions  of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty 

In  broad  outline,  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  has  four  major 
functions,  which  are  to : 

(1)  Commit  the  nations  of  the  world  which  do  not  now  have 
nuclear  weapons  not  to  produce  or  to  receive  them  in  the  future ; 

(2)  Assure  equally  that  such  nations  have  the  full  peaceful 
benefits  of  the  atom ; 

(3)  Provide  assurance,  through  international  safeguards,  that 
the  peaceful  nuclear  activities  of  states  which  have  not  already 
developed  nuclear  weapons  will  not  be  diverted  to  making  sucn 
weapons ;  and 

(4)  Recognize  the  determination  of  the  parties  that  the  Treaty 
should  lead  to  further  progress  toward  arms  control  and  dis- 
amament. 

The  Treaty  identifies  two  classes  of  nations :  those  which  have  the 
atom  bomb,  and  those  which  do  not.  The  latter  are  expected  to  open 
their  borders  and  nuclear  facilities  to  international  inspection, 
which  nations  that  possess  the  atom  bomb  have  not  agreed  to 
do.  In  return,  the  non-weapons  countries  have  the  pledge  of  the 
weapons-possessing  powers  not  to  give  nuclear  weapons  to  non- 
weapons  states.  Among  the  major  nuclear  nations,  the  United  States, 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  United  Kingdom  are  parties  to  the  Treaty.. 
France  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China  have  not  signed  it,  nor 
have  three  nations  thought  to  be  able  to  produce  weapons:  India, 
Israel,  and  the  Union  of  South  Africa.  The  South  Africans  assert  that 
they  are  developing  a  secret  process  to  enrich  uranium.  Among  other 
leading  countries,  early  in  1972  eight  had  signed  but  had  not  ratified 
the  Treaty.  These  included  Australia,  Belgium,  Egypt,  Italy,  Japan, 
the  Netherlands,  Switzerland  and  West  Germany. 

Among  the  nations  party  or  signatory  to  the  Nonproliferation 
Treaty  are  several  which  have  a  strong  enough  industrial  and  finan- 
cial base  to  produce  nuclear  weapons.  These  include  Australia,  Can- 

827  Stockholm  International  Peace  Research  Institute.  World  Armaments  and  Disarma- 
ment;  SIPRI  Yearbook  1972  (New  York:  Humanities  Press,  1972),  pp.  288-290. 

338  The  15  countries  identified  by  SIPRI  fall  into  two  groups  :  the  non-signatories  and 
those  which  have  signed  hut  not  ratified  the  Treaty.  Early  in  1972  the  nations  in  each 

froup  were  as  follows  :  Non-signatories  included  Argentina,  Brazil,  India,  Israel,  Pakistan, 
outh  Africa  and  Spain  ;  signers  included  Australia,  Belgium,  Egypt,  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands  and  Switzerland. 


268 


a  da,  Japan,  perhaps  Argentina,  the  Scandinavian  nations,  and  West- 
Germany.  These  nations  naturally  expect  something  in  return  for 
foregoing  development  of  their  own  nuclear  weapons  capability.  In 
addition  to  sharing  in  benefits  from  nuclear  power,  they  expect  to  be 
protected  from  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  capability  among 

their  neighbors.. 

The  Nonproliferation  Treaty  obliges  nations  having  nuclear  weap- 
ons to  share  the  benefits  of  nuclear  energy  with  the  other  nations, 
and  also  to  support  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  as  it 
struggles  to  perfect  credible  and  acceptable  safeguards  systems.  Each 
state  party  to  the  Treaty  needs  to  be  assured  that  fissionable  material 
in  the  possession  of  each  non-nuclear- weapon  neighbor  is  not  used  to 
make  weapons.  IAEA  has  the  unenviable  task  of  an  international 
watchdog  to  ensure  that  the  non-nuclear-weapons  states  fulfill  their 
obligations  under  the  Treaty.  Each  such  state  has  committed  itself  to 
negotiate  an  agreement  with  the  IAEA  under  which  it  will  accept 
safeguards  to  verify  compliance  with  these  obligations.  But  the 
Treaty  does  not  itself  specify  the  nature  of  the  safeguards  system  to 
be  adopted. 

U.S.  Ratification  and  Support  of  the  Treaty 

As  a  nuclear-weapons  state,  the  United  States  is  exempt  from 
IAEA  safeguards.  Nonetheless,  when  President  Johnson  signed 
the  Nonprohferation  Treaty  on  July  f,  1968,  he  offered  to  put  com- 
merieal  nuclear  power  in  the  United  States  under  IAEA  safeguards. 
He  said : 329 

We  will  cooperate  fully  to  bring  the  Treaty  safeguards  into  being.  We  shall 
thus  help  provide  the  basis  of  confidence  that  is  necessary  for  increased  coopera- 
tion in  the  peaceful  nuclear  field.  After  the  Treaty  has  come  into  force,  we  will 
permit  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  to  apply  its  safeguards  to  :ill 
nuclear  activities  in  the  United  States — excluding  only  those  with  direct  na- 
tional security  significance.  Thus  the  United  States  is  not  asking  any  country 
to  accept  any  safeguards  that  we  are  not  willing  to  accept  ourselves. 

In  this  commitment,  President  Johnson  repeated  his  earlier  offer  of 
December  2,  1967.  The  United  Kingdom  made  a  similar  offer  on  De- 
cember 4.  1967.  The  Soviet  Union  did  not  join  in  these  offers.  Instead, 
it  took  the  position  that  inspection  of  any  atomic  activities  within 
the  nuclear-weapons  countries  was  unnecessary  and  irrelevant  as  the 
Treaty  does  not  prohibit  these  nations  from  having  or  manufacturing 
nuclear  weapons. 

The  Ratification  Treaty  was  opened  for  signature  on  July  1.  1968, 
and  was  signed  that  same  day  by  the  United  States,  the  United  King- 
dom, the  Soviet  Union,  and  53  other  members  of  the  United  Nations. 
President.  Johnson  transmitted  the  Treaty  to  the  Senate  on  .Inly  9. 
lie  advised  the  Congress  thai  the  Treaty  would  do  more  than  just  pro- 
hibit the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons.  It  would  also  promote  the  fur- 
ther development  of  nu, deai- energy  for  peaceful  purposes.  Elaborat- 
ing the  anticipated  benefits  of  the  Treaty,  the  President  said  : 

I  believe  Hint  tins  treaty  will  greatly  advance  the  goal  of  unclear  cooperation 
for  peaceful   purposes  under  international   safeguards. 

It  will  require  that  all  parties  which  export  nuclear  materials  and  equip- 
ment n.  non-nuclear-weapon  states  for  peaceful  purposes  make  sure  that  such 
materials,  and  those  used  or  produced  in  such  equipment,  are  under  international 
safeguards. 

3=8  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents,  vol.  4  (July  8   1968)    p   1044 
^"Nuctc'ir  Nonproliferation  Treaty,"    Weekly   Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents. 
vol.  4  (July  15.  1968),  p.  1091. 


269 


It  will  require  all  noninuclear  parties  to  accept  international  safeguard?  on 
nil  peaceful  nuclear  activities  within  their  territories,  under  their  jurisdiction, 
or  carried  out  under  their  control  anywhere. 

It  will  help  insure  cooperation  in  the  field  of  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy, 
and  the  exchange  of  scientific  and  technological  information  on  such  peaceful 
applications. 

It  will  enable  all  countries  to  assist  non-nuclear  parties  to  the  treaty  with  their 
peaceful  nuclear  activities,  confident  that  their  assistance  will  hot  he  diverted 
to  the  making  of  nuclear^weapons.  x  ' 

It  obligates  the  nuclear- weapon  parties  to  make  potential  benefits  from  any 
peaceful  applications  of  nuclear  explosions  available— oh  a  non-discriminatory 
basis,  and  at  the  lowest  possible  cost— *o  parties  to  the  treaty  that  are.  required 
to  give  up  the  right,  to  have  their  own  nuclear  explosives. 

The  next  day  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  opened 
hearings  on  the  Treaty.  'On  September  17  the  committee-  voted  13  to 
3,  with  three  abstentions,  to  recommend  ratification.  However,  the 
Senate  did  not  act  before  adjournment  and  President  Johnson's  term 
of  office  ended  with  the  Treaty  not  yet  approved.  President  Nixon  on 
February  5,  1969  sent  a  special  message  to  the  Senate  recommending 
its  approval.  In  it,  he  reendorsed  the  previous  commitment  that  the 
United  States  would  permit  the  IAEA  to  apply  its  safeguards  to  all 
peaceful  nuclear  activities  in  the  United  States.  Also  he  repeated  U.S. 
willingness  to  join  with  all  Treaty  parties  to  insure  that  the  potential 
benefits  from  peaceful  applications  of  nuclear  explosions  would  be 
made  available  to  non-nuclear- weapon  parties.331 

Brief  additional  hearings  were  quickly  held  by  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee 332  and  the  Senate  gave  its  advice  and  consent 
on  March  13, 1969.  The  Treaty  was  ratified  at  Washington  on  Novem- 
ber 24,  1969,  and  the  instrument  of  ratification  was  deposited  on 
March  5, 1970,  at  which  time  the  Treaty  entered  into  force. 

U.S.  Support  for  Safeguards 

The  commitment  of  the  non-weapons  nations  to  open  their  nuclear 
activities  to  international  safeguards  is  a  notable  innovation  in  inter- 
national relations.  Arriving  at  this  commitment  was  a  major  feat 
of  international  diplomacy.  In  testimony  before  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee,  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Rusk  recounted  some 
of  the  difficulties.  The  problem  which  had  most  complicated  the  nego- 
tiations arose  out  of  the  existence  of  two  international  safeguards  sys- 
tems :  those  of  IAEA  and  of  Euratom.  It  has  always  been  U.S.  policy 
to  work  toward  a  single,  worldwide  system  of  safeguards.  However, 
the  Common  Market  countries  were  reluctant  to  allow  the  IAEA 
safeguards  system  to  operate  in  their  countries  for  fear  that  this  ar-. 
rangement  would  lead  to  abandonment  of  Euratom  with  unfavorable 
effects  on  progress  toward  European  unity.  As  a  result,  the  United 
States  in  its  negotiations  had  to  seek  accommodation  for  both  systems. 
But  this  was  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the  U.S.S.R.  The"  Soviet 
Union  was  agreeable  to  mandatory  safeguards  requirements  for  the 
non-weapons  signatories  of  the  treaty,  but  held  that  those  safeguards 
should  be  administered  by  the  IAEA.  The  U.S.S.R.  was  a  member 
of  the  IAEA  but  not  of  Euratom.  From  the  outset  of  the  negotia- 
tions, the  Soviets  had  opposed  accepting  Euratom  safeguards  as  a 
substitute  for  those  of  IAEA  on  the  ground  that  this  alternative 
amounted  to  self -inspection  by  Euratom  members. 

fV'^clear  Nonproliferation  Treaty,"   Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents. 
vol.  5  (February  10.  1969),  p.  219. 

^U.S    Congress,   Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  Hearings,  Nonproliferation 
Treaty,  91st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1969  part  2. 


270 


The  safeguards  impasse  was  not  resolved  until  May  1968  when  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  jointly  presented  a  final  draft 
of  the  Treaty  to  the  United  Nations,  which  avoided  the  issue  by 
committing;  non-nuclear  weapons  states  to  negotiate  safeguards  agree- 
ments with  the  IAEA  either  individually  or  together  with  other 
states.  The  Secretary  of  State,  in  submitting  the  Treaty  to  the  Presi- 
dent and  recommending  its  transmittal  to  the  Senate,  pointed  to  the 
statement  of  principles  enumerated  by  the  U.S.  Co-chairman  of  the 
Eighteen  Nation  Disarmament  Committee  (now  the  Conference  of  the 
Committee  on  Disarmament,  or  CCD)  and  by  Ambassador  Arthur 
Goldberg  when  the  Treaty  was  presented  to  the  United  Nations 
General  Assembly.  The  principles  were : 333 

(1)  The  safeguards  system  of  the  IAEA  must  be  credible; 

(2)  Individual  nations  or  groups  of  nations  could  negotiate 
safeguards  agreements  with  the  IAEA.  By  indirection  this  meant 
Euratom  could  do  so ; 

(3)  Existing  national  records  and  safeguards  should  be  used 
by  the  IAEA. 

Safeguards  Provisions  of  the  Treaty 

Probably  the  most  controversial  part  of  the  negotiations  concerned 
the  issue  of  verification  of  nuclear  materials  holdings.  Article  III  sets 
out  terms  and  conditions  for  safeguards,  prohibited  acts,  non-inter- 
ference with  safeguards,  and  for  agreements  between  the  IAEA  and 
signatory  states.  The  arrangements  finally  agreed  to  were  as  follows : 

Scope:  Safeguards  shall  be  applied  on  all  source  or  special  fission- 
able material  in  all  peaceful  nuclear  activities  within  the  territory, 
jurisdiction,  or  control  of  non-nuclear-weapon  parties,  for  the  exclu- 
sive purpose  of  verification  of  the  fulfillment  of  their  obligations 
under  the  Treaty  not  to  divert  fissionable  materials  to  weapons  use. 

Prohibited  acts:  Transfer  is  prohibited  of  source  or  special  fission- 
able material  or  equipment  or  material  especially  designed  or  pre- 
pared for  the  processing,  use,  or  production  of  special  nuclear  material, 
to  any  non-nuclear  weapon  state  for  peaceful  purposes,  unless  the  item 
shall  be  subject  to  safeguards. 

Non-interference :  Safeguards  shall  be  implemented  ?o  as  to  avoid 
hampering  either  the  economic  and  technological  development  of  the 
parties  or  international  cooneration  in  peaceful  nuclear  activities. 

Safeguards  agreements :  The  Treaty  commits  the  non-weapons  signa- 
tories to  negotiate  details  of  a  safeguards  agreement  with  the  Inter- 
national Agency,  and  specifies  how  these  agreements  are  to  be  nego- 
tiated. Non-weapons  parties  may  enter  into  such  agreements  with 

838  The  detailed  statement  of  those  principles  follows  : 

(1)  There  should  he  safeguards  for  all  non-nueloar  weapons  parties  of  such  a  nature 
that  all  parties  ean  have  confidence  in  their  effectiveness.  Therefore  safeguards  estab- 
lished bv  an  agreement  negotiated  and  Concluded  with  the  IAEA  in  accordance  with 
the  statute  of  the  IAEA  and  the  Agency's  safeguards  system  must  enable  the  IAEA 
to  ctrrv  out  its  responsibility  of  providing  assurance  that  no  diversion  Is  taking  place. 

(2)  In  discharging  their  obligations  under  Article  III.  non-nuclear-weapons  parties 
may  negotiate  safeguards  agreements  with  the  1  VKA  individually  or  together  with 
other  parties  :  'ind  sneciflcallv.  ail  agreement  covering  such  obligations  may  be  entered 
Into  between  tbe  IAEA  and  other  international  organization  the  work  of  which  is 
related  to  the  IAEA   and  the  membership  of  which   Includes  the  parties  concerned. 

(3)  In  order  to  avoid  unnecessary  duplication,  the  IAEA  should  make  nnnronriate 
use  of  existing  records  and  safeguards,  provided  that  under  such  mutually  agreed 
arrangements  the  IAEA  can  satisfy  Itself  that  nuclear  material  is  not  diverted  to 
nuclear  weapons  or  other  nuclear  explosive  devices. 

Of.   U.S.  Congress.   Senate.  Commltl >n    Foreign   Relations.  Hearings,  Nonproliferation 

Treaty,  90th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1968  part  1  p.  255. 


271 


the  IAEA  either  individually  or  together  with  other  states.  This  latter 
provision  could  enable  Euratom  member  nations,  for  example,  to 
work  out  group  arrangements  for  Euratom. 

Safeguards  are  not  mandatory  for  parties  who  already  possess 
nuclear  weapons.  This  situation  was  upsetting  to  many  non- weapons 
states  during  negotiations,  but  ultimately  the  distinction  was  accepted. 

Chairman  Seaborg  of  the  AEC,  in  supporting  the  Treaty,  men- 
tioned the  concerns  expressed  by  several  countries  that  the  application 
of  IAEA  safeguards  might  place  the  non-weapon  states  at  a  commer- 
cial disadvantage  by  compromising  their  commercial  secrets  or  by 
interfering  with  the  operation  of  the  facilities.  He  called  these  fears 
groundless  and  explained : 334 

Agency  inspectors  are  precluded  from  interfering  in  plant  operations  and  they 
normally  require  access  only  to  information  that  is  not  commercially  sensitive. 
Nevertheless  they  are  barred  from  transmitting  any  information  that  they 
receive  to  unauthorized  parties  and  any  state  has  the  right  to  declare  a  proposed 
Agency  inspector  unacceptable. 

Negotiation  of  safeguards  agreements  was  to  begin  within  180  days 
from  the  original  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty. 

To  date,  the  IAEA  Board  of  Governors  has  approved  safeguards 
agreements  with  three  states :  Austria,  Finland,  and  Uruguay.  More 
approvals  are  expected  at  coming  meetings  of  the  Board. 

ELEMENTS   OF  THE  IAEA  SAFEGUARDS   SYSTEM 

The  IAEA  safeguards  system  under  the  Treaty  is  based  on  four 
main  elements  to  be  incorporated  into  individual  safeguards  agree- 
ments during  negotiations : 

( 1 )  A  review  of  the  design  of  nuclear  facilities ; 

(2)  Specification  of  a  system  of  facility  records  and  accounts; 

(3)  Specification  of  a  system  of  facility  reports;  and 

(4)  Inspections  of  safeguarded  nuclear  facilities  to  verify 
compliance  with  the  safeguards  agreement. 

The  design  review,  based  on  information  given  to  the  Agency  by  the 
state  or  obtained  by  initial  inspections,  is  to  ensure  that  each  facility 
will  permit  the  effective  applications  of  safeguards.  The  review  will 
also  be  used  to  determine  the  material  balance  areas 335  and  to  select 
those  "strategic  points"  336  which  will  be  used  for  measuring  nuclear 
material  flows  and  inventories. 

Agency  inspectors  will  be  sent  into  states  to  audit  records  and 
reports ;  to  verify  the  information  in  the  records  and  reports  by  physi- 
cal inspection,  independent  measurements,  and  sampling;  and  to  ex- 
amine facilities  to  check  on  measuring  equipment  and  operations 
carried  out.  The  frequency  and  duration  of  IAEA  inspections  are  to 
be  kept  to  the  minimum  consistent  with  the  effective  implementation 
of  the  safeguards  procedures.  The  inspectors  are  expected  to  carry 
out  their  duties  in  a  way  which  will  avoid  hampering  the  operation 
of  nuclear  facilities  or  the  technological  development  of  a  nation's 
nuclear  industry.  However,  the  Agency's  inspectors  must  be  given 
access  to  any  location  where  earlier  reports  and  inspections  have  indi- 

331  Ibid.,  p.  100. 

335  A  materials  balance  area  Is  an  area  within  which  the  accounts  for  nuclear  materials 
entering,  leaving,  and  stored  must  be  kept  In  balance. 

336  For  a  discussion  of  "strategic  points"  see  page  144. 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1-19 


272 


cated  that  nuclear  material  is  present.  Information  about  the  inspec- 
tors is  to  be  given  to  the  state  before  the  inspection  is  made,  and  the 
state  may,  if  it  wishes,  object  to  an  individual  inspector  and  ask  that 
another  be  sent.  Moreover,  the  state  has  the  right  to  have  inspectors 
accompanied  by  its  officials. 

NEGOTIATION  OF  IAEA   SAFEGUARDS   AGREEMENTS:   THE   IAEA    SAFEGUARDS 

COMMITTEE 

In  April  1970,  the  IAEA  Board  of  Governors  created  a  Safeguards 
Committee  to  recommend  the  contents  of  draft  safeguards  agree- 
ments. The  Committee  was  open  to  all  member  states  of  the  Agency, 
whether  Board  members  or  not.  This  open  membership  was  in  recogni- 
tion of  the  general  interest  in  safeguards  and  the  desire  of  many  non- 
weapons  member  nations  to  participate  directly  in  formulating  con- 
tents of  the  safeguards  agreements  which  they  ultimately  would  be 
asked  to  conclude.  The  Committee  met  intensively  over  many  months 
and  issued  three  reports,  covering  all  aspects  of  the  proposed  safe- 
guards agreements.337  With  the  approval  by  the  Board  of  Governors 
of  the  final  report  on  April  20,  1971,  the  IAEA  was  ready  to  nego- 
tiate and  conclude  all  aspects  of  the  necessary  safeguards  agreements 
with  parties  to  the  Treaty. 

In  defining  the  basic  content  of  the  agreement  between  the  states 
and  the  IAEA,  the  Safeguards  Committee  recommended  a  text  similar 
to  that  in  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  itself.  But  whereas  the  Treaty 
refers  to  the  Agency's  right  and  obligation  to  verify  the  prevention 
of  the  diversion  of  nuclear  energy  from  peaceful  purposes,  the  Com- 
mittee's document 338  limits  the  verification  procedure  to  nuclear  ma- 
terials. This  change  should  make  the  agreement  more  acceptable  to 
Euratom  countries,  for  it  shifts  the  emphasis  away  from  facilities 
and  toward  materials. 

SOME   FACETS   OF  THE   NEGOTIATIONS 

Underlying  the  IAEA's  guide  for  the  structure  and  content  of 
safeguards  agreements  are  two  principles  that  deserve  attention.339 
It  called  for  (1)  arrangements  that  would  provide  the  Agency  with 
an  effective  means  to  detect  the  diversion  of  nuclear  materials  or  to 
identify  unusual  circum stances  that  warrant  further  investigation; 
and  (2)  the  fullest  possible  use  of  existing  national  systems  of  ac- 
counting and  control  for  nuclear  materials,  and  the  requirements  that 
their  findings  be  verified  by  independent  measures. 

**»  Mr.  Peter  Kelly,  a  United  Kingdom  representative  on  the  Board  of  Governors  and 
a  participant  in  the  Committee's  work,  gives  some  insight  into  the  daily  workings  of 
this  group  of  nearly  50  very  different  delegations.  Relating  his  experiences,  he  wrote: 

Quite  early  In  our  work  a  moderate,  compromising  spirit  displayed  itself  in  the 
Committee.  Then  the  atmosphere  became  friendly,  at  times  even  humorous.  Instead 
of  confronting  opposed  views  in  the  Board  room,  delegates  took  to  talking  them 
over   in   the  lounge,  or  in  one  or  two   nearby   restaurants.    In   such   environments,   even 

tie   i :i    Intractable   looking   problems   proved   soluble :  even    the   prickliest-looking 

delegate   proved    to   have  a    human   side,    informal   consultation   came  to   count   for 

more    and    more    in    our    work:    and    when    we    got    hack    to    the    Hoard    room    even    the 

Intractable  problems   had   been     one   daren'1    say   "fixed,"   but,    perhaps,   "adjusted.' 
Cf.  International  Atomic  Energu   Igency  Bulletin,  vol.  L3,  No.  •".  (1971),  p.  10. 
338  IAEA,  The  Structure  and  Content  of  Agreements  Between   the  Agency  and  states 
Required  m   Connection    With   the   Treaty  on   the  Nonproliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons, 
\.  publication  INFCIRC/153  (May  1971),  29  pages. 

The  following  diSCUSSion  draws  extensively  upon  a  commentary  liy  Myron  I?.  Kratzer, 
then  Assistant  General  Manager  for  International  Activities  of  the  I'.S.  Atomic  Energy 
Commission,  in  into  national  Atomic  Energy  Agency  Bulletin,  vol.  13,  No.  3  (11)71), 
pp.  11    13. 


273 


One  of  the  most  important  actions  of  the  Safeguards  Committee 
was  to  specify  the  use  of  national  systems  of  accounting  and  control 
for  nuclear  materials.  The  United  States  consistently  supported  this 
idea  to  avoid  duplication  of  systems.  For  the  United  States  the  princi- 
ple of  independent  verification  is  the  cornerstone  of  any  meaningful 
system  of  safeguards.  Deciding  whether  there  has  been  a  diversion 
must  rest  on  objective  evidence  examined  by  international  inspectors 
and  not  on  information  made  available  by  the  inspected  party  itself. 

As  analyzed  by  the  United  States,  it  was  impractical  for  the  Agency 
to  operate  a  materials  accountability  system  with  its  own  accountants 
and  auditors  in  each  nuclear  facility.  This  approach  would  have  de- 
manded far  more  resources  than  would  be  available  to  the  Agency,  as 
well  as  far  more  intrusion  into  national  nuclear  operations  than  would 
be  tolerable.  Independent  verification  to  authenticate  findings  and 
data  in, national  systems  was  seen  as  the  solution. 

The  .Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  likely  to  be  a  principal  Euro- 
pean user  of  nuclear  power,  wanted  a  national  accounting  and  control 
system, to  serve  as  a  fink  between  the  IAEA  and  operators  of  nuclear 
power  plants.  According  to  one  analysis:  "This  arrangement  reduces 
the  Agency's  safeguards  costs  and.  at  the  same  time  avoids  the  arising 
of  substantial  differences  in  the  .application  of  safeguards  between 
countries  forming  part  of  a  regional  safeguards  systems," 340 

,A  satisfactory  national  svstem  would  include  a  measurement  system 
for  the  determination  of  the  quantities  of  nuclear  fuel  material  im- 
ported, produced,  shipped,  lost,  or  otherwise  removed  from  inventory. 
It  would  #lso  ;need  procedures  for  evaluating  accumulations  of  un- 
measured inventory  and  losses,  the  precision  and  accuracy  of  measure- 
ments, differences  in  shipper/receiver  measurements,  and  so  on.  A 
state  having  a  national  svstem  with  these  characteristics  would  pre- 
sumably Tbe  subject  to  a  minimum  of  Agency  verification. 

PROTECTION    OF    COMMERCIAL    INTERESTS 

Another  important  result  of  the  Safeguards  Committee's  work  was 
to  provide  a  state  being  inspected  with  assurances  that  its  legitimate 
commercial  interests  would  be  protected.  The  guidelines  enjoin  the 
Agency  to  exercise  extreme  care  in  the  protection  of  commercial  se- 
crets, to  avoid  undue  interference  with  the  nation's  peaceful  nuclear 
activities,  and  to  conduct  safeguards  in  a  manner  consistent  with 
the  economy  and  safety  of  the  activities  concerned. 

The  Safeguards  Committee's  report  incorporates  the  principle  that 
information  about  design  of  nuclear  facilities  supplied  by  member 
states  should  be  limited  to  that  necessary  for  safeguards.  It  also  con- 
tains an  important  new  feature  that  if  a  state  so  requests,  the  review 
of  information  of  particular  commercial  sensitivity  can  take  place  in 
the  country  concerned  so  that  reports  and  drawings  do  not  have  to 
leave  the  country  or  remain  on  file  in  the  IAEA. 

INSPECTIONS    AND  THEIR    SCHEDULING 

The  draft  agreement  lays  down  formulas  for  determining  the 
"intensity"  of  inspection  for  several  categories  of  nuclear  facilities. 

mo  Werner  Ungerer,   "Safeguards  :  Five  View?,"  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
Bulletin,  vol.  13,  No.  3  (1971),  p.  4. 


274 


Reactors  would  be  subject  to  a  predetermined  inspection  rate,  while 
that  for  other  facilities  would  depend  upon  the  throughput  of  nuclear 
materials  or  their  inventory.  The  inspection  effort  contemplated  under 
the  new  approach  ranges'from  one  inspection  per  year  for  modest 
facilities,  such  as  research  reactors,  to  several  man-years  of  continuous 
inspection  in  the  case  of  commercial  scale  reprocessing  or  fuel  fabrica- 
tion plants.  The  arrangements  also  permit  the  Agency  to  employ  a 
part  of  its  routine  inspection  effort  on  an  unannounced  basis.  In  the 
case  of  sensitive  facilities  such  as  fuel  reprocessing  plants,  the  maxi- 
mum inspection  effort  would  rise  in  proportion  to  the  square  root  of 
the  throughput,  reflecting  the  concept  that  large  size  plants  give  eco- 
nomies of  scale  not  only  of  operating  costs  but  also  for  the  inspection 
effort  needed.341 

"strategic  points" 

The  Safeguards  Committee  proposed  one  answer  to  the  question 
of  how  far  IAEA  inspectors  could  go  in  performing  their  functions. 
It  advanced  the  concept  of  "strategic  points,''  which  are  also  explicitly 
recognized  in  the  Treaty.  The  "strategic  points"  concept  means  that 
Agency  inspectors  would  normally  confine  their  access  to  locations 
selected  by  the  Agency  in  advance,  where  nuclear  material  can  be 
most  easily  measured,  contained,  or  observed.  IAEA  inspectors  would 
stay  at  these  points  and  not  roam  throughout  the  facilities.  In  this 
way.  the  chance  that  an  inspector  might  obtain  technological  informa- 
tion of  commercial  value  can  be  reduced  and  interference  with  plant 
operations  held  to  a  minimum. 

The  effectiveness  of  this  limited  inspection  concept  depends  on  new 
technological  advances  and  administrative  skills.  Development  of 
tamper-proof  instruments  and  seals,  for  example,  will  be  needed.  Some 
procedures  that  have  been  developed  will  impress  some  countries  or 
observers  as  too  harsh ;  others  as  too  lenient.  Disagreements  can  be 
expected  between  the  IAEA  and  the  countries  subject  to  inspections. 
Nevertheless  the  fact  that  many  nations  have  agreed  to  subject  a  po- 
tentially significant,  future  undertaking — the  commercial  use  of 
nuclear  power — to  international  inspection  is  encouraging. 

enforcement  or  safeguards 

The  Safeguards  Committee  of  the  IAEA  inevitably  has  had  to  deal 
with  the  question :  what  would  be  done  in  the  event  of  a  known  or 
suspected  diversion?  This  question,  it  will  be  recalled,  was  one  of  the 
most  thorny  and  unresolved  issues  in  the  abortive  negotiations  of  the 
Banich  plan. 

The  draft  agreement  provides  for  procedures  designed  to  afford  op- 
portunity for  resolution  of  any  diversion  issue  through  consultation 
between  the  TAEA  and  the  nation  concerned.  Should  this  not  be  pos- 
sible, the  TAEA  Board  of  Governors  is  empowered  to  apply  the  pro- 
vision of  the  Agency  statute  relating  to  noncompliance  which  includes 
among  other  steps,  a  report  to  the  United  Nations  Security  Council. 
The  agreement  also  provides  for  the  arbitration  of  disputes  by  an 
impartial  tribunal,  except  those  relating  to  a  finding  of  non- 
verification. 


M1Frnnk  Bnrnnhy.  Director  of  the  Stockholm  Institute  for  Peace  Research,   quips  that 
this  must  he  the  first  time  a  square  root  appears  In  an  International  agreement. 


275 


U.S.  SUPPORT  OF  THE  SAFEGUARDS  COMMITTEE 

The  United  States  has  consistently  supported  the  Safeguards  Com- 
mittee's work.  Addressing  the  14th  session  of  the  IAEA's  General 
Conference  in  September  1970,  AEC  Chairman  Seaborg  said  that  the 
United  States  was  very  satisfied  with  the  work  of  the  Committee  in 
formulating  principles,  and  in  providing  for  independent  verification 
by  the  Agency.  He  urged  that  the  Agency  should  make  full  use  of 
national  systems  in  carrying  out  safeguards.  Chairman  Seaborg  em- 
phasized U.S.  desire  for  these  principles  and  for  their  constructive 
refinement : 342 

We  believe,  on  the  basis  of  our  direct  experience  with  IAEA  safeguards,  that 
they  are  not  intrusive  and  will  not  interfere  with  the  economical  operation  of 
plants  or  the  security  of  proprietary  information.  At  the  same  time,  we  strongly 
favor  the  continuing  evolution  of  the  IAEA  safeguards  system  to  take  full 
advantage  of  all  technical  advances  permitting  improved  efficiency  of  safeguards. 

THE    SOVIET   VIEW 

The  Soviet  Union  also  supported  the  work  of  the  Safeguards  Com- 
mittee. Professor  I.  D.  Morokhov,343  commented  on  the  Committee's 
recommendations  as  follows : 344 

Its  recommendations  on  the  content  of  the  agreements  concerning  the  Agency's 
supervision  of  the  nuclear  activities  of  non-nuclear- weapons  States  will  enable 
the  Agency  effectively  to  discharge  its  functions  under  the  Treaty,  on  the  basis 
of  a  judicious  combination  of  national  safeguards  systems  and  independent 
verifications  by  the  Agency.  The  procedures  for  the  conduct  of  inspections,  desig- 
nation of  inspectors  and  settlement  of  disputes,  which  the  Committee  has  worked 
out,  take  full  account  of  the  sovereign  rights  of  States. 

The  Committee's  recommendations  ensure  protection  of  the  industrial  and 
commercial  interests  of  States  by  providing  for  communication  to  the  Agency 
of  only  the  minimum  of  data  on  the  nuclear  activities  of  a  State  necessary  for 
safeguards  purposes  and  by  requiring  the  Agency  to  treat  as  strictly  confidential 
such  commercial  and  industrial  information  of  importance  to  States  as  may  come 
into  its  possession  in  connection  with  safeguards. 

Criticisms  of  IAEA  Safeguards 

Critics  have  contended  it  has  not  been  proved  that  IAEA  will  be 
able  to  perform  adequately  the  inspection  role  assigned  to  it  in  the 
Treaty.  They  challenge  the  reliability  of  estimates  of  the  costs  to 
sufficiently  strengthen  the  IAEA  to  fulfill  its  inspection  role  and 
they  ask  what  share  of  the  increased  burden  the  United  States  might 
be  asked  to  underwrite. 

Even  with  the  successful  application  of  inspection  procedures  by 
the  IAEA  on  declared  peaceful  nuclear  activities,  critics  contend  that 
a  nation  could  still  manufacture  nuclear  weapons  in  secret.  Could  a 
nation  which  desires  to  produce  weapons  hide  some  fissionable  ma- 
terial before  the  inauguration  of  the  safeguards?  Or  could  it  secretly 
build  separate  facilities  to  produce  fissionable  material  and  to  fabri- 
cate weapons  which  could  not  be  detected  by  the  circumscribed  visits 
of  IAEA  inspectors?  Could  illicit  facilities  be  detected  without  gen- 
eral inspection  of  the  entire  countryside?  Has  a  feasible  way  been 
found  to  detect  hidden  stockpiles  of  fissionable  material  ?  These  ques- 
tions await  answers. 


343  "General  Conference  of  the  International  Atomic  Ene^v  Agencv  holds  14th  session 
at  Vienna,"  State  Department  Bulletin,  vol.  63  (October  26,  1970),  p.  487. 

"»  First  Deputy  Chairman  of  the  U.S  S.R.  State  Committee  on  the  Utilization  of  Atomic 
Energy  and  representative  from  the  U.S. S.R.  on  the  IAEA  Board  of  Governors. 

*"  I.  D.  Morokhov.  "Safeguards :  Five  Views,"  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
Bulletin,  vol.  13,  No.  3  (1971),  pp.  7-9. 


276 


An  even  bigger  potential  loophole,  critics  contend,  is  the  lack  of  any 
inspection  of  the  nuclear- weapon  powers:  China,  France,  the  United 
States,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  Soviet  Union.  Without  auditing 
the  use  of  the  fissionable  material  they  produce,  much  less  the  stock- 
piles they  have  produced  in  the  past,  is  there  a  way  to  be  sure  that  they 
are  not  secretly  transferring  fissionable  material  to  non-nuclear  coun- 
tries ?  In  the  view  of  some  critics,  only  comprehensive  inspection,  per- 
haps covering  all  exports  from  nuclear  to  non-nuclear  countries,  could 
provide  assurance  against  the  illicit  international  transfer  of  nuclear 
weapons  of  fissionable  materials  for  weapons  purposes. 

One  student  of  the  proliferation  problem  has  questioned  the  whole 
approach  of  the  inspection  system  and  believes  that  accounting  for 
nuclear  fuels  is  an  inadequate  safeguard.  He  argues  that  what  is 
needed  instead  is  a  method  of  internationally  acquiring,  storing,  and 
guarding  the  plutonium  produced  by  civil  nuclear  reactors.  Leonard 
Beaton,  writing  in  Foreign  Affairs  in  1967,  said : 345 

The  proposed  nonproliferation  treaty  must  be  judged  primarily  for  its  effect 
on  the  growing  threat  of  a  worldwide  diffusion  of  plutoniiun.  If  it  reinforces 
the  false  security  of  the  safeguards  system  by  persuading  the  legalists  that  no 
country  which  has  signed  is  ever  capable  of  building  nuclear  weapons,  it  will 
do  a  grave  disservice  to  the  cause  of  nonproliferation.  It  could  provide  the 
cover  under  which  the  plutonium  silently  spreads,  as  it  is  now  spreading  to 
Italy  and  India.  Like  a  fine  row  of  Georgian  houses  condemned  to  come  down, 
everything  would  be  gradually  let  go.  When  the  houses  are  finally  bulldozed 
away  they  have  usually  become  so  ramshackle  that  no  one  minds.  Equally,  under 
the  placid  rule  of  safeguards  as  they  are  now  understood,  the  plutonium  will 
spread  for  and  wide.  When  the  collapse  comes,  no  one  will  remember  how  easy 
it  might  have  been  to  hold  a  narrow  ring. 

Finally,  critics  point  out,  any  nation  can  withdraw  upon  3 
months'  notice.  A  nation  could  sign  the  Treaty  but  proceed  secretly 
as  far  as  possible  with  all  the  plans  for  making  nuclear  weapons  and, 
whenever  it  felt  ready,  merely  notify  the  other  parties  and  the  Secur- 
ity Council  of  the  United  Nations  that  it  was  withdrawing. 

Some  Congressional  Doubts 

Although  the  Senate  assented  to  the  Treaty,  and  thus  to  the  antici- 
pated role  of  the  International  Agency  in  safeguards,  there  have  l>een 
some  congressional  doubts.  For  example,  the  House  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  during  hearings  in  19P>S  heard  pointed  criticism  and 
a  warning  from  a  leading  member  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy  who  questioned  the  enforceability  of  Article  III.  the  ability 
of  the  International  Agency  to  carry  out  the  safeguards  function,  and 
the  role  of  the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency  in  the  nego- 
tiations. Representative  Craig  Hosmer  said,  in  part. : 346 

.  .  .  ACDA  now  comes  up  with  the  NPT  article  III  which  it  claims  provides 
an  enforcing  mechanism  in  the  form  of  inspection.  This  is  a  sad  delusion  made 
a  tragic  one  because  it  is  self-induced  by  ACDA  whose  spokesman  .  .  .  actually 
believe  article  III  lias  real  teeth,  when  in  truth  and  in  fact,  it  has  false  teeth 
for  tlie  fo'lowing  reasons: 

A.  Article  TII  only  calls  upon  signatories  to  "undertake  to  accept  safeguards 
as  set.  forth  in  an  agreement  to  I>e  negotiated  and  included  with  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency"  and  (hat  such  negotiations  commence  within  ISO  days 
after  the  treaty  goes  into  effect.  This  is  no  more  than  an  "agreement  to  make 
an  agreement."  No  legal  system  recognizes  as  valid  or  enforceable  any  such 
ambiguous  present,  promise  to  come  to  a  future  unspecified  agreement.  Article 

n4r'  l>r>nnrd  Ronton.  "Nurlenr  Fu<>1  for-All,"  Foreign  Affairs,  vol.  45   (July,  19R7).  p.  fifiO. 
849  U.S.    Conpross.   House,   Cnmmlttpp   on    Forolpn    Aff.iirs,    Hearings,    Arms    Control   and 
Disarmament  Aet  Amendments,  196S,  90th  Conp..  2d  Scss.,  1968,  p.  9fi. 


277 


III  is  just  as  blank  as  if  it  remained  without  words.  The  words  it  contains  mean 
nothing.  The  treaty  remains  without  any  provisions  for  enforcement  whatever. 
B.  In  any  event,  to  speak  of  IAEA  safeguards  as  something  which  exist  and 
can  be  relied  upon  to  enforce  this  treaty  is  ridiculous  to  the  point  of  absurdity. 
Anyone  familiar  with  the  primitive  capabilities  either  technological  or  financial, 
of  IAEA  in  the  safeguards  area  knows  this.  I  personally  verified  it  myself  only 
last  September  at  IAEA  headquarters.  To  assert  or  imply  that  IAEA  safeguards 
are  something  which  can  be  relied  upon  for  the  heavy  purpose  of  policing  this 
treaty  is  misleading  and  unconscionable.  It  will  take  years  for  IAEA  to  achieve 
even  a  minimum  inspection  capability.  .  .  .  IAEA  inspection  is  simply  a  facade 
like  a  Hollywood  movie  setting,  there  is  a  front  with  no  structure  behind  it. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  IAEA  has  fewer  inspectors  than  this  committee  has  mem- 
bers .  .  .  for  all  of  Europe  they  have  five  inspectors.  .  .  . 

Costs  of  Safeguards 

Questions  were  raised  during  negotiations  of  the  Treaty  whether  the 
IAEA  could  recruit  the  staff  to  administer  its  safeguards  responsi- 
bilities. There  were  also  fears  that  the  costs  would  be  enormous.  Chair- 
man Seaborg  countered  these  two  points  >m  1968.  He  regarded  the 
IAEA  safeguards  staff  while  then  modest  in  size  as  nevertheless  in  bal- 
ance with  the  worlrtio  be  done.  He  also  expressed  confidence  that  the 
Agency  would  be  able  to  recruit  the  necessary  people  for  its  expanded 
function.  As  for  expenses,  obviously  the  costs  for  administering  safe- 
guards would  go  up.  However,  these  Costs,  when  pro-rated  against  the 
cost  of  nuclear  power,  would  represent  no  more  than  a  fraction  of  one 
percent  of  the  cost  of  electricity  produced.  A  projection  of  manpower 
and  funding,  prepared  by  the  AEC's  Brookhaven  National  Labora- 
tory, estimated  requirements  of  IAEA  safeguards  as  increasing  from 
775  persons  and  $29.8  million  in  1971  to  2,374  persons  and  $143  million 
by  the  year  1990.  Comparing  these  costs  with  the  estimated  value  of 
nuclear  generated  electricity  produced  an  estimated  cost  increase  of 
0.16  mills  per  kilowatt-hour  for  1971,  which  would  drop  to  0.02  mills 
per  kilowatt-hour  by  1990.347 

•  More  recently,  in  1970?  Brookhaven  revised  its  estimates  for  man- 
power and  financial  requirements  for  IAEA  safeguards.438  Table  VI 
lists  the  latest  BNL  estimates  of  manpower  requirements  and  the 
future  costs  of  implementing  IAEA  safeguards.  It  assumes  that  power 
reactors  and  nuclear  fuel  facilities  in  17  non- weapons  countries — which 
would  include  all  of  the  European  nations  except  France  and  the 
United  Kingdom — will  be  safeguarded  under  the  Treaty. 

A  summary  of  the  number  of  nuclear  facilities  in  non- weapons  states 
to  be  safeguarded  by  IAEA  is  given  in  Table  VII.  Little  change  in 
the  number  of  conversion,  fabrication,  and  reprocessing  facilities  is  . 
expected,  but  by.  1980  the  number  of  power  reactors  should  increase, 
and  likewise  the  number  of  Countries  safeguarded. 

ljhe  present  safeguards  staff  of  the  IAEA  numbers  about  60.  Brook- 
Raven  estimates  this  must,  increase  to  275  if  the  Treaty  is  to  be  fully 
implemented  by  1^73.  This  growth  of  almost  500  percent  in  less  than 
3  ydars  would  probably  fee  difficult  for  IAEA  to  attain.  If  so,  the 
Agency  initially  may  ha^e  to  accept  a  lower  level  of  safeguards. 
":.  ^i  number  of  conditions  ap'pears  necessary  to  achieve  effective  safe- 
gfudrcls  at  acceptable  eodts;  These  iriclude :  (1)  standarization  of  the 
existing  systems  of  control  and  management,  (2)  adoption  of  a  uni- 

'««-ibtti.,p.  154,       •  ••:>..  >-th  '•:■.'■!■■.'••        '  ,•      ;■'    '    ..'■..''  ':':.' 

848  L.  Green,  H.  Kouts,  and  W.  Marcuse,  IAEA  Costs  and  Manpower  RequlreYnetita  tinder. 
VPT  (Upton, •'N'.'Y.;:  Technical  Support  Organization,  Broofchaven  National ,  laboratory, 
September  1970,  report  No.  BNL  50263),  34  pp.  .    -        -,■  .'•■•',' V 


278 


349 


form  national  control  system,  and  (3)  adaptation  of  the  IAEA  safe- 
guards system  to  the  new  circumstances  arising  from  the  Treaty 

TABLE  VI.— TOTAL  MANPOWER  AND  COST  ESTIMATES  FOR  IAEA  SAFEGUARDS 
[Dollar  amounts  in  millions] 


1973 


1975 


1980 


Operating  cost 

Equipment  cost 

Total 

Manpower: 

Professional 

Secretary  or  clerk 


$9.6 
1.3 

$10.8 
1.5 

$13.6 
1.9 

10.9 

12.3 

15.5 

262 
30 

297 
32 

378 
36 

Source:  L.  Green,  H.  Kouts,  and  W.  Marcuse,  "IAEA  Costs  and  Manpower  Requirements  Under  NPT"  op.  cit,  p.  15. 
TABLE  VII.— SUMMARY  OF  NUCLEAR  FACILITIES  IN  NONWEAPONS  STATES 


1973 


1975 


1980 


Number  of  countries 

Power  reactor  sites 

Fuel  conversion  and  fabrication  plants  (natural  and  low  energy  U). 

Reprocessing  plants 

Research  reactors  (low  power) 

Critical  facilities 

Plutonium  fabrication  plants 


17 

17 

25 

69 

91 

200 

12 

12 

12 

>5 

7 

9 

50 

50 

53 

4 

3 

0 

3 

3 

4 

■2  small  plants  for  special  fuels. 
Loc.  cit. 

Financing  Safeguards  Under  the  Treaty 

Financing  was  discussed  by  the  U.S.  delegation  at  the  14th  session  of 
the  IAEA  General  Conference  in  September  1970.  AEC  Chairman 
Seaborg  said  that  the  United  States  attached  great  importance  to  the 
principle  of  financing  Agency  safeguards  costs  under  the  Agency's 
regular  budget,  which  would  spread  the  costs  among  all  members. 
Nonetheless,  the  United  States  recognized  that  there  was  room  for 
difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  relative  weight  to  be  given  to  factors 
used  to  determine  the  participation  of  each  Agency  member  in  meeting 
these  costs,  and  the  United  States  would  play  an  "active  and  construc- 
tive role"  in  the  discussion  of  the  matter.360 

Putting  the  costs  of  safeguards  into  the  IAEA's  regular  budget 
offered  the  advantage  of  lower  national  outlays  by  the  nuclear  power 
countries,  for  the  safeguards  costs  would  be  shared  by  nations  not  yet 
using  nuclear  power.  The  developing  countries  were  quick  to  protest. 
At  the  summer  1970  session  of  the  Safeguards  Committee,  a  spirited 
debate  on  financing  took  place.  The  developing  countries  objected  to 
the  idea  that  costs  of  safeguards  should  be  shared  by  all  members.361 
Delegates  from  nations  with  small  or  no  nuclear  programs  argued  that 
those  members  who  were  using  nuclear  power  should  bear  the  costs  of 
safeguards.  On  their  part,  the  nuclear  nations  argued  that  all  member 
states  should  pay  in  proportion  to  their  contributions  to  the  IAEA 

848  George  C.  Delcolgne  and  G.  Rubinstein,  "Nonnrollferatlon  and  Control :  Peaceful  Uses 
of     Atomic  Energy,"  Bulletin,  of  the  Atomic  Scientist*,  vol.  27    (February  1971),  p.   5. 

860  "General  Conference  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  holds  14th  Session  at 
Vienna,"  op.  cit.,  p.  487. 

161  Myron  B.  Kratzer.  "A  New  Era  for  the  International  Safeguards,"  Nuclear  Netca, 
vol.  14  (February  1971),  p.  42. 


279 


budget.  Those  IAEA  members  who  had  not  signed  the  Treaty,  pri- 
marily France  and  India,  expressed  concern  lest  money  be  diverted 
from  other  Agency  activities  to  pay  for  safeguards  in  which  they  had 
no  interest.362 

The  Safeguards  Committee  recommended  one  of  two  approaches  to 
financing  safeguards.353 

(a)  An  agreement  with  a  member  of  the  Agency  should  provide 
that  each  party  thereto  shall  bear  the  expenses  it  incurs  in  imple- 
menting its  responsibilities  thereunder.  However,  if  the  state  or 
persons  under  its  jurisdiction  incur  extraordinary  expenses  as  a 
result  of  a  specific  request  by  the  Agency,  the  Agency  shall  re- 
imburse such  expenses  provided  that  it  has  agreed  in  advance  to 
do  so.  In  any  case  the  Agency  shall  bear  the  cost  of  any  additional 
measuring  or  sampling  which  inspectors  may  request;  or 

(b)  An  agreement  with  a  party  not  a  member  of  the  Agency 
should  .  .  .  provide  that  the  party  shall  reimburse  fully  to  the 
Agency  the  safeguards  expenses  the  Agency  incurs.  However,  if 
the  party  or  persons  under  its  jurisdiction  incur  extraordinary  ex- 
penses as  a  result  of  a  specific  request  by  the  Agency,  the  Agency 
shall  reimburse  such  expenses  provided  that  it  has  agreed  in 
advance  to  do  so. 

A  JOINT  COMMITTEE  RESERVATION 

Some  members  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  have  ques- 
tioned costs  of  IAEA  safeguards.  Representative  Craig  Hosmer  esti- 
mated that  if  the  Agency  had  undertaken  inspection  of  peaceful 
nuclear  activities  in  1968  it  would  have  needed  a  total  of  245  inspec- 
tors at  a  cost  of  $17  million.  Based  on  five  full-time  inspectors  for  each 
1,000  megawatts  of  installed  nuclear  capacity,  plus  one  and  one-half 
full  time  mspectors  for  every  two  power  plants,  and  estimating  a  world 
total  of  4,000  power  reactors  by  the  year  1990,  he  forecast  that  some 
16,725  IAEA  mspectors  would  be  needed  for  safeguards  at  an  annual 
cost  of  $1.1  billion.354  He  asked  whether  such  an  international  burden 
would  be  tolerable. 

More  recently,  in  its  annual  report  for  1970,  the  Joint  Committee  said 
it  was  mindful  of  the  importance  of  safeguards,  but  was  looking  very 
cautiously  at  the  growing  IAEA  safeguards  program  and  what  could 
develop  into  a  need  for  increased  funding  to  support  the  numbers  of 
personnel  which  may  be  necessary.855 

Physical  Security  of  Nuclear  Materials 

IAEA  safeguards  under  the  Treaty  have  only  one  purpose :  to  detect 
the  diversion  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  from  authorized  purposes. 
Physical  security  measures  to  prevent  thefts  have  no  place  in  the 
Treaty.  It  is  assumed  that  governments  will  maintain  appropriate 
physical  security  and  will  deal  with  theft.  But  is  this  a  tenable  assump- 

•"Thls  point  was  made  by  Frank  Barnaby,  Director  of  the  Stockholm  International 
Peace  Research  Institute,  in  "Safeguards — With  or  Without  Strings?",  New  Scientist  and 
Science  Journal,  vol.  49  (February  25.  1971),  p.  432. 

868  INFCIRC/153,  op.  cit.,  pp.  5-6. 

tu  U.S.,  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  International  Agree- 
ments for  Cooperation — 1967-68,  90th  Cong.,  1st  and  2d  Sess.,  1968,  p.  74. 

858  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Activity  and  Accomplishments 
of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  During  the  Second  Session  of  the  91st  Congress, 
op.  cit.,  p.  44324. 


280 


tion  ?  Can  a  system  not  concerned  with  prevention  of  theft  or  catching 
and  punishing  thieves,  accurately  be  called  "safeguards"  ? 

There  may  be  a  tendency  for  international  safeguards  to  become  the 
glamour  segment  of  the  overall  anti-proliferation  effort.  Representa- 
tive Hosmer  addressed  this  issue : 356 

Safeguards  people,  their  systems  and  analyses,  methodologies,  black  boxes,  game 
theories,  non-destructive  test  paraphernalia  preventing  diversion.  This  may  be  a 
very  dangerous  assumption  in  the  real  world,  populated  by  very  fallible  people, 
some  of  whom  are  very  certain  to  be  just  no  damn  good. 

In  any  event,  the  world  political  community  probably  ought  to  be  doing  a  lot 
more  than  it  is  now.  .  .  . 

Deterrence  can  be  made  more  certain  by  boosting  the  illicit  diverter's  risk  of 
getting  caught,  thereby  both  incurring  punishment  and  losing  the  profits  of  his 
crime. 

If,  under  our  safeguards  system  of  international  public  opinion,  when  a  diver- 
sion is  discovered,  the  alarm  sounds,  whistles  blow,  sirens  scream,  the  United 
Nations  is  notified,  and  it  all  strikes  fear  and  terror  in  the  hearts  of  the  general 
public,  that  is  one  thing.  Quite  another  and  far  better  thing  is  if  it  scares  the  hell 
out  of  the  criminal  because  he  knows  that  the  jig  is  up. 

Every  increase  in  the  likelihood  of  a  quick  and  positive  identification  and  appre- 
hension of  a  nuclear  criminal  plays  a  key  role  in  fortifying  the  deterrent  equation. 
So  also  does  every  increase  in  the  degree  of  certainty  with  which  the  stolen  item 
can  be  recovered. 

Physical  security  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  appears  not  to  be  a  con- 
cern of  the  IAEA.  Mr.  Hosmer  raised  the  issue  whether  the  Agency 
should  be  involved  with  physical  security  by  establishing  guidelines 
for  police  training,  indoctrination,  and  equipment  for  this  highly 
specialized  responsibility.  He  would  have  the  major  nuclear  nations 
actively  assist  other  countries  in  developing  a  worldwide  network  of 
nuclear  police  systems. 

Providing  an  ultimate  answer  to  this  question  is  another  task  for 
U.  S.  diplomacy  in  this  nuclear  age. 

Nonprollferation  and  Euratom 

Had  the  Soviet  Union  succeeded  in  having  IAEA  safeguards  apply 
to  all  peaceful  nuclear  activities,  IAEA  would  have  had  to  take  over 
the  safeguards  already  established  by  Euratom.  The  United  States, 
however,  favored  a  continued  safeguards  function  for  Euratom.  The 
diplomatic  situation  on  this  issue  was  outlined  for  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Affairs  early  in  1968  by  Adrian  S.  Fisher,  Deputy 
Director  of  the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency,  which  was 
deeply  involved  in  negotiation  of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty.357 

As  late  ns  August  19G7  the  provisions  for  non-proliferation  remained 
blank.  As  Mr.  Fisher  explained  the  situation :  "* 

We  bad  no  safeguards  article  primarily  bcause  we  couldn't  agree  with  the 
Soviets  on  a  safeguards  article  that  was  acceptable  to  our  NATO  allies.  The  prob- 
lem of  negotiating  a  safeguards  article  with  our  NATO  allies  was  as  important 
in  our  minds  as  negotiating  one  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  principal  issue  was  the  relative  role  of  Euratom  and  the  IAEA  on  safe- 
guards  and  on  the  other  side  of  the  coin  whether  or  not  the  nuclear  weapons  states 
accepted  any  safeguards  on  their  own  peaceful  nuclear  activities.  They  have  been 
unwilling  to  do  so  on  the  ground  that  it  doesn't  relate  to  the  purposes  of  the 
treaty. 


aw  Keynote  remarks  of  Coneressmnn  CraJe  TTosmcr  hoforc  the  Symposium  on  Imple- 
menting Nuclear  Safejruards,  Kansas  State  University,  October  25. 1071.  In  Conqrexaional 
Record  (October  26.  1071).  p.  TT9002  (Dully  edition). 

857  Statemenl  of  Adrian  S.  Basher,  In  U.S.  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Foreign  AfT.-iirs, 
Hearings,   ASmt   Control  and  Disarmament  Art   Amendments,  1968,  op.   cit.,  pp.  59-91. 

"8  Ibid.,  p.  60. 


281 


As  for  Euratom,  he  underscored  the  concern  of  its  member 
nations :  ** 

Our  Euratom  friends  were  very  concerned  that  Euratom  safeguards  not  dis- 
appear, the  Euratom  structure  not  disappear,  as  a  result  of  any  IAEA  safeguards 
agreement.  They  opposed,  for  example,  a  provision  which  on  its  face  would  seem 
the  simplest,  which  said  that  this  treaty  shall  be  safeguarded  by  the  IAEA ;  that 
is,  IAEA  safeguards  shall  be  applicable  to  non-nuclear  activities. 

Our  allies  opposed  that,  and  they  opposed  it  with  good  reason.  They  opposed 
it  because  they  didn't  want  a  duplicative  set  of  safeguards,  because  if  there  were 
such,  the  Euratom  safeguards  themselves  might  disappear  as  unnecessary. 

U.S.  policy,  Mr.  Fisher  went  on  to  say,  was  that  we  did  not  wish  to  be 
a  party  to  any  attempt  to  undermine  the  structure  of  Euratom  in  terms 
of  national  programs.  mo 

EURATOM  CONCERN 

Euratom  members  have  been  disturbed  over  the  Nonproliferation 
Treaty.891  One  concern  has  been  expressed  that  Euratom's  inspection 
system,  which  has  been  a  major  factor  in  binding  the  members  to- 
gether, would  lose  substance  if  it  is  subordinated  to  the  inspection  sys- 
tem of  the  IAEA.  Other  observers  had  hoped  that  were  Euratom  to  be 
given  an  inspection  role  under  the  Treaty  it  would  give  the  organiza- 
tion a  needed  boost.  As  finally  adopted,  the  Treaty  does  not  recognize 
Euratom  by  name,  but  does  permit  nations  or  groups  of  nations  to 
enter  into  inspection  arrangements  with  the  IAEA.  This  provision  has 
been  interpreted  as  permitting  the  IAEA  to  enter  an  agreement  with 
Euratom  giving  Euratom's  inspection  system  some  role. 

Another  concern  of  members  of  Euratom  is  that  if  IAEA  safeguards 
were  applied,  it  would  result  in  a  discriminatory  control  system  within 
the  Euratom  community,  and  that  it  would  hinder  the  creation  of  a 
European  nuclear  industry.  Because  France  as  a  nuclear  weapons 
power  would  not  be  subject  to  inspection  under  the  Treaty,  other  Eura- 
tom members  feared  this  exemption  might  result  in  a  displacement  of 
nuclear  research  and  industry  from  the  controlled  members  to  France, 
or  that  the  Treaty  would  impede  joint  nuclear  activities  involving 
France  and  other  states.  ; 

A  State  Department  memorandum  prepared  in  January  1969  for 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  explained  that  the  safeguards 
article  was  incorporated  in  the  final  drafts  of  the  Treaty  only  after 
consultation  by  the  United  States  with  its  Euratom  allies  and  with 
the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities.  The  three  Euratom 
members  who  had  signed  the  Treaty  did  not  consider  that  there  was 
any  incompatibility  between  the  goals  of  nonproliferation  and  Eura- 
tom. It  was  their  position  that  the  safeguards  provided  in  the  Treaty' 
would  be  the  subject  of  agreements  to  be  concluded  with  the  IAEA 
and  that  to  avoid  the  possibility  of  incompatibilities  with  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Euratom  treaty,  safeguards  must  be  defined  so  that  the 
rights  and  obligations  of  the  member  states  and  the  Community  remain 
intact.  The  Euratom  members  which  had  signed  the  Nonproliferation 

858  Ibid.,  p.  61. 

880  Loc.  clt. 

an  Much  of  the  following  discussion  of  the  impact  of  NPT  uDon  Euratom  draws  heavily 
SES. a„ repc rt  0f  E1r?n  C-  Coilip,r-  Analyst  in  U.S.  Foreign  Policy,  of  the  then  Legislative 
Reference  Service  Library  of  Congress,  entitled  "Effects  of -the  Nonproliferation  Treaty 
£«j£,fr£atii0Mal  In|*ltution8.*'  It  is  reprinted  in  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate.  Committee  on 
462^475  Relations'   Heartn08>  Nonproliferation   Treaty,  91st   Cong.,    1st   Sess.,    1969,    pp. 


282 


Treaty  expected  that  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities 
would  enter  into  negotiations  with  the  IAEA.  To  emphasize  their 
desire  to  preserve  Euratom  safeguards,  they  expressed  their  intention 
not  to  ratify  the  Treaty  before  such  negotiations  has  produced  an 
agreement.362 

A   RECENT  DEVELOPMENT 

The  most  recent  development  affecting  Euratom  safeguards  under 
the  Treaty  is  the  reported  agreement  in  principle  between  Euratom 
and  the  International  Agency  for  IAEA  inspection  of  nuclear  activities 
in  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  Italy,  and  West  Germany, 
but  not  in  France.  European  Economic  Community  sources  say  the 
five  will  drop  their  insistence  that  tighter  Euratom  inspections  be 
allowed  in  France  as  a  prerequisite  to  their  approval  of  IAEA  inspec- 
tion of  their  facilities.  Thus  by  giving  in  to  the  French,  who  had  agreed 
only  to  Euratom  inspection  of  French  facilities  for  nuclear  materials 
from  non-French  sources,  the  way  could  be  cleared  for  ratification  of 
the  Treaty  by  Euratom  members.363 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 

The  development  of  international  safeguards  is  an  evolving  inter- 
action between  nuclear  technology  and  American  diplomacy.  The 
United  States  has  consistently  supported  international  safeguards 
administered  by  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  U.S.  sup- 
port of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  has  reaffirmed  the  importance 
that  this  Nation  attaches  to  effective  performance  of  safeguards — a 
technological  activity  growing  out  of  the  discovery  of  nuclear  fission. 
As  a  gesture  to  persuade  other  nations  that  the  inspection  provisions 
of  the  Treaty  do  not  impose  an  unacceptable  interference  with  na- 
tional sovereignty,  the  United  States  has  volunteered  to  place  its  civil 
nuclear  industry  under  IAEA  safeguards,  and  the  United  States  has 
already  voluntarily  placed  several  nuclear  facilities  under  these  safe- 
guards. 

Another  task  for  U.S.  diplomacy  will  be  to  assure  a  satisfactory 
outcome  of  the  agreement  reached  between  the  IAEA  and  Euratom 
for  continuation  of  the  Euratom  safeguards  system  in  cooperation 
with  IAEA  safeguards.  These  safeguards  arrangements  between  two 
international  agencies  will  be  important  for  the  future  of  Euratom. 
A  success  would  add  reason  for  future  support  to  this  declining  orga- 
nization. Also,  success  could  present  an  interesting  issue  for  U.S.  diplo- 
macy should  the  Soviet  Union  propose  a  similar  arrangement  for  na- 
tions within  its  bloc. 

So  far  the  IAEA  safeguards  system  has  proven  tolerable  to  na- 
tions exposed  to  it  under  the  "trilateral"  nuclear  assistance  agree- 
ments between  the  United  States,  individual  other  nations,  and  the 
Agency.  Can  IAEA  experience,  derived  from  safeguarding  compara- 
livelv  small  amounts  of  nuclear  materials  in  special  curcumstances, 
provide  an  adequate  base  for  the  routine  safeguarding  of  large  quan- 
tities? The  amounts  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  now  used  for  civil  nu- 
clear power  are  modest,  as  is  the  amount  of  plutonium  being  produced 

382  Memorandum  relating  to  minority  and  individual  views  on  the  Nonproliferation 
Treat  v.  In  U.S.  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  Hearings,  Nonprolijera- 
tin»  Treaty,  op.  dt.,  pp.  310-311. 

*»  Nucleonics  Week,  vol.  12  (September  30,  1971),  p.  8. 


283 


as  a  byproduct  of  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe  and  the 
United  States.  Yet  if  present  estimates  for  growth  of  nuclear  power 
are  correct,  within  the  decade  there  will  be  a  marked  increase  in 
both  the  number  of  nuclear  power  plants  and  supporting  facilities 
to  be  safeguarded  and  the  amounts  of  material  in  process,  transit,  and 
inventory,  factors  which  would  be  expected  to  increase  the  tempta- 
tion and  opportunities  for  attempted  diversions.  U.S.  foreign  policy 
toward  commercial  nuclear  energy  in  Europe  can  be  expected  to  have 
some  influence  on  the  nature  and  pace  of  this  future  growth,  and  upon 
the  attitude  of  the  governments  involved  toward  the  IAEA  and  the 
safeguards  system. 

Specific  issues  of  importance  in  U.S.  foreign  policy  for  the  1970's 
and  the  1980's  appear  to  include  the  following : 

(1)  A  point-of -no-return  decisian:  At  this  time,  in  1972,  nuclear 
power,  while  growing  rapidly,  is  still  not  a  major  component  of  electric- 
ity supply  in  either  the  United  States  or  Europe.  If  the  risks  to  world 
peace  from  potential  diversion  of  nuclear  materials  cannot  adequate- 
ly be  controlled  by  safeguards,  there  may  still  be  time  to  deemphasize 
nuclear  power  despite  the  economic  loss  of  much  of  the  past  national 
investments  in  bringing  nuclear  power  to  its  present  state.  Within 
a  .few  years,  however,  the  nations  of  the  world  will  pass  a  point  of 
no  return  beyond  which  a  decision  to  abandon  or  limit  nuclear  power 
will  no  longer  be  a  njanageable  policy  alternative.  At  issue  for  U.S. 
foreign  policy  is  a  final  decisive  international  risk-versus-benefit 
analysis  for  nuclear  power  in  terms  of  dangers  to*  world  peace  from 
diversion  of  materials  to  use  in  clandestine  weapons. 

(2)  U.S.  support  for  IAEA  safeguards :  The  present  demonstra- 
tion of  IAEA  safeguards  would  not  have  been  possible  without  U.S. 
support  and  cooperation.  But  what  of  preparing  the  IAEA  to  apply 
its  safeguards  systems  to  commercial  nuclear  power  throughout  the 
world  ?  For  U.S.  diplomacy  there  are  interacting  foreign  and  domes- 
tic considerations.  On  the  one  hand,  strong  past  U.S.  support  would 
suggest  that  future  U.S.  support  should  be  expanded  so  that  the 
Agency  can  prepare  for  the  anticipated  rapid,  worldwide  growth  in 
the  use  of  nuclear  power.  On  the  other  hand,  domestic  demands  for 
funds  and  changing  attitudes  toward  foreign  aid  seem  likely  to  make 
such  expansion  difficult.  In  these  circumstances,  it  would  seem  that 
U.S.  diplomacy  has  a  two-pronged  responsibility  for  the  future  of 
this  international  control  of  a  potentially  dangerous  technological 
product.  First,  it  will  have  to  help  assure  conditions  for  the  IAEA 
adequately  to  perform  its  safeguards  function.  Second,  it  will  have 
to  help  generate  the  domestic  understanding  and  commitment  needed 
to  assure  adequate  U.S.  support. 

Another  related  function  for  U.S.  diplomacy  is  likely  to  be  that  of 
working  to  determine  the  future  shape,  scale,  and  balance  of  the 
IAEA  activities.  If  only  the  safeguards  function  expands,  then  bit  by 
bit  other  Agency  functions  may  atrophy  so  that  ultimately  the  IAEA 
may  become  primarily  a  safeguards  agency.  This  condition  may  or 
may  not  be  m  the  ultimate  U.S.  interest.  IAEA  concentration  on 
safeguards  should  improve  the  management  and  effectiveness  of  this 
function.  However,  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  offered  non- weapons 
states  the  promise  of  benefits  from  nuclear  energy.  Could  this  promise 
be  adequately  fulfilled  by  an  international  agency  whose  technical 


284 


assistance  and  related  functions  have  been  stunted  by  asymmetrical 
preoccupation  with  safeguards? "" 

U.S.  diplomacy  inevitably  will  have  a  major  responsibility  for  work- 
ing out  answers  to  these  issues. 

(3)  Voluntary  safeguards  in  the  United  States:  Two  Presidents 
have  committed  the  United  States  voluntarily  to  place  its  nuclear  in- 
dustries under  IAEA  safeguards  as  an  inducement  to  persuade  non- 
weapons  nations  to  sign  and  ratify  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty.  At 
the  moment,  the  ratification  process  is  incomplete  and  the  United 
States  has  not  been  called  upon  to  honor  this  offer.  However,  it  may 
be  timely  to  consider  foreign  and  domestic  policy  implications  of  the 
offer,  such  as : 

The  acceptable  scale  of  IAEA  inspections ; 

The  degree  of  reliability  desired ; 

Whether  the  function  of  IAEA  safeguards  will  be  independ- 
ently to  detect  unauthorized  diversions,  or  to  assure  that  national 
safeguards  systems  are  adequate  to  do  so  and  to  test  them  occa- 
sionally ; 

Necessary  limitations  upon  IAEA  use  of  inspectors  who  are 
nationals  of  nations  whose  foreign  and  domestic  policies  are  in 
conflict  with  those  of  the  country  to  be  inspected;  and 

Available  measures  to  protect  trade  secrets  of  the  host  coun- 
try's nuclear  industry  while  at  the  same  time  providing  adequate 
access  by  IAEA  inspectors  to  nuclear  materials  in  process  and 
in  inventory. 

(4)  The  -physical  security  issues:  The  IAEA  safeguards  system  is 
limited  in  purpose  to  detecting  diversion  of  nuclear  materials.  It  does 
not  extend  to  security  and  other  measures  to  protect  the  materials 
against  attempted  diversions.  To  what  extent,  if  any,  should  U.S. 
foreign  policy  attempt  to  extend  the  IAEA  safeguards  function  into 
physical  protection  and  security  of  nuclear  materials  and  to  apprehen- 
sion of  would-be  diverters? 

(5)  Increased  U.S.  assistance  in  nuclear  energy:  A  premise  of  the 
Nonprol  iteration  Treaty  is  that  the  nuclear  weapons  states  will  share 
with  the  non- weapons  states  the  benefits  of  nuclear  energy  to  induce 
them  to  agree  to  international  safeguards.  This  commitment  has  im- 
plications for  foreign  and  domestic  U.S.  policy  for  nuclear  energy. 
To  what  extent  is  the  United  States  prepared  to  shape  its  develop- 
ment of  nuclear  power  technology  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  non- weapons 
states?  Are  present  forms  and  channels  of  U.S.  nuclear  technological 
assistance  sufficient  for  purposes  of  the  Treaty,  or  need  they  be  broad- 
ened and  expanded?  Should  the  U.S.  develop  those  nuclear  power 
technologies  which  can  use  natural  uranium  or  thorium  as  fuel  and 
thus  avoid  the  requirements  for  enrichment  and  safeguards?  These  are 
some  of  the  questions  that  combine  elements  of  nuclear  technology, 
domestic  energy  policy,  and  diplomacy  which  will  have  to  be  answered 
during  the  1970's. 


XII.  Some  Issues  Recapitulated 

How  the  discovery  of  nuclear  fission  came  to  influence  American 
diplomacy  and  foreign  policy  has  been  examined  in  this  case  study. 
Clearly  these  interactions  are  of  interest  to  students  of  the  relations 
among  science,  technology,  and  American  diplomacy.  But  why  should 
the  Congress  and  the  public  be  interested  in  the  past  and  future  impli- 
cations of  nuclear  energy  for  diplomacy  in  the  face  of  all  the  other 
matters  clamoring  for  attention '. 

Two  primary  reasons  support  such  interest.  First,  after  several 
false  alarms  in  Europe — or  perhaps  they  were  preliminary  warnings 
unrecognized — it  is  now  becoming  evident  that  the  nations  of  the 
world  are  facing  a  growing  gap  between  demand  for  and  supply  of 
fuels  for  energy.  The  United  States  and  other  nations,  including  those 
of  the  European  Economic  Community  and  the  Soviet  bloc,  expect 
that  nuclear  energy  will  supply  a  large  part  of  the  electricity  reoxuired 
in  the  future,  perhaps  as  much  as  half  by  the  1900's.  U.S.  diplomacy 
and  foreign  policy  should  prepare  now  to  take  this  anticipated  energy 
gap  into  account,  especially  since  this  Nation  is  expected  to  import 
greatly  increasing  amounts  of  oil  and  natural  gas  in  the  decades 
ahead.  Thus  considerations  of  foreign  policy  may  become  an  input 
into  formation  of  domestic  policy  to  develop  nuclear  power  further 
as  a  means  of  reducing  the  U.S.  need  to  import  fuels,  thereby  easing 
international  tensions  and  competition  for  scarce  resources.  Second. 
European  experience  with  international  safeguards  with  its  feature 
of  international  inspection  could  provide  a  working  demonstration  of 
inspection  for  future  arms  control  and  disarmament.  Realization  of 
this  benefit  alone  would,  for  many  observers,  be  well  worth  the  U.S. 
effort  thus  far  devoted  to  fostering  nuclear  power  in  Europe. 

The  United  States,  by  deliberate  foreign  policy  decisions,  has  chosen 
to  foster  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe.  While  it  is  not  clear 
in  the  literature  what  quantitative  effects  U.S.  policies  and  programs 
have  had,  they  did  contribute  to  the  creation  of  one  global  and  two 
regional  international  organizations  for  nuclear  power,  and  to  the 
establishment  of  commercial  nuclear  industries  in  technological  nations 
of  Europe,  primarily  France,  Italy,  and  West  Germany.  Yet  U.S. 
support  has  not  led  to  a  unified  European  nuclear  industry,  which 
is  splintered  among;  competing  national  industries.  So  the  grand  hope 
of  the  European  Economic  Community  for  a  truly  European  nuclear 
energy  industry  remains  unrealized.  This  shortfall  from  the  goals 
of  A  Target  for  Euratom  has  benefited  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry, 
which  by  itself  is  today  appreciably  larger  and  stronger  than  any 
one  of  the  European  nuclear  industries. 

Commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe  is  beginning  to  lessen  Euro- 
pean dependence  upon  imported  fuels.  x\ssumin<r  that  European  prog- 
ress with  the  demonstration  and  deployment  of  the  breeder  reactor 
will  further  reduce  this  dependence  upon  uncertain  sources  of  fuels, 

(285) 


286 


such  as  those  of  the  Middle  East  or  the  Soviet  Union,  Europe  should  be 
less  vulnerable  to  energy  blackmail. 

Granted  the  historical  validity  of  the  reasons  for  U.S.  foreign 
policy  toward  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe,  what  of  the 
future?  Are  new  issues  emerging  that  are  of  sufficient  urgency  to 
compete  successfully  for  public  and  legislative  attention  ? 

No  straightforward  answer  is  at  hand.  It  is  easier  to  say  what 
may  be  theoretically  possible  in  the  world  of  physical  sciences  than 
it  is  to  predict  the  directions  that  men  and  their  institutions  may  take. 
Nonetheless,  there  are  several  probable  future  interactions  between 
nuclear  power  and  U.S.  diplomacy  and  foreign  policy.  These  inter- 
actions can  be  categorized  under  the  headings  of  nuclear  power  for 
U.S.  foreign  policy,  and  foreign  policy  for  U.S.  nuclear  power. 

Nuclear  Power  for  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 

Likely  issues  having  to  do  with  nuclear  power  as  an  element  of 
U.S.  foreign  policy  for  the  1970's  include  : 3<54 


SUSTAINING   U.S.   TECHNOLOGICAL   LEADERSHIP    IN    THE    19  7o's 

From  World  War  II  to  Sputnik  U.S.  world  technological  leadership 
went  unchallenged  and  was  sustained  in  large  part,  by  advances  in 
nuclear  science  and  technology.  Rather  than  seek  to  monopolize 
this  leadership,  the  United  States  offered  and  supplied  technological 
assistance  to  many  countries,  especially  in  Furone,  to  develop  their 
own  use  of  nuclear  power.  During  the  late  1960's,  U.S.  world  leadership 
was  challenged  by  other  nations.  Looking  to  the  1970's  and  to  an  era 
of  greater  peaceful  rather  than  military  competition,  there  are  several 
fundamental  issues  involving  nuclear  energy:  To  what  extent  should 
U.S.  foreign  policv  and  diplomacy  continue  to  foster  commercial  use 
of  nuclear  power  abroad?  Can  such  a  policy  help  enough  with  future 
U.S.  technological  leadership  to  be  worth  the  effort.,  or  would  the 
required  financial  and  other  resources  be  more  profitably  dedicated 
to  some  other  venture?  Would  the  benefits  for  U.S.  technological 
leadership  be  more  than  offset  by  economic  losses  through  competition 
from  other  countries  receiving  U.S.  technological  assistance?  Most 
important  of  all,  are  there  any  significant  risks  and  dangers  from  the 
standpoint  of  U.S.  national  security  in  continued  U.S.  support  of 
foreign  nuclear  power  development? 

REDUCING   EUROPEAN    DEPENDENCE    UPON    IMPORTED   ENERGY 

Assuming  that  U.S.  foreign  policv  objectives  continue  to  call  for  a 
European  community  stirmg  enough  to  withstand  pressures  from 
other  blocs  of  nations,  and  taking  into  account  the  si  ill  increasing 
demand   of   European   economies   for  energy,  can   development  of 

aw There   Is   one   .'isixi-t    of   national    and    International    development    of   nuclear   power 

which  has  nol   I ii   ii ti'ii   in   this  ense-study,  hut   that  should  he  mentioned.   Tf  is  the 

expanding  role  <>f  multinational  cornoratlons  In  tin-  nuclear  Industry.  Recently  major 
companies  "f  the  U.S.  nuclear  Industry  have  been  entering  Into  arrangements  with  their 
counterparts  In  Europe  and  elsewhere  that  may  presage  the  penetration  <>f  powerful 
multinattoa.il  corporations  Into  the  world's  nuclear  market.  Sucb  ;i  development  could 
pose  problems  of  national  and  foreign  policy.  Multinational  corporations  In  the  nuclear 
field  could  raise  issues  of  uncontrolled  export  "r  transfer  of  technology,  or  Questions  of 
control  over  movement  of  nuclear  materials  and  associated  safeguards,  or  the  ability  of 
some  government  effectively  to  regulate  use  of  nuclear  power  In  the  face  of  the  resources 
ami  pressure  from  such  powerful  organizations. 


287 


nuclear  power  significantly  reduce  Europe's  dependence  upon  un- 
certain imports?  To  what  extent  should  U.S.  diplomacy  and  foreign 
policy  reflect  an  objective  of  reducing  a  potential  trap  between  demand 
and  supply  for  energy  in  Europe?  In  particular,  do  present  arrange- 
ments for  U.S.  technical  assistance  for  nuclear  power  need  updating? 
What  future  balance  is  desirable  between  a  U.S.  foreign  policy 
objective  of  assuring  European  nations  of  a  reliable,  accessible  supply 
of  enriched  uranium  from  the  United  States  and  a  domestic  energy 
policy  which  might  prefer  to  limit  U.S.  foreign  supply,  commitments 
and  thus  reduce  the  need  to  expand  U.S.  enrichment  capacity  I 

CONTROLLING    THE    POSSIBILITIES    FOR    PROLIFERATION 

It  is  safe  to  predict  that  U.S.  foreign  policy  will  continue  to  empha- 
size the  fostering  of  world  peace  by  international  measures  to  reduce 
proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons,  particularly  into  the  hands  of  less 
stable  nations  or  other  organizations.  Questions  arising  out  of  this 
policy  posture  include : 

To  what  extent  should  the  United  States  support  the  expansion 
of  the  safeguards  function  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  ? 

How  much  is  it  in  the  U.S.  interest  for  the  IAEA  to  focus 
upon  safeguards  in  comparison  with  its  other  technical  assistance 
functions  ? 

In  what  way  and  within  what  limitations,  if  any.  should  the 
United  States  fulfill  its  commitment  to  place  its  nuclear  industry 
voluntarily  under  IAEA  safeguards? 

To  what  extent  should  U.S.  foreign  policy  attempt  to  extend 
the  safeguards  concept  to  include  physical  security  of  nuclear 
materials,  prevention  of  their  theft,  and  apprehension  of  thieves? 
To  what  extent  should  U.S.  diplomacy  support  fulfillment  by 
the  nuclear  weapons  nations  of  their  commitments  under  the 
Nonprolifcration  Treaty  to  share  benefits  of  nuclear  tcchnology 
with  non-nuclear  weapons  states? 

DEMONSTRATING  THE   PRACTICABILITY  OF   INSPECTION  FOR  ARMS  CONTROL 

U.S.  foreign  policy  supports  arms  control  and  disarmament.  One 
critical  issue  has  been  that  of  international  inspection  to  assure  the 
reliability  of  control.  Commercial  use  of  nuclear  power  in  Europe  of- 
fers useful  experience  with  international  inspection.  To  what  extent 
can  this  experience  be  used  by  the  United  States  in  its  advocacy  of 
arms  control  ?  Would  support  of  IAEA  or  of  Euratom  safeguards  be 
more  useful  in  this  context  ?  Would  U.S.  support  of  Euratom  safe- 
guards encourage  counterpart  safeguards  through  a  regional  bloc  of 
nations  within  the  Soviet  orbit? 

IMPROVING    THE   U.S.    POSITION   IN   WORLD  TRADE 

Assuming  that  economic  losses  due  to  competition  from  foreign 
countries  whose  nuclear  power  development  has  been  assisted  by  the 
United  States  can  be  avoided,  to  what  extent  can  further  encourage- 
ment of  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe,  and  elsewhere  overseas. 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  20 


288 


benefit  the  U.S.  position  in  world  trade  \  Can  export  of  nuclear  power 
products  and  services  provide  the  United  States  with  foreign  income 
comparable  to  that,  for  example,  of  aviation  exports  '. 

A  POTENTIAL  LIMITATION  UPON  NUCLEAR  POWER  FOR  FOREIGN  POLICY 

The  President's  energy  message  of  June  1^71  clearly  anticipated  a 
growing  role  for  nuclear  power  in  the  United  States.  On  the  other 
hand,  nuclear  power  has  been  under  continuing  attack  in  the  United 
States  during  recent  years  by  those  critical  of  its  environmental  ef- 
fects and  fearful  of  the  potential  dangers  of  its  radioactive  wastes. 
What  effect  this  criticism  will  have  upon  the  future  of  nuclear  power 
in  the  United  States  remains  to  be  seen.  Pending  the  outcome  of  this 
controversy,  there  may  be  the  question  of  how  far  U.S.  diplomacy 
should  go  in  further  encouraging  the  use  of  nuclear  power  abroad 
while  it  is  being  challenged  at  home. 

Foreign  Policy  for  Nuclear  Power 

If  nuclear  power  can  be  used  as  an  clement  in  U.S.  foreign  policy, 
then  conversely  U.S.  foreign  policy  may  be  turned  to  the  benefit  of 
the  domestic  nuclear  industry.  Several  issues  in  this  category  of  for- 
eign policy  benefits  for  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  include: 

MAINTAINING  THE  COMPETITIVE  POSITION  OF  THE  U.S.  NUCLEAR  INDUSTRY 

IN  THE  WORLD  MARKET 

To  date,  the  largest  export  market  for  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry 
has  been  in  Europe.  However,  as  the  United  Kingdom  joins  the  Euro- 
pean Economic  Community  and  Euratom,  there  is  the  possibility  that 
this  market  may  wish  to  favor  its  own  internal  nuclear  industries. 
What  diplomatic  measures  and  foreign  policy  decisions,  if  any.  would 
be  appropriate  to  preserve  access  of  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  to  the 
nuclear  market  of  the  European  Economic  Community  \ 

FURTHER  DEVELOPMENT  AND  DEMONSTRATION  OF  U.S.   NUCLEAR 

TECHNOLOGY  ABROAD 

The  long-term  future  of  nuclear  power  will  require  the  commercial 
use  of  the  breeder  reactor.  The  nuclear  industries  of  the  United  States 
and  Europe  are  seeking  to  complete  the  development  and  demonstra- 
tion of  breeder  technology.  The  U.S.  nuclear  industry  has  chosen  to 
concentrate  its  efforts  on  the  liquid  metal  fast  breeder  reactor,  one  of 
several  technological  approaches.  This  decision  lias  provoked  the  cril  i- 
cism  that  too  much  is  being  risked  on  the  success  of  one  approach. 
To  what  extent  should  U.S.  diplomacy  and  foreign  policy  seek  to  en- 
courage European  governments  and  nuclear  industries  to  develop  and 
demons! rate  alternal ives  to  the  I \S.  approach  \  To  what  extent  could 
diplomatic  and  foreign  policy  measures  reduce  the  barriers  to  the  flow 
of  technical  information  on  breeder  technologies  from  European  nu- 
clear industries,  keeping  in  mind  that  trade  secrecy  is  often  applied  in 
Europe  at  an  earlier  stage  of  industrial  development  than  in  the 
United  States? 


289  , 


EXPEDITING  THE  SOLUTION  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  EFFECTS  OF  NUCLEAR 

POWER 

Several  technological  problems  for  nuclear  power  technology  re- 
main to  be  solved  before  large-scale  commercial  use  of  nuclear  power 
is  likely  to  occur,  namely,  improvements  in  technology  for  reactor 
safety,  for  perpetual  storage  of  radioactive  wastes,  and  for  better  ways 
to  dissipate  or  use  waste  heat  from  nuclear  power  plants.  To  what  ex- 
tent should  U.S.  foreign  policy  and  diplomacy  seek  to  encourage  Eu- 
ropean nations,  individually  or  through  the  Common  Market,  to  per- 
form research  and  development  on  these  problems  which  would  be  of 
benefit  to  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  ? 

ESTABLISHMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  STANDARDS  FOR  NUCLEAR  POWER 

The  ability  of  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry,  and  for  that  matter  of 
other  technologically  intensive  U.S.  industries,  to  compete  in  foreign 
markets  will  be  affected  by  the  setting  of  international  standards  and 
perhaps  international  regulations.  To  what  extent  should  U.S.  for- 
eign policy  and  diplomacy  seek  to  assure  a  voice  for  the  United  States 
in  the  setting  and  application  of  international  standards  for  the  de- 
sign, construction,  and  operation  of  nuclear  power  plants?  Should  this 
concept  be  encouraged  or  discouraged  ?  If  international  standard  set- 
ting for  nuclear  power  is  to  be  encouraged,  what  should  be  the  respec- 
tive roles  of  the  Government  and  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  in  their 
establishment  ? 

PROTECTING  THE  U.S.  POSITION  IN  URANIUM  ENRICHMENT 

Past  U.S.  policy  determinations  have  judged  as  advantageous  the 
strong  position  of  the  United  States  as  the  principal  supplier  of  en- 
riched uranium  or  enrichment  services  in  the  free  world  market.  To 
what  extent  should  U.S.  diplomacy  and  foreign  policy  seek  to  preserve 
this  position?  To  what  extent  should  the  U.S.  attempt  to  prevent, 
limit,  or  control  the  development  and  use  of  alternative  enrichment 
technologies  that  might  threaten  U.S.  facilities  with  technological 
obsolescence,  or  increase  the  possibilities  of  proliferation  of  foreign 
capabilities  to  produce  nuclear  weapons  materials  ? 


GLOSSARY 


Atomic  energy — The  energy  released  by  a  nuclear  reaction  or  by  radioactive 
decay*.  (See  radioactive,  fission,  fusion,  nuclear  reactors,  i 

Atomic  number— The  number  of  protons  in  the  nucleus  of  an  atom,  and  also  its 
positive  charge.  Each  chemical  element  has  its  characteristic  atomic 
number,  and  the  atomic  numbers  of  the  known  elements  form  a  complete 
series  from  1  for  hydrogen  to  103  for  the  man-made  element  lawrencium. 

Atomic  reactor — See  nuclear  reactor. 

Atomic  weapon — An  explosive  weapon  in  which  the  energy  is  produced  by  nuclear 
fission  or  fusion. 

Atomic  weight — The  mass  of  an  element  relative  to  other  elements.  The  atomic 
weight  of  an  element  is  approximately  equal  to  the  total  number  of 
protons  and  neutrons  in  its  nucleus. 

Boiling  water  reactor — A  nuclear  reactor  in  which  water,  used  as  both  coolant 
and  moderator,  is  allowed  to  boil  in  the  reactor  core.  The  resulting  steam 
can  be  used  directly  to  drive  a  turbine. 

Breeder  reactor — A  nuclear  reactor  so  designed  that  it  converts  more  uranium- 
238  or  thorium  into  useful  nuclear  fuel  than  the  uraniumr-235  or  Plu- 
tonium which  it  uses.  The  new  fissionable  materials  are  created  by 
capture  in  the  fertile  materials  of  neutrons  from  the  fission  process. 
There  are  three  types  of  breeder  reactors  :  the  liquid  metal,  fast  breeder 
(LMFBR)  :  the  gas  cooled  fast  breeder  (GCBR)  ;  and  the  molten-salt 
breeder  i  MSBR). 

Breeder  ratio — The  ratio  of  the  number  of  fissionable  atoms  produced  in  a 
breeder  reactor  to  the  number  of  fissionable  atoms  consumed  in  the 
reactor. 

Byproduct  material — Any  artificial  radioactive  material  obtained  during  the 
production  or  use  of  source  material  or  fissionable  material.  It  includes 
fission  products  and  radioisotopes  produced  in  nuclear  reactors,  but  not 
radioactive  materials  occuring  in  nature  or  those  made  with  accelerators 
such  as  cyclotrons. 

Chain  reaction — A  nuclear  reaction  that  stimulates  its  own  repetition.  In  a  fission 
chain  reaction,  a  fissionable  nucleus  absorbs  a  neutron  and  fissions, 
releasing  additional  neutrons.  These  in  turn  can  be  absorbed  by  other 
fissionable  nuclei,  releasing  still  more  neutrons.  A  fission  chain  reaction  is 
self-sustaining  when  the  number  of  neutrons  released  equals  or  exceeds 
the  number  of  neutrons  lost  by  absorption  in  nonfissionable  material  or 
by  escape  from  the  system. 

Containment  The  provision  of  a  gastight  shell  or  other  enclosure  around  a 
nuclear  reactor  to  confine  fission  products  tli.it  otherwise  might  be 
released  to  the  atmosphere  in  the  event   of  an  accident. 

Conversion  ratio  The  ratio  of  the  number  of  atoms  of  new  fissionable  material 
produced  in  a  converter  reactor  to  the  original  number  of  atoms  of 
fussionable  fuel  consumed. 

Converter  reactor  -A  nuclear  reactor  that  produces  some  fissionable  material, 
but  less  than  it  consumes. 

Coolant  A  substance  circulated  through  a  nuclear  reactor  to  remove  or  transfer 
heat.  Common  coolants  are  water,  air.  carbon  dioxide,  liquid  sodium, 
and  helium. 

Core-  The  central  portion  of  a  nuclear  reactor  containing  the  fuel  elements 
and  usually  t lie  moderator. 

Decay  hea<      The   heat   produced   by    the  decay  of  radioactive   nuclides. 

Decay,  radioactive  The  spontaneous  transformation  of  one  nuclide  into  a 
different  nuclide,  or  into  a  different  energy  state  of  the  same  nuclide. 

Depleted  uranium— Uranium  having  less  uranium-235  than  the  0.71  percent 
found  in  natural  uranium. 

(290) 


291 


Deuterium — An  isotope  of  hydrogen  whose  nucleus  contains  one  neutron  and 
one  proton,  and  is  therefore  about   twice  as  heavy  as  the  nucleus  of 
normal  hydrogen,  which  is  only  a  single  proton.  It  occurs  in  nature  as 
1   atom  to  6500  atoms  of  normal  hydrogen  and  is  not  radioactive. 
Energy — The  capability  of  doing  work. 

Enriched  uranium — Uranium  in  which  the  amount  of  uranium-235  present  has 
been  artificially  increased  above  that  found  in  nature.  Enriched  uranium 
for  civil  nuclear  power  is  generally  enriched  to  about  3  to  6  percent ; 
enriched  uranium  for  weapons  is  above  00  percent. 

Fast  breeder  reactor — A  nuclear  reactor  that  operates  with  neutrons  at  the 
fast  speed  of  their  initial  emission  from  the  fission  process,  and  that 
produces  more  fissionable  material  than  it  consumes. 

Fast  reactor — A  nuclear  reactor  in  which  the  fission  chain  reaction  is  sustained 
primarily  by  fast  neutrons  rather  than  by  thermal  or  intermediate 
neutrons. 

Feed  materials — Refined  uranium  or  thorium  metal  or  their  pure  compounds 
in  a  form  suitable  for  use  in  nuclear  reactor  fuel  elements  or  as  feed  for 
uranium  enrichment  processes. 

Fertile  material — A  material,  not  itself  fissionable  by  thermal  neutrons,  which 
can  be  converted  into  a  fissionable  material  by  irradiation  in  a  nuclear 
reactor.  The  two  basic  fertile  materials  are  uranium-238  and  thorium- 
232.  When  these  fertile  materials  capture  neutrons,  they  become  fission- 
able plutonium-230  and  uranium-233.  respectively. 

Fission — The  splitting  of  a  heavy  nucleus  into  two  approximately  equal  parts 
(which  are  radioactive  nuclei  of  lighter  elements),  accompanied  by  the 
release  of  a  relatively  large  amount  of  energy  and  generally  one  or  more 
neutrons.  Fission  can  occur  spontaneously,  but  usually  is  caused  by 
nuclear  absorption  of  neutrons  or  other  particles. 

Fissile  material — "While  sometimes  used  as  a  synonym  for  fissionable  material, 
this  term  has  also  acquired  a  more  restricted  meaning,  namely,  any 
material  fissionable  by  neutrons  of  all  energies. 

Fission  produces — The  nuclei  formed  by  the  fission  of  heavy  elements,  plus 
nuclides  formed  by  the  fission  fragments'  radioactive  decay. 

Fissionable  material — Any  material  fissionable  by  slow  neutrons.  The  three  basic 
ones  are  uranium-235.  plutonium-239  and  uranium-233. 

Fuel  cycle — The  series  of  steps  involved  in  supplying  fuel  for  nuclear  power 
reactors.  It  includes  mining,  refining,  fabrication  of  fuel  elements,  their 
use  in  a  nuclear  reactor,  chemical  processing  to  recover  remaining 
fissionable  material,  reenrichment  of  the  fuel,  and  refabrication  into  new 
fuel  elements. 

Fuel  element — A  rod.  tube,  plate  or  other  shape  or  form  into  which  nuclear 
fuel  is  fabricated  for  use  in  a  reactor. 

Fuel  reprocessing — The  processing  of  reactor  fuel  to  recover  the  unused,  residual 
fissionable  materials. 

Fusion — The  formation  of  a  heavier  nucleus  from  two  lighter  ones,  such  as 
hydrogen  isotopes,   with   the  attendant  release  of  energy. 

Gas  centrifuge  process — A  method  of  enrichment  in  which  heavier  uranium 
adorns  are  partially  separated  from  lighter  ones  by  centrifugal  force. 

Gaseous  diffusion  process — A  method  of  uranium  enrichment  based  on  the  fact 
that  gas  atoms  or  mo^cules  with  different  masses  will  diffuse  through 
a  porous  barrier,  or  membrane,  at  different  rates. 

Isotope — One  of  two  or  more  atoms  with  the  same  atomic  number  but  with 
different  atomic  weights.  Isotopes  usually  have  very  nearly  the  same 
chemical   properties,  but  somewhat  different  physical  properties. 

Licensed  material — Source  material,  special  nuclear  material,  or  byproduct 
material  received,  possessed,  used  or  transferred  under  a  general  or 
special  license  issued  by  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission. 

Magnetohydrodymmics  (MHD) — A  process  for  converting  energy  of  very  hot. 
electrically  conducting  gases  into  electricity  by  the  movement  of  streams 
of  such  gases  in  a  magnetic  field.  The  process  in  theory  offers  a  sub- 
stantial improvement  in  thermal  efficiency  over  conventional  steam- 
turbine-generator  systems. 

Maximum  credible  accident — The  most  serious  reactor  accident  that  can  reason- 
ably be  imagined  from  any  adverse  combination  of  equipment  malfunc- 
tion, operating  errors,  and  other  foreseeable  causes. 

Megawatt — One  million  watts,  one  thousand  kilowatts. 


292 


Megawatt-day  per  ton— A  unit  that  expresses  the  burnup  of  nuclear  fuel  in  a 
reactor;  specifically  the  number  of  megawatt-days  of  heat  output  per 
metric  ton  of  fuel  in  the  reactor. 

Metric  ton — loot)  kiln-nuns  (2205 pounds). 

Moderator— A  material,  .such  as  water,  heavy  water,  or  graphite,  used  in  a 
nuclear  reactor  to  slow  down  high-velocity  neutrons  emitted  by  fission- 
ing atoms,   thus   increasing  the  likelihood  of  capture  to  cause  further 

fissi 
Natural  uranium— Uranium  as  found  in  nature,  containing  0.7%  uranium-23o, 

99.39!    of  uranium-238  and  a   trace  of  uranium-234.  It  is  also  called 

normal  uranium. 
Normal  uranium — See  natural  uranium. 
Nuclear  power  plant — Any  device,  machine,  or  assembly  that  converts  nuclear 

energy  into  some  form  of  useful  power,  such  as  mechanical  or  electrical 

power. 

Nuclear  reactor — A  device  in  which  a  fission  chain  reaction  can  be  initiated, 
maintained,  and  controlled.  Its  essential  component  is  a  core  with  fission- 
able fuel.  It  usually  has  a  moderator,  reflector,  shielding  coolant  and 
control  mechanisms.  It  is  the  basic  machine  of  nuclear  power. 

Nuclide— A  general  term  applicable  to  all  atomic  forms  of  the  elements.  It  is 
not  a  synonym  for  "isotope."  which  properly  has  a  more  limited  defini- 
tion. Whereas  isotopes  are  the  various  forms  of  a  single  element,  undid,  s 
comprise  all  the  isotopic  forms  of  all  the  elements. 

Plutonium — A  heavy,  radioactive,  man-made  element  of  atomic  number  t>4.  Its 
most  important  isotope  is  fissionable  plutonium-239,  produced  by  neu- 
tron irradiation  of  uranium-238.  It  is  used  for  reactor  fuel  and  in 
weapons. 

Pressurized  water  reactor — A  power  reactor  in  which  heat  is  transferred  from 
the  core  to  a  heat  exchanger  by  water  kept  under  high  pressure  to  pre- 
vent it  from  boiling.  Steam  is  generated  in  a  secondary  circuit. 

Pu-239 — The  isotope  of  plutonium  of  weight  239. 

Radiation — The  emission  and  propagation  of  energy  through  matter  or  space 
by  electromagnetic  waves,  or  by  particles.  Nuclear  radiation  is  that 
emitted  from  atomic  nuclei  in  various  nuclear  reactions. 

Radiation  standards — Exposure  standards,  permissible  concentrations,  rules  for 
safe  handling,  regulations  for  transportation,  regulations  for  industrial 
control  of  radiation  and  control  of  radiation  exposure  by  legislative 
means. 

Radioactive  contamination — Deposition  of  radioactive  material  in  any  place 
where  it  may  harm  persons,  spoil  experiments,  or  make  products  or 
equipment  unsuitable  or  unsafe.  The  presence  of  unwanted  radioactive 
matter. 

Radioactivity — The  spontaneous  decay  or  disintegration  of  an  unstable  atomic 
nucleus,  usually  accompanied  by  emission  of  ionizing  radiation. 

Source  material— As  defined  in  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1954,  any  material. 
e\c  pt  special  nuclear  material,  which  contains  0.05%  or  more  of  ura- 
nium, thorium,  or  any  combination  of  the  two. 

Special  nuclear  material — As  defined  in  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  or  1954,  this 
term  refers  to  plutonium-239,  uranium-238,  enriched  uranium,  or  any 
material  artificially  enriched  in  any  of  these  substances. 

Toll  enrichment  A  business  arrangement  whereby  privately  owned  uranium 
is  enriched  in  uranium-235  content  in  government  facilities  upon  pay- 
iin m  of  a  service  charge. 

Tritium  A  radioactive  isotope  of  hydrogen.  It  is  man-made  and  is  heavier 
than  deuterium. 

U-235,  U-238 — Uranium  of  atomic  weights  235  and  238,  respectively. 

Uranium— A  radioactive  element  with  atomic  number  92  and,  as  found  in 
natural  ore-;,  an  average  atomic  weight  of  approximately  238.  The  two 
principle  natural  isotopes  of  uranium  are  uranium-235  (0.7%  of  natural 
uranium),  which  is  fissionable,  and  uranium-238  (99.3%  of  natural 
ii'-;.  uimn  > .  w  liich  is  Perl  ile. 

Uranium  hexafluoride — A  volatile  compound  of  uranium  and  fluorine.  In  ira^i ous 
form,  this  is  the  process  material  Cor  the  gaseous  diffusion  and  gas 
centrifuge  methods  of  enrichment. 

Wastes,  radioactive  Equipment  and  materials,  from  nuclear  operations,  which 
are  radioactive  and  for  which  there  is  no  further  use.  Wastes  are  gen- 
erally classified  as  high-level  (having  radioactivity  concentrations  of 
hundr<  ds  to  thousands  of  curies  per  gallon  or  cubic  foot),  low  level  (in 
the  range  of  1  microcurie  per  gallon  or  cubic  foot),  or  intermediate. 


Chapter  5 — The  Political  Legacy  of  the 
International  Geophysical  Year 


CONTENTS 


Page 

I.  Introduction 297 

II.  Background  of  the  IGY  (1957-58) 300 

Antecedents  of  the  IGY 300 

The  First  International  Polar  Year  (1882-83) 301 

The  Second  International  Polar  Year  (1932-33) 301 

Origin  and  Evolution  of  the  IGY 301 

Impetus  for  a  Third  International  Polar  Year 302 

The  Scientific  Response 304 

The  Political  Response 305 

Organization  and  Funding  of  the  IGY 305 

International  Organization  and  Funding 306 

U.S.  Organization  and  Funding 309 

III.  The  Scientific  Program 313 

The  Scientific  Rationale 313 

Organization  of  the  Program 314 

Implementation  of  the  Program 316 

IGY  Reporters 317 

Data  Centers 317 

World  Days  and  Alerts 318 

Publication  of  Results 318 

"Gemutlichkeit" 319 

Political  Constraints  on  the  Program 320 

The  Two  Chinas 320 

Soviet  Missiles 321 

Arctic  Flights 321 

Radioactive  Fallout 322 

Antarctic  Bases 322 

Mapping 322 

The  "Stolen"  Satellite  Rocket 322 

Censorship 323 

IV.  The  Scientific  Results 324 

Summary  of  Scientific  Findings  of  the  IGY 324 

Aurora  and  Airglow 324 

Cosmic  Rays 324 

Geomagnetism 325 

Glaciology 325 

Gravity 325 

Ionospheric  Physics 325 

Longitudes  and  Latitudes 325 

Meteorology 326 

Nuclear  Radiation 326 

Oceanography , 326 

Seismology 326 

Solar  Activity 327 

Upper  Atmosphere 327 

Appraisal  of  Findings 327 

Continuation  of  IGY  Programs 329 

(295) 


296 

Page 

V.  The  Political  Impacts 331 

General  Impacts  on  the  United  States 331 

Specific  Impacts  on  the  United  States 332 

Federal  Support  of  Basic  Science 334 

The  Space  Program 336 

Federal  Science  Advisory  Structure 337 

Science  Education  in  America 338 

Public  Attitudes  Toward  Science 339 

Communications  Satellites 340 

Effect  on  National  Defense 341 

Effect  on  Foreign  Policy 341 

International  Impacts 341 

The  Effect  on  International  Science 342 

Science  in  Foreign  Affairs 343 

International  Cooperation  and  Good  Will 345 

VI.  Analysis  and  Discussion 347 

Scientists  as  Eternal  Optimists 347 

Scientific  Vis-a-Vis  Political  Good  Will 348 

International  Diplomacy  and  the  IGY 351 

The  Antarctic  Treaty 351 

The  Test  Ban  Treaty 353 

The  Space  Treaty 355 

Concluding  Remarks 357 

Appendix  1.  List  of  Abbreviations 359 

Appendix  2.  A  Brief  Chronology  of  the  IGY 360 

TABLES 

1.  Plenary  Meetings  of  the  CSAGI 304 

2.  Congressional  Appropriations  for  the  IGY 311 

3.  Congressional  Appropriations  for  the  IGY  by  Individual  Scientific  Area. 

4.  Scientific  Areas  Represented  During  the  IGY 314 

5.  Budget  Obligations  of  the  National  Science  Foundation,  1951-72 335 

6.  Comparison  of  the  Provisions  of  the  Antarctic  and  Space  Treaties 357 

FIGURES 

1.  Evolution  of  the  Concept  of  the  IGY 303 

2.  International  Organization  of  Science 306 

3.  The   IGY   Constitution   and   Associations  of  the   ICSU  Special  IGY 

Committee,  CSAGI 308 

4.  Schematic  Flowchart  for  International  Funding  of  the  IGY 310 

5.  International  Coordination  of  the  IGY 317 

6.  The  IGY  Calendar  of  Special  Events 319 


CHAPTER  5— THE  POLITICAL  LEGACY  OF  THE 
INTERNATIONAL  GEOPHYSICAL  YEAR 

I.  Introduction 

Increasingly,  science  is  being  blamed  for  many,  if  not  most,  of  the 
world's  ills.  It  is  science  which  has  made  possible  a  highly  technological 
world,  and  it  is  ever-expanding  technology  which  has  led  to  some  of 
that  world's  seemingly  most  intractable  problems.1  Not  only  do  these 
problems  severely  tax  domestic  capabilities  at  home,  they  threaten 
to  engulf  relations  with  countries  abroad.  Seemingly,  science  and 
technology  have  become  the  genie  escaped  from  the  bottle,  no  longer 
subject  to  man's  command  alone.  Rather,  the  genie  seems  possessed 
by  a  will  of  its  own,  increasingly  beyond  man's  control.  At  the  same 
time,  ironically,  it  appears  unlikely  that  many  of  today's  problems, 
whether  domestic  or  international,  can  be  solved  other  than  through 
the  application  of  additional  science  and  technology.  Calls  by  the 
neo-Luddites2  to  return  to  the  technological  womb,  while  one  part 
of  the  world  attempts  to  cope  with  technology's  problems  and  another 
part  still  struggles  for  its  fair  share  of  technology's  fruits,  appear 
both  inhumane  and  unrealistic.  What,  then,  to  do? 

This  study,  in  accordance  with  the  objectives  of  the  entire  series 
of  which  it  is  one  part,3  is  concerned  with  the  role  of  science  and 
technology  in  helping  to  solve  (or,  conversely,  in  sharing  the  re- 
sponsibility for  generating)  problems  of  international  affairs.  Con- 
tributing to  these  problems  is  the  fact  that  science  has,  in  relatively 
quick  succession,  provided  man  with  the  chemical,  the  atomic,  and 
the  hydrogen  bomb,  with  other,  more  potent  bombs  waiting  next  on 
the  horizon.  The  extent  to  which  these  devices  are  likely  to  be  used 
remains  largely  unresolved.  Having  provided  these  singularly  power- 
ful tools  of  destruction,  has  science  contributed  to  that  diplomacy 
upon  which  avoidance  of  their  use  depends?  That  question  reflects 
the  general  concern  of  this  study. 

In  seeking  to  shed  light  on  the  role  of  science  in  international 
affairs,  it  seems  reasonable  to  examine  in  some  detail  the  workings  of 
the  world  scientific  community  and  the  way  in  which  its  various 
components  interact.  Rather  than  undertake  such  an  examination 
theoretically,  this  case  study  focuses  upon  one  particular  international 
scientific  undertaking  and  seeks  to  find  ways  m  which  the  participa- 
tion of  scientists  in  this  activity  may  have  helped  contribute  to  the 
ultimate  resolution  of  some  problems  of  international  concern. 

The  International  Geophysical  Year  (IGY)  4  was  chosen  for  study 
because  it  represents  the  largest,  most  complex,  and  most  compre- 
hensive international  scientific  undertaking  thus  far  conceived  and 

i  Current  public  awareness  of  technologically  induced  problems  would  appear  to  be  sufficiently  widespread 
to  require  no  elaboration  here.  For  a  brief  discussion  of  the  subject  earlier  in  this  series,  see:  U.S.,  Congress, 
House,  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs.  Subcommittee  on  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific  Develop- 
ments, The  Evolution  of  International  Technology,  91st  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  December  1970  (vol. 
II,  pp.  615-616). 

*  A  term  applied  to  those  opposed  to  technology  on  value  grounds.  Opposition  to  technology  is  taken  as  a 
moral  position:  economic  determinism  has  been  found  inadequate  to  regulate  the  production  and  adoption 
of  good  technology  while  restraining  the  bad,  or  (according  to  another  view)  there  are  so  many  technological 
innovations  that  society  is  increasingly  incapable  of  adjusting  to  them. 

3  For  an  overview  of  the  series  of  studies,  see:  U.S.,  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs, 
Subcommittee  on  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific  Developments,  Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a 
Scientific  Age,  91st  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  April  1970.  For  a  list  of  studies  published  to  date,  see  p.  ii. 

•  For  a  list  of  abbreviations  used  throughout  this  study,  see  app.  1. 

Note  :  This  chapter  was  prepared  in  1973  by  Harold  Bullis. 

(297) 


298 


successfully  carried  out  by  scientists.  Sixty-seven  nations  partici- 
pated, represented  by  20,000  to  40,000  scientists  and  as  many  volun- 
teer observers,  manning  about  4,000  principal  stations  and  an  equal 
number  of  secondary  stations  and  sites  scattered  throughout  the 
world  from  pole  to  pole.6  Estimates  of  the  total  expense  of  the  under- 
taking have  been  as  high  as  $2  billion,  including  logistical  support. 
Throughout  the  18  months  of  the  activity  fl  scientists  generated  an 
unprecedented  aura  of  international  cooperation  and  good  will  as 
they  attacked  the  scientific  problems  while  largely  avoiding  the 
political  ones.  Their  efforts  were  hailed  variously  as  "a  major  turning 

Eoint  in  history,"7  as  opening  up  "a  new  era  in  the  history  of  the 
uman  race," 8  and  as  having  been  "the  single  most  significant  peace- 
ful activity  of  mankind  since  the  renaissance  and  the  Copernican 
revolution."9  In  view  of  these  assessments  by  responsible  observers, 
the  IGY  was  an  attractive  subject  for  analysis  of  possible  contribu- 
tions of  science  to  the  conduct  of  international  affairs. 

Significantly,  the  IGY  took  place  at  a  time  of  considerable  inter- 
national political  distrust  and  hostility,  the  period  of  the  so-called 
cold  war  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  It  would  be 
naive  to  suggest  that  the  political  tensions  of  the  period  had  no  effect 
upon  the  conduct  of  IG  Y  scientists  or  their  activities,  and  equally 
mistaken  to  suppose  that  the  IGY  brought  about  fundamental  changes 
in  the  prevailing  pattern  of  confrontation.  The  influences  of  such 
tensions  and  confrontation  upon  international  cooperation,  however, 
have  been  discussed  in  some  detail  in  previous  studies  of  this  series.10 
Here,  rather,  an  attempt  is  made  to  illuminate  the  other  side  of  the 
picture:  to  show  how  scientists  and  political  leaders  of  many  countries 
worked  together  with  a  purposefulness  and  vigor  which  suggested  not 
only  a  spirit  of  adventure  and  anticipated  accomplishment  but  also, 
perhaps,  a  sense  of  gratitude  or  relief  over  the  opportunity  to  cooperate 
m  an  undertaking  largely  removed  from  the  arena  of  political  conflict. 
It  may  be  that  the  IGY,  representing  as  it  did  an  island  of  relative 
tranquillity  in  a  sea  otherwise  lashed  by  violent  political  storms,  has 
been  overpraised  and  undercriticized.  Certainly  those  who  knew  it 
best  were  most  enthusiastic  and  lavish  in  their  praise,  and  no  record 
appears  to  remain  of  any  significant  criticisms  of  their  exuberance  and 
optimism.  A  considerable  but  unsuccessful  effort  was  made  to  find 

•  U.S.,  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Appropriations,  National  Science  Foundation,  National  Academy 
of  Science*,  Hearings;  Report  on  the  International  Geophysical  Year,  86th  Cong.,  1st  sess.,  February  1959, 
p.  6.  Subsequently  referred  to  as  NSF-NAS  Hearings;  IOY  Report.  From  the  statement  of  Dr.  Joseph 
Kaplan,  Chairman  of  the  U.S.  National  Committee  for  the  IQ  Y.  The  67  nations  were:  Argentina,  Australia, 
Austria,  Belgium,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Bulgaria,  Burma,  Canada,  Ceylon,  Chile,  Colombia,  Cuba,  Chech- 
oslovakia, Denmark,  Dominican  Republic,  East  Africa,  Ecuador.  Egypt,  Ethiopia,  Finland,  France, 
German  Democratic  Republic,  German  Federal  Republic,  Ghana,  Greece,  Guatemala,  Hungary,  Iceland, 
India,  Indonesia,  Iran,  Ireland,  Israel.  Italy.  Japan,  Jugoslavia,  Korea  (Democratic  People's  Republic), 
Malaya,  Mexico,  Mongolian  People's  Republic,  Morocco,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Pakistan, 
Panama,  Peru,  Philippines,  Poland,  Portugal.  Rhodesia  and  Nyasaland,  Romania,  Spain,  Sweden, 
Switzerland,  Taiwan  (Academia  Slnica),  Thailand,  Tunisia,  Union  of  South  Africa,  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics  United  Kingdom,  United  States  of  America,  Uruguay,  Venezuela,  Vietnam 
(Democratic  Republic),  and  Vietnam  (Republic).  (A  committee  formed  by  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
In  September  1955  withdrew  in  June  1957). 

•  The  year  actually  encompassed  18  months,  rather  than  the  calendar  12  months,  to  accommodate  the  full 
period  of  estimated  maximum  solar  activity. 

»  Walter  Sullivan,  Assault  on  the  Unknown;  The  International  Geophysical  Year  (New  York:  McGraw-Hill 
Book  Co.,  1961),  p.  416. 

•  Sidney  Chapman,  IOY;  Year  of  Discovery ,  The  Story  of  the  International  Geophysical  Year  (Ann  Arbor: 
The  University  of  Michigan  Press,  1959),  p.  107. 

•  NSF-NAS  Hearings;  IOY  Report,  p.  17.  From  the  statement  of  Dr.  Hugh  Odishaw,  Executive  Director 
of  the  U.S.  National  Committee  for  the  IOY. 

«•  8ee,  in  particular,  the  following:  Lenice  N.  Wu,  The  Baruch  Plan;  U.S.  Diplomacy  Enters  the  Nuclear 
Age  (August  1972)  and  Warren  H.  Donnelly,  Commercial  Nuclear  Power  in  Europe;  The  Interaction  of 
American  Diplomacy  with  a  New  Technology  (December  1972).  U.8.,  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Foreign 
Affairs,  Subcommittee  on  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific  Developments,  92d  Congress,  2d  sess. 
(Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office). 


299 


such  criticism  for  the  sake  of  a  more  balanced  account.  However,  it 
is  not  the  purpose  of  the  study  to  dissect  the  IGY  in  an  attempt  to 
judge  what  it  failed  to  accomplish.  The  primary  intent  is  to  search 
for  positive  contributions  the  IGY  may  have  made  to  building  bridges 
between  science  and  diplomacy,  and  to  determine  whether  the  mo- 
mentum generated  by  its  activities  was  sufficient  to  continue  thereafter 
to  help  translate  a  variety  of  international  hopes  and  plans  into  con- 
crete realities. 

Too  much  should  not,  of  course,  be  read  into  the  apparent  detente 
reflected  in  this  one  scientific  enterprise,  and  assessment  of  its  effects 
on  world  diplomacy  must  be  tempered  by  the  recognition  that  many 
other  factors  were  at  work  both  for  and  against  international  amity. 
Sorting  out  and  weighing  the  particular  impacts  and  consequences  of 
the  IGY  would  be  a  manifest  impossibility.  Nevertheless,  it  is  possible 
to  identify  specific  attitudes,  behavior  patterns,  and  rules  of  procedure 
that  are  consistent  with  or  even  promote  detente.  Without  overstating 
the  case,  the  study  attempts  to  highlight  these  factors. 

The  first  part  of  this  analysis  provides  background  information  on 
the  IGY,  including  its  antecedents,  origin,  and  evolution,  and  organi- 
zation and  funding.  The  scientific  program  is  described  in  section  III ; 
the  scientific  results  are  discussed  in  section  IV.  The  political  impacts 
are  considered  in  section  V,  including  both  general  effects  and  those 
specific  effects  due  primarily  to  the  Soviet  IGY  artificial  satellite 
program.  In  section  VI  some  general  comments  are  made  concerning 
the  possibility  of  applying  the  international  goodwill  generated  by  the 
world  scientific  community  to  the  solution  of  international  political 
problems.  Finally,  some  specific  examples  are  given  of  the  influence  of 
the  IGY  upon  subsequent  international  diplomacy. 


II.  Background  of  the  IGY  (1957-58) 

The  IGY  has  been  called  "perhaps  the  most  ambitious  and  at  the 
same  time  the  most  successful  cooperative  enterprise  ever  undertaken 
by  man."  u  This  assessment  was  voiced  by  the  late  Lloyd  V.  Berkner, 
originator  of  the  proposal  which  ultimately  led  to  the  IGY,  and 
Vice  President  of  the  international  body  which  coordinated  all  IGY 
activities.12  Yet  this  remarkable  effort  might  never  have  taken  place 
had  it  not  been  preceded  by  a  history  of  growing  international 
scientific  cooperation  from  ancient  times  to  the  present  day. 

Antecedents  of  the  IGY 

Scientific  cooperation  appears  evident  even  in  ancient  times,  when 
travelers  exchanged  information  needed  to  develop  maps  for  their 
mutual  use.13  Francis  Bacon,  early  in  the  17th  century,  proposed 
cooperative  efforts  as  the  best  way  of  obtaining  information  about  the 
nature  of  the  world.  Such  efforts  as  did  take  place,  however,  were 
undoubtedly  more  a  matter  of  happenstance  and  chance  than  of 
premeditated  planning.  Not  until  the  18th  century  did  coordinated 
efforts  by  many  men  at  many  points  become  more  common.  Observa- 
tions of  the  transit  of  Venus  in  1761  represented  an  early  attempt  at  a 
concerted  international  effort,  largely  by  European  nations.  In  1769 
a  subsequent  transit  of  Venus,  some  portions  of  which  were  visible 
in  the  American  colonies,  afforded  the  opportunity  on  the  part  of  the 
New  World  to  link  scientific  observations  with  the  Old. 

For  the  most  part,  these  initial  early  cooperative  efforts  were 
independently  conceived  and  only  poorly  coordinated.  During  the 
19th  century,  international  efforts  intensified  and  close  coordination 
became  more  common.  Largely  as  a  result  of  efforts  by  a  group  of 
French  scientists,  a  network  of  weather  observation  stations  was 
established,  data  first  being  published  in  1800.  To  facilitate  coordinated 
weather  observations  at  sea  as  well  as  ashore,  an  international  con- 
ference in  Brussels  in  1853  decided  that  warships  of  the  participating 
nations  would  utilize  standard  forms  for  data-taking,  and  the  in- 
formation would  be  distributed  to  all.  This  effort  moved  Matthew  F. 
Maury,  an  American  naval  officer  who  had  initially  proposed  such 
cooperation,  to  comment: 

Rarely  before  has  there  been  such  a  sublime  spectacle  presented  to  the  scientific 
world :  all  nations  agreeing  to  unite  and  cooperate  in  carrying  out  one  system  of 
philosophical  research  with  regard  to  the  sea.  Though  they  may  be  enemies  in 
all  else,  here  they  are  to  be  friends. M 

The  need  to  learn  more  about  the  earth's  magnetism,  as  well  as  its 
weather,  led  to  other  international  cooperative  efforts  during  the  19th 
century.  Worldwide  magnetic  observations  were  carried  out  from 

"  J.  Tmo  Wilson,  JOY;  The  Year  of  the  New  Moons  (New  York:  Alfred  A.  Knopf,  1961),  p.  vil. 

"  This  group  was  known  as  the  Bureau  du  Comlte  Special  de  l'Annee  Geophysique  Internationale,  or 
C8AQI. 

"  Much  of  the  following  material  has  been  summarized  from  Sullivan,  Assault,  pp.  4-19. 

»  Matthew  F.  Maury,  The  Physical  Geography  of  the  Sea  (New  York:  Harper  Bros.,  1856),  p.  xiii.  Maury, 
known  as  the  Pathfinder  of  the  Beas  fur  his  researches  of  ocean  currents  following  an  injury  that  incapacitated 
him  for  sea  duty,  Joined  the  Confederacy  during  the  Civil  War  and  became  its  foremost  naval  officer. 

(300) 


301 


Peking,  China,  to  Sitka,  Alaska,  and  an  international  magnetic  union 
was  established  to  fix,  in  advance,  specific  days  for  the  simultaneous 
recording  of  data.  Increased  cooperation  led  rapidly  to  the  formation 
of  other  international  scientific  organizations,  including  the  Inter- 
national Association  of  Geodesy  (1864),  the  International  Bureau  of 
Weights  and  Measures  (1875),  and  the  International  Meteorological 
Organization  (1878).  The  most  direct  antecedents  of  the  IGY,  how- 
ever, were  the  First  and  Second  International  Polar  Years,  which  to 
some  extent  may  be  considered  models  for  the  IGY. 

-     THE    FIRST   INTERNATIONAL   POLAR   TEAR  (1882-83) 

The  First  International  Polar  Year  (FPY),  which  took  place  in 
1882-83,  has  been  called  the  grandfather  of  the  IGY.  During  this 
period,  scientists  from  20  nations  carried  out  cooperative  efforts  in 
the  high  northern  latitudes,  placing  primary  emphasis  upon  studies  of 
surface  meteorology,  geomagnetism,  and  the  aurora  borealis.15  Al- 
though no  fundamental  discoveries  resulted  from  these  studies,  many 
valuable  data  were  obtained  in  many  fields,  including  those  of  the 
aurora,  geology,  geomagnetism,  earth  currents,  meteorology,  glaci- 
ology,  oceanography,  and  latitude  and  longitude.16  The  success  of 
these  efforts  led,  50  years  later,  to  the  much  larger  effort  of  the  Second 
International  Polar  Year. 

THE  SECOND  INTERNATIONAL  POLAR  TEAR  (1932-88) 

Although  the  primary  emphasis  of  the  Secondllnternational  Polar 
Year  (SPY),  which  took  place  in  1932-33,  was  also  on  studies  of  the 
weather,  the  earth's  magnetism,  and  the  aurora,  the  program  also 
included  studies  of  earth-sun  relationships  and  of  atmospheric  elec- 
tricity. Scientists  from  40  countries  participated,17  publishing  analyses 
and  observations  in  the  fields  of  meteorology,  radiation,  ozone, 
aerology,  geomagnetism,  earth  currents,  atmospheric  electricity, 
ionospheric  physics,  auroral  physics,  cosmic  rays,  hydrography, 
glaciology,  noctilucent  clouds,  nacreous  clouds,  biology,  and  as- 
tronomy.18 Substantial  progress  was  achieved  toward  understanding 
magnetic  storms  and  other  magnetic  disturbances,  associated  auroral 
and  ionospheric  phenomena,  and  wind  and  pressure  systems  in  high 
latitudes  of  the  Northern  Hemisphere.19  Perhaps  the  most  important 
result  of  the  SPY,  however,  was  increased  knowledge  of  the  ionosphere, 
which  greatly  advanced  the  science  of  radio  communications.20 

Origin  and  Evolution  of  the  IGY 21 

The  success  of  the  SPY,  following  the  FPY  by  exactly.  50  years, 
raised  expectations  that  a  Third  International  Polar  (TPY)  would  be 
held  at  an  interval  of  another  50  years,  or  during  1982-83.  However, 

»  Allen  V.  Astin,  "The  Scientific  Community  and  International  Cooperation,"  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  61  (July  14,  1969),  p.  34. 

i«  N.  C.  Oerson,  "From  Polar  Years  to  IGY,"  Advances  in  Geophysics  5  (1958),  p.  43. 

"  Astin,  "The  Scientific  Community,"  p.  34. 

"  Gerson,  "Polar  Years,"  p.  44. 

'•  Elliott  Roberts,  "The  IGY  in  Retrospect,"  Annual  Report  of  the  Board  of  Regents  of  the  Smithsonian 
Institution,  Publication  4392  (Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1960),  p.  265. 

20  National  Academy  of  Sciences,  Report  on  the  U.S.  Program  for  the  International  Geophysical  Year  (Wash- 
ington: National  Academy  of  Sciences-National  Research  Council,  1965),  p.  50-v.  Subsequently  referred 
to  as  NSF  IOY  Program  Report. 

11  A  brief  chronology  of  the  IGY  is  given  in  app.  2. 


302 


the  accelerating  pace  of  technological  achievement  was  generating  a 
need  for  more  frequent  international  efforts.  By  1950,  at  least  three 
compelling  reasons  for  reducing  the  time  interval  between  "polar 
years"  had  evolved:  (1)  existing  basic  scientific  data  in  the  earth 
sciences  had  been  largely  exploited,  making  desirable  the  accumulation 
of  new  data;  (2)  the  need  for  new  information  regarding  the  earth, 
the  oceans,  and  the  upper  atmosphere  was  becoming  critical  with  the 
development  of  supersonic  aircraft  and  new  communications  systems; 
and  (3)  a  period  of  unusual  solar  activity  was  predicted  for  1957- 
58,  thereby  offering  an  unparalleled  opportunity  for  observing  solar 
phenomena. 

IMPETUS  FOB  A  THIRD  INTERNATIONAL  POLAR  TEAR 

It  was  therefore  suggested  by  Berkner  that  a  Third  International 
Polar  Year  (TPY)  be  held  during  1957-1958,  only  25  years  after  the 
SPY,  rather  than  the  anticipated  50  years.  The  suggestion,  which  was 
made  at  a  small  gathering  of  scientists  at  the  home  of  Dr.  James  A. 
Van  Allen,  was  enthusiastically  welcomed  by  Van  Allen  and  his  guests, 
who  suggested  that  Berkner  should  present  his  idea  at  the  next  meet- 
ing of  the  Joint  Commission  on  the  Ionosphere  (MCI).23  Following 
this  suggestion,  the  basic  concept  of  the  TPY  was  presented  to  a  num- 
ber of  international  scientific  organizations  which  readily  supported 
and  promoted  the  idea.  A  schematic  representation  of  the  progress 
of  the  concept  through  the  world  scientific  community  is  given  in 
figure  1.  Initially,  as  suggested  at  the  Van  Allen  meeting,  Berkner 
and  Dr.  Sydney  Chapman,  who  later  was  to  serve  as  president  of  the 
governing  IGY  committee,  presented  the  concept  at  the  Brussels 
meeting  of  the  MCI  in  July  1950.  The  MCI  endorsed  the  proposal, 
amplified  the  suggested  program  somewhat,  and  recommended  the 
proiect  to  the  International  Council  of  Scientific  Unions  (ICSU), 
and  the  three  groups  comprising  ICSU:  the  International  Union  of 
Scientific  Radio  (URSI),23  the  International  Union  of  Geodesy  and 
Geophysics  (IUGG),  and  the  International  Astronomical  Union 
(IA  U) .  The  URSI  and  IAU  officially  endorsed  the  plan  in  September 

1950,  and  the  IUGG  followed  with  its  endorsement  in  August  1951. 
The  ICSU  Bureau,  the  executive  body  responsible  for  operations  of 
IC^U^approved  the  plan  in  January  1951  and  recommended  it  to 
the  ICSU  executive  board,  which  granted  its  approval  in  October 

1951.  On  May  16,  1952,  the  ICSU  established  a  committee  to  take 
•charge  of  the  program,  which  was  still  being  considered  primarily 
as  a  Third  Polar  Year. 

M  8ometlmes  referred  to  as  the  Mixed  Commission  on  the  Ionosphere. 

*  The  Initials  are  derived  from  the  French  version  of  its  name:  the  Union  Radlo-Scientiflque  Internation- 
ale. 


303 


Fioure  1.  Evolution  of  the  Concept  of  the  IG  Y. 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  21 


304 


Early  in  1952,  invitations  to  participate  were  sent  to  member  na- 
tions of  the  ICSU,  as  well  as  to  the  U.S.S.R.,  which  was  not  an  ICSU 
member.  M  The  response  to  this  initial  solicitation  was  modest,  largely 
because  many  of  the  national  academies  were  not  greatly  interested 
in  participating  in  a  polar  scientific  activity.  Several  international 
organizations,  particularly  the  World  Meteorological  Organization 
(WMO),  the  International  Meteorological  Association,  and  the  Inter- 
national Association  of  Terrestrial  Magnetism  and  Electricity,  took 
the  position  that  the  TPY  program  placed  too  much  emphasis  upon 
the  polar  regions  and,  instead,  should  be  expanded  to  encompass 
worldwide  phenomena. 

The  ICSU  considered  these  suggestions  for  enlarging  the  scope  of 
the  TPY,  and  Dr.  Chapman  proposed  that  the  suggestions  be  adopted 
with  the  name  of  the  program  changed  to  the  International  Geo- 
physical Year.  This  change  in  name  and  scope  was  approved  by  the 
ICSU  general  assembly  in  October  1952,  to  reflect  the  need  for  world- 
wide synoptic  observation  and  analysis.  Followup  notices,  sent  to 
ICSU  member  countries  and  calling  for  participation  in  the  IGY, 
resulted  in  a  much  better  response  than  had  the  initial  invitation  for  a 
TPY.  One  result  of  the  improved  response  was  that  the  original  special 
ICSU  committee  was  enlarged  and,  early  in  July  1953,  was  renamed 
the  Comite  Special  de  l'Annee  Geophysique  Internationale,  or 
CSAGI.  At  this  time,  Dr.  Chapman  was  named  president  of  the 
CSAGI  and  Berkner  vice  president.  One  of  the  first  decisions  made 
by  the  CSAGI  was  that  the  IGY  would  continue  for  18  months,  from 
July  1,  1957,  to  December  31,  1958,  so  as  to  include  the  entire  period 
of  anticipated  maximum  solar  activity. 

THE  SCIENTIFIC  RESPONSE 

The  concept  of  an  IGY,  as  opposed  to  a  TPY,  gained  immediate 
and  widespread  acceptance  throughout  the  world  scientific  community. 
Following  the  initial  provisional  meeting  of  the  CSAGI  in  October 
1952,  five  additional  meetings  were  held,  as  listed  in  table  1,  below: 


TABLE  1. 

PLENARY  MEETINGS  OF  THE  CSAGI 

Location 

Date 

Year 

First 

Brussels 

Rome 

June39-July3 

1953 

Second 

Sept.  30-Oct.  4 

1954 

Third 

Sept.  8-14 

1955 

Fourth 

Sept.  10-15.. 

1956 

Fifth 

July29-Aug.9 

1958 

At  the  first  meeting,  26  nations  participated;  at  the  second,  38 
nations;  at  the  fourth,  51  nations;  and  by  the  final  meeting,  67  nations 
were  represented. 

The  general  spirit  of  the  scientific  community  was  summarized  by 
Berkner  as  follows: 

But  most  encouraging  in  all  has  been  the  genuine  enthusiasm  with  which  the 
scientists  of  the  earth,  and  the  nations  that  support  them,  have  embraced  this  pro- 
gram. Tired  of  war  and  dissension,  men  of  all  nations  have  turned  to  "Mother 
Earth"  for  a  common  effort  on  which  all  find  it  easy  to  agree.24 

*  Although  not  a  member  of  the  TC8TJ,  the  TJ.S.S.R.  was  a  member  of  the  IAU  and  also  of  the  World 
Meteorological  Organization  (WMO).  Inasmuch  as  Soviet  participation  in  any  large-scale  international 
■scientific  undertaking  was  Important  to  the  success  of  that  event,  the  Soviets  were  also  approached  through 
the  IAU  and  WMO.  6 

"Lloyd  V.  Berkner,  "International  Scientific  Action:  The  International  Geophysical  Year,  1957-58," 
Science  119  (Apr.  30,  1954),  p.  575. 


305 


THE  POLITICAL  RESPONSE 


Interest  in  the  IGY  was  not  confined  to  the  World  scientific 
community,  but  was  shared  by  th6  various  governments  concerned, 
by  heads  of  state,  and  by  the  public  at  large.  This  interest  was  aroused 
by  the  strong  appeal  of  the  IGY  as  a  cooperative  venture  representing 
many  nations  working  together  for  the  Denefit  of  all  mankind.  Con- 
sequently, the  collective  response  of  the  many  legislative  bodies  arid 
governments  whose  approval  was  necessary '  to' make  the  program  a 
success  was  on  a  far  more  generous  scale  than  that  prompted  by  any 
previous  international  scientific  enterprise. 

Governmental  support  consisted  not  only  of  unprecedented  financial 
contributions,  but  also  of  equally  valuable  and  necessary  logistic 
support.  Governments  cooperated  by  facilitating  the  movement  of 
participating  scientists  from  one  country  to  another,  and  in  assuring 
prompt  movement  through  customs  of  scientific  equipment  upon  which 
the  various  programs  depended.  President  Eisenhower,  in  a  White 
House  press  release  on  June  25,  1954,  called  the  IGY  "a  striking 
example  of  the  opportunities  which  exist  for  cooperative  action  among 
the  peoples  of  the  world."  M  Pope  Pius  XII  commended  the  effort  as 
one  likely  to  contribute  to  peace  and  cooperation  among  all  people 
and  to  their  material  well-being.27  Widespread  interest  in  the  IGY 
was  aroused  in  the  general  public  by  numerous  articles  in  the  daily 
press  and  in  popular  magazines.  Consequently,  more  was  undoubtedly 
known  concerning  the  IGY  than  had  been  the  case  for  any  previous 
international  scientific  effort,  and  expectations  were  correspondingly 
raised. 

Although  it  would  seem  unlikely  that  no  voices  were  raised  in 
protest  concerning  an  effort  of  this  cost  and  magnitude,  such  ex- 
pressions do  not  appear  to  have  survived  the  passage  of  time.  Vir- 
tually no  criticism  of  the  IGY  exists  throughout  the  vast  quantity 
of  published  material  concerning  it.  Congressional  debate  on  the 
IGY  during  the  period  1954-59  was  almost  devoid  of  criticism. 
Similarly,  appropriations  hearings  and  committee  reports  accompany- 
ing appropriations  bills  did  not  criticize  the  scientific  intent  of  the 
effort,  but  were  largely  limited  to  discussions  of  the  reliability  of  cost 
estimates  made  by  scientists.  Thus  the  question  was  never  "whether" 
but  "how  much,"  as  discussed  later.28 

Organization  and  Funding  of  the  IGY 

One  of  the  outstanding  features  that  characterized  the  IGY  was 
the  relative  smoothness  and  efficiency  with  which  its  governing 
apparatus  functioned  despite  the  enormous  size  of  the  effort.  Partly, 
this  success  was  due  to  the  utilization  by  the  scientific  community 
of  existing  organizations  and  institutions  wherever  feasible.  Of 
perhaps  even  greater  significance,  however,  was  the  ability  on  the 
part  of  the  IGY  leadership  to  structure  the  urdertaking  so  as  to 

*  U.8.  President  (Eisenhower),  "Letter  to  Dr.  Chester  I.  Barnard,  Chairman,  National  Science  Board, 
Concerning  United  States  Participation  in  the  International  Geophysical  Year.  June  26,  1964."  In:  Public 
Papers  of  the  Pre*iderU$  of  the  United  States.  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower  (Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  1954),  p.  698. 

"  Sidney  Chapman,  "The  International  Geophysical  Year,  1957-58,"  Nature  175  (Jan.  8, 1955),  p.  56.  A  sum- 
mary of  the  Pope's  remarks,  as  translated  from  the  French  by  Lloyd  Berkner,  appears  in  U.S.,  Congress, 
House,  Committee  on  Appropriations,  Independent  Offices  Appropriations  for  196G,  Hearings,  84th  Cong., 
1st  sess.,  Feb.  9, 1955,  p.  343.  Subsequently  referred  to  as  House,  Independent  Offices  Appropriations  for  1956. 

«•  For  Congressional  debates  on  the  IGY,  see  the  following  in  the  Congressional  Record:  Vol.  100,  pp. 
10932,  11462-11464,  14807  (1954);  vol.  101,  pp.  4055,  4068,  7629  (1965);  vol.  102,  pp.  6267,  6209,  8358  (1956),  and 
vol.  104,  pp.  14643, 17535  (1958). 


306 


maintain  as  sharp  as  possible  a  demarkation  between  international 
concerns,  on  the  one  hand,  and  more  purely  national  concerns  on 
the  other.  This  separation  was  instrumental  in  reducing  both  the 
number  and  the  intensity  of  the  inevitable  nationalistic  issues  which, 
if  permitted  to  ferment  and  grow,  could  have  undercut  and  arrested 
the  growth  of  the  international  scientific  program.  The  way  in  which 
the  IGY  was  organized  largely  prevented  national  political  concerns 
from    unduly    interfering    with    international    scientific    objectives. 

INTERNATIONAL   ORGANIZATION   AND   FUNDING 

Both  international  organization  and  funding  of  the  IGY  were 
under  the  general  oversight  of  the  ICSU,  a  federation  of  several 
international  and  scientific  unions.  Although  independent  and  not 
directly  linked  with  any  nation,  the  ICSU  was  organizationally 
linked  to  national  Governments  through  their  national  academies 
and  through  the  United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific,  and  Cultural 
Organization  (UNESCO),  as  shown  schematically  in  figure  2.  This 
existing  arrangement  provided  a  convenient,  efficient  mechanism 
development  of  the  IGY,  which  probably  would  never  have  been 
initiated  without  the  influence  of  the  ICSU  and  its  member  unions. 

The  chief  governing  body  for  all  IGY  activities  was  the  CSAGI, 
which  was  established  by  the  ICSU  for  that  purpose.  The  status 
and  functions  of  the  CSAGI  were  specifically  international.  As 
originally  constituted,  the  so-called  Bureau  of  the  CSAGI  consisted 
of  three  people  representing  the  ICSU:  Sidney  Chapman,  President 


NATIONAL 
ACADEMIES 


INTERNATIONAL 

SCIENTIFIC 

UNIONS 


ASTRONOMY 

GEOPHYSICS 

RADIO 

PHYSICS 

CHEMISTRY 

MATHEMATICS 

BIOLOGY 

GEOGRAPHY 

HISTORY  OF  SCIENCE 


INTERNATIONAL 

COUNCIL 

OF 

SCIENTIFIC 

UNIONS 

ICSU 


I ! 


i ^.  _ 


Appoints  to  membership 
Supports  financially 
Border  national 
Border  international 
Border  governmental,  political 


{scientific, 
academic 


Figure  2.  International  Organization  of  Science  (not  including  medical  or 
agriculture).  Taken  from:  Sidney  Chapman,  "International  Cooperation  and 
the  IGY,"  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists  16  (May  I960),  p.  174. 


307 


(United  Kingdom),  Lloyd  V.  Berkner,  Vice  President  (United  States), 
and  M.  Nicolet,  Secretary  General  (Belgium).  This  group,  or  Bureau, 
was  subsequently  expanded  to  include  V.  V.  Beloussov  (U.S.S.R.) 
and  J.  Coulomb  (France),  both  members  of  the  IUGG,  so  as  to 
include  representation  from  the  four  major  powers:  the  United  States, 
the  United  Kingdom,  the  U.S.S.R.,  ana  France.  Gradually  the 
CSAGI  was  enlarged  to  include  additional  members  of  various  inter- 
national unions,  organizations,  and  committees  until  there  were  24 
members  in  all.  In  keeping  with  the  nonnationalistic  character  of 
the  CSAGI,  little  attempt  was  made  to  have  the  representation 
correspond  in  any  way  to  the  IGY  efforts  of  the  individual  nations.29 

Thus,  the  composition  of  CSAGI  was  based  upon  the  relative  effort 
being  expended  m  the  various  scientific  areas,  and  to  some  extent 
upon  the  physical  location  of  CSAGI,  rather  than  upon  the  magni- 
tude and  cost  of  the  scientific  programs  of  individual  participating 
nations.  This  arrangement  was  sometimes  questioned  by  members  of 
Congress  who  felt  that,  in  view  of  the  relatively  large  costs  of  the  U.S. 
program,  more  American  scientists  should  have  been  members  of 
CSAGI.  The  scientists  pointed  out  that  such  representation  had  no 
political  significance  or  importance  and  was  unrelated  to  the  cost  of 
the  various  IGY  programs,  which  were  national  whereas  CSAGI  was 
international.  This  international  concept  was  essential  in  order  to 
preserve  the  completely  nonpolitical  character  of  CSAGI,  a  factor 
which  proved  to  be  vital  in  preventing  nationalistic  issues  from  inter- 
fering with  IGY  scientific  activities. 

It  was  evident  early  in  the  IGY  preparations,  however,  that  a  need 
existed  for  bringing  national  problems  before  the  IGY  for  solution, 
since  many  activities  required  coordination  between  the  national 
committees  of  participating  nations.  A  formal  means  was  also  needed 
to  enable  the  national  committees  collectively  to  discuss  and  express 
their  views  on  IGY  matters.  Such  local  matters  as  one  nation's  as- 
sisting another  with  funds,  equipment,  or  personnel,  or  permitting 
workers  to  carry  out  or  cooperate  with  assignments  on  foreign  terri- 
tory, could  not  be  dealt  with  by  CSAGI.  Hence,  CSAGI  recommended 
that  ICSU  form  an  advisory  council  for  the  IGY  composed  of  one 
delegate  from  each  national  committee,  but  not  to  include  members 
of  CSAGI. 

The  Advisory  Council  was  thereby  established,  and  proceeded  to 
deal  with  problems  of  a  largely  national  character,  usually  after  such 
problems  had  been  considered  first  by  representatives  of  the  particular 
nations  concerned.  The  Advisory  Council,  made  up  of  representatives 
of  all  the  nations  participating  in  the  IGY,  advised  and  assisted  the 
much  smaller  CSAGI.  The  main  areas  of  Council  responsibility  were: 

(1)  To  arrange  for  mutual  assistance  between  and  among  nations, 

(2)  to  arrange  regional  meetings  on  specific  subjects,  and  (3)  to  allocate 
responsibility  to  various  nations  for  storing  IGY  data.  The  Advisory 
Council,  which  met  in  parallel  sessions  during  each  plenary  session 
of  CSAGI,  became  highly  influential  and  added  much  strength  to  the 
central  organization.  The  presence  of  designated  official  delegates 
from  IGY  nations  made  it  easier  to  arrange  bilateral  mutual  assistance, 
like  establishment  by  one  national  committee  of  operations  on  another 
committee's  territory.30  These  were  the  kinds  of  arrangements  which 

«  Sidney  Chapman,  "International  Cooperation  and  the  IGY,"  BuOttin  of  the  Atomic  Scientist*  16  (May 
1960)   p.  174. 
M  Chapman,  "International  Cooperation,"  p.  176. 


308 


CSAGI  itself  expressly  avoided.  The  general  organizational  arrange- 
ment is  shown  in  Figure  3. 

The  separate  existence  of  CSAGI,  on  the  international  level,  and 
the  Advisory  Council,  on  the  national  level,  has  been  considered  the 
key  element  in  the  efficient  and  effective  functioning  of  the  IGY. 
Scientists  of  each  participating  country  devised  their  own  research 
programs  within  their  own  national  committees,  and  the  output  of 
these  committees  then  served  as  the  input  for  the  Advisory  Council. 
The  IGY  was  thus  an  international  scientific  enterprise,  operated  by 
scientists  with  the  consent,  cooperation,  and  support  of  their  indi- 
vidual governments,  but  in  effect  without  the  direction  of  these 
governments.31 

This  dual  organizational  structure — CSAGI  and  international  sci- 
entific bodies,  vis-a-vis  the  Advisory  Council  and  national  IGY 
committees — was  considered  by  many  observers  to  be  the  major 
reason  why  the  IGY  was  so  generously  funded.  Berkner,  for  example, 
pointed  out  that  various  national  governments  responded  favorably 
to  requests  for  money  and  support  because  the  actual  work  was  direct- 
ed and  carried  out  by  national  committees  rather  than  by  an  inter- 
national body.32  In  testimony   before   congressional   appropriations 


NATIONAL 
ACADEMIES 


NATIONAL 

IGY 

COMMITTEES 


IGY 
ADVISORY 
COUNCIL 


INTERNATIONAL 

SCIENTIFIC 

UNIONS 


GEOPHYSICS 

RADIO 
ASTRONOMY 

PHYSICS 
GEOGRAPHY 

BIOLOGY 


Consultation 
on  IGY  matters 


WORLD 

METEOROLOGICAL 

ORGANIZATION 

(under  UNO) 


Figure  3.  The  IGY  Constitution  and  Associations  of  the  ICSU  Special  IGY 
Committee,  CSAGI.  Taken  from:  Sidney  Chapman,  "International  Cooperation 
and  the  IGY,"  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists  16  (May  1960),  p.  174.  (Key: 
as  in  Figure  2.) 

»'  Lloyd  V.  Berkner,  "Geography  and  Space,"  Ths  Geographical  Rtvinr  49  (July  1969),  p.  313.  The  budget 
for  the  U.S.  IOY  program,  of  course,  was  carefully  scrutinized  by  the  appropriate  congressional  appropria- 
tions committees  and  justification  for  each  element  of  the  program  was  required  on  a  line-item  basis.  In  no 
instance,  however,  was  a  suggestion  made  for  reducing  or  expanding  any  particular  element  in  the  program. 

»  Statement  to  the  Second  United  Nations  International  Conference  ou  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic 
Energy,  Geneva,  Sept.  12,  1958,  p.  13. 


309 


hearing,  considerable  emphasis  was  placed  by  scientists  upon  the  fact 
that  the  IGY  program  was  "preeminently  national  in  character  and 
scope."  w  Dr.  Alan  T.  Waterman,  at  that  tune  Director  of  the  National 
Science  Foundation,  stated  that — 

. . .  this  Geophysical  Year  is  entirely  handled  by  this  country;  it  is  not  an 
internationally  pooled  effort;  the  United  States  has  its  own  program,  in  keeping 
with  the  general  plan  under  which  all  the  nations  are  participating.24 

Only  a  relatively  small  proportion  of  IGY  funds  was  spent  to 
finance  the  international  IGY  organization:  somewhat  more  than  one 
quarter  of  a  million  dollars  out  of  an  estimated  total  expenditure  of 
approximately  $2  billion,  or  slightly  more  than  about  0.01  percent.35 
General  operating  funds  were  obtained  from  a  number  of  different 
sources,  as  shown  in  figure  4.  Most  of  these  funds  were  obtained  from 
national  and  international  members  of  the  ICSU,  special  contribu- 
tions from  participating  members  and  foundations,  and  from  UNESCO. 
One  indication  of  the  popularity  of  the  IGY  with  national  govern- 
ments was  that  funding  requests  by  the  ICSU  were  oversubscribed, 
thus  permitting  a  substantial  balance  to  be  carried  forward  to  assist 
in  post-IGY  publication  of  scientific  results.86 

U.S.  ORGANIZATION  AND  FUNDING 

Different  countries  approached  the  problem  of  gaining  and  ad- 
ministering funds  in  different  ways.  In  the  United  States,  a  National 
Committee  for  the  IGY  (the  USNC)  was  established  by  the  National 
Academy  of  Sciences,  which  was  a  member  of  ICSU.37  The  USNC 
served  as  a  focus  for  all  U.S.  technical  panels,  geographical  com- 
mittees, and  special  groups,  as  well  as  for  a  broad  cross  section  of 
leading  American  geophysicists.  The  USNC  provided  technical 
guidance  for  the  National  Science  Foundation,  which  was  responsible 
for  preparation  of  budget  estimates  and  for  obtaining  congressional 
appropriations.  Originally  questions  were  raised  as  to  whether  NSF 
possessed  the  necessary  authority  to  participate  in  the  IGY,  but  these 
questions  were  resolved  satisfactorily.38 

'  •»  Testimony  of  Dr.  Alan  T.  Waterman  in:  U.S.,  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Appropriations,  The 
Supplemental  Appropriation  BUI,  1966.  Hearing*,  Pt.  t.  83d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  Apr.  27, 1954,  p.  901.  Subsequently 
referred  to  as:  House,  Supplemental  Appropriation  Bill,  1966. 

**  Testimony  In:  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Appropriations,  The  Supplemental  Appropriation 
Bm,  1966,  Hearing*  on  H.R.  9936,  83d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  Apr.  28,  1954,  p.  551.  Subsequently  referred  to  as: 
Senate.  Hearing*  on  H.R.  99S6. 

*  Sidney  Chapman,  "The  International  Geophysical  Year,"  .4017  Transaction*  XL  (June  1959),  p.  118. 
The  chief  contributors,  and  the  approximate  amounts  contributed  over  the  period  1955-61,  were:  the  United 
States,  $76,000;  the  Soviet  Union.  $45,000:  Great  Britain,  $21,000;  and  Canada,  $10,000.  In  addition, 
UNESCO  gave  $85,000  and  the  ICSU,  $40,000. 

n  Wallace  W.  Atwood,  Jr.,  "The  International  Geophysical  Year  in  Retrospect,"  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  40  (May  11, 1959),  p.  884. 

*>  A  detailed,  comprehensive  description  of  U.S.  organisation  and  funding  is  given  in  NAS IOY  Program 
Report,  pp.  896-900. 

*•  House,  Supplemental  Appropriation  Bill,  1966,  p.  937. 


310 


SCOR 


CSAGI 


Figure  4.  Schematic  Flow  Chart  for  International  Funding  of  the  IGY.  Taken 
from:  Wallace  W.  Atwood,  Jr.,  "The  International  Geophysical  Year  in  Retro- 
spect," Department  of  State  Bulletin  40  (May  11,  1959),  p.  685. 

The  original  budget  presented  to  the  Congress  for  the  IGY  was  for 
$13  million.  Dr.  Waterman  emphasized  that  this  budget  was  "entirely 
separate  and  distinct  from  the  regular  programs  of  the  National 
Science  Foundation,"  39  a  fact  of  considerable  importance  inasmuch 
as  the  entire  NSF  budget  at  that  time  was  of  similar  magnitude.40 
Later,  a  considerably  greater  budget  of  $40  million  for  an  expanded 
IGY  program  was  presented.41  In  all,  $43.5  million  was  appropriated 
by  the  Congress  in  support  of  the  U.S.  scientific  program  for  the 
IGY,  as  shown  in  table  2. 

*•  House,  Supplemental  Appropriation  BUI,  1966,  p.  901. 

40  The  1955  NSF  budget  was  $12,486  thousand,  and  the  1956  budget  was  $16,038  thousand.  See:  U.S.,  Congress, 
House,  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics,  Subcommittee  on  Science,  Research,  and  Development, 
The  National  Science  Foundation;  A  General  Review  of  Its  First  16  years,  89th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  Jan.  24,  1966, 
pp.  32-35. 

41  For  details  of  this  expanded  program,  see  U.S.,  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Appropriations,  Second 
Supplemental  Appropriation  BUI,  1966,  Hearings,  84th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  Mar.  8,  1956,  pp.  427-440.  Subse- 
quently referred  to  as:  House,  Second  Supplemental  Appropriation  BUI,  1966. 


311 


TABLE  2.  CONGRESSIONAL  APPROPRIATIONS  FOR  THE  IGY  « 


Appropriated       Obligations      Unobligated  < 


Fiscal  year— 

1955 .._.-.-..„ $2,000,000  $1,836,542  $163,458 

1956 37,000,000  14,904,593  22,172,936 

1957 15,036,898  17,337,064 

1958 2,000,000  19,337,064 

1959 2,500,000  5,932,004  1,707,589 

1960 1,597,585  110,004 

1961 20, 429  36, 629 

1962 88  39,717 

>  Financial  reports  of  the  National  Science  Foundation. 

TABLE  3.  CONGRESSIONAL  APPROPRIATIONS  FOR  THE  IGY  BY  INDIVIDUAL  SCIENTIFIC  AREA" 
Program  Amount 

Aurora  and  airglow _- $1, 718, 022 

Cosmic  rays 1, 164, 812 

Geomagnetism _■ 1,580,894 

Glaciology 1,137,905 

Gravity .-. 505,289 

Ionospheric  physics 3,237,816 

Longitudes  and  latitudes r. 24,100 

Meteorology 2,226,800 

Oceanography 2,007,054 

Rocketry 2,598,952 

Seismology 877,049 

Solar  activity 307,378 

World  days. ■„ 229,050 

Interdisciplinary  research _■ 1,750,526 

Earth  satellites _• 19, 843, 210 

World  data  center 1, 513, 587 

General  scientific  support 1,076,  551 

Technical  direction 1, 377, 266 

Total ._- 43,176,261 

Almost  half  of  this  money  was  spent  in  support  of  the  IGY  earth 
satellite  program,  as  shown  in  table  3.  However,  as  pointed  out  by 
Hugh  Odishaw,  Executive  Director  of  the  U.S.  National  Committee, 
these  apprpriated  funds  represented  only  about  one-third  of  the 
total  U.S.  research  effort:  another  third  resulted  from  contributions 
from  private  institutions  (particularly  universities) ,  with  the  remaining 
third  being  provided  through  already  existing  programs  in  both  public 
and  private  laboratories.44  Other  Government  agencies  providing  sup- 
port for  the  USNC  included  the  Department  of  Defense,  the  State 
Department,  the  Commerce  Department,  the  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
mission, and  the  Office  of  Defense  Mobilization.45  The  Navy,  for 
example,  initially  estimated  its  support  for  the  Antarctic  IGY  pro- 

°  U.S.,  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics,  Subcommittee  on  8cience,  Research 
and  Development,  The  National  Science  Foundation;  A  General  Review  of  Itt  Firtt  IB  Yeart,  89th  Cong. 
2d  sess.,  H.  Kept.  No.  1219,  Jan.  24, 1966,  p.  77. 

«  Report  on  the  U.S.  Program  for  the  International  Geophysical  Year  (Washington:  National  Academy  of 
Sciences-National  Research  Council,  November  1966),  p.  897. 

"  Hugh  Odishaw,  "The  Meaning  of  the  International  Geophysical  Year."  In:  NSF-NAS  Hearings; 
JOY  Report,  p.  20. 

«  House,  Supplemental  Appropriation  Bill,  19S5,  pp.  901,  923. 


312 


gram  to  be  almost  $30  million.48  Eventually  the  logistical  and  opera- 
tional support  for  IGY  activities  increased  the  U.S.  outlay  to 
approximately  $500  million.47 

Although  both  Houses  of  Congress  supported  IGY  requests  en- 
thusiastically, the  House  frequently  reduced  the  amounts  requested 
whereas  the  Senate  usually  voted  for  the  full  amounts.  The  final 
figures  arrived  at  represented  a  compromise  between  the  two  bodies.48 
Action  in  the  House  reflected  a  belief  that  the  budget  estimates 
arrived  at  by  the  scientists  were  necessarily  rough  and  could  be 
reduced  without  damage  to  the  U.S.  IGY  program,  whereas  the 
scientists  insisted  that  the  budget  estimates  were  conservative  and 
that  any  reductions  would  indeed  severely  damage  the  program.49 
Irritation  was  also  expressed  in  the  House  that  the  scientists  were 
making  use  of  administration  prestige  to  "sell"  the  IGY  program, 
thereby  relegating  the  Congress  to  a  back  seat  in  the  endeavor.60 
These  difficulties  were  relatively  minor,  however,  and  for  the  most 
part  the  Congress  granted  the  scientists  what  they  requested. 

«•  House,  Second  Supplemental  Appropriation  Bill,  1966,  p.  523. 

*>  Much  of  this  support  was  provided  for  two  major  areas:  Antarctic  research,  and  rocket  and  satellite 
activities.  This  estimate  is  very  rough,  however,  and  represents  a  best  estimate  by  those  having  an  intimate 
knowledge  of  the  U.S.  program.  It  includes  not  only  explicit  expenses,  but  also  such  expenses  as  the  salaries 
of  scientists  on  loan  at  full  pay  from  their  respective  institutions. 

«  See  these  House  and  Senate  reports:  H.  Rept.  2266  (July  16, 1954),  304  (Mar.  26, 1955),  1897  (Mar.  15, 1956), 
and  2221  (July  18,  1958);  and  S.  Rept.  2034  (July  31,  1954),  411  (June  2,  1955),  1725  (Apr.  11,  1956),  and  2350 
(Aug.  13,  1958). 

"  See,  for  example:  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Appropriations,  Independent  Offices  Appro- 
priation* for  1956,  Hearings  on  H.R.  6240,  84th  Cong.,  1st  sess.,  Apr.  26,  1955,  pp.  441-443.  Subsequently 
referred  to  as:  Senate,  Hearing  on  H.R.  6240. 

M  House,  Second  Supplemental  Appropriation  BUI,  1956,  pp.  440-442. 


III.  The  Scientific  Program 

The  scientific  program  proposed  for  the  IGY  was  both  ambitious 
and  complex.  Having  agreed  upon  the  scientific  rationale  for  the 
undertaking,  however,  scientists  quickly  organized  and  implemented 
the  program,  subject  only  to  several  seemingly  unavoidable — but 
not  overly  restrictive — political  constraints. 

The  Scientific  Rationale 

The  scientific  rationale  for  undertaking  the  IGY  25  years  sooner 
than  had  been  anticipated  was  based  upon  a  number  of  factors.  First, 
since  the  world's  scientific  "storehouse"  of  data  concerning  man's 
physical  environment  was  considered  largely  exhausted,  it  was 
maintained  that  the  scientific  community  could  not  wait  until  1982 
(50  years  after  the  SPY)  to  replenish  this  storehouse.61  In  particular, 
many  scientists  considered  that  further  progress  in  the  geophysical 
sciences  was  being  hampered  by  lack  of  information  that  could  only  be 
obtained  by  a  coordinated,  worldwide  cooperative  data-taking  venture. 

Second,  soon  after  the  SPY  there  had  been  an  unprecedented 
development  of  new  research  tools  in  the  geophysical  sciences.  These 
included  radiosonde  balloons  capable  of  investigating  90  percent  of 
the  earth's  atmosphere,  and  rockets  (developed  during  World  War  II) 
capable  of  investigating  the  remaining  upper  10  percent,  as  well  as 
the  fringes  of  outer  space.  New  cosmic  ray  recorders,  spectroscopes, 
and  other  instruments  were  available  to  permit  in-depth  investigation 
of  the  nature  and  composition  of  the  aurora,  the  newly-discovered 
"air-glow",  the  sun  and  its  corona,  and  the  earth's  magnetic  field. 
Furthermore,  electronic  computers  had  sufficiently  evolved  to  enable 
efficient  handling  of  the  vast  amounts  of  data  that  a  massive  worldwide 
scientific  effort  would  generate. 

Third,  geophysicists  had  become  increasingly  fascinated  by  the 
earth's  remote  polar  areas.  The  Arctic  was  of  great  interest  from  the 
standpoint  of  radio  communications  and  weather  forecasting.  The 
Antarctic  remained  the  largest  unexplored  landmass  on  the  earth's 
surface.  With  scientists  encircling  the  globe  in  unprecedented  numbers, 
the  IGY  offered  an  excellent  opportunity  for  obtaining  information 
regarding  these  remote  polar  regions. 

Fourth,  and  finally,  a  period  of  intense  solar  activity  had  been 
predicted  for  1957-58.  The  actual  18-month  period  finally  chosen  for 
the  IGY  represented  an  attempt  to  span,  as  completely  as  possible, 
the  anticipated  period  of  maximum  sunspots  so  that  the  effect  of  solar 
storms  upon  the  earth  could  be  investigated.  Such  storms  were 
particularly  interesting  to  the  scientific  community  because  sunspot 
activity  had  been  at  a  minimum  during  the  SPY.  This  prediction  of 
high  solar  activity  turned  out  to  be  gratifyingly  accurate:  sunspot 

«'  Wallace  W.  Atwood,  Jr..  "The  International  Geophysical  Year:  A  Twentieth  Century  Achievement  In 
International  Cooperation,"  Department  of  State  Bulletin  35  (Dec.  3,  1956),  p.  880. 

(313) 


314 


fluctuations  during  the  IGY  reached  the  greatest  intensity  ever 
recorded  since  scientists  first  began  to  observe  such  phenomena  in  the 
18th  century.62 

Organization  oj  the  Program 

Programs  of  the  IGY  were  selected  primarily  to  assist  in  solving 
specific  planetary  problems  of  the  earth,  criteria  for  selection  having 
been  specified  by  the  CSAGI  as  follows: 

(i)  Problems  requiring  concurrent  synoptic  observations  at  many  points  involv- 
ing cooperative  observations  by  many  nations. 

(ii)  Problems  of  branches  of  geophysical  sciences  whose  solutions  will  be  aided 
by  the  availability  of  synoptic  or  other  concentrated  work  during  the  IGY  in 
other  geophysical  sciences. 

(iii)  Observations  of  all  major  geophysical  phenomena  in  relatively  inacces- 
sible regions  of  the  earth  that  can  be  occupied  during  the  IGY  because  of  the 
extraordinary  effort  during  that  interval,  in  order  to  augment  our  basic  knowledge 
of  the  earth  and  of  the  solar  and  other  influences  acting  upon  it. 

(iv)  Epochal  observations  of  slowly  varying  terrestrial  phenomena,  to  establish 
basic  information  for  subsequent  comparison  at  later  epochs.63 

Where  questions  of  priority  arose,  the  first  requirement  (i)  was 
recognized  as  controlling.  This  emphasis  upon  synoptic  observations, 
the  need  for  carrying  out  measurements  throughout  the  entire  globe, 
and  the  great  expense  necessitated  in  so  doing,  were  all  major  elements 
in  the  readiness  of  the  Congress  to  provide  the  needed  funds,  as 
discussed  earlier. 

Primary  emphasis  of  the  IGY,  as  summarized  by  the  National 
Academy  of  Sciences,  was 

...  to  observe  geophysical  phenomena  and  to  secure  data  from  all  parts 
of  the  world;  to  conduct  this  effort  on  a  coordinated  basis  by  fields,  and  in  space 
and  time,  so  that  results  could  be  collated  in  a  meaningful  manner." 

Within  this  context,  problems  generally  fell  within  these  three 
broad  areas: 

(a)  The  earth  itself  as  a  structure; 

(b)  Atmospheric  and  oceanic  circulation  and  heat  and  water  budget  of  the 
earth;  and 

(c)  Upper  atmospheric  physics  and  solar-terrestrial  relationships." 

TABLE  4.  SCIENTIFIC  AREAS  REPRESENTED  DURING  THE  IGY 

Aurora  and  airglow  •  Meteorology ' 

Cosmic  rays  >  Nuclear  radiation  > 

Geomagnetism »  Ocebnogriphy ' 

Glaciology  Seismology 

Gravity  Solar  activity 

Ionospheric  physics)  Upper  atmospheric  studies  utilizing  rockets  and  satellite 

Longitudes  and  latitudes'  vehicles 

>  Disciplines  of  major  interest. 

Reference:  Report  on  the  U.S.  Program  for  the  International  Geophysical  Year  (Washington:  National  Academy  of 
Sciences-National  Research  Council.  November  1966),  p.  vii. 

»  NAS  JOY  Program  Report,  p.  vii. 

«  CSAOI,  HulUlin  a" Information,  No.  4  (London:  IUOQ  Newsletter  No.  9,  1955),  pp.  54-65. 

m  NAS  JOY  Program  Report,  p.  vii. 

m  NAS  IOY  Program  Report,  p.  vii. 


315 


These  broad  areas  were  subdivided  into  13  scientific  areas,  as  shown 
in  table  4.  Of  these,  first  priority  was  given  to  those  requiring  con- 
current, coordinated  observation,  as  indicated  in  the  table.  The 
remainder,  including  glaciology,  gravity,  and  seismology,  did  not 
require  synoptic  observations,  but  were  included  because  scientists 
would  be  available  in  areas  where  these  fields,  too,  could  be  studied. 
Comprehensive  summaries  of  activities  carried  out  in  each  of  these 
disciplines  have  been  published  by  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences 
and  will  not  be  described  in  detail  here.66  However,  a  capsule  rationale 
for  inclusion  of  these  particular  disciplines  is  given  below.67 

Synoptic  studies  of  the  aurora  were  planned,  particularly  relative 
to  magnetic  storms.  Also  planned  were  the  improvement  of  auroral 
charts,  detailed  spectrograph^  and  photometric  studies,  and  study 
of  airglow  phenomena.  Of  particular  interest  was  the  detailed  char- 
acterization of  the  Antarctic  aurora,  of  which  little  was  known. 
By  the  use  of  artificial  earth  satellites,  scientists  hoped  to  learn 
more  about  the  cause  and  formation  of  the  aurora.  Studies  were 
planned  to  determine  the  solar  and  geophysical  effects  of  cosmi 
rays,  including  their  relation  to  the  magnetic  fields  of  the  sun,  the 
earth,  and  space,  as  well  as  their  interaction  with  the  atmosphere. 
Plans  for  geomagnetic  studies  included  the  morphology  of  magnetic 
storms  and  transient  effects,  relations  with  the  ionosphere,  and  the 
equatorial  electrojet.  Particular  interest  was  to  be  focused  upon 
greater  understanding  of  the  earth's  magnetic  field  as  it  extended 
into  outer  space. 

Glaciology  studies  were  not  originally  planned  as  part  of  the  IGY, 
primarily  because  they  did  not  meet  the  requirement  for  concurrent 
sunoptic  observations.  The  importance  of  such  studies  was  well 
recognized,  however,  because  of  their  influence  upon  heat  balance 
and  chemical  problems  of  meteorology.  Glaciers  affect  the  world's 
weather,  although  admittedly  less  than  atmospheric  disturbances 
and  changes  in  the  oceans.  However,  since  IGY  activities  would 
necessarily  result  in  the  presence  of  many  scientists  in  the  Arctic 
and  Antarctic  regions,  it  seemed  reasonable  to  take  advantage  of 
their  presence  to  conduct  glacier  surveys  to  establish  a  data  base 
which  would  permit  determination  of  glacial  changes  by  comparison 
with  similar  surveys  in  the  future. 

Plans  for  ionospheric  studies  included  extensive  recordings  of 
layer  heights,  radio  absorption  and  scatter  effects,  and  galactic 
noises.  Of  special  interest  were  plans  for  conducting  ionospheric 
experiments  northward  from  the  South  Polar  plateau  during  the 
long,  total-night  season  to  shed  light  on  the  physical  characteristics 
of  the  ionosphere  during  periods  of  prolonged  absence  of  sunlight. 
Studies  of  latitude  and  longitude  were  planned  primarily  to  improve 
time  determinations  and  star  catalogs,  and  to  determine  irregularities 
in  the  earth's  rotation.    Plans   for  meteorological   studies  included 

*  NAS  IGY  Program  Report,  pp.  3-661. 

"  For  more  detail  concerning  the  U.S.  IGY  program,  see:  Senate,  Hearing*  on  H.R.  99S8,  pp.  643-549;  and 
U.S.,  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Appropriations,  The  Supplemental  Appropriation  Bill,  1969,  Hearingt, 
86th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  2  July  1968,  pp.  804-814.  Much  of  the  summary  in  the  text  is  also  based  upon  information 
from:  Sullivan,  Atiault  p.  346;  Sullivan,  "The  International  Geophysical  Year,"  International  Conciliation 
(January  1969),  p.  276;  Roberts,  "The  IGY  in  Retrospect,"  pp.  266-268;  Chapman,  Year  ofDiecovery,  p.  12; 
and  Chapman,  "International  Cooperation,"  p.  174. 


316 


global  atmospheric  circulation,  energy  content  and  dynamics,  ozone, 
cloud  physics,  and  radio  atmospherics  and  electricity.  Plans  for 
oceanographic  studies  were  included  because  of  the  interrelationships 
among  the  oceans,  the  weather,  and  terrestrial  dynamics,  and  also 
because  of  the  enormous  natural  resources  of  the  oceans.  It  was  well 
known  that  the  oceans  exert  a  sizable  impact  upon  the  weather  of 
the  lower  atmosphere,  and  it  was  hoped  that  investigation  of  the  deep 
ocean  basins  would  shed  light  on  the  structure  and  history  of  the 
earth. 

Plans  for  seismological  studies  were  included  as  part  of  the  general 
effort  to  gain  further  understanding  of  the  solid  earth:  its  form,  size, 
and  rotation;  its  bodily  tides;  and  its  earthquakes,  which  provide  the 
best  means  of  studying  the  interior  of  the  earth.  Solar  activity  plans 
included  observations  of  radiation,  sunspots  and  flares,  the  corona, 
and  general  spectroscopy.  It  was  known  that  the  "electrical  weather' 
was  greatly  influenced  by  changes  in  the  sun,  and  it  was  hoped  that' 
these  studies,  utilizing  vastly  improved  instruments,  would  advance 
man's  knowledge  of  these  cnanges,  particularly  in  the  Antarctic.  Fi- 
nally, upper  atmospheric  studies  were  included  because  of  their  close 
relation  to  large-scale  topography  determinations  of  the  earth.  Such 
determinations  depend  partly  on  radio  time  signals  between  distant 
astronomical  observatories.  Intensive  studies  of  the  upper  atmosphere 
enabled  the  time  of  passage  of  such  signals  to  be  estimated  with  high 
accuracy.  Considerable  interest  existed  in  obtaining  complete  north- 
south  profiles  of  air  circulation  and  the  electrified  layers  of  air  above 
the  weather.  Much  interest  also  concerned  explorations  of  outer  space. 
It  was  anticipated  that  satellite  vehicles  would  provide  otherwise 
inaccessible  information  concerning  the  aurora,  fluctuations  in  the 
earth's  magnetic  field,  the  influence  of  solar  ultraviolet  and  other 
radiations,  and  cosmic  ray  phenomena,  as  well  as  providing  scientists 
with  their  first  views  of  the  earth  from  outside  its  atmosphere. 

Implementation  of  the  Program 

Various  participating  nations  devised  separate  means  for  implement- 
ing their  individual  IGY  programs,  but  all  of  these  diverse  programs 
were  coordinated  on  an  international  level  by  the  CSAGI  and  its 
advisory  council,  as  shown  schematically  in  figure  5.  The  U.S. 
technical  program  was  directed  by  the  IGY  Committee  of  the  Na- 
tional Academy  of  Sciences,  in  cooperation  with  many  scientists  from 
both  public  and  private  organizations  and  institutions.  Technical 
panels,  representing  the  various  scientific  disciplines,  were  established 
to  plan  the  basic  technical  program  for  each  discipline  and  assure  its 
execution  by  appropriate  groups  of  scientists. 

The  overall  tasks  of  program  and  budget  planning,  of  coordinating 
various  activities  among  projects  and  related  scientific  fields,  of 
assisting  in  the  technical  direction  of  the  U.S.  program,  and  of  prepar- 
ing technical  and  general  articles  on  operations  and  results,  were 
under  the  direction  of  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences  IGY  staff, 
working  closely  with  the  USNC.68 

«  NAS  IOY  Program  Report,  p.  vlll. 


317 


S    NATIONAL     k 
PLANNING     f 


INTERNATIONAL 
COORDINATION 


I 


OBSERVATIONAL  PERIOD 


k  WORLD  DATA k 
f     CENTERS      f 


RESEARCH  ANO 
EVALUATION 


I 


PUBLICA- 
TIONS 


THE   IGY 


66  IGY 
Participating 
Committees 


CSAGI 
IAU        IGU      WMO 
URSI       ILK5G    CCI8 
IUPAP     IUBS 


CSAGI  Reporters 


IGY  Participating 

Committees 

IACIGVI 


CSAGI  Reporters 


Annals    I 
ol  the  IGY  I 


Nat.  IGY  Committees 
9  Scientific  Institutions 
Individual  Scientists 


Scientific 

Journals 

and 

other  media 


19S7  -  1958 


CSAGI 
Secretariat 


Symposia  I 


Coordination 


5  Discipline  I 
Confer  eno 


through 


\nt\      5  General  j     9  Regional  | 
etsj      Agemblios  I    Conference*! 


Figure  5.  International  Coordination  of  the  IGY.  From:  Wallace  W.  Atwood,  Jr., 
"The  International  Geophysical  Year  in  Retrospect,"  Department  of  State  Bul- 
letin 40  (May  11,  1959),  p.  687. 

IGY   REPORTERS 

Coordination  of  various  IGY  programs  was  enhanced  through  the 
appointment  of  14  reporters,  each  of  whom  was  responsible  for  a 
particular  scientific  area.6'  The  reporters  were  scientists  chosen  for 
their  demonstrated  ability  and  wide  previous  experience.  They  organ- 
ized the  discussion  and  planning  of  the  central  program,  prepared 
working  manuals,  made  plans  for  data  collection  and  publication,  and 
assisted  in  the  analysis  and  interpretation  of  the  data. 


DATA    CENTERS 

It  was  evident  at  the  outset  of  the  IGY  that  free  exchange  of  data, 
and  protection  of  data  from  loss,  would  be  essential  ingredients  of  the 
undertaking.  One  unfortunate  aspect  of  the  SPY  had  been  the  loss 
of  much  data,  both  through  delays  in  reporting  and  because  of  de- 
struction of  records  during  World  War  II.  Therefore,  most  of  the 
scientific  observations  made  by  IGY  were  collected  at  three  World 
Data  Centers.  Two  of  the  centers,  one  located  in  the  United  States  60 
and  the  other  in  the  Soviet  Union,  maintained  complete  duplicate 
records  of  all  data  collected.  The  third  center  consisted  of  a  number 
of  partial  centers  maintained  by  individual  participating  countries 
in  one  or  more  specific  disciplines.61  Duplication  of  records  m  this  way 

M  For  a  complete  list  of  subject  areas  and  individuals  who  served  as  reporters,  see  Wilson,  New  Moons,  p. 
3*4. 

M  World  Data  Center  A,  assigned  to  the  United  States,  consisted  of  11  subcenters:  visual  auroral  obser- 
vations f Cornell  University);  instrumental  auroral  observations  (University  of  Alaska);  airglow  and  iono- 
spheric physics  (National  Bureau  of  Standards,  Central  Radio  Propagation  Laboratory):  cosmic  rays  (Uni- 
versity of  Minnesota);  geomagnetism,  gravity,  and  seismology  (U.S.  Coast  and  Geodetic  Survey);  glaciology 
(American  Geographical  Society);  latitudes  and  longitudes  (U.S.  Naval  Observatory);  meteorology  (U.S. 
Weather  Bureau,  National  Weather  Records  Center);  oceanography  (Agricultural  and  Mechanical  College 
of  Texas);  solar  activity  (University  of  Colorado,  High  Altitude  Observatory);  and  rockets  and  satellites 
(National  Academy  of  Sciences).  From  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Appropriations,  The  Sup- 
plemental Appropriations  Bill,  1969,  Hearings  on  H.R.  13460,  86th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  July  22,  1958,  p.  360.  Sub- 
sequently referred  to  as:  Senate,  Hearings  on  H.R.  13460. 

•'  Senate,  Hearings  on  H.R.  13460,  p.  360.  The  locations  were:  Japan,  Australia,  and  Western  Europe. 


318 


assured  their  safekeeping  from  loss  by  fire  or  other  catastrophe,  and 
each  center  provided  copies  of  data,  in  whole  or  in  part,  to  any 
qualified  applicant  at  cost.62 

WORLD  DAYS  AND  ALERTS 

A  major  objective  of  the  IGY  was  to  obtain  simultaneous  observa- 
tions of  phenomena  by  observers  distributed  throughout  the  world. 
To  achieve  this  capability,  a  communications  headquarters  was 
established  at  Ft.  Belvoir,  Va.,  to  notify  participants  when  interesting 
phenomena  developed,  like  sudden  flareups  on  the  surface  of  the  sun 
or  a  fast-developing  solar  storm.  At  such  times  an  alert  would  be 
called  which  might  be  followed  by  a  special  world  interval  during 
which  more  intensive  observations  of  phenomena  would  be  under- 
taken. In  addition,  certain  world  days  were  selected  in  advance  for 
intensive  worldwide  observation  of  particular  phenomena,  as  well 
as  world  meteorological  intervals  for  the  making  of  special  weather 
observations.  These  events  are  indicated  in  figure  6. 

PUBLICATION  OF  RESULTS 

Essential  to  most  scientific  undertakings  is  the  publication  of 
results.  Because  the  results  of  the  2  polar  years  had  .been  published 
primarily  by  the  participating  countries  as  they  saw  fit,  few  copies 
were  printed;  many  important  scientific  libraries  still  lack  copies. 
To  avoid  such  a  gap  in  programing,  arrangements  were  made  to 
publish  IGY  results  in  an  international  journal  created  for  that 
purpose:  the  Annals  of  the  IGY.  In  this  journal  were  published  not 
only  the  results  of  IGY  observations,  but  a  history  of  the  IGY,  and 
a  brief  account  of  the  2  polar  years.83 

«  For  additional  information  on  the  World  Data  Centers,  see:  Chapman,  Year  of  Discovery,  p.  107;  and 
Chapman,  "International  Cooperation,"  p.  176. 
•*  Chapman,  Year  of  Discovery,  p.  107. 


319 


June  1967  (Advance  Trial) 
Ion  Moo  Tim  Wed  Ttw  Fri  Set 

1 

t      3      4      5      6      7     1 

July  1957 
Sun  Men  Tue  Wed  Thu  Fri  Set 

1      2      3  (T)  6      6 

7     6      9    10    11    12    13 

August  1957 
Sun  Mon  Tue  Wed  Thu  Fri  Set 

1      2      3 

4     5     6      7      8      9    10 

September  1957 
Sun  Men  Tee  Wed  Thu  Fri  Sal 

(7)  2     3     4     5     6     7 

6     9    10    11    12    13    14 

£   IS    11    12    13    14 

15 

14    15    16    17    18    19    20 

11  @  13    14    15    16    17 

15    16    17  1 18    19   20   2lJ 

16    17    18    19 1  20    21 

22 

21    22    23    24    25  @(2^) 
28    29    30    31 

18    19    20    21    22    23    24 

22  U3)(W)  25    26    27  [28 

23    24    26    26(27)(28 

^5X26)27    28    29    30    31 

29  (TO) 

30 

October   1967 
Sun  Mon  Tee  Wed  Thu  Fri  Set 

November  1957 
San  Mon  Tue  Wed  Thu  Fri  Sat 

December  1957                                 January  1958 
Sun  Mon  Tue  Wed  Thu  Fri  Sat           Sun  Mon  Tue  Wed  Thu  Fri  Sat 

12      3      4 

5                                                 1      2 

12            3456789 

19          10    11     12    13  M4)  15    16 

26          17    18    19    20(2n(22)23 

24    25    26    27    28    29    30 

12      3      4 

6      6      7 

1  2®£ 

6      7      8      9    10    11 

8      9    10    11 

12  (l3)l4 
19    20  @f) 

aWTa*^ 

5      6      7      8      9    10    11 

13    14    15    16    17    18 

15  (l6)  17    18 

12    13    14    15    16    17    18 

20    21  (22%23J(24)  26 
27    28    29    30    31 

[22)  23    24    25    26    27    28 
29    30    31 

^?)(20)21    22    23    24    25 
26    27    28    29    30    31 

February  1958                                   March  1958 
Sun  Mon  Tuc  Wed  Thu   Fri  Sat            Sun  Mon   Tua  Wad  Thu   Fri  Sat 

April  1958                                       May  1958 
Sun  Mon  Tua  Wed  Thu   Fri  Sat           Sun  Mon  Tue  Wed  Thu   Fri  Sat 

1            2      3      4      5      6      7    yy/ 

12      3      4      5                                         12      3 

2      3      4      5      6      7 

8            9 

10    11    12    13    14    15 

6      7      8      9    10    11     12           4  (5)  6      7      8      9    10 
13    14    15    16    17  @Rf]       11     12    13    14    15    16    17 
[20)21    22    23    24    25    26       ^@2°    21    22    a    2* 
27    28    29    30                               25    26    27    28    29    30    31 

9(lo)l1     12    13    14 

15          16 

17    18    19 

^C2i) 22 1 

16    17(^?)(l9)20    21 

22 

23    24    25    26 

27(28)29     1 

23    24    25  (26)  27    28 

30    31 

June  1958 
Sun  Mon  Tue  Wed  Thu  Fri 

July  1958 
Set           Sun  Mon  Tue  Wed  Thu  Fri  Sat 

August  1958                                 September  1958 
Sun  Mon  Tue  Wed  Thu  Fri  Sat          Sun  Mon  Tue  Wed  Thu  Fri  &L 

12     3     4      5     6 

7                         12      3     4     5 

12                   1      2      3      4      5  (^6, 

ft  (^)lfi  U   12  13 

14 

6      7      8      9    10    11     12 

3      4      5      6  (V)   8      9 

7      8      9    10    11     12  p? 

15    16lj7Xl8)  19    20 

21 

13    14    15(^6)(l7)  18    19 

10    11  @13  M4Yl5*)l6 
17    18    19    20    21    22    23 

(14)  15    16    17     18    19  (20) 

22    23  (24)|  25    26    27 

28 

20    21    22    23    24    25    26 

21    22 1 23    24    25    26    27 

29    30 

(27)28    29    30    31 

y{,25    26    27    28    29    30 

28    29    30 

October  1958 

Sun  Men  Tue  Wed  Thu  Fri 

November  1958 
Sat           Sun  Mon  Tua  Wed  Thu   Fri  Sat 

December  1958                                 January  1959 
Sun  Mon  Tue  Wed  Thu   Fri  Sat            Sun  Mon  Tue  Wed  Thu   Fri  Sat 

12      3 

4                                                            1 
J)         2-3  GO   5      6      7      8 
is          9  (limy  12   13   14   15 
25         16    17  (li)  19    20   21    22 

12      3 

7.    8     9  u?) 

4      5      6 

1      2  (3. 

5     6     7     8     9  (kT) 

Vl)|l2  @ 
18    19    20 

(V)  5      6      7      8  (^XjOJ 

^2^13)  14    15    16    17 

14    15    16  (17) 

11     12    13    14    15    16    17 

19   20   21    22    23   24 

21 1 22    23    24    25    26    27 

18    19    20    21    22    23    24 

26   27    28   29   30   31 

n  s 

yal 

24    25    26    27    28 

29 

28    29    30    31                                25    26    27    28    29    30   31 

World  Meteorological  Inter 

120    21    22 

1 

23    24    25    26    27    28    29 

Regular  world  day  (n) 

Regular  world  day  at  new  moon  (10 ) 

Unusual  meteoric  activity  8.  (but  not  world  day) 

Regular  world  day  with  unusual  meteoric  activity  (w) 

Day  of  total  ed ipse  ml 

Adopted  dy  CSAGI,  September  1966 

Figure  6.  The  IGY  Calendar  of  Special  Events.  From:  Sidney  Chapman, "IGY: 
Year  of  Discovery.  The  Story  of  the  International  Geophysical  Year  (Ann  Arbor: 
University  of  Michigan  Press,  1959),  p.  103. 

"gemutlichkeit" 

Much  has  been  written  about  the  spirit  of  cooperative  good  will  that 
existed  among  scientists  during  the  IGY  and  which  continued  in  large 
measure  thereafter.  Dr.  Joseph  Kaplan,  Chairman  of  the  U.S.  National 
IGY  Committee,  observed  that  both  the  national  and  international 

Elanning  for  the  IGY  were  marked  by  a  spirit  of  "objectivity  and 
armony."  M  Wallace  W.  Atwood,  Jr.,  then  Director  of  the  Office  of 

*•  Testimony  In  NSF-NAS  Hearing*:  IGY  Report,  p.  6. 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1-22 


320 


International  Relations  of  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences,  re- 
marked that  "scientists  from  countries  whose  political  leaders  were 
snarling  at  each  other  worked  on  in  amity  .  .  .  ."  M  Walter  Sullivan, 
science  writer  for  the  New  York  Times  assigned  to  cover  the  IGY 
full  time,  remarked  that  the  program  was  "...  carried  forward  by  a 
seemingly  irresistible  tide  of  scientific  enthusiasm."  w  Sidney  Chapman 
commented  upon  the  "co-operative  and  harmonious  spirit"  among 
the  scientists  of  the  67  nations  associated  with  the  IGY,  pointing  out 
that  "Their  common  interest  in  its  subject  and  purposes  made  it  pos- 
sible for  them  to  work  together  despite  differences  of  race,  creed,  or 
political  organization."  OT 

J.  Tuzo  Wilson,  who  served  as  president  of  the  IUGG.  during  the 
IGY,  attributed  this  cooperation  and  harmony  to  the  fact  that  "The 
senior  scientists  trusted  one  another  and  expected,  in  turn,  to  be 
trusted.  Generally  speaking,  this  faith  was  justified  and  generated 
confidence."  a8  However,  Wflson  recognized  that  all  political  influences 
in  so  broad  an  undertaking  could  not  completely  be  avoided,  and  that 
the  scientists  involved  were  not  unrealistic  in  their  expectations  in 
that  ".  .  .  the  participants  were  alive  to  human  frailty  and  to  the 
reality  of  political  influences,  so  they  did  not  expect  perfection."69 
Although,  according  to  Atwood,  "At  no  time  did  the  scientists  allow 
political  differences  to  block  their  course," 70  nonetheless,  such 
differences  did  on  occasion  arise  and  had  to  be  dealt  with. 

Political  Constraints  on  the  Program 

Political  constraints  upon  the  IGY  were  minimized  by  adherence 
to  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  ICSU  and  its  affiliated  bodies:  that 
scientists  from  any  country  or  territory  were  welcomed  as  participants, 
and  that  such  participation  carried  no  implications  for  diplomatic 
recognition  of  the  government  of  the  country  or  territory  concerned. 
As  pointed  out  by  Atwood,  "This  principle  made  possible  the  virtually 
universal  enrollment  of  national  scientific  communities  in  the  IGY."  " 
However,  the  principle  could  not  at  times  surmount  the  de  facto 
recognition  which  the  existence  of  national  committees  implied, 
particularly  when  two  opposing  groups  or  committees  claimed  the 
same  nationality. 

THE  TWO  CHINAS 

Political  difficulties  concerning  the  two  Chinas — the  People's 
Republic  of  China  (Red  China)  and  the  Republic  of  China  (Nation- 
alist China) — were  perhaps  the  most  marked  of  all  political  influences 
that  affected  the  IGY.  According  to  Chapman,  these  difficulties  left 
the  members  of  the  CSAGI  with  ".  .  .  some  of  their  most  painful 
IGY  memories." n  Given  the  attitudes  of  the  protagonists,  the 
problem  was  inherently  insoluble. 

The  People's  Republic  of  China  formed  an  IGY  Committee  late 
in  1955  through  the  Peking  Academia  Sinica,  which  had  built  a 
worldwide  reputation  for  scientific  scholarship.  The  Pekirig  Committee 

«  Atwood,  "The  IQ  Y  In  Retrospect,"  p.  682. 

"  Sullivan,  "The  I(1Y,"  p.  299. 

w  Chapman,  Year  of  Discovery,  p.  107. 

M  Wil.-on,  New  Moon*,  p.  326 

«•  Wilson,  New  Moon*,  p.  326. 

w  Atwood,  "The  IGY  In  Retrospect,"  p.  688. 

73  Atwood,  "The  IOY  in  Retrospect,"  p.  6K  I 

n  Chapmun,  "International  Cooperation,"  p.  178. 


321 


announced  that  it  would  participate  in  the  IGY  upon  the  condition 
that  the  Chinese  Nationalists  would  not.  Peking  participation  was 
accepted  by  the  CSAGI  despite  this  condition,  which  was  essentially 
ignored  as  irrelevant  since  the  Nationalist  Chinese  had  not  responded 
to  an  invitation  sent  3  years  earlier.  In  1956,  however,  the  Nationalist 
Chinese  indicated  a  desire  to  participate,  demanding  that  the  Peking 
group  be  excluded.  This  demand,  which  was  rejected  by  the  CSAGI, 
subsequently  was  withdrawn  in  1957,  by  the  Nationalist  Chinese,  who 
then  officially  joined  the  IGY.  The  Peking  group  thereupon  withdrew. 
Sullivan  has  called  this  action  "...  the  only  case  in  which  the  IGY 
was  significantly  affected  by  political  considerations."  73 

SOVIET  MISSILES 

Political  considerations  also  influenced  the  extent  to  which  the 
Soviets  released  data  concerning  their  Sputnik  satellites.  It  had  been 
agreed  among  IGY  participants  that,  before  the  launching  of  any 
satellites,  certain  data  would  be  released,  including  time  of  launch; 
weight,  shape,  and  dimensions  of  objects  placed  in  orbit;  and  infor- 
mation concerning  transmission  of  data  and  details  of  orbit.  It  soon 
became  apparent  that  the  U.S.S.R.  was  not  prepared  to  release  all 
the  agreed-upon  information,  primarily  because  military  rockets  had 
been  used  to  launch  the  satellites  and  it  was  feared  that  such  infor- 
mation would  disclose  military  secrets,  especially  with  regard  to  the 
location  of  launch  sites.  Much  discussion  during  the  latter  part  of  the 
IGY  concerned  exactly  what  satellite-related  information  the  Soviets 
would  release.  However,  the  American  and  Soviet  representatives 
were  never  able  to  reach  complete  agreement  on  this  issue.  American 
representatives,  to  be  sure,  were  at  a  decided  advantage  in  that 
information  on  Vanguard  firings,  largely  utilizing  nonmilitary  hard- 
ware, was  quite  open  and  unrestricted  by  comparison. 

ARCTIC  FLIGHTS 

One  aspect  of  Arctic  studies  centered  around  the  fact  that  little 
information  was  available  concerning  drifting  ice  in  the  Arctic  Ocean, 
sometimes  clogging  Alaskan  waters,  sometimes  Siberian.  Hence, 
American  scientists  suggested  to  Soviet  scientists  that  a  cooperative 
program  be  established  to  enable  aerial  photographic  mapping  of  the 
Arctic  ice  packs  and  their  patterns  of  drift.  Soviet  scientists  accepted 
the  suggestion,  proposing  that  flights  be  made  between  Murmansk  and 
Fairbanks,  which  would  permit  mapping  of  the  entire  Arctic  ocean. 
This  suggestion  was  vetoed  in  Washington,  however,  apparently 
because  two  important  Air  Force  bases  had  been  built  near  Fairbanks. 
Instead,  Washington  proposed  that  flights  terminate  at  Nome,  a 
much  less  satisfactory  location  than  was  Fairbanks.  Meanwhile,  the 
Hungarian  and  Suez  crises  erupted  in  1956,  and  the  Soviet  reply  to 
the  American  suggestion  of  Nome  was  that  the  Soviet  Air  Force 
would  map  the  Siberian  side  by  itself.  Thus,  a  mixture  of  political 
and  military  considerations  prevented  the  implementation  of  the 
scientific  program  as  originally  conceived. 

n  Sullivan.  "The  IGY,"  p.  294. 


322 


RADIOACTIVE  FALLOUT 


Much  thought  was  given  by  meteorological  scientists  during  the 
IGY  to  determination  of  air  mass  movements  by  the  use  of  radio- 
active fallout  techniques.  In  particular,  plans  were  made  to  determine 
the  extent  of  nuclear  radiation  in  the  atmosphere,  the  amount  of 
fallout  reaching  the  ground,  and  the  quantity  of  dust  already  ac- 
cumulated. Although  indications  were  that  Soviet  IGY  leaders  backed 
the  program,  Soviet  scientists  did  not  participate.  Sullivan  has  specu- 
lated that  rejection  of  Soviet  participation  was  "...  a  political 
decision  in  Moscow  not  to  take  part  in  any  activity  which  implied 
that  fallout  had  some  usefulness."  u  Nonetheless,  a  limited  fallout 
study  was  conducted  by  other  IGY  participants. 

ANTARCTIC  BASES 

A  significant  proportion  of  IGY  activities  was  carried  out  in  the 
Antarctic,  where  a  number  of  participating  nations  had  made  terri- 
torial claims,  some  of  which  overlapped.  It  was  therefore  inevitable 
that  political  considerations  could  not  be  completely  excluded  from 
the  Antarctic  program.  In  particular,  it  was  clear  that  Australian 
representatives  were  disturbed  over  the  establishment  of  Soviet  bases 
that  close  to  Australia,  and  the  extent  to  which  such  bases  appeared 
of  a  permanent  nature.  Through  informal  agreement  and  mutual 
understanding,  however,  these  various  claims  were  not  enforced  in 
any  way,  thus  permitting  the  Antarctic  program  to  be  pursued  largely 
unaffected  by  such  claims. 

MAPPING 

Soviet  delegates  to  the  IGY  proposed  that  all  expeditions  to  the 
Antarctic  cooperate  in  preparing  a  detailed  map  of  the  continent 
primarily  through  aerial  photography.  This  proposal  was  rejected  on 
the  grounds  that  mapping  did  not  meet  the  basic  requirements  for 
IG  i  programs.  American  participants  also  objected  to  the  program 
on  the  grounds  that  mapping  represented  a  quasi -political  activity 
which  should  not  be  included  in  what  otherwise  were  purely  scientific 
activities.  The  American  view  was  inadvertently  reinforced  when  the 
U.S.  Navy,  in  its  Operation  Deepfreeze  plan,  used  the  phrase  "United 
States  rights  in  the  area,"  75  a  phrase  to  which  the  American  scientists 
strongly  objected.  Although  the  Soviets  eventually  proceeded  to  map 
half  the  continent,  the  American  contingent  did  not  participate  in 
these  activities.  Subsequent  technological  developments  in  recon- 
naissance by  artificial  satellites  have  rendered  the  disagreement 
irrelevant. 

THE   "STOLEN"   SATELLITE   ROCKET 

Politics  also  intruded  into  the  IGY  with  regard  to  the  recovery 
of  the  rocket  which  launched  Sputnik  I.  By  coincidence,  a  large 
meteor  fell  over  Alaska  almost  precisely  at  the  time  predicted  for 
the  final  pass  of  the  Soviet  rocket  over  that  area.  Subsequently, 
local  U.S.  Army  headquarters  erroneously  announced  that  the  rocket 

"  Sullivan,  "The  TOY,"  p.  282. 

"  Operation  De«pfrrezp,  Operation  Plan  No.  1-65,  Commander,  U.S.  Naval  Support  Force,  Antarctica, 
p.  2.  For  details,  see:  8ullivan,  Atiault,  p.  402. 


323 


had  fallen  into  an  Army  reservation  in  the  vicinity  of  Fairbanks. 
Soviet  Premier  Khrushchev  commented  later,  "We  know  [the  rocket] 
fell  on  the  United  States,  but  they  do  not  want  to  give  it  back  to  us."  78 
Correspondence  regarding  the  rocket  and  its  recovery  then  ensued 
between  the  Soviet  and  American  IG  Y  committees,  until  the  American 
delegates  were  able  to  demonstrate  conclusively  that  the  rocket 
must  have  fallen  in  Siberia  rather  than  in  Alaska. 

CENSORSHIP 

A  basic  principle  of  the  ICSU,  and  therefore  of  the  IGY,  was 
that  all  scientific  information  would  be  reported  as  soon  as  possible 
and  thereafter  quickly  disseminated  to  all  interested  parties.  However, 
some  newspaper  and  radio  reports  covering  a  CSAGI  conference  in 
Moscow,  held  from  July  29  to  August  9,  1958,  were  held  up  by  Soviet 
censors.  Chiefly,  the  censored  material  concerned  Japanese  infor- 
mation regarding  radioactive  rain  samples  which  demonstrated  that 
radioactivity  in  Japanese  rainwater  resulted  primarily  from  Soviet 
nuclear  weapons  tests.  Protests  over  this  censorship  of  reporting 
IGY  results  successfully  prevented  further  censorship,  and  news 
stories  that  had  been  held  up  were  released. 

»  New  York  Timet,  Dec.  7, 1957,  p.  1. 


IV.  The  Scientific  Results 

Tremendous  masses  of  data  were  obtained  during  the  IGY.  For 
example,  approximately  17  tons  of  records  were  generated  by  Ameri- 
can Antarctic  stations  alone.  This  dramatic  outpouring  of  information 
posed  more  questions  than  were  answered.  Berkner  likened  the  situa- 
tion to  that  of  coming  from  outer  space  and  finding  a  new  planet.77 

Summary  of  Scientific  Findings  of  the  IGY 

The  assimilation  of  this  wealth  of  new  information  required  con- 
siderable time,  and  the  process  is  still  continuing.  However,  com- 
prehensive summaries  of  the  major  scientific  results  of  the  IGY  are 
available,78  as  well  as  numerous  more  popularized  summaries.79  Hence, 
only  a  brief  synopsis  of  the  major  findings  will  be  given  here.80 

AURORA  AND  AIRGLOW 

It  was  found  that  the  aurorae  are  continuous  along  a  "magnetic 
dip  line"  on  the  dark  side  of  the  earth,  and  that  movements  within 
them  pass  from  west  to  east.  Also  discovered  was  the  fact  that  airglow 
results  from  light  emitted  upon  the  decay  of  chemical  compounds 
formed  in  the  outer  fringes  of  the  atmosphere  by  incident  solar  energy, 
and  that  auroral  displays  typically  result  from  solar  activity.  Follow- 
ing a  particularly  outstanding  solar  flare  during  the  IGY,  activity 
was  observed  at  altitudes  as  high  as  800  kilometers,  and  the  effects 
were  visible  as  far  south  as  Cuba.  Worldwide  disruptions  in  communi- 
cations by  radio,  land  telegraph  lines,  and  ocean  cables  were  observed. 
For  example,  magnetic  activity  in  the  upper  atmosphere  induced 
potentials  m  transatlantic  cables  of  up  to  2,650  volts. 

COSMIC  RAYS 

Cosmic  rays,  believed  to  represent  possibly  half  of  all  the  energy 
in  the  universe,  were  found  to  be  influenced  by  solar  activity,  with 
diminished  cosmic  ray  intensity  being  noted  during  periods  of  high 
sunspot  activity.  However,  fundamental  questions  concerning  the 
origin  and  nature  of  cosmic  rays  remained  unanswered.  Sullivan  com- 
mented that  cosmic  ray  physics  ".  .  .  emerged  from  the  IGY 
as  .  .  .  the  broadest-ranging  of  all  man's  intellectual  endeavors," 
dealing  not  only  with  the  immense  concepts  of  galaxies  and  inter- 
galactic  space,  but  with  the  opposite  spectrum  of  atomic  and  nuclear 
particles  and  forces  as  well.81 

"  Roberts,  "The  IQY  In  Retrospect,"  p.  269. 

'•  See.  (or  eiample,  the  NAS  IQY  Program  Report. 

'•  Included  are:  Chapman,  Year  of  Ditcocery;  Sullivan,  Assault;  and  Wilson,  Nm  Moon*. 

••Summarized  primarily,  but  not  exclusively,  from:  Roberts,  "The  IQY  In  Retrospect,"  pp.  269-284; 
Atwood.  "The  IQY  In  Retrospect,"  pp.  686-688;  and  Odlshaw  In  NSF-NAS  Hearings;  JOY  Report,  pp.  23- 
48. 

•>  Sullivan,  Assault,  p.  211. 

(324) 


325 


GEOMAGNETISM 


IGY  magnetic  observatories  and  recording  stations  provided 
working  material  for  extensive  investigations  into  many  aspects  of 
natural  electric  and  magnetic  phenomena  and  their  relation  to  solar 
events.  Existence  of  an  equatorial  electrojet — a  powerful,  concen- 
trated stream  of  current  close  to  the  magnetic  equator — was  con- 
firmedj  chiefly  on  the  sunlit  side  of  the  earth.  Currents  in  the  earth's 
crust,  induced  from  ionospheric  currents,  were  found  in  unexpectedly 
great  intensity  and  wide  distribution.  Additional  light  was  shed  on 
the  old  and  unresolved  question  of  whether  any  real  correlation  of 
meteorological  and  geomagnetic  effects  exists.  Many  unknown  mag- 
netic anomalies  were  discovered  in  the  ocean  depths. 

GLACIOLOGT 

IGY  investigations  showed  that  ice  depths  may  extend  to  more 
than  14,000  feet,  giving  rise  to  estimates  that  the  ice  content  of  the 
earth  is  about  4.5  million  cubic  miles,  or  40-percent  greater  than 
previously  thought.  Approximately  90  percent  of  this  ice  is  in  Ant- 
arctica. New  information  dramatically  advanced  the  theoretical 
analysis  of  glaciers,  especially  theories  concerning  the  deformation 
and  flow  of  ice,  and  the  heat  now  in  ice  sheets. 

GRAVITY 

New  gravimeters,  faster  and  more  portable  than  the  classic  pendu- 
lum apparatus,  were  used  during  the  IGY  to  carry  out  widespread 
detailed  surveys  of  the  earth's  gravitational  field.  Results  showed  that 
the  earth's  mass  distribution  is  highly  irregular,  with  regard  not  only 
to  mountains  and  ocean  depths,  cmt  also  to  hidden  ore  bodies  and 
structural  irregularities  of  the  earth's  rocks.  Antarctic  profiles  were 
obtained,  as  well  as  information  concerning  the  earth's  tides  and  the 
rise  and  fall  of  the  earth's  crust  (approximately  6  inches  in  amplitude 
at  Washington,  D.C.).  Much  was  learned  concerning  knowledge  of 
the  elastic  constants  of  the  earth  and  its  crust,  and  of  world  mass 
distribution. 

IONOSFHEBIC  PHTSIC8 

Research  showed  that  although  ionospheric  electric  currents  exist 
everywhere  in  some  form,  they  are  especially  intense  and  complex  in 
the  auroral  zones.  A  particularly  strong  electric  current  was  found 
close  to  the  earth's  magnetic  equator.  Much  information  was  obtained 
concerning  neutral  and  ionized  ionospheric  gases  and  their  effect  upon 
radio  communications,  particularly  as  a  function  of  radio  frequency. 

LONGITUDES  AND   LATITUDES 

Improved  measurements  were  made  with  the  help  of  special  moon- 
position  cameras  located  at  20  astronomical  observatories  distributed 
around  the  world.  These  cameras  were  capable  of  taking  simultaneous 
exposures  of  the  moon  and  surrounding  stars  while  holding  the  moon's 
image  fixed  relative  to  the  stars.  By  taking  several  observations  on  a 
single  night  at  a  given  station,  it  was  possible  to  fix  the  position  of  that 
station  accurately  relative  to  the  center  of  the  earth,  without  depend- 
ence upon  a  plumbline. 


326 


METEOROLOGY 


Possibly  the  most  important  IGY  contribution  to  meteorology  was 
the  study  of  Antarctic  weather.  Old  theories  of  air  circulation  were 
disproved,  and  fundamental  contrasts  with  northern  polar  weather 
were  made  possible.  In  particular,  it  was  found  that  the  Antarctic 
continent  did  not,  as  previously  thought,  impede  the  free  flow  of 
tropospheric  winds  across  it,  distributing  heat  and  moisture  and 
greatly  slowing  temperature  drops  during  the  polar  night.  Rather, 
stratospheric  air  masses  were  found  to  be  contained  by  a  strong  jet 
stream  which  encircles  the  continent  and  Causes  continuously  dropping 
temperatures  in  the  winter.  Much  of  what  was  learned  during  tnese 
IGY  studies  should  assist  in  developing  better  weather  prediction 
capabilities,  as  well  as  contributing  to  long-range  efforts  to  exercise 
some  degree  of  control  over  the  earth's  weather. 

NUCLEAR    RADIATION 

IGY  experiments  confirmed  the  fact  that  atomic  bursts  in  iono- 
spheric regions  can  produce  artificial  radiation  and  other  widespread 
effects  similar  to  those  produced  by  nature.  By  exploding  small 
nuclear  devices  between  tne  Van  Allen  radiation  belts,  the  scientists 
injected  a  known  quantity  of  electrons  of  known  energies  into  the 
earth's  magnetic  field  at  known  times  and  places,  thus  producing 
artificial  auroral  luminescence.  These  experiments  represented  the 
first  time  in  history  that  worldwide  synoptical  measurements  were 
made  on  a  completely  controlled  geophysical  phenomenon. 

OCEANOGRAPHY 

Studies  of  ocean  currents  demonstrated  that  the  ocean  depths  are 
very  much  in  motion.  The  discovery  that  movements  were  much 
greater  than  those  necessary  to  compensate  for  windblown  currents  on 
the  surface  led  to  the  conclusion  that  thermal  forces  are  primarily 
responsible  for  the  massive  circulation  of  ocean  water.  Three  major 
countercurrents — one  in  the  Atlantic  flowing  deep  beneath  the  Gulf 
Stream,  and  two  in  the  Pacific — were  located,  clocked,  and  measured. 
Studies  of  the  deep  ocean  trenches  of  the  Pacific  showed  that  life, 
including  fish,  crustaceans,  and  fauna,  exists  even  under  conditions 
almost  40,000  feet  below  the  surface.  Also,  it  was  shown  that,  contrary 
to  previous  belief,  the  water  of  deep  ocean  trenches  is  not  stagnant, 
and  hence  it  was  demonstrated  that  such  trenches  are  unsuitable  for 
dumping  of  radioactive  wastes. 

SEISMOLOGY 

The  IGY  afforded  unique  opportunities  to  place  seismographic 
recorders  in  remote  parts  of  tne  world,  particularly  in  the  polar 
regions.  Antarctic  observations  were  especially  useful  in  obtaining 
valuable  readings  on  a  broad  range  of  far-southern  quakes  covering  a 
vast  area,  and  for  helping  to  determine  propagation  velocities  through 
ocean  crustal  formations.  Reflected  waves  from  small  surface  explo- 
sions were  used  to  determine  subsurface  structure,  disclosing  the  ice 


327 

depths  in  Antarctica  and  Greenland,  and  providing  information 
about  the  continental  structure  of  Antarctica.  Explorations  in  South 
America  showed  the  crust  of  the  Andean  massif  to  be  unexpectedly 
thin.  Ground  waves  of  ultralong  period  were  subjected  to  intensive 
study,  demonstrating  the  value  of  such  waves  in  detecting  distant 
earthquakes  and  underground  explosions. 

SOLAR  ACTIVITY 

IGY  studies  resulted  in  unprecedented  observations  of  solar 
activity,  including  an  almost  complete  record  of  hydrogen  gas  flares. 
Observations  were  enhanced  by  occurrence  of  the  greatest  number  of 
sunspots  since  1612,  when  such  phenomena  were  first  observed  by 
Galileo.  Solar  clouds  were  shown  to  be  the  source  of  ultraviolet  light, 
solar  flares  the  source  of  gamma  radiation,  and  the  corona  the  source 
of  X-rays.82  Magnetic  fields  of  varying  intensities  were  found  to 
accompany  sunspots  and  flares,  with  residual  magnetic  fields  extend- 
ing outward  possibly  beyond  the  solar  system.  Possibilities  were 
raised  that  much  thermal  energy  might  be  transferred  to  the  earth's 
atmosphere  by  way  of  direct  contact  with  the  thin  but  hot  gases  of 
the  sun's  corona. 

UPPER  ATMOSPHERE 

IGY  research  established  that  there  is  no  definite  end  to  the 
earth's  atmosphere.  As  far  distant  as  10  earth  diameters  a  sub- 
stantial hydrogen  atmosphere  was  found  to  exist,  fading  into  the 
atmosphere  of  outer  space  itself,  dominated  by  the  effects  of  untold 
meteors,  X-rays,  ultraviolet  light,  protons,  electrons,  cosmic  rays, 
and  electric  and  magnetic  fields.  Thus,  the  upper  atmosphere  was 
found  to  be  a  place  of  considerable  activity,  affecting  many  phenomena 
on  the  earth  itself.  Of  tremendous  interest  was  the  discovery  of  the 
two  Van  Allen  radiation  belts,  •  existing  as  annular  shrouds  about 
the  earth,  shaped  by  terrestrial  magnetic  fields.  These  belts  of  intense 
radiation  were  seen  as  important  factors  in  determining  and  per- 
haps limiting  man's  future  exploration  of  space. 

Appraisal  of  Findings 

.  If  one  particular  field  of  activity  were  to  be  singled  out  as  the  most 
outstanding  scientific  achievement  of  the  IGY,  it  would  undoubtedly 
be  the  launching  of  artificial  earth  satellites.  Although  the  IGY  was 
primarily  an  exercise  in  pure  science,  one  of  its  primary  objectives 
was  to  exploit  contemporary  technology  in  the  pursuit  of  scientific 
objectives.  The  launching  of  the  IGY  artificial  earth  satellites  repre- 
sented a  remarkable  technological  achievement  that,  despite  advance 
warning,  nonetheless  created  astonishment  and  a  sense  of  wonder 
throughout  the  world.  Thus,  these  scientific  space  probes  clearly 
initiated  the  space  age,  opening  a  new  era  of  exploration  and  dis- 
covery which  nas  progressed  much  more  rapidly  than  could  possibly 
have  been  foreseen  during  the  IGY.  Sullivan  has  likened  the  scientific 

*  X-rays  are  emitted  when  a  beam  of  high-velocity  electrons  impinges  upon  a  suitable  metallic  target 
within  an  evacuated,  or  partially  evacuated,  glass  tube.  Powerful  natural  emitters  of  X-rays  outside  the 
solar  system  are  believed  to  Include  radio  sources,  and  novae  and  supernovae.  Gamma  rays,  similar  in 
many  respects  to  X-rays  but  generally  of  higher  frequency  and  greater  penetrating  power,  are  emitted  upon 
the  decay  of  radioactive  substances. 


328 


importance  of  orbiting  the  first  artificial  satellites  to  the  release 
of  atomic  power,83  and  has  commented  as  follows: 

By  now,  references  to  the  Space  Age  have  become  hackneyed,  yet  upon  reflec- 
tion it  seems  possible  that,  a  thousand  years  hence,  the  year  1957  will  be  to  the 
schoolchildren  of  the  world  what  1492  is  to  young  Americans  today.  In  M92 
the  Old  World  opened  the  door  to  the  New;  in  1957  man  opened  the  door  to  the 
solar  system,  and  perhaps  beyond.*4  • 

Furthermore,  it  was  the  IGY  space  satellite  program  which  led 
to  the  aforementioned  discovery  of  the  Van  Allen  radiation  belts, 
characterized  by  Roberts  as  "one  of  the  great  physical  science  dis- 
coveries of  all  time,"  the  implications  of  which  "are  yet  unimagin- 
able, but  they  are  certainly  tremendous — quite  possibly  comparable 
with  those  attending  the  discovery  of  radio  waves."  K 

If  the  launching  of  artificial  earth  satellites  was  the  most  outstanding 
IGY  accomplishment,  then  the  exploration  of  the  Antarctic  was 
undoubtedly  the  next  greatest  achievement.  Before  the  IGY,  most 
of  man's  knowledge  of  his  native  planet  had  been  based  on  data 
derived  from  observations  made  on  the  six  continents  he  inhabited; 
Antarctica  remained  the  unknown  continent.8*  On  a  global  scale, 
information  regarding  atmospheric  circulation,  ionospheric  conditions, 
and  geological  history  of  the  earth  necessarily  remained  incomplete. 
IGY  activities  initiated  in  the  Antarctic  and  continued  thereafter 

;  .  .  resulted  in  numerous  significant  discoveries  which  contributed  to  better 
knowledge  and  a  clearer  picture  of  the  physical  processes  of  [the  earth].  Geologic, 
paleontologic,  and  paleomagnetic  discoveries  .  .  .  were  largely  responsible 
for  the  revival  of  the  Continental  Drift  theory  and  the  emergence  of  a  new  and 
more  accurate  picture  of  Earth's  geology,  this  time  with  the  seventh  continent 
included." 

The  IGY  was,  of  course,  much  more  than  the  launching  of  earth 
satellites  and  exploration  of  the  Antarctic,  dramatic  as  those  accom- 
plishments were.  It  was,  according  to  Kaplan,  "primarily  a  program 
of  basic  research,  a  seeking  after  first  causes."  88  Atwood  has  described 
it  as  "a  good  program,  carefully  planned,  and  magnificently  executed," 
which  led  to  'new  scientific  knowledge  of  untold  wealth."  89  In 
particular,  important  new  discoveries  were  made  regarding  man's 
environment,  the  earth  itself,  the  oceans,  and  the  atmosphere.  Thus,  as 
stated  by  Roberts, 

The  borders  of  our  knowledge  of  man's  environment  were  pushed  back  in  several 
Important  respects,  with  an  already  vast  and  growing  store  of  new  knowledge 
which  will  sharply  influence  the  course  of  human  development.'4 

The  mere  production  of  data  is  in  itself  no  guarantee  of  scientific 
advancement.  The  IGY  did  much  more  than  generate  data:  it  pro- 
duced new  scientific  understanding  and  knowledge.  It  permanently 
increased  both  the  .amount  and  quality  of  geophysical  and  solar 
observations,  served  to  catalyze  much  research  that  might  never  have 

•Walter  Sullivan,  "The  IQY— Scientific  Alliance  in  a  Divided  World,"  Bulktia  of  On  Atonic  BdtnUtU 
14  (May  1958),  p.  78. 

«  BoUrvan,  AnmnU,  pp.  2-8. 

■  Roberts.  "The  IOY  In  Retrospect,"  p.  364.  _ 

•  George  Doomanl,  "Science  Policy  tor  Antarctica,"  BulUiin  of  the  Atomic  Sckntittt  24  (April  IMP), 
D  80 

'«  Doumanl,  "Science  Policy  (or  Antarctica,"  pp.  80-40. 

•Joseph  Kaplan.  "What  We've  Learned  from  toe  IOY,"  The  Rotation  108  (March  I960),  p.  Ml 

»  Atwood,  "The  IOY  in  Retrospect,"  p.  680. 

«  Roberta,  "The  IOY  la  Retrospect,"  p.  203. 


329 


been  initiated  otherwise,  stimulated  thought  and  imagination  in 
opening  up  unparalleled  new  horizons,  and  transformed  earth  science 
into  planetary  science.  As  summarized  by  Wilson,  it  "vastly  enlarged 
the  scope  of  man's  activities  and  gave  him  a  new  vision  of  his  place  in 
the  universe."  91 

Continuation  of  IGY  Programs 

One  of  the  major  scientific  outcomes  of  the  IGY  was  the  establish- 
ment of  new  means — and  new  international  organizations — to  con- 
tinue many  of  the  scientific  undertakings  initiated  or  expanded  during 
the  IGY.  Without  the  IGY,  these  programs  might  have  been  delayed 
for  many  years  or  possibly  might  never  have  been  initiated  at  all. 
Major  credit  for  the  continuation  of  many  programs  was  due  the 
ICSU,  which,  through  CSAGI,  had  begun  to  consider  as  early  as  June 
1957  proposals  for  the  formation  of  new  groups  through  which  the 
central  IGY  organization  could  be  perpetuated.  The  first  such  group 
to  be  formed  was  the  Special  Committee  on  Antarctic  Research 
(SCAR),  established  in  March  1957.  There  soon  followed  creation  of 
the  Special  Committee  on  Oceanic  Research  (SCOR),  which  held  its 
first  meeting  at  Woods  Hole,  Mass.,  during  the  period  August 
28-30,  1957. 

A  broad  program  for  establishing  special  committees  for  continuing 
IGY  activities  in  various  fields,  as  exemplified  by  SCAR  and  SCOR, 
was  given  general  endorsement  by  the  CSAGI  at  its  fifth  assembly 
meetmg  in  Moscow  during  the  period  July  30  to  August  9,  1958,  at 
which  time  the  name  International  Geophysical  Cooperation — 1959 
(IGC-1959)  was  coined  to  describe  the  program,92  In  a  sense,  this 
proposal  represented  a  compromise  between  the  Soviet  and  American 
positions  on  formal  continuation  of  the  IGY.  The  Soviet  leaders,  it 
appeared,  had  a  very  urgent  and  demanding  need  for  both  the  IGY 
name  and  the  IGY  organization  to  help  maintain  their  position  at 
home.93 

A  direct  continuation,  however,  posed  a  delicate  problem  for  the 
American  scientists,  who  had  repeatedly  emphasized  to  the  Congress 
that  the  IGY  was  to  be  a  specific,  time-limited  undertaking.  Early 
in  1954,  while  seeking  the  initial  appropriation  for  the  IGY,  Dr. 
Waterman  had  pointed  out  that  the  scientific  community  regarded 
the  activity  as  "a  one-shot  program."  M  Early  the  following  year,  in 
seeking  additional  appropriations,  Dr.  Berkner,  speaking  on  behalf  of 
the  USNC,  agreed  that  a  cutoff  date  of  July  1960  would  be  satisfactory 
for  the  U.S.  program.95  This  agreement  was  somewhat  qualified  later 
in  the  year  when  Berkner,  looking  forward  to  the  post-IGY  period, 
raised  the  possibility  of  further  development  of  IGY  activities.98 
Although  this  possibility  fell  upon  receptive  congressional  ears,  the 
American  position  had  become  solidified  to  the  extent  that  support 
for  the  Soviet  direct  continuation  proposal  was  impractical.  Thus,  as 
Waterman  explained: 

•»  Wilson,  New  Moon*,  p.  324. 

•>  NAS  IOY  Program  Report,  p.  vil. 

«  Sullivan,  Assault,  p.  409. 

M  House,  The  Supplemental  Appropriation  Bill,  196S,  p.  936. 

M  House,  Independent  Offices  Appropriations  for  196t>,  p.  320. 

"  Senate,  Hearings  on  H.R.  6t40,  p.  447. 


330 


The  Russians  have  proposed  an  extension  recently,  but  our  delegation  feels  this 
would  be  a  mistake.  It  may  be  that  certain  special  fields  of  global  interest  might 
be  continued  in  some  cooperative  way,  but  this  would  not  be  desirable,  in  our 
opinion,  for  the  complete  IGY  program.97 

Acceptance  of  the  IGC-1959  as  the  "some  cooperative  way," 
leaving  the  extent  of  participation  entirely  up  to  each  participant, 
helped  resolve  the  conflicting  American  and  Soviet  positions. 

The  proposal  for  the  IGC-59  was  endorsed  by  the  ICSU  during  its 
meeting  in  Washington,  October  2-6,  1958,  at  which  time  a  successor 
body  was  created,  the  Special  Committee  for  Inter- Union  Cooperation 
in  Geophysics  (SCG)  of  the  ICSU.  The  last  meeting  of  the  CSAGI 
and  the  first  meeting  of  the  SCG  were  held  concurrently  in  May 
1959,  both  committees  having  essentially  the  same  representation. 
At  this  joint  meeting  it  was  proposed  that  a  committee  somewhat 
different  in  composition  from  the  SCG  be  formed,  a  Comita  Inter- 
nationale de  Geophysique  (CIG)  which  would  be  composed  of  a 
larger  membership,  including  the  IGY  reporters.  This  proposal  was 
approved  by  the  ICSU  Executive  Board  in  October  1959  and  the 
first  meeting  of  the  CIG  took  place  in  November  1959.  Thus,  the 
CIG  assumed  essentially  the  same  responsibilities  for  the  IGC-1959 
as  the  CSAGI  had  assumed  for  the  IGY,98  including  publication  of 
such  IGY  publications  as  the  Annals  and  oversight  and  support  of  the 
work  of  the  World  Data  Centers." 

Other  organizations  set  up  to  continue  various  IGY  programs  in- 
cluded the  Inter- Union  Committee  on  Contamination  by  Extra- 
Terrestial  Exploration  (CETX),  the  Committee  on  Space  Research 
(COSPAR),  and  the  International  World  Days  Service  (IWDS).100 
Formation  of  these  various  organizations  assured  that  work  accom- 
plished during  the  IGY  was  suitably  reported  and  published,  and  pro- 
vided for  its  continuation  thereafter.  The  existence  of  these  inter- 
national organizations  and  programs  must  be  considered  one  of  the 
most  important  legacies  of  the  IGY.101 

w  Senate,  Hearings  on  H.R.  lStfO.  p.  384. 

•»  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  IOY  Report,  p.  21.  Testimony  of  Hugh  Odlshaw. 

••  NAS  IOY  Program  Report,  p.  x. 

100  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  IGY  Report,  p.  21. 

101  For  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  organizational  structure  of  the  international  scientific  community 
and  the  role  of  COSPAR  in  particular,  see:  International  Cooperation  and  Organization  for  Ovter  Space, 
pp  a^S— 42fi  and  Richard  W.  Porter,  "International  Scientific  Community:  International  Council  of  Sci- 
entific Unions  and  COSPAR"  in:  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Aeronautica'  and  Space  Sciences, 
International  Cooperation  in  Outer  Space:  A  Symposium,  92d  Cong.,  1st  sess.,  Dec.  9,  1971,  pp.  527-567. 


V.  The  Political  Impacts 

Much  emphasis  has  already  been  placed  upon  the  fact  that  the  IGY 
was  not  an  international  undertaking  in  the  literal  sense  of  the  term, 
but  rather  an  internationally  coordinated  collection  of  otherwise 
independent  national  activities.  These  national  activities,  once 
approved  and  funded  by  their  respective  governments,  were  in  turn 
almost  exclusively  under  the  control  of  individual  scientists  and  thus 
were  almost  entirely  apolitical.  Berkner  has  emphasized  the  fact  that 
the  IGY  programs  were  "operated  by  scientists  [italics  his],  with  the 
consent,  cooperation,  and  aid,  but  not  the  direction,  of  govern- 
ments." 102  The  individualized  nature  of  the  activities  has  been  under- 
scored by  Odishaw,  who  called  the  IGY  "a  gathering  together  of 
private  human  beings,  each  of  whom  had  a  vital  personal  interest  in 
a  particular  subject,  each  of  whom  felt  that  this  subject  needed  .  .  . 
a  concerted  attack."  103 

Despite  this  basic  scientific  individualism  of  the  IGY,  its  ultimate 
impact  reached  considerably  beyond  individual  scientists  and  the 
scientific  community  itself  and  was  felt  within  the  political  community 
as  well.  Chapman,  for  example,  commented  that  "it  cannot  be  doubted 
that  the  IGY  .  .  .  had  significant  political  results."  104  An  examina- 
tion of  those  political  results  is  the  primary  purpose  of  this  study. 
In  carrying  out  this  examination,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  IGY 
represented  a  major  technological  achievement  as  well  as  a  scientific 
achievement.  Indeed,  the  eventual  political  impacts  of  the  program 
perhaps  owe  more  to.IGY  technology  than  to  its  science.  In  discussing 
the  results  of  these  impacts,  it  is  well  to  keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  the 
specific  technology  employed  in  the  artificial  earth  satellite  program 
of  the  IGY  required  agreements  among  nations  which  subsequently 
made  further  agreements  in  related  areas  much  easier  to  accomplish 
(see  section  VI).  Thus,  although  primary  emphasis  in  the  preceding 
section  has  been  given  to  the  scientific  results  of  the  IGY,  there  is  no 
intent  in  this  study  to  minimize  the  importance  of  the  technology 
employed  in  the  pursuit  of  those  results,  especially  insofar  as  the 
employment  of  that  technology  impacted  upon  subsequent  political 
affairs. 

In  this  section,  the  political  effects  of  the  IGY  are  examined  first 
as  they  affected  the  United  States,  in  both  general  and  specific  ways, 
and  then  as  they  affected  the  international  political  scene. 

General  Impacts  on  the  United  States 

Political  impacts  of  the  IGY  were  felt  within  the  United  States 
on  two  levels,  one  general  and  one  more  specific.  First,  considerable 
impact  was  evident  hi  general  in  what  is  frequently  termed  the 
"politics  of  science,"  which  roughly  may  be  considered  a  matter  of 
"who  spends  how  much  money  for  what."  It  was  inevitable  that  an 
undertaking  of  the  magnitude  of  the  IGY  should  benefit  the  earth 

102  Berkner,  "Geography  and  Space,"  p.  313. 

i"  From  testimony  in  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  IOY  Report,  p.  20. 

lM  Chapman,  "International  Cooperation,"  p.  174. 

(331) 


332 


sciences  and  shift  attention  toward  projects  supporting  the  four 
major  goals  discussed  earlier  in  section  III.  To  the  extent  that  scientific 
manpower,  technical  resources,  and  available  funds  were  allocated 
in  support  of  IGY-oriented  programs,  the  earth  sciences  clearly 
received  high  priority.  A  reflection  of  this  emphasis  is  contained  in 
the  highly  international  philosophy  that  appears  to  have  prevailed 
during  the  IGY  period.  Certainly  the  earth  sciences  benefited  enor- 
mously, never  before  having  enjoyed  especially  great  largess  as 
compared  with  more  spectacular  fields  like  high-energy  physics  or 
atomic  energy.  As  Kaplan  remarked, 

The  impact  of  the  International  Geophysical  Year  in  the  geophysieal  sciences 
has  been  remarkable.  In  my  opinion,  the  International  Geophysical  Year  has 
usheied  in  a  new  era  in  geophysics.105 

Specific  Impacts  on  the  United  States 

On  a  more  specific  level  were  the  large  number  of  national  impacts 
which  occurred  primarily  as  a  result  of  the  Soviet  IGY  artificial 
satellite  program.  The  launching  of  artificial  satellites  was  an  im- 
portant and  integral  part  of  the  total  IGY  effort.106  Although  only 
two  of  the  67  participating  nations — the  United  States  and  the 
U.S.S.R. — took  part  in  these  activities,  they  represented  the  world's 
two  most  powerful  countries,  and  the  proportions  of  their  respective 
IGY  outlays  which  went  into  the  satellite  effort  were  substantial.107 

The  possibility  of  launching  artificial  earth  satellites  had  been 
discussed  long  before  the  IGY,  and  Van  Allen  had  outlined  the 
scientific  usefulness  of  satellites  as  early  as  1948. 108  In  November 
1953,  the  president  of  the  Soviet  Academy  of  Sciences  told  the  World 
Peace  Council  in  Vienna  that  "science  has  reached  a  state  when  it 
is  feasible  ...  to  create  an  artificial  satellite  of  the  Earth."  109  In 
view  of  the  optimism  regarding  the  technology  available  for  satellite 
launching  and  the  ability  to  make  measurements  encompassing  the 
globe  through  their  use,  it  is  not  surprising  that  especially  serious 
attention  was  given  the  use  of  satellites  as  part  of  the  IGY. 

At  the  Rome  meeting  of  the  CSAGI  in  1954,  a  formal  proposal 
was  made  that  those  nations  able  to  do  so  should  include  artificial 
satellites  within  their  IGY  programs.  In  particular,  it  was  felt  by  the 
CSAGI  that  use  of  such  satellites  should  provide  information  regarding 
the  aurora,  the  earth's  magnetic  field,  the  solar  ultraviolet,  X-ray 
and  particle  radiation,  and  cosmic  ray  phenomena  that  could  not  be 
acquired  in  any  other  way.  As  stated  by  Roberts,  "A  direct  result 
of  the  agreement  reached  at  Rome  [was]  that  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  embarked  at  this  time  on  what  was  to  become  per- 
haps man's  most  adventurous  scientific  enterprise  .  .  .  destined  to 
produce  results  far  beyond    the  initial  expectations  of  CSAGI."  uo 

">»  Testimony  in  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  IGY  Report,  p.  8. 

10*  S  unple:  U.S.,  Co  enate,  Committee  on  Aeronautical  and  Space  Sciences,  Soviet  Space 

Programs:  Organization,  Plans,  Goals,  and  International  Implications,  s7th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  May  31,  1962, 
p.  123.  This  staff  study  calls  the  launching  of  Sputnik  1  the  tGY'8"mos1  dramatic  event"  (p.  173). 

""As  mentioned  eai  Her  in  chap  2,  almost  half  of  the  $-13  million  appropriated  by  Congress  for  the  10 Y 
was  used  for  earth  satellite  acth  ii  I 

101  Sullivan,  "The  I<>  V,"  p.  J75.  Some  discussion  took  place  in  military  department  reports  possibly  as 
early  as  l 

'MSi«  P.  J.  Kroner,  Behind  the  Sjmtniks,  A  Survey  of  Soviet  Space  Science  (New  York:  Public  Affairs 
Press,  1958),  p.  ■'*. 

»°  Roberts,  "The  IO  Y  in  Retrospect,"  p.  268. 


333 


In  retrospect,  the  way  in  which  the  Soviet  and  American  responses 
to  the  CSAGI  proposal  developed  can  be  held  responsible  to  a  large 
degree  for  the  subsequent  American,  and  world,  reaction  to  Sputnik 
I.  On  April  16,  1955,  only  6  months  after  passage  of  the  CSAGI 
proposal,  the  Soviets  announced  creation  of  a  Commission  on  Inter- 
planetary Communication  which,  as  one  of  its  functions,  was  to 
organize  work  on  the  construction  of  artificial  earth  satellites.111 

No  mention  was  made  of  the  IGY,  however,  and  the  report  went 
largely  ignored  by  the  rest  of  the  world.112  Three  months  later,  on 
July  29,  1955,  President  Eisenhower  announced  that  artificial  satel- 
lites would  be  launched  as  an  integral  part  of  the  U.S.  IGY  program.113 
Unlike  the  earlier  Soviet  announcement,  the  Eisenhower  announce- 
ment received  widespread  attention.  Of  particular  interest  was  the 
U.S.  plan  to  develop  a  nonmilitary  rocket,  the  Vanguard,  specifically 
for  IGY  purposes,  rather  than  make  use  of  existing  military  rockets. 
This  decision  was  made  by  American  scientists  who  hoped  to  develop 
not  only  their  own  launching  rockets,  but  also  the  necessary  tracking 
facilities,  computers,  and  related  support  systems  in  order  to  ".  .  . 
remain  independent  of  military  security  and  military  requirements 
and  to  develop  a  satellite  designed  solely  for  the  gathering  of  scientific 
information."  1H  Only  a  few  days  after  the  Eisenhower  announcement 
of  American  plans,  the  Soviets  announced  that  they,  too,  would 
launch  IGY  satellites,  but  no  specifics  were  given  at  that  time. 
Thus,  the  stage  was  set  for  the  beginning  of  the  "space  race"  be- 
tween the  two  powers. 

Following  these  initial  announcements  of  IGY  satellite  activity, 
a  number  of  further  clarifying  announcements  were  made  from  time 
to  time  by  both  participants.  The  gist  of  these  remarks  was  that  the 
American  satellites  would  be  relatively  small,  light  spheres,  about  20 
inches  in  diameter,  weighing  about  20  pounds.115  The  original  plan 
called  for  12  rocket  propulsion  vehicles,  thus  theoretically  making 
possible  the  launching  of  12  instrumented  research  satellites.118  Sub- 
sequently, the  size  of  the  satellites  was  revised  somewhat  higher,  from 
20  to  30  inches,  inclusive,  but  the  satellites  continued  to  be  popularly 
referred  to  as  basketballs.117  The  U.S.  effort  was  described  by  Dr. 
Homer  E.  Newell,  Jr.,  who  substituted  for  Berkner  as  CSAGI  reporter 
for  rockets  and  satellites,  as  being 

.  .  .  simply  an  extension  of  the  conventional  rocket  program,  which  in  turn 
has  been  thought  of  as  an  integral  pari  and  natural  extension  of  the  overall  IGY 

effort. 118 

Comment  concerning  the  Soviet  effort,  on  the  other  hand,  indicated 
that  Soviet  satellites  might  be  considerably  heavier  than  the  American 

111  Krieger,  Behind  the  Sputniks,  p.  330.  The  formation  of  the  Commission,  headed  by  L.  I.  Sedov,  was 
announced  in  the  newspaper  Vechernyaya  Moskva. 

112  Sullivan,  "The  IGY,"  p.  301. 

1,3  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Aeronautical  and  Space  Sciences,  Soviet  Space  Programs,  1966- 
70,  92d  Cong.,  1st  sess.,  Dec.  9, 1971,  p.  160. 

114  Wilson,  Neiv  Moons,  p.  66. 

'i°  House,  Second  Supplemental  Appropriation  Bill,  1956,  pp.  451,  461. 

i"  House,  Second  Supplemental  Appropriation  Bill,  1956,  p.  452. 

117  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Appropriations,  Second  Supplemental  Appropriation  Bill, 
1956,  Hearings  on  H.R.  10004,  84th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  Mar.  20, 1956,  p.  222.  As  the  U.S.  plan  actually  developed, 
!he  first  Vanguard  satellite  was  a  6-inch  test  sphere  weighing  3.5  pounds,  containing  only  a  radio  transmit- 
ter. Vanguard  II  weighed  20.7  pounds,  and  Vanguard  III  100  pounds.  These  were  the  only  Vanguard  sat- 
llite~  launched:  eight  other  attempts  to  orbit  Vanguard  satellites  failed. 

1,8  Speech  of  Sept.  9, 1955,  reproduced  in  the  CSAGI  Bulletin  a" Information. 


334 


ones,119  and  remarks  of  Soviet  Academician  Sedov  indicated    that 
Soviet  military  rockets  might  be  used  for  the  launchings: 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  time  has  come  when  it  is  possible  to  direct  all  forces  and 
means  toward  mutual  efforts  for  creating  an  artificial  satellite  and  to  switch  the 
military  potential  in  the  technology  of  rockets  to  the  peaceful  and  noble  purposes 
of  developing  cosmic  flights.  I  think  that  such  work  would  be  an  important  con- 
tribution to  the  cause  of  eliminating  the  cold  war  and  would  serve  the  cause  of 
consolidating  peace.120 

Again,  Soviet  announcements  did  not  arouse  much  interest  and 
went  largely  unnoticed.121  Thus,  as  a  result  of  widespread  publicity 
given  the  U.S.  effort  as  contrasted  with  the  relative  lack  of  attention 
paid  the  Soviet  effort,  the  launching  of  Sputnik  I  was  almost  univer- 
sally greeted  with  great  astonishment  and  surprise.  As  expressed  by 
Sullivan, 

In  the  consternation  that  ensued  in  the  West,  either  it  was  forgotten  that  the 
satellite  launchings  were  part  of  an  international  scientific  effort  or  there  was  a 
strong  feeling  that  the  Russians  had  not  played  the  IGY  game  according  to  the 
rules.122 

This  strong  reaction  to  the  news  of  Sputnik  I  was  summarized  by 
Walt  W.  Rostow,  as  follows : 

There  is  no  clear  analogy  in  American  history  to  the  crisis  triggered  by  the 
launching  of  the  Soviet  earth  satellite  on  October  4,  1957.  This  intrinsically 
harmless  act  of  science  and  engineering  was  also,  of  course,  both  a  demonstration 
of  foreseeable  Soviet  capability  to  launch  an  ICBM  and  a  powerful  act  of 
psychological  warfare.  It  immediately  set  in  motion  forces  in  American  political 
life  which  radically  reversed  the  Nation's  ruling  conception  of  its  military  problem, 
of  the  appropriate  level  of  the  budget,  and  of  the  role  of  science  in  its  affairs. 
The  reaction  reached  even  deeper,  opening  a  fundamental  reconsideration  not 
only  of  the  organization  of  the  Department  of  Defense  but  also  of  the  values  and 
content  of  the  American  educational  system  and  of  the  balance  of  values  and 
objectives  in  contemporary  American  society  as  a  whole.123 

These  reactions  are  discussed  in  greater  detail  below. 

FEDERAL    SUPPORT    OF    BASIC    SCIENCE 

The  net  effect  of  the  IGY  and  Sputnik  I  on  Federal  support  for 
basic  science  in  the  United  States  was  unprecedented.  Many  effects 
were  evident,  including  the  restoration  of  Federal  funds  for  scientific 
facilities  that  previously  had  been  closed,  strengthening  of  the  Federal 
Government's  in-house  research  efforts,  and  increased  benefits  for 
Federal  scientists  and  engineers.  Perhaps  the  most  striking  effect, 
however,  was  the  change  in  appropriations  for  the  National  Science 
Foundation  (NSF).  Established  by  Congress  in  1950,  the  NSF 
had  "struggled  through  its  first  few  years  with  appropriations  far  below 
even  its  fixed  ceiling  of  $15  million."  124  By  1956,  the  NSF  budget  had 
increased  to  almost  $30  million,  about  half  of  which,  however,  was 
specifically  budgeted  for  IGY  activities,  as  shown  in  table  5.  Three 
years  later,  as  pointed  out  by  Berkner, 

'•  Senate,  Soviet  Space  Programs,  1966-70,  p.  160. 
»  »  S  »:  K  richer.  Behind  the  Sputnik*,  pp.  330-331. 
>"  Sen  itc,  Soviet  Space  Programs,  1966-70,  p.  160. 
»'  Sullivan   "The  IGY,  p.  300. 

>"  Wait  W.  Rostow,  The  I  nil  t<l  States  in  the  World  Arena;  An  Essay  in  Recent  History  (New  York:Harper 
an  I  Row,  1'60),  p.  366. 
i"  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  IQY  Report,  p.  191. 


335 


As  a  direct  result  of  Sputnik,  [the  NSF's]  1959  appropriations  total  $130 
million,  certainly  a  radical  recognition  of  the  neglected  importance  of  science 
and  technology.12* 

Furthermore,  the  1959  NSF  budget  was  entirely  devoted  to  Federal 
support  of  basic  research;  less  than  5  percent,  or  only  $6  million, 
represented  formal  IGY  expense.  By  1968,  the  NSF  budget  had 
peaked  at  over  $500  million.  As  stated  in  a  review  of  NSF  activities, 
the  IGY  ".  .  .  permitted  the  Foundation  to  support  basic  research 
to  meet  needs  of  science  somewhat  sooner  than  might  have  other- 
wise been  possible."  126 

In  retrospect,  it  is  unfortunate  that  this  increased  Federal  funding, 
and  the  considerable  public  interest  in  the  IGY,  were  not  translated 
into  widespread  public  understanding  and  support  of  basic  research. 
Unlike  many  of  the  activities  of  the  IGY,  which  took  place  dra- 
matically in  remote  and  exciting  areas  of  the  globe,  basic  research 
was  a  difficult  area  of  scientific  activity  for  the  general  public  to  under- 
stand and  appreciate,  and  still  remains  so.  Although  the  IGY  was, 
to  scientists,  primarily  an  exercise  in  basic  research,  to  the  public  it 
appeared  largely  a  matter  of  polar  adventures  and  space  satellites. 
Thus,  were  such  an  effort  proposed  today,  it  would  appear  doubtful 
that  it  would  receive  widespread  public  support  unless  the  activities 
involved  were  sufficiently  broadened  so  as  to  appeal  to  a  wide  variety 
of  interests. 


TABLE  5.  BUDGET  OBLIGATIONS  OF  THE  NATIONAL  SCIENCE  FOUNDATION, 

1951-72.' 

Fiscal  year                                                                  Basic  NSF                   IGY 

Total 

Percent  IGY 

1951 153 

1952. 3,466 

1953 4,431 

1954.. 7,962 

1955 12,486 

1955 16,068 

1957 38,630 

1958 49,973 

1959 132,940 

1960 158,600 

1961 174,995 


1,837 

14,323 

12.8 

14,905 

30,  973 

48.2 

15,037 

53,667 

28.0 

19,337 

69,310 

27.9 

5,932 

138,872 

4.3 

1,598 

160,198 

1.0 

20 

175,015  ... 

1962 260,821 

1963 320,754 

1964 354,584 

1965 M16.000 

1966.... 2  466,000 

1967 2  465,000 

1968.... 2  505,000 

1969. 2433,000 

1970... 2461,000 

1971... 2495,000 

1972 2  598,000 


1  Figures  in  thousands  of  dollars. 

2  Figures  rounded  off  to  nearest  thousand  dollars. 

Data  for  1951-64  are  taken  from:  U.S.,  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics.  Subcommittee  on 
Science,  Research,  and  Development,  The  National  Science  Foundation:  A  General  Review  of  Its  1st  15  Years,  89th 
Cong.,  2d  sess.  Jan.  24,  1965,  pp.  32-35.  Data  for  1965-72  are  taken  from:  National  Science  Foundation,  Databook  NSF 
73-3  (Washington:  National  Science  Foundation,  January  1973),  p.  15. 


mNSF-NAS  Hearings:  IGY  Report,  p.  191. 
12«  NSF:  Its  First  16  Years,  p.  78. 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  23 


336 

THE  SPACE  PROGRAM 

The  launching  of  artificial  earth  satellites  during  the  IGY,  thereby 
initiating  mankind's  exploration  of  outer  space,  has  frequently  been 
characterized  as  the  most  significant  result  of  the  IGY.  Berkner,  for 
example,  remarked  that  space  research  was  perhaps  "...  the 
area  of  the  IGY's  greatest  impact.  For  it  was  the  IGY  mechanism 
.  .  .  which  stimulated  the  first  steps  forward  into  space  within  the 
context  of  a  peaceful,  international  program."  127  Similarly,  Odishaw 
commented  that  the  artificial  satellite  program  of  the  IGY,  represent- 
ing a  "striking  departure"  from  the  kinds  of  research  techniques 
previously  employed  by  scientists,  might  be  the  innovation  that 
would  determine  "the  ultimate  place  of  [the]  IGY  in  history."128 
Gerson  observed  that 

.  .  .  the  truly  remarkable  feature  of  the  IGY  [was]  its  boldness  of  execution 
in  the  space-age  era.  .  .  .  Undoubtedly,  the  space  age  would  have  been  launched 
by  1960-65  [but]  the  inclusion  of  satellite  vehicles  ...  in  the  IGY  hastened 
[its]  fruition. ,2* 

Sullivan  commented  that 

Under  the  auspices  of  the  IGY  the  door  to  outer  space  has  been  opened.  .  .  . 
The  placement  of  the  first  space  vehicles  in  orbits  around  the  earth  has  marked 
the  IGY  as  a  momentous  event  in  scientific  history,  comparable  to  the  release  of 
atomic  power.130 

More  recently,  in  a  report  of  the  United  Nation's  Economic  and 
Social  Council,  the  role  of  the  IGY  in  space  research  was  summarized 
as  follows : 

One  of  [the  IGY's]  projects  was  to  have  satellites  circling  the  earth  equipped 
with  instruments  to  measure  the  earth's  forces  and  the  influences  from  outer 
space.  From  the  original  modest  program  in  which  the  U.S.S.R.  and  the  United 
States  agreed  to  put  small  satellites  into  orbit  emerged  the  space  race,  with  cos- 
monauts and  astronauts  going  first  into  orbit  and  then  to  the  Moon,  with  rockets 
to  Venus  and  Mars  and  the  positioning  of  manmade  satellites  to  reflect  broadcast 
signals  and  make  long-range  television  possible;  to  maintain  day  and  night  obser- 
vations of  the  weather  system  and  report  back  and  in  later  refinements  of  detection 
to  give  a  pattern  of  natural  resources.131 

Within  the  United  States,  the  primary  result  of  the  Soviet  achieve- 
ment was  the  creation  of  the  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Admini- 
stration (NASA),  which  was  formed  in  1958  "either  directly  or 
indirectly  [as  a  result  of]  activities  of  the  IGY."132  As  discussed  by 
Sullivan,  the  IGY  forced  the  Federal  Government  "to  undertake  a 
new  function — that  of  large-scale  exploration.  It  became  necessary  to 
form  a  new  organ,  the  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration, 
and  to  allocate  to  it  an  increasing  share  of  the  national  budget."  l33 

A  corresponding  response  was  evoked  in  the  Congress.  On  March  5, 
1958,  the  House  Select  Committee  on  Astronautics  and  Space  Ex- 
ploration was  created,  followed  on  July  21  by  the  establishment  of  the 

i»  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  JOY  Rtport,  p.  177. 

m  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  IGY  Report,  p.  22. 

"•  Oorsen,  "Polar  Years  to  IO  Y,"  p.  44. 

>«>  Sullivan,  "Scientific  Alliance,"  p.  Tl. 

'»'  United  Nations  Economic  and  Social  Council,  Science  and  Technology,  Role  of  Modem  Science  and 
Technology  in  the  Development  of  Nations  and  the  Need  to  Strengthen  Economic  and  Technico-scientiftc  Coopera- 
tion Among  States  (New  York:  United  Nations  ESC.  Jan.  26,  l'.)73),  pp.  20-30.  As  of  the  present  writing 
of  cours«,  only  [U.S.J  astronauts  have  succeeded  in  going  to  the  Moon. 

>"  Atwood,  "The  IO  Y  in  Retrospect,"  p.  689.  See  also  remarks  of  Berkner  in  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  IQY 
Report,  i>.  191  and  remarks  earlier  In  this  series  In  Toward   l    \  etc  Diplomacy  in  A  Scientific 

' -:  Sulilv'an  Assault,  p.  416.  The  Increases  in  funds  fur  space  activities  was  discussed  in 
The  Evolution  <>f  International  Technology  (vol.  II.  p.  tiiMii  :  "The  must  direct  response  [to 
Sputnik  1]  In  the  United  States  was  an  expansion  In  outlays  for  space  activities.  These 
virtually  doubled  In  each  fiscal  year  after  Sputnik  until  1961  ;  they  peaked  at  $7,688.5  mil- 
lion In  1966." 


337 

Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics.  In  the  Senate,  the  Special 
Committee  on  Space  and  Astronautics  was  created  on  February  6, 
1958,  followed  on  January  14, 1959,  by  establishment  of  the  Committee 
on  Aeronautical  and  Space  Sciences.  The  National  Aeronautics  and 
Space  Administration  was  established  by  passage  of  the  National 
Aeronautics  and  Space  Act  of  1958,  simultaneously  creating  the  Na- 
tional Aeronautics  and  Space  Council.  Appropriations  were  passed 
funding  both  these  and  other  space  groups  and  activities.  These 
moves  effectively  ushered  both  the  legislative  and  executive  branches 
of  the  Federal  Government  into  the  space  age. 

FEDERAL  SCIENCE  ADVISORY  STRUCTURE 

The  launching  of  Sputnik  I  during  the  IGY  resulted  in  radical 
changes  in  the  Federal  science  advisory  structure.  Most  important 
were  the  appointment  of  a  Science  Adviser  to  the  President  and  the 
location  of  the  President's  Science  Advisory  Committee  directly 
within  the  White  House.134  The  latter  step,  according  to  Berkner, 
"has  profoundly  influenced  all  that  has  followed,  for  the  needs  of 
science,  scientific  research,  and  science  education  can  now  be  under- 
stood and  discussed  at  top  governmental  levels.  Scientists  finally 
have  a  definitive  access  to  Government."  135  This  much-expanded 
science  advisory  apparatus  within  the  Executive  Office  in  turn  led  to 
"the  designation  of  a  number  of  Assistant  Secretaries  for  Science  and 
Technology  (or  equivalent)  in  old-line  departments."  136  This  struc- 
ture continued  largely  intact  until  it  was  dismantled  by  Reorganiza- 
tion Plan  No.  1  of  1973.137 

Additional  effects  were  felt  within  the  State  Department,  which  in 
1950  had  created  an  Office  of  the  Science  Adviser  and  had  appointed 
scientific  attaches  to  several  embassies  in  Western  European  countries. 
The  Departments  Science  Office,  which  had  been  drastically  curtailed 
in  1955,  was  revived  and  strengthened  following  Sputnik  I.  Science 
attaches,  appointed  to  serve  at  U.S.  embassies  in  London,  Paris, 
Rome,  Bonn,  Stockholm,  and  Tokyo,  were  the  first  to  serve  under 
Wallace  R.  Brode,  newly  appointed  as  Science  Adviser  to  the  Secre- 
tary, and  constituted  the  first  of  a  series  of  such  appointments  follow- 
ing Sputnik  I.  Additional  appointments  to  embassies  in  the  U.S.S.R., 
India,  and  South  American  countries  soon  followed.  The  primary 
duties  of  the  science  attache,  according  to  the  State  Department,  was 

.  .  .to  serve  as  an  adviser  to  the  Ambassador  and  his  staff  in  the  evaluation 
of  the  interaction  of  science  with  foreign  policy,  the  assessment  of  current  scien- 
tific progress  abroad,  and  the  enhancement  of  the  liaison  between  United  States 
and  foreign  scientists  and  engineers.138 

The  fact  that  24  countries  had  scientific  attaches  attached  to  their 
embassies  in  Washington  attested  to  "the  need  and  usefulness  for 
representation  of  science  in  international  affairs."  138  Transferred  to 
the  Office  of  the  Science  Adviser  in  May  1962  were  several  nonmilitarv 
functions  of  the  Space  Affairs  Section  of  the  Office  of  the  Special 

««  These  moves  are  discussed  in  detail  by  Atwood,  "The  IGY  in  Retrospect,"  p.  689,  and  in  NSF-NAS 
Hearings:  IOY  Report,  p.  191. 

1M  Testimony  of  Berkner  in  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  IOY  Report,  p.  191. 

'*>  Toivard  a  New  Diplomacy.  See  vol.  I,  p.  12. 

«w  Reproduced  in:  U.S.  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Government  Operations,  Reorganization  Plan 
No.  1  of  197$,  Hearing,  93d  Cong.,  1st  sess.,  Feb.  26,  1973,  pp.  97-104. 

'»  Department  of  State  Bulletin  39  (Dec.  29,  1959),  pp.  1048-1049. 

»»•  Department  of  State  Bulletin  39  (Dec.  29,  1959),  p.  1049. 


338 


Assistant  for  Atomic  Energy,  established  in  1957.  This  consolidated 
office  ultimately  became  the  present  Bureau  of  International  Scientific 
and  Technological  Affairs,  one  office  of  which  is  the  Office  of  Space 
and  Atmospheric  Science  Affairs.140 

SCIENCE  EDUCATION  IN  AMERICA 

The  IGY  and  Sputnik  I,  according  to  Sullivan,  "precipitated  a 
reexamination  of  the  educational  system  and,  in  fact,  of  the  entire 
American  scale  of  values."  U1  According  to  Senator  Lyndon  Johnson, 
then  Senate  Majority  Leader,  "We  have  lost  an  important  battle  in 
technology.  That  has  been  demostrated  by  the  satellites  that  are 
whistling  above  our  heads."  142  In  a  unanimous  statement,  the  Senate 
Armed  Services  Preparedness  Subcommittee  declared:  "We  had  ex- 
pected to  be  first  with  this  achievement.  In  fact,  we  have  yet  to  prove 
second.  .  .  .  We  are  engaged  in  a  race  for  survival,  and  we  intend  to 
win  that  race."  143 

Such  concerns  raised  serious  questions  regarding  the  quality  of 
science  education  in  America  and  led  to  an  analysis  of  the  kind  of 
education  system  necessary  to  "produce  the  well-informed  and  highly 
competent  men  of  science  and  public  affairs  required  if  our  Nation  is 
to  retain  its  position  of  responsibility  and  leadership  in  world  af- 
fairs." 144  Congress  requested  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences  to 
look  into  ways  in  which  the  IGY,  as  an  undertaking  of  great  public 
interest,  could  help  to  educate  the  public  with  regard  to  the  value  of 
science.  The  Academy  responded  by  publishing  the  IGY  bulletin  and 
full-color  educational  posters  on  "Planet  Earth,"  and  by  producing 
a  series  of  13  half -hour  color  films,  one  describing  each  IGY  dis- 
cipline.145 As  a  result  of  these  and  other  related  IGY  activities,  parents, 
school  boards,  and  legislators  became  more  aware  of  the  importance 
of  science  training  for  the  Nation's  youth. 

Demands  were  voiced  that  highly  qualified  students  be  given 
better  preparation  for  science  careers.  Curricula  for  secondary  educa- 
tion were  revised,  and  books  by  Conant,  Kickover,  and  others  sought 
to  provide  guidelines  and  stimulate  discussion.  Mathematics  and 
science  courses  began  to  reappear  in  high  schools  on  a  substantial 
scale.  Efforts  were  made  to  bring  textbooks  and  teaching  methods  up 
to  date  as  exemplified  by  the  work  on  physics  teaching  by  MIT  and 
the  revision  of  high  school  mathematics  curricula  by  Yale.  These 
and  other  efforts  helped  to  stimulate  a  new,  widespread  interest  in 
science  in  young  people  in  schools  and  colleges  throughout  the  coun- 
try. Perhaps  the  greatest  effect,  however,  was  passage  of  the  National 
Defense  Education  Act  of  1958,  which  made  available  substantial 
Federal  appropriations  for  these  purposes. 

In  retrospect,  this  emphasis  was  not  entirely  beneficial.  Science 
careers  may  have  been  made  attractive  to  some  students  who  lacked 
either  the  necessary  qualifications  or  the  sustained  motivation  re- 

'•»  Personal  communication  from  Mr.  Arthur  E.  Pardee,  Jr.,  Executive  Director  of  the  BISTA. 

t«  Sullivan,  Assault,  p.  416. 

|i«  Statement  before  the  Senate  Preparedness  Investigating  Committee.  In:  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate, 
Committee  on  Armed  Services,  Inquiry  Into  Satellite  and  Missile  Programs,  Hearings,  86th  Cong.,  2d  sess., 
1968,  p.  3. 

•«  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate,  Armed  Services  Committee,  Preparedness  Investigating  Subcommittee, 
Hearings  on  Reports  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  on  Accomplishments  of  the  Defense  Department  on  Recommen- 
dations of  the  Preparedness  Subcommittee,  86th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  Jan.  23,  1968,  p.  2427.  I 

i«  NSF  Eighth  Annual  Report,  p.  6. 

i«  NAS  IQY  Program  Report,  p.  x. 


339 

quired  for  such  careers.  Furthermore,  as  Dean  Harvey  Brooks  has 
pointed  out,  curriculum  reform  was  largely  undertaken  for  the  wrong 
reason,  namely,  ".  .  .  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  needed  to  make 
our  engineers  and  scientists  better  than  their  Soviet  counterparts," 
rather  than  because  of  a  fundamental  desire  to  improve  the  way  in 
which  science  was  being  taught.146  Thus,  while  the  Sputnik  motiva- 
tion increased  interest  in  science  and  made  changes  easier,  the  danger 
also  existed  that  both  interest  and  programs  might  collapse  once  the 
motivation  subsided. 

PUBLIC  ATTITUDES  TOWARD  SCIENCE 

The  impact  of  Sputnik  I  upon  the  American  public  was  profound 
convincing  Americans  that  they  no  longer  possessed  an  undisputed 
lead  over  the  rest  of  the  world  in  science  and  technology.  The  Soviet 
accomplishment  "caused  a  great  deal  of  turmoil  in  the  United  States" 
and  was  "a  real  jolt  to  the  complacency  of  the  American  people."147 
Unlike  such  previous  Soviet  successes  as  the  atomic  and  hydrogen 
bombs,  which  Americans  could  rationalize  as  having  been  stolen 
from  them  through  espionage,  no  such  rationale  was  possible  any 
longer.  Furthermore,  the  large  and  shiny  rocket  that  had  propelled 
Sputnik  I  into  the  heavens  was  now  circling  the  earth,  clearly  visible 
in  the  dark  sky  when  illuminated  by  the  rising  or  setting  sun.  Large 
numbers  of  Americans  viewed  this  speck  of  light  not  only  with  awe, 
but  with  a  shudder,  recognizing  the  value  of  rocketry  in  warmaking. 

Public  attitudes  were  intensified  by  the  extensive  publicity  given 
the  Soviet  achievement.  As  Chapman  observed,  "Never  before  was 
an  international  scientific  enterprise  made  so  widely  known,  by  press 
and  other  publicity,  to  the  parliaments  and  peoples  of  the  world."148 
Detlev  W.  Bronk,  then  chairman  of  the  National  Science  Board, 
declared  that  "The  fact  that  .  .  .  the  newspapers  of  our  country 
have  given  such  a  tremendous  amount  of  space  to  the  achievements 
of  [the  IGY]  I  think  is  evidence  of  the  fact  that  they  recognize  that 
the  imagination  of  the  peoples  of  our  country,  the  peoples  of  the  world 
have  been  captured  by  this  great  adventure."149  This  widespread 
publicity  and  public  interest,  according  to  the  National  Science 
Foundation,  made  Sputnik  I 

...  a  symbol  of  competition  between  Russian  and  American  science,  and 
a  sign  that  we  had  "lost"  a  "scientific  race."  To  the  extent  that  the  symbol 
became  identified  with  such  a  "race,"  it  was  erroneous  and  destructive — we  did 
not  think  of  the  undertaking  in  these  terms,  but  regarded  it  as  a  part  of  a  coopera- 
tive international  scientific  undertaking,  the  International  Geophysical  Year."  15° 

This  universal  concern  helped  focus  public  attitudes  upon  the 
necessity  for  basic  research,  as  well  as  its  value.  As  stated  further 
by  the  NSF, 


144  Harvey  Brooks,  "Impact  of  the  Defense  Establishment  on  Science  and  Education."  In:  U.S.,  Con- 
gress, House,  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics,  Subcommittee  on  Science,  Research,  and  Develop- 
ment, National  Science  Policy.  Hearings  on  H.  Con.  Res.  666,  91st  Cong..  2d  sess.,  July,  August,  and  Septeiu* 
ber  1970,  p.  962. 

147  See  The  Evolution  of  International  Technology,  vol.  II,  p.  633. 

"«  Chapman,  "International  Cooperation,"  p.  178. 

i"  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  IGY  Report,  p.  4. 

»*>  NSF  Eighth  Annual  Report,  p.  3. 


340 


Public  discussions  following  the  satellite  launchings  brought  out  once  again  the 
fact  that  Americans  customarily  think  of  science  in  terms  of  applied  work,  or 
engineering,  despite  the  highly  significant  accomplishments  of  research  workers 
in  the  areas  of  fundamental  investigation.  Nevertheless,  the  connection  between 
ba«ic  and  applied  research,  and  the  degree  of  dependence  of  the  latter  upon  the 
former,  has  become  increasingly  clear  during  the  past  year.151 

A  nation  of  predominantly  "practical"  people,  not  overly  concerned 
with  "impractical"  basic  research,  began  to  appreciate  its  value 
better  as  a  result  of  the  IGY.152  Citizens  became,  according  to  Atwood, 
"more  keenly  aware  of  the  contributions  being  made  by  scientists 
and  by  scientific  institutions."  l53  The  leadership  provided  by  the 
National  Academy  of  Sciences  brought  it  greater  recognition,  and  the 
public  became  more  aware  of  the  value  of  the  NSF  and  other  scientific 
organizations,  both  public  and  private.  The  IGY  also  captured  the 
imagination  of  children  who,  having  lived  always  in  an  age  of  great 
scientific  achievement,  found  artificial  satellites  less  marvellous, 
miraculous,  threatening,  or  unnecessary  than  did  their  parents.  How- 
ever, ".  .  .  once  the  United  States  had  begun  to  launch  its  own 
space  vehicles  there  was  an  improvement  in  American  attitudes,  a 
thrill  at  witnessing  the  inception  of  a  new  era."  u* 

COMMUNICATIONS  SATELLITES 

An  important  outcome  of  the  IGY  artificial  earth  satellite  program 
was  the  development  of  international  communications  satellites.  As 
pointed  out  by  Ambassador  Abbott  Washburn,  chairman  of  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  INTELSAT  Conference  in  1971: 

After  the  first  artificial  earth  satellite  was  launched  in  1957,  orbiting  satellites 
for  communications  moved  rapidly  from  theory  to  practical  reality.165 

Progress  was  facilitated  because  the  potential  usefulness  of  earth 
satellites  for  communications  purposes  had  been  widely  discussed 
and  the  theory  of  their  application  was  relatively  well  developed. 
At  a  sufficiently  high  altitude,  individual  satellites  each  can  relay 
microwave  signals  directly  to  more  than  one-third  of  the  earth's 
surface,  reaching  remote  and  less  accessible  areas  as  well  as  major 
world  centers  of  economic  and  political  power.  The  Communications 
Satellite  Corporation  (COMSAT)  was  organized  in  1963  as  a  result 
of  the  1962  Communications  Satellite  Act  to  represent  the  "chosen 
instrument"  of  the  United  States  in  bringing  commercial  satellite 
communications  to  the  world.  The  International  Telecommunications 
Satellite  Consortium  (INTELSAT)  was  created  by  interim  inter- 
national agreement  in  1964  to  provide  an  international  mechanism 
through  which  a  single,  unified,  global  commercial  communications 
satellite  system  could  be  operated.  Permanent  arrangements  for 
INTELSAT  were  completed  after  much  negotiation  during  1968-71 
and  entered  into  force  on  February  12,  1973,  providing  the  world 
with  ".  .  .  the  first  peaceful  use  of  outer  space  for  everyday  com- 
mercial purposes."  l56 

i"  NSF  Eighth  Annual  Report,  p.  4. 

IM  Kaplan,  "What  We've  Learned,"  p.  13. 

'"  Atwood,  "The  IGY  in  Retrospect,"  p.  688. 

'*«  Sullivan,  Astault.  p.  2. 

"» Ambassador  Abbott  Washburn,  "The  International  Telecommunications  Satellite  Organization," 
in:  International  Cooperation  in  Outer  Space:  A  Symposium.  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Aero- 
nautical and  Space  Sciences,  Senate  Document  No.  9t-67,  92d  Cong.,  1st  sess..  Dec.  9,  1971,  p.  437.  Much  of 
the  material  in  this  section  is  summarized  from  Washburn,  pp.  437-452. 

'"Ibid.  For  additional  information  concerning  the  interim  and  definitive  Intelsat  agreements,  see: 
Treatiet  and  Other  International  Act*  Seriu,  Nos.  6646  and  7632,  respectively. 


341 


EFFECT   ON    NATIONAL    DEFENSE 


As  previously  discussed,  the  size  of  the  initial  orbiting  sputniks 
(180  pounds  for  Sputnik  I  and  1,120  pounds  for  Sputnik  II)  made 
it  immediately  evident  that  the  Soviets  possessed  rockets  capable 
of  traversing  intercontinental  distances  with  quite  heavy  payloads. 
Concern  was  expressed  that  this  Soviet  capability  might  lead  to  a 
race  to  produce  military  space  vehicles  at  the  expense  of  scientific 
space  research.157  Although  research  did  not  flag,  U.S.  efforts  to 
develop  long-range  missiles  were  greatly  speeded  up,  no  doubt  leading 
to  further  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  Soviets.  To  promote  U.S.  efforts, 
the  position  of  Director  of  Research  and  Engineering  was  established 
within  the  Department  of  Defense,  ranking  above  the  Assistant 
Secretaries  of  Defense  and  possessing  the  authority  to  manage  in- 
terservice  projects  without  following  the  normal  military  chain  of 
command.  He  was  supported  by  an  Office  of  the  Director  of  Defense 
Research  and  Engineering,  as  well  as  by  the  Advanced  Research 
Projects  Agency.  In  addition,  some  parts  of  the  DOD  were  reor- 
ganized to  permit  "a  more  intelligent  treatment  of  some  of  our  most 
urgent  and  difficult  defense  problems."  158 

Sputnik  I  also  led  to  a  revoking  of  the  initial  decision  to  use  only 
nonmilitary  rockets  in  the  American  IGY  artificial  satellite  program. 
The  great  weights  of  the  Sputnik  satellites  made  it  clear  that  Soviet 
IGY  scientists,  far  from  being  required  to  develop  their  own  rocketry, 
were  being  furnished  with  the  U.S.S.R.'s  most  powerful  military  hard- 
ware. The  effect  of  this  knowledge,  coupled  with  a  succession  of 
failures  of  the  Vanguard  program,  was  to  establish  a  parallel  satellite 
program  in  which  the  U.S.  Army  took  responsibility  for  the  launchings. 
This  decision  resulted  in  the  successful  orbiting  of  the  highly  useful 
Explorer  satellites. 

EFFECT   ON    FOREIGN    POLICY 

The  IGY,  according  to  Atwood,  "further  demonstrated  the  signifi- 
cance of  scientific  factors  in  formulating  and  executing  foreign  policy," 
particularly  as  evidenced  in  the  daily  activities  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment and  pronouncements  of  other  Federal  agencies.  With  its  asso- 
ciated scientific  and  technological  achievements,  the  IGY  "clearly 
indicated  that  science  could  facilitate  the  attainment  of  peaceful 
objectives  of  foreign  policy."  159  Certainly  the  IGY  engendered  un- 
precedented international  cooperation  and  good  will,  at  least  on  the 
part  of  scientists.  The  extent  to  which  this  rapprochement  was 
effectively  utilized  as  a  tool  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  is  difficult  to  assess 
and  is  discussed  later. 

International  Impacts 

International  impacts  of  the  IGY  and  the  orbiting  of  the  first 
sputniks  were  every  bit  as  spectacular  as  were  the  impacts  upon 
the  United  States  and  would  be  difficult  to  exaggerate.  Foremost 
was  the  impact  upon  the  cold  war.  Tensions  heightened  in  East- 
West  relations  as  the  Soviet  leadership  sought  to  use  its  success  in 
space  to  further  its  goals  in  foreign  and  military  policy  and  as  the 
United  States  countered  Soviet  thrusts  with  crash  programs  in  space 

•"  Sullivan,  "Scientific  Alliance,"  p.  72.  As  noted  earlier  in  The  Evolution  of  International  Technology, 
the  Soviet  achievement  "erased  the  issue  of  the  'Bomber  Gap'  [and]  created  a  'Missile  Gap'  "  (p.  24). 
us  NSF-NAS  Hearinos:  IGY  Report,  p.  192. 
"•  Atwood,  "The  IGY  in  Retrospect,"  p.  689. 


342 


and  missile  development.  Sputnik  I  catalyzed  the  cold  war  and  not 
until  the  aftermath  of  the  Cuban  missile  crisis  6  years  later  were 
Soviet-American  leaders  able  to  take  the  first  steps  decelerating  the 
spiralling  pressures  of  the  arms  race.  Additional  impacts  were  the 
effect  upon  the  international  politics  of  science,  the  use  of  science  as 
a  vital  element  in  foreign  affairs,  and  the  generation  of  a  remarkable 
degree  of  international  cooperation  and  good  will  in  politically  non- 
sensitive  pursuits. 

THE  EFFECT  ON  INTERNATIONAL  SCIENCE 

The  impact  of  the  IGY  upon  the  politics  of  world  science  was 
considerable.  Although  international  scientific  adventures  had  taken 

Elace  before  the  IGY  (as  discussed  in  section  II  of  this  study),  none 
ad  approached  the  IGY  in  magnitude.  As  stated  by  Gerson,  the 
physical  entirety  of  the  IGY  was  almost  majestic,  the  number  of 
participating  nations  was  impressive,  a  veritable  army  of  scientists 
were  deployed,  the  number  of  participating  stations  exceeded  all 
expectations,  and  the  cost  was  astronomical.160  It  was  thus  inevitable 
that  the  IGY  should  exert  considerable  influence  upon  the  future  con- 
duct of  international  science. 

A  major  influence  was  the  strengthening  of  old  ties  among  scientists 
and  the  forging  of  many  new  ones.  The  previous  system  of  somewhat 
limited  bilateral  cooperation  in  developing  and  exchanging  information 
was  replaced  by  true  international  cooperation  in  coordinated  and 
continuing  investigations.  Methods  developed  so  successfully  by  the 
ICSU  and  its  various  unions  during  the  IGY  were  seen  as  ideally 
suited  for  the  furtherance  of  international  cooperation  in  science,  and 
suggestions  were  made  that  these  methods  should  be  emulated  in  the 
future  and  used  in  other  scientific  areas. 

International  organizations  like  the  ICSU  and  its  member  nations 
were  considerably  strengthened  by  their  roles  in  the  IGY,  and  thus 
tsubsequent  efforts  were  made  easier.  For  example,  Sullivan  commented 
hat  the  ICSU,  "largely  because  of  the  IGY  .  .  .  emerged  as  the 
world's  supreme  non-governmental  organ  in  science."161  The  Soviet 
rocletiy  and  space  scientist,  previously  leading  "a  solitary  life  in  his 
cloistered  laboratory  cut  off  from  the  world  scientific  community,"  re- 
gained contact  with  the  Western  world.162  Furthermore,  Western  scien- 
tists gained  a  deeper  appreciation  of  the  quality  and  value  of  the  work 
of  their  Soviet  counterparts.  The  IGY  also  served  to  stimulate,  on  a 
world  wide  basis,  the  interdisciplinary  approach  to  problem  solving. 
Finally,  the  IGY  helped  to  spur  the  revival  of  science  in  underde- 
veloped nations  newly  experiencing  their  independence,  and  facili- 
tated the  reopening  of  major  scientific  facilities  like  observatories 
which  had  been  closed  when  vacated  by  scientists  returning  to  their 
native  countries. 

Significantly,  the  IGY  legacy  also  includes  formative  influences 
upon  entirely  new,  governmentally  sponsored  programs  which  fre- 
quently use  as  models  corresponding  programs  which  had  been  de- 
veloped during  the  IGY  and  then  continued  after  the  expiration  of 
the  IGY  and  the  IGC-1959  (discussed  in  section  IV).  One  of  these 

'•»  Gerson,  "Polar  Years  to  IGY,"  p.  44. 
"•'  Sullivan  "The  IGY,"  p.  331. 

'«  Senate,  ''Soviet  Space  Programs:  Organization  [etc.],"  p.  23.  The  role  of  the  Soviet  scientist  Is  also 
discussed  by  Sullivan  in:  "The  IGY,"  p.  327. 


343 


new  programs  was  the  international  years  of  the  quiet  sun  (IYQS), 
held  from  January  1,  1964,  through  December  31,  1965,  which  was 
organized  in  much  the  same  fashion  as  was  the  IGY  but  was  geared 
for  a  period  of  relatively  quiet  solar  activity.183  Another  was  the 
upper  mantle  program,  held  in  1966-70.164  Other  new  programs 
included  the  global  atmospheric  research  program,  the  international 
geodynamics  project,  the  international  magnetosphere  survey,165  the 
world  weather  watch,  Indian  Ocean  research,  and  the  international 
biological  program.  Typical  of  the  long-lasting  effects  of  the  IGY 
is  a  reference  appearing  in  a  1966  Senate  report  giving  credit  to  the 
IGY  for  providing  impetus  to  the  Soviet  use  of  meteorological  rockets 

that  is  still  being  felt.166 ____  ___ 

It  is  worth  noting 'Ii^ere^that  the^ciehtitic  leadershrp~ofTrTe  lGY~was~ 
largely  composed  o?  a  distinguished  elite  having  considerable  influence 
within  their  respective  countries.  The  IGY  was  effective  in  helping  to 
consolidate  these  various  national  elites  into  an  international  elite, 
the  influence  of  which  has  not  been  confined,  over  the  years,  to  purely 
scientific  matters.  Thus,  the  effect  of  the  IGY  on  both  international 
science  and  political  affairs  upon  which  international  science  depends, 
is  doubtless  still  being  felt  in  many  areas  today. 

SCIENCE   IN    FOREIGN   AFFAIRS 

Given  the  wide-ranging  character  of  the  IGY  in  international 
scientific  affairs,  it  was  natural  for  hopes  and  expectations  to  be  raised 
regarding  the  ability  of  scientists  to  function  as  international  diplomats. 
Their  possible  success  in  doing  so  is  difficult  to  evaluate,  but  it  seems 
reasonable  to  assume  at  least  a  certain  degree  of  effectiveness.  Sullivan 
has  remarked  that  "The  IGY's  construction  of  scientific  bridges  across 
political  chasms  coincided  with  a  general  growth  of  science's  role  in 
diplomacy,  as  well  as  in  national  policymaking."  He  further  points 
out  that  "Russian  academicians,  many  of  them  bearers  of  a  venerable 
humanistic  tradition,  had  reestablished  contact  with  the  Western 
World  and  had  shown  the  extent — and  limitations — of  their  influence 
on  Soviet  policy."  167  George  B.  Kistiakowsky,  science  adviser  to 
President  Eisenhower,  has  pointed  out  that,  in  terms  of  its  potential 
impact  on  political  relations,  participation  in  international  scientific 
activities  like  the  IGY  remains  perhaps  the  most  important  role  that 
can  be  played  by  scientists  today : 

For  science  is  today  one  of  the  few  common  languages  of  mankind;  it  can 
provide  a  basis  for  understanding  and  communication  of  ideas  between  people 
that  is  independent  of  political  boundaries  and  of  ideologies.  Science  also  provides 
a  sometimes  unique  opportunity  for  cooperative  endeavors  that  can  contribute 
in  a  major  way  to  the  reduction  of  tension  between  nations  and,  more  positively, 
to  close  relations  between  the  United  States  and  other  countries.188 

Sullivan  speculates  that  the  IGY  "could  prove,  from  the  perspective 
of  the  future,  to  have  been  a  turning  point  in  the  history  of  mankind — 

1U  For  a  discussion  of  the  IYQS,  see:  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Aeronautical  and  Space 
Sciences,  International  Cooperation  and  Organization  for  Outer  Space,  Document  No.  66,  89th  Cong.,  1st  sess., 
Aug.  12,  1965,  pp.  95-97,  375;  and  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Aeronautical  and  Space  Sciences, 
Soviet  Space  Programs,  1968-66;  Goals  and  Purposes,  Achievements,  Plans,  and  International  Implications, 
89th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  Dec.  30,  1966,  pp.  627-633. 

1M  National  Academy  of  Sciences,  Physics  in  Perspective,  vol.  I  (Washington:  National  Academy  of 
Sciences,  1972,  p.  569. 

"*  NAS,  Physics  in  Perspective,  p.  509. 

»«  Soviet  Space  Programs,  1962-66,  p.  229. 

w  Sullivan,  Assault,  pp.  415,  417. 

>«  George  B.  Kistiakowsky,  "Science  and  Foreign  Affairs,"  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientist*  16  April 
(1960),  p.  115. 


344 

the  start  of  a  period  in  which  scientists  assumed  a  greater  role  in 
helping  to  solve  international  problems."  169  Atwood  similarly  ex- 
pressed the  belief  that  the  IGY  helped  open  many  eyes  to  the  signifi- 
cance of  science  in  world  affairs.170  Undoubtedly  it  helped  make 
possible  further  participation  of  scientists  in  "unofficial,  exploratory 
investigations  of  possible  future  diplomatic  opportunities,"  including 
such  ventures  as  the  Pugwash  conferences.171  Although  the  diplomatic 
consequences  of  these  international  contacts  are  difficult  to  evaluate, 
they  appear  to  be  significant.  In  Sullivan's  view,  one  cannot  "separate 
the  IGY  from  the  growth  of  science's  role  in  diplomacy  during  1957 
and  1958."  172 

On  a  largely  political  scale,  the  rocketry  and  outer  space  activities 
of  the  IGY  provide  an  excellent  example  of  the  role  of  a  scientific 
program  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  On  the  surface,  the  early 
space  activities  were  purely  scientific  endeavors,  aimed  at  the  explora- 
tion of  natural  phenomena  high  above  the  earth's  atmosphere.  How- 
ever, Mr.  Arnold  W.  Frutkin,  Director  of  Information  for  the  USNC 
during  the  IGY,  has  expressed  the  belief  that  the  Soviet  IGY  space 
program  had  primarily  political  rather  than  scientific  objectives.173 
His  view  conforms  with  the  widespread  agreement  that  still  appears 
to  exist  in  the  West  that  "An  important  governing  principle  in  the 
Soviet  system  of  research  and  development  is  the  close  interrelation- 
ship of  science,  technology,  and  military  affairs."  m  In  keeping  with 
this  view,  it  is  maintained  that 

.  .  .  the  Russians  have  approached  space  exploration  not  only  as  a  strictly 
technical  matter  but  aa  an  important  component  of  politics,  both  national  and 
international.  For  them  space  is  only  one  part  of  a  much  larger  political  ideological 
effort,  namely,  to  achieve  the  historically  determined  goals  of  communism.17' 

More  recently  Frutkin,  speaking  as  Assistant  Administrator  for 
International  Affairs,  NASA,  pointed  out  that,  particularly  with 
respect  to  the  Apollo-Soyuz  test  project,  Soviet  cooperation  with  the 
United  States  in  peaceful  activities  for  outer  space  has  greatly  accel- 
erated since  1969. m  This  cooperation  has  also  resulted  m  agreement 

.  .  .  for  the  exchange  of  lunar  samples,  for  exchanges  of  scientific  results  and 
objectives  for  certain  coordinated  scientific  activities,  and  on  procedures  for 
recommending  additional  cooperation  in  space  science  and  applications.1" 

This  cooperation,  says  Frutkin,  is  ".  .  .  more  than  a  pleasant  and 
useful  gesture  in  an  era  of  political  accommodation,"  but  in  addition 
should  "...  point  the  way  to  future  joint  activities  which  should 
help  both  countries  gain  more  in  space  than  they  would  from  separate 
programs."  178 

However,  the  Soviets  are  by  no  means  unique  in  this  respect.  Al- 
though an  exact  parallel  cannot  be  drawn  between  Soviet  and  Ameri- 
can attitudes,  nonetheless,  a  strong  relationship  exists  also  between 
the  U.S.  research  and  development  community  and  the  Department  of 
Defense,  and  Americans  are  not  immune  from  exploiting  their  scientific 

'««  Sullivan,  "The  IOY,"  p.  259. 

"•  Atwood,  "The  IQ  Y  In  Retrospect,"  p.  689. 

m  Toward  A  New  Diplomacy,  vol.  I,  p.  26. 

>"  Sullivan,  "The  IOY,"  p.  334. 

"»  Arnold  W.  Frutkin,  "The  Character  of  International  Cooperation  In  Space,"  address  before  the  Amer- 
ican Rocket  8oclety  during  its  symposium.  Space  Flight  Report  to  the  Nation,  Oct.  9-16,  1961.  See:  Soviet 
Space  Programs:  Organization,  etc.,  p.  177. 

"4  Senate,  Soviet  Space  Programt:  Organization,  [etc.],  p.  177. 

"»  SenaU^  Soviet  Space  Programs,  1966-70,  p.  63. 

"•  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  AeronauUcal  and  8pace  Sciences,  NASA  Authorization  for  Fiscal 
Year  1911,,  Hearings  on  S.  880,  pt.  I,  93d  Cong.,  1st  sess.,  Mar.  22,  1973,  p.  1368. 

•"  Senate,  Hearings  on  S.  880,  pp.  13fl8~1369. 

>'•  Senate,  Hearings  on  S.  880,  p.  1369. 


345 

accomplishments  politically.  The  Soviets,  it  is  claimed,  maintain  in 
"what  has  come  to  be  a  fairly  traditional  propaganda  line  ...  that 
the  United  States  uses  space  for  military  purposes."  179  The  difference, 
it  is  said,  is  that  "the  United  States  has  never  denied  that  it  has 
military  space  programs  [whereas]  the  Soviets,  seeking  to  maintain 
their  propaganda  image  as  a  'peaceful'  user  of  outer  space,  have,  in 
contrast,  never  made  such  admissions."  18°  Furthermore,  it  is  stated 
that  the  Soviets  have  attempted  to  link  "the  militarization  of  space 
with  other  foreign  policy  issues,"  including  American  involvement  in 
Vietnam.181 

Thus,  space  exploration,  although  in  essence  primarily  a  scientific 
and  technological  enterprise,  inevitably  is  deeply  involved  in  current 
international  politics.  Space  politics  has  become  a  matter  of  major 
concern  between  the  two  great  space  powers,  as  a  result  of  decades  of 
rivalry  and  confrontation.  182  The  Soviet  Government,  on  the  one 
hand,  is  said  to  see  limited  reason  for  cooperating  only  in  those  areas 
which  can  (1)  pay  off  in  military  strength,  or  (2)  promise  opportunity 
for  spectacular  developments  politically  useful  in  shaping  world 
opinion.  183  Space  exploration  has  provided  the  Soviets  with  a  unique 
instrument  for  achieving  this  political  purpose  of  reaffirmation  through 
glorification;  that  is,  using  the  glory  derived  from  success  in  space  to 
reaffirm  the  legitimacy  of  the  party  and  the  state.184  Space  triumphs 

.  .  .  have  been  used  to  affirm  the  glory  of  the  Communist  Party  and  the 
Soviet  state  .  .  .  [and]  have  been  attributed  to  the  workings  of  the  Soviet  sys- 
tem. The  foundations  of  the  space  program  have  been  tied  to  Lenin  and  Leninism. 
The  pride  in  space  accomplishments  has  been  seen  as  a  way  of  raising  citizen 
morale,  and  the  resulting  prestige  of  space  successes  has  been  exploited  for  what 
political  value  it  had.18* 

The  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  has  generally  sought  to  pre- 
vent such  total  subjugation  of  its  space  activities  to  national  and  in- 
ternational politics.  In  recent  years  as  Soviet- American  relations  have 
shifted  gradually  from  confrontation  to  negotiation,  as  the  cold  war 
has  been  appreciably  decompressed,  as  American  space  activities 
have  far  outdistanced  Soviet  efforts,  and  as  a  nuclear  balance  has  been 
achieved,  rivalry  in  space  has  been  reduced  to  the  extent  that  joint 
Soviet-American  space  flights  are  now  in  the  realm  of  the  possible. 
Thus,  the  efforts  begun  during  the  IGY  appear  at  last  to  be  promoting 
the  kind  of  cooperation  and  good  will  hoped  for  by  so  many  nearly 
two  decades  ago. 

INTERNATIONAL   COOPERATION   AND   GOOD  WILL 

Participants  in  the  IGY,  although  scientists  keenly  aware  of  its 
major  scientific  value,  have  nonetheless  frequently  been  moved  to 
claim  that  the  most  valuable  benefits  of  the  IGY  were  not  scien- 
tific, but  were  those  derived  from  the  generating  of  international  co- 
operation and  good  will.  Atwood,  for  example,  has  stated : 

I  think  that  it  is  fair  to  say  that  the  international  significance  of  the  program, 
as  its  name  bears  out,  has  been  of  greater  significance  than  even  the  very  impor- 
tant discoveries  which  have  been  made.  At  a  time  when  we  are  torn  asunder  by 

i?»  Senate,  Hearings  on  S.  880,  p.  43. 

»»  Senate,  Hearing*  on  S.  880,  pp.  43-44. 

'«  Senate,  Hearing*  on  S.  880,  p.  44. 

"2  Senate,  Hearing*  on  S.  880,  p.  1. 

l»  Senate,  Soviet  Space  Program*;  Organization,  [etc.],  p.  175. 

"*  Senate,  Soviet  Space  Programs,  1966-70,  p.  15. 

183  Senate,  Soviet  Space  Programs,  1966-70,  p.  xxl. 


346 


ideological  differences  and  by  selfish  national  attacks  upon  the  freedom  we  stand 
for,  it  is  heartening  to  find  that  there  are  some  things  that  people  can  do  together 
with  common  amity.188 

Somewhat  similar  sentiments  were  expressed  by  Tuve : 

Perhaps  the  most  important  result  of  the  IGY  is  the  demonstration  that  the 
people  of  the  Earth,  despite  their  differences,  can  get  together  and  work  with 
complete  wholeheartedness  in  studying  things  which  are  of  concern  to  all  of  us 
and  which  could  be  of  great  nationalistic  value  if  they  were  emphasized  from  a 
selfish  point  of  view.187 

To  participants,  this  international  cooperative  fellowship  appears  to 
have  been  a  constant  source  of  unexpected  pleasure  and,  to  observers, 
a  constant  source  of  amazement  and  surprise.  Odishaw,  a  participant, 
remarked  how  the  IGY  succeeded  brilliantly  in  marshaling  interna- 
tional cooperation.188  Roberts,  another  participant,  remarked: 

As  a  result  [of  the  IGY]  we  have  new  and  powerful  ties  on  an  individual  level 
between  leading  scientists  of  many  lands,  mounting  understanding  for  one  another, 
a  great  breach  in  the  Iron  Curtain,  and  a  demonstration  that  men  of  many  races 
and  political  faiths  can  work  together  fruitfully.  Even  if  these  accomplishments 
cannot  be  exactly  evaluated,  their  meaning  for  the  world  is  deep  and  pervasive.181 

Wilson,  also  a  participant,  commented  that: 

It  is  perhaps  not  unreasonable  to  maintain  that  the  greatest  achievement  of 
the  IGY  lay  not  in  its  remarkable  technical  advances,  but  in  the  demonstration 
that  scientists  are  good  humanists,  for  they  successfully  organized  a  small  but 
complex  segment  of  society  which  worked  [and  thus]  helped  achieve  a  better 
balance  between  humanism  and  science.190 

Chapman  called  the  IGY  the  greatest  example  of  worldwide  scientific 
cooperation  in  the  history  of  our  race,191  and  to  Berkner  the  Antarctic 

Erogram  of  the  IGY  represented  international  collaboration  of  the 
ighest  type.192  These  expressions  of  gratification  on  the  part  of  scien- 
tists reflected  their  pleasure  in  the  IGY  as  an  international  scientific 
undertaking  that  had  exceeded  even  their  greatest  expectations  both 
scientifically  and  diplomatically.  But  in  a  larger  sense,  underlying 
these  expressions,  and  sometimes  openly  voiced,  was  the  further  ex- 
pectation or  hope  that  this  immense  spirit  of  cooperation  and  goodwill 
could  somehow  be  caused  to  flow  unimpeded  into  the  political  arena, 
there  to  ease  the  political  tensions  so  prevalent  at  the  time,  and  pro- 
mote peaceful  coexistence  among  diverse  political  powers.  The  extent 
to  which  these  hopes  were  met  is  discussed  next. 

im  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  WY  Report,  p.  3. 
•w  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  I OY Report,  p.  65. 
im  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  WY  Report,  p.  20. 
im  Roberts,  "The  IO  Y  in  Retrospect,"  p.  263. 
iw  Wilson,  New  Moons,  pp.  327-328. 
'•'  Sullivan,  "The  IQY,"  p.  283. 

'«  Lloyd  V.  Berkner,  "The  International  Geophysical  Year,  1957-58:  A  Pattern  for  International  Co- 
operation in  Research,"  Proceedings  of  the  American  Physical  Society  101  (Apr.  19,  1957),  p.  160. 


VI.  Analysis  and  Discussion 

The  specific  questions  addressed  by  this  study  are  simple:  does 
evidence  exist  that  the  tremendous  spirit  of  international  cooperation 
and  good  will  generated  by  the  IGY  was  to  any  extent  successfully 
transferred  from  the  scientific  to  the  political  arena?  Can  it  be  said 
with  any  confidence  that  the  techniques  so  successfully  employed  by 
IGY  scientists  in  dealing  with  one  another  to  solve  problems  of  com- 
mon interest  are  at  all  applicable  to  political  behavior? 

The  discussion  which  follows  suggests  that  a  reasonable  case  can  be 
made  for  the  observation  that  at  least  some  degree  of  cooperative 
spillover  occurred;  that  is,  that  certain  subsequent  international 
political  agreements  were  furthered  by  the  climate  created,  in  some 
instances  many  years  earlier,  by  the  IGY.  After  considering  the  scien- 
tific good  will  which  was  mainly  responsible  for  the  cooperative  suc- 
cesses of  the  IGY,  this  section  concludes  with  a  brief  discussion  of 
three  such  agreements. 

Scientists  as  Eternal  Optimists 

The  participants  in  the  IGY  were  primarily  physical  scientists, 
largely  concerned  with  the  study  and  control  of  scientific  phenomena 
rather  than  with  the  conduct  of  human  society.  They  may  therefore 
be  excused  their  apparent  naivete  in  voicing  expectations  that  the 
cooperative  spirit  and  techniques  they  developed  so  successfully  in 
dealing  with  each  other  as  scientists  might  work  equally  well  in  deal- 
ing with  one  another  as  social  and  political  creatures.  The  esprit  de 
corps  engendered  by  the  IGY  appears  to  have  replaced  natural  human 
conservatism,  and  expressions  of  optimism  flowed  freely  in  the  after- 
math of  that  spectacular  scientific  activity.  Wilson,  for  example,  ob- 
served that 

.  .  .  the  International  Geophysical  Year  brought  many  men  together  under 
conditions  that  tended  to  create  harmony  and  sympathy  between  them  [and] 
showed  that  scientists  could  play  a  fruitful  role  in  international  negotiations  and 
could  strengthen  international  organizations  such  as  ICSU  and  its  parent  body 
UNESCO  .  .  .  .in 

These  and  other  joint  efforts  by  scientists,  he  maintained,  must  be 
extended  to  include  the  control  of  nuclear  fission  and  the  problem 
of  an  increasing  population;  or  we  are  lost.19*  Berkner  pointed  out 

that: 

Even  more  than  nuclear  energy,  the  satellite  has  symbolized  the  cohesive  force 
of  science  in  bringing  together  and  cementing  political,  social,  and  economic 
elements  of  man's  civilization.195 

Chapman  suggested  that: 

The  harmonious  development  and  execution  of  the  IGY  enterprise  set  a 
pattern  that  might  serve  as  an  example  to  be  emulated  in  more  difficult,  political 
fields.1  •• 


"»  Wilson,  New  Moon*,  pp.  325,  328. 
1M  Wilson,  New  Moon,  p.  328. 
'•*  Berkner,  "Geography  and  Space,"  p.  306. 

,M  Sydney  Chapman,  "Earth  and  Beyond:  The  International  Geophysical  Year  In  Retrospect.  Was  It 
A.  'Turning  Point  in  History?,'  "  Science  133  (July  7,  1961),  p.  41. 

(347) 


348 


Atwood  commented  that  "As  a  consequence,  peaceful  cooperation 
among  people  of  all  nations  is  a  little  closer  to  realization,"  and  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  "the  United  Nations  and  its  specialized 
agencies  .  .  .  will  call  upon  organizations  such  as  ICSU  for  advice 
and  assistance."  197  Similarly,  Kistiakowsky  remarked  on  the  potential 
role  of  science  in  international  affairs : 

The  significance  of  international  scientific  activities  to  the  relations  between 
nations  is  perhaps  the  most  important  of  the  roles  science  and  scientists  can  play 
in  today's  embittered  and  divided  world — not  a  new  role  in  the  sense  that  inter- 
national activities  of  science  are  part  of  the  lifeblood  of  science;  but  new  in  its 
potential  impact  on  political  relations.188 

Perhaps  not  surprisingly,  the  optimism  of  the  scientific  community 
spread  to  nonscientists  as  well.  On  the  eve  of  the  IGY,  Prince  Philip, 
the  Duke  of  Edinburgh,  in  a  television  interview  remarked: 

The  IGY  is  the  world  studying  itself.  It  is  seldom  that  this  world  of  ours  acts 
together.  .  .  .  Yet,  for  the  next  18  months,  east  and  west,  north  and  south,  will 
unite  in  the  greatest  assault  in  history  on  the  secrets  of  the  earth.  ...  At  the 
same  time,  it  may  well  help  to  solve  the  real  problem — the  conflict  of  ideas.m 

Representative  Albert  Thomas,  while  chairing  a  subcommittee  of 
the  House  Appropriations  Committee,  commented: 

I  think  you  gentlemen  of  the  International  Geophysical  Year  have  set  a  pat- 
tern of  worldwide  cooperation  that  nations  and  governments,  and  particularly 
our  good  State  Department,  can  take  a  leaf  out  of  your  book.200 

And  Walter  Sullivan,  having  served  as  a  full-time  observer  of  the 
IGY  for  the  New  York  Times,  expressed  the  hope  that  the  efforts 
of  scientists,  as  exemplified  by  the  IGY,  might  "provide  a  meeting 
ground  where  East  and  West  can  find  mutually  acceptable  techniques 
for  disarmament."  201 

These  comments  represent  a  cross-section  of  the  frequent  direct  or 
indirect  exhortations  to  politicians  to  employ  in  their  political  affairs 
the  techniques  of  science  and  scientists.  Implicit  in  these  exhortations 
is  the  notion  that  political  problems  are  amenable  to  scientific  prin- 
ciples, properly  applied.  Refreshing  as  the  intent  underlying  such 
beliefs  may  be,  it  nonetheless  underestimates  the  formidable  differences 
existing  between  the  scientific  and  political  communities. 

Scientific  vis-a-vis  Political  Good  Will 

One  of  the  difficulties  in  attempting  to  transfer  scientific  method- 
ology into  political  reality  is  suggested  by  Sullivan's  observation  that 
"science,  in  treating  our  planet  as  indivisible,  is  far  ahead  of  politics, 
which  treats  it  as  two  worlds."  202  In  view  of  today's  multiple  ideologies, 
"multiple  worlds"  might  be  a  more  appropriate  political  designation. 
During  the  IGY,  as  a  result  of  their  common  participation  in  efforts 
which  opened  up  to  man  not  only  Antarctica  but  outer  space,  scientists 
were  said  to  have  experienced  unusually  strong  feelings  of  humility  and 
brotherhood.203  These  feelings  served  to  reinforce  the  traditional  atti- 
tudes most  natural  scientists  develop  as  a  result  of  sharing  with  others 
the  common  objective  of  unveiling  nature's  secrets.  There  is  but  one 
universe  for  scientists  to  study,  and  its  singularity  unites  all  scientific 
minds. 

'»»  Atwood,  "The  IO  Y  in  Retrospect,"  p.  689. 

188  Kistiakowsky,  "Science  and  Foreign  AfT:urs,"  p.  lit. 

"'■•Illustrated  Sens  (London).  Julv  27,  1957,  pp.  2G-27. 

*»  NSF-NAS  Hearings:  IGY  Report,  p.  20. 

soi  Sullivan,  "The  1UY,"  p.  260. 

SM  Sullivan.  "Scientific  Alliance,"  p.  68. 

*»  Wilson,  New  Moon*,  p.  325. 


349 


Traditionally,  cooperation  in  solving  scientific  problems  has  always 
appeared  immeasurably  less  complex  than  cooperation  in  solving 
political  problems.  As  pointed  out  by  Astin,  since — 

.  .  .  science  is  concerned  with  external  phenomena  which  are  usually  measure- 
able  and  whose  manifestations  are  demonstrable  and  repeatable,  there  is  less 
cause  for  disagreement,  for  controversy,  than  there  is  ...  in  politics  .... 
Furthermore,  the  preoccupations  of  .  .  .  scientists  are  usually  less  charged  with 
emotion  than  are  those  of  .  .  .  politician [s]  ....  The  consideration  of  po- 
litical .  .  .  plans  or  policies  tends  to  arouse  .  .  .  passions,  whereas  delibera- 
tions [on  scientific  matters]  tend  to  proceed  more  calmly.204 

Thus  scientists  tend  to  have  fewer  social  problems  since  their  research 
is  generally  focused  upon  common,  well-defined  objectives  offering 
"a  natural  point  of  convergence,  namely,  the  correct  result."  205 
Unlike  politicians,  they  are  not  engaged  in  conflict  resolution  as  a 
profession  and  are  not  charged  with  responsibility  for  the  protection 
of  national  interests  in  a  competitive  arena.  Rather,  the  existence  of  a 
common,  agreed-upon  technical  objective  creates  a  tendency  toward 
social  cooperation  despite  all  obstacles,  a  tendency  which  has  become  a 
characteristic  of  the  international  scientific  community.206  Scientists 
tend  inherently  to  recognize  the  interdependence  of  their  efforts 
and  accept  that  interdependence  as  one  of  the  basic  conditions  of  the 
environment  in  which  they  work.  It  is  then  relatively  easy  for  them 
to  accept  the  extension  of  this  principle  to  the  environment  in  which 
they  live. 

Despite  these  inherent  advantages  scientists  possess  over  their  politi- 
cal brethren,  some  pitfalls  persist.  It  is  possible  "to  interject  political 
considerations  into  scientific  and  technical  discussions  so  that  a  con- 
sensus of  opinion  can  deliberately  be  prevented  from  emerging  into  a 
group  decision."  207  This  appears  to  have  occurred  during  the  IGY 
when  the  Soviets  made  agreement  impossible  on  what  kinds  of 
launch  and  telemetering  data  would  be  provided  to  all  participants.208 
In  general,  however,  such  behavior  tends  to  be  minimized  among 
scientists  because  of  their  overriding  concern  for  success  of  the  project 
itself.  Scientists  appear  unusually  skilled  in  finding  "common  de- 
nominators which  enable  them  to  cooperate  in  attaining  generally 
desired  objectives."  209 

In  view  of  the  substantial  differences  between  the  scientific  and 
political  communities  in  the  kinds  of  problems  they  are  respectively 
called  upon  to  solve,  prudence  would  suggest  caution  in  looking  for 
too  bold  a  transfer  of  techniques  from  one  community  to  another. 
The  IGY  itself  was  apolitical  and  closed-ended,  whereas  the  political 
process  is,  a  priori,  political  and  open-ended.210  Yet,  politicians  and 
scientists  do  share  some  important  human  characteristics.  Politicians 
and  governments,  no  less  than  scientists  and  scientific  organizations, 
are  capable  of  and  motivated  toward  uniting  to  achieve  common 
objectives.  A  major  difficulty  is  that  the  procedures  for  finding 
solutions  to  problems  facing  politicians  and  governments  are  less 
clearly  defined  than  are  the  procedures  for  finding  solutions  to  the 
specific  types  of  problems  commonly  faced  by  scientists  and  engineers. 

JM  Astin,  "The  Scientific  Community,"  p.  32. 

205  Senate  Document  No.  56,  International  Cooperation  and  Organization,  p.  208. 
J»  Astin,  "The  Scientific  Community,"  p.  32. 

107  Senate  Document  No.  56,  International  Cooperation  and  Organization,  p.  209. 

508  Discussed  in  detail  in:  Arnold  W.  Frutkin,  International  Cooperation  in  Space  (Englewood  Cliffs: 
Prentice  Hall,  1965). 

206  Senate  Document  No.  56,  International  Cooperation  and  Organization,  p.  209. 

S1°  Comment  by  Murray  Todd,  executive  director,  Office  of  the  Foreign  Secretary,  National  Academy  of 
8ciences. 


350 


Scientific  and  engineering  problems  are  typically  more  specifically 
defined  than  are  political  problems,  which  tend  to  be  overburdened 
with  value  systems  in  which  rational  and  irrational  factors  are  inter- 
mixed. Nonetheless,  if  men  can  unite  to  solve  problems  under  one 
set  of  circumstances  (the  scientific),  there  presumably  is  room  for 
hope  that  they  can  learn  to  do  so  under  another  (the  political). 
Scientists,  as  already  indicated,  tend  to  share  this  hope. 

Several  factors  help  provide  at  least  some  degree  of  optimism  that 
the  scientists  may  be  justified.  One  is  the  great  importance  of  first 
perceiving  and  assessing,  and  then  communicating,  technological 
impacts.  Scientists  and  technologists  are  likely  to  comprehend  the 
possible  consequences  of  new  discoveries  and  applications  in  the  fields 
of  energy  or  of  ecology,  for  example,  more  immediately  or  fully  than 
are  politicians.  Partly  because  of  the  IGY,  both  technological  develop- 
ments and  political  (or  institutional)  developments  which  significantly 
affect  the  human  condition  can  be  more  readily  appreciated  and  uti- 
lized today.  First,  they  can  be  brought  to  the  attention  of  both 
political  leaders  and  the  public  within  countries  (it  is  becoming 
increasingly  difficult  for  leaders  to  withhold  them  even  in  dictator- 
ships); secondly,  they  can  be  shared  among  the  countries  of  the 
world  far  more  readily  than  was  possible  just  two  or  three  decades 
ago.  Wider  public  understanding  of  technological  impacts  and  a 
stronger  institutional  framework  (governmental,  professional,  and  the 
press)  for  increasing  that  understanding  still  further  are  in  large  part 
responsible  in  the  first  instance;  technological  advances  in  rapid 
communications  and  transportation  are  among  the  factors  responsible 
in  the  second. 

More  effective  communication  does  not  necessarily  serve  the 
interests  of  peace  and  stability;  it  can  be  used  to  increase  strife  and 
tension.  Even  well-intentioned  communication  could  conceivably 
do  more  harm  than  good,  as  by  inducing  excessive  anxieties.  In  gen- 
eral, however,  the  friendly  (or  at  least  nonhostile)  communicating, 
both  within  and  among  countries,  of  knowledge  relating  to  human 
survival  on  earth  is  a  responsibility  which  cannot  be  evaded  by  the 
present  generation.  Scientists  and  politicians  have  an  obvious  common 
mterest  in  meeting  that  vital  challenge;  scientists,  again,  are  likely 
to  be  the  first  to  perceive  it  in  specific  forms.  Moreover,  as  Wilson 
has  pointed  out,  "The  dangerous  tensions  that  can  so  easily  be  .  .  . 
generated  between  nations  can  best  be  resolved  by  friendly  com- 
munication." Such  communication  can  first  be  initiated  with  subjects 
like  science  "for  which  standards  of  excellence  are  universally  accepted 
and  applicable  across  national  barriers."211  As  long  as  scientists  con- 
tinue to  talk  to  one  another  without  regard  for  national  boundaries, 
hope  exists  that  diplomats  from  various  nations  (whose  very  business 
is  communicating)  may  also  begin  to  speak  to  one  another  in  similar 
fashion,  raising  their  sights  and  their  expectations  of  accomplish- 
ment. It  is  not  unreasonable  to  suggest  that  in  view  of  the  enormous 
scope  of  the  IGY  and  the  number  of  scientists  involved,  the  example 
set  by  discussion  of  scientific  problems  may  well  have  provided  some 
impetus  for  undertaking  significant  political  discussions  as  well. 

A  factor  of  growing  importance  and  urgency  is  the  universal  need 
for  cooperation  in  solving  problems.  No  better  example  of  inter- 
national cooperation  exists  than  the  IGY  which,  as  pointed  out  by 

«"  Wilson,  New  Moom,  p.  325. 


351 


Wilson,  "provided  an  example  of  how  international  agreements  can 
be  made  to  work  smoothly."212  Astin  has  commented  that  "valid 
and  important  scientific  goals  can  lead  governments  away  from  narrow 
nationalistic  rigidities  toward  free  and  constructive  international 
cooperation."213  Although  these  comments  may  tend  to  oversimplify 
the  transfer  process,  implicit  in  them  is  the  recognition  that,  having 
agreed  once  in  one  area,  it  is  easier  for  human  beings  to  move  forward 
toward  agreement  in  another  area  than  had  there  been  no  original 
agreement  at  all.  Agreements  made  during  the  IGY  were  sufficiently 
widespread  and  long-lasting  as  to  make  plausible  the  possibility  that 
their  consummation  helped  contribute  to  eventual  agreements  in 
political  areas. 

Still  another  factor  is  that  of  common  understanding,  without 
which  agreement  in  any  area  is  impossible.  Berkner  has  remarked 
that  the 

.  .  .  rule  of  law  among  nations  will  not  be  achieved  until  men  are  bound 
together  by  common  threads  of  cultural  understanding.  Certainly  science  is  one 
of  those  threads — perhaps  a  major  line  that  permits  men  to  speak  to  one  another 
with  comprehension,  confidence,  and  common  purpose.  Coming  in  times  of  inter- 
national tension,  the  IGY  was  a  clear  demonstration  of  the  power  of  such  cultural 
bonds.21* 

Thus  the  IGY,  in  helping  to  ameliorate  international  tensions  and 
spread  good  will,  provided  "a  common  meeting  ground  and  a  common 
goal  for  nations  that  disagreed  on  about  all  else."216 

International  Diplomacy  and  the  IGY 

As  indicated  earlier,  the  specific  objective  of  this  study  is  to  deter- 
mine to  what  extent,  if  any,  the  IGY  contributed  to  international 
diplomacy  by  opening  up  new  communication  channels,  stimulating 
cooperation,  and  promoting  increased  understanding  among  the  67 
nations  that  participated  jointly  in  its  activities.  A  review  of  the 
circumstances  suggests  that  these  factors  may  have  contributed 
substantially  to  at  least  three  major  diplomatic  achievements:  the 
1961  Antarctic  Treaty,  the  1963  Test  Ban  Treaty,  and  the  1967 
Space  Treaty.216 

THE    ANTARCTIC    TREATY 

Perhaps  no  better  example  exists  of  the  direct  effect  of  scientific 
affairs  on  international  diplomacy  than  the  Antarctic  Treaty,  of 
which  the  first  sentence  of  article  I  states,  "Antarctica  shall  be  used 
for  peaceful  purposes  only."217  As  a  result  of  this  agreement,  "a  whole 
continent  on  this  planet  was,  for  the  first  time  in  man's  history, 
reserved  as  a  universal  laboratory  for  one  and  all,  whoever  desires  to 
freely  pursue  scientific  investigation  for  peaceful  purposes."218  This 

as  Wilson,  New  Moons,  p.  326. 

218  Astin,  "The  Scientific  Community,"  p.  34. 

a«  Remark  by  Berkner  in  his  introduction  to-  Wilson,  New  Moons,  p.  ix. 

"»  Gerson,  "Polar  Years  to  IGY,"  p.  43. 

218  Exact  titles  of  these  agreements  and  the  dates  when  they  entered  into  force  for  the  United  States  are 
as  follows:  The  Antarctic  Treaty,  June  23,  1961;  the  Treaty  Banning  Nuclear  Weapons  Tests  in  the  Atmos- 
phere, in  Outer  Space,  and  Under  Water,  Oct.  10, 1963;  and  the  Treaty  on  Principles  Governing  the  Activi- 
ties of  States  in  the  Exploration  and  Use  of  Outer  Space,  Including  the  Moon  and  Other  Celestial  Bodies, 
Oct.  10, 1967.  From:  U.S.  Department  of  State,  Treaties  in  Force:  A  List  of  Treaties  and  Other  International 
Agreements  of  the  United  States  in  Force  on  Jan.  1, 1973.  State  Department  Document  No.  8697  (Washington: 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  no  date),  pp.  284,  357,  386. 

a'  The  complete  text  of  the  treaty  appears  in:  The  Conference  on  Antarctica,  Department  of  State  Publica- 
tion 7060,  International  Organization  and  Conference  Series  IS  (Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  September  1960),  pp.  61-67.  See  also:  TIAS  No.  4780. 

«•  Doumani,  "Science  Policy  for  the  Antarctic,"  p.  40. 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  24 


352 


remarkable  event,  unprecedented  in  international  politics,  is  generally 
agreed  to  have  resulted  directly  from  IGY  activities  in  Antarctica. 
Chapman,  for  example,  stated  that  the  IGY  led  to  the  drafting  of  the 
Antarctic  Treaty  that  aims  to  exclude  military  action  from  Ant- 
arctica,"219 and  Sullivan  commented,  "The  stated  objective  of  the 
proposed  treaty  was  to  perpetuate  the  cooperation  that  had  marked 
the  IGY  in  Antarctica."220  Indeed,  the  IGY  is  mentioned  twice  in 
the  treaty  itself : 

Convinced  that  the  establishment  of  a  firm  foundation  for  the  continuation 
and  development  of  such  cooperation  on  the  basis  of  freedom  of  scientific  investi- 
gation in  Antarctica  as  applied  during  the  International  Geophysical  Year 
accords  with  the  interests  of  science  and  the  progress  of  all  mankind  [preamble]; 

Freedom  of  scientific  investigation  in  Antarctica  and  cooperation  toward  that 
end,  as  applied  during  the  International  Geophysical  Year,  shall  continue,  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  the  present  treaty,  [art.  II).221 

Antarctica,  for  many  decades  prior  to  the  IGY,  had  been  an  object 
of  continued  interest  and  investigation  to  many  nations.  Of  these, 
seven  had  established  territorial  claims  upon  the  continent,  some 
of  which  overlapped.222  As  early  as  1948  the  United  States,  which 
officially  recognized  no  claims,  had  proposed  an  international  solution 
to  other  claimants,  but  without  success.  Similar  efforts  by  India  in 
1956  before  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  also  met  with 
no  success,  ostensibly  being  shelved  to  avoid  controversy  during  the 
IGY;  and  discussions  of  the  problem  by  Australia,  New  Zealand, 
and  the  United  Kingdom  also  led  nowhere.  Thus,  throughout  the 
IGY  the  status  of  Antarctica  was  not  only  politically  unresolved, 
but  remained  an  issue  of  political  controversy. 

This  controversy,  by  and  large,  did  not  significantly  affect  relation- 
ships among  scientists  carrying  out  work  in  Antarctica  during  the 
IGY.  The  general  apolitical  tone  of  this  activity  was  set  quite  early 
during  the  first  IGY  regional  conference  on  the  Antarctic  held  in 
Paris  during  July  6-10,  1955.  As  noted  by  Sullivan,  a  somewhat 
awkward  situation  existed  at  this  meeting  because  both  the  Chilean 
and  Argentine  delegations  were  headed  by  ambassadors  rather  than 
by  scientists.  However,  the  forcefulness  of  the  chairman  of  the  meeting 
"was  unquestionably  responsible  for  subduing  the  political  contro- 
versies that  repeatedly  seemed  about  to  erupt."  223  Subsequent  scienti- 
fic activities  in  the  Antarctic  demonstrated  convincingly  that  scien- 
tists of  various  countries,  including  those  having  overlapping  Antarctic 
claims,  could  work  peacefully  together,  relatively  unaffected  by  the 
unresolved  political  difficulties.  That  they  could  do  so  was  due  partly 
to  common  scientific  objectives  and  partly  to  the  forbidding  nature 
of  the  area.  As  Sullivan  commented: 

The  stark,  perilous  environment  of  Antarctica  had  a  remarkable  effect  in 
submerging  political  differences.  The  expeditions  there  were  bound  together  by 
the  presence  of  a  common  enemy.224 

218  Chapman,  "Earth  and  Beyond,"  p.  41. 

*>°  Sullivan.  "The  TOY,"  p.  328. 

221  Department  of  State,  Conference  on  Antarctica,  pp.  61-62. 

232  The  seven  nations  were  Argentina,  Australia,  Chile,  Fiance,  New  Zealand,  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
(unofficially)  the  United  States.  The  overlapping  claims  were  those  of  Argentina,  Chile,  and  the  United 
Kingdom. 

223  Sullivan,  "The  fOY,"  p.  320. 

224  Sullivan,  Assault,  p.  413. 


353 


An  additional  factor  was  that  scientists  were  not  personally  responsi- 
ble for  protecting  their  respective  national  interests  in  the  area,  since 
such  interests  were  not  at  stake  in  the  IGY. 

It  was  clear  to  all  nations  involved  that  much  could  be  gained  if  the 
scientific  work  begun  during  the  IGY  could  be  continued  thereafter. 
On  May  2,  1958,  the  United  States  proposed  to  other  participants 
that  all  should  join  "in  a  treaty  designed  to  preserve  the  continent 
as  an  international  laboratory  for  scientific  research  and  insure  that 
it  be  used  only  for  peaceful  purposes." 225  All  accepted,  but  preliminary 
talks  in  Washington  were  largely  stalled  by  Soviet  opposition  to 
existing  Antarctic  claims  of  other  nations,  and  by  Chilean  and  Argen- 
tine reluctance  to  agree  to  international  control.  However,  the  ad- 
visability of  maintaining  the  Antarctic  free  for  the  kinds  of  scientific 
observations  and  studies  begun  during  the  IGY  ultimately  prevailed. 
A  formal  treaty  conference  was  opened  on  October  15,  1959,  and  the 
treaty  was  signed  on  December  1,  1959.  On  August  4,  1960,  Japan 
became  the  first  nation  to  ratify  the  treaty,  at  that  time  considered 
"unique  in  diplomatic  history."  226  U.S.  ratification  followed  on  Au- 
gust 18,  1960,  and  the  treaty  entered  into  force  for  the  United  States 
on  June  23,  1961.  Major  provisions  of  the  treaty  are  as  follows: 

Article  1.  Antarctica  shall  be  used  for  peaceful  purposes  only.  All  measures  of  a 
military  nature,  including  weapons  testing,  are  prohibited. 

Article  2.  Freedom  of  scientific  investigation  and  cooperation  shall  continue. 

Article  3.  Scientific  plans,  personnel,  observations,  and  results  shall  be  freely 
exchanged. 

Article  4.  Signatories  do  not  recognize,  dispute,  or  establish  territorial  claims. 

Article  5.  Nuclear  explosions  and  the  disposal  of  radioactive  wastes  in  the  area 
are  prohibited. 

Article  6.  All  land  and  ice -masses  below  60  degrees  south  latitude  are  included, 
but  international  law  with  regard  to  the  high  seas  shall  prevail. 

Article  7.  Observers  from  treaty  nations  have  the  right  of  free  access  to  any 
area  and  may  inspect  all  stations,  installations,  and  equipment 
within  those  areas.  Aerial  observations  are  permitted,  and  each 
signatory  must  provide  advance  notice  of  its  activities  within  the 
area.227 

THE   TEST   BAN   TREATY 

The  spirit  of  international  cooperation  and  good  will  resulting 
from  the  IGY,  and  the  communication  channels  thereby  opened 
up  among  nations,  may  have  played  an  appreciable  part  in  negoti- 
ations which  led  to  the  Test  Ban  Treaty.228  It  would  be  difficult  to 
overestimate  the  role  of  communications  in  international  affairs, 
especially  since  technical  talks  appear  to  have  become  an  accepted 
approach  to  difficult  international  problems.  Lloyd  Berkner,  in 
addressing  the  Second  United  Nations  International  Conference  on 
the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy,  in  Geneva,  had  emphasized 
the  value  of  the  experience  gained  during  the  IGY.  Sullivan  pointed 

224  Sullivan,  "The  IGY,"  p.  325.  Participating  nations,  in  addition  to  the  United  States,  we're:  Argentina, 
Australia,  Belgium,  Chile,  France,  Japan,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  the  Soviet  Union,  the  Union  of  South. 
Africa,  and  the  United  Kingdom. 

229  Neal  Stanford.  "Antarctica-  Where  Territorial  Claims  Are  Barred,"  The  Christian  Science  Monitor, 
Jan.  9,  1971,  p.  5. 

>st  Summarized  from:  Department  of  State,  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series,  No.  4780 
(Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1961),  36  pages.  The  Antarctic  Treaty,  in  banning  nuclear 
explosions  from  the  Antarctic,  established  a  precedent  for  what  was  to  become  a  steadily  expanding  con- 
cept of  "nuclear  free  zones"  throughout  the  world.  One  such  proposal  would  have  progressively  moved  the 
area  covered  by  the  Antarctic  Treaty  to  further  latitudes.  Other  proposals  would  have  expanded  the 
concept  to  include  Latin  America,  Asia,  Africa,  and  Western  Europe.  To  the  extent  that  such  proposals 
represent  additional  efforts  to  achieve  diplomatic  agreement,  they  owe  much  to  the  spirit  of  international 
cooperative  good  will  that  evolved  from  the  IGY. 

828  Treaty  Banning  Nuclear  Weapon  Tests  in  the  Atmosphere,  in  Outer  Space,  and  Under  Water.  State 
Department  Document  TIAS  No.  6433. 


354 


out  that  "The  IGY  had  helped  significantly  to  contribute  to  the 
atmosphere  of  international  scientific  cooperation  in  which  the 
Geneva  talks  were  held," 229  and  U.N.  Secretary  General  Dag 
Hammarskjold,  in  his  Annual  Report  to  the  United  Nations  General 
Assembly,  had  noted  that  "the  Geneva  agreement  suggested  a  way 
by  which  further  progress  might  be  made  in  separating  the  political 
from  the  nonpolitical."  Hammarskjold  went  on  to  point  out  that 
discussion  by  scientists 

.  .  .  would  not  in  itself  bring  about  disarmament,  but  it  might  help  to  im- 
prove the  atmosphere  and  clarify  many  of  the  problems  involved,  thus  preparing 
the  ground  for  a  time  more  politically  propitious  than  the  present  seems  to  be 
for  a  general  disarmament  agreement.230 

Although  it  is  too  soon  to  judge  its  significance,  the  Test  Ban 
Treaty  appears  to  have  been  a  critical  forward  step  toward  the 
responsible  international  control  of  arms  in  the  interest  of  world 
peace  and  security.  President  Kennedy  is  said  to  have  attached 
great  importance  to  the  treaty  as  a  symbol  winch 

.  .  .  would  provide  a  turning  point,  a  way  to  break  out  of  the  circle  of  fear» 
distrust,  conflict,  insistence  on  strength,  demands  for  guarantees,  insistence  on 
the  unchanging  and  implacable  hostility  and  activist  role  of  the  Soviet  Union, 
and  the  futile  search  by  the  United  States  to  bring  back  the  total  security  of  the 
preatomic  period.231 

To  a  considerable  extent,  the  President's  attitude  thus  was  in  close 
agreement  with  the  political  expectations  raised  by  scientists  during 
the  IGY.  It  seems  a  fair  assumption  that  at  least  some  aspects  of 
the  IGY  experience  were  translated  into  political  attitudes  and 
behavior  which  ultimately  led  to  the  Test  Ban  Treaty. 

The  treaty  was  signed  in  Moscow  on  August  5,  1963,  received 
Senate  approval  on  September  24,  was  signed  by  President  Kennedy 
on  October  7,  and  entered  into  force  for  the  United  States  on  October 
10.  In  article  I  of  the  treaty,  each  signatory  agreed  to  prohibit  all 
nuclear  explosions  on  territory  within  its  jurisdiction  and  control, 
including  tests  of  nuclear  weapons,  in  the  atmosphere  or  under  water. 
This  prohibition  also  encompassed  outer  space  and  the  high  seas. 
Nuclear  explosions  were  prohibited  in  any  environment  whatsoever  if 
they  might  result  in  the  presence  of  radioactive  debris  outside  the 
territorial  limits  of  the  nation  conducting  the  explosion.  Furthermore, 
signatories  agreed  to  refrain  from  offering  help  or  encouragement  for 
any  nuclear  weapons  tests  whatsoever  within  the  prohibited 
environments.232 

These  provisions  bear  a  resemblance  to  article  I  of  the  Antarctic 
Treaty  banning  "the  testing  of  any  type  of  weapons."  It  is  clear  from 
congressional  hearings  and  debates  on  the  Test  Ban  Treaty  that  the 
IGY  experience  and  the  Antarctic  Treaty  were  prominent  in  the 
thoughts  of  many  participants.  Reference  was  made  to  the  fact  that 
the  Antarctic  Treaty  had  been  in  force  for  almost  5  years  without 
incident,  and  the  debate  prompted  the  first  formal  inspections  to  be 
carried  out  under  article  VII  or  the  treaty. 

»•  Sullivan.  "The  TOY,"  p.  334. 

J"  United  Nations  General  Assembly,  Official  Record*,  13th  sess.,  1058,  snpp.  No.  !A,  p.  1. 
"'  U.S.,  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics,  Subcommittee  on  Science,  Research, 
and  Development,  Technical  Information  for  Congress,  92d  Cong.,  1st  sess.,  Apr.  16,  1971  (revised  edition), 

a*  Department  of  State,  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series,  No.  M33  (Washington:  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  1963),  76  pp. 


355 


THE  SPACE  TREATY 

The  need  for  future  cooperation  in  space  was  already  evident  at  the 
time  the  Antarctic  Treaty  233  was  signed.  As  discussed  by  Sullivan, 

Before  putting  their  pens  to  [the  Antarctic  Treaty]  several  of  the  signers  pointed 
out  that,  contingent  upon  the  treaty's  ratification,  it  could  serve  as  a  precedent 
for  the  settlement  of  the  more  difficult  problem  of  outer  space.  234 

As  early  as  March  15,  1958,  while  the  IGY  was  still  in  progress,  the 
Soviet  Government  had  proposed  an  international  agreement  "for 
cooperation  in  the  exploration  and  peaceful  use  of  outer  space,"  and 
had  referred  the  question  to  the  United  Nations  for  consideration.235 
In  the  fall  of  1958,  when  the  General  Assembly  convened  for  its 
13th  session,  the  Soviet  resolution  was  debated  along  with  a  similar 
resolution  proposed  by  the  United  States  on  September  2,  1958. 236 
The  primary  difference  between  the  two  proposals  was  that  the  Soviet 
resolution  incorporated  the  question  of  removal  of  military  bases  from 
foreign  soil,  whereas  the  American  resolution  did  not.  Subsequently, 
a  compromise  resolution  was  introduced  on  November  13,  1958,  by 
20  nations,  including  the  United  States,  entitled  "Question  of  the 
Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space,"  which  was  adopted  by  the  General 
Assembly  on  December  13,  1958. 237  Incorporated  in  this  resolution 
were  two  specific  references  to  the  IGY.  In  the  preamble,  the  resolu- 
tion called  to  attention  the  fact  that  the  General  Assembly  noted 

.  .  .  the  success  of  the  scientific  cooperative  program  of  the  International 
Geophysical  Year  in  the  exploration  of  outer  space  and  the  decision  to  continue 
and  expand  this  type  of  cooperation  .... 

The  resolution  then  established  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee  on  the 
Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space  to  report  to  the  General  Assembly  on 
the 

.  .  .  continuation  on  a  permanent  basis  of  the  outer  space  research  now  being 
carried  on  within  the  framework  on  the  International  Geophysical  Year.238 

Difficulties  were  encountered,  however,  with  the  space  treaty  itself. 
The  United  States  was  willing  and  made  "...  numerous  gestures 
in  an  effort  to  elicit  Soviet  participation  in  cooperative  space  activities, 
but  to  no  avail."  239  On  the  surface,  the  Soviets  clearly  supported  the 
principle  of  international  cooperation,  citing  their  participation  in  the 
IGY,  and  giving  "special  emphasis  to  the  need  for  international  co- 
operation in  space  exploration."  240  In  practice,  however,  the  Soviets 

m  "Treaty  on  Principles  Governing  the  Activities  of  States  in  the  Exploration  and  Use  of  Outer  Space, 
Including  the  Moon  and  Other  Celestial  Bodies"  (State  Department  Document  TIAS  6347).  Furthermore,- 
in  like  manner,  the  IO  Y  can  be  considered  as  having  played  a  similar  role  in  the  more  recent  Agreement  on 
the  Rescue  of  Astronauts  and  the  Return  of  Objects  Launched  Into  Outer  Space  (signed  on  Apr.  22,  1968, 
and  entered  into  force  for  the  United  States  on  Dec.  3,  1%8;  see  State  Department  Document  TIAS  6599); 
and  the  Convention  on  International  Liability  for  Damage  Caused  by  Space  Objects  (signed  on  Mar.  29, 
1972,  and  entered  into  force  on  Sept.  1,  1972). 

"«  Sullivan.  Assault,  p.  415. 

•«  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Aeronautical  and  Space  Sciences,  Treaty  on  Principles  Governing 
the  Activities  of  States  in  the  Exploration  and  Use  of  Outer  Space,  Including  the  Moon  and  Other  Celestial  Bodies. 
Analysis  and  Background  Data,  90th  Cong.,  1st  sess.,  Mfirch  1967,  p.  5. 

238  S.  Doc.  No.  56,  International  Cooperation  and  Organization,  p.  184. 

"'  S.  Doc.  No.  56,  International  Cooperation  and  Organization,  p.  185. 

238  S.  Doc.  No.  56.  International  Cooperation  and  Organization,  p.  186. 

"»  Senate,  Soviet  Space  Programs,  1962-65,  p.  428. 

s<°  Senate,  Soviet  Space  Programs:  Organization,  [etc.],  pp.  173-174.  In  particular,  V.  V.  Kuznetsov  ex- 
pounded on  this  point  in  a  speech  before  the  14th  General  Assembly;  see  "Unanimity  in  Outer  Space," 
United  Nations  Review  6  (February  1960),  p.  34.  Later,  on  Sept.  20,  1963,  in  a  speech  before  the  Assembly, 
President  Kennedy  called  for  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  to  join  forces  in  exploring  outer  space.  In 
particular,  the  President  called  for  both  nations  to  cooperate  in  a  manned  lunar  landing:  "Why  .  .  .  should 
man's  Qrst  flight  to  the  Moon  be  a  matter  of  national  competition?  .  .  .  Surely  we  should  explore  whether 
the  scientists  and  astronauts  of  our  two  countries— indeed,  of  all  the  world — cannot  work  together  in  the 
conquest  of  space,  sending  someday  in  this  decade  to  the  Moon  not  the  representatives  of  a  single  nation  but 
the  representatives  of  all  of  our  countries"  Department  of  State  Bulletin  45  (Oct.  7,  1963),  pp.  532-533. 


356 


appeared  to  be  less  candid.  The  years  immediately  following  the  IGY 
represented  "  a  period  of  acute  international  distress,"  with  Soviet 
policy  becoming  "confidently  outgoing,  aggressively  assertive,  and 
dangerously  risk  taking."  M1  As  a  consequence,  the  Soviets  were  pro- 
fessing one  course  of  action  while  following  another.  This  behavior 
was  aptly  described  by  Frutkin: 

The  Russians  have  accepted  such  cooperation  in  principle,  and  have  suggested 
a  cautious  step-by-step  procedure.  But  we  have  not  yet  been  able  to  identify 
the  first  step.14* 

Not  until  December  20,  1961,  did  "a  breakthrough  in  the  politics 
of  space  cooperation"  seem  to  take  place  with  the  adoption  of  the 
United  Nations  General  Assembly  Resolution  1721  (XVI),  which 
cleared  the  way  for  initiation  of  a  "comprehensive  program  of  spare 
cooperation  under  the  auspices  ...  of  the  United  Nations."  243 
Progress  was  such  that  by  1965  Frutkin  was  able  to  write, 

Soviet  attitudes  and  performance,  and,  indeed,  personal  relationships  with 
their  representatives,  all  have  come  a  long  way  since  the  early  days  of  the  In- 
ternational Geophysical  Year.244 

By  1973  American-Soviet  relations  had  improved  so  remarkably  that 
Frutkin  could  comment  that  collaboration  between  members  of  the 
joint  working  groups  of  the  Apollo-Soyuz  Test  Project  was 
"unmatched"  in  their  experience.245 

Provisions  of  the  Space  Treaty,  which  was  signed  on  January  27, 
1967  and  entered  into  force  for  the  United  States  on  October  10,  1967, 
bore  marked  similarities  to  principles  established  earlier  by  the 
Antarctic  Treaty.  Major  provisions  were  as  follows: 

Article     1.  The  exploration  and  use  of  outer  space  shall  be  for  the  benefit  of  all 

nations.  There  shall  be  access  to  all  areas,  including  celestial  bodies, 

for  exploration  and  scientific  investigation. 
Article    2.  Outer  space,  including  the  moon  and  other  celestial  bodies,  shall  not 

be  subject  to  claims  of  sovereignty   by   any  nation  regardless  of 

use  or  occupation. 
Article    3.  International  law  shall  prevail  in  outer  space. 
Article    4.  Outer  space,  including  the  moon  and  other  celestial  bodies,  shall  be 

used   for   peaceful    purposes.    All   measures   of  a  military  nature, 

including   the   presence   of   nuclear  weapons   in   outer  space,   are 

prohibited. 
Article    5.  Signatories  shall  treat  astronauts  as  envoys  of  mankind,  rendering 

all  possible  assistance  in  the  event  of  accidents  or  emergencies,  and 

shall  inform  one  another  of  all  dangers  to  human  life  and  health. 
Article    6.  Signatories  shall  bear  the  responsibility  for  their  activities  in  outer 

space. 
Article    7.  Signatories  shall  bear  responsibility  for  all  damage  caused  by  launching 

of  objects  into  outer  space. 
Article    8.  Signatories  shall  maintain  individual  ownership  of  all  objects  launched 

into  outer  space. 
Article    9.  Signatories  shall  not  conduct  activities  in  outer  space  which  may  prove 

harmful  to  other  nations. 

341  Senate,  Soviet  Spaa-  Programs,  1962-66,  p.  427.  The  report  goes  on  to  state  that  "Khrushchev  seemed 
to  be  i  oncerned  less  with  cooperating  in  space  than  with  mnking  a  concrete  political  reality  of  t tie  abstract 
Soviet  claim  that  a  shift  in  the  balance  of  world  i>ower  against  the  West  had  occurred,  and  that  this  was 
attributed,  among  ol b.er  factors,  to  Communist  superiority." 

m>  Senate,  Soviet  .s'/>arr  Programs:  Organization,  [etc.],  p.  176.  Speech  to  the  Phi  Beta  Kappa  alumni  of 
New  York  City  on  Mar.  lfi,  1961.  Frutkin  was  referring  to  Soviet  cooperation  during  the  IGY  itself,  stating 
that  "the  Soviet  voice  was  often  raised  to  limit  tho  scope  of  exchange  agreements"  (Senate,  Soviet  Sjhicc 
Programs,  1961-66,  p.  443).  In  retrospect,  however,  his  remarks  appear  more  appropriate  to  the  immediate 
post-IGY  period  under  discussion  above. 

"!  Senate  Soviet  Space  Programs,  1966-70,  p.  399.  For  further  detail,  see:  Senate,  Soviet  Space  Programs, 
1969  85,  p.  427. 

3"  Senate,  Soviet  Space  Programs,  1966-70,  p.  462. 

>"  Senate,  Hearings  on  S.  8S0,  p.  1308. 


357 


Article  10.  Signatories  shall  consider  on  a  basis  of  equality  any  requests  by  other 
signatories  to  observe  the  flight  of  objects  launched  into  outer 
space. 

Article  11.  Signatories  shall  make  public  the  nature,  conduct,  location,  and 
results  of  their  activities  in  outer  space  to  the  fullest  extent  feasible 
and  practicable. 

Article  12.  All  stations,  installations,  equipment,  and  space  vehicles  on  the  moon 
and  other  celestial  bodies  of  each  signatory  shall  be  open  to  repre- 
sentatives of  all  other  signatories.248 

Six  of  the  basic  concepts  of  the  7  major  articles  of  the  Antarctic 
Treaty  are  included  within  the  12  articles  of  the  Space  Treaty,  as 
shown  in  table  6. 

TABLE  6.  COMPARISON  OF  THE  PROVISIONS  OF  THE  ANTARCTIC  AND  SPACE  TREATIES 


Antarctic  Treaty  Provision  Space  Treaty 

Art.  1.  Peaceful  use,  ban  on  military  activities Art.  4. 

Art.  2.  Freedom  of  scientific  investigation Art.  1. 

Art.  3.  Free  exchange  of  information Art.  11. 

Art.  4.  No  recognition  of  territorial  claims Art.  2. 

Art.  5.  Ban  on  nuclear  explosions 

Art,  6.  Validity  of  international  law Art.  3. 

Art.  7.  Free  right  of  inspection Art.  12. 

Article  5  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty,  prohibiting  the  carrying  out  of 
nuclear  explosions,  was  unnecessary  in  the  Space  Treaty  in  view  of  the 
previous  signing  of  the  Test  Ban  Treaty.  Arthur  Goldberg,  in  his 
capacity  as  U.S.  Representative  to  the  U.N.  General  Assembly, 
remarked  that  the  arms  control  provision  of  the  Space  Treaty  ".  .  . 
is  similar  to  that  embodied  in  the  Antarctic  Treaty  .  .  .  namely, 
free  access  by  all  parties  to  one  another's  installations."  M7 

This  free  access  principle,  as  well  as  other  basic  principles  established 
by  the  Antarctic  Treaty,  could  be  applied  to  outer  space  largely  be- 
cause, as  during  the  IGY, 

...  no  nation  protested  the  flight  of  satellites  over  its  territory.  No  nation 
requested  the  launching  states  to  obtain  permission  to  fly  over  its  sovereign  lands 
and  territorial  waters  .  .  .  No  nation  reserved  its  rights  with  regard  to  space- 
flights in  the  future.  Nor  did  any  nation  set  an  upper  limit  on  airspace  that  might 
have  been  construed  as  the  lower  boundary  for  outer  space.248 

Thus,  as  pointed  out  by  Ambassador  Goldberg,  the  three  treaties 
represented  a  "historic  progression": 

First  was  the  Antarctic  Treaty  of  1959,  reserving  that  large  area  of  the  world 
for  exclusively  peaceful  activity;  second  was  the  limited  test  ban  treaty  of  1963, 
and  third  is  the  treaty  [on  outer  space]  which  now  lies  before  this  committee.249 

Concluding  Remarks 

As  indicated  earlier,  the  main  objective  of  this  case  study  has  been 
to  shed  light  on  whether  the  good  will  and  cooperative  spirit  generated 
by  the  international  scientific  community  can  be  utilized  to  any  extent 
in  the  international  political  arena.  In  particular,  the  objective  was  to 
determine  whether  the  unprecedented  scientific  legacy  of  the  IGY 
exerted  any  significant  impact  upon  subsequent  international  politi- 
cal behavior. 


2«  Summarized  from:  Department  of  State,  Treaties  and  Other  International  Actt  Series,  No.  6347  (Wash- 
ington: U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1067),  89  pp. 

«'  Department  of  Stale  Built  tin  49  (Jan.  9,  1967),  p.  80.  From  a  speech  before  the  U.N.  General  Assem- 
bly. Goldberg  was  referring  specifically  to  art.  I,  II,  and  XII  of  the  treaty. 

248  Rilenp  Galloway,  "Law,  Order,  and  Outer  Space,"  Electronic  Age  !9  (autumn  1970),  p.  4. 

2«  Department  of  State  Bulldin  49  (Jan.  9,  1967),  p.  78.  Goldberg  mentioned  this  "historic  progression" 
twice  during  his  remarks. 


358 


It  would  appear  that  this  question  can  now  be  answered  affirma- 
tively. The  evidence  is  highly  suggestive,  if  not  conclusive,  that  the 
new  communications  channels,  the  tremendous  cooperative  spirit, 
and  the  increased  understanding  among  participants  of  the  67  nations 
which  took  part  in  the  IGY  led  directly  to  the  Antarctic  Treaty. 
Whether  or  not  the  IGY  can  be  credited  in  such  strong  terms,  it 
clearly  played  an  important  part  in  helping  shape  that  treaty,  which 
in  turn  reinforced  the  cooperative  pattern  for  the  other  treaties  and 
agreements  which  were  to  follow.  Just  as  scientists  approach  their 
objectives  through  a  step-by-step  process,  so  did  politicians  appear 
to  approach  these  international  objectives  in  similar  fashion,  with 
similar  success. 

It  may  be  argued,  of  course,  that  the  implications  of  the  Cuban 
missile  crisis  of  1962  had  more  to  do  with  the  test  ban  than  did  the 
IGY,  that  only  after  facing  up  to  the  unpleasant  realities  of  a  possible 
nuclear  war  did  the  Soviets  opt  for  agreement,  thereby  making  possi- 
ble the  essential  conditions  in  which  the  promise  of  the  IGY  could  be 
fulfilled.  To  acknowledge  the  reality  of  political  and  military  power, 
however,  is  not  to  diminish  the  power  of  the  IGY  as  an  idea  whose 
time  had  come. 

Perhaps  an  even  more  persuasive  testament  to  that  power  is  to 
be  found  not  in  the  symbolic,  formal  language  and  protocol  of  treaties 
but  in  the  quickened  pace  and  broadened  scope  of  the  many  inter- 
national meetings  to  exchange  both  basic  knowledge  and  techno- 
logical know-how  which  can  trace  their  origins  to  the  IGY  example. 
It"  was  50  years  between  the  First  Polar  Year  and  the  Second,  and 
25  years  from  that  to  the  IGY.  Today  hardly  a  year  goes  by  without 
one  or  more  major  conferences  addressed  to  phenomena  and  problems 
of  the  environment,  the  oceans,  energy,  or  new  aspects  of  mankind's 
relationships  with  regard  to  outer  space.  To  say  that  the  IGY  was 
responsible  for  these  developments  to  advance  the  human  condition 
would  be  gross  overstatement,  since  the  phenomena  and  problems 
themselves  are  ultimately  responsible  simply  by  their  existence.  But 
human  perception  of  them  was  furthered  by  the  IGY;  international 
good  will  in  collaborating  to  explore  them  was  fostered  by  it;  and  it 
seems  quite  possible  that  the  IGY  conferred  on  political  leaders  of  most 
of  the  world's  nations  an  enlarged  appreciation  of  the  potential  of  con- 
structive international  collaboration  for  solving  political,  as  well  as 
scientific  and  technological,  problems. 


Appendix  1.  List  of  Abbreviations 

ACIGY —     Advisory    Council    of   the    International    Geophysical 

Year. 

CCIR International  Radio  Consultative  Committee. 

CETX Inter- Union  Committee  on  Contamination  by  Extra  - 

Terrestrial  Exploration. 

CIG Comite  Internationale  de  Geophysique  (International 

Geophysical  Committee) . 

COMSAT Communications  Satellite  Corporation. 

COSPAR Committee  on  Space  Research. 

CSAGI Bureau   du    Comite   Special   de  l'Annee    Geophysique 

Internationale  1957-58  (Special  Committee  for  the 
International  Geophysical  Year). 

FAGS Federation  of  Astronomical  and  Geophysical  Services. 

FPY First  International  Polar  Year. 

IATME International    Association    of    Terrestrial    Magnetism 

and  Electricity. 

IAU International  Astronomical  Union. 

ICSU International  Council  of  Scientific  Unions. 

IGU International  Geographical  Union. 

IGY International  Geophysical  Year. 

IMU International  Mathematical  Union. 

INTELSAT International  Telecommunications  Satellite  Consor- 
tium. 

IUB International  Union  of  Biochemistry. 

I  UBS International  Union  of  Biological  Science3. 

IUCr International  Union  of  Crystallography. 

IUGG International  Union  of  Geodesy  and  Geophysics. 

IUHPS International    Union    of    History   and    Philosophy    of 

Science. 

IUPAC International  Union  of  Pure  and  Applied  Chemistry. 

IUPAP International  Union  of  Pure  and  Applied  Physics. 

IUPS International  Union  of  Physiological  Sciences. 

IUTAM International     Union     of     Theoretical     and     Applied 

Mechanics. 

IWDS International  World  Days  Service. 

MCI Mixed  Commission  on  the  Ionosphere  (or,  Joint  Com- 
mission on  the  Ionosphere). 

NSF National  Science  Foundation. 

SCAR Special  Committee  on  Antarctic  Research. 

SCG Special    Committee    for    Inter-Union    Cooperation    in 

Geophysics. 

SCOR Special  Committee  on  Oceanic  Research. 

SPY Second  International  Polar  Year. 

TPY Third  International  Polar  Year. 

UNESCO United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific,  and  Cultural 

Organization. 

URSI Union  Radio-Scientifique  Internationale  (Interna- 
tional Scientific  Radio  Union). 

USNC-IGY United  States  National  Committee  for  the  IGY. 

WMA World  Meteorological  Association. 

WMO World  Meteorological  Organization. 

(359) 


Appendix  2.  A  Brief  Chronology  of  the  IGY 

Aug.  1 ,  1 882 Beginning  of  the  First  International  Polar  Year. 

Aug.  31,  1883__ End  of  the  First  International  Polar  Year. 

Aug.  1,  1932 __     Beginning  of  the   Second   International   Polar 

Year. 

Aug.  31,  1933 End  of  the  Second  International  Polar  Year. 

April  5,  1950 Berkner's  proposal  for  a  Third  Polar  Year,  at  a 

meeting  in  Van  Allen's  home. 
July  1950 Meeting  of  the  MCI  at  which  it  was  decided  to 

commend  the  Berkner  proposal  to  the  ICSU 

and  its  unions. 

Sept.  1950 Approval  of  the   Berkner  proposal  by  URSI. 

Sept.  1950 Approval  of  the  Berkner  proposal  by  IAU. 

Jan.  1951 ICSU  Bureau  commends  the  Berkner  proposal 

to  its  Executive  Board. 

Aug.  1951 Approval  of  the  Berkner  proposal  by  the  IUGG. 

Oct.  1951 Creation  by  the  ICSU  of  a  Special  Committee 

for  a  Third  International  Polar  Year. 
Oct.  1952 Suggestion    by    Chapman    that    the    name    be 

changed  to  International   Geophysical    Year 

approved  by  ICSU. 
Oct.  1952 Provisional  meeting  of  the  CSAGI;  all  nations 

are  asked  to  form  national  IGY  committees. 
June  30- July  3,  1953 First   plenary  session   of   CSAGI   in   Brussels, 

attended  by  26  nations. 
Early  1954 Program   devised   for   world   days   and    10-day 

meteorological  intervals. 
March  1954 Completion  of  proposed  IGY  program  by  the 

USNC. 
May  1954 Deadline   for  submission   of   detailed   national 

programs. 
Sept.  30-Oct.  4,  1954 Second  plenary  session  of  the  CSAGI  in  Rome, 

attended  by  38  nations. 
March  1955 Recommendation  by  ICSU  that  an   Advisory 

Council  be  formed  to  assist  CSAGI. 
Sept.  8-14,  1955 Third  plenary  session  of  the  CSAGI  in  Bni6- 

sells.  Parallel  sessions  of  the  Advisory  Council. 

Decision  was  made  that  the  IGY  be  officially 

begun   at   zero   hours,    Greenwich   time,    on 

July  1,  1957. 

Sept.  10-15,  1946 Fourth  plenary  session  of  the  ICSU  in  Barcelona. 

Jan.  10,  1957 Creation  by  the  U.S.S.R.  of  the  "Consultative 

Committee    for    Preparing    for    and    Imple- 
menting the  IGY  at  Establishments  of  the 

Academy  of  Sciences,  U.S.S.R." 
July  1,  1957 Official   beginning  of  the   IGY   at  zero   hours 

Greenwich  time. 
Oct.  4,  1957 Sputnik    I    injected   into   orbit    to   become   the 

world's  first  artificial  earth  satellite. 

Julv  29-Aug.  9,  1958 _     Final  plenary  session  of  the  CSAGI  in  Moscow. 

Dec.  31,  1958... Official  end  of  the  IGY. 

(360) 


Chapter  6 — The  Mekong  Project: 
Opportunities  and  Problems  of  Regionalism 


CONTENTS 


Page 

I.  Introduction 1 365 

Regionalism  as   a  System  for  the    Application   of   Science   and 

Technology 365 

The  Timing  of  the  Johns  Hopkins  Speech 366 

Regional  Development  Proposal  in  the  Johns  Hopkins  Speech  __  366 

Diplomatic  Environment  of  the  Johns  Hopkins  Speech 367 

Diplomatic  and  Political  Reactions  to  the  Speech 368 

Some    Possible    Longer-Range    Consequences    of    the    Mekong 

Concept 370 

II.  Varieties  of  National  and  International  Regionalism 372 

Regional  Development  in  the  United  States 373 

Early  Proposals  for  International  Regional  Development 374 

Forms  of  International  Regionalism 376 

III.  Evolution   of  the   Program   To    Develop   the    Region   of  the   Lower 

Mekong  Basin 380 

Adoption  of  the  Regionalism  Principle  into  the  United  Nations 

System 380 

Geography  of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin  Region 382 

Complex  Social  and  Cultural  Patterns  of  the  Basin 384 

Early  Planning  for  Development  of  the  Mekong,  1952-1957 385 

Socio-Economic  Research  Planning:  The  Ford  Foundation  Study.  388 

Action  Programs  on  the  Mekong,  1962-1965 389 

Status  of  the  Mekong  Project  in  the  Spring  of  1965 390 

IV.  Accelerated  Progress  in  1965 395 

President  Johnson's  Contacts  With  Regionalism 395 

Relationship  of  U.S. -Vietnamese  War  Goals  to  Regionalism 398 

U.S.  Measures  To  Raise  the  Tempo  of  Mekong  Development 400 

The  Nam  Ngum  Dam..r 401 

The  Asian  Development  Bank 402 

The  Pa  Mong  Dam  Project 404 

Infrastructure  for  the  Mekong  Project 406 

Status  of  the  Mekong  Project  at  the  Close  of  1965 408 

V.  Slump  and  Recovery:  The  Mekong  Project,  1966-1971 409 

Postwar  Planning  in  Vietnam:  The  Thuc-Lilienthal  Report 410 

Action  on  the  Large  Main  Stem  Projects 413 

Status  of  the  Mekong  Project,  Beginning  of  1972 414 

Environmental  Quality  and  Regional  Development  of  the  Me- 
kong   418 

The  Nixon  Doctrine  and  Asian  Regionalism :  Security  Plus  Devel- 
opment   420 

Regionalism  for  National  Security  and  Economic  Development..  421 

VI.    Issues,  Problems,  and  Opportunities  Offered  by  World  Regionalism __  425 

Southeast  Asia  as  a  Regional  Security  Bloc 425 

Regional  Development  as  an  Instrument  of  Foreign  Aid 427 

Global  Regionalism  as  a  Long-Range  Means  Toward  U.S.  Diplo- 
matic Goals 430 

Appendix:  Comments  by  Eugene  R.  Black  on  Topics  Relating  to  This 

Study 433 

TABLES 

1.  Mekong  Project:  Operational  Resources  as  of  January  11,  1965 391 

2.  Comparison — Large  Dams  and  Hydroelectric  Plants 405 

3.  U.S.  Military  Forces  in  Vietnam 409 

4.  Mekong  Project,  Operational  Resources  as  of  December  31,  1971 416 

5.  Mekong  Tributary  Projects:  January  1972 417 

(363) 


CHAPTER  6— THE  MEKONG  PROJECT:  OPPORTUNITIES 
AND  PROBLEMS  OF  REGIONALISM 

I.  Introduction 

The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  examine  the  concept  and  the  out- 
come to  date  of  the  Mekong  proposal  contained  in  President  Lyndon  B. 
Johnson's  peace  initiative,  April  7,  1965,  expressed  in  a  speech  at 
Johns  Hopkins  University  and  to  a  national  radio  and  television 
audience.  The  speech  asserted  U.S.  willingness  to  negotiate  an  end  to 
the  then-expanding  conflict  in  Vietnam,  defended  U.S.  policy  of  bomb- 
ing in  North  Vietnam,  and  offered  U.S.  support  for  a  large  program  of 
regional  development  in  Southeast  Asia. 

The  President  offered  a  general  program  of  rehabilitation  of  Viet- 
nam, but  singled  out  for  particular  attention  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin 
Project,  an  ambitious  scheme  of  river-related  development  in  the  four 
nations  of  Southeast  Asia  that  had  been  gathering  impetus  for  nearly 
a  decade. 

Regionalism  as  a  System  for  the  Application  of  Science  and  Tech- 
nology 

The  significance  of  this  study  in  the  present  series  on  "Science,  Tech- 
nology, and  American  Diplomacy"  is  that  the  principal  type  of  region- 
alism here  discussed  is  above  all  a  technique  for  applying  science  and 
technology  1  systematically  to  a  multinational  region. 

Development  of  a  country  is  inherently  a  process  of  technological 
application  toward  an  economic  result,  Regionalism — or  more  pre- 
cisely, regional  development — introduces  the  idea  of  a  system  within 
which  technology  is  applied  more  coherently  to  a  geographic  unit  than 
to  a  political  unit.  The  technological  system  requires,  first  of  all,  an 
intensive  application  of  science.  The  scientific  base  of  a  regional  de- 
velopment scheme,  of  which  the  Mekong  Lower  Basin  Project  is  here 
the  prototype,  involves  an  enormous  range  of  research  disciplines: 
meteorology,  soil  chemistry,  biomedicine,  forestry,  plant  genetics,  so- 
ciology, anthropology,  marine  biology,  entomology,  and  geology,  to 
mention  only  a  few.  The  technology  and  engineering  base  of  such  a  re- 
gional development  scheme  is  similarly  broad.  It  encompasses  hydraul- 
ics, electric  power,  flood  control,  electronic  communications,  computer 
modeling,  electrical  industries,  large  demonstration  farms,  highway 
and  bridge  construction,  fish  and  agricultural  food  processing,  and 
many  more  fields  of  technological  applications. 

The  leadership  role  of  the  United  States  had  been  demonstrated  in 
the  first  regional  development  project  to  command  worldwide  atten- 


1  The  broad  implications  of  "Technology"  in  this  context  require  explanation.  The 
term  means  more  than  tools,  manufacturing  processes,  and  advanced  engineering.  It 
signifies  the  systematic,  purposeful  application  of  knowledge  to  modify  an  environment 
toward  predetermined  goals.  Regional  application  of  technology  means  that  the  goals 
are  expressed  in  regional  terms.  The  regional  development  scheme  for  the  Lower  Mekong 
Basin  started  out  as  an  ambitious,  capital-intensive  civil  works  program  aimed  at  dams, 
hydroelectric  plants,  flood  control,  and  large-scale  irrigation.  Rut  the  application  of 
"knowledge"  brought  about  important  modification  ;  more  modest,  agriculturally-centered, 
and  labor-intensive  activities  received  priority  emphasis.  The  plan  in  1972  remained 
ambitious  and  far-reaching.  Rut  sophistication  was  more  evident,  and  awareness  was 
sharpened  as  to  the  need  for  careful  planning  and  study  of  the  consequences  of  change. 

Note  :  This  chapter  prepared  in  1972  by  Franklin  P.  Huddle. 

(365) 


366 


tion — the  Tennessee  Valley  Authority.  President  Johnson's  expressed 
hope  was  that  by  applying  this  same  regional  development  concept  in 
Southeast  Asia,  the  United  States  could  (a)  demonstrate  a  construc- 
tive form  of  technological  leadership  congenial  to  the  U.S.  electorate, 
(b)  stimulate  a  concerted  effort  with  the  technological  resources  of 
the  United  Nations  system  directed  at  regional  development,  (c)  en- 
list the  interest  and  enthusiasm  of  the  peoples  of  Southeast  Asia  in  a 
constructive,  pacific,  cooperative,  technologically-oriented  enterprise 
as  an  alternative  to  war,  and  (d)  attract  support  for  this  effort  from 
the  other  nations  of  the  world,  regardless  of  their  ideological  leanings. 
The  magnitude  of  the  proposed  task,  moreover,  would  require — and, 
it  was  hoped,  receive — so  large  an  effort  as  to  diminish  the  resources 
and  energy  diverted  to  conflict  in  the  region.  These  were  some  of  the 
underlying  purposes  of  the  Johns  Hopkins  proposal  of  April  7,  1965. 

The  Timing  of  the  Johns  Hopkins  Speech 

The  timing  of  the  speech  coincided  with  stepped-up  bombing  of 
strategic  targets  in  North  Vietnam  by  U.S.  military  aircraft,  begin- 
ning with  isolated  strikes  in  mid-February,  and  broadening  into  a 
more  sustained  air  offensive  in  early  March.  It  followed  by  a  week  the 
President's  decision,  to  be  disclosed  later  on,  to  deploy  U.S.  troops  and 
undertake  ground  combat  operations  in  South  Vietnam  (to  an  extent 
that  would  number  184,314  military  personnel  in  the  area  by  the  end 
of  1965).  This  decision  seems  attributable  to  the  threatened  collapse 
of  military  control  in  the  South;  both  land  and  air  operations  were 
intended  to  blunt  the  assault  from  the  North,  neutralize  the  operations 
of  the  Vietcong,  and  shore  up  the  disorganized  government  of  South 
Vietnam.2 

Concern  at  this  time  over  the  enlargement  in  the  conflict  was  evi- 
denced by  the  major  powers  and  by  a  number  of  "nonaligned"  nations. 
In  the  United  States,  sentiment  against  U.S.  involvement  in  Vietnam 
had  not  yet  peaked  but  was  rising  rapidly.  All  of  these  developments 
were  germane  to  the  several  purposes  of  the  President's  speech.  How- 
ever, the  present  study  is  concerned  essentially  with  that  part  of  it 
which  proposed  U.S.  support  for  regional  development  in  Southeast 
Asia  as  an  alternative  to  conflict  in  Vietnam.  It  was  a  proposal  to 
apply  technology  to  the  development  of  a  multinational  region  as  an 
alternative  to  ideological  or  nationalistic  uses  of  force. 

The  question  is  whether  the  Mekong  proposal  amounted  to  more 
than  a  diplomatic  maneuver  toward  a  shortrange  objective.  What  was 
its  significance  then,  and  what  is  it  today,  as  a  more  basic  and  evolu- 
tionary concept  of  general  strategy  toward  U.S.  foreign  policy  ob- 
jectives in  Southeast  Asia  ?  Does  it  offer  a  means  toward  a  more  accept- 
able pattern  of  diplomatic  relationships  over  the  longrange  future? 

Regional  Development  Proposal  in  the  Johns  Hopkins  Speech 
Substantively,  the  speech  consisted  of  three  parts:  (1)  a  declaration 

that  the  United  States  proposed  to  continue  the  bombing  raids  on 
North  Vietnam  with  an  explanation  of  why.  (2)  a  definition  of  U.S. 

•John    McNaughton,  Assistant    Secretary  of  Defense   (Internationa]  Security   Affairs), 
cabled  Ambassador  Maxwell  Taylor,  April  15,  t<>  savin  part  : 

Mij.'h<'st  Authority  [the  President]  believes  the  situation  in  Smith  Vietnam  lias 
been  deteriorating  ami  that,  in  addition  t"  actions  against  the  North,  something  new 
must  he  added  in  the  South  to  achieve  victory.  (The  document  is  quoted  in  Neil 
Sheehan,  ilrdrlck  Smith.  B.  W.  Kenworthy,  Fox  Butterfleld,  The  l'cntaqon  Papers 
(New  York  ;  Bantam  Books,  Inc.,  1971),  p.  404.) 


367 


policy  with  respect  to  war  purposes  coupled  with  a  declaration  of  U.S. 
readiness  to  negotiate  a  peace  settlement,  and  (3)  an  offer  of  $1  bil- 
lion to  the  United  Nations  in  support  of  cooperative  regional  develop- 
ment in  Southeast  Asia. 

Although  the  third  point  dealt  generally  with  food,  medical  services, 
education,  and  economic  progress  in  Indochina,  the  specific  references 
emphasized  development  of  the  Lower  Basin  of  the  Mekong  River. 
The  President  declared  that  Vietnamese  on  both  sides  of  the  conflict 
wanted  the  same  things:  "Food  for  their  hunger — health  for  their 
bodies  and  a  chance  to  learn — progress  for  their  country,  and  an  end 
to  the  bondage  of  material  misery."  These  goals,  he  asserted,  could  be 
more  readily  achieved  in  peaceful  cooperation.  He  went  on — 

The  first  step  is  for  the  countries  of  Southeast  Asia  to  associate  themselves 
in  a  greatly  expanded  cooperative  effort  for  development.  We  would  hope  that 
North  Vietnam  will  take  its  place  in  the  common  effort  just  as  soon  as  peaceful 
cooperation  is  possible. 

The  United  Nations  is  already  actively  engaged  in  development  in  this  area. 
I  would  hope  that  the  Secretary  General  of  the  United  Nations  could  use  the 
prestige  of  his  great  office — and  his  deep  knowledge  of  Asia — to  initiate,  as  soon 
as  possible,  with  the  countries  of  the  area,  a  plan  for  cooperation  in  increased 
development. 

For  our  part  I  will  ask  Congress  to  join  in  a  billion-dollar  American  invest- 
ment in  this  effort  when  it  is  underway. 

And  I  hope  all  other  industrialized  countries — including  the  Soviet  Union — 
will  join  in  this  effort  to  replace  despair  with  hope,  and  terror  with  progress. 

The  task  is  nothing  less  than  to  enrich  the  hopes  and  existence  of  more  than 
a  hundred  million  people.  And  there  is  much  to  be  done. 

The  vast  Mekong  River  can  provide  food  and  water  and  power  on  a  scale  to 
dwarf  even  our  own  TVA. 

The  wonders  of  modern  medicine  can  be  spread  through  villages  where 
thousands  die  for  lack  of  care. 

Schools  can  be  established  to  train  people  in  the  skills  needed  to  manage  the 
process  of  development. 

To  implement  this  "billion-dollar"  development  program,  the  Presi- 
dent proposed  to  organize  a  special  team,  headed  by  Mr.  Eugene  Black, 
former  (1949-1962)  president  of  the  Bank  for  International  Recon- 
struction and  Development,  which  he  hoped  would  be  able  to  work 
in  cooperation  with  the  United  Nations. 

Diplomatic  Environment  of  tlie  Johns  Hopkins  Speech 

The  decision  to  begin  sustained  air  war  against  North  Vietnam 
had  been  made  by  the  President  on  February  13,  1965.  On  April  1  he 
made  the  further  decision  to  use  American  ground  troops  for  offensive 
action  in  South  Vietnam.  Both  actions  were  taken  primarily  to  stave 
off  collapse  in  the  South. 

In  his  own  account  of  the  speech,  President  Johnson,  writing  in 
1971,  recalled  that  his  purpose  had  been  threefold:  "to  explain  our 
policy  as  clearly  as  possible,  to  urge  Hanoi  once  more  to  join  us  in 
trying  to  reach  a  peaceful  settlement,  and  to  describe  what  peace  and 
cooperative  effort  could  do  for  the  economic  development  of  all  of 
Southeast  Asia."  The  President  went  on  to  refer  to  an  "outside  de- 
velopment" in  which  leaders  of  17  nonaligned  nations  meeting  in  mid- 
March  had  sent  an  appeal  to  the  belligerent  nations  and  to  the  Secre- 
tary General  of  the  United  Nations,  asking  for  negotiations  to  end  the 
war.  The  appeal  reached  Washington  April  1.  The  President's  ac- 
count continues — 

Ambassador  [Maxwell]  Taylor  was  home  from  Vietnam  at  that  time  and  we 
had  scheduled  a  National  Security  Council  meeting  on  April  2  to  hear  his  report 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.   1 


25 


368 


ou  Vietnamese  developments.  Rusk  opened  the  NSC  meeting  by  describing  the 
appeal  of  the  seventeen  nonaligned  nations.  He  urged  that  our  reply  lie  "serious, 
restrained,  and  positive."  1  agreed  and  decided  to  incorporate  the  main  elements 
of  our  reply  in  the  Johns  Hopkins  speech.3 

Id  sum.  the  speech  was  in  response  to  foreign  and  domestic  pressure 
to  negotiate  an  end  to  the  conflict.  It  sought  to  present  a  constructive 
alternative  to  conflict.  It  sought  to  reassure  the  people  of  the  United 
States  that  its  leadership  was  seeking  the  peaceful  alternative  and 
stood  ready  to  negotiate  to  this  end.  It  sought  to  encourage  a  '"coop- 
erative effort  for  development"  to  increase  the  peaceful  interaction 
among  the  nations  of  Indochina. "It  sought  to  involve  the  United  Na- 
tions more  extensively  in  the  theater,  and  also  to  stimulate  participa- 
tion of  as  many  industrialized  nations  as  possible  (including  the 
Soviet  Union)  in  the  constructive  effort  in  the  region  as  an  alternative 
to  conflict;  conceivably,  such  Soviet  participation  would  widen  the 
breach  between  mainland  China  and  the  USSR,  as  well  as  generating 
a  possible  source  of  difference  between  the  North  Vietnamese  and  the 
Vietcong.  Possibly  also  it  was  intended  to  contribute  further  stability 
to  the  government  of  South  Vietnam,  and  offer  an  enticement  to  the 
North  Vietnamese  to  negotiate.  It  combined  the  goals  of  ending  the 
war  and  winning  the  war. 

Diplomatic  and  Political  Reactions  to  the  Speech 

It  is  not  easy  to  characterize  the  immediate  consequences  of  the 
President's  speech.  There  were  too  many  objectives,  too  many  ingredi- 
ents, and  too  many  concurrent  developments,  for  any  unequivocal 
identification  of  the  results.  From  Hanoi  and  Peking,  the  reaction  was 
one  of  strong  rejection.  In  the  American  and  British  press,  the  com- 
ments were  generally  favorable.  On  the  floor  of  the  Congress,  re- 
sponses were  largely  partisan,  with  the  President's  Democratic  sup- 
porters praising  the  statesmanlike  balance  of  the  speech  and  the  Repub- 
licans denouncing  it  as  a  futile  effort  to  '"buy  peace." 

President  Johnson  has  summed  up  the  communist  response  to  the 
proposal  in  these  words: 

The  Communists'  answer  came  quickly.  On  April  9  Radio  Peking  said  my  offer 
was  "full  of  lies  and  deceptions."  The  following  day  Moscow  called  the  proposal 
"noisy  propaganda."  Two  days  after  that  Hanoi's  Communist  party  newspaper 
described  the  Johns  Hopkins  offer  as  "bait."  On  April  L'<>  North  Vietnam  de- 
clared that  the  seventeen  nations  thai  had  signed  the  proposal  for  unconditional 
talks  "were  not  accurately  informed." 

The  door  to  peace  remained  closed.  As  for  economic  cooperation  and  regional 
improvement,  Hanoi's  spokesmen  described  our  proposal  as  an  attempt  to  "bribe" 
them.  They  had   no  interest  in  cooperating  with  their  neighbors  in  a  peaceful 

way;   they  preferred  to  take  them  over  by  force.' 

In  the  Senate,  Majority  Leader  Mike  Mansfield  praised  the  speech 
;i-  making  clear  thai  '*.  .  .  we  are  prepared  to  do  our  part  with  other 
nat  ions  to  convert  t  hat  peace,  once  it  is  obtained,  into  a  dynamic  peace, 
a  peace  of  constructive  benefit,  not  only  to  the  people  of  Viel  nam, 'North 


'Lyndon    B.   Johnson,    The   Vantagi    Point:   Perspectives   o)    ih>    Presidency    196S    i960 
(New    York  :    Roll,    Rineharl    I     Winston,    1071),    p     133    The   uonallpned    nations    were 
Afgnnlstan,  Cyprus    Ceylon,  Ethiopia,  Ghana,  Guinea,  India,  Iraq,  Kenya,  Nepal, 

Syria,  Tuni  in    i  ganda,  The  United  Arnb  Republic,  Yugoslavia,  and  Zambia    The  texts  of 
the  formal  appeal  from  these  nations,  and  the  tl.S.  response  to  it,  appear  in  the  Depart 
ment  of  State  Bulletin  (April  26    1985),  pp   610  612, 
in,  v  he  Vantage  Point,  p, 


369 


and  South,  but  to  Southeast  Asia  as  a  whole."  :'  Congressman  Zablocki 
declared  himself  "impressed  by  the  dramatic  and  hold  initiative  s<  ized 
by  the  President  in  proposing  a  massive  program  of  cooperative  de- 
velopment for  Southeast  Asia."  He  observed  that  its  "principal  object/1 
had  been  insufficiently  recognized: 

"That  is  the  bold  move  to  stabilize  Southeast  Asia  and  assist  the 
peaceful  progress  of  the  people  in  that  area  through  a  multi-national 
program  of  economic  assistance,  directed  by  the  United  Nations,  in 
which  Communist  nations  would  be  invited  to  participate.'5  " 

Senator  McGovem  concurred.  Peace  in  Asia,  he  said.  ".  .  .  means 
precisely  the  kind  of  imaginative  effort  the  President  proposed  last 
night,  including  regional  development  of  water  resources,  including 
use  of  our  own  farm  products,  including  spread  of  cheap  electric 
power,  including  health  programs,  including  expert  and  experienced 
assistance  from  the  best  people  available  in  the  field  of  international 
development."  Senator  Moss  added  that  the  speech  "represents  a  major 
.break-through  in  the  international  posture."  7 

On  the  other  hand,  Senator  Everett  Dirksen,  the  Minority  Leader, 
questioned  the  feasibility  of  an  attempt  to  ''buy  peace  with  an  Ameri- 
can aid  program"  and  Representative  Gerald  R.  Ford  declared  that 
".  .  .  friendship,  security,  and  solid  international  relationships  can- 
not be  bought  with  dollars."  8 

In  the  press,  the  immediate  response  emphasized  the  "carrot  and 
stick"  theme.  A  typical  statement  in  the  New  York  Times  observed 
that  the  speech  had  been  prompted  by  ".  .  .  a  personal  desire  to  yield 
to  and  appeal  to  opinion  at  home  and  abroad''  plus  a  move  ;'.  .  .  in 
the  complicated  and  subtle  effort  to  bring  North  Vietnam  to  terms — 
to  suggest  that  Hanoi  could  profit  from  a  settlement  while  emphasiz- 
ing how  Hanoi  would  suffer,  largely  alone,  in  further  combat."  9  How- 
ever, as  time  went  on,  and  the  responses  from  both  the  North  Vietna- 
mese authorities  and  the  leadership  in  Mainland  China  were  strongly 
negative  to  the  peace  move,  attention  in  the  U.S.  press  turned  more 
and  more  to  the  regional  development  feature  of  the  speech.  On  April 
0,  the  Washington  Post  carried  a  follow-up  story  that  began — 

President  Johnson's  dramatic  offer  of  $1  billion  to  help  finance  a  Southeast 
Asian  development  program  is  designed  to  harness  regional  resources  in  a  vast 
effort  to  raise  Asian  living  standards  and  at  the  same  time  reduce  Communist 
pressures  on  the  area. 

The  concept,  the  story  went  on,  "could  provide  the  spark  necessary  • 
to  set  the  region  for  the  first  time  on  a  concentrated  drive  toward 
development  and  prosperity."  1() 


n  Mike  Mansfield,  "President  Johnson's  Speech  on  Southeast  Asia — Vietnam."  Remarks 
of  Senator  Mike  Mansfield  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate,  Congressional  Record  (April  8, 
1965)  :  p.  7492. 

"Clement  Zablocki,  "President  Johnson's  Address  on  Vietnam."  Remarks  of  Repre- 
sentative Clement  Zablocki  on  the  floor  of  the  House,  Congressional  Record  (Auril  $, 
1965)  :  p.  7459. 

TGeorpe  S.  McGovem  and  Frank  E.  Moss,  "President  Johnson's  Speech  on  Southeast 
Asia — Vietnam."  Remarks  of  Senators  George  S.  McGovem  and  Frank  !■".  Moss  on  the  Boor 
of  the  Senate,  Congressional  Record  (April  8,  1965)  :  p.  74(.tr,. 

*  '"Dirksen,  Ford  Rap  Johnson  on  Bid  to  Buy  Peace,"  Washington  Star  (A;  ril  8,  1905)  : 

"Max  Frankel,   "President  Makes  Offer  to  Start  Vietnam  Talks  Unconditionally;   Pro 

po^s  -SI  Billion  Aid  for  Asia,"  New  York  Times  (April  8,  1965)  :  p.  1. 

10  Dan  Kurzman,  "Offer  Envisions  Harnessing  of  Mekong,"  Washington  Post  (April  9, 
196o)  :  p.  A22. 


370 


Similar  reports  appeared  in  many  other  journals.  For  example: 
"Funds  to  Flood  Mekong  River  Project?"  {Christian  Science  Moni- 
tor, April  10)  ;  ''Hopes  for  Harnessing  the  Mekong''  {Business 
Week,  April  17)  ;  "The  Mekong,  Work  in  Progress"  {London  Econ- 
omist, April  17)  ;  "The  Promise  of  the  Mekong"  ( Washington  Star, 
April  21)  ;  "On  the  Mekong,  Mr.  Johnson's  Billion  Dollar  Offer" 
{New  Republic,  April  24)  ;  "A  Project  to  Harness  the  'Sleeping 
Giant'"  {Life,  May  3). 

But,  as  the  commitment  of  U.S.  troops  to  the  Vietnamese  conflict 
continued  to  enlarge  throughout  1965  and  following  years,  interest 
in  the  Mekong  development  feature  of  President  Johnson's  proposal 
dwindled.  Opposition  to  all  forms  of  intervention  in  Southeast  Asia — 
whether  military  or  economic — intensified.  The  speech  itself  faded  to 
a  brief  episode  in  the  eventful  period  that  culminated  in  the  Presi- 
dent's decision  not  to  seek  reelection  in  1968,  the  violent  protests  that 
exploded  on  American  college  campuses,  the  disorderly  events  of  the 
Democratic  presidential  convention  in  Chicago,  and  the  choice  of 
President  Nixon  to  lead  a  new  administration  committed  to  U.S. 
withdrawal  from  Vietnam. 

Thus,  while  in  the  United  States  the  President's  Mekong  proposal 
may  have  slowed  the  growth  of  opposition  to  the  war,  its  longterm 
domestic  impact  is  open  to  question.  Its  diplomatic  consequences 
abroad  are  perhaps  even  more  subject  to  speculation  and  debate.  At 
least  in  a  broad  and  symbolic  sense,  however,  it  may  have  left  an  en- 
during impression.  Eugene  E.  Black,  who  served  beginning  in  1965  as 
Advisor  to  President  Johnson  on  Southeast  Asia  Economic  and  Social 
Development,  holds  the  following  affirmative  view : 

While  impossible  to  measure  with  any  precision,  there  is  little  doubt  in  my 
mind  that  the  political  impact  [on  indigenous  leadership  elements]  of  President 
Johnson's  offer  of  large-scale  postwar  assistance  to  Southeast  Asia  was  sub- 
stantial. ...  I  considered  the  $1  billion  offer  to  be  more  symbolic  than  mathe- 
matically precise.  .  .  .  Both  an  immediate  and  short-range  political  impact 
of  our  offer  was  its  positive  role  as  a  catalyst  in  stimulating  the  interest  in 
and  moves  toward  regional  cooperation.  .  .  .  Many  of  the  regional  organizations 
and  groupings  in  Southeast  Asia  owe  their  origin  or  vitality  to  the  boost  for 
regional  cooperation  given  by  the  United  States  in  the  period  1965-1969.  Best 
known  is  the  formation  in  late  1965  of  the  Asian  Development  Bank.  .  .  .  Less 
recognized  but  no  less  real  was  the  large  increase  in  inter-regional  personal 
contacts  which  occurred  in  Southeast  Asia  over  these  years  at  various  levels 
and  in  varied  forums.  I  have  in  mind  such  developments  as  the  initiation  of 
plans  for  a  region-wide  study  of  transportation  infrastructure  (the  study  was 
completed  in  1971  with  help  of  the  ADB)  ;  the  coming  together  of  Ministers  of 
Education  of  the  region  to  plan  development  of  training  institutions  of  regional 
significance  and  the  mushrooming  of  specialized  regional  groups  to  consider 
one  topic  or  another  of  economic,  social  or  political  significance.  .  .  .  The  Johns 
Hopkins  speech  and  the  stepped-up  interest  in  the  development  potential  of  the 
Mekong  which  it  generated  certainly  had  a  healthy  political  impact  in  the  non- 
communisl  riparian  states  hy  focussing  attention  < m  the  future.  I  know  this 
from  my  four  trips  to  the  areas  for  President  Johnson  and  subsequent  visits. 
...  I  would,  therefore  .  .  .  say  both  the  short  and  long-term  political  impact 
of  the  Johns  Hopkins  offer  was  substantial  in  the  professional  communities  in 
all  the  riparian  states  hy  opening  up  new  horizons.  .  .  .10a 

Some  Possible  Longer-Range  Consequences  of  the  Mekong  Concept 

The  question  remains  as  to  whether  regionalism  as  an  international 

strategy  for  peace  offers  opportunities  to  he  exploited.  In  the  United 


10»  Excerpt  from  a  statement  of  Mnrcli   14,   11*72,  prepared  by  Mr.  Black  in  response  to 
questions  by  the  author.  The  full  statement  Is  reproduced  In  the  appendix  to  this  study. 


371 


States  the  concept  of  regional  development  has  long  been  well  under- 
stood and  generally  accepted.  Subsequent  events  in  Southeast  Asia 
have  demonstrated  that  there  is  a  real  and  growing  interest  there  in 
the  application  of  technology  on  a  geographic  rather  than  politically- 
defined  basis  (the  essence  of  ''regionalism").  It  is  at  least  possible  that 
the  concept  of  regionalism  might  at  some  future  time,  and  under  more 
favorable  auspices,  serve  a  useful  purpose  in  support  of  U.S.  diplo- 
matic objectives.  Accordingly,  the  rest  of  this  study  will  undertake  to 
define  and  examine  the  concept,  its  application  to  the  Lower  Basin  of 
the  Mekong,  and  the  problems  and  issues  surrounding  this  develop- 
ment. Attention  will  be  given  to  such  questions  as — 

What  durable  consequences  came  from  the  President's  Mekong 
initiative? 

Might  the  proposal  have  served  a  broader  and  more  decisive 
diplomatic  purpose  under  more  favorable  circumstances  and 
timing  ? 

What  potential  diplomatic  opportunities  are  offered  by  region- 
alism— the  concept  of  applying  technology  to  geographic  as  dis- 
tinguished from  politically-defined  areas  ? 

Under  what  circumstances  might  regional  development  involv- 
ing multinational  regions  afford  an  alternative  to  conflict,  and 
can  the  factor  of  timeliness  in  adopting  this  alternative  be  deter- 
mined and  exploited? 
Following  the  President's  peace  initiative,  foreign  aid  from  the 
United  States  to  Vietnam  became  inextricably  merged  with  efforts  to 
mobilize  Vietnamese  manpower  in  support  of  the  war  or  to  strengthen 
the  government  of  South  Vietnam.  Nevertheless,  throughout  the  seven 
years  from  the  time  of  the  speech  to  the  present,  the  international 
effort  to  apply  technology  to  the  systematic  development  of  the  Lower 
Mekong  Basin  has  grown  considerably.  Undeniably,  as  Mr.  Black 
suggests,  the  speech  and  subsequent  efforts  to  implement  its  proposal 
stimulated  progress  in  the  regional  project.  Despite  many  strains,  co- 
operation among  the  four  countries  of  the  Basin  (Thailand,  Cambodia, 
Laos,  and  South  Vietnam)   held  steadfast.  Outside  support  for  the 
project  has  come  from  many  countries,  many  agencies  within  the 
United  Nations  family,  and  many  nongovernmental  institutions.  As  a 
multinational  development  effort  it  has  demonstrated  14  years  of  con- 
tinuity, stability,  and  growth.  It  has  provided  evidence  to  justify  the 
forecast  made  in  1963  : 

.  .  .  The  best  opportunities  for  encouraging  regionalism  in  Southeast  Asia 
still  exist  in  the  economic  and  cultural  fields.  In  many  respects  the  development 
of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin  ...  is  a  beacon  for  the  future.  The  success  of  the 
scheme  could  be  one  of  the  most  important  steps  in  the  development  of  regional- 
ism in  Southeast  Asia.11 

The  chapter  to  follow  presents  a  general  discussion  of  the  nature  and 
types  of  regionalism,  both  national  and  international.  Then  the  evolu- 
tion of  the  Mekong  Project  is  chronicled,  before  and  after  the  Presi- 
dent's speech.  Finally,  the  account  concludes  with  a  consideration  of 
possible  roles  and  limitations  of  types  of  international  developmental 
regionalism  as  an  instrument  of  U.S.  diplomacy. 


^C.  Hart  Schaaf  and  Russell  H.  Fifield,  The  Lower  Mekong:  Challenge  to  Cooperation 
in  Southeast  Asia  (Princeton,  New  Jersey:  D.  Van  Nostrand  Company,  Inc.,  l\)bS),  p.  t><. 


II.  Varieties  of  National  axd  International  Regionalism 

.Vn  obstacle  to  clarity  of  discussion  about  the  Mekong  Project,  or 
about  regionalism  generally,  is  that  it  carries  so  mam'  different  mean- 
ings. Jn  the  chapter  to  follow,  some  of  the  varieties  of  regionalism  are 
identified;  these  are  all  involved  to  some  extent  in  one  or  another  of 
the  spectrum  of  attitudes  toward  the  Mekong  Project.  The  term 
"Region''  is  itself  a  kind  of  omnibus  word  involving  variously  the 
idea  of. — 

An  area  defined  by  "one  or  more  physical  characteristics,  such  as 
rainfall,  length  of  growing  season,  character  of  soil,  vegetation, 
contours,  and  similar  features*': 

An  area  characterized  by  the  "prevalence  of  one  or  more  cultural 
characteristics — such  as  language  or  dialect,  costume,  form  of 
social  organization,  type  of  architecture,  use  of  given  tools,  ac- 
ceptance of  a  given  religion,  practice  of  certain  social  cus- 
toms .  .  ."; 

An  area  set  off  from  other  areas  "by  barriers  of  various  sorts 
!    tich  as]  mountains,  deserts,  rivers,  lakes,  and  oceans  .  .  ."; 

An  area  within  which  the  component  parts  are  in  a  condition  of 
interdependence  in  some  important  respect  or  respects;  an  ex- 
ample is  a  trade  area,  "delineated  by  the  network  of  economic 
interconnections  that  holds  it  together  .  .  .";  and 

An  ana  in  which  some  problem  or  collection  of  problems  is  shared, 
and  planning  to  deal  with  them  comprehensively  takes  on  a 
"regional  planning"  or  "regional  administration''  character. 

Accordingly,  ".  .  .  In  the  concept  of  region  we  are  not  dealing  with 
a  single  and  unambiguous  idea,  but  rather  with  a  variety  of  notions 
and  approaches.''  Therefore.  "To  use  the  regional  concept  as  if  it  were 
one  clear  and  univocal  term  is  to  make  for  misunderstandings  and  con- 
fusion rather  than  clarity.*'  '-  The  varieties  of  regionalism  suggested 
in  this  source  are  primarily  intranational.  They  include  the  geophysi- 
cal (e.g.,  the  Rocky  Mountain  region),  the  cultural  (e.g..  the  "Old 
Soul  h."),  the  physiographically  separate  (e.g.,  Hawaii  or  Alaska),  the 
economically  interdependent  (e.g..  the  Pittsburgh  iron  and  steel 
region),  and  the  area  whose  components  share  a  common  problem  or 
opportunity  (e.g..  the  Tennessee  Valley  region,  the  St.  Lawrence  Sea- 
way and  its  served  area,  Appalachia,  Four  Corners,  etc.). 

Regionalism  in  the  United  States  has  followed  one  or  another  of 
these  patterns.  But  when  the  effort  was  made  to  apply  the  general  con- 
cepl  of  "Regionalism"  to  groups  of  nations  abroad,  many  other  crite- 
ria came  into  play.  International  regionalism  involves  the  interaction 


12 1 is   Wlrth,    "Limitations    of   Regionalism."   In:    Merrill   Jensen    ed.,   Regionalism   in 

Imeri  </  •  Papers  of  Symposium  on  American  Regionalism    (Madison,  Wise:  university  of 
In  Press,  1965),  pp.  381   386. 

(372) 


373 


of  sovereignties  not  only  of  nations  within  intended  ''regions"  but  also 
of  such  nations  with  various  of  the  superpowers.  Goals  of  such  interna- 
tional regions  may  be  the  same  as  (hose  of  U.S.  developmental  regions, 
but  alternatively  may  encompass  shared  interests  in  national  security, 
and  these  interests  may  also  involve  the  superpowers.  A  further  com- 
plicating factor  is  the  existence  of  innumerable  international  agencies 
with  different  objectives,  different  scopes  of  interest,  and  different  ap- 
proaches to  regionalism. 
Regional  Development  in  the  United  States 

Regionalism  became  almost  an  ideology  in  the  United  States  during 
the  depression  years.  Its  advocate*- cited  the  Tennessee  Valley  Au- 
thority as  the  idealization  of  the  concept.  Although  admittedly  a 
capital-intensive  development  of  dams,  power  plants,  transmission 
lines,  Mood  control  works,  and  navigation  improvements,  TVA  was 
much  more:  a  complex  program  of  soil  improvement,  agricultural 
processing,  farm  technology!,  reforestation,  and  commercial  develop- 
ment of  the  entire  basin  of  the  Tennessee  River  and  its  tributaries. 
The  TVA  concept  was  characterized  by  the  following  features: 
Corporate  organization 

Exercise  of  the  sovereign  powers  of  the  Federal  Government 
Right  to  hold  and  sell  property,  to  sue  and  be  sued 
Authority  to  construct  and  operate  power  dams  and  distribution 

lines — to  sell  power  wholesale  or  retail 
Domain  over  the  entire  watershed  of  the  Tennessee  River 
A  policy  of  contracting  with  State  and  local  governments  and 

individuals  for  cooperative  development  arrangements 
Maintenance  of  its  own  civil  service  and  labor  relations 
Incorporation  within  its  central  organization  of  miniature  de- 
partments of  commerce,  agriculture,  labor,  health,  mining,  and 
engineering  technology,  in  addition  to  its  more  widely  pub- 
licized power  activities. 
Various  criticisms  have  been  expressed  of  alleged  imperfections  in 
TVA — its  tendency  to  yield  to  elitist  elements  locally,  technical  deci- 
sions to  flood  extensive'areas  of  bottomland,  the  sharp  bargaining  for 
coal  that  encouraged  extensive  strip  mining  without  subsequent  re- 
pair, conflicts  of  jurisdiction  with  departments  of  the  National  Gov- 
ernment, and  charges  of  excessive  claims  of  regional  economic  benefits. 
Nevertheless.  TVA  must  be  accounted  a  technical  success,  and  perhaps 
more  importantly  a  political  success.  Xotable  bipartisan  support  has 
arisen  in  the  Valley  whenever  TVA  lias  been  challenged,  and  its  place 
as  an  American  institution  appears  to  be  firmly  established. 

Despite  this  acceptance,  when  the  question  arose  as  to  whether  the 
TVA  experiment  should  be  repeated  elsewhere  in  precisely — or  essen- 
tially— the  same  format,  the  decision  was  always  in  favor  of  some 
other  approach.  There  were  many  of  these.  Development  of  the  Mis- 
souri, the  Columbia,  the  Colorado,  and  other  of  America's  great  rivers 
was  entrusted  to  departments  of  the  National  Government.  Encour- 
agement and  support  for  cooperative  joint  organizations  of  the  States 
to  develop  such  regions  as  Appalachia,  Four  Corners,  the  Great  Lakes, 
and  elsewhere,  were  coordinated  by  an  institution  of  the  Department 
of  Commerce.  Significantly,  many  of  the  lessons  learned  in  the  TVA 
experiment  were  applied  elsewhere:  enlisting  local  support  and  par- 


374 


ticipation,  broad  scope  of  planning,  the  search  for  interactions  and 
coherence.  These  aspects  of  the  particular  brand  of  ad  hoc  regionalism 
practiced  in  the  TVA  experiment  permeated  many  of  the  other  re- 
gional development  programs.  Even  in  the  national  programs  of  the 
Federal  departments,  a  gesture  was  made  in  the  direction  of  regional 
coherence  by  a  sustained  attempt  to  rationalize  the  jurisdictional  areas 
of  "regional"  offices. 

Early  Proposals  for  International  Regional  Development 

An  analysis  of  TVA  as  a  possible  prototype  for  international  appli- 
cation to  developing  regions  was  conducted  during  the  latter  years  of 
World  War  II  by  Herman  Finer  under  the  sponsorship  of  the  Inter- 
national Labour  Office.  Dr.  Finer  concluded  that  while  international 
development  projects  might  be  of  great  assistance  to  developing  coun- 
tries, TVA  as  a  model  was  "not  transplantable  without  reservations 
and  qualifications."  13  On  the  basis  of  a  thorough  examination  of  the 
organization,  activities,  and  economic  impacts  of  TVA,  Finer  con- 
cluded that  its  cardinal  feature  was  that  "it  was  deliberately  estab- 
lished and  given  responsibility  for  the  welfare  of  an  under-developed 
area."  There  wore  many  such  areas  throughout  the  world.  To  apply  the 
regional  concepts  of  TVA  to  such  regions  would  offer  an  outlet  for 
savings  and  for  capital  transfers  from  the  affluent  to  the  disadvan- 
taged. Areas  of  development  "need  not  be  restricted  to  valleys, 
although  mention  has  been  made  of  the  Danube,  Yangtze,  and  the 
Jordan  Valleys."  What  was  important  was  that  "existing  political 
divisions  of  the  world  and  their  frontiers,  whether  States  or  their 
subdivisions,  are  not  self-sufficient  economic  units." 

Finer  noted  that  regional  development  required  comprehensive  and 
longrange  planning.  The  relationship  between  those  in  charge  of  the 
development  and  the  political  authorities  of  the  region  needed  to  be 
explicit.  Cooperation  was  imperative  between  them.  Moreover,  the 
powers  given  to  any  international  regional  development  authority, 
"in  order  to  calm  any  national  sensitiveness,"  should  be  clear,  defined, 
soberly  constructed,  and  modified  with  care  as  the  need  arose. 

One  example  of  a  possible  application  of  the  regional  development 
principle  appeared  shortly  after  World  War  II  ended.  It  was  offered 
in  a  short  book  by  Walter  C.  Lowdermilk.  an  official  of  the  U.S.  De- 
partment of  Agriculture,  and  proposed  a  "Jordan  Valley  Authority — 
A  Counterpart  of  TVA  in  Palestine."  14  He  observed  that  the  valley 
of  the  Jordan  River  "offers  a  combination  of  natural  features  and  a 
concentration  of  resources  which  set  the  stage  for  one  of  the  greatest 
and  most  far-reaching  reclamation  projects  on  earth,  comparable  to 
our  TVA  in  scope  and  importance."  He  proposed  that  the  sweet  water 
of  the  valley  be  used  for  irrigation,  and  that  salt  water  from  the  Medi- 
terranean lie  introduced  into  the  Dead  Sea.  generating  electric  power 
as  it  dropped  the  1.200  feet  from  sea  level  to  the  level  of  the  water 
across  the  bottom  of  the  Jordan  rift.  Other  features  of  Lowdermilk's 
plan  included  water  conservation,  flood  control,  soil  erosion  control. 


w Herman  Finer.  The  TVA,  Lessons  for  International  Application,  studies  and  Reports, 
Series  B  (Economic  Conditions),  no.  ::7  (Montreal:  International  Labour  Office,  nun, 
pp.  218   236. 

14  Walter  Clay  Lowdermilk,  Palestine,  I. ami  <>]  Promise  (New  York  :  Harper  and  Krotliors, 
1944).  p. 


375 


range  management,  fertilization,  reforestation,  land  reclamation,  and 
extraction  of  mineral  values  from  the  Dead  Sea. 

Another  effort  that  has  received  less  attention  was  the  1944  mission 
to  China  of  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Reclamation.  A  team  of  engineers 
visited  Chungking  to  study  the  upper  reaches  of  the  Yangtze  River  to 
explore  the  possibility  of  a  national  program  of  regional  development. 
The  team  sketched  out  a  billion-dollar  project  to  irrigate  60  million 
acres,  generate  more  than  10  million  kilowatts  of  firm  power,  and  open 
navigation  on  the  river  from  Shanghai  to  Chungking.15 

By  the  close  of  World  War  II,  regionalism  had  become  the  ortho- 
dox philosophy  of  planning  for  large-scale  public  works.  Water  re- 
source projects  in  the  United  States  generally  conformed  to  this 
pattern,  emphasized  alike  in  reports  of  the  Hoover  Commission,  the 
plans  of  the  Bureau  of  Reclamation  and  Corps  of  Engineers,  and 
congressional  studies.16  An  endless  stream  of  foreign  visitors  to  the 
TVA  took  home  with  them  the  notion  of  comprehensive  planning  for 
whole  river  drainage  basins.17 

However,  TVA  was  a  special  case — a  capital-intensive  development 
program  in  a  lagging  region  of  a  nation  affluent  and  technologically 
advanced.  The  people  of  the  region  were  culturally  receptive  to  the 
project  and  the  opportunities  it  offered  to  them.  Four  questions 
emerged:  (1)  What  elements  of  the  special  case  of  TVA  regionalism 
were  suitable  for  export?  (2)  What  new  elements  needed  to  be  added 
to  improve  the  acceptability  and  effectiveness  of  multinational  region- 
alism? (3)  What  should  be  the  roles  of  the  various  United  Nations 
organizations?  and  (4)  How  would  the  superpowers  relate  to  multi- 
national regionalism  ? 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  United  States  in  the  period  follow- 
ing World  War  II,  two  primary  objectives  were  to  be  sought  in  the 
encouragement  of  regional  association  of  foreign  nations :  economic 
development  as  a  counter  to  communist  penetration,  and  mutual  secu- 
rity pacts  to  deter  the  application  of  overt  military  force  in  support  of 
communist  penetration.  However,  as  the  image  of  monolithic  world 
communism  faded,  a  more  complex  view  of  regionalism  became  possi- 
ble, and  a  variety  of  alternative  forms  of  international  regionalism 
could  be  identified. 

One  form  of  regional  development  to  which  the  United  States  has 
contributed  substantially  in  the  past,  and  to  which  it  continues  to  con- 
tribute, involves  the  direct  construction  of  civil  works.  However,  this 
construction  has  been  undertaken  without  careful  consideration  of 
the  social  consequences,  and  without  the  precondition  of  a  partnership 
among  the  nations  participating  in  the  project.  One  example  of  this 
kind  of  regional  development  is  the  economic  development  of  the 
Indus  River  Basin,  centering  on  water  project  development  in  India 
and  West  Pakistan.  A  purpose  of  U.S.  aid  in  this  instance  was  to 
help  build  an  economic  basis  for  cooperation  between  two  countries 


16  Frank  P.  Huddle,  "Development  of  China,"  Editorial  Research  Reports  I  (1945), 
p.  137. 

18  See,  for  example,  "Congressional  Decisions  on  Water  Projects,"  Technical  Information 
for  Congress   (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office),  pp.  426-467. 

"According  to  the  Washington  office  of  TVA,  a  total  of  1,5.35  visitors  from  Southeast 
Asia  inspected  the  TVA  operation  from  1960  to  1965,  and  1,327  more  between  1966  and 
1972. 


376 


perennially  on  the  verge  of  hostilities.  The  project  was  successful  to 
the  extent  that  both  India  and  Pakistan  met  their  commitments  under 
the  terms  of  the  project;  it  increased  agricultural  production,  espe- 
cially in  West.  Pakistan;  it  also  cemented  relations  among  districts  in 
"West  Pakistan  where  some  sentiment  toward  separatism  existed.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  project  did  not  lead  to  a  resolution  of  the  basic 
issues  in  dispute  between  India  and  Pakistan,  which  resulted  in  open 
hostilities  between  them  in  1965  and  again  in  1971.  Moreover,  the  in- 
vestment in  West  Pakistan  added  to  the  already  serious  disparity  in 
income  with  East  Pakistan,  providing  one  of  the  motives  for  the 
separatist  movement  in  1971  that  culminated  in  the  formation  of 
Bangladesh. 

Forms  of  International  Regionalism 

In  one  important  respect,  international  regions  are  similar  to  sub- 
national  regions:  they  are  geographic  areas  rather  than  areas  with 
political  boundaries.  All  components  of  either  kind  of  region  share 
some  particular  interest  in  common.  On  the  other  hand,  the  differences 
between  subnational  and  international  regions  are  vast.  The  primary 
distinction  is  that  of  sovereignty,  of  competing  national  interests.  The 
nations  comprising  a  region  need  to  reconcile  their  own  interests 
with  their  participation  in  a  joint  enterprise.  In  addition,  the  Great 
Powers  have  the  problem  of  reconciling  their  own  national  interests 
with  their  bilateral  relations  with  the  individual  states  of  the  region 
and  with  the  region  as  a  whole. 

Varieties  of  regional  relationships  of  an  international  region  are 
numberless  ami  involve  such  variables  as:  purpose,  geographic  scope, 
scope  of  participation,  leadership,  functional  scope,  relation  of  the 
region  to  member  nations,  and  funding  arrangements. 

International  regionalism  can  have  all  the  different  variations  of 
subnational.  Over  and  above  these,  depending  on  the  variety  of  pur- 
poses, possible  combinations  of  different  nations,  and  further  com- 
plexities of  relations  of  states  in  the  region — separately  and  collec 
tively — with  the  Great  Powers  and  with  the  United  Nations,  there  is 
literally  no  limit  to  possible  kinds  of  regional  activity.  A  tabulation  of 
some  of  the  more  obvious  kinds  might  include : 

Purpose 

mutual  seeuritj    (NATO,  SEATO) 

technological  development   (Euratom,  Mekong) 

trade  advantage  (Common  .Market  i 

economy  of  scale  (Common  Market  i 

shared  information  (OECD,  ECAFE) 

resource  development   (Mekong) 
<  teographic  Scope 

cm  incut  a  1  i  EGA,  ECLA,  Org.  of  African  t'liity  i 

river  l>asin  <  Mekong  i 

sphere  of  interest  of  Great  Power  <  Warsaw  Tact  i 
Scope  of  Part  icipation 

nations  of  the  region 

(same)  plus  I  nited  Nations  institutions 

(same)  plus  a  Great  Power  (or  several) 

i  same  i  plus  many  ether  nations 
Leadership 

supplied  by  Hi.-  nations  of  the  region 

supplied  by  die  I'uiied  Nat  ions 

supplied  Py  a  Greal  Power 

supplied  by  an  ad  hoc,  self-starting  institution  in  the  region 


377 


Functional  Scope 

single  purpose 

multipurpose 

planned  expansion 

incremental  evolution 
Relation  of  Region  to  Component  States 

confederation 

treaty  consortium 

delegation  of  limited  powers 

consultative 

pooled  resources 

trading  bloc  tariff  union 
Arrangements  for  Funding 

internal  (from  revenues  of  states  of  the  region) 

external — 

donations  (bilateral,  multilateral) 

loans   (private,  U.N.  lending  agency,  regional  lending  agency,  bilateral 
Great  Power,  bilateral  other) 

combined  internal  and  external. 

The  United  States  lias  actively  supported  some  forms  of  interna- 
tional regionalism,  has  been  sympathetic  to  others,  and  has  been  neu- 
tral to  some.  Active  opposition  was  expressed  in  the  late  1930s  to  the 
effort  by  Japan  to  evolve  the  "Greater  East  Asia  Co-Prosperity 
Sphere."  This  effort  was  viewed  as  a  form  of  imperialism  posing  a 
threat  to  both  military  and  commercial  interests  of  the  United  States. 
The  Soviet  arrangements  with  Comecon  countries  do  not  appear  to 
have  elicited  any  positive  U.S.  posture.  On  the  other  hand,  NATO  has 
received  vigorous  U.S.  support  as  wTell  as  initial  U.S.  sponsorship; 
the  same  is  true  of  a  number  of  other  regional  security  treaties.  To- 
ward the  Common  Market  and  OECD,  the  general  U.S.  posture  has 
been  one  of  acceptance  and  encouragement ;  here  the  risks  of  economic 
competition  were  judged  to  be  balanced  by  the  gains  in  Atlantic 
security. 

Among  the  possible  motivations  behind  the  U.S.  posture  toward 
various  schemes  are :  to  preserve  national  power  and  national  security, 
to  reduce  tensions  among  the  Great  Powers,  to  alleviate  sources  of  con- 
flict (which  could  escalate)  in  a  region  of  lesser  Powers,  and  generally 
to  raise  the  living  standards  in  a  region  of  less  developed  countries. 

It  may  be  useful  to  contrast  the  relative  advantages  and  disadvan- 
tages to  the  United  States  of  three  principal  kinds  of  regionalism 
representing  extreme  differences  of  purpose  and  organizational  form. 

Type  One:  Mutual  security  of  the  nations  of  a  region,  with  U.S. 
support.  (Example:  SEATO). 

Advantages  to  the  United  States : 

Demonstrated  acceptability  to  U.S.  Congress  : 

Explicit  program  toward  a  capability  desired  by  the  United  States ; 

Assured  compatibility   of  military   organization  and  equipment   with   U.S. 

counterparts ; 
Opportunity  for  U.S.  military  contacts  through  operational  and  maintenance 

training ;  and 
Outlet  for  U.S.   weapons  and  equipment  which  are  becoming  obsolescent. 

Disadvantages  to  the  United  States : 

Usefulness  depends  on  existence  of  evident  and  overt  threat  to  the  receiving 

nation ; 
Tends  to  increase  military  costs  to  receiving  nation,  requiring  either    (a) 

further  U.S.  aid,  or  (b)  transfer  of  resources  from  development; 
Increases  substantially  the  level  of  U.S.  commitments,  with  some  question 

as  to  whether  there  is  a  commensurate  increase  in  U.S.  security  ; 


378 


High  U.S.  profile: 

Competition  stimulated  for  arms  acquisition  among  states  of  a  region  with 

intensified  intraregional  tensions  ;  and 
Hostility  invited  on  the  part  of  the  Great  Powers  against  both  the  arms 

supplier  and  the  recipient. 

Type  Txoo :  Natural  resources  and  economic  development  of  a  region, 
with  direct  bilateral  support  from  the  United  States  to  the  nations  of 
the  region.  (Example:  postwar  U.S.  aid  to  Eastern  Mediterranean 
Region — Greece,  Turkey,  etc.) 

Advantages  to  the  United  States : 

Direct  U.S.  legislative  control  of  aid  policy  and  spending  levels ; 

Acceptability  to  U.S.  Congress ; 

Encouragement  of  U.S.  exports;  benefits  to  U.S.  industry,  both  present  and 

future ;  and 
Assurance   of  positive   U.S.    leverage   on   policy   formulation   of   recipient 

nations. 

Disadvantages  to  the  United  States : 

High  U.S.  profile ; 

Persistent    reliance   invited    on   particular   kinds   of   U.S.    assistance    and 

technicians ; 
Progressive  resentment  and  antagonism  generated  toward  the  United  States 

as  progress  is  achieved ; 
High    costs   to    the   United    States    in   proportion   to   development   results 

achieved ; 
Competition  generated  among  regional  states  for  U.S.  donations ;  and 
Distortion  of  world  trade  patterns. 

Type  Three :  A  developmental  region  receiving  aid  primarily  from 
two  sources — contributions  from  countries  in  the  region,  and  multi- 
national institutions  (e.g.,  United  Nations  Development  Program, 
World  Bank,  Asian  Development  Bank,  etc.),  of  which  the  United 
States  is  one  of  many  sponsors.  (Example:  Mekong  Lower  Basin 
Project  as  meeting  most  of  the  criteria.) 

Advantages  to  the  United  States : 

Shared  costs — larger  developmental  results  per  U.S.  dollar  outlay  ; 

Lower  U.S.  profile ; 

International  cooperation,  fostered  both  within  the  region  and  between  the 

region  and  the  supporting  international  institution (s)  : 
Strengthened    responsibility    and    management    skills    of    both    the    region 

and  the  international  institution  (s)  ;  and 
Exertion  of  pressure  generally  on  donor  nations  to  accept  exports  from  the 

developing  region. 

Disadvantages  to  the  United  States  : 

Reduct  ion  of  U.S.  control  of  disposition  of  aid  funds  : 

Minimal  acceptability  to  U.S.  Congress  : 

Primary   emphasis   of   development   on   economic   priorities   of   the   nations 

Of  the  region,  rather  than  on  compatibility  with  U.S.  economy: 
Pressure  on  U.S.   to  ease  trade  harriers,  and  accept  exports  from  the  coun- 
tries of  the  region. 

Unlike  the  various  examples  of  regional  security  arrangement 
(NATO.  ANZrS.  SEATO,  etc.),  the  Mekong  Lower  Basin  Project 
was  directed  explicitly  at  development  <>f  resources  of  a  river  ha  sin.  by 
r  rather  close  analogy  with  the  TVA.  Its  leadership  shifted  early 
from  its  Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East  (  ECAFE) 
sponsorship  <<>  an  internal  organization  in  which  the  representatives 
<»!'  i he  Riparian  Nations  spoke  for  their  respective  sovereignties.  Presi- 
dent Johnson's  proposal  to  support  the  project  was  welcomed  by  the 


379 


single-minded  Coordination  Committee  in  Bangkok.  But  as  a  strate- 
gem  to  undermine  popular  sentiment  in  North  Vietnam  and  to  set  in 
train  a  course  of  events  to  bring  an  end  to  the  war  on  terms  favorable 
to  the  United  States,  the  proposal  demonstrated  scant  success.  It  is 
conceivable  that  the  move  may  have  generated  an  attitude  of  opposi- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  communist  countries  toward  various  kinds  of 
regional  cooperation  for  the  future. 


III.  Evolution  of  the  Program  to  Develop  the  Region  of  the 

Lower  Mekong  Basin 

When  President  Johnson  made  the  offer  to  contribute  greatly  to  the 
Mekong  program  in  1965,  the  Lower  Basin  development  work  had 
already  been  underway  for  about  eight  years  with  some  modest  U.S. 
participation.  The  basis  for  international  cooperation  on  such  projects 
went  back  a  decade  earlier  than  that.  In  his  1946  study  of  the  United 
Nations  Economic  and  Social  Council  (ECOSOC),  Herman  Finer 
wrote : 

The  Council  will  encourage  or  institute  regional  conferences  on  economic, 
social,  and  humanitarian  problems.  The  authority  for  this  does  not  and  need  not 
appear  directly  in  the  Charter,  for  this  is  a  matter  of  instruments  not  principles. 
It  is  always  a  little  discomforting  to  suggest  regional  differentiation  in  economic, 
social,  and  humanitarian  matters,  because  it  is  difficult  to  define  a  region,  and 
unpleasant  to  think  that  separate  areas  might  pursue  competitive  or  hostile 
policies.  But  what  is  meant  is  roughly  this.  Some  countries  by  reason  of  their 
proximity  and  certain  common  characteristics  of  geography  and  climate  and  lo- 
cation or  the  chance  of  history,  have  some  problems  in  common. 

He  added :  "The  word  'regional'  is  not  used  here,  and  certainly  ought 
never  to  be  used,  in  the  sense  of  a  unified  economic  area  marked  off 
from  the  rest  of  the  world  and  properly  pursuing  its  own  self-suffi- 
cient interests."  18  He  recalled  that  in  the  International  Labor  Con- 
ference of  May  1933,  representatives  of  China  and  India  had  proposed 
that  a  Far  Eastern  Regional  Conference  should  be  called,  and  sug- 
gested that  "No  doubt  the  Economic  and  Social  Council  could  foster 
such  special  regional  bodies  . . .  .v  Specifically.  Article  68  of  the  charter 
of  ECOSOC  authorized  it  to  "set  up  commissions  in  economic  and 
social  fields  and  for  the  promotion  of  human  rights  and  such  other 
commissions  as  may  be  required  for  the  performance  of  its  functions." 

Adoption  of  the  Regionalism  Principle  into  the  United  Nations  System 
Cinder  its  charter,  ECOSOC  created  an  Economic  Commission  for 
Asia  and  the  Far  East  (ECAFE)  on  March  28,  1947.  Its  headquarters 
were  located  in  Bangkok,  Thailand.  Its  scope  extended  to  trade,  agri- 
culture, transportation,  industrial  and  technological  development, 
education,  and  data -gathering.  Its  membership  included  all  members 
of  the  United  Nations  in  Asia,  plus  Australia,  New  Zealand,  France. 
England,  The  Netherlands,  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union.19 
(Other  regional  commissions  have  been  established  by  ECOSOC  for 
Europe  |  ECE),  for  Latin  America  |  ECLA),and  for  Africa  (ECA).) 
An  early  action  by  ECAFE  was  the  organization  of  a  series  of  con- 
ferences on  water  resources,  a  subject  to  which  the  Commission  gave 
priority  attention.  In  support  of  this  activity,  and  to  provide  consulta- 


18  Herman  Finer,  Tin  United  Nations  Economic  and  Social  Council  (Boston  Mass  : 
World  Peace  F idatlon,  1940),  pp.  107    108. 

'•China    (Taiwan)    withdrew   fron mbersliip   In   anticipation   of  expulsion   from   the 

United  Nations,  and  the  People's  Republic  ol  China  lias  indicated  the  Intention  i<>  join 
both  ECOSOC  a ICAFE 

(380) 


381 


tive  services  to  member  nations,  ECAFE  in  1949  established  a  small 
stall'  organization,  the  Bureau  of  Flood  Control,  whose  title  was  later 
enlarged  to  Bureau  of  Flood  Control  and  Water  Resources  Develop- 
ment. Under  its  charter,  the  Bureau  was  instructed  to  advise  and  assist 
governments  in  dealing  with  flood  control  and  river  problems;  it  was 
also  to  maintain  contact  with  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organisation 
and  other  specialized  U.N.  agencies  dealing  with  problems  related  to 
water. 

The  next  organizational  step  was  the  creation  in  1957  by  the  four 
Riparian  Nations— in  association  with  ECAFE — of  a  permanent 
"Committee  for  Coordination  of  Investigations  of  the  Lower  Mekong," 
to  be  referred  to  hereafter  as  the  "Coordination  Committee."  The  fol- 
lowing year,  the  Committee  agreed  to  the  establishment  by  ECAFE 
of  a  permanent  Advisory  Board  of  professional  engineers,  headed  by 
an  Executive  Agent.  The  four  members  of  the  Coordination  Commit- 
tee representing  the  Riparian  Nations  had  plenipotentiary  powers  of 
decision ;  the  Agent  had  authority  for  making  decisions  on  a  day-by- 
day  basis  in  the  preparation  of  requests  for  technical  and  financial 
assistance,  program  planning  and  supervision,  and  staff  support  of  the 
Coordination  Committee.  On  this  rather  unusual  and  extemporized 
foundation  was  erected  the  organization  to  plan  and  administer  a  re- 
gional program  covering  three-quarters  of  the  drainage  basin  of  the 
tenth  largest  river  in  the  world,  a  region  larger  than  France,  wTith 
a  population  of  perhaps  30  million.-0  How  much  the  total  invest- 
ment in  the  project  will  be  is  a  matter  of  sheer  guesswTork;  under  con- 
ditions of  political  stability  and  soundly  based  economic  growth  in  the 
region,  investment  in  reasonable  cost/benefit  terms  could  reach  the  tens 
of  billions  of  dollars.  (The  long  range  plan  for  the  Basin  currently 
projects  a  level  of  investment  of  $12  billion  over  the  next  30.  years.) 
What  makes  plausible  the  management  of  so  large  a  program  with  so 
miscellaneous  an  array  of  resources  and  authorities  is  that  the  project 
has  shown  an  adaptive  capability  for  15  years,  has  not  committed  itself 
to  an  unmanageably  large  effort,  has  concentrated  on  laying  a  solid 
data  base  for  each  effort,  and  appears  willing  to  accept  a  deliberate 
pace  for  the  future. 

The  relationship  of  the  Mekong  project  to  the  United  Nations  is 
viewed  as  a  healthy  and  constructive  one  for  the  future.  One  analysis 
suggests  that  it  could  serve  as  a  prototype  for  such  programs  else- 
where— 

International  river  basin  development  will  undoubtedly  be  one  of  the  major 
means  of  accomplishing  economic  growth  and  social  change  in  the  next  few 
decades,  especially  in  the  developing  countries.  Most  of  the  world's  major  rivers 
are  international  rivers,  and  most  flow  through  the  developing  countries.  Ap- 


20  Population  figures  for  the  countries  of  Indochina  are  notoriously  suspect.  According 
to  tiie  United  Nations  Demographic  Year  Book  (New  York:  United  Nations.  195S),  pp. 
95-97.  the  total  population  for  the  four  countries  in  1957  was  ahout  40  million  (Thailand 
21  million,  Vietnam  12.3,  Cambodia  4.6,  and  Laos  1.7).  An  ECAFE  study  that  same  year 
estimated  the  population  of  tile  Basin  at  ahout  17  million.  Other  estimates  run  very  much 
higher.  The  most  recent  estimate  gives:  Thailand  37.4,  South  Vietnam  is..",,  Cambodia  4.6, 
and  Laos,  3.1,  for  a  total  of  66.1  million.  North  Vietnam,  not  included  in  tiiis  total,  was 
estimated  at  21.6  million.  ("World  Population  Data  Sheet."  Washington,  D.C.  :  Population 
Reference  Bureau,  Inc.,  June  1971).  The  rate  of  increase  of  population  in  the  region  is 
estimated  at  from  two  to  three  percent  annually.  Concentration  of  persons  of  child-hearing 
age  in  urban  areas  will  have  considerable  effect  on  future  population  growth.  So  will 
public  health  measures.  One  theme  that  is  constantly  repeated  in  all  the  many  studies  of 
the  Lower  Basin  of  the  Mekong  is  the  need  for  better  data — demographic,  economic,  geo- 
graphical, meteorological,  and  the  like. 


382 


proximately  150  river  basins  straddle  international  boundaries,  and  together  they 
cover  almost  one-half  or  the  world's  land  surface,  excluding  Australia  and 
Antarctica.  Some  of  these  rivers  could  be  utilized  for  the  production  of  hydro- 
electric power,  the  provision  of  water  for  irrigation  or  domestic  and  industrial 
uses,  the  improvement  of  navigation,  or  the  control  of  floods.  Despite  these 
potential  benefits,  however,  only  a  few  of  the  world's  international  rivers  have 
been  developed.21 

Another  study  suggests  that  the  United  Nations  has  a  "vested  interest" 
in  regionalism  as  an  alternative  means  of  peacekeeping,  instead  of 
the  use  of  international  military  forces.  The  latter  means,  this  study 
notes,  has  not  been  signally  successful.  Alternatively,  "The  precedent- 
forming  Mekong  project  may  thus  establish  the  pattern  for  new  instru- 
mentalities intended  to  harmonize  international  relations  through  co- 
ordinated economic  development."  22 

Before  the  judgment  can  be  reached  that  regionalism  offers  a  sig- 
nificantly hopeful  tool  toward  the  ultimate  purposes  of  the  United 
Nations,  further  evidence  is  required  of  the  success  of  the  Mekong 
effort,  and  evidence  also  that  the  idea  strikes  a  responsive  chord  else- 
where in  the  world.  A  dedicated  enthusiast  declares:  "The  future  of 
Southeast  Asia  is  bound  up  with  the  question  whether  regionalism 
will  develop  sufficiently  to  become  a  major  consideration  in  the  policies 
of  local  and  foreign  governments."  Cooperation  on  a  multinational 
regional  basis,  he  asserts,  "better  meets  the  needs  of  small  countries."  If 
this  is  indeed  the  case,  perhaps  it  follows  that  "The  systematic 
development  of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin  under  international  aus- 
pices can  help  to  reduce  barriers  of  misunderstanding  and  lay  founda- 
tions of  goodwill  among  the  four  riparian  states."  23  It  remains  to  be 
seen  how  durable  and  how  extensive  this  goodwill  can  be. 

Geography  of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin  Region  24 

Many  engineering  opportunities  are  offered  by  a  huge  undeveloped 
river  in  a  region  suffering  alternately  from  too  much  and  too  little 
water,  where  the  low  incomes  characteristic  of  subsistence  agricul- 
ture are  almost  universal.  These  opportunities  have  been  persistently 
sought  by  leaders  in  the  nations  of  the  Lower  Basin,  by  the  regional 
organization  of  the  United  Nations  serving  the  area,  and  by  many 
volunteer  groups  and  individuals  who  have  contributed  their  resources 
for  this  purpose.  It  may  serve  a  useful  purpose  to  describe  here  the 
physical  and  political  setting,  the  geography  of  the  Basin,  and  the 
history  of  the  nations  that  occupy  it. 

The  region  of  concern  embraces  the  countries  of  Laos,  Cambodia,2"' 
Thailand,  and  Vietnam,  usually  referred  to  as  the  "Riparian  States."' 


21  W.  R.  Derrick  Sewell  and  Gilbert  F.  White,  "The  Lower  Mekong,"  International  Con- 
ciliation 558  i  May.  1966)  :  p.  1. 

Victor    J.    Croizat,    "The    Mekong    River    Development    Project:    Some    Geographical, 
Historical,  and   Political  Considerations,"  Paper  P3616   (Santa  Monica,  Calif.  :  Hand  Cor 
poratlon,  June  1967  i 
»  Russell    n     Infield,   professor  of  political   science,  University  of  Michigan.   C.   Schaaf 

Plfleld,  The  Loioei  Mekong:  Challenge  to  Cooperation  in  Southeast  Isia,  pp.  '.•.  56, 
-'A  considerable  literature  lias  been  produced  dealing  with  aspects  of  the  Lower  Mekong 
Basin.  Sources  for  information  in  this  section  were:  Sewell  and  White.  "The  Lower 
Mekong";  U.S.  Corps  "i  Engineers  ami  the  Tennessee  Valley  Authoritj  under  'he  direc- 
tion of  the  U.S.  Agency  for  International  Development,  The  United  Xations  Atlas  o] 
ft  i.  Economic,  mni  Social  Resources  of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin  (New  Vork  :  United 

fati       ,  September  1968),   157  pp.:  Willard  A.   Hanna,  "The  Mekong  Project,"  Southeast 
Asia  Efteldstaff  Reports  xvi,  Numbers  10,  11,  1-.  l"..  14,  and  10  (New  York:  Amer- 

ican i  ,      vrsities  Field  Staf)  Reports,  .Inly  September,  1968)  ;  Schaaf  and  Fi field,  77c   Lower 
Mekong:  ami  Victor  Croizat,  77m-  Mekong  River  Development  Project. 

lip-  authorities  of  the  former  kingdom  of  Cambodia  declared  their  nation   the  "Khmer 
Republic"  on  October  9,  1970, 


383 


The  Mekong  River,  which  rises  in  the  northern  slope  of  the  Himalayas 
within  China,  flows  some  2,600  miles  east  and  south  before  emptying 
into  the  South  China  Sea  in  the  delta  area  south  of  Saigon.  The  river 
from  its  source  to  Chiang  Saen  (where  the  borders  of  Burma,  Thai- 
land, and  Laos  meet)  extends  about  1,200  miles;  from  there  to  the  sea 
is  about  another  1,400  miles.  This  1,400-mile  stretch  of  the  Mekong, 
with  its  tributaries,  drains  the  236,000  square  miles  of  the  Lower  Me- 
kong Basin,  inhabited  by  some  30  million  people.  (See  map.) 


*Uandj!?v 


.Hsippw 

BURMA 

Tskaw. 

.Tannggjft 


CHINA 

Cntang-ch'eng 


'Ban  Sotene' 

Muong  Sa 


.  Meng-t/u 


Lao  Cai 


AMES     AND     BOL'NOAOV     «  t.  P  »  E  S  t  N  T  A  T  1  O  * 
f»E      NOT      NECESSARILY      A  J  I  HOHIT  A  T  i  V  t 


Cao  Bang. 


.Kan -ning 
CHINA 


Yo  Itn, 


Saty      f  #0i\n  6ien 


Muong\ 
Khoua 


Samneua. 


Chiang, 
fang  R„  *' 


bAsttkel  , 


(S[(  . 


Hot. 


SdUng 


MkW\ 


Chiang  Mai.      ^J  \\ 
Lampang, 

Uttaodil 

.Tak 


Ho«ei  Sat  ,, 

,Muong  Houn  > 

—'alt    y^y  *\ 

Beng       y^louangphiabang  ^* 

Xiangkhoang,  t   >- 

"flan  Ungliang' 

N3nJ 


#Bac  Kan   1      .Nmg-ming 

NORTH 

oH6N0l 
Haiphong  J 

Mam  Binl) 

VIETN/ 

'SSY  GULF 

OF 
TONKIN 


Udon  Thani 


-Paksane 


\t 


»3je.S 


If. 

.PhilsanuloW    I 
Phetcbabufi 


MakhJ.., 
Phaoom* 


Sakhsn* 
Nakhon 


1     Khofi  Kaen* 
I 

1 

THAILAND 

I 

•  Ta  Khli  ,--' 

.Lop  Bun  I — -'■"TTaktonn 


LAOS 

Sepont, 
LSa»anft3khet 


Jlong  Hot 

■wDema/carion  line 


Hje1 


Uten 
N»ir/<<J.»  vJalchatkam, 


-Pakse 


Ratcbasima 


*    )   Tarty^V.KancfianabLri 


*Sara) 


'»  Kabin 


ANDAMAN 
S£A  I 

MERGUI 

v 

ARCHIPELAGO 


^'BANGKOK     Kallhana 
Nakbon 


"Pbumi 
Sanitating 

pophon  )/  lumpbat, 

.Siemreab  |  Stoeng 

(liambang.  — T>C  AMBODI  A\Ir"9 
i  1 .         ro/uifV  \  Kampong 

„V  I'PiHin     »""W^       .'ti»"i 


Pooltiisa! " 


LKtacheti 


>Kampong/ 
Cham. 


fa  Hang 


t 
-Hcrtlum 

; 

^pfiiku 

\ 

\ 

Ban  Me. 
.Thuot  -s 

SOUT&   , 

llbajlinj.' 

•oa-nir" 


im  Ranh 


GULF 

OF 

THAILAND 


|S    KampQng\Sppe* 


1 

"PHU 

ouoc 


/ 


VIETNAM 


* 


s; 


,8ien  Hot 
t,S»IG0» 


xta»  !b« 


?uin 
.  5»g 


'VwgTi"     SOUTH 

CHINA 
SEA 


X 

Of", 
STRAIT  OF  ,---~i$- 
MALACCA 


Mainland  Southeast  Asia 


-Mekong  Bosin  Limit 


96-525    O  -  77  -  vol.    1-26 


384 


The  Mekong  is  already  large  (1.200  feet  wide)  at  the  point  where 
it  leaves  China.  However,  it  is  further  swelled  by  some  34  major  trib- 
utaries and  countless  smaller  streams,  so  that  perhaps  as  much  as  two- 
thirds  of  the  water  that  discharges  from  the  mouth  is  contributed  by 
the  lower  drainage  basin.  The  minimum  flow  of  the  river  190  miles 
upstream  from  the  mouth  is  twice  that  of  the  Columbia  River  at  its 
mouth,  and  its  maximum  flow  is  30  to  40  times  as  great.26 

From  China  to  the  sea  the  river  descends  about  1.000  feet.  The  de- 
scent is  uneven,  with  falls  and  rapids  obstructing  river  traffic  at  Krai  ie. 
Khone  Falls,  and  Khemmarat  Rapids.  Variation  in  flow  is  extreme: 
much  of  the  annual  rainfall,  of  about  60  inches,  occurs  during  the  rainy 
season,  from  May  to  October,  when  the  flow  of  the  river  in  the  lower 
basin  increases  15-  or  20-fold  from  low  water  to  flood  season. 

Although  the  flat  lands  of  the  Mekong  Delta  are  intensively  culti- 
vated (mostly  in  rice),  much  of  the  rest  of  the  region  is  predominantly 
forest,  with  most  of  the  farming  along  watercourses.  River  transpor- 
tation is  the  principal  form  of  freight  movement,  with  few  roads  or 
rail  connections;  in  the  Delta,  a  network  of  some  8,000  miles  of  canals 
has  been  dredged.  From  the  sea,  ocean  vessels  can  navigate  upriver 
190  miles  from  Phnom  Penh;  coastal  vessels  can  reach  another  80 
miles.  River  vessels  can  also  ply  the  river  on  the  long  stretches  of 
more  placid  water  upstream. 

Complex  Social  and  ( 'ultural  Patterns  of  the  Basin 

The  four  Riparian  States  present  considerable  racial,  linguistic, 
and  religious  complexity.  Educational  levels  are  low  (typically,  four 
years  of  schooling).  Standards  of  health  and  hygiene  arc1  generally 
poor,  with  a  heavy  incidence  of  malaria  and  waterborne  infections. 
Incomes  are  low,  but  despite  the  generally  primitive  level  of  subsist- 
ence agriculture,  food  supplies  appear  to  be  adequate.  Populations  in 
these  countries  have  tripled  in  the  past  half-century;  accordingly. 
with  high  birth  rates  and  short  life  expectancy,  the  populations  are 
extremely  young  (60  percent  under  25  years  of  age).  The  very  young 
and  old  people  live  mostly  in  rural  villages,  while  young  adults  and 
the  middle-aged,  the  most  numerous  segment,  congregate  in  urban 
areas. 

The  four  nations  have  had  a  long  and  complicated  history  of  politi- 
cal and  military  interactions.  There  have  been  incessant  and  disjointed 
conflicts  of  aggression,  frequent  internal  power  struggles,  expansions 
and  contractions  of  territory,  waves  of  invasion  from  the  north,  cul- 
tural penet  i  at  ion  from  India,  and  economic  penet  rat  ion  mainly  by  the 
French.  Colonial  administration  by  the  French  lias  left  important  ef- 
fects in  Cambodia,  Laos,  and  Vietnam.  A  sharp  break  in  the  continuity 
of  balkanization  occurred,  L941  L945,  with  the  Japanese  invasion. 
Thailand  bowed  to  the  inevitable,  allying  itself  with  Japan,  while  the 
other  three  states  were  overrun;  with  the  end  of  World  War  II.  all 
four  states  were  faced  with  the  need  for  extensive  political  and  eco 
nomic  adjustment.  Following  expulsion  of  the  Japanese,  these  adjust- 
ments began  with  expulsion  of  the  French,  followed  by  an  interaction 
of  economic,    ocial,  political,  and   religious  developments  too  com 


;ures  of  water  flow  :it   various  points  on  Hip   Mekong  and  at   various  seasons.  01 
different  years,  varj    widely  from  one  source  to  nnother.  It  Is  rleai   from  all  of  these 
the  river  is  i  n  *  l I  extremely  large,  but  precisely  how  large  Is  hard  to  say. 


385 


plicated  to  trace  but  generally  reflecting  the  desires  of  leadership  in 
the  four  countries  to  reconcile  retention  of  political  control  with  eco- 
nomic and  social  advance.  Relationships  among  the  four  countries 
were  conditioned  by  all  these  factors,  as  well  as  by  the  historical  tradi- 
tion of  conflict  and  mistrust,  and  the  growing  awareness  of  the  op- 
portunities for  the  future  from  the  application  of  western  technology 
and  organization.  To  differing  degrees,  the  centralizing  influence  of 
national  government  ran  up  against  the  strong  prior  loyalties  to  ex- 
tended family  and  community.  In  some  cases,  groups  remote  from  the 
capital  would  identify  their  own  national  capital  as  the  foremost 
threat  to  their  own  security.  Urban  localities  quickly  became  west- 
ernized while  rural  communities  preserved  much  of  their  traditional 
culture  and  local  loyalties. 

Injected  into  this  situation  was  the  long  war,  first  against  the 
French,  and  then  a  revolution  presenting  a  mixture  of  nationalistic 
and  ideological  elements.  As  the  power  struggle  went  on,  the  tech- 
nological level  of  the  combat  rose,  with  both  sides  receiving  outside 
equipment  and  training.  As  of  mid-May  1972,  the  ultimate  resolution 
of  this  war  remained  an  uncertainty,  and  none  of  the  four  national 
governments  was  able  to  exercise  complete  sovereignty  over  all  parts 
of  its  domain. 

Early  Planning  for  Development  of  the  Mekong,  1952-1957 

A  succession  of  three  studies  between  early  1952  and  the  close  of 
1957  helped  give  tangible  form  to  the  concept  of  a  regional  develop- 
ment program  for  the  Lower  Basin  of  the  Mekong.  Earlier  planning 
had  been  concerned  almost  exclusively  with  downstream  navigation.27 
The  first  general  study,  initiated  in  1951  at  the  request  of  ECAFE,  in- 
structed the  Bureau  of  Flood  Control  and  Water  Resources  Develop- 
ment to  report  on  the  problems  and  opportunities  of  international  riv- 
ers in  Asia.  The  Bureau  chose  to  focus  on  the  Mekong.  Its  18-page 
study,  published  in  May  1952  under  the  title  "Preliminary  Report  on 
Technical  Problems  Relating  to  Flood  Control  and  Water  Resources, 
Development  of  the  Mekong — an  International  River,"  dealt  optimisti- 
cally with  the  engineering  possibilities  of  the  region  but  called  atten- 
tion to  the  lack  of  hard  information  needed  for  operational  planning. 
According  to  an  active  participant  in  the  program,  this  brief  report 
attracted  favorable  interest  by  providing  ammunition  to  ECAFE  for 
its  own  planning  on  a  wider  scope,  because  it  was  "international,"  and 
because  "it  cited  exciting  specific  possibilities  such  as  the  possible  de- 
velopment of  firm  power  between  Vientiane  and  Luang  Prabang  and 
the  diversion  of  the  flow  of  the  Mekong  for  irrigating  the  vast  area  in 
North-Eastern  Thailand."  28  However,  the  report  also  admitted  that 
"resources  have  not  yet  been  explored"  and  until  military  activity  in 
the  eastern  portion  of  the  basin  had  subsided,  field  surveys  to  secure  the 
necessary  data  were  not  feasible. 

With  the  signing  of  the  Geneva  Accords  of  1954,  which  had  the 
effect  of  separating  North  and  South  Vietnam,  the  political  situation 


27  In  1949,  a  Convention  was  signed  by  France,  Laos,  Cambodia,  and  Vietnam  (redrafted 
in  1954  to  exclude  France)  concerning  navigation  on  the  Mekong.  Under  its  terms  the 
contracting  parties  agreed,  among  other  things,  to  take  concerted  action  on  "Programs  for 
improvement  of  waterways,  their  installations  and  equipment"  as  well  as  projects  bene- 
ficial to  industry  or  agriculture  to  the  extent  that  such  projects  might  obstruct  navigation. 

28  Schaff  and  Fifield,  The  Lower  Mekong. 


386 


in  Indochina  for  a  short  time  stabilized.  The  kingdoms  resumed  inter- 
est in  Mekong  developments.  The  next  Mekong  study  was  undertaken 
in  this  context.  It  was  a  brief  reconnaissance  by  the  U.S.  Bureau  of 
Reclamation  under  the  sponsorship  of  the  U.S.  International  Cooper- 
ation Administration  (later  U.S.A.I.D.)  at  the  request  of  the  Riparian 
States.  Although  the  interest  of  the  States  themselves  was  undeniable, 
it  seems  likely  that  the  initiative  for  this  effort  traces  ultimately  to 
France  and  the  United  States.  It  may  well  have  been  thought  that 
simulating  a  general  interest  in  technological  and  economic  develop- 
ment of  the  region  might  help  to  stabilize  the  political  regimes  there. 
At  any  event,  a  Special  Project  Agreement  was  signed  between  the  Ri- 
parian States  and  the  United  States  in  November  1955.  Thereafter, 
the  representatives  of  the  Bureau  of  Reclamation  ranged  the  area,  held 
several  meetings  with  representatives  of  the  four  countries,  and  re- 
turned to  the  United  States,  where  their  "Reconnaissance  Report — 
Lower  Mekong  River  Basin"  was  issued  in  March  1956.  Perhaps  be- 
cause it  was  issued  by  representatives  of  the  nation  that  had  most  to 
offer  in  support  of  the  project,  as  well  as  the  broadest  experience  with 
systematic  river  basin  development,  this  36-page  report,  with  its  five 
detailed  appendices,  received  close  attention  in  Indochina.  It  was  a  col- 
lection of  the  best  data  available  about  the  region,  and  identified  with 
some  care  the  kinds  of  data  needed  to  get  on  with  the  project.  Specifi- 
cally, it  called  for  hydrographic  and  sediment  surveys  of  the  main 
river;  surveys  of  such  features  of  the  entire  basin  as  topography, 
geology,  transportation,  communications,  and  agriculture;  establish- 
ment of  water  flow  measuring  stations  on  the  main  stem  and  tribu- 
taries, weather  stations,  and  a  systematic  search  for  preferred  dam 
sites ;  studies  of  such  special  problems  as  the  control  of  the  water  level 
of  the  great  lake  (Tonle  Sap)  in  central  Cambodia,  the  salty  soil  in 
the  great  Plaine  des  Jones  of  Vietnam,  the  technology  of  double-crop- 
ping to  increase  agriculture  production,  and  improved  fish  capture  and 
processing;  and  such  action  programs  as  improved  sanitation  in  water 
supply,  and  the  training  of  local  personnel  in  the  technical  skills  that 
would  be  required  later  on.  The  study  emphasized  the  need  for  cooper- 
ation among  the  four  Riparian  States  in  collecting,  maintaining,  and 
disseminating  data  on  a  uniform,  integrated  basis. 

In  the  year  1957  the  pace  of  events  quickened.  When  the  Bureau  of 
Reclamation  report  was  presented  at  the  annual  meeting  of  ECAFE 
in  Bangkok  in  March  it  was  enthusiastically  endorsed.  Toward  the 
end  of  May  a  group  of  experts  from  the  Riparian  States  convened  in 
Bangkok  to  implement  the  recommendations.  This  group  proposed 
that  the  Riparian  States  form  a  coordinating  committee  with  ECAFE 
guidance.  A  further  meeting  was  held  in  mid-September  1957  which 
produced  an  agreed-upon  "Statute  of  the  Committee  for  Coordina- 
tion of  Investigations  of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin."29 
_  As  approved  by  the  participating  governments,  this  charter  as- 
signed to  I  he  (  loordination  Committee  the  functions  of  overseeing  the 


28  At  Its  meeting  in  Bangkok,  May  10-11,  1967,  the  Committee  decided  to  change  its 
name  to  "Committee  for  the  Development  of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin,"  abbreviated  to 
"Mekong  Development  Committee." 


387 


planning  and  investigation  of  water  resources  development  projects 
in  the  lower  Mekong  basin.  It  was  to — 

(a)  prepare  and  submit  to  participating  governments  plans  for  carrying  out 
co-ordinated  research,  study,  and  investigation  ; 

(b)  make  requests  on  behalf  of  the  participating  governments  for  special 
financial  and  technical  assistance  and  receive  and  administer  separately  such 
financial  and  technical  assistance  as  may  be  offered  unuer  the  technical  assist- 
ance programme  of  the  United  Nations,  the  specialized  agencies  and  friendly 
governments ; 

(c)  draw  up  and  recommend  to  participating  governments  criteria  for  the  use 
of  the  water  of  the  main  river  for  the  purpose  of  water  resources  development. 

The  chapter  provided  that  each  of  the  Riparian  States  would  appoint 
one  member  with  "plenipotentiary  authority"  and  that  the  participat- 
ing governments  were  to  act  through  this  Committee.  Reports  would 
be  made  to  both  the  governments  and  ECAFE. 

When  the  Preparatory  Committee  met  to  adopt  this  charter,  it 
took  a  number  of  other  actions  at  the  same  time.  One  was  to  recom- 
mend that  priority  should  be  given  to  the  recommendations  of  the 
Bureau  of  Reclamation  for  hydrologic  and  meteorologic  stations  and 
stream  profile  studies.  This  action,  however,  brought  out  the  fact 
that  equipment  and  resources  had  not  been  made  available  for  such 
measurements.  Accordingly,  the  Committee  expressed  the  hope  that 
help  would  be  forthcoming  from  the  United  Nations  or  other  sources, 
and  also  asked  the  United  Nations  Technical  Assistance  Administra- 
tion to  help  recruit  a  visiting  team  of  water  resources  experts  to  review 
the  two  previous  studies. 

By  mid-November,  the  United  Nations  team  had  assembled  in 
Bangkok  under  the  chairmanship  of  Lt.  Gen.  Raymond  Wheeler  (re- 
tired) of  the  U.S.  Army  Corps  of  Engineers.  In  the  Wheeler  Report, 
completed  January  23,  1958,  the  recommendations  were  similar  to 
those  of  the  previous  Bureau  of  Reclamation  report.  However,  it  went 
further  in  three  particulars,  recommending  that: 

(1)  Priority  in  the  collection  of  .  .  .  basic  data  should  be  given  to  reaches 
having  promising  sites  for  development.  .  .  . 

(2)  Studies  and  investigations  for  the  preparation  of  a  comprehensive  plan 
of  the  Lower  Mekong  River  Basin,  including  major  tributaries,  should  follow 
with  the  careful  coordination  and  integration  of  the  various  specific  site  plans. 

(3)  Qualified,  responsible  firms  of  engineers  should  be  employed  to  plan  and 
execute  the  proposed  operations  and  to  assist  and  train  local  personnel,  under 
the  general  direction  of  the  Coordination  Committee  of  the  four  countries,  ad- 
vised by  an  international  technical  board  of  engineers. 

A  five-year  program  of  data  collection  was  recommended,  at  a  total 
estimated  cost  of  $9,200,000.  Soon  afterwards,  the  United  Nations 
Technical  Assistance  Administration  (with  approval  of  the  Coordi- 
nation Committee)  appointed  three  members  of  the  recommended 
technical  board  (later  increased  to  five).  And  at  the  close  of  1958,  the 
Committee  determined  the  need  for  an  executive  agent.  When  this 
proved  agreeable,  C.  Hart  Schaaf,  long  active  in  the  project,  was 
named  Executive  Agent. 

It  is  remarkable  that  the  problem  of  funding  the  work  of  the  Co- 
ordination Committee  and  its  staff  was  solved  so  easily.  The  first 
need — for  hydrologic  measuring  instruments — was  met  by  a  donation 
of  some  $120,000  (equivalent)  by  the  Government  of  France,  Octo- 


388 


ber  29,  1957.  The  support  of  the  U.S.  foreign  aid  program  and  of  the 
United  Nations  Technical  Assistance  Administration  has  already  been 
mentioned.  Donations  also  came  from  New  Zealand  and  other  coun- 
tries. Within  a  year,  more  than  $4  million  had  been  given  or  pledged, 
and  by  the  end  of  1961  the  figure  came  to  almost  $14  million.  The  prin- 
cipal contributors  were  the  United  States,  Japan,  France,  Australia, 
( Janada,  India,  and  Israel. 

Mention  should  also  be  made  of  a  separate  study,  undertaken  shortly 
after  the  Bureau  of  Reclamation  had  completed  its  work,  under  the 
direction  of  ECAFE  itself.  The  principal  significance  of  this  study  is 
that — in  addition  to  endorsing  the  work  of  the  Bureau — it  called  for  a 
broad  river  basin  approach  with  close  cooperation  in  planning  and 
development  among  the  nations  sharing  the  basin. 

Socio- Economic  Research  Planning :  The  Ford  Foundation  Study 

In  1961,  a  very  different  kind  of  study  of  the  Mekong  Basin  was 
undertaken.  It  was  sponsored  by  a  private  foundation  and  addressed 
the  economic  and  social  effects  of  the  proposed  development.  Unlike 
the  previous  investigations,  it  did  not  deal  with  the  engineering  feasi- 
bility of  construction  projects  nor  with  the  technical  exploitation  of 
their  benefits.  At  the  request  of  the  Coordination  Committee,  the  Ford 
Foundation  sent  a  mission  headed  by  Gilbert  F.  White  to  advise  on  the 
kinds  of  investigation  needed  in  social  science  fields.  The  terms  of 
reference  of  the  mission  called  for  the  identification  of  social  data  to 
determine  feasibility,  benefits,  impacts  of  specific  constructions,  ad- 
ministrative management,  design  of  studies,  and  priority  of  short-term 
versus  long-term  projects. 

The  report  of  the  Ford  Foundation  mission  30  was  made  in  Bangkok 
in  July  1962.  It  recommended  substantial  strengthening  of  the  staff  of 
the  Coordination  Committee  in  social  science  fields  for  the  purpose  of 
generating  and  collecting  social  statistics.  It  called  for  joint  studies 
with  intergovernmental  agencies  on  problems  of  wide  interest  in  the 
ECAFE  region.  It  proposed  that  the  Bank  for  International  Recon- 
struction and  Development  (World  Bank)  be  invited  to  participate 
in  a  study  of  methods  for  determining  economic  feasibility,  and  pointed 
out  that  the  primitive  economy  of  the  Riparian  States  imposed  inex- 
orable limits  on  the  rate  of  investment  in  regional  development.  It 
emphasized  the  need  for  a  systematic  compilation  of  available  data 
concerning  resources,  resource  use,  and  social  characteristics.  A  power 
market  survey,  land  use  inventory,  and  study  of  ways  to  optimize 
agricultural  use  of  water  were  all  needed.  Training  of  technicians  was 
again  emphasized.  The  report  suggested  that  flood  control  benefits 
might  lie  overstated  and  the  institution  of  a  flood  warning  system 
could  reduce  losses  at  moderate  cost.  Tt  suggested  that  a  large  demon- 
stration area  he  set  up  where  the  potential  impacts  of  the  Mekong 
projecl  upon  rural  life  could  be  observed.  It  proposed  an  elaborate 
program  of  demonstration  projects  in  forest  planting.  In  the  intro- 
duction to  the  report,  the  authors  warned  that  heavy  investment  in 
engineering  works  would  not   automatically  lead  to  solid  growth  in 


Iberl  P.  White.  Egbert  d<>  Vrles,  Harold  B.  Dunkerley,  and  John  V.  Krutilln.  "Eco- 
nomic and  Social  Aspects  of  Lower  Mekong  Develooments,"  Report  to  tlie  Committee  for 
Coordination  of  Investigations  of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin,  1962, 


389 


social  structure  and  economic  gains.  Choice  of  engineering  tasks  and 
careful  timing  were  essential : 

Unlike  countries  with  much  larger  income  per  capita,  the  Lower  Mekong 
countries  cannot  afford  to  build  power  and  navigation  projects  yielding  very 
low  returns  or  to  carry  out  irrigation  which  has  full  effects  upon  agriculture 
only  two  or  three  decades  later.  They  cannot  stand  the  luxury  of  monolithic  con- 
crete structures  whose  most  immediate  return  is  inflation  of  national  ego.  They 
must  husband  available  social  resources  so  as  to  squeeze  the  maximum  net 
returns  from  their  investment  at  the  right  time  and  the  right  place. 

The  shopping  list  of  investigations  and  research  projects  blocked 
out  by  the  Ford  Foundation  study  would  cost  an  estimated  $15  mil- 
lion and  would  require  a  much  closer  degree  of  supervision  than  the 
staff  of  the  Coordination  Committee  had  previously  provided. 

The  specific  limitations  on  rate  of  construction,  according  to  the 
report,  were  an  increase  in  agricultural  production  of  3.5  to  4  percent 
and  an  increase  in  industrial  output  of  6  to  7  percent.  Savings  avail- 
able from  the  Riparian  States  to  invest  in  construction  projects  and 
related  development  would  fall  far  short  of  the  requirements  en- 
visioned in  the  engineering  studies. 

To  illustrate  what  was  meant  by  priority  and  timing,  the  report 
suggested  that  ".  .  .  the  first  construction  should  be  initiated  on  one 
or  more  of  the  tributaries :  they  can  provide  essential  experience  with 
ways  of  reaping  an  adequate  harvest  of  benefits  from  investment  in 
water  management. "  This  recommendation  directly  conflicted  with 
the  views  of  the  Coordination  Committee  which,  from  1957  on,  had 
given  priority  to  three  very  large  projects  on  the  main  stem  of  the 
Mekong :  at  Pa  Mong,  Tonle  Sap,  and  Sambor. 

Action  Programs  on  the  Mekong,  1962-1965 

Dating  from  about  the  time  of  the  Ford  Foundation  (White) 
Report,  the  tempo  of  activity  on  the  Mekong  Project  appears  to  have 
speeded  up.  The  number  of  participating  countries  increased.  Dona- 
tions and  pledges  of  contributions  to  support  the  planning  studies 
rose  from  $20  million  in  March  1962  to  $45  million  by  the  end  of  the 
calendar  year  1963  and  to  $68  million  a  year  later.  For  the  most  part, 
these  contributions  were  made  in  kind  rather  than  in  cash  or  credits. 
They  included  donations  of  cement,  technical  services,  measuring  in- 
struments, boats,  computer  time,  and  aerial  survey. 

In  1964,  a  first  geological  map  of  the  basin  was  completed.  In 
France,  work  was  proceeding  on  a  mathematical  model  of  the  river 
while  representatives  from  the  Columbia  River  headquarters  of  the 
U.S.  Corps  of  Engineers  were  undertaking  a  system  study  of  the 
Mekong.  Studies  were  underway  by  the  World  Health  Organization 
of  the  problems  of  malaria  and  schistosomiasis  in  the  basin.  Scores 
of  hydrologic  and  meteorologic  stations  had  been  set  up  and  a  radio 
network  linked  them  to  headquarters  in  Bangkok,  where  their  reports 
were  collected  and  tabulated.  The  Bureau  of  Reclamation  was  be- 
ginning work  on  a  feasibility  study  of  the  Pa  Mong  Dam.  Stream 
gradient  measurements  on  the  main  stem  had  been  completed  in 
1961  and  measurement  of  the  capacity  of  possible  reservoirs  was  ac- 
tively proceeding.  In  1964  ECAFE  completed  an  agricultural  market 
analysis.  Resources  for  the  Future,  Inc.,  had  begun  a  study  of  world 
demand  for  products  of  electro-processing  industries.  A  study  of 


390 


manpower  needs  and  resources  was  begun  in  1962,  with  the  Inter- 
national Labor  Office  as  lead  agency.  The  Food  and  Agriculture 
Organization  of  the  United  Nations,  and  Israel,  were  studying  agri- 
cultural improvement  methods;  plans  were  underway  for  farm  and 
timber  demonstration  projects. 

The  foregoing  sampling  of  activities  illustrates  the  stepped-up 
pace  of  the  Mekong  investigations.  It  also  shows  that  the  character  of 
the  investigations  had  changed  markedly  since  the  inception  of  the 
project.  Xot  only  was  the  scope  of  pertinent  data  recognized  as  far 
wider  than  it  had  been  in  the  1950s,  but  primary  emphasis  was  shifting 
to  the  economic  and  social  consequences  of  proposed  constructions  and 
development.  In  the  United  States,  river  basin  development  had 
followed  this  trend,  but  the  conversion  to  total  system  planning  had 
taken  more  than  a  century;  benefitting  from  U.S.  experience,  the 
Mekong  planning  activity  had  achieved  it  in  less  than  a  decade. 

Status  of  the  Mekong  Project  in  the  Spring  of  1965 

By  the  time  of  President  Johnson's  proposal  for  a  billion  dollar 
aid  program  featuring  the  Mekong  regional  plan,  an  elaborate  complex 
of  countries  and  United  Nations  agencies  were  actively  pursuing  proj- 
ects under  the  rubric  of  the  Mekong  Lower  Basin  Scheme.  The  center 
of  the  activity  was  the  Coordination  Committee,  its  staff  and  Execu- 
tive Agent — whose  technical  and  administrative  resources  were  also 
expanding.  Twenty-one  countries,31  12  U.N.  agencies,  and  7  private 
institutions  were  contributors;  donations  and  pledges  by  the  end  of 
1965  were  to  reach  $68  million. 

On  the  Tonle  Sap  feature  of  the  project,  France,  India,  and  New 
Zealand  were  preparing  preliminary  plans.  For  the  Sambor  dam,  a 
Japanese  team  was  at  work.  On  the  large  construction  at  Pa  Mong, 
the  United  States  was  taking  the  lead  ($2.5  million  in  feasibility 
studies).  Australia  had  a  half-million-dollar  program  of  geologic 
studies  underway  at  both  Sambor  and  Pa  Mong  dam  sites. 

Significantly,  construction  was  at  last  underway  on  some  of  the  civil 
works  on  tributary  streams:  dams  at  Prek  Thnot  (Cambodia),  Lower 
Se  Done  and  Nam  Dong  (Laos),  and  Nam  Pong  and  Nam  Pung 
(Thailand),  plus  channel  marking  and  barges  for  river  transporta- 
tion. By  the  latter  part  of  1965,  construction  costs  exceeded  $40  mil- 
lion, as  against  some  $27  million  for  "pre-investment"  studies.  The 
Nam  Pong  dam,  a  multipurpose  structure  (24,900  kw;  $28.4  million) 
and  the  Nam  Pung  (also  multipurpose — 7,000  kw;  $5  million)  were 
Hearing  completion.  Ground  had  been  broken  for  the  Nam  Dong  dam 
(1,000  kw;  $6  million)  and  the  Prek  Thnot  dam  (18,000  kw;  $54  mil- 
lion). The  proposed  Nam  Ngum  dam  in  Laos  (120,000  kw ;  $40  million ; 
5,()oo  In. tares  of  land  irrigated)  had  been  judged  economically  feasi- 
ble. Work   had  started  on  the  Lower  Se  Done  dam   (1,400  kw;  $1.2 


31  The  following  21  countries  were  working  In  cooperation  with  the  Mekong  Committee 
(which  represented  Cambodia,  Laos,  Thailand,  and  Republic  of  Vietnam)  as  of  March  1965: 
Australia,  Canada,  India,  Japan,  New  Zealand,  Pakistan,  United  Kingdom  and  United  States 
(through  the  Colombo  Plan)  ;  and  Belgium,  China,  Denmark,  Finland,  France.  Federal  Re- 
public m'  Germany,  Iran,  Italy.  Israel.  Netherlands,  Norway,  Sweden,  and  Philippines.  The 
United  Nations  agencies  "r  units  supporting  the  Mekong  Committee  were:  ECAFE,  UN 
special  Fund,  in  Technical  Assistance  Board,  I'N  Bureau  of  Technical  Assistance  opera- 
tions, ILO,  FAO.  UNESCO,  World  Health  Organization,  World  Meteorological  Organization, 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Develop- 
ment, and  World  Food  Program, 


391 


million)  for  electric  power.  (For  a  complete  list  of  projects  and  con- 
tributors, as  of  January  11, 1965,  as  listed  in  the  1964  annual  report  of 
the  Coordination  Committee,  see  Table  1.) 

Table  1. — Mekong  project:  Operational  resources  as  of  Jan.  11,  1965 

[Total  resources  contributed  or  pledged  to  the  Mekong  scheme  in  approximate 
U.S.  dollar  equivalent  as  of  Jan.  11, 1965] 

Preinvestment  investigations  and  planning  (dollar  equivalent)  : 

Australia  12  (Pa  Mong  and  Sambor  damsite  geology) 530,  000 

Belgium    (hydrographer) 30,000 

Canada  J  2  (aerial  mapping) 1,  365,  000 

China  (Nationalist)   (cement;  experimental  highlands  rice  seed; 

study  tour) 80,000 

Denmark 3  (survey  of  large-scale  pulp  and  paper  industry) 10,  000 

Finland3  (survey  of  large-scale  pulp  and  paper  industry) 10,  000 

France2  (hydrology;  Tonle  Sap  planning,  including  fisheries, 
sedimentation,  soil  surveys  and  delta  reclamation  studies ; 
flood  prediction;  bauxite  and  other  minerals  prospection; 
geological  mapping ;  domestic  power  market  survey ;  and  soil 

surveys  on  selected  tributaries) 1,286,329 

India12  (Tonle  Sap:  barrage  design  and  feasibility  report,  soil 

laboratory;   raingauges) 282,  000 

Iran  (petroleum  products) 99,400 

Italy2   (expert  services) 24,300 

Israel 2  (Prek  Thnot  project  plan  :  irrigation  planning,  and  plan- 
ning of  experimental  farm  and  demonstration  pilot  farms, 
comprehensive  regional  planning ;  cement ;  programwide  con- 
tingencies;  fellowships) 346,  000 

Japan x  2  (Tributaries  reconnaissance ;  Sambor  project  plan  ;  Nam 
Pung  project  plan  ;  Prek  Thnot  project  plan ;  dams  and  hydro- 
electric power  ;  Upper  Sre  Pok  project  investigations  including 

Darlac  and  Drayling;  hydrology) 977,893 

Netherlands    (dredge ;    map   reproduction   machine ;   hydraulic 

equipment;   pilot  training) 169,061 

New  Zealand1  (jet  survey  boats;  Tonle  Sap  project:  equipment; 

programwide  contingencies) ^ 220,  000 

Norway3  (survey  of  large-scale  pulp  and  paper  industry) 10,000 

Pakistan  x  ( Nam  Pong  project :  irrigation  construction  plans  and 

specifications)     100,000 

Philippines  (mapping) 257, 250 

Sweden3    (survey  of  large-scale  pulp  paper  industry) 20,000 

United  Kingdom1  (hydrology;  meteorology;  hydrography;  navi- 
gation improvement ;  geochemical  mineral  survey 249,  000 

United  States12  (hydrology,  hydrography,  leveling  and  ground 
control  surveys:  $2,420,000;  Pa  Mong  project  plan  estimated 
cost  $2,500,000;*  hydrologic  equipment  $36,000;  system  anal- 
ysis; natural  and  social  resources  inventories  $375,000) 5,331,000. 

UN/EC AFE5  (expert  services  and  administrative  support  for 
Committee  and  Executive  Agent ;  figure  given  is  budget  figure 

for   1961-64) 484,752 

UN/TAB  2  (coordinates  expanded  technical  assistance  program 
through  which  most  of  the  BTAO  and  specialized  agencies  par- 
ticipation listed  below  is  channeled) 

UN/BTAO2  (Wheeler  Mission;  experts;  Advisory  Board;  serves 
jointly  with  ECAFE  as  Executing  Agency  for  Special  Fund 
Mineral    Surveys   and   Institutional    Support   projects   listed 

below;  support  to  Office  of  Executive  Agent) 362,799 

ILO  (manpower  analysis) 12, 104 

FAO2  (agriculture  and  forestry  studies;  executing  agency  for 
agricultural  stations  in  special  fund  tributaries  project  listed 

below)     133, 930 

UNESCO2  (executing  Agency  for  U.N.  Special  Fund  mathemati- 
cal delta  model;  seismic  survey) 16,800 

See  footnotes  at  end  of  table. 


392 


Table  1. — Mekong  project:  Operational  resources  of  Jan.  11,  1965 — Continued 

[Total  resources  contributed  or  pledged  to  the  Mekong  scheme  in  approximate 
U.S.  dollar  equivalent  as  of  Jan.  11,  1965] — Continued 

Preinvestment  investigations  and  planning  (dollar  equivalent) — Continued 

WHO   (schistosomiasis  and  malaria  studies) 5,077 

WMO     (hvdrometeorologv) 45,300 

IAEA  (isotope  studies  of  hydrology  and  sedimentation) 55,  650 

International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development   (has 
provided   member  in   Advisory   Board ;   desk  study   of  Nam 
Ngum  feasibility  study. ) 
United  Nations  Special  Fund  : 

Tributaries  survey  including  agriculture  station  2 1,  698,  450 

Experimental  and  demonstration  farm  in  Laos  (Vientiane 

Plain)  2 345,885 

Experimental  and  demonstration  farm  in  Thailand  (Kalasin)  2_        293,900 

Hydrographic  survey2 380,500 

Mineral  survey2 422,300 

Mathematical  delta  model  survey2 920,  600 

Institutional  support 2 2,  451,  700 

World  Food  Program  : 6 

Reserve 35,  000 

Experimental  and  demonstration  farm  in  Laos 91, 130 

(Asia  Foundation  (travel  grants)  ;  Ford  Foundation  (eco- 
nomic and  social  study)  ;  Gestetner  (Eastern)  Ltd.  (print- 
ing services)  ;  Resources  for  the  Future,  Inc.  (power  mar- 
ket analysis)  ;  Price  Water  house  Co.  (auditing  of  expendi- 
ture under  New  Zealand  contribution)  ;  Sycip,  Gorres, 
Valaya  &  Co.  (auditing  of  expenditure  under  Philippine 
contribution;  and  Shell  Oil  Co.  (documentary  motion  pic- 
ture of  Mekong.7) 
Local  costs  and  contributions  paid  or  pledged  by  the  riparian 
countries : 

Under  Canadian  mapping  program 105,  000 

Under  Indian  Tonle  Sap  project 50,  000 

Under  United  States  hydrology  program 400,  000 

Under  post-U.S.  hydrology  program 483,000 

Under  United  Nations  Special  Fund  Tributaries  Project 471, 192 

Under  United  Nations  Special  Fund  hydrographical  survey 

for  navigation  improvement 266,  600 

Under  United  Nations  Special  Fund  Minerals  Survey 233,  640 

Under  United  Nations  Special  Fund  UNESCO  mathematical 

delta  model  project 192, 143 

French  Mineral  Survey  to  Cambodia 171,400 

Under  Israel/Japanese  Prek  Thnot  project  (Cambodia) 72,000 

Under  Japanese  Sambor  preliminary  project  (Cambodia)__  21,457 

Under  Japanese  Upper  Sre  Pok  project   (Viet-Nam) 22,843 

Under  Pakistan  Nam  Pong  Irrigations  planning 25,  000 

For  experimental  and  demonstration  farm  at  Prek  Thnot 

(Cambodia)     1,000,000 

For  experimental  and  demonstration  farm  at  Battambang 

(Cambodia)     514,000 

Under  United  Nations  Special  Fund  experimental  and  dem- 
onstration farm  at   Kalasin    (Thailand) 307,104 

Under  United  Nations  Special  Fund  experimental  and  dem- 
onstration farm  at  Vientiane  Plain    (Laos) 205,260 

Under  WFP  food  assistance  project  to  Vientiane  Plain  fann__  13,  07H 

Under   United    Nations   Special   Fund   Institutional   Support 

project    (for  5  years) 3,413,000 

For   Belgium   hydrographer 1,  r><H> 

Reserve   for  Laos   local   contribution 22,000 

Revolving  fund  contributed  by  Thailand 500 

Subtotal :    preinvestment 27,  143,  814 

See  footnotes  at  end  of  table, 


393 


Table  1. — Mekong  project:  Operational  resources  of  Jan.  11,  1965 — Continued 

[Total  resources  contributed  or  pledged  to  the  Mekong  scheme  in  approximate 
U.S.  dollar  equivalent  as  of  Jan.  11,  1965] — Continued 

Investment  contributions : 

Investment  for  construction  Prek  Thnot  tributary  project  in 
Cambodia : 

(a)  Australia1  for  engineering  service  for  construction  (es- 
timate)       800,000 

(6)   Cambodian  appropriations  for  construction  cost  includ- 
ing procurement  of  earthmoving  and  other  equipment 3,  357,  000 

(c.)   WFP,  food  assistance6 760,510 

(d)  Local  cost  under  WFP  program  to  be  borne  by  Cam- 
bodia    54, 000 

Subtotal  4,  971,  510 

Lower  Se  Done  tributary  project  in  Laos : 

(a)  Loan  to  Laos  by  France 591,800 

(6)   Grant  to  Laos  by  France 163,200 

(o)  Eearmarkings  by  Laos 500,  000 

(d)  WFP  food  assistance 6 32,150 

(e)  Local  cost  under  WFP  program  to  be  borne  by  Laos 8, 000 

Subtotal 1,  295, 150 

Nam  Dong  tributary  project  in  Laos : 

(a)  Loan  to  Laos  by  France 326,500 

(6)  Grant  to  Laos  by  France 142,900 

(c)  Earmarkings  by  Laos 133,400 

(d)  WFP  food  assistance9 20,450 

(e)  Local  cost  under  WFP  program  to  be  borne  by  Laos 5,  300 

Subtotal   628,  550 

Nam  Pong  tributary  project  in  Thailand : 

(a)  Federal    Republic    of    Germany:    Infrustructure    low- 
interest  loan  to  Thailand   (20  years) 12,650,000 

(6)   Cement  provided  by  China,  2,000  tons 40,000 

(c)  Earmarking  by  Thailand  for  power  and  multipurpose 

items  9,  855,  769 

(d)  Earmarking  by  Thailand  for  irrigation  works 3, 152,  000 

(e)  WFP  food  assistance6 270,350 

(/)   Local  cost  under  WFP  program  by  Thailand 49,  600 

Subtotal  26,  017,  719 

Nam  Pung  tributary  project  in  Thailand  : 

(a)  Earmarking  by  Thailand 5,000,000 

(o)   Cement  provided  by  China,  250  tons 5,000 

(c)  Cement  provided  by  Israel,  250  tons 5,000 

(d)  WFP  food  assistance9 106,250 

(e)  Local  cost  under  WFP  program  by  Thailand 23,600 

Subtotal  5, 139,  850 

Navigation  improvement  works — Channel  marking  and  improve- 
ment in  Cambodia,  Laos,  Thailand,  and  Vietnam  : 

(a)   United  States  (tugs  and  barges)1 2,250,000 

(6)  United  Kingdom1 190,000 

(c)  Riparian  Governments  (approximately) 90,000 

Subtotal 2,  530,  OOP 

See  footnotes  at  end  of  table. 


394 


Table  1. — Mekong  project:  Operational  resources  of  Jan.  11,  1965 — Continued 

[Total  resources  contributed  or  pledged  to  the  Mekong  scheme  in  approximate 
U.S.  dollar  equivalent  as  of  Jan.  11,  1965] — Continued 

Investment  contributions — Continued 

Israel  grant  for  Nam  Ngum  Tributary  Project  in  Laos 50,  000 

Subtotal;  investment  for  construction 40,632,779 

Total ;  preinvestment  and  investment 67,  776,  593 

1  Through  its  Colombo  plan  progra  total  participation  to  date  of  8  countries  In  Colombo 
plan  equals  approximately  $12,294,803. 

2  Includes  fellowships  the  cost  of  which  in  most  cases  are  not  included  in  the  cost  figure 
given  above. 

8  Joint  contribution  by  Nordic  group  ;  Denmark,  Finland,  Norway,  and  Sweden. 

*  In  1961  the  United  States  undertook  to  investigate  the  feasibility  of  the  Pa  Mong 
project  subject  to  the  constitutional  process  of  appropriation  in  the  United  States,  and 
equally  on  the  understanding  that,  as  in  all  comprehensive  feasibility  investigations,  a 
demonstration  of  nonfeasibility  would  terminate  the  investigations  ;  the  broad  estimate  in 
1961  of  the  total  sum  involved  was  $2,500,000  ;  a  subsequent  estimate  bv  the  U.S.  Bureau 
of  Reclamation  was  $5,000,000  ;  the  detailed  firm  estimate  of  U.S.  expenditure  for  the  first 
phase  of  the  work,  now  in  process,  is  $690,000. 

8  ECAFE  also  performs  many  of  the  functions  of  the  United  Nations  as  executing  agency 
for  the  United  Nations  Special  Fund  tributary  hydrography  and  mineral  surveys  and  In- 
stitutional support  projects  listed  above. 

8  Total  World  Food  Program  pledge  for  both  planning  and  construction:  $1,315,840 
equivalent. 

7  No  cost  estimate  given. 

Note. — In  addition  to  the  4  firms  listed  in  the  above  table,  principal  engineering  firms 
engaged  in  the  various  programs  include  :  Associated  Consulting  Engineers  of  Karachi ; 
Certeza  Surveying  Co.  ;  Christian!  &  Nielson  (Thai)  Ltd.  ;  Japan  Electric  Power  Develop- 
ment Co.  ;  Harza  Co.  International  ;  Hunting  Survey  Corp.  Ltd.  ;  Italconsult  ;  Nippon  Koei 
Co.  Ltd.  ;  Rogers  International ;  Soclete  Grenobloise  d'Etudes  et  d'Appliactions  Hydrau- 
liques  (SOGREAH)  ;  Societe  Francalse  d'Etudes  et  de  Realisation  d'Equipements  Elec- 
triques  (SOFRELEF)  ;  Salgltter  Industries  Gesellschaft  MPH  ;  and  Philipp  Holzman  AG/ 
Siemens  Bauunlon  GmbH. 

Perhaps  the  most  notable  events  to  be  chronicled  about  the  Mekong 
Scheme  from  its  inception  to  early  1965,  a  period  of  more  than  a 
decade,  were  the  events  that  did  not  happen.  The  rather  imnrovised 
Coordination  Committee  was  able  to  maintain  coherence  and  control, 
as  well  as  forward  movement,  The  four  Riparian  States,  despite  sev- 
eral serious  diplomatic  contretemps,  continued  their  active  participa- 
tion and  cooperation  in  the  Committee.  Communist  factions  in  all  four 
States  did  not  impede  the  field  studies  or  construction,  and  a  mini- 
mum of  guerrilla  incidents  were  reported,  even  as  the  conflict  in  Viet- 
nam worsened.  Among  donor  nations  also,  competition  for  choice  ac- 
tivities or  preferential  arrangements  does  not  appear  to  have  surfaced. 
A  feature  publication  issued  by  the  United  Nations  Office  of  Public 
Information  in  March  1965  called  attention  to  this  uncommon  amity : 

The  Mekong  project  ...  is  for  the  good  of  all  the  people  of  the  Lower 
Mekong  Basin,  without  distinction  as  to  nationality,  race,  or  political  creed.  Be- 
cause of  this,  the  Mekong  Committee  has  been  able  to  convene  its  meetings  with- 
out interruption  in  all  the  four  riparian  countries  in  spite  of  the  difficulties  be- 
setting their  relations.  It  met  in  Laos  when  that  country  was  under  siege.  In 
October  1961,  when  Cambodia  broke  relations  with  Thailand,  the  late  Prime 
Minister  of  Thailand,  Field  Marshal  Sarit  Thanarat,  expressly  made  an  excep- 
tion of  the  Mekong  programme  when  he  severed  relations  with  Cambodin. 

A  similar  note  was  struck  by  Prince  Souvanna  Phouma.  He  was  asked  in 
Paris  a  few  summers  iigo  about  the  chances  of  a  neutral  Laos  to  feed  its  people. 
The  Prince,  who  was  a  private  citizen  at  the  time,  replied  that  the  hope  of 
Laos  was  the  Mekong  project.  Laos,  he  said,  was  poor,  but  in  the  Mekong  it 
had  a  tremendous  resource  which,  he  added,  was  being  developed  under  the 
auspices  of  the  Nations,  with  the  help  of  many  countries,  in  a  completely  non- 
politlcal  manner.'12 


■h  Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East,  "Putting  the  Mekong  to  Work — An 
International  Undertaking.  Power,  Irrigation  and  Navigation  Projects  Progressine  :  Fishery, 
Forestry  and  Mineral  Studies  Under  Wav  ;  Experimental  Farms  Set  Up"  (New  York: 
United  Nations,  March  1965),  p.  10, 


IV.  Accelerated  Progress  in  1965 

The  proposal  by  President  Johnson  to  contribute  a  billion  dollars 
to  regional  development  in  Southeast  Asia  as  an  alternative  to  military 
action  seems  to  have  been  represented  in  the  press  as  an  unprecedented 
innovation  and  a  wholly  new  concept.  It  is  evident,  however,  that  a 
number  of  persons  familiar  with  the  Mekong  project  had  proposed 
variants  of  this  approach.  Mention  has  been  made  of  the  views  of 
C.  Hart  Schaaf,  who  saw  the  Mekong  project  as  contributing  to  the 
"achievement  of  peace  and  well-being  for  all  people  of  the  Lower 
Mekong  Basin."  Similarly,  Gilbert  F.  White,  principal  author  of  the 
report  of  the  Ford  Foundation,  in  an  article  published  four  months 
before  the  Johns  Hopkins  speech,  suggested  that — 

A  peaceful  and  honorable  resolution  of  the  conflict  in  South  Vietnam  and  Laos 
may  be  found  in  a  bold  plan  for  land  and  water  development  which  already  unites 
factions  in  four  nations  of  Southeast  Asia.  For  seven  years,  Cambodia,  Laos, 
Thailand,  and  South  Vietnam  have  been  working  with  little  publicity  and  without 
disagreement  on  a  huge  development  program.  These  four  countries,  which  do 
not  cooperate  in  anything  else,  have  reached  accord  on  development  of  the  Lower 
Mekong  Basin. 

And  then,  near  the  conclusion  of  his  exposition  he  asked — 

Is  it  possible  that  the  vision  of  a  majestic  river  harnessed  for  the  advance  of 
twenty  million  people  by  an  unprecedented  piece  of  international  cooperation 
would  so  command  the  imagination  of  the  nations  that  the  present  grueling  con- 
flict could  give  way  to  a  struggle  for  more  abundant  life?  Could  this  mean  to  a 
world  increasingly  aware  of  its  network  of  mutual  responsibilities  what  the 
Tennessee  Valley  Authority  meant,  to  proponents  of  national  development  thirty 
years  ago?*8 

President  Johnson's  Contacts  with  Regionalism 

President  Johnson  himself  had  had  extensive  exposure  to  the  subject 
of  regionalism.  Shortly  after  he  first  came  to  the  Capitol  as  a  con- 

fressional  secretary  in  1932,  the  Congress  with  strong  support  from 
'resident  Roosevelt  was  deliberating  on  passage  of  the  TVA  Act  of 
1933.  Issues  involving  TVA,  or  the  question  of  extension  of  the  region- 
alism principle,  periodically  came  before  the  Congress  during  his 
service  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  1937-1948.  As  Vice  President, 
Johnson  was  asked  by  President  Kennedy  "to  undertake  a  special 
fact-finding  mission  to  Asia."  34 

Of  this  trip,  President  Johnson,  two  days  after  his  Johns  Hopkins 
speech,  commented  as  follows : 

I  went  to  bed  last  night  reading  a  transcript  of  a  meeting  I  had  out  in  Bangkok 
in  1961  with  a  group  of  men  of  vision,  and  we  were  talking  about  the  development 

^Gilbert  F  White,  "Lower  Mekong,  a  Proposal  for  a  Peaceful  and  Honorable  Resolution 
of  the  Conflict  in  South  Vietnam,"  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists  (December  1964) 
+*.  T7 ■■?  President's  News  Conference  of  May  5,  1961,"  Public  Papers  of  the  President  of 
the  United  States  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1962),  p  354.  The 
mission  was  announced  by  the  President  at  his  new  conference  of  May  5,  1961 ;  the  Vice 
President  returned  May  24. 

(395) 


396 


of  the  great  Mekong  Delta  Valley — the  construction  of  dams  and  the  great  evolu- 
tion operation  out  there.86 

Vice  President  Johnson  visited  the  Bangkok  headquarters  of  the 
United  Nations  Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East 
(ECAFE),  May  17,  1961.  He  conferred  with  ECAFE  Executive  Sec- 
retary U  Nyun — 

.  .  .  On  UN-aided  economic  development  activities  in  the  region,  including 
the  Mekong  River  project — in  which  the  Vice  President  expressed  particular 
interest — and  work  on  an  Asian  highway. 

In  the  course  of  the  conversation  U  Nyun  commented  that  ECAFE's  main 
objective  was  to  promote  economic  progress  and  regional  thinking,  and  he  cited 
the  Mekong  River  project  as  an  example  of  international  cooperation  of  which 
the  United  Nations  could  be  truly  proud. 

Development  of  the  Lower  Mekong  basin  would  benefit  Cambodia,  Laos, 
Thailand,  and  Vietnam,  he  said,  and  he  noted  that  the  project  was  receiving 
assistance  from  12  countries  and  several  international  agencies. 

In  response,  the  Vice  President  said  he  could  "think  of  nothing  that 
would  help  Thailand,  Laos,  Cambodia,  and  Vietnam  more  than  work- 
ing together  on  a  river  since,  if  they  could  work  together  on  a  river, 
they  could  work  together  on  anything  else."  Doubtless,  the  project 
would  bring  prosperity  to  millions  in  the  region,  but  "he  wanted  to 
know  when  the  action  stage  would  start."  3G  Regionalism  had  been  an 
important  element  of  President  Johnson's  domestic  program  from  the 
outset,  and  was  a  much  intensified  feature  of  it  in  1965.  Following  the 
lead  of  President  Kennedy,  he  had  encouraged  the  evolution  of  the 
Appalachian  Regional  Development  Commission  from  a  presidential 
advisory  commission  (established  April  9, 1963)  to  a  Federal  Develop- 
ment Planning  Committee  for  Appalachia  (created  by  Executive 
Order  11186,  signed  October  25,  1964),  to  a  statutory  Commission 
(under  the  terms  of  the  Appalachian  Regional  Development  Act, 
approved  March  9, 1965) . 

Another  strongly  regional  element  of  his  program  was  embodied  in 
the  State  Technical  Services  Act,  approved  September  14,  1965,  in 
which  the  President  proposed  250  colleges  and  technical  schools  to 
serve  as  "economic  planning  centers  for  their  areas"  with  the  Depart- 
ment of  Commerce  as  a  clearing-house  to  disseminate  technical  infor- 
mation on  a  national  basis.  In  signing  the  measure,  the  President  said : 
"This  bill  will  do  for  American  businessmen  what  the  great  Agri- 
cultural Extension  Service  lias  done  for  the  American  farmer.  It  will 
put  into  their  hands  the  latest  ideas  and  methods,  the  fruits  of  research 
and  development."  Such  a  bill,  he  commented,  "might  have  prevented 
the  economic  depression  that  today  exists  in  Appalachia." 

In  liis  agricultural  message  to  the  Congress  of  February  4.  1965,  the 
President  was  substantially  concerned  with  regional  economic  balance 
of  rural  areas.  In  particular,  he  cited  the  Area  Redevelopment  Act. 


w  "Remarks  ;it  the  Swearing  In  of  Members  of  the  National  Council  on  the  Arts,"  April 
L965,  I'm, Hi-  Pavers  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Oovern- 
menl  PrintitiL-  Office,  1966),  p.  406.  Friends  of  the  President  at  this  time  recall  that  lie  took 
pride  in  liis  own  roll'  in  the  creation  of  a  state  sponsored  regional  development  authority 
(the  Lower  Colorado  River  Anthorit\  LCRA)  in  Texas,  financed  witli  Public  Works  Ad- 
ministration money  during  the  early  New  Deal  da.VB,  lie  had  also  been  interested  In  a 
similar  project  in  Xchraska  Uotli  projects  were  developed  under  guidance  fro")  officials  of 
TVA,  which  was  tile  center  of  regionalism  philosophy  and  method  at  that  time.  On  the 
Ion  of  thi'  President's  vMt  to  the  Tinted  Nations,  soon  after  the  assassination  of 
President   Kennedy,  lie  had  Riven  attention  to  these  matters  in  discussions  witli  UN  officials. 

39  Press  Release/88,  United  Nations  Press  Services,  Office  of  Public  Administration 
(May  17,  1901  I. 


397 


various  aspects  of  "rural  economic  development,"  and  electrical  serv- 
ices to  rural  communities  to  "insure  that  the  benefits  of  industrial 
diversifiation  are  available  in  rural  areas."  37 

Perhaps  the  most  comprehensive  regional  development  measure  in 
the  Johnson  domestic  program  was  the  Public  Works  and  Economic 
Development  Act  of  1965.  This  too  had  its  inception  in  a  Kennedy  pro- 
gram, signalized  by  the  Area  Redevelopment  Act  of  May  1, 1961.  The 
earlier  act  had  included  provisions  for  regional  loans,  public  facility 
loans  and  grants,  technical  assistance,  and  training  programs.  Expe- 
rience gained  with  this  measure  led  President  Johnson,  on  March  25, 
1965,  to  ask  Congress  for  an  enlarged  authority  to  undertake  extensive 
application  of  the  regionalism  principle  in  the  United  States.  He  said : 

A  key  feature  of  this  new  program  is  the  proposal  to  group  together  dis- 
tressed counties  and  communities  in  economically  viable  development  districts. 
Planning  and  assistance  will  concentrate  on  the  needs  of  the  area  as  a  whole.  .  .  . 
It  makes  sense  to  work  in  terms  of  larger  regions  encompassing  in  some  cases 
parts  of  two  or  more  states. 

This  is  merely  the  recognition  of  a  simple  fact.  Neither  distress  nor  the  poten- 
tial for  development  respects  state,  county,  or  community  boundaries.88 

Out  of  this  measure  was  developed  an  extensive  system  of  regional  de- 
velopment commissions — coordinated  by  an  Economic  Development 
Administration  in  the  Department  of  Commerce.  These  were  primarily 
State-organized  regional  commissions  dealing  with  mutual  problems 
in  such  regions  as  the  Four  Corners  area,  the  Great  Lakes,  New  Eng- 
land, and  the  Ozarks.  The  Appalachian  Commission  maintained  a 
separate  but  parallel  program. 

On  the  same  day  as  he  submitted  his  Special  Message  on  Regional 
Development,  the  President  also  declared  that  the  United  States  hoped 
for  a  time  when  people  and  governments  in  Southeast  Asia  would  need 
not  military  support  but  only  economic  and  social  cooperation  for 
progress  in  peace. 

Even  now  [he  went  on],  in  Vietnam  and  elsewhere,  there  are  major  programs 
of  development  which  have  the  cooperation  and  support  of  the  United  States. 
Wider  and  bolder  programs  can  be  expected  in  the  future  from  Asian  leaders  and 
Asian  councils — and  in  such  programs  we  would  want  to  help.  This  is  the  proper 
business  of  our  future  cooperation.88 

It  should  be  recalled  that  the  Johnson  proposal  of  April  7, 1965,  was 
deliberately  vague  as  to  whether  it  addressed  the  U.S.  posture  toward 
the  entire  Southeast  Asian  region  after  cessation  of  hostilities,  or 
whether  it  was  a  move  to  end  the  hostilities  in  Vietnam.  One  source  of. 
the  uncertainty  was  the  question  as  to  how  long  the  combined  efforts 
of  the  Vietcong  and  North  Vietnamese  forces  could  continue  to  exert 
military  pressure  against  South  Vietnam  as  U.S.  military  assistance 
was  poured  increasingly  into  the  balance.  Apparently  White  House 
advisers  foresaw  a  negotiated  settlement  soon,  or  a  collapse  of  North 
Vietnam  in  no  more  than  four  years  or  so.  The  President's  Mekong 
proposal,  in  short,  was  a  concept  of  postwar  reconstruction  that  he 


87  "Special  Message  to  the  Congress  on  Agriculture,  February  1965.  Public  Papers  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1966), 
p.  142. 

38  "Special  Message  to  the  Congress  on  Area  and  Regional  Economic  Development." 
March  1965,  Public  Papers  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  1966),  p.  323. 

89  "Special  Message  to  the  Congress  on  Regional  and  Economic  Development,"  Ibid.,  p.  319. 


398 


hoped  would  bring  economic  and  political  stability  to  the  countries  of 
the  region,  satisfy  the  diplomatic  objectives  of  the  United  States,  and 
prove  acceptable  to  the  other  great  powers  of  the  world  ("Including 
the  Soviet  Union"),  as  well  as  undercutting  immediate  motivation  of 
the  Vietnamese  communists,  and  responding  to  the  expressed  anxieties 
of  the  nonaligned  powers.  It  is  possible,  in  short,  that  it  looked  toward 
a  balanced  world  system  of  developing  regions,  benefiting  themselves 
from  orderly  advance ;  '  such  a  system  might  perhaps  have  eased 
world  tension  generally. 

The  relation  of  the  speech  to  U.S.  objectives  in  Southeast  Asia  is  il- 
luminated by  remarks  by  Leonard  Unger,  an  official  of  the  Department 
of  State,  shortly  after  the  Johnson  speech.  There  were  four  of  these 
objectives : 

First,  that  the  nations  of  Southeast  Asia,  as  with  other  Asian  states,  should 
develop  as  free  and  independent  countries  according  to  their  own  views  and  to- 
ward increasingly  democratic  structures. 

Second,  that  the  nations  of  the  area  should  not  threaten  each  other  or  outside 
nations. 

Third,  that  no  single  Asian  nation  should  either  control  other  nations  or  exercise 
domination  either  for  the  whole  area  or  for  any  major  part  of  it. 

And  fourth,  that  the  nations  of  the  Far  East  should  maintain  and  increase 
their  ties  with  the  West  in  trade  and  culture,  as  a  major  means  of  knitting  to- 
gether a  peaceful  and  stable  world.40 

Relationship  of  U .S .-Vietnamese  War  Goals  to  Regionalism 

In  an  earlier  study  in  this  series,  the  consensus  on  American  foreign 
policy  goals  was  discussed  in  the  following  words : 

"These  might  be  summarized  as  a  world  of  peace  and  freedom,  or  a 
peaceful  world  order  in  which  justice  and  freedom  prevail,  or  a  world 
in  which  the  United  States  may  exist  in  peace  and  security. 

"Within  these  broad  goals  there  are  more  specific  objectives.  The  pro- 
motion of  mutual  understanding  and  friendly  relations,  further  prog- 
ress toward  a  sound  and  expanding  world  economy,  the  wider  appli- 
cation of  international  law,  the  reduction  and  control  of  armaments, 
or  the  building  of  collective  security  systems,  for  example,  are  objec- 
tives through  which  the  United  States  is  seeking  to  attain  a  world  of 
peace  and  freedom.  These  objectives  in  turn  may  be  broken  down  into 
still  more  specific  components  such  as,  in  the  case  of  the  reduction  and 
control  of  armaments,  regulation  of  the  military  use  of  the  ocean  bed 
or  outer  space."  41 

In  an  age  in  which  powerful  nations  possess  nuclear  weapons  and 
means  for  their  delivery  to  a  target  thousands  of  miles  away,  a  cate- 
gorical imperative  in  support  of  the  objective  of  security  is  that  un- 
limited or  total  war  between  nuclear-armed  powers  be  avoided.  A  cor- 
ollary of  this  proposition  is  that  no  overt  conflict  can  be  permitted  to 
occur  between  such  powers,  lest  it  escalate  to  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons. 
This  set  of  conditions  is  superimposed  on  more  traditional  objectives  or 
guidelines  of  U.S.  foreign  policy,  such  as  self-determination  by  peoples 
of  their  own  forms  of  government ;  peaceful  resolution  of  international 
disputes;  free  and  unrestricted  international  commerce;  unobstructed 
transit  of  persons ;  freedom  of  the  seas ;  and  economic  and  technological 

40  "Present  Objectives  and  Future  Possibilities  in  Southeast  Asia,"  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  (May  10,  1965),  p.  712.  The  statement  was  In  an  address  before  the  Detroit  Eco- 
nomic Club,  Detroit,  Michigan  April  19,  19<;:>. 

"U.S.  Congress,  House,  Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a  Scientific  Age  (Washington,  D.C.  : 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1970),  90th  Cong.,  2nd  sess.,  1970.  See  vol.  I,  p.  22. 


399 


development  of  lagging  regions  of  the  world.  Following  World  War 
II,  the  general  endorsement  of  self-determination  was  applied  more 
explicitly,  in  the  face  of  Soviet  expansionism,  toward  the  goal  of  con- 
taining "world  communism."  This  goal  was  also  rather  explicitly  re- 
lated to  the  accepted  U.S.  practice  of  aiding  the  developing  countries 
of  the  world. 

In  a  discussion  before  the  American  Foreign  Service  Association  on 
June  23,  1965,  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Rusk  discussed  the  Vietnamese 
conflict  in  relation  to  these  and  other  objectives  of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 
In  this  conflict,  he  said,  the  traditional  U.S.  objective  of  encouraging 
self-determination  by  peoples  of  their  own  forms  of  government  was 
combined  with  the  more  recent  objective  of  containing  the  spread  of 
world  communism.  Said  the  Secretary : 

In  Vietnam  today  we  face  one  more  challenge  in  the  long  line  of  dangers  we 
have,  unhappily,  had  to  meet  and  master  for  a  generation.  We  have  had  to  show 
both  strength  and  restraint — courage  and  coolness — for  Iran  and  for  Greece,  for 
Berlin  and  for  Korea,  in  the  Formosa  Strait,  and  in  the  Cuban  missile  crisis.*2 

Another  longstanding  element  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  is  that  one- 
nation  dominance  of  either  Europe  or  Asia  should  be  prevented.43 
The  logic  of  this  position  is  that — apart  from  the  obvious  economic 
and  commercial  consequences — the  natural  and  human  resources  of 
either  continent,  mobilized  under  a  single  competent  and  hostile  man- 
agement, could  threaten  U.S.  security.  The  relation  of  this  position  to 
the  Vietnamese  conflict  was  implied  by  Secretary  Rusk  as  follows : 

As  I  have  said,  Hanoi  is  presently  adamant  against  negotiation  or  any  avenue 
to  peace.  Peiping  [sic]  is  even  more  so,  and  one  can  plainly  read  the  declared 
doctrine  and  purpose  of  the  Chinese  Communists.  They  are  looking  beyond  the 
current  conflict  to  the  hope  of  domination  in  all  of  Southeast  Asia — and  indeed 
beyond.44 

The  Secretary  also  rejected  both  the  possibility  of  a  nuclear  conflict, 
with  all  its  awesome  possibilities,  and  also  U.S.  abandonment  of  the 
contest : 

A  few — a  very  few — may  believe  that  unlimited  war  can  take  the  place  of  the 
sustained  and  steady  effort  in  which  we  are  engaged,  just  as  there  may  be  a 
few — a  very  few — who  think  we  should  pull  out  and  leave  a  friendly  people  to 
their  fate.  But  the  American  people  want  neither  rashness  nor  surrender.45 

The  Secretary  then  introduced  the  theme  of  American  support  for 
national  self-determination  by  summarizing  a  statement  of  goals  by 
the  Foreign  Minister  of  South  Vietnam,  which  included  "Freedom  for 
South  Vietnam  to  choose  and  shape  for  itself  its  own  destiny  in  con- 
formity with  democratic  principles  and  without  any  foreign  interfer- 

.^Pean  Rusk.  "Viet -Nam:  Four  Steps  to  Peace,"  Department  of  State  Bulletin  (July  12 
1965),  pp.  50-55. 

«  On  this  point  see  :  Bernard  K.  Gordon,  Toward  Disengagement  in  Asia:  a  Strategy  for 
American  Foreign  Policy  (Englewood  Cliffs,  N.J.  :  Prentice-Hall,  1969).  Gordon,  Southeast 
Asia  Project  Chairman,  Research  Analysis  Corporation,  writes,  p.  13  :  "The  reason  for 
these  repeated  involvements  [of  the  United  States]  In  East  Asian  affairs  [Japanese  War 
Korean  War,  and  Vietnamese  War]  is  to  be  found  in  principles  nearly  identical  with  those 
on  which  the  U.S.  has  operated  in  Europe.  Washington  has  been  unwilling,  in  other  words, 
to  accept  an  East  Asian  structure  under  the  main  influence,  or  dominance,  of  any  single 
power.  For  this  reason,  the  post-World  War  II  period  in  East  Asia  has  been  characterized 
by  a  continuation  of  the  bipolar  conflict  that  began  in  1915.  For  China,  under  Mao  has 
appeared  to  aim  for  East  Asian  hegemony,  and  the  United  States — having  successfully 
opposed  Japan's  efforts  of  achieving  that  goal — has  been  unwilling  to  accept  China  in  her 
place." 

**  Rusk,  "Vietnam  :  Four  Steps  to  Peace,"  p.  52. 

"Ibid.,  p.  54. 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  27 


400 


ence  from  whatever  sources."  And  finally,  he  referred  to  the  U.S.  goal 
of  supporting  foreign  economic  and  technological  development — 

And  even  while  these  hopes  of  peace  are  blocked  for  now  by  aggression,  we 
on  our  side  and  other  nations  have  reaffirmed  our  deep  commitment  to  the  peace- 
ful progress  of  Vietnam  and  Southeast  Asia  as  a  whole.  In  April  the  President 
proposed  to  the  nations  of  Asia  and  to  the  United  Nations  that  there  be  con- 
structed a  new  program  of  support  for  Asian  efforts  and  called  upon  Mr.  Eugene 
Black  to  assist  them.  Now  in  June  this  work  is  underway.  The  Mekong  River 
project  has  been  given  new  life.  A  new  dam  is  ready  to  rise  in  Laos.  A  billion- 
dollar  bank  is  in  the  making  for  the  development  of  Southeast  Asia.  And  in 
Vietnam  itself  new  impetus  has  been  given  to  programs  of  development  and 
education  and  health.48 

Shortly  after  the  President's  April  1965  speech,  Walt  W.  Rostow, 
Counselor  of  the  Department  of  State  and  chairman  of  the  Policy 
Planning  Council,  identified  five  ways  Asian  nations,  cooperating  as 
a  region,  mignt  "help  one  another  in  this  next  phase  of  the  region's 
economic  evolution."  They  could  intensify  trade  among  themselves. 
They  could  harmonize  tlieir  national  development  plans,  with  each 
nation  concentrating  in  fields  of  its  own  natural  advantage,  at  the 
same  time  reducing  possibilities  of  overproduction  and  idle  industrial 
capacity.  There  could  be  multilateral  planning  and  financing.  (In  this 
connection,  the  proposed  Asian  Development  Bank  would  be  "an  ex- 
tremely useful  instrument.")  For  his  fourth  and  fifth  points,  Mr. 
Rostow  stressed  the  opportunities  of  regional  development  per  se : 

Certain  of  the  countries  within  the  region  may  wish  to  generate  even  more 
intensive  measures  of  economic  cooperation  than  are  possible  on  an  all-regional 
basis.  This  has  always  been  the  hope  which  lay  behind,  for  example,  the  schemes 
to  uevelop  the  Mekong  River  basiu.  [Anu  in  tliis  context,  also]  'mere  would  cer- 
tainly be  an  enlarged  role  for  intensified  technical  assistance  on  a  regional  basis, 
notably  in  the  fields  of  agriculture,  marketing,  and  export  promotion.'7 

U.S.  Measures  to  Raise  the  Tempo  of  Mekong  Development 

President  Johnson  moved  vigorously  to  show  that  he  intended  his 
proposal  to  take  effect  at  once — without  waiting  for  the  war  to  end.48 
He  dramatized  this  intention  by  immediately  ordering  $500,000  of 
U.S.  surplus  foods  sent  to  Southeast  Asia  for  use  by  workers  on  Me- 
kong development  projects;  he  also  sent  six  U.S.  experts  to  make  a 
90-day  survey  of  rural  electrification  opportunities  in  Vietnam.  He 
named  Eugene  Black,  former  president  of  the  World  Bank,  to  head 
a  presidential  mission  to  develop  a  plan  of  U.S.  assistance  to  the 
Mekong  project. 

The  plan  that  evolved  concentrated  on  four  lines  of  attack :  ( 1 )  An 
immediate  contact  with  the  U.N.  Secretary  General,  U  Thant,  to  gather 
resources  to  start  work  on  the  Nam  Ngum  Dam,  to  which  the  United 
States  would  contribute  substantially;  (2)  reversal  of  the  U.S.  posi- 
tion from  opposition  to  a  proposed  Asian  Development  Bank  to  one  of 
vigorous  support;  (3)  resumption  of  a  program  of  pre-engineering 
st  nil  its  by  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Reclamation  of  a  proposed  huge  dam  at 
Pa  Mong  on  the  main  stem  of  the  Mekong  west  of  Vientiane  in  Laos, 


tn  Ibid.,  p.  fiT). 

"Wall  w.  Rostow,  "Economic  Development  in  Asia,"  address  at  Tokyo,  Japan,  April  23, 
1965,  Department  of  State  Bulletin  (May  31,  1965),  pp.  850  851. 

"Meeting  In  special  session  in  Bangkok,  May  l<i  11,  1965,  tin-  Coordination  Committee 
qulrklv  formulated  a  priority  lisl  of  projects.  First  on  the  list  was  the  Nam  Ngum  Dam. 
The  list  was  sent  in  a  communique  to  the  United  Nations  Secretary-General,  noting  with 
interest  That  substantial  additional  resources  may  be  made  available"  to  the  U.N.  to 
support  the  Mekong  1'roject. 


401 


and  (4)  a  series  of  actions  to  strengthen  the  economies  of  the  Riparian 
States  (without  mentioning  Cambodia)  and  to  deal  constructively 
with  "disease  and  hunger  and  illiteracy." 

THE  NAM  NGTJM  DAM 

In  a  special  message  to  Congress,  June  1,  1965,  requesting  a  supple- 
mental $89  million  of  foreign  aid  "for  expanded  programs  of  economic 
and  social  development  in  Southeast  Asia,"  the  President  indicated 
that — 

Approximately  $19  million  will  provide  the  first  installment  of  our  contribution 
to  the  accelerated  development  of  the  Mekong  River  Basin.  This  is  an  important 
part  of  the  general  program  of  regional  development  which  I  outlined  at  Johns 
Hopkins  University  on  April  7.  This  money  will  enable  us  to  meet  a  request  for 
half  the  cost  of  building  the  Nam  Ngum  Dam.  which  the  international  Mekong 
Committee  has  marked  "Top  Priority"  if  the  Mekong  River  is  to  be  put  to  work 
for  the  people  of  the  region.  This  will  be  the  first  Mekong  power  project  to  serve 
two  countries,  promising  power  to  small  industry  and  lights  for  thousands  of 
homes  in  northeast  Thailand  and  Laos.  The  funds  will  provide  also  for — power- 
lines  across  the  Mekong,  linking  Laos  and  Thailand ;  extensive  studies  of  further 
hydroelectric,  irrigation,  and  flood  control  projects  on  the  Mekong  main  stream 
and  its  tributaries ;  and  expansion  of  distribution  lines  in  Laos.48 

This  dam  was  proposed  for  power  and  irrigation,  across  the  Nam 
N>um  tributary  of  the  Mekong  some  50  miles  north  of  Vientiane. 
Amonqr  the  many  actions  taken  by  the  Johnson  administration  at 
mid-1965  was  a  request  to  the  Edison  Electric  Institute  to  undertake  a 
power  market  survey  in  this  part  of  the  Mekong  region.  The  pre- 
engineering  work  on  the  unit,  like  the  subsequent  construction,  was 
characteristically  performed  in  separate  segments  contributed  by 
various  nations  or  the  U.N.  or  other  institutions.  Thus,  the  original 
site  selection  had  resulted  from  an  earlier  survey  of  tributaries,  con- 
ducted by  the  Japanese  Government.  An  experimental  farm  to  serve 
the  nlain  irrigated  with  water  from  the  dam  was  being  managed  by  a 
combined  Laos-Israel  team,  under  a  bilateral  agreement.  Feasibility 
investigations  for  the  dam  were  made  bv  the  Nippon  Koei  Company, 
financed  partly  from  the  U.N.  Special  Fund  and  partly  by  Japan 
under  a  bilateral  economic  and  technical  cooperation  agreement  be- 
tween Laos  and  Japan. 

Although  the  U.S.  Congress  acted  promptly  to  grant  the  Presi- 
dent's request  for  funds  for  the  project,  it  was  not  until  May  4,  1966 
that  all  the  financial  preliminaries  were  completed — culminating  in 
the  Nam  Ngum  Development  Fund  Agreement.  This  agreement  in- 
volved the  recipient  nations,  Laos  and  Thailand,  and  the  donor  na- 
tions— Australia,  Canada,  Denmark,  Japan,  Netherlands,  New  Zea- 
land, Thailand,  and  the  United  States,  plus  the  World  Bank.  Funds 
were  to  be  provided  in  the  form  of  grants  to  the  extent  of  $22.8  mil- 
lion, to  be  administered  by  the  World  Bank.  Principal  contributors 
were  the  United  States  ($12  million),  Japan  ($4  million),  Nether- 
lands ($3.3  million)  and  Canada  ($2  million).  Thailand  donated  $1 
million  in  cement. 

The  Nam  Ngum  unit  is  of  impressive  size.  The  dam  is  707  feet  high, 
and  1,541  feet  in  span.  Its  reservoir  will  impound  8  billion  cubic  meters 


49  Lyndon  B.  Johnson.  "Sneclal  Message  to  the  Congress  on  the  Need  for  Additional 
Foreign  Aid  Funds  for  Southeast  Asia,"  June  1965.  Public  Pavers  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States  (Washington,  D.C. :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1966),  p.  607. 


402 


of  water  (an  area  of  230  square  miles).  Its  power  generation  facili- 
ties— power  generators,  transformer,  and  switchyard — will  deliver 
initially  30,000  kw  and  ultimately  120,000  kw  over  115  kv  transmission 
lines  to  Vientiane  and  into  Thailand.  Laotian  personnel  are  being 
trained  to  operate  the  facility. 

Reasons  for  the  assigning  by  the  Coordination  Committee  of  "first 
priority"  to  this  unit  are  complex  but  persuasive.  It  was  to  be  located 
in  Laos,  the  least  developed  of  the  Riparian  States.  Political  and  dip- 
lomatic relations  were  favorable.  (For  example,  although  its  location 
was  in  an  area  under  at  least  partial  control  by  the  communist  Pathet 
Lao,  the  communists  had  permitted  site  surveys  in  1964  and  were 
agreeable  to  the  scheme.)  It  would  be  the  first  unit  in  the  Mekong 
Project  to  serve  more  than  one  country,  which  would  dramatize  the 
international  character  of  the  entire  enterprise.  It  was  the  largest 
tributary  project  then  in  prospect.  It  offered  a  good  cost/benefit  ratio. 
One  of  the  most  important  considerations  was  that  while  large,  the 
project  was  still  of  manageable  size  for  completion  in  a  reasonably 
short  time;  and  once  completed  it  would  demonstrate  tangibly  the 
opportunities  offered  by  the  Mekong  Project  as  a  whole.  As  the  1966 
annual  report  of  the  Coordination  Committee  noted :  "A  very  signifi- 
cant feature  of  the  Mekong  Development  Project's  gross  resources  is 
thus  not  only  the  very  substantial  increase  in  these  during  1965-1966 
[up  from  $6Y.9  million  as  of  31  December  1964  to  $105.1  million  a  year 
later,  although  only  to  $110  million  by  31  December  1966  of  which  the 
U.S.  contribution  was  $26  million]  but  the  increased  proportion  [64 
percent]  of  total  resources  now  being  used  for  construction."  50  Charac- 
teristically, this  development  was  of  interest  to  President  Johnson  who 
in  1961  had  expressed  impatience  over  the  protracted  planning  phase 
and  asked  when  the  "dirt  would  begin  to  fly."  It  was  also  considered 
important  that  almost  one-third  of  the  resources  had  been  contributed 
by  the  Riparian  States  themselves. 

A  not  wholly  sympathetic  account  of  the  preliminary  history  of  the 
Nam  Ngum  Dam  asserts  that  the  United  States  negotiators  had 
"agreed  to  put  up  half  of  the  money  [for  the  dam]  on  the  understand- 
ing that  Japan  would,  in  turn,  put  up  half  the  money  for  an  equally 
troublesome  foundling  in  Cambodia:  i.e.,  the  Prek  Thnot  project, 
whose  paternity  the  United  States  had  been  willing  to  acknowledge 
but  Cambodia  had  denied."  This  account  observes  that  Nam  Ngum 
constitutes  "the  first  real  test  of  the  validity  of  the  Mekong  concept 
that  large-scale  schemes  in  remote  and  backward  regions  will  sustain 
rather  than  strain  newly  developing  social  and  economic  systems."  51 

THE  ASIAN  DEVELOPMENT  BANK 

Apparently  there  had  long  been  a  sentiment  in  favor  of  a  regional 
credit  institution  to  specialize  in  the  accumulation  of  capital  resources 
to  support  regional  projects  of  ECAFE  and  its  regional  member  states. 
Apparently  also  this  proposal  was  not  favored  by  the  White  House  or 
the  Department  of  State  or  Treasury,  nor  by  the  World  Bank.  Ob- 


60  Committee  for  the  Coordination  of  Investigation  of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin,  Annual 
Report,  1966   I  New  York  :  United  Nations,  1967),  D    99 

81  Willard  A.  Hanna,  "The  Mekong  Project,"  Part  IV  "The  Test  at  Nam  Ngum,"  Amer- 
ican Universities  Field  Staff  Reports,  Southeast  Asia  Series  xvl,  no.  13  (July  1968),  4. 


403 


jections  from  these  sources  were  based  on  the  idea  that  standards  in 
the  extension  of  credit  in  remote  regional  banks  would  be  low  so  that 
resources  would  accordingly  be  wasted.  Writing  in  1969,  Eugene  Black 
observed  that  he  had  been  persuaded  to  change  his  opinion  of  the 
merits  of  the  regional  bank  concept  after  he  had  been  enlisted  by  Pres- 
ident Johnson  in  the  campaign  to  help  the  Mekong  Project." 
And  Lyndon  Johnson  has  recorded : 

One  of  the  first  things  I  asked  Black  to  do  was  to  push  hard  to  bring  the  pro- 
posed Asian  Development  Bank  to  life.  Almost  all  the  nations  of  Asia  and  other 
concerned  and  more  prosperous  nations  joined  in  this  effort,  thirty-two  coun- 
tries in  all.  The  charter  of  the  new  bank  was  signed  at  Manila  on  Decem- 
ber 4,  1965. 

The  first  year  and  a  half  was  taken  up  with  planning,  recruiting  able  personnel 
from  many  countries,  and  building  a  headquarters  in  Manila.  By  the  end  of  1967 
the  Asian  Development  Bank  was  in  business.  The  Bank  has  two  main  functions  : 
to  make  loans  for  worthy  projects  and  to  provide  technical  assistance.  In  1968, 
its  first  year  of  operation,  the  Bank  made  seven  major  loans  totaling  $41.6  mil- 
lion. Twenty  additional  loans  amounting  to  $98.1  million  were  approved  in 
1969.53 

Upon  his  return  from  his  first  visit  to  Southeast  Asia  for  the  Presi- 
dent, Black  reported  that  progress  had  been  encouraging,  and  that  the 
Bank  could  be  in  business  by  early  1966. 

Mr.  Black  [said  a  White  House  press  release,  July  10]  told  the  President  that 
the  consultative  committee  meetings  went  very  well  ....  [He  had  told  the 
other  delegates]  that — subject  to  congressional  approval — the  United  States 
[was]  prepared  to  provide  20  percent  of  the  Bank's  capital,  up  to  $200  million, 
and  also  to  contribute — if  other  countries  [would]  join — up  to  $100  million  to 
the  multilateral  Southeast  Asia  Development  Fund.  The  Fund  would  be  admin- 
istered by  the  Asian  Bank  and  would  finance  regional  projects  in  Southeast  Asia. 

The  President  [the  press  release  continued]  was  happy  to  learn  from  Mr. 
Black  that  the  Japanese  Government  also  intends  to  take  a  20-percent  share  in 
the  Bank's  capital." 

Authority  for  U.S.  participation  in  subscribing  $200  million  to  the 
capital  of  the  Asian  Development  Bank  Act  was  provided  in  Public 
Law  89-369,  89th  Congress,  approved  March  16,  1966.  The  Bank's 
Articles  of  Agreement  came  into  force  on  August  22,  1966.  A  recent 
evaluation  of  this  action,  by  the  National  Advisory  Council  on  Inter- 
national Monetary  and  Financial  Policies,  observed  that  "The  forma- 
tion of  the  Asian  Development  Bank  is  the  most  important  single  de- 
velopment of  the  past  several  years  in  terms  of  Asian  regional  cooper- 
ation [and  that]  the  .  .  .  decision  of  the  United  States  to  become  a 
member  of  a  properly  conceived  Asian  Development  Bank  was  decisive 
in  assuring  that  the  Bank  would  receive  major  support  from  outside 
the  region."  55 


62 Eugene  R.  Black:  Alternative  in  Southeast  Asia  (New  York:  Frederick  A.  Praejrer. 
1969),  pp.  96-97.  He  notes  : 

As  early  as  1954,  the  member  countries  of  ECAFE  and  the  ECAFE  secretariat  began 
talking  about  the  formation  of  an  Asian  development  bank.  I  was  then  President  of  the 
World  Bank,  and,  frankly,  I  was  opposed  to  the  establishment  of  regional  banks,  whether 
in  Asia  or  Africa  or  Latin  America.  I  feared  that  they  would  become  political  institutions 
which,  while  ostensibly  charged  with  tasks  very  like  those  of  the  World  Bank,  would  tend 
to  undermine  the  kind  of  lending  standards  we  were  trying  to  get  accepted  and  the  con- 
fidence we  were  trying  to  build  up  in  the  bond  markets  of  the  world.*    *    * 

A  similar  view  prevailed  in  the  U.S.  Treasury  as  late  as  March  1965   *   *   *. 

63  Johnson,  The  Vantage  Point,  p.  356. 

54  "Mr.  Black  Reports  on  Southeast  Asia  Economic  Development,"  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  (August  2,  1965),  p.  215. 

55  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Communication  transmitting  to  the  Committee  on  Banking 
and  Currency  a  "Special  Report  on  the  Proposed  U.S.  Contribution  to  the  Consolidated 
Special  Funds  of  the  Asian  Development  Bank,"  91st  Cong.,  2nd  sess.,  1970,  p.  13. 


404 


The  principal  subscribers  to  the  Bank  included  both  regional  coun- 
tries and  non-regional  countries.  Of  the  regional  countries  the  prin- 
cipal subscribers  and  the  amounts  originally  subscribed  were  as  fol- 
lows: Japan  ($200  million),  India  ($93  million),  and  Australia  ($85 
million)  ;  of  the  non-regional,  apart  from  the  United  States,  the  prin- 
cipal subscribers  were  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  ($34  million) , 
United  Kingdom  ($30  million),  and  Canada  ($25  million).  The  total 
subscription  was  $978  million. 

It  had  been  anticipated  that  the  new  Bank  would  be  a  major  chan- 
nel for  the  flow  of  capital  to  the  various  planned  units  of  regional 
development  in  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin.  However,  the  quest  for  a 
sound  financial  reputation  in  its  first  years  of  operation  apparently 
moved  the  Bank  to  impose  rather  stringent  credit  terms  so  that  Mekong 
activities  tended  to  Wk  e^ewhere  for  <>rants  or  soft  loans  on  easier 
terms.  An  effort  to  establish  a  separate  soft  loan  "window"  at  the  Asian 
Development  Bank  received  little  immediate  support. 

THE    PA    MONG    DAM    PROJECT  56 

The  largest  engineering  task  on  the  agenda  of  the  Coordination 
Committee  was  a  proposed  dam  some  12  miles  upstream  from  Vien- 
tiane, Laos,  on  the  main  stem  of  the  Mekong.  This  dam  site  drew  the 
attention  of  engineers  from  the  first  because  it  offered  on  an  enormous 
scale  opportunities  for  power,  irrigation  water  storage,  flood  Control, 
and  flow  stabilization  to  favor  downstream  navigation.  The  first  sur- 
vey of  the  Pa  Mongsite  was  requested  from  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Recla- 
mation by  the  Coordination  Committee  shortly  after  Vice  President 
Johnson's  visit  to  the  Committee  in  May  1961.  The  request  was  for  a 
preliminary  reconnaissance  to  prepare  the  design  requirements  for  a 
comprehensive  feasibility  study. 

The  Bureau  of  Reclamation  preliminary  report  on  Pa  Mong  was 
made  early  in  1962.  It  proposed  an  8-year,  three-phase  program  of 
investigation  emphasizing  land  use  studies.  Each  succeeding  phase 
would  be  contingent  on  positive  findings  in  the  phase  preceding. 

The  Phase  I  investigations  were  begun  by  the  Bureau  under  an 
agreement  (with  U.S.A.I.D.  as  intermediary)  with  the  Coordination 
Committee  on  May  31,  1963.  It  continued  the  availability  of  abundant 
land  suitable  for  irrigation  using  water  from  the  project,  and  recom- 
mended that  work  begin  on  Phase  II.  A  preliminary  report  anticipat- 
ing these  findings  was  issued  by  the  Bureau  in  June  1965.  less  than  two 
months  after  the  President's  Johns  Hopkins  speech. 

Phase  II  consisted  of  several  interim  reports  to  gather  all  the  find- 
ings together  into  a  comprehensive  plan  for  the  project.  The  various 
studies  under  this  phase  were  merged  in  a  '"Pa  Mong  Stage  One  Feasi- 
bility Report"  which  the  Bureau  of  Reclamation  transmitted  Decem- 
ber 1!».  L969,  to  I". S.A.I. I),  for  delivery  to  the  Coordination  Commit- 
tee. This  was  an  impressive  279-page  report  with  many  maps,  draw- 
ings, tables,  and  graphs.  The   project   that   emerged  was  heroir  in  si/.e 

and  scope.  (See  Table  2  for  a  L968  comparison  of  Pa  Mong  with  some 


M  A  concise  history  of  tin-  Pa  Mong  project,  through  19B9,  is  presented  as  Chapter  1  of 
the  "Pa  M *  > 1 1  ir  Stage  One  Feasibility  Report,"  Bureau  of  Reclamation,  Departmenl  of  the 
Interior  I  December  19,  1969) 


405 


other  great  dams  of  the  world.)  The  total  cost  of  construction  was 
estimated  at  $1.16  billion.  The  reservoir  behind  the  dam  would  contain 
more  than  100  billion  cubic  meters  of  water,  to  irrigate  some  43,000 
hectares  of  land.  The  accompanying  power  plant  would  be  capable  of 
generating  4.8  million  kw  of  power,  with  transmission  lines  distribut- 
ing it  to  various  market  areas  from  Vientiane  to  Bangkok.  Annual 
revenues  estimated  in  the  report  were  $143  million  (mainly  from  the 
sale  of  power,  which  accounted  for  more  than  $120  million).  Revenues 
over  and  above  operating  costs,  the  report  said,  would  be  sufficient  to 
amortize  costs  of  the  project  in  50  years  at  6  percent  interest,  from 
power  revenues  at  4.53  mills  per  kwh.  A  preliminary  market  survey 
found  that  Thailand  alone  would  be  able  to  use  all  power  generated 
by  the  project  within  10  years. 

It  is  not  evident  that  this  report  satisfied  fully  the  requirement  set 
by  USAID  for  the  Stage  I  Report.  The  design  sought  was  described 
as  follows : 

The  first  stage  is  expected  to  be  the  smallest  viable  component  that  constitutes 
a  financeable  construction  start.  It  ought  to  be  a  package  that  can  stand  on  its 
own  financially,  yet  be  capable  of  later  expansion — in  stages — to  ultimate  project 
size.  .  .  .  Basic  requirements  are  that  Stage  I  be  economically  feasible,  capable  of 
sustained  operation  and  maintenance,  and  that  there  be  reasonable  prospects 
that  it  is  financeable.  Stage  I  should  be  small  enough  to  be  manageable  in  an 
underdeveloped  area. 

TABLE  2.— COMPARISONS-LARGE  DAMS  AND  HYDROELECTRIC  PLANTS  i 


Grand  Coulee 

Glen  Canyon 

Akosombo 

High  Aswan 

Pa  Mong 
(estimated) 

Date  completed.. 

Location 

River.. 

1942 

Washington 

Columbia 

1964 

Arizona 

Colorado 

1965 

Ghana 

Volta 

1967 

Egypt 

Nile 

Thailand/Laos 
Mekong 

Average  annual  flow  at  dam  site  (millions 
of  acre-feet) 79. 1 

Maximum  annual  flow  (millions  of  acre- 
feet).... 103.0 

Minimum  annual  flow  (millions  of  acre- 
feet) 53.0 

Peak  flow  (cubic  feet/second  (est.) 725,000 

(1894) 

Dam— Type. _ Gravity- 

concrete 

Volume  (millions  of  cubic  yards) _.  10.6 

Structural  height  (feet). 550 

Crest  lengtn  (feet) 4,173 

Gross  reservoir  capacity  (millions  of  acre- 
feet) 9.6 

Active   reservoir  capacity  (millions  of 

acre-feet). 5.0 

Area  irrigated  (potential)  (million  acres).  1. 0 

Powerplant: 

Maximum  head  (feet) 345 

Installed  capacity  (millions  of  kilo- 
watts).  2.0 

Maximum   annual  generation  (bil- 
lions of  kw-hr). 14.0 

Costs— (indexed  to  1967  prices)  (millions 
of  U.S.  dollars): 

Dam 477 

Powerplant  338 

Cost  per  kilowatt  of  capacity  (plant).  169 


13.3 

27.9 

68.1 

109.4 

23.3 

52.9 

346.0 

157.5 

5.6 

220,  000 
(1921) 

10.2 
550, 000 
(1917) 

34.0 
476, 000 
(1878) 

68.5 

950,000 

(1966) 

Arch- 
concrete 


Rockfill      Sand/rockfill 


Gravity- 
concrete 


4.9 

710 

,560 

10.5 

370 

2,100 

56.3 

364 

12,790 

5.2 

394 

3,900 

28.0 

130.0 

127.0 

61.0 

21.5 
(?) 

50.0 
(?) 

103.0 
1.4 

51.0 
2. 0-5.  0 

560 

(213  design) 

242 

279 

.9 

.9 

2.1 

2. 8-4.  0 

4.1 

4.3 

8.4 

20.  0 

144  1 
96  } 
106  . 

112.0  | 

230 

184 

88 

228 

248-416 

104 

1  Source:  U.S.  Agency  for  International  Development  and  Bureau  of  Reclamation,  U.S.  Department  of  Interior.  "To 
Tame  a  River."  (Wasnington,  U.S.  Gsvern/nant  Printing  Office,  19S8),  p.  24. 


406 


Undoubtedly,  construction  of  the  Pa  Mong  dam  would  be  a  turning 
point  in  regionalism  in  Southeast  Asia.  It  would  confer  on  the  partici- 
pating countries  a  considerable  prestige.  It  would  provide  economic 
stimulus  for  further  technological  development.  It  would  afford  many 
kinds  of  economic  opportunity.  It  would  significantly  mitigate  the 
threat  of  massive  floods  in  the  lower  Mekong  basin.  Moreover,  success 
in  this  task  would  break  the  ice  for  at  least  two  other  grand  under- 
takings on  the  main  stem:  at  Sambor  and  Tonle  Sap.  However,  as 
the  undertaking  at  Pa  Mong  progressed  through  the  planning  phase, 
more  and  more  attention  was  directed  to  the  matter  of  infrastructure. 
What  social  adaptations  would  be  necessary  to  make  proper  use  of 
the  dam  as  a  new  resource  ?  What  amenity  capital  investments  would 
be  needed  in  the  form  of  schools,  hospitals,  terminals,  and  other  social 
overhead  items?  What  would  be  the  problems  of  resettling  people 
from  the  inundated  reservoir?  How  would  the  power  generated  at 
the  dam  be  distributed  and  how  should  it  be  utilized? 

INFRASTRUCTURE    FOR    THE    MEKONG    PROJECT 

President  Johnson's  Johns  Hopkins  speech  was  the  signal  for  an 
accelerated  staff  effort  in  U.S.A.I.D.,  working  in  cooperation  with  an 
improvised  White  House  office  set  up  to  support  Eugene  Black  in  his 
role  as  the  President's  Advisor  on  Southeast  Asia  Economic  and  Social 
Development.  A  program  of  increased  assistance  to  the  countries  of 
Southeast  Asia  was  quickly  drafted,  and  was  presented  to  the  Con- 
gress June  1.  Hearings  were  held  promptly,  and  the  Congress  speedily 
acted  on  the  President's  request  for  a  supplemental  $89  million  "to 
help  in  the  peaceful  economic  and  social  development"  of  that  region. 

The  bulk  of  the  request  was  for  import  assistance :  $45  million  to  buy 
iron  and  steel,  cement,  chemicals  and  pesticides,  drugs,  trucks,  and 
other  essential  goods.  Another  $19  million  was  earmarked  for  use  by 
the  Coordination  Committee  to  start  the  Nam  Ngum  dam  construction 
work,  associated  power  lines,  and  some  further  studies.  The  remaining 
$25  million  would  be  used  to  help  the  three  countries  (Cambodia  being 
at  that  time  unrecognized  57)  to  develop  a  supporting  infrastructure. 

According  to  the  President's  message  to  Congress: 

$5  million  would  be  used  to  support  electrification  cooperatives  as  a  pioneer 
project  in  Vietnam ; 

$7  million  would  be  used  to  provide  improved  medical  services  in  the  three 
countries ; 

$3  million  would  be  used  to  "train  people  for  the  construction  of  roads,  dams, 
and  other  small-scale  village  projects  in  Thailand  and  Laos  ;"  and 

$7  million  to  "supplement  the  present  program  of  agricultural  development 
and  support  additional  government  services  in  all  three  countries,  and  [to]  help 
in  the  planning  of  further  industrial  expansion  in  the  secure  areas  of  Vietnam." 

In  hearings  before  (he  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  June  3, 
L965,  Secretary  Rusk  explained  thai  the  requested  funds  had  two  pur- 
poses: (i)  to  implement  the  President's  April  7  proposal  ("an  inter- 
tiational  campaign  to  stimulate  Southeasl  Asian  economic  and  social 
progress  and   promote  closer  regional  economic  cooperation'')    and 


'7  i-'or  an  account  "f  the  complicated  diplomacy  of  Prince  Sihanouk  toward  the  I'nited 
stains  and  the  Mekong  Project  in  this  period,  Bee  William  A,  Hanna,  "The  Mekong  Project," 
Part  VII  "The  Enigma  <>f  Cambodia,"  American  Universities  Field  staff  Report*,  Southeast 
Asia  Series  xvl,  no.  17,   (September,  1968). 


407 


(2)  to  enable  South  Vietnam  to  further  its  own  development  of  in- 
dustry, housing,  and  public  works  "while  carrying  out  an  expanded 
defense  effort."  Emphasis  was  to  be  placed  on  public  health  programs 
in  Thailand  and  Laos,  rural  electrification  cooperatives  in  South 
Vietnam,  training  and  equipping  of  local  engineering  and  public 
works  agencies  for  rural  development  work  in  Laos,  and  Thailand, 
and  expanded  technical  assistance  to  Lao  agricultural  development 
("particularly  agricultural  credit  and  marketing,  and  the  introduc- 
tion on  a  wider  scale  of  improved  livestock  and  seeds").58 

The  various  studies  of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin  had  all  agreed  that 
a  good  deal  of  preparatory  planning  and  training  should  take  place 
before  actual  construction  of  dams  and  power  plants.  Much  of  this 
work  was  already  underway  in  mid-1965.  Thus,  ECAFE  reported  in 
March  that  54  different  teams  were  at  work  in  the  basin  on  such  tasks 
as  fishery  and  forestry  studies,  mineral  surveys,  demonstration  farms, 
irrigation  experiments,  and  river  navigation  surveys  and  channel 
marking.59 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  calendar  year  1965,  the  annual  report  of 
the  Coordination  Committee  to  ECAFE  listed,  in  addition  to  various 
dams  and  other  construction  projects  and  progress  in  organization 
and  staffing,  the  following  "highlights"  which  illustrate  the  kind  of 
supporting  developmental  program  then  judged  necessary  for  the 
Mekong  engineering  tasks — in  view  of  the  relatively  primitive  econ- 
omy and  technology  of  the  region ;  analysis  of  200  samples  of  Cambo- 
dian bauxite;  soil  study  of  the  Laotian  resettlement  area;  mineral 
survey  of  northeast  Thailand ;  exploratory  development  of  a  rock  salt 
deposit  in  Thailand ;  construction  of  tug  boats  for  river  navigation ; 
study  of  feasibility  of  pulpwood  industry;  training  of  river  pilots, 
hydrologists,  and  systems  analysts ;  and  development  of  a  network  of 
demonstration  farms.  The  Coordination  Committee  itself  had  as- 
sembled a  substantial  organization  (See  organization  chart  in  annual 
report  for  1965,  page  210)  .60 

It  was  evident,  of  course,  that  electricity  and  irrigation  water  would 
be  useless  without  capital,  labor  skills,  agricultural  knowledge  of  the 
specialized  procedures  appropriate  for  irrigated  crops,  marketing  and 
transportation  of  produce,  and  a  more  highly  developed  economic 
system.  In  the  absence  of  fertilizer,  for  example,  perhaps  the  silt- 
laden  floods  of  the  Mekong  served  a  useful  function  to  enrich  the  soil 
of  the  delta.  Health  of  the  population  was  an  important  factor  in 
development.61 

It  was  significant  that  as  late  as  1970.  the  Bureau  of  Reclamation  in 
its  Stage  One  Feasibility  Report  was  to  report  that:  "Under  the 
Mekong  Basin  Development  Project  AID  is  presently  (FY  1970) 
supporting  the  following  ecological  and  social  studies  which  will  pro- 
vide new  information  for  future  Pa  Mong  investigations : 

1.  Water-borne  Disease  Study — With  emphasis  on  snails  as  vector ; 

2.  Aquatic  Weeds  Study  ; 


68  Department  of  State  Bulletin  (June  28,  1965) ,  pp.  1056-1060. 

68  Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East,  "Putting  the  Mekong  to  Work — an 
International  Undertaking,"  feature  no.  14,  (March,  1965). 

80  Committee  for  Coordination  of  Investigation  of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin,  Annual 
Report,  1965  (New  York  :  United  Nations,  1966). 

41  See  U.S.  Congress.  House,  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  "Beyond  Malthus  :  the  Food/ 
People  Equation,"  (Washington,  D.C. :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1971),  92nd 
Cong.,  1st  sess.,  1971. 


408 


3.  Ecological  Bench  Mark  Study  ; 

4.  Cadastral   [land  ownership]   Survey  of  Vientiane  Plain; 

5.  Social  Studies  for  Resettlement  from  Reservoir  Area  and  for  Irriga- 
tion Farmer  Organizations ;  and 

6.  Rural  Electrification  Feasibility   Studies  for  Northeast  Thailand  and 
Vientiane  Plain  in  Laos."  62 

Statics  of  the  Mekong  Project  at  the  Close  of  1965 

Under  the  stimulus  of  the  President's  representative.  Mr.  Eugene 
Black,  the  United  Nations  by  the  end  of  the  calendar  year  1965  was 
giving  increased  attention  to  the  Mekong  as  a  priority  project  on  its 
agenda.  At  headquarters  of  the  Coordination  Committee,  in  Bangkok, 
the  program  was  substantially  accelerated  :  an  increase  by  $37.2  million 
(to  a  total  at  year's  end  of  $105  million)  in  grants  to  the  project  had 
been  achieved;  64  percent  of  the  funds  at  hand  were  for  construction, 
with  the  rest  for  studies  and  "pre-investment"  purposes.  Prospects 
were  at  last  favorable  for  the  early  establishment  of  the  Asian  De- 
velopment Bank. 

The  Mekong  project  itself  was  also  beginning  to  move.  The  first  hy- 
droelectric project  in  the  S}'stem,  the  Xam  Pung  tributary  dam  in 
Thailand,  had  been  completed.  Construction  was  under  way  in  Laos 
on  two  smaller  dams,  the  Lower  Se  Done  and  the  Nam  Dong.  The 
World  Bank  had  agreed  to  administer  financing  and  construction  of 
the  large  Nam  Ngum  tributary  dam  in  Laos  and  funding  arrange- 
ments had  almost  been  completed  dining  the  year.  Design  work  had 
been  completed  for  a  dam  at  Prek  Thnot  in  Cambodia.  The  U.S. 
Bureau  of  Reclamation  was  at  work  on  cost/benefit  studies  and 
analyses  of  the  proposed  main  stem  at  Pa  Mono-.  A  Japanese  team  was 
at  work  on  a  feasibility  study  of  another  proposed  main  stem  dam  at 
Sambor.  And  a  complicated  water  project  was  under  study  by  an  In- 
dian team  at  Toule  Sap.  (These  last  three  had  earlier  been  identified 
by  the  Coordination  Committee  as  the  priority  projects — although 
also  the  most  ambitious — in  the  entire  Mekong  Project.) 

An  assessment  of  the  state  of  the  project  in  early  1966.  with  particu- 
lar reference  to  the  impact  of  the  Johnson  initiative,  observed : 

The  [Johns  Hopkins]  proposal  immediately  gave  rise  to  a  flurry  of  interest 
throughout  the  Mekong  Basin.  Within  two  or  three  days,  the  Executive  Agent 
of  the  Mekong  Committee  [Mr.  Hart  Schaaf]  had  received  calls  and  communi- 
cations from  representatives  of  the  fonr  governments  and  from  representatives  of 
other  governments  that  might  participate  in  the  proposed  program.  As  a  direct 
result,  a  special  meeting  of  the  Mekong  Committee  was  held  in  May  196H  to 
discuss  ways  and  means  of  implementing  the  Mekong  scheme.  The  meeting  was 
especially  significant  since  it  was  attended,  for  the  first  time,  by  the  Cambodian 
I  >i  rector  of  External  Finance. 

It  is  still  unclear  what  would  he  the  best  type  of  mechanism  for  administering 
the  billion  dollar  program  of  aid.  .Much  can  he  done  through  the  Mekong  Com- 
mittee, tint  the  program  is  intended  to  serve  countries  outside  the  .Mekong  region 
as  well.  Perhaps  a  solution  to  this  problem  can  be  provided  by  the  Asian  Devel- 
opment Bank,  which  is  expected  to  become  operational  in  the  autumn  of  1966. 
Meanwhile  it  is  still  uncertain  what  the  long-run  effects  of  the  military  opera- 
tions in  Vietnam  will  be  on  the  Committee  and  its  work.  So  far  none  of  the 
countries  has  withdrawn  support,  and  the  Committee  has  been  able  to  continue  its 
coordinative  role.93 


"2  "Pa  Moim  Stage  line  Feasibility  Report."  Bureau  of  Reclamation,  1-fi. 
93  W.  R.  Derrick  Sewell  and  Gilbert  1".  White,  "The  Lower  Mekong,"  \<.  63. 


V.  Slump  and  Recovery:  The  Mekong  Project,  1966-1971 

The  considerable  impetus  to  the  Mekong  Project  that  followed  the 
Johnson  initiative  in  1965  was  not  sustained  in  the  year  that  fol- 
lowed. The  coffers  of  the  Coordination  Committee  received  only  $4.9 
million  (bringing  the  total  to  some  $110  million)  compared  with  re- 
ceipts and  pledge^  in  1965  of  $37.2  million.  There  were  a  few  signs 
of  progress  in  1966 :  the  small  Nam  Pong  dam  in  Thailand  had  been 
completed  in  mid-March;  the  large  Nam  Ngum  dam  in  Laos  was 
finally  funded  on  May  4,  although  the  bulk  of  pledges  had  been  made 
the  year  before;  the  U.S.  Congress,  on  March  16,  had  authorized  a 
$200  million  subscription  to  the  capital  of  the  Asian  Development 
Bank  (matched  by  a  Japanese  subscription  of  the  same  amount)  ; 
field  reconnaissances  continued  at  Pa  Mong  and  Sambor;  studies  went 
on  of  resources,  and  organization  and  training  in  preparation  for 
operational  phases;  and  there  was  slow  growth  of  the  staff  support- 
ing the  Committee  and  its  Executive. 

On  the  negative  side,  there  was  the  continued  refusal  of  North  Viet- 
nam to  settle  diplomatically  for  less  than  continued  military  action  was 
judged  likely  to  achieve;  the  insistence  of  Cambodia  on  aloofness  from 
the  United  States,  even  where  the  Mekong  was  involved  (which  con- 
tributed to  delay  on  an  important  dam  at  Prek  Thnot)  ;  the  continued 
expansion  of  the  Vietnamese  War;  and  the  erosion  of  U.S.  effort  for 
development  not  directly  contributing  to  U.S.  presence  in  South  Viet- 
nam. Troop  strength  of  the  United  States  military  services  in  Vietnam 
increased  rapidly  in  1965  and  thereafter,  reaching  a  peak  in  April 
1969.  (See Table 3.) 

TABLE  3.— U.S.  MILITARY  FORCES  IN  VIETNAM  ' 
[In  thousands] 

Date  Army  Navy  Air  Force     Marine  Corps  Totals 2 

Dec.  31, 1964 

Dec.  31,1965 

Dec.  31,  1966 

Apr.  30,1969 

Feb.  10,1972 

May  11,  1972 

1  Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Defense. 

'Totals  include  small  contingents  of  Coast  Guard. 

Not  only  was  the  rate  of  construction  and  new  starts  on  Mekong 
work  unimpressive,  but  a  record-breaking  flood  on  the  Mekong  in  Sep- 
tember 1966  had  caused  enormous  damage  in  the  delta,  wiped  out  a 
large  demonstration  farm  complex  in  Laos,  and  caused  diversion  of 
supplies  to  aid  flood-stricken  refugees. 

Right  up  to  the  present  day,  the  uneven  progress  of  the  Mekong 
project  has  continued  to  reflect  the  political  and  military  turmoil  in  the 
region.  The  project  does  not  appear  to  be  regarded  as  an  ideological 

(409) 


14.7 

1.1 

6.6 

0.9 

23.3 

116.8 

8.4 

20.6 

38.2 

184.3 

239.4 

23.3 

5L.9 

69.2 

385.3 

363.3 

36.5 

61.4 

81.8 

543.3 

99.7 

6.8 

26.6 

.5 

133.7 

43.6 

2.8 

17.1 

1.4 

65.0 

410 


issue — for  example,  the  Pathet  Lao  has  been  agreeable  to  the  Nam 
Ngum  construction,  and  interferences  with  the  various  working  groups 
and  construction  projects  have  been  few  and  apparently  inadvertent. 
However,  sustained  commitment  of  resources  and  manpower  to  long- 
range  development  projects  is  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  fact  of  the 
spreading  conflict  in  Southeast  Asia.  The  expectations  in  1965  that  the 
war  would  wind  down  in  perhaps  another  four  years  had  been  a  factor 
in  President  Johnson's  calculation ;  he  had  apparently  judged  the  time 
ripe  in  April  of  1965  to  encourage  thought  about  planning  for  postwar 
development,  if  only  as  a  self-fulfilling  prophecy  in  hastening  the  end- 
ing of  the  war.  A  similar  outlook,  at  the  end  of  1966,  appears  to  have 
motivated  his  appointment  of  the  Lilienthal  mission. 

Postwar  Planning  in  Vietnam :  the  Thuc-Lilienthal  Report 

As  an  evidence  of  President  Johnson's  continuing  interest  in  region- 
alism as  applicable  to  Southeast  Asia  was  his  action  of  December  16, 
1966  in  appointing  David  E.  Lilienthal  to  head  a  regional  planning 
mission  to  Vietnam.  Lilienthal  had  come  into  national  attention  in  the 
mid-1980s  as  general  manager  and  then  chairman  of  TVA,  and  subse- 
quently chairman  of  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  After  re- 
tiring from  public  service  in  1950,  he  had  organized  the  Development 
and  Resources  Corporation,  a  private  venture  to  aid  developing  coun- 
tries in  their  regional  planning.  The  Lilienthal  mission  to  Vietnam 
was  originally  conceived  as  a  postwar  planning  venture.64  After  his 
appointment  to  the  task,  Lilienthal  went  to  South  Vietnam  on  a  short 
reconnaissance  visit,  accompanied  by  Robert  W.  Komer,  special  as- 
sistant to  President  .Johnson.  Upon  their  return  they  held  a  joint  press 
conference  at  the  White  House  with  President  Johnson  on  Febru- 
ary 27,  1967.  In  describing  his  views  of  their  mission,  the  President 
explained : 

From  the  early  stage  of  the  TVA  I  have  .  .  .  admired  the  novel,  constructive, 
and  farreaching  thoughts  and  programs  which  (Lilienthal)  has  inaugurated  on 
behalf  of  people  in  a  democratic  way  and  in  a  democratic  society. 

We  finally  prevailed  on  him  to  go  out  and  do  some  studying  (in  Vietnam).  .  .  . 
He  has  given  us  his  help.  I  think  it  will  have  farreaching  results  and  effects/ 
It  is  going  to  be  essential  to  our  success  in  that  area. 

This  goes  back  to  what  was  said  in  Baltimore  in  April  of  1965.  .  .  . 

Later  in  the  interview,  the  President  again  interjected — 

Some  of  this  thinking  is  reflected  in  the  Baltimore  speech  of  April  of  1965. 
That  will  be  brought  up  to  date.  We  have  worked  some  with  some  of  the  United 
Nations  people  and  some  of  our  own  economic  people  since  that  time.  Of  course. 
we  talked  to  Mr.  (Eugene)  Black  about  the  agreed  deal  with  the  Asian  Devel- 
opment   Hunk  and  the  economic  development  of  that  whole  part  of  the  world. 

Mr.  Komer  stressed  the  postwar  development  theme — 

Everywhere  I  traveled  in  the  country  there  was  a  feeling  that  the  outcome  of 
this  conflict  w;is  no  Longer  in  doubt.  .  .  .  There  is  a  growing  mood  of  confidence  in 
South  Vietnam. 

Mr.  Lilienthal's  contribution  to  the  conference  was  centered  on  the 


"lAt  the  Manila  Conference,  October  1966,  a  statement  was  Issued  In  a  Joint  Com- 
munique  (State  Department  Bulletin,  November  i!>.  1966,  p.  732)  that  read:  "Looking  to 
the  long-term  future  of  their  richly  endowed  country,  the  Vietnamese  representatives  de 
scribed  their  views  and  plans  for  the  building  of  an  expanded  postwar  economy."  This 
led  to  the  action  by  President  Johnson,  announced  December  1G,  that  the  United  States 
Oovernmenl  and  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  would  sponsor  a  joint  plan- 
nine  effort  on  the  "long  run  development  of  the  Vietnamese  economy."  at  the  request  of 
Prime  Minister  Kv  (This  was  reported  in  Department  of  State  Bulletin,  January  9,  1967, 
p.  69). 


411 


terms  of  reference  of  his  projected  mission.  It  would  be  nongovern- 
mental because,  as  Prime  Minister  Nguyen  Ky  had  told  him,  the  long- 
term  development  of  his  country  "would  not  be  possible  unless  this 
group  of  planners  and  developers  were  not  to  be  interrupted  from 
time  to  time  by  possible  changes  in  the  government."  The  study  would 
be  carried  on  over  a  three-year  period,  with  projected  funding  of  $1.5 
million.  He  would  have  a  partner  in  the  study,  Professor  Nguyen  Dang 
Thuc,  heading  a  nongovernmental  group  of  Vietnamese.  Asked  what 
the  priority  elements  of  the  study  would  be,  Mr.  Lilienthal  said  that 
there  were  some  "fantastically  productive  resources  of  that  country 
that  could  change  the  whole  complexion." 

One  of  them  is  the  Delta,  so-called,  the  Delta  of  the  Mekong  River.  That  may 
well  be  the  first,  to  look  at  the  long-term  future  of  that  area  which  is  producing 
enormous  amounts  of  rice. . . . 

This  river  has  water  resources  that  are  almost  unmanageable.  I  thought  I 
knew  rivers,  but  I  have  never  seen  a  river  with  such  fertile  land  stretching 
out  as  far  as  the  eye  can  see.96 

At  a  second  White  House  news  conference,  almost  a  year  later, 
Lilienthal  explained  that  circumstances  had  changed  the  terms  of 
reference  of  his  mission : 

At  the  time  we  undertook  this  [job],  it  was  thought  of  as  a  postwar  economic 
long-range  development  program ;  namely,  that  this  would  begin  after  hostilities 
had  ceased.  This  soon  turned  out  to  be  unrealistic,  this  postwar  emphasis. 

The  war  itself,  being  informal  with  territories  undefined  and  sover- 
eign authorities  not  well  established,  seemed  to  promise  no  definite 
termination  point.  Moreover,  "It  also  became  clear  that  it  would  be 
nothing  less  than  a  disaster  if  economic  development  by  the  Viet- 
namese were  to  await  a  conclusion  of  the  war — disaster  because  infla- 
tion would  take  over,  disaster  because  the  needs  of  the  country  are 
great  and  the  opportunities  are  great." 

His  outlook  was  optimistic,  full  of  praise  for  the  initiative  of  the 
Vietnamese  people,  and  hopeful  for  the  spread  of  small,  local  industry. 

Small-scale  industry  depends  upon  people,  first  of  all,  who  have  some  entre- 
preneurial sense.  These  people  have  it.  You  don't  have  to  teach  profit  motive 
to  these  peasants ;  they  invented  it.  They  are  very  adept  at  machinery ;  prac- 
tically anywhere  you  go,  there  is  a  fellow  who  sets  up  a  business  to  take  a  Honda 
apart  and  put  it  together.  If  he  doesn't  have  the  part,  he  will  take  an  old  Bud- 
weiser  beer  can  and  cut  out  the  part.  I  have  never  seen  people  as  adaptable. 

The  test  of  success,  Lilienthal  concluded,  was  whether  the  new  gov- 
ernment of  South  Vietnam  would  sustain  its  interest  in  economic  devel- 
opment, or  whether  it  would  be  consumed  by  political  questions  or 
quarrels.  "The  way  to  tell  about  that,"  he  said,  "is  when  the  first  bill 
for  the  Mekong  Delta  Authority,  which  is  one  of  the  things  we  want, 
is  introduced  into  the  Legislature  .  .  ."  66 

A  Rand  Corporation  analysis67  of  the  Thuc-Lilienthal  mission 
report 68  called  attention  to  the  difficulty  encountered  by  the  report's 


66  "Economic  Situation  in  Viet-Nam,"  Department  of  State  Bulletin  (March  20,  1967), 
pp.  467-471. 

88  "Mr.  Lilienthal  Discusses  Viet-Nam's  Economic  Development  Program,"  Department  of 
State  Bulletin  '  December  25,  1967),  pp.  864-867. 

87  Albert  P.  Williams,  Jr.,  "South  Vietnam's  Develonment  Prospects  in  a  Postwar  Era  : 
A  Review  of  the  Thuc-Lilienthal  Report,"  report  No.  P-4563  (Santa  Monica,  Calif.  :  Rand 
Corporation,  January  1971). 

68  Joint  Development  Group,  "The  Postwar  Development  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  : 
Policies  and  Programs,"  3  vols.  (Saigon,  New  York  :  Postwar  Planning  Group,  Development 
and  Resources  Corporation,  1969).  The  report  was  transmitted  to  Nguyen  Van  Thieu, 
President.  Republic  of  Vietnam,  from  Vu  Quoc  Thuc,  Chairman,  Postwar  Planning  Group, 
and  David  E.  Lilienthal,  Chairman,  Development  and  Resources  Corporation,  March  1969. 


412 


authors  in  resolving  the  issue  of  a  postwar  versus  a  more  broadly  de- 
fined "futures"  study.  The  Rand  analysis  concluded  : 

The  whole  environment  in  Vietnam  is  in  a  state  of  transition.  There  are 
numerous  important  current  trends:  Americans  are  leaving;  Vietnamese  are 
assuming  more  of  the  defense  burden ;  security  is  improving ;  and  the  economy 
is  growing.  These  trends  do  not  lead  directly  to  peace.  All  are  favorable,  though 
some  may  be  reversible.  Their  continuity  will  not  be  assured  by  favorable  eco- 
nomic performance,  but  such  performance  will  be  reinforcing. 

The  Thuc-Lilienthal  report  had  recommended  a  large-scale,  capital- 
intensive  water  project  which,  said  the  Rand  analysis,  "seems  precisely 
the  kind  of  project  that  is  unlikely  to  be  undertaken  until  the  national 
budget  is  relieved  of  some  of  the  burdens  of  the  national  security  and 
until  the  GVN  (Government  of  Vietnam)  top  managers  become  less 
preoccupied  with  the  war."  Earlier,  the  Rand  analysis,  in  discussing 
the  report's  suggestions  for  a  large  public  investment  program, 
commented : 

The  discussion  of  sectoral  investment  priorities  argues  against  favoring  the 
industrial  sector  at  the  expense  of  agriculture.  This  is  doubtless  good  advice  to 
a  country  with  the  resource  endowments  of  South  Vietnam,  no  matter  what 
investment  environment,  but  the  case  seems  particularly  strong  in  the  environ- 
ment postulated  here.  In  the  first  place,  the  success  of  Vietnamization  almost 
surely  hinges  on  the  continuation  of  the  favorable  security  developments  in  the 
Mekong  Delta,  the  richest  agricultural  region.  Thus  agricultural  investment  will 
be  the  safest  kind — security-wise — during  the  next  five  years.  Secondly,  agricul- 
tural capital  formation  in  Vietnam  is  largely  comprised  of  widespread  mecha- 
nization of  relatively  small  enterprises.  Thus  the  capital  goods  are  spread  out  and 
are  less  suitable  as  hostages  for  enemy  objectives.  Finally,  small  scale  agricul- 
tural investment  is  very  conserving  of  GVN  management  .  .  .  ." 

The  Thuc-Lilienthal  study  also,  by  implication,  posed  the  question 
as  to  how  planning  for  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin  as  a  geographic  and 
developmental  entity  was  to  be  reconciled  with  planning  in  the  sep- 
arate Riparian  States.  Parts  of  Laos,  Cambodia,  and  Thailand,  and 
most  of  South  Vietnam,  lay  outside  the  Basin.  The  complications  of 
planning  a  coherent  and  balanced  program  of  development  of  the 
Basin,  with  active  military  conflict  in  three  of  the  countries,  seem 
formidable.  Logically,  most  of  the  active  construction  was  in  single 
nations  and  on  tributaries.  It  was  important  that  each  of  the  four 
Riparian  States  should  be  assigned  some  equitable  share  of  these,  as 
well  as  contributing  some  equitable  share  of  the  total  costs. 

The  Thuc-Lilienthal  study  apparently  recognized— as  did  the  Rand 
Corporation  analysis  of  it— that  the  form  taken  by  the  conflict  and 
the  manner  of  its  termination  would  be  an  important  determinant  of 
the  appropriateness  of  any  development  plan.  The  primary  value  of 
the  Thuc-Lilienthal  survey  lay  in  its  description  of  the  Mekong  Delta 
as  a  populous  and  potentially  rich  region,  and  their  analysis  of  the 
economic  problems  and  opportunities  in  other  parts  of  Vietnam.  How- 
ever, as  the  war  continued  to  expand  into  Laos  and  Cambodia  .(i.e., 
Khmer  Republic),  the  problems  of  planning  for  future  economic  de- 
velopment in  these  countries  might  be  expected  to  resemble  those  of 
South  Vietnam. 

In  fact,  as  the  war  spread,  more  and  more  of  the  total  activity  on 
the  Mekong— as  distinguished  from  planning  and  "pre-investment" 
work— tended  to  take   place  in  Thailand.  Although  attention  had 

*  Williams,  "South  Vietnam's  Development  Prospects,"  p.  19. 


413 


earlier  been  called  repeatedly  to  the  remarkable  freedom  from  inter- 
ference enjoyed  by  those  working  on  the  Mekong  Project,  the  report 
of  the  Coordination  Committee  for  1971  makes  numerous  men- 
tion of  projects  retarded  by  the  "security"  problems  and  the  unsettled 
conditions.70 

The  piling  up  of  studies  in  the  face  of  compelled  inaction  on  con- 
struction may  help  to  ensure  more  thorough  examination  of  the  total 
system  before  it  turns  into  a  reality.  However,  the  delay  must  also  be  a 
source  of  frustration  not  only  in  Bangkok  but  also  in  the  three  other 
national  capitals,  and  at  the  long-promised  construction  sites. 

Action  on  the  Large  Main  Stem  Projects 

Early  in  its  history,  and  particularly  from  1957  onward,  the  Co- 
ordination Committee  repeatedly  characterized  the  three  main  stem 
dam  projects — at  Pa  Mong,  Sambor,  and  Tonle  Sap — as  its  "priority" 
items  of  construction.  The  Pa  Mong  unit  in  particular  was  favored 
because  of  its  enormous  potential  for  alleviating  downstream  floods, 
as  well  as  its  irrigation  and  power  features.  Responsibility  for  plan- 
ning the  Pa  Mong  dam,  by  agreement  between  the  Committee  and 
U.S.A.I.D.,  was  assigned  to  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Reclamation.  An 
elaborate  series  of  studies  followed.  In  the  most  recent  of  these,  the 
"Pa  Mong  Stage  One  Feasibility  Report,  1970,"  the  Bureau  concluded 
with  the  following  passage : 

One  of  the  most  frequently  asked  questions  during  the  course  of  the  investiga- 
tions leading  to  this  report  is  :  When  will  Pa  Mong  Project  be  built? 

Pa  Mong  Project  will  probably  be  built  when  the  Riparian  countries,  especially 
Laos  and  Thailand,  decide  that  they  need  the  project  and  that  it  fits  their  na- 
tional development  requirements  as  well  as  or  better  than  any  alternative.  When 
and  how  the  project  fits  into  their  development  plans  will  presumably  be  based 
on  decisions  as  to  the  best  use  of  development  resources  including  funds  and 
manpower,  and  a  determination  of  how  to  best  meet  their  development  needs. 

One  of  the  first  questions  to  be  resolved  insofar  as  Pa  Mong  is  concerned  is : 
Are  the  products  of  Pa  Mong,  i.e.,  power,  increased  agricultural  production, 
corollary  effects,  and  the  human  benefits,  needed  in  the  development  scheme  and 
if  so,  what  are  the  orders  of  priority? 

The  conclusion  was  suggested  that  the  project  might  be  activated  at  a 
"much  earlier  date"  if  it  could  be  set  up  on  a  self-liquidating  basis 
"with  a  management  organization  having  authority  to  (1)  negotiate 
loans,  (2)  monitor  expenditures,  (3)  control  operation  and  mainte- 
nance so  as  to  produce  maximum  sustained  revenues,  and  (4)  control 
revenues  for  most  expeditious  debt  service.  .  .  ." 

A  separate  examination  of  the  question  as  to  the  timing  of  main  stem 
projects  was  undertaken  in  1970  by  Resources  for  the  Future,  Inc., 
at  the  request  of  the  World  Bank.  Specifically,  RFF  was  asked  to  ex- 
amine the  Amplified  Basin  Plan  Report  of  the  Coordination  Commit- 
tee, completed  in  1970,  with  respect  to  development  strategy  and  pri- 
orities in  the  region  as  they  might  affect  agriculture. 

The  findings  of  the  RFF  report 71  were  that  despite  the  substantial 
effort  in  research  and  "impact  studies,"  there  were  still  many  serious 
gaps.  These  included :  the  role  of  electric  power,  the  ecological  conse- 


70  In  the  draft  report,  references  to  this  problem  appear  on  pases  21,  22,  23.  36-37,  40,  42, 
59,  and  74.  On  the  subject  of  war  disruption  in  the  Republic  of  Viet  Nam  see  U.S.  Congress.' 
Senate.  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  "Impact  of  the  Vietnam  War,"  (Washington  D.C.  : 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  1971),  91st  Cong.,  2nd  sess.,  1971. 

71  Resources  for  the  Future,  Agricultural  Development  in  the  Mekong  Basin:  Goals,  Pri- 
orities, and  Strategies  (Baltimore,  Md.  :  Johns  Hopkins  Press,  1971). 


414 


quences  of  creating  a  great  lake  behind  the  Pa  Mong  dam,  the  threat 
of  costly  interruption  of  work  on  a  very  large  project,  political  and 
international  considerations  of  equity,  and  alternative  uses  of  water. 
The  report  identified  three  essential  preconditions  for  main  stem 
projects : 

(1)  That  substantial  results — physical,  managerial,  and  social — have  been 
reached  in  the  tributary  projects  ; 

(2)  That  markets  are  clearly  opening  up  in  a  sustained  way  for  absorbing  the 
increased  output  that  would  come  from  the  development  of  mainstem  projects ; 
and 

(3)  That  associated  power  production  is  carefully  channeled  so  as  to  minimize 
the  chance  of  its  accentuating  social  and  economic  inequities  both  between  rural 
and  urban  areas  and  within  urban  areas.72 

Undoubtedly,  the  engineering  achievement  represented  by  the  Pa 
Mong  dam  would  have  many  beneficial  effects — for  the  morale  of  the 
Coordination  Committee  and  all  associated  sponsors,  for  the  Riparian 
States — especially  Laos  and  Thailand,  for  the  United  Nations,  and  for 
the  United  States.  Even  though  exploitation  of  the  benefits  in  irriga- 
tion and  power  might  have  to  be  spread  over  many  future  years,  the 
dam  would  be  a  magnificent  billion-dollar  symbol  of  global  interest  in 
the  Mekong  Region.  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  RFF  report  concludes : 

.  .  .  International  organizations  no  less  than  donor  countries  must  beware  lest 
their  desire  to  see  economic  development  proceed  along  certain  lines  lead  them 
into  assuming  a  primary  responsibility  which  really  is  not  theirs.  At  times  it  may 
even  be  better  to  see  development  falter  than  to  see  primary  responsibility  pass 
out  of  the  hands  of  the  riparian  countries.  By  the  same  token  any  line  of  action 
that  spells  increased  understanding  and  participation  of  people  in  the  region,  of 
local  groups  and  organizations,  and  of  governmental  units  should  receive  high 
priority  in  assistance.  For  only  to  the  degree  that  the  people  in  the  Basin  make 
the  plans  for  development  theirs  will  they  succeed  in  bringing  development 
worthy  of  the  name. 

Status  of  the  Mekong  Project,  Beginning  of  1972 

As  the  Mekong  Project  has  unfolded,  the  scope  and  complexity  of 
its  totality  becomes  progressively  more  difficult  to  characterize.  The 
spread  of  the  Vietnamese  War  has  impacted  at  many  points.  National 
planning — particularly  with  respect  to  the  part  of  the  Delta  lying  in 
South  Vietnam — has  interacted  with  river  basin  planning.  Circum- 
stances in  Cambodia  (Khmer  Republic)  have  been  altered  by  the 
change  in  that  country's  government.  Uncertainties  surrounding  U.S. 
foreign  aid  policy  are  an  important  complication.  The  apparent  suc- 
cess of  initial  moves  toward  detente  between  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  and  the  United  States  invite  speculation  as  to  whether  Main- 
land China  may  in  time  agree  to  a  comprehensive  scheme  to  combine 
planning  and  development  of  the  Upper  Mekong  Basin  with  the 
Lower.  Question  is  also  raised  as  to  the  possible  interest  of  the  Soviet 
Union  in  contributing  its  support  to  the  Project;  the  USSR  has  not 
yet  contributed  to  the  activity  but  does  not  appear  to  disfavor  it. 

According  to  the  draft  report  of  the  Coordination  Committee  for 
1971,  allocation   of  expenditures  for  the  Mekong  Project   has  con- 


™Ibid.,  pp.  106-107. 


415 


tinued  to  emphasize  construction  over  planning  and  "pre-investment." 
Nevertheless,  the  scope  of  the  latter  has  expanded  enormously  in  re- 
spect to  range  of  subject-matter  and  fineness  of  detail.  Technical  train- 
ing and  large-scale  agricultural  experiment  stations  have  assumed 
much  greater  importance,  and  appear  to  be  laying  the  groundwork  for 
progressive  evolution  of  an  infrastructure  to  exploit  the  resources  de- 
veloped in  the  civil  engineering  phase  of  the  Project. 

Progress  has  been  achieved,  of  course,  in  the  dam-building  work.  On 
tributaries  of  the  Mekong,  three  small  and  two  larger  dams  have  been 
completed  in  Thailand  and  Laos,  along  with  associated  power  plants 
and  irrigation  works.  Three  other  tributary  dams  are  funded  and 
under  construction,  although  the  largest,  a  $27  million  facility  on  the 
Prek  Thnot  tributary  in  the  Khmer  Republic,  has  been  interrupted  by 
war.  The  total  resources  available  to  the  Coordination  Committee  were 
divided  between  construction  ($144  million  or  68  percent)  and  pre- 
investment  work  ($69  million  or  32  percent) .  The  four  Riparian  States 
contributed  $93  million  or  44  percent  if  the  total.  As  between  loans 
and  outright  grants,  the  latter  accounted  for  $162.5  million  or  76 
percent.  (For  a  listing  of  Operational  Resources  as  of  December  31, 
1971,  see  Table  4.  For  a  report  of  the  status  of  construction  and  de- 
velopment activities  in  1972,  see  Table  5.) 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1-28 


416 


TABLE  4.1— MEKONG  PROJECT.  OPERATIONAL  RESOURCES  AS  OF  DEC.  31,  1971 


Preinvestment 

investigations 

Investment  for 

and  planning 

construction 

(dollar 

(dollar 

Total  (dollar 

equivalent) 

equivalent) 

equivalent) 

1,011,000 

2,  733,  458 

3,744,458 

75,000  . 

75,000 

171,000  . 

171,000 

1,365,000 

5,000,000 

6,365,000 

10,000 

1,280,000 

1,290,000 

10,000  . 

10,000 

1,774,049 

4,977,311 

6,751,360 

2,500 

17,000,000 

17,002,500 

20,000  . 

20.  000 

312,805 

200,  000 

512.805 

20,  000  . 

20,  000 

243,500  . 

243,500 

1,121,480 

5,000 

1,126,480 

49,  700 

1,000,000 

1,049,700 

1,555,430 

13,  907,  000 

15,462,430 

1,727,942 

4,  770,  000 

6, 497,  942 

366, 327 

432,  860 

799, 187 

10,  000  . 

10,  000 

100,000 

150,000 

250,  000 

339,  957 

80,  000 

419,957 

20,000  . 

20, 000 

475,000  . 

475, 000 

5,000  . 

5,000 

896,  453 

1,554,247 

2,  450,  700 

21,163,022 

16, 645, 000 

37,808,022 

Australia . 

Austria 

Eelgium 

Canada 

Denmark 

Fhland 

France -. 

Federal  Republic  of  Germany. 

Hong  Kong 

India 

Indonesia 

Iran 

Israel 

Italy 

Japan 

Netherlands 

New  Zealand 

Norway 

Pakistan. 

Philippines... 

Sweden 

Switzerland 

United  Arab  Republic 

United  Kingdom... 

United  States 


Subtotal. 


Khrre"  Republic. 

Laos 

Thailand. 

Vietnam 


Subtotal. 


ECAFE 

UNOTC(BTAO). 

ILO 

FAO 

UNESCO 

UNICEF 

UNIDO 

WHO 

WMO 

IAEA 

UNDP/SF 

WFP. 


Subtotal. 


Magsaysay  Foundation. 
Others... 


32,  845, 165 


3,491,583 

3,030,121 

10,  369,  786 

2,663,842 


19,555,332 


790,  582 

452,  799 

13,104 

140,050 

17,  800 

50,  000 

14,820 

8,277 

45,300 

55,650 

15,121,288 

36,  508 


16,746,178 


10,  000 
455,  443 


69,  734,  876 


9,  328, 100 

934, 500 

52,  330, 969 

11,020,000 


73,613,569 


810,  900 
136,575 


947,475 


67,  850 


102,580,041 


12,819,683 

964,621 

62,700,755 

13,683,842 


90,168,901 


790,  582 

452,  799 
13, 104 

140,  050 
17,800 
50,  000 
14,820 
8,277 
45,  300 
55.650 
15,  932, 188 

173,083 


17,693,653 


10,000 
523,  293 


Grand  total. 


69,612,118  144,363,770 


210,975,888 


Supplied  by  U.S.  AID. 


417 


TABLE  5.— MEKONG  TRIBUTARY  PROJECTS:  JANUARY  1972' 


Project  and  status 

Installed 

capacity 

(kilowatts) 

Irrigation 
(hectares) 

Other  benefits 

Co-operating  countries 

LAOS 
Nam  Ngun:  Completed  1971 

Nam  Dong:  Completed  1971 

Lower  Se  Done:  Completed  1970 

30, 000 

1,250 
2,500 

18, 000 

31,500 
4,500 

6,300 

25,  000 

24, 000 
(36,  000) 

(135,000) 

Power  for  down- 
stream pump 
irrigation,  fish- 
eries, flood 
control. 

Australia,  Canada,  Denmark 
France,  Japan,  Netherlands, 
New  Zealand,  Thailand, 
United  States. 

France. 
Do. 

KHMER  REPUBLIC 
Prek  Thnot:  Under  construction 

Battambang:  Under  Investigation 

Stung  Chi  nit :  Feasibility  report 
completed. 

THAILAND 

Nam  Pung:  Completed  1965 

Nam  Pong:  Completed  1966. _. 

Lam  Dom  Noi:  Completed  1971 

Lam  Takong:  Completed  1971 

(5,000) 
70,  000 

68,000 
25,  000 

53,  000 

38,  000 
9,000 

54,  000 
32,000 

78, 000 

Flood  control,              Australia,  Canada,  Denmark 
fisheries.                     France,  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  India,  Italy,  Japan, 
Netherlands,  Pakistan, 
Philippines,  United  Kingdom. 
Do.                     Switzerland. 
Flood  control Japan. 

Power  for  pump 
irrigation. 

Flood  control,              Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
fisheries. 

Pump  irrigation  for      Japan. 
33,000  hectares  fish- 
eries, flood  control, 
water  supply. 

Lam  Phra  Phloeng:  Completed  1971.. 

Flood  control, 
fisheries. 

Flood  control 

Flood  control, 
fisheries. 

United  States 

Nam  Phrom:  Under  construction 

Lam  Pao:  Under  construction. 

Nam  Oon:  Under  construction 

Nam  Mae  Kok:  Under  investigation. . 

40,000 
(80,000) 

80, 000 
108,  000 

Japan. 

United  States. 

Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 

Pak  Mun:  Feasibility  report  com- 

Power for  pump 

irrigation, 

fisheries. 
Flood  control, 

fisheries. 

do 

do 

Switzerland. 
France. 

pleted. 
Mun  &  Chi:  Feasibility  report 

50, 000 

75,  000 
21, 150 

United  States 

completed. 

VIETNAM 

Upper  Sre  Pok:  Reconnaissance 

report  completed. 
Upper  Se  San:  Reconnaissance 

report  completed. 
Yali  Falls:  Feasibility  report 

2  200 

2  300 

100, 000 

Japan. 
Japan,  UNDP. 

• 

completed. 

i  Source:  "The  Mekong  Project  1972,"  unpaginated  brochure  issued  by  the  Coordination  Committee  in  early  1972. 
3  Megawatts. 


418 


Apart  from  civil  works  construction,  one  of  the  most  important  ac- 
tivities under  the  Mekong  Project  is  the  network  of  experimental  and 
demonstration  farms  and  "Pioneer  Agricultural  Projects."  The  farms 
have  been  under  development  for  some  years,  and  include :  Vientiane 
Plain  Farm  (Laos),  Kalasin  Farm  (Thailand),  Prek  Thnot  Farm 
(Khmer  Republic),  Battambang  Farm  (Khmer  Republic),  and  Eak 
Mat  Farm  (Republic  of  Vietnam).  The  Pioneer  Agricultural  Projects 
are  a  more  recent  development,  dating  from  1971.  They  are  larger  in 
area  than  the  farms,  roughly  5,000  to  10,000  hectares,  to  enable  detailed 
study  of  economic,  social,  and  institutional  problems,  as  well  as  mat- 
ters of  credit,  marketing,  and  processing.  The  plan  of  the  Coordination 
Committee  calls  for  pioneer  projects  to  be  instituted  in  each  of  the  four 
Riparian  States.  According  to  the  draft  report  of  the  Coordination 
Committee  for  1971 :  "In  September-October  a  plan  of  operation  was 
signed  by  the  Mekong  Committee,  the  UNDP  (United  Nations  De- 
velopment Program),  and  the  IBRD  (World  Bank)  for  the  execution 
of  this  program  by  the  World  Bank  on  behalf  of  the  Mekong  Commit- 
tee and  for  the  UNDP  and  the  contributing  countries.  Subsequently, 
arrangements  were  made  for  the  collaboration  of  the  FAO  (Food  and 
Agriculture  Organization)  and  the  Asian  Development  Bank  with  the 
IBRD  in  this  undertaking." 

Difficulties  with  field  surveys  under  the  conditions  of  war  instability 
have  led  to  an  interesting  development :  the  proposed  use  of  Earth  Re- 
sources Satellites  to  perform  agricultural  land  use  surveys,  reservoir 
resettlement  studies,  and  surveys  of  floods  and  flood  damage. 

The  ramifications  of  the  Mekong  Project  are  beginning  to  appear  al- 
most limitless — encompassing  river  navigation  and  channel  marking, 
flood  warning  and  control,  weather  stations,  hydroelectric  power  pro- 
duction-distribution-use, irrigation,  mineral  resource  exploitation,  pri- 
mary manufacturing,  fertilizer  production  and  use,  power  market 
surveys,  agricultural  experiment  and  demonstration,  public  health, 
education  and  training,  bridges,  roads,  resettlement  problems,  and  even 
archeological  considerations.  Were  it  not  for  the  coherence  inherent  in 
the  plan  for  a  river  basin  in  its  entirety,  the  diffusion  of  effort  would 
almost  certainly  be  unmanageable. 

An  effort  to  heighten  this  coherence  is  the  preparation  by  the  Co- 
ordination Committee  of  an  "Indicative  Basin  Plan  Report."  This 
comprehensive  document  Avas  made  public  in  Bangkok  on  March  10. 
1972.  The  700-page  report  outlined  a  $12  billion  30-year  program  of 
"integrated"  regional  development. 

Environmental  Quality  and  Regional  Development  of  the  Mekong 

For  more  than  a  decade  of  planning  and  development  in  the  Lower 
Mekong  Basin  the  question  of  adverse  ecological  consequences  re- 
ceived little  attention.  Mostly  it  was  dismissed  as  of  minor  significance 
relative  to  the  great  economic  opportunities  in  prospect,  especially  in 
view  of  the  depressed  condition  of  those  about  to  be  benefited.  How- 
ever, the  rising  anxieties  in  the  United  States  over  environmental 
consequences  of  applied  technology  compelled  increasing  attention  to 
these  same  consequences  for  the  inhabitants  of  the  Mekong  Basin. 

One  evidence  of  this  trend  was  presented  in  the  renort  of  a  field 
study  of  the  Pa  Mong  dam,  financed  by  U.S.A.I.D.,  which  predicted 
extensive  disadvantages  along  with  the  merits:  bilharzia  and  malaria 


419 


from  the  penned-up  slack  water,  the  consequences  of  heavy  reliance 
(foreseen  as  necessary)  on  chemical  pesticides,  resettlement  of  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  families  from  the  reservoir  area,  need  for  large 
amounts  of  chemical  fertilizer  as  farmers  were  displaced  from  fertile 
river  flood  plains  to  less  fertile  uplands,  flooding  of  prime  timber 
lands,  and  diminished  fish  population.73  An  additional  catalog  of 
possible  disadvantages  was  offered  by  Claire  Sterling  in  a  series  of 
newspaper  articles  on  the  Mekong  Project.74  Reservoirs  choked  with 
water  hyacinths,  leaching  of  great  salt  deposits  into  the  main  stem  of 
the  river  rendering  the  water  unsuitable  for  irrigation,  the  threat  of 
an  epidemic  of  liver  fluke  to  a  nation  of  raw  fish  eaters,  and  the  loss 
of  fertilizing  silt  downstream  as  a  result  of  upstream  flood  control. 
However,  the  author  concluded  this  catalog  with  the  observation  that 
"For  once,  developers  and  planners  are  giving  some  study  to  this  sort 
of  thing  before  the  event."  But  even  that  assurance  carried  an  accom- 
panying danger:  "Whether  or  not  they  may  end  by  studying  the 
scheme  to  death  is  another  thing." 

An  analysis  of  this  problem  of  adverse  environmental  effects,  with 
particular  reference  to  the  Aswan  High  Dam,  suggests  that  there 
are  some  reasonably  objective  guidelines  to  determine  good  from 
bad  environmental  management.  The  analysis  recommended  (1)  that 
qualitative  requirements  for  the  environment  be  quantitatively  ex- 
pressed and  brought  into  the  equation  of  good  and  bad  products  of 
the  development,  (2)  that  the  options  be  preserved — including  plant 
and  animal  species — to  enable  readaptation  of  the  environment  to 
future  changes  in  policy,  (3)  that  the  environment  itself  be  diversi- 
fied as  much  as  possible,  and  (4)  that  the  planners  take  into  account 
the  limited  tolerance  of  any  environment  to  change.75 

Perhaps  the  most  serious  of  these  criticisms  concerns  the  health 
and  medical  consequences  of  civil  works.  Even  without  manipulation 
of  the  Mekong,  the  health  problems  of  the  region  are  serious.  One  pro- 
posal (with  specific  reference  to  such  problems  in  Africa)  calls  for 
a  "series  of  strong  medico-biological  research  centers"  and  also  "col- 
laborative efforts  or  programs  involving  as  full  a  local  participation 
as  possible."  Each  of  the  proposed  centers  would  have  a  set  of  par- 
ticular objectives  related  to  local  needs,  but  aimed  at  anticipating  and 
correcting  for  adverse  ecological  effects  of  technological  applications. 

This  means  evaluation  of  health  needs  in  the  fullest  sense,  and  it  requires  com- 
bined contributions  from  as  many  disciplines  as  can  effectively  be  focused  on  the 
problem.  The  effort  must  be  regional,  cooperative,  sympathetic — but  scientifically 
rigorous.  It  must  build  a  bank  of  reliable  information,  continually  cross-checked 
from  the  standpoint  of  different  disciplines.  This  material,  re-evaluated  and 
restudied  as  opportunity  and  need  require,  assembled  and  available  to  all,  should 
provide  an  invaluable  source  for  aid  at  any  level.  Major  programs  without  such 
prior  study  are  unthinkable  in  view  of  past  experience.  From  each  study  area 
an  even  more  valuable  resource  would  emerge :  experts  with  firsthand  field 
experience,  both  theoretically  and  pragmatically  knowledgeable,  available  for 
consultation.™ 


73  "Eeologlsts  in  the  Mekong,"  The  New  Republic  (March  28,  1970)  :  pp.  6-7. 

74  Claire  Sterling,  "Thai-Laos  Dam  Plan  Is  Perfect  One — Except  for  Why?  Washington 
Post  (May  1,  1971),  p.  A14,  and  Claire  Sterling,  "40-Odd  Dams  Hold  Promise  for  Great 
Mekong  Basin,"  Washington  Post  (April  24,  1971),  p.  A18. 

76  Gerardo  Budowski,  "The  Quantity-Quality  Relationship  in  Environmental  Manage- 
ment." Impact  of  Science  on  Society  XX,  no.  3  (1970),  pp.  245-246. 

78  Donald  Heyneman,  "Why  We  Must  Prevent  Foreign  Aid  From  Becoming  an  l|cological 
Nightmare,"  Science  Forum  (October  1971),  p.  9. 


/ 


420 


It  is  of  interest  that  attention  to  these  matters  of  regional  health, 
in  the  management  of  TVA,  resulted  in  the  development  of  a  protocol 
for  reservoir  control  and  other  measures  that  virtually  eliminated 
malaria — formerly  endemic — from  the  region.  It  is  also  of  interest 
that  medical  research  is  an  active  and  promising  part  of  the  program 
of  regional  development  of  the  Mekong.  For  example,  progress  in 
research  into  the  etiology  of  schistosomiasis  was  reported  by  a  medical 
research  team,  October  11,  1971,  that  identified  a  transmitting  snail 
on  Khong  Island,  in  Laos.77 

These  episodes  suggest  that  a  concerted  regional  approach  associated 
with  civil  works  can  stimulate  positive  medical  gains  that  go  well 
beyond  the  negative  goal  of  ameliorating  adverse  impacts  of  new 
construction. 

In  a  broader  sense,  the  policy  of  the  Coordination  Committee  and 
its  staff  appears  to  be  adaptive  to  the  concerns  expressed  both  as  to  the 
sociological  and  the  environmental  impacts  of  the  Mekong  Project. 
Mohamed  Shoaib,  an  official  of  the  World  Bank,  has  described  three 
of  these  adaptations  (paraphrase)  : 

First,  the  policy  now  evolving  is  one  of  deliberate  inerementalism.  The  largest 
works  are  perhaps  a  decade  away,  some  much  further.  By  raising  issues  on  a 
smaller  scale,  on  tributary  works,  a  learning  process  is  set  in  motion  for  ways 
to  deal  with  similar  problems  on  larger  projects. 

Second,  the  approach  is  increasingly  pragmatic.  An  example  is  the  introduction 
of  irrigated  farming  to  farmers  unfamiliar  with  it.  Rather  than  trying  to  resolve 
the  uncertainties  by  theoretical  speculation  or  analysis,  the  Committee  is  solv- 
ing them  by  "learning  while  doing."  This  approach  lies  at  the  heart  of  the 
concept  of  "Pioneer  Projects"  which  the  Committee  and  the  World  Bank  are 
promoting. 

Third,  "the  Committee  is  giving  increasing  attention  to  the  problems  created 
by  intervening  in  depth  in  the  subtle  equilibria  of  established  eco-systems."  Such 
major  problems  as  water-borne  diseases,  uncontrolled  use  of  potentially  dan- 
gerous chemicals  in  fertilizers  and  pesticides,  aquatic  weeds,  and  impact  of  a 
"changed  river  regime  on  flood-dependent  agriculture  and  fish  and  salt  water 
fisheries"  are  all  under  study. 

Shoaib  observed  that  it  could  always  be  shown  that  the  effects  of 
any  development  would  be  in  part  adverse,  but  that  the  consequences 
of  economic  stagnation  were  also — demonstrably — adverse.  He  called 
for  a  "meaningful  balance  between  the  urgency  of  development  and 
the  demands  for  conservation  .  .  .  through  a  timely  interdisciplinary 
approach  to  development  planning."  7S 

The  Nixon  Doctrine  and  Asian  Regionalism :  Security  Plus  Develop- 
ment 

President  Nixon  does  not  appear  to  have  differentiated  between  eco- 
nomic regionalism  and  national  security  regionalism  objectives  any 
more  than  did  President  Johnson.  The  diplomatic  goals  of  an  accept- 
able end  to  the  Vietnamese  War,  political  and  economic  consolidation 
of  Southeast  Asia  as  a  counterbalance  to  the  People's  Republic  of 
China,  and  development  of  multilateral  aid  arrangements  to  reduce 
U.S.  costs,  all  appear  in  the  Nixon  policy  as  in  President  Johnson's. 


"Chamlonp  Harlnasuta,  Santaslrl  Sornmani,  Viroj  Kitlkoon,  Curt  R.  Schneider,  Onnhuan 
Pathamniavong,  "Experimental  Infection  of  Aquatic  Hydroblid  Snails  and  Laboratory 
Animals  with  Schistosoma  J<iponicum]\ko  Parasites  from  Khonp  Island.  Southern  Laos," 
mimeograph  from  U.S.  Agency  for  International  Development   (October  11.  1971) 

78  Mohamed  Shoaib,  "The  Development  of  the  Mekong  Basin:  Problems  and  Prospects." 
an  address  to  the  Center  for  International  Relations  ana  Ana  Studies  of  the  University  of 
Minnesota,  mimeograph  from  the  World  Bank  (April  29,  1973  I 


421 


However,  unlike  his  predecessor,  President  Nixon  stressed  the  de- 
sirability of  a  low  U.S.  "profile"  in  Asian  affairs. 

Before  Mr.  Nixon  acceded  to  the  Presidency,  he  offered  a  strategy 
of  U.S.  diplomacy  toward  Asia,  and  particularly  Southeast  Asia,  after 
the  conclusion  of  the  war  in  Vietnam.  The  war,  he  said,  had  com- 
manded too  great  a  share  of  U.S.  attention.  Meanwhile — 

Sometimes  dramatically,  but  more  often  quietly,  the  rest  of  Asia  has  been 
undergoing  a  profound,  an  exciting  and  on  balance  an  extraordinarily  promising 
transformation.  One  key  to  this  transformation  is  the  emergence  of  Asian  re- 
gionalism .  .  .  .*" 

He  continued : 

The  developing  coherence  of  Asian  regional  thinking  is  reflected  in  a  disposi- 
tion to  consider  problems  and  loyalties  in  regional  terms,  and  to  evolve  regional 
approaches  to  development  needs  and  to  the  evolution  of  a  new  world  order.  This 
is  not  excessively  chauvinistic,  but  rather  in  the  nature  of  a  coalescing  con- 
fidence, a  recognition  that  Asia  can  become  a  counterbalance  to  the  West,  and  an 
increasing  disposition  to  seek  Asian  solutions  to  Asian  problems  through  coopera- 
tive action.80 

There  was  also  a  sense  of  common  danger,  the  source  of  which  was 
Communist  China.  Regionalism  was  a  means  of  repelling  this  danger. 
It  was  also  a  means  to  avert  direct  confrontations  between  the  nuclear 
powers  by  minimizing  the  number  of  "occasions  on  which  the  great 
powers  have  to  decide  whether  or  not  to  commit  their  forces."  These, 
he  said,  "can  be  reduced  by  the  development  of  regional  defense  pacts, 
in  which  nations  undertake,  among  themselves,  to  attempt  to  contain 
aggression  in  their  own  areas."  81 

At  the  same  time,  the  nations  of  Asia — through  their  governments — 
were  "consciously,  deliberately,  and  programmatically  developing  in 
the  direction  of  greater  liberty,  greater  abundance,  broader  choice,  and 
increased  popular  involvement  in  the  processes  of  government."  This, 
too,  was  a  regional  process  but  it  was  one  in  which  the  Asian  nations 
themselves  had  to  take  the  lead.  The  diplomatic  role  of  the  United 
States,  in  encouraging  this  development,  needed  to  be  low  in  profile. 

In  a  design  for  Asia's  future,  there  is  no  room  for  heavy-handed  American 
pressures ;  there  is  need  for  subtle  encouragement  of  the  kind  of  Asian  initia- 
tives that  help  bring  the  design  to  reality.  The  distinction  may  seem  superficial, 
but  in  fact  it  is  central  both  to  the  kind  of  Asia  we  want  and  to  the  effectiveness 
of  the  means  of  achieving  it.  The  central  pattern  of  the  future  U.S.-Asian  rela- 
tions must  be  American  support  for  Asian  initiatives.82 

Regionalism  for  National  Security  and  Economic  Development 

Upon  coming  to  the  Presidency,  Richard  Nixon  developed  further 
his  concept  of  regionalism  as  a  means  of  economic  development  and 
national  security.  In  supporting  a  "soft-loan"  capability  for  the  Asian 
Development  Bank — after  an  extended  study  of  the  subject — he  urged 
that  the  United  States  "should  join  with  other  donor  countries  in  es- 
tablishing this  Special  Fund,  and  strengthen  the  Bank  so  that  it  can 
better  deal  with  Asia's  current  development  problems  and  future 
needs."  83 


78  Richard  M.  Nixon,  "Asia  After  Vietnam,"  Foreign  Affairs,  46,  no.  1  (October  1967), 
p.  111. 

80  Ibid.,  p.  113. 

81  JMtf.,  p.  114-115. 

82  Ibid.,  pp.  117-118,  124. 

83  "Special  Message  to  the  Congress  on  Foreign  Aid,"  May  1969,  Public  Papers  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States  (Washington  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1969), 
pp.  411-417. 


422 


One  candidate  envisioned  for  such  soft  loan  funding  was  the  Mekong 
Project: 

The  Bank  may  also  be  expected  to  cooperate  with  interested  countries  and 
international  agencies  in  financing  projects  which  may  emerge  over  the  years 
in  the  development  of  the  lower  Mekong  River  Basin.  The  Bank's  involvement  in 
Mekong  River  development  is  expected  to  be  through  financial  participation  on 
a  project  by  project  basis,  where  such  projects  are  of  priority  in  the  development 
programs  of  the  riparian  countries  and  appropriate  for  Special  Funds  financing. 
By  the  nature  of  the  potential  projects,  as  well  as  the  general  economic  condition 
of  the  Mekong  riparian  countries,  such  projects  may  be  expected  to  qualify  for 
Special  Funding  financing.84 

Perhaps  the  most  comprehensive  statement  of  the  Nixon  doctrine  of 
regionalism  was  presented  in  his  message  to  Congress  of  February  25, 
1971,  transmitting  his  Second  Annual  Review  of  United  States  For- 
eign Policy.  In  this  report,  he  developed  the  general  theme  that  a  new 
partnership  among  nations  was  needed  to  share  the  responsibilities 
and  the  tangible  burdens  of  global  leadership  and  underdevelopment. 
Withdrawal  of  U.S.  forces  from  Vietnam  was  one  manifestation  of 
this  new  concept.  Another  was  a — 

.  .  .  more  restrained  American  approach,  designed  to  encourage  and  sustain 
Asian  regionalism,  Asian  self-reliance,  anu  Asian  initiatives.  For  those  character- 
istics are  essential  to  the  construction  of  a  stable  international  order  in  the 
region.85 

For  the  future,  said  the  President : 

Asian  regionalism  has  an  essential  role  to  play  in  the  future  structure  of  Asia. 
It  is  already  a  source  of  growing  strength  to  the  individual  Asian  nations. 
Through  joint  action,  their  potential  influence  on  the  future  of  the  region  far  ex- 
ceeds that  which  they  can  exert  acting  individually.80 

The  President  went  on  to  cite  specific  elements  of  Asian  regionalism, 
such  as  the  "Five  Power  Arrangement  for  the  defense  of  Malaysia  and 
Singapore,"  the  regional  security  organization  of  SEATO,  the  ANZUS 
Pact,  and  the  Djakarta  eleven-nation  meeting  on  the  Cambodian  crisis. 
One  important  mechanism  of  regionalism,  lie  said,  was  the  Asian  De- 
velopment Bank.  The  Bank, 

...  To  which  the  U.S.  has  contributed  only  20  percent  of  the  capital,  has 
become  an  established  and  major  source  of  capital  and  technical  assistance  to 
meet  Asian  needs.  In  li)'<0  the  Bank  had  its  most  active  year  to  date,  approving 
fifty-three  projects  and  increasing  its  lending  by  150  percent.  I  hope  that  the 
Congress  will  give  early  approval  to  the  proposal  for  an  additional  $100  million 
U.S.  contribution  to  a  Special  Fund  permitting  the  Bank  to  finance  projects 
which,  while  meritorious,  require  more  generous  terms  than  those  now  ex- 
tended.87 

With  specific  reference  to  the  Mekong  Project,  the  President  de- 
el  a  red — 

Political  difference  notwithstanding,  the  effort  continues  to  develop  within  a 
regional  framework  Southeast  Asia's  single  major  resource — the  Lower  Mekong 


"l  T.S.  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Banking  and  Currency,  To  Authorize  the  United 
States  to  Participate  in  Increases  in  the  Resources  of  the  Asian  Development  Hunk,  the 
International  Monetary  Fund,  and  the  International  Hank  for  Reconstruction  and  Dentop 
ment    Hearing  on  ll  H    18891   (Washington,  D.C. :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1970), 
91st  Congress.  2nd  Session,  16,  April  17.  1970,  p.  44. 

86  U.S.  Foreign  Polieu  for  the  1970's:  Building  for  Peace,  Message  from  the  President  of 
the  United  81  itea  Transmitting  ids  Second  Annual  Review  of  United  states  Foreign  Policy, 
February  25,  1971,  92d  Congress,  1st  Session,  House  Document  92  53  (Washington,  D.C: 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office  1971),  p.  74. 

M/bid.,  p.  77. 

"Ibid.,  p.  79. 


423 


Basin.  This  project  has  an  almost  immeasurable  potential  for  the  well-being  of 
the  countries  of  the  Basin,  Thailand,  Laos,  Cambodia,  and  Vietnam.  Along  with 
a  large  number  of  other  non-Asian  states,  we  continue  to  participate  actively  in 
this  massive  scheme  to  harness  the  hydro-electric,  irrigation,  and  transportation 
potential  of  one  of  Asia's  greatest  rivers.  Its  promise  for  transforming  the  life 
of  the  area  is  at  least  equal  to  the  impact  of  TVA  in  our  own  country.88 

The  diplomatic  implications  of  regionalism  as  "one  of  the  new  reali- 
ties of  Asia"  were  essentially  threefold :  it  provided  a  focus  for  the  ex- 
tending of  multilateral  aid  to  development,  it  generated  a  spirit  of 
cooperation  in  overcoming  the  "divisions  and  enmities  of  the  past," 
and  "its  vigor  is  one  of  the  guarantees  of  the  influence  of  Asia's  smaller 
states  in  the  future  political  structure  of  the  region."  89 

Again  in  1972,  the  President  alluded  to  the  theme  of  regionalism  in 
Asia  in  his  Report  to  Congress  on  "United  States  Foreign  Policy  for 
the  1970s,  The  Emerging  Structure  of  Peace."  90 

He  spoke  with  approval  of  the  "noteworthy  advance  of  the  spirit 
of  regionalism  in  Asia,"  citing  the  meeting  of  the  Association  of 
Southeast  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)  at  Kuala  Lumpur,  in  November 
1971,  and  the  utility  of  the  Asian  and  Pacific  Council  (ASPAC).  Said 
the  President : 

A  central  purpose  of  the  new  partnership  we  are  building  with  Asian  states  is 
to  nurture  a  growing  sense  of  regional  identity  and  self-confidence.  Without  it, 
a  vital  impetus  for  cooperation  would  be  lost,  and  individual  nations  would  be 
obliged  to  choose  between  an  inward-looking  nationalism,  and  excessive  reliance 
on  the  initiative  of  others  to  bring  coherence  and  stability  to  the  area.  Working 
together,  however,  smaller  powers  can  gain  the  influence  needed  to  mold  their 
own  futures,  while  their  efforts  provide  a  natural  focus  for  assistance  and  co- 
operation from  others. 

The  President  again  stressed  the  need  for  support  of  the  Asian  De- 
velopment Bank  as  "a  major  source  of  the  area's  development  and 
technical  assistance."  By  the  end  of  1971,  he  reported,  the  ADB  had 
approved  85  loans  to  developing  nations  in  Asia,  totaling  some  $639 
million.  He  added : 

Though  I  attach  great  importance  to  our  continued  financial  support  for  Asian 
development — including  Congressional  approval  of  soft  loan  funds  for  the  Asian 
Development  Bank — there  are  welcome  signs  that  others  recognize  the  limits  of 
our  resources  and  the  need  for  a  broader  effort.  [He  cited  Japan,  Australia,  and 
New  Zealand  as  leaders  in  this  movement.] 

It  was  revealed  on  January  27,  1972,  that  President  Nixon  had  ex- 
tended in  two  secret  sessions  of  the  Paris  peace  talks  with  Hanoi,  "last 
summer,"  through  his  representatives  in  Paris  an  offer  of  $7.5  billion 
in  aid  to  Indochina,  of  which  something  like  $2.5  billion  would  be 
earmarked  for  postwar  reconstruction  aid  to  North  Vietnam.  The 
offer  was  in  response  to  demands  from  the  Hanoi  representatives  for 
reparations  from  the  United  States.  Newspaper  reports  of  this  devel- 
opment linked  it  to  the  offer  by  President  Johnson  in  his  Johns  Hop- 
kins speech,  and  called  attention  to  the  changed  situation  since  then. 
President  Johnson  had  deplored  the  death,  up  to  April  1965,  of  "400 
young  men,"  while  William  P.  Rogers,  Secretary  of  State,  in  1972 


88  Ibid. 

89  TbM.,  p.  80. 

90  Richard  Nixon,  "United  States  Foreign  Policy  for  the  1970's  :  The  Emerging  Struc- 
ture of  Peace,"  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents,  Vol.  8,  No.  7  (February  14, 
1972),  pp.  304-307. 


424 


cited  the  toll  of  more  than  45,000  Americans  killed  in  the  war,  with 
another  10,051  deaths  from  "non-hostile"  causes.91 

The  Nixon  offer  had  come  after  more  than  six  years  of  conflict,  with 
large  investment  of  manpower,  hardware,  and  war-related  foreign 
assistance  poured  into  South  Vietnam.  The  intervening  years  had 
demonstrated  once  again  what  had  been  shown  in  the  Korean  War — 
that  it  was  politically  and  technically  difficult  for  the  United  States 
to  wage  a  limited  war  for  limited  objectives  remote  from  its  territory. 

It  is  clear  from  the  record  that  in  regard  to  Southeast  Asia,  both 
President  Johnson  and  President  Nixon  used  "regionalism"  alterna- 
tively as  a  vehicle  of  anticommunism  through  alliance  and  as  a  ve- 
hicle of  economic  and  technological  development.  Both  Presidents 
appear  to  have  approached  the  second  form  of  regionalism  ambiva- 
lently :  as  worthwhile  to  advance  the  regional  economy,  and  as  a  pos- 
sible* means  of  accelerating  a  favorable  end  of  the  war.  Moreover, 
both  Presidents  cited  the  essential  role  of  multilateral  aid  programs 
in  developmental  regionalism,  while  concentrating  actual  aid 
bilaterally. 

The  response  of  the  Hanoi  authorities  to  the  two  offers,  by  the  two 
Presidents,  for  a  program  of  regionalism  supported  by  U.S.  resources, 
appears  to  have  demonstrated  also  that  "dollar  diplomacy"  does  not 
convince  an  adversary  as  long  as  there  is  any  reasonable  prospect  that 
he  can  outlast  the  United  States  without  some  form  of  capitulation. 
The  underlying  meaning  of  that  tenet  of  communist  ideology  which 
Nikita  Khrushchev  expressed  as  "AVe  will  bury  you"  is  that  com- 
munism as  a  form  of  political-social  state  will  surpass  and 
hence  outlast  capitalistic-democratic  forms  in  the  Ioiuj:  run.  Accord- 
ingly, it  seems  reasonable  to  infer  that  the  kind  of  offer  represented 
by  the  Johns  Hopkins  speech,  under  the  circumstances  prevailing 
at  that  time,  was  unlikely  to  be  an  effective  tactical  move  toward  end- 
ing the  war.  The  question  remains,  however,  as  to  whether  there  could 
be  circumstances  under  which  the  concept  of  regionalism — that  is  to 
say,  developmental  regionalism— with  U.S.  support  for  it  on  some  in- 
ternational basis,  might  serve  a  broader  strategic  purpose  looking 
toward  the  achievement  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  objectives. 

91  Garnett  D.  Horner  and  George  Sherman,  "U.S.  Aid  Offer  is  $7.5  Billion,"  Washington 
Star  (January  28,  1972),  p.  Al  ;  and  Murrey  Marder,  "U.S.  Reconstruction  Proposal  Offers 
$2.5  Billion  to  Hanoi,"  Washington  Post  (January  28,  1972),  p.  Al. 


VI.  Issues,  Problems,  and  Opportunities  Offered  by 
World  Regionalism 

The  whole  history  of  the  Mekong  Project  shows  a  trend  from  a 
simple  public  works  program  to  a  program  in  which  construction  is 
linked  to  the  readiness  of  the  region  to  accept  and  use  rationally  the 
electricity,  irrigation  water,  and  accompanying  economic  stimulus  the 
Project  would  provide.  Of  progressively  greater  consequence  is  the 
question  of  compatibility  of  new  engineering  structures  with  the  cul- 
ture, ecology,  economy,  technical  expertise,  management  skills,  and 
political  organization  of  the  component  units  of  the  region.  Origi- 
nally, regionalism — as  practiced  in  the  Tennessee  Valley — was  seen  as 
a  concept  to  accelerate  development  of  resources  on  a  coherent  basis. 
But  as  emphasis  was  intensified  on  coherence  of  comprehensive  plan- 
ning, the  elements  of  speed  and  efficiency,  while  still  present,  assumed 
a  secondary  importance. 

U.S.  policy  toward  the  Mekong  Project  can  be  approached  in  a 
number  of  ways.  First,  it  can  be  regarded  as  an  element  of  U.S.  na- 
tional security  policy  in  the  sense  that  it  is  a  move  toward  building  a 
more  unified  regional  complex  of  countries  as  a  counterbalance  to 
Mainland  China  and  the  presence  of  the  U.S.S.R.  in  Asia,  as  well  as  to 
a  revitalized  Japan.  Second,  it  can  be  regarded  as  a  point  of  departure 
toward  a  limitless  variety  of  forms  of  economic  assistance  to  a  develop- 
ing region ;  also,  as  a  mechanism  for  shifting  the  costly  burden  of  aid- 
ing developing  countries  to  a  less  onerous  multilateral  arrangement 
with  more  sharing  of  costs  among  the  developed  countries  (and  a 
"lower  profile"  of  each  individual  donor).  Third,  as  a  very  longrange 
diplomatic  strategy,  the  concept  of  "world  regionalism"  perhaps  offers 
a  way  to  restructure  national  political  forces  into  economically  bal- 
anced regions,  sharing  interests  and  problems,  but  with  lessened  levels 
of  interregional  conflict  and  tensions  while  building  viable  regional 
systems  of  economic  and  technological  development,  interregional 
t .ra.de,  and  mutual  assistance. 

Southeast  Asia  As  a  Regional  Security  Bloc 

One  analyst  of  U.S.  policy  in  Asia  observes  that  the  "fifty-year 
global  behavior  pattern  of  the  United  States  indicates  that  it  will 
accept  general  war  rather  than  tolerate  [the  achievement  by  any  na- 
tion of  "final  dominance  on  Europe  and  East  Asia"]."  92 

This  observation  is  given  support  by  the  flat  statement  by  President 
Johnson,  October  17,  1966,  that  "No  single  nation  can  or  should  be 
permitted  to  dominate  the  Pacific  region."  93 


93  Bernard  K.  Gordon,  Toward  Disengagement  in  Asia:  A  Strategy  for  American  Foreign 
Policy  (Englewood  Cliffs,  N.J.  :  Prentice-Hall,  Inc.,  1969),  pp.  14-15. 

88  "Additional  Documentation  on  President  Johnson's  Trip  to  Asia,"  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  (November  28,  1966),  p.  815. 

(425) 


426 


The  rationale  for  a  regional  alliance  is  described  by  Bernard  K. 
Gordon,  Southeast  Asia  Project  Chairman,  Research  Analysis  Cor- 
poration, in  these  terms : 

There  is  today  in  East  Asia  a  convergence  of  factors  highly  favorable  to  both 
the  immediate  objectives  and  long-term  interests  of  the  United  States.  Precisely 
at  a  time  when  Americans  are  most  anxious  to  reduce  their  unilateral  role  in 
East  Asian  affairs,  nations  like  Japan  and  Australia  have  begun  to  achieve  the 
economic  output,  and  nations  like  Indonesia,  Thailand,  and  the  Philippines  have 
Degun  to  adopt  the  political  outlook,  that  for  the  first  time  makes  the  concept 
of  burden-sharing  applicable  in  Asia.  .  .  .  There  is  an  increasingly  suitable  poli- 
tical environment  for  regional  cooperation  in  Asia,  especially  in  Southeast  Asia 
where  the  need  is  greatest. 

Accordingly,  he  proposed  a  "posture  of  declining  direct  American 
involvement  in  the  defense  and  security  of  Southeast  Asia,  coupled 
with  an  increase  in  U.S.  support  to  the  Association  of  Southeast 
Asian  Nations"  (ASEAN).94 

The  concept  of  regional  alliances  to  share  among  nations  the  re- 
sponsibilities of  mutual  defense  presents  unusually  thorny  problems 
of  conflicting  national  interest,  as  has  been  demonstrated  on  several 
occasions  with  respect  to  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Alliance.  "When 
in  addition — as  in  Southeast  Asia — many  of  the  countries  concerned 
have  a  long  history  of  conflict  and  aggression,  the  problem  of  mutual 
defense  is  compounded. 

Another  question  has  to  do  with  the  size  of  the  region  to  be  organ- 
ized for  mutual  defense.  Manifestly,  the  more  countries  encompassed 
by  an  alliance,  the  larger  the  resource  base  that  can  be  tapped.  Con- 
versely, the  more  different  sovereignties  embraced  in  the  system,  the 
smaller  the  base  of  agreement  in  shared  national  interests.  The  pros- 
pect of  the  admission  of  Communist  China  to  ECAFE,  for  example, 
poses  an  interesting  problem  for  that  regional  grouping  of  states.  It 
is  a  widely  held  view  95  that  the  posture  of  Communist  China  was 
largely  responsible  for  the  ASEAN  alliance  whose  five  members 
(Thailand,  Malaysia,  Indonesia,  Philippines,  and  Singapore)  are  all 
also  members  of  ECAFE. 

Another  problem  concerns  the  changing  governmental  structure  of 
individual  members,  leading  to  instability  of  alliances.  For  example, 
although  the  change  that  converted  the  kingdom  of  Cambodia  into 
the  Khmer  Republic  did  not  interrupt  the  continuity  of  that  coun- 
try's participation  in  the  Mekong  Project,  it  brought  a  notable  change 
in  diplomatic  relations  with  neighboring  states.  Conceivably,  at  some 
future,  time.  North  and  South  Vietnam  might  find  ways  of"  cooperat- 
ing in  regional  economic  projects,  but  a  mutual  defense  alliance  seems 
less  likely,  even  with  a  change  in  leadership. 

An  interesting  question  is  posed  by  the  presence  of  Russia.  China, 
and  India  in  the  Asian  power  system.  On  this  subject.  George  Thomp- 
son, formerly  Director  of  the  Political  Study  Centre.  Singapore,  has 
written: 

Russia,  too,  is  inextricably  involved  as  China  becomes  the  focus  of  the  prob- 
lem of  the  Asian  Balance  of  Power,  for  the  U.S.S.R.  owns  more  Asian  real  estate 
than  any  purely  Asian  power  and  depends  Increasingly  on  Asian  seas  for  com- 
munication between  the  parts  of  its  own  territory,  for  trading  its  surplus,  for 


w  Gordon,  Toward  Ditengagement,  p.  Ifi2. 

96  Sop.  for  example,  Gordon,  Toward  Disengagement,  p.  nin. 


427 


widening  the  range  of  consumer  purchases,  and  for  the  food  from  its  two 
oceans.  As  a  great  power  it  seeks  to  be  wherever  the  Americans  can  be,  and  in 
so  doing  it  is  learning  that  it  is  the  greatness  of  power  itself  and  not  the  declared 
purpose  of  power  which  causes  apprehension,  that  it  is  an  expensive  and  haz- 
ardous role  to  play,  and  that  it  cannot  win  universal  friendship  in  a  world  of 
national  interests.  And  Soviet  power  in  the  world,  especially  the  communist 
world,  requires  the  containment,  voluntary  or  involuntary,  of  China.  Thus, 
Peking,  having  wished  to  expel  one  policeman  from  Southeast  Asia,  has  suc- 
ceeded in  establishing  two.  If  America  has  decided  it  cannot  be  the  world's  one 
policeman,  with  the  burden  of  cost  and  of  criticism  the  role  entails,  there  is  now 
a  second  policeman,  if  it  can  afford  the  cost  and  accept  the  criticism.  And  in  the 
mutual  vigilance  of  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  and  in  the  climate 
of  being  assessed  by  the  smaller  power,  may  lie  a  temporary  pattern  of  power, 
till  a  cooperative,  collective,  regional,  self-policing  force  emerges  in  Southeast 
Asia. 

In  short,  he  concludes,  "international,  regional,  and  national  prob- 
lems overlap."  96 

Clearly,  an  important  aspect  of  the  regional  defense  alliance  is  its 
scope.  If  limited  to  strictly  security  considerations,  a  regional  pact 
would  seem  vulnerable  to  changes  in  national  interest  or  control.  Pre- 
sumably, this  view  motivated  President  Johnson's  attempt  to  couple 
the  concept  with  that  of  regional  development.  Said  the  President 
(in  part)  : 

We  recognize  that  our  strength,  our  size  and  our  great  wealth  may  impose  a 
very  special  obligation  upon  us  in  the  transition  to  the  new  Asia.  But  we  also 
recognize  that  the  cooperative  tasks  of  assistance  and  defense  will  be  assumed 
more  and  more  by  others,  and  we  hope  by  collective  regional  groupings  as  the 
nations  of  Asia  develop  and  build  their  own  strength  and  their  own  abundance.87 

It  may  be  that  the  most  durable  regional  alliances  are  those  in  which 
the  national  interest  of  the  participants  is  served  by  economic  as  well 
as  (or  perhaps  rather  than)  security  benefits.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the 
Mekong  Project  did  not  constitute  a  regional  defense  alliance  in  any 
formal  sense,  although  disruption  in  one  part  of  the  Basin  would  be 
likely  to  cause  repercussions  in  other  parts. 

But  the  question  arises  as  to  what  groupings  of  nations  can  provide 
both  shared  interest  in  defense  and  shared  interest  in  development. 
Should  the  grouping  encompass  both  developed  and  developing  states, 
for  example,  or  does  this  invite  the  danger  of  a  progressive  economic 
"neo-colonialism"?  One  possible  answer  would  involve  a  regional  core 
of  developing  nations,  with  a  multilateral  tier  of  developed  nations 
lending  economic  support — with  or  without  military  support. 

Regional  Development  as  an  Instrument  of  Foreign  Aid 

The  natural  advantages  of  a  geographic  approach  to  economic  de- 
velopment assistance  abroad  appear  to  be  matched  by  the  political  ad- 
vantages. From  the  geographic  point  of  view,  capital  resources  can  be 
focused  and  concentrated.  From  the  political  point  of  view,  the  effort 
can  be  represented  as  functional  rather  than  evolved  out  of  the  diplo- 
matic calculus  of  competing  preferential  trade  and  investment, 

Experience  of  the  United  States  with  domestic  regionalism  has  been 
mixed,  but  the  outstanding:  example  of  the  TVA  demonstrates  what 
can  be  accomplished  by  the  systematic,  planned  development  of  a 
coherent  geographic  region  under  the  leadership  of  a  well-supported 


88  George  Thompson,  "The  New  World  of  Asia,"  Foreign  Affairs  48,  no.  1,  (October  1969), 
pp.  37-13,8. 

97  "Additional  Oocumentation  on  President  Johnson's  Trip,"  p.  816. 


428 


corporate  instrumentality  situated  in  the  region.  Officials  of  the  U.S. 
foreign  assistance  program  tended  at  first  to  be  skeptical  that  this 
approach  could  be  transplanted  to  a  multinational  region.  Bilateral 
aid  problems  were  thought  hard  enough  to  deal  with,  without  the 
necessity  of  becoming  involved  in  multinational  plans  and  programs. 
However,  the  "spirit  of  the  Mekong  has  been  shown  to  have  exerted 
a  durable  cooperative  influence  on  the  Riparian  States  for  nearly 
two  decades.  (jiven  a  forum  for  consultation,  and  a  shared  opportunity 
for  economic  growth  and  development  with  many  donor  nations  con- 
tributing, the  nations  of  a  region  can  demonstrably  work  together,  de- 
spite a  long  history  of  conflict  and  instabilities. 

When  a  regional  development  project  involves  both  a  plurality  of 
recipient  nations  and  a  plurality  of  donor  nations  (and  perhaps  also 
an  array  of  United  Nations  instrumentalities)  the  administrative  com- 
plications may  grow  but  the  political  complications  seem  actually  to 
be  reduced.  One  reason  for  this  is  the  doubly  '"lowered  profile"  of  the 
individual  donors,  even  though  their  contributions  may  be  of  com- 
manding importance  on  an  individual  program  unit  in  some,  one  coun- 
try. The  various  arrangements  for  task  management  by  the  World 
Bank  or  some  other  institution,  plus  the  coordinating  organization  for 
the  total  regional  program,  tend  to  insulate  the  donor  from  the  re- 
cipient. In  terms  of  imposing  conditions  on  the  recipient,  this  insula- 
tion may  limit  the  benefits  of  the  arrangement  to  the  donor,  but  in 
terms  of  its  general  acceptability  to  all  recipients  and  amity  among 
all  participants  it  is  highly  beneficial.  At  the  same  time,  as  President 
Nixon  has  said:  "I  am  confident  that  our  role  can  be  kept  in  conso- 
nance both  with  our  interests  and  with  those  of  the  increasingly  self- 
reliant  and  independent  Asian  states."  98 

Drawing  upon  his  experience  in  helping  to  organize  the  Asian  De- 
velopment Bank  and  fund  the  Nam  Ngum  Dam,  Engene  Black  in  1969 
published  a  short  study  in  which  he  proposed  the  Mekong  Project  as 
a  prototype  for  American  diplomacy  in  the  future.  He  offered  "pro- 
grammed development"  as  a  substitute  for  the  "doctrine  of  counter- 
insurgency." 

The  diplomatic  problem  [wrote  Black]  is  to  reconcile  with  the  short-term  needs 
and  demands  of  the  riparian  countries  the  long-range  interest  that  the  rest  of  the 
world  has  in  restoring  peace  and  stability  in  this  area.  Mekong  development  offers 
the  opportunity  to  protect  this  interest  by  building  inhibitions  in  the  form  of 
development  projects  among  four  fragmented  countries  that  are  likely  to  find 
themselves  beset  with  turmoil  and  threats  for  some  time  to  come.  Mekong  de- 
velopment is  an  invitation  to  North  Vietnam  to  join  in  a  vast  program  of  regional 
cooperation.  It  is  just  the  sort  of  commitment  needed  to  counteract  the  ill-effects 
of  the  Vietnam  war. 

Black  suir<rcsts  that  what  is  needed  is  to  reduce  the  U.S.  presence, 
and  to  continue  the  building  of  a  "strong  multilateral  f ramework."  °9 

As  a  development  banker.  Black  is  "frankly  a  partisan  of  multi- 
lateral and  regional  organizations  .  .  .  ,"  because  this  arrangement 
insulates  development  finance  from  political  considerations.  ("Or  to 
put  it  the  other  way  around,  it  does  not  stand  to  reason  that  the  U.S. 
Government  should  undertake  in  the  name  of  development  to  intervene 
wholesale  in  the  domestic  all'airs  of  six  dozen  or  so  poor  countries.") 


,e  U.S.  Foreign  Policy  for  the  1970'8:  Building  for  Peace,  House  Document  92,o3,  p.  70. 
00  Black,  Alternative  in  Southeast  Aniii,  p.  145. 


429 


It  also  is  able  to  draw  on  many  sources  of  capital  and  skill,  and  pro- 
motes international  cooperation.100 

The  virtually  limitless  opportunities  for  capital  investment  in  civil 
works  projects  in  developing  countries  are  reduced  when  pre-in vest- 
ment studies  are  undertaken  of  the  economic  and  social  consequences 
of  such  investments.  Further  limitations  derive  from  the  generally 
accepted  necessity — of  which  Black  spoke — that  decisionmaking  should 
come  from  the  region  itself.  Former  colonies  engaged  in  nation-build- 
ing are  likely  to  be  wary  of  external  interference,  even  with  the  best 
of  motives.  And  there  are  always  differences  among  factions  within 
regions  and  countries.  All  these  are  limiting  factors  to  rate  of  capital 
transfer  from  outside.  As  one  study  observes : 

.  .  .  Diversities,  antagonisms,  and  strong  nationalism  within  the  region  and 
the  uncertainty  of  benefits  from  existing  proposals  for  formal  integration  all 
suggest  that  outside  encouragement  should  be  in  the  main  through  informal, 
partial,  politically-neutral  measures  of  obvious  joint  benefit.  Outside  encourage- 
ment of  major  integration  projects  should  be  limited ;  more  emphasis  needs  to 
be  placed  on  research  and  mutual  education  through  discussion  of  problems  and 
possibilities.  Until  potential  participants  in  Southeast  Asian  regionalism  see 
clearly  that  there  is  a  problem,  that  the  problem  can  best  be  met  through  regional 
efforts,  and  that  the  net  benefits  to  each  participant  will  be  significant  with  in- 
cursions on  national  sovereignty  minimal,  pressures  from  outside  the  region  are 
unlikely  to  achieve  a  continuing  effect.101 

As  a  general  principle,  therefore,  the  cited  study  calls  for  avoidance 
of  political  suspicions  and  antagonism  in  the  face  of  political  and 
economic  differences  and  sensitivities.  "Regional  cooperation  measures 
have  the  best  chance  of  success  when  they  achieve  a  net  maximum  of 
two  goals:  the  maximum  of  intraregional  political  neutrality  and 
colorlessness."  102 

A  plausible  case  can  be  made  that  precisely  the  virtues  of  regional 
development  as  an  efficient  means  of  accelerating  the  economic  progress 
of  blocs  of  poor  countries  (thereby  reducing  the  "frustrated  expecta- 
tions" that  encourage  insurgency)  would  lead  to  automatic  rejection  of 
such  an  approach  by  the  large  communist  nations.  In  fact,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  tended  to  be  cool  toward  developmental  regionalism,  and 
has  tended  to  favor  direct  bilateral  aid  arrangements  on  a  country-to- 
country  basis.  However,  the  Soviet  attitude  toward  developmental 
regionalism  has  not  been  as  strongly  negative  as  that  toward  regional 
security  arrangements.  It  is  at  least  conceivable  that  some  forms  of 
regional  development  arrangement  might  be  eligible  for  Soviet  ac- 
ceptance. While  the  Soviet  Union  has  not  yet  actually  contributed 
as  a  donor  country  to  the  Mekong  Project,  at  the  Fifteenth  Session  of 
ECAFE,  meeting  at  Broadbeach,  Queensland,  Australia,  in  March 
1959,  the  Soviet  representative,  Mr.  Chernyshev,  was  reported  as  say- 
ing "that  the  Soviet  Union  was  prepared  to  provide  technical  assist- 
ance in  the  planning  and  construction  of  hydrotechnical  projects  on 
the  Mekong.  The  terms  and  details  of  such  assistance  could  be  agreed 
upon  with  the  countries  concerned  either  directly  or  through  the 
ECAFE  secretariat."  103 


100  Ibid.,  pp.  166-168. 

101  Theodore  Morgan  and  Myle  Spoelstra,  Eds.,  Economic  Interdependence  in  Southeast 
Asia  (Madison  :  University  of  Wisconsin  Press,  1969),  p.  416. 

102  Ibid.,  p.  11. 

103  Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East,  Summary  Records,  (May  11,  1959), 
p.  195. 


430 


It  is  also  possible  that  the  various  brands  of  communism  in  China 
and  Southeast  Asia  might  learn  to  accept  some  of  the  features  of  the 
Mekong  Project.  Attention  has  been  called  by  Mekong  Project  en- 
thusiasts on  numerous  occasions  to  the  fact  that  local  communist  fac- 
tions (explicitly  the  Pathet  Lao,  and  by  implication  others)  have  at 
least  tolerated  Mekong  development  activities.  The  Mekong  arrange- 
ment does  not  do  violence  to  the  communist  solicitude  for  national 
sovereignty.  No  "supranational"  authority  is  involved.  The  general 
thrust  of  current  Mekong  Committee  studies  is  toward  accommodation 
of  physical  works  to  the  broadest  possible  base  of  social  need  and 
utility.  Possible  sources  of  disaffection  will  always  be  likely  to  arise, 
but  in  general  the  Mekong  style  has  been  toward  goals  to  provide  for 
widely  distributed  economic  advances  in  the  region,  balanced  against 
maximum  political  neutrality  and  colorlessness. 

Global  Regionalism  as  a  Long-Range  Means  Toward  U.S.  Diplomatic 
Goals 

Nearly  seven  years  have  elapsed  since  President  Johnson  made  his 
billion-dollar  offer  to  support  regional  development  in  Southeast  Asia. 
The  work  on  the  Mekong,  at  first  stimulated  by  the  offer  and  accom- 
panying measures  of  support,  has  settled  back  to  a  more  deliberate 
pace.  Hampered  by  spreading  conflict,  the  work  has  been  unable  to 
achieve  the  balanced  benefits  among  countries  the  Coordination  Com- 
mittee sees  as  its  guiding  principle.  The  prospect  is  that  until  the  polit- 
ical unrest  in  Laos,  Khmer  Republic,  and  Vietnam  has  subsided  there 
will  continue  to  be  delays,  postponements,  and  unbalance.  To  some  ex- 
tent, however,  this  may  be  a  blessing  in  disguise:  it  compels  postpone- 
ment of  engineering  works  not  only  on  the  main  stem  but  also  the  tribu- 
taries of  the  Mekong,  compels  more  intensive  examination  of  poten- 
tially socially  disruptive  consequences,  and  affords  opportunity  for 
recruitment  and  training  of  Riparian  personnel  in  the  countless  skills 
needed  for  the  action  phase  of  development. 

Manifestly,  the  contribution  of  the  Mekong  Project  to  an  easing 
of  the  Vietnamese  conflict  has  not  been  significant  or  even  measurable. 
The  determined  nationalism  of  North  Vietnam  in  the  face  of  conflict 
has  remained  obdurately  aloof  from  the  attractions  of  U.S.  aid  as  an 
alternative  to  a  prospective  ultimate  victory.  Notably  also,  Prince 
Sihanouk  of  Cambodia  adopted  a  not  dissimilar  stance,  apparently 
fearing  that  any  U.S. -led  or  sponsored  regional  aid  scheme  might 
entail  dangerous  compromises  and  reduced  freedom  of  self-determina- 
tion. Accordingly,  as  a  device  to  win  over  an  adversary,  the  offer  of 
cooperation  in  a  regional  development  scheme  does  not  present  a  con- 
vincing opportunity. 

It  is  interesting  to  speculate  on  what  different  course  events  in 
Southeast  Asia  might  have  followed  had  the  Johnson  offer  been  made 
at  the  time  of  the  Geneva  Agreement  of  1954  that  partitioned  Vietnam. 
Willard  Hanna's  comment  about  the  Mekong  Project  is  appropriate  in 
this  context : 

In  a  region  in  which  discontinuity,  it  outright  sabotage,  of  international  en- 
deavor has  heretofore  prevailed,  the  Mekong  Project  may  provide  the  long- 
sought-for  new  formula    for  sustained,  constructive  development.  Here,  in  the 


431 


past — at  least  in  Laos  and  Vietnam — the  familiar  contemporary  panacea  of  aid 
had  provided  no  answers.  What  seems  absolutely  basic  is  a  massive,  well-inte- 
grated, area-wide,  peacetime  program  in  which  the  riparian  nations  themselves 
can  swiftly  build  up  experience  and  competence  in  modern  development  and  ad- 
ministration. Whether  the  Mekong  Project  is  really  appropriate  or  adequate  to  the 
need  remains  to  be  proved,  but  it  is  certainly  the  most  promising  scheme  which 
has  yet  been  proposed.  The  $10  billion  project — to  which  two  years  ago  President 
Johnson  pledged  $1  billion,  once  peaceful  regional  development  became  possible — 
would  seem  from  almost  any  point  of  view  a  much  better  investment  than  $1  bil- 
lion per  annum  in  an  endless  Vietnam  War.104 

It  is  sheer  speculation  that  a  U.S. -encouraged  regional  development 
of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin  in  1954  might  have  provided  a  focus  for 
peaceful  economic  progress,  served  as  an  educational  process,  and  es- 
tablished a  base  for  wider  cooperation  in  that  disrupted  region.  How- 
ever, the  question  seems  legitimate  as  to  whether  the  consequences  of 
a  slowly  and  deliberately  encouraged  regional  development — region 
by  region — in  lagging  parts  of  the  world  might  serve  U.S.  foreign 
policy  objectives  in  the  long  run.  The  concept  of  dealing  with  multi- 
national geographic  regions  rather  than  with  nations,  and  extending 
aid  from  a  multinational  base  instead  of  bilaterally,  has  been  credited 
in  the  literature  with  a  number  of  attractive  characteristics : 

Emphasis  is  on  local  participation  in  development  and  planning  ; 

Subregions  in  greatest  need  and  offering  greatest  opportunity  for  advance- 
ment tend  to  receive  priority  by  local  consent ; 

Nationalistic  preoccupations  appear  to  be  moderated  ; 

Self-help  is  encouraged  and  stimulated  by  being  made  more  effective  in 
combined  actions  with  mutual  support ; 

National  sensitivities  that  bilateral  aid  would  exacerbate  are  less  abraded 
by  multinational  arrangements ; 

Regional  cohesiveness — the  tendency  for  people  of  different  countries  work- 
ing together  on  a  shared  problem  to  lay  aside  their  national  differences — 
can  result  from  attention  to  geographic  regional  goals  rather  than  formal 
national  boundaries ; 

Burdens  of  foreign  aid  tend  to  be  more  widely  distributed  ;  and 

The  process  of  applying  technological  means  to  social  and  economic  objec- 
tives can  be  made  coherent  and  understandable  to  those  who  expect  to  enjoy 
the  benefits. 

The  resultant  alignment  of  nations  and  international  structures 
from  a  deliberate  program  of  world  regionalism  acceptable  to  de- 
veloped and  developing  countries  might  warrant  further  study  and 
analysis.  What  actions  could  help  to  encourage  a  world  system  of  eco- 
nomically and  technologically  better  balanced  regions?  Would  there 
be  any  effect  on  the  levels  of  international  tensions,  either  in  the  re- 
gions or  in  the  relations  among  the  major  powers?  Might  regional  vot- 
ing in  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  and  the  associated  U.N. 
agencies  provide  a  better  or  more  representative  arrangement  than  the 
present,  admittedly  awkward  system  of  one-country-one-vote? 

The  implication  of  the  Hanna  observation,  and  other  like  writings, 
is  that  the  cost-effectiveness  of  regional  development  projects  is  not 
fully  measurable  in  economic  terms  alone.  If  an  economically  marginal 
project  advances  a  diplomatic  goal — stabilizes  a  region,  inspires  inter- 
national cooperation,  ameliorates  tensions,  provides  a  peaceful  alterna- 


101  Willard  A.  Hanna,  "The  Mekong  Project."  Part  I,  "The  River  and  the  Region,"  Amer- 
ican Universities  Field  Staff  Reports  (July  1968),  p.  10. 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.   1-29 


432 


tive  to  insurgency,  offers  an  ideological  bridge,  and  teaches  different 
ethnic  groups  how  to  work  together — it  might  well  be  more  useful 
than  a  project  yielding  high  economic  return  but  without  these  in- 
tangible benefits.  There  is,  of  course,  no  hard  evidence  that  all  these 
favorable  outcomes  are  a  likely  product  of  a  global  policy  of  regional- 
ism. However,  the  bare  possibility — as  evidenced  in  what  has  been 
called  "the  Mekong  Spirit" — that  the  concept  might  serve  as  an  instru- 
ment of  long-range  diplomacy  seems  worth  further  examination  and 
putting  to  the  test. 


APPENDIX 


Comments  by  Eugene  R.  Black  on  Topics  Related  to  this  Study — 

March  14,  1972 

An  assessment  of  the  political  impact,  short-  and  long-range,  of  the  Johns  Hopkins 
speech  on  the  leadership  and  professional  community  in  the  ''Riparian 
States"* 
While  impossible  to  measure  with  any  precision,  there  is  little  doubt  in  my 
mind  that  the  political  impact  of  President  Johnson's  offer  of  large-scale  post- 
war assistance  to  Southeast  Asia  was  substantial.  I  say  Southeast  Asia  rather 
than  the  "riparian  States"  because  the  offer  of  assistance  was  not  confined  to 
them.  I  believe  the  President  intended  and  I  acted  as  though  Southeast  Asia 
covered  the  five  Mekong  countries — Thailand,  Cambodia,  Laos  and  both  Viet- 
nams — and  Burma,  Malaysia,  Singapore,  Indonesia  and  the  Philippines.  And  I 
considered  the  $1  billion  offer  to  be  more  symbolic  than  mathematically  precise. 
My  visits  and  contacts  included  all  of  these  countries  except  North  Vietnam. 
Both  an  immediate  and  short-range  political  impact  of  our  offer  was  its  positive 
role  as  a  catalyst  in  stimulating  the  interest  in  and  moves  toward  regional  co- 
operation. While  nationalism  is,  of  course,  the  dominant  political  force  in  the 
region,  this  is  now  tempered  by  a  fairly  widely  accepted  view  that  the  states  of 
Southeast  Asia  have  a  common  interest  in  working  together  for  political,  eco- 
nomic and  even  cultural  reasons.  Many  of  the  regional  organizations  and  group- 
ings in  Southeast  Asia  owe  their  origin  or  vitality  to  the  boost  for  regional  coop- 
eration given  by  the  United  States  in  the  period  1965-1969.  Best  known  is  the  for- 
mation in  late  1965  of  the  Asian  Development  Bank.  While  the  idea  for  such  a 
bank  had  been  around  for  several  years  and  ECAFE  circles  favored  it,  its  forma- 
tion in  1965  resulted  directly  from  President  Johnson's  April  7  general  offer  to 
Southeast  Asia  and  his  July  offer  to  propose  the  U.S.  join  such  a  bank,  if  formed, 
which  I  was  able  to  convey  to  a  special  meeting  of  Asian  bankers  in  Bangkok. 
Less  recognized  but  no  less  real  was  the  large  increase  in  inter-regional  personal 
contacts  which  occurred  in  Southeast  Asia  over  these  years  at  various  levels  and 
in  varied  forums.  I  have  in  mind  such  developments  as  the  initiation  of  plans  for 
a  regionwide  study  of  transportation  infrastructure  ( the  study  was  completed  in 
1971  with  help  of  the  ADB)  ;  the  coming  together  of  Ministers  of  Education  of  the 
region  to  plan  development  of  training  institutions  of  regional  significance  and 
the  mushrooming  of  specialized  regional  groups  to  consider  one  topic  or  an- 
other of  economic,  social  or  political  significance.  As  for  the  Mekong  "riparian 
States,"  they  have  participated  in  most  of  this  region-wide  activity  plus,  of  course, 
made  progress  in  further  developing  plans  for  harnessing  the  resources  from  the 
river  itself.  The  Johns  Hopkins  speech  and  the  stepped-up  interest  in  the  de- 
velopment potential  of  the  Mekong  which  it  generated  certainly  had  a  healthy, 
political  impact  in  the  non-communist  riparian  states  by  focussing  attention  on 
the  future.  I  know  this  from  my  four  trips  to  the  area  for  President  Johnson 
and  subsequent  visits.  While  I  did  not  visit  North  Vietnam,  I  understand  from 
C.  L.  Sulzberger's  trip  to  Hanoi  and  other  accounts  that  some  political  figures 
there  were  quite  interested  in  the  possibility  of  sharing  in  the  proposed  major  de- 
velopment effort.  At  the  same  time  it  was  as  unrealistic  in  1905  as  it  is  today 
to  believe  that  leaders  in  North  Vietnam  [bent]  on  conquest  of  the  South  would 
abandon  their  goals  simply  in  response  to  offers  of  aid.  I  would,  therefor,  rephrase 
your  question  a  little  and  say  both  the  short  and  long-term  political  impact  of  the 


*The  headings  in  italics  define  the  topics,  relating  to  the  present  study,  on  which  the 
author  asked  Mr.  Black  to  comment.  See  vol.  I,  p.  370  for  context. 

(433) 


434 


Johns  Hopkins  offer  was  substantial  in  the  professional  communities  in  all  the 
riparian  states  by  opening  up  new  horizons;  that  it  was  a  morale  boost  to  non- 
communist  states  by  promise  of  a  better  future  in  spite  of  present  difficulties ; 
and  that  it  was  an  incentive  to  North  Vietnam  to  consider  the  alternative  to  war 
by  assuring  them  their  foe  could  be  generous. 

The  effectiveness  and  limitations  of  large-scale  proposals  for  technological  de- 
velopment as  a  means  of  diverting  attention  and  energies  from  military 
conflict 

As  I  indicated  above,  there  is  little  reason  to  believe  that  a  carrot  approach 
alone  will  force  totalitarian  leaders  to  change  their  policies.  And  I  am  con- 
vinced President  Johnson  shared  this  view  even  when  he  made  his  offer  to  in- 
clude North  Vietnam  in  postwar  development  plans.  Yet  there  is  evidence,  as 
first  reported  by  C.  L.  Sulzberger  from  Hanoi,  that  at  least  some  North  Viet- 
namese leaders  were  interested  in  President  Johnson's  offer.  And  while  I  have 
no  knowledge  whatsoever  of  the  background  of  President  Nixon's  more  recent 
offer  of  a  $7.5  billion  reconstruction  program  with  $2.5  billion  earmarked  for 
Hanoi,  I  am  satisfied  it  was  made  in  the  belief  it  would  help  Hanoi  to  alter  its 
course.  When,  and  if,  these  offers  or  other  circumstances  persuade  North  Viet- 
nam to  turn  to  peaceful  pursuits,  then  I  remain  persuaded  that  it  will  be  enor- 
mously helpful  to  package  reconstruction  efforts  around  the  Mekong  River 
development  scheme.  I  believe  this  will  strengthen  support  in  the  United  States  to 
provide  the  funds  and  if  negotiated  carefully  in  the  field  can  be  a  strong  in- 
centive for  regional  cooperation  among  the  riparian  states. 

Steps  that  might  have  been  taken  in  the  United  States  to  make  the  President's 
proposal  more  attractive  to  the  leadership  in  North  Vietnam 
I  did,  of  course,  think  often  in  1965  and  1966  about  what  else  could  be  done  in 
the  United  States  to  make  the  Johns  Hopkins  offer  more  acceptable  to  the  leader- 
ship in  North  Vietnam.  We  did  most  of  them — principally  launch,  together  with 
United  Nations  agencies,  a  whole  series  of  studies  and  plans  for  the  Mekong 
program  calculated  to  show  the  sincerity  of  our  postwar  intentions.  I  believe 
that  via  UN  and  other  channels  leaders  in  North  Vietnam  were  kept  well  abreast 
of  the  good  prospects  of  their  participating  in  these  plans.  My  own  extensive 
contacts  in  the  United  States  persuaded  me  that  the  American  public  would 
support  development  and  reconstruction-type  aid  to  North  Vietnam  once  the  war 
was  over.  Therefore)  I  did  not  see  the  problem  as  primarily  one  of  further  action 
in  the  United  States  to  confirm  the  President's  offer.  Our  postwar  record  in 
Germany  and  Japan  is  no  doubt  fully  appreciated  in  Hanoi. 

A  broader  view  of  the  possible  role  of  technology  in  contributing  toward  a  tcorld 
of  peaceable,  and  economically  healthy  States,  and  what  the  United  States 
program  might  be  toward  this  contribution 
There  are  many  others  more  competent  than  I  to  speak  to  the  role  of  technology 
In  international  development.  What  I  can  do  is  underscore  from  my  experience 
with  the  World  Bank,  and  subsequently,  that  all  developing  countries,  and  espe- 
cially the  newly  trained  elite  rapidly  assuming  power,  are  intrigued  with  the 
prospects  of  leapfrogging  along  the  hard  road  to  development  by  making  use  of 
all  the  new  technology  available.  This  is  possible  as  some  of  our  businessmen 
know  who  must  compete  with  the  very  latest  machinery  and  equipment  some- 
times found  in  the  least  developed  countries.  Also  significant,  and  frequently 
overlooked,  is  the  fact  that  new  technology  is  regularly  introduced,  particularly 
by  governments,  in  advance  of  the  administrative  reforms  and  training  programs 
needed  to  make  the  new  technology  more  efficient  and  economical  than  the  old. 


Chapter  7 — Exploiting  the  Resources  of  the 

Seabed 


CONTENTS 


Page 

I.  Ocean  Space 439 

An  Overview  of  the  Geography  of  the  Seabed 439 

Scope  and  Limitations  of  the  Study 439 

II.   Geography  and  Legal  Concepts  of  the  Continental  Shelf 440 

Continental  Shelf  of  the  United  States 441 

Continental  Shelf  of  the  Soviet  Union 443 

Differing  Doctrines  of  the  "Legal  Shelf" 444 

The  Truman  Proclamation 445 

The  Submerged  Lands  Act  of  1953 447 

The  Outer  Continental  Shelf  Lands  Act  of  1953 448 

Geneva  Conventions  of  1958 450 

Deficiencies  of  the  Geneva  Conventions 451 

III.  Seabed  Resources 453 

Deposits  on  the  Seabed  Surface: 

Building  Materials 453 

Heavy  Minerals 454 

Phosphorite 454 

Manganese  Nodules 456 

Red  Sea  Geothermal  Deposits 457 

Other  Surface  Deposits 458 

Deposits  Below  the  Seabed  Surface 458 

Petroleum 459 

Other  Subsurface  Deposits 462 

Resources  of  the  Oceans 463 

Food  From  the  Sea 463 

Fish  Protein  Concentrate 464 

Aquaculture 464 

Drugs  From  the  Sea 464 

Sea  Water  and  Its  Minerals 465 

IV.  Technology  and  Economics 466 

Harvesting  Hard  Minerals  From  the  Seabed 466 

Phosphorite 468 

Manganese  Nodules 471 

Commercial  Recovery  of  Offshore  Petroleum 472 

Exploration 472 

Drilling 473 

Production 474 

Future  Trends 475 

Supply  and  Demand 478 

V.  Policy  for  Seabed  Resources 481 

Policy  for  Submarine  Mining 481 

Policy  for  Offshore  Petroleum 482 

General  Policy  for  Seabed  Resources 484 

VI.  International  Concern 484 

Organizations  for  Marine  Activities 485 

Non- Governmental  Organizations 486 

Intergovernmental  Organizations 486 

VII.  U.N.  Activities  Concerning  Seabed  Resources 488 

Emergence  of  the  Malta  Proposal 489 

Organization  of  the  U.N.  Seabed  Committee 491 

Legal  Subcommittee 493 

Economic  and  Technical  Subcommittee 493 

International  Machinery 494 

(437) 


438 

Page 

VIII.  U.S.  Participation  in  International  Ocean  Activities 495 

U.S.  Policy  Apparatus  for  Seabed  Issues 495 

Congressional  Committees 496 

Council  on  Marine  Resources  and  Engineering  Develop- 
ment   496 

Commission     on     Marine     Science,      Engineering,     and 

Resources 497 

Committee  on  International  Policy  in  the  Marine  Environ- 
ment   497 

Interagency  Law-of-the-Sea  Task  Force 498 

The  National  Academies 499 

Formulation  of  U. S.  Policy  for  the  Seabed 499 

Legislative  Concern  in  the  90th  Congress 499 

House  Support  for  the  Malta  Proposal 500 

Proposal  for  a  U.N.  Marine  Resources  Agency 500 

Support  and  Opposition  in  the  Senate 501 

Reasons  for  Opposition 501 

Legislative  Concern  in  the  91st  Congress 502 

Senator  Pell's  Proposals 503 

Position  of  the  Subcommittee  on  Outer  Continental 

Shelf 504 

Position  of  the  Executive  Branch 506 

Seabed  Disarmament  Treaty 508 

Seabed  Regime 509 

IX.  Role  of  Science  and  Technology  in  Seabed  Diplomacy 511 

Military  Technology  and  Ocean  Strategy , 511 

Scientists  in  the  Diplomatic  Process 514 

Role  of  the  Marine  Council  Staff 514 

Role  of  Scientists  in  Others  Agencies 516 

Scientific  Advice,  Policy,  and  Diplomacy 517 

X.       Summary 519 

FIGURES 

1.  Sketch  profile  showing  the  components  and  average  depths  of  the  con- 

tinental margin 441 

2.  Diagrammatic  sketch  showing  typical  oil  and  gas  types  of  traps 461 

3.  Conceptual  design  of  an  underwater  petroleum  production  system 476 

4.  Service  capsule  (Top  sphere)   being  lowered  to  couple  with  wellhead 

cellar  (Bottom  sphere)  encapsulating  production  equipment 477 

5.  Artist's  impression  of  offshore  oilfield  development  showing  underwater 

production,  separation,  and  storage  systems 478 

6.  United  Nations  bodies  with  responsibilities  in  the  marine  sciences 487 

7.  Organizational  chart  showing  the  relationships  within  the  Federal  Gov- 

ernment for  decisionmaking  in  marine  affairs  (1967) 498 

TABLES 

I.  Depth  Zones  of  the  Oceans 442 

II.  Countries  With  Extensive  Ocean  Area  at  Depths  Less  Than  1,000 

fathoms 443 

III.  Inland  Waters  Areas  of  the  United  States,  by  Regions 449 

IV.  Area  of  the  United  States  Continental  Shelf,  by  Coastal  Regions.  __  450 
V.  Ocean  Mining  Technology  Time  Table 467 

VI.   Population  Projections:  World,  United  States,  etc.  1965-2000 469 

VII.  Per  Capita  Consumption  (Apparent)  of  Phosphate  Rock 469 

VIII.   Projected  Total  Consumption  of  Phosphate  Rock,   1966  Through 

2000  A.D ----  469 

IX.   Reserves  and  Potential  Resources  of  Phosphate  Rock  in  the  United 

States 470 

X.   Reserves  of  Metals  in  Manganese  Nodules  of  the  Pacific  Ocean 471 


CHAPTER  7— EXPLOITING  THE   RESOURCES  OF 

THE  SEABED 

I.  Ocean  Space 

The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  describe  the  seabed,  its  configuration 
and  resources,  and  to  show  how  technological  advances  to  exploit  the 
resources  under  the  oceans  have  impacted  on  national  policy  and  inter- 
national diplomacy. 

An  Overview  of  the  Geography  of  the  Seabed 

The  world  oceans  occupy  more  than  70  per  cent  of  the  surface  of 
the  Earth.  Although  the  oceans  have  been  divided  into  Arctic,  Atlantic, 
Indian,  Pacific,  and  Antarctic,  this  division  reflects  only  the  point  of 
view  of  humans  inhabiting  the  land  of  the  planet  Earth.  Viewed  from 
the  Moon,  Earth  is  essentially  a  water  planet — one  large  ocean  inter- 
spersed with  continental  land  masses. 

Geologically,  the  picture  is  even  more  radical.  The  world  oceans  are 
merely  a  film  of  water  covering  a  major  portion  of  the  Earth's  crust. 
Other  portions  of  the  crust  protrude  above  this  film  of  water  and  are 
called  land ;  what  is  below  the  water  is  the  seabed. 

By  virtue  of  its  global  characteristics,  therefore,  ocean  space  is  a 
common  link  among  land  masses,  shared  by  the  nations  touching  this 
ocean  space.  Its  waters  wash  indiscriminately  the  shores  of  these  na- 
tions, and  its  marine  life  forms  journey  freely  through  their  grazing 
grounds  heedless  of  national  boundaries.  Despite  these  natural  char- 
acteristics, ocean  space  has  been  zoned  off,  and  national  boundaries  and 
jurisdictions  established  by  the  coastal  states. 

Until  recently,  man's  needs  for  the  ocean  were  for  the  most  part  con- 
fined to  food  and  commerce,  followed  by  military  uses.  The  main  con- 
cern of  nations  was  the  protection  of  their  near-shore  areas  for  their 
food  supply,  and  their  commercial  fleets.  The  ocean  floor  and  the  sea- 
bed were  virtually  unknown,  and  their  potential  resources  unheard  of. 

Progress  in  marine  technology  and  the  widening  horizons  of  scien- 
tific inquiry  enlarged  the  sphere  of  man's  knowledge  and  revealed  the 
presence  of  natural  resources,  not  only  in  sea  water  itself,  but  also  on 
the  ocean  floor  and  in  the  underlying  layers.  Today,  the  sea  floor  is  no 
longer  a  bottomless  basin  but  an  underwater  world  with  a  "landscape" 
not  very  unlike  man's  own  world  on  land.  It  has  valleys  and  mountain 
ranges,  seamounts  and  volcanoes,  canyons  and  deep  trenches,  and  a  con- 
tinental margin  extending  from  land  to  the  abyss,  all  complete  with 
plant  and  animal  life.  It  is  a  whole  new  world,  heretofore  alien  and 
hostile  to  man,  yet  virtually  at  his  doorstep. 

Into  this  underwater  realm  man  has  begun  to  direct  his  energy — his 
quest  for  knowledge,  for  profit,  and  for  his  ultimate  survival. 

Scope  and  Limitations  of  the  Study 

This  study  defines  the  area  under  consideration,  the  resources  of 
the  seabed,  and  the  international  activities  toward  an  orderly  exploita- 

Note  :  This  chapter  was  prepared  in  1971  by  George  A.  Doumani. 

(439) 


440 


tion  of  these  resources.  It  presents  the  geographical  and  legal  defini- 
tions of  the  continental  shelf  and  the  sea  floor  beyond,  and  the  histori- 
cal background  leading  to  the  international  concern  and  the  Geneva 
Conventions  of  1958.  An  inventory  is  taken  of  all  the  resources  of  the 
seabed,  which  are  the  object  of  concern  among  the  nations  of  the  world. 
The  development  in  the  techniques  of  exploiting  the  seabed  are  re- 
viewed, showing  the  present  state  of  the  art  and  what  the  future  holds 
for  underwater  exploitation.  The  economic  factors  are  added  to  the 
technological  capabilities  to  assess  the  parameters  interacting  in  the 
formulation  of  policy  for  exploiting  seabed  resources. 

On  the  international  scene,  the  United  Nations  activities  are  re- 
viewed, particularly  following  the  Malta  proposal  for  an  international 
regime  for  the  seabed.  The  participation  of  the  United  States  in  these 
activities  is  discussed,  including  the  U.S.  policy  apparatus  and  the 
evolution  of  U.S.  policy  in  international  ocean  affairs.  The  role  of 
science  and  technology  is  analyzed,  showing  the  effect  of  technological 
development  on  ocean  strategy,  and  the  role  played  by  scientists  in 
the  diplomatic  and  policymaking  processes. 

The  study  is  mainly  addressed  to  the  seabed  portion  of  ocean  space 
beyond  national  jurisdiction.  It  includes  only  cursory  mention  of 
fisheries  and  other  ocean  resources,  and  the  issues  of  territorial  limits. 

II.  Geography  and  Legal  Concepts  of  the  Continental  Shelf 

The  crust  of  the  Earth  as  a  whole  has  two  major  features — the  con- 
tinental platforms  and  the  ocean  basins.  The  physiographic  features 
of  the  oceans  are  not  merely  expressions  of  the  Earth's  surface  but, 
more  significantly,  they  are  reflections  of  fundamental  geological  and 
geophysical  provinces  of  the  Earth's  crust.  These  provinces  differ  in 
shape,  mass,  structure,  physical  and  chemical  properties,  and  the 
composition  of  their  rock  constituents. 

Where  water  meets  land  is  not  exactly  where  the  ocean  basins  meet 
the  continental  platforms.  A  relatively  narrow  margin  of  each  plat- 
form is  under  water,  belonging  geologically  to  the  continent  and  not 
to  the  ocean  basin.  This  feature  is  called  the  continental  margin. 

The  continental  margin  has  three  physiographic  features:  The 
shelf,  the  slope,  and  the  ripe  (Figure  1).  The  shelf  is  the  extension  of 
the  laud  mass;  the  slope  is  its  frontal  edge ;  and  the  rise  is  that  vaguely 
definable  area  where  the  bottom  of  the  slope  meets  the  deep  ocean 
basin. 

As  its  name  implies,  the  continental  shelf  is  topographically  :i  gently 
sloping  terrace,  ranging  in  depth  from  the  mean  water  line  at  the 
.shore  to  a  maximum  of  300  fathoms1  where  the  sharp  slope  begins. 


1  The  International  Committee  on  the  Nomenclature  of  Ocean  Rottom  Features  proposed 
the  following  definition.  Continental  shrif,  shelf  edpe  and  borderland:  The  zone  around 
the  continent,  extending  from  the  low  water  line  to  the  depth  ;it  which  there  Is  a  marked 
Increase  of  slope  in  greater  depth.  Where  this  Increase  occurs  the  term  "shelf  edge"  is 
appropriate.  Conventionally,  the  edge  Is  taken  nl  100  fathoms  (or  200  meters)  hut  in- 
stances are  known  where  the  Increase  of  slope  occurs  at  more  than  200  or  less  than  65 
fathom-  Where  the  /one  below  the  low  water  line  is  highly  irregular  and  includes  depths 
well  In  excess  of  those  typical  of  continental  shelves,  the  term  "continental  borderland" 
Is  appropriate. 

The  same  definition  was  used  by  a  group  of  marine  geologists  who  chose  the  depth  of 
300  fathoms  arhitrarllv  (Andre  Gnllcher  and  others)  In  preparing  a  report  for  the  T'nited 
Nations  Kdurntlonnl,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization,  Conference  on  the  Law  of  the 
Sea,  1057.  13/2. 

One  fathom  equals  6  feet  or  1.83  meters. 


441 


I  Conti- 
I   nental   I 
I      Slope    I 
k 1 

I 

Continental  Terrace      Continental  Rise  '   Deep  sea  bed 
-I- 

Continental  Margin 


Figure  1. — Sketch  profile  showing  the   components  and  average  depths  of  the 
continental  margin.  Not  to  scale. 


Where  this  break  occurs,  the  average  depth  throughout  the  world  is 
about  72  fathoms,  though  for  convenience  the  100-fathom  depth  has 
been  adopted. 

The  width  of  the  continental  shelf  varies  widely  from  a  very  narrow 
shelf  off  the  west  coasts  of  North  and  South  America,  to  hundreds  of 
miles  along  Arctic  Europe  and  the  Far  East.  It  ranges  from  a  mini- 
mum of  less  than  one  mile  to  a  maximum  of  800  miles.  Although  the 
depth  of  the  shelf  has  been  used  as  an  international  limit,  it  is  the 
width  that  determines  the  area  of  the  shelf  and,  hence,  its  significance 
for  the  exploitation  of  its  resources. 

Continental  Shelf  of  the  United  States 

The  United  States  of  America  has  a  coastline  approximately  12,000 
miles  long,  with  a  continental  shelf  of  650,000  square  miles  at  the 
100-fathom  depth,  including  the  East  Coast,  West  Coast,  and  Alaska. 

Off  Newfoundland,  the  shelf  width  increases  greatly,  averaging 
over  200  miles.  To  the  south  and  east  are  the  Grand  Banks,  which  aver- 
age only  about  30  fathoms  in  depth  and  stretch  eastward  for  more 
than  450  miles.  If  the  shelf  were  limited  to  100  fathoms,  the  width 
would  be  only  about  200  miles. 

Between  Newfoundland  and  Cape  Hatteras,  the  shelf  decreases  in 
depth  from  80  to  30  fathoms.  The  channel  into  the  Gulf  of  St.  Law- 
rence is  more  than  30  miles  wide,  and  the  shelf  width  varies  from 
about  120  miles  off  Nova  Scotia  to  less  than  20  miles  off  Cape  Hatteras. 

From  Cape  Hatteras  south,  the  shelf  gradually  widens  from  less 
than  20  miles  to  a  maximum  of  70  miles  off  Georgia,  then  virtually 
disappears  off  south  Florida.  If  the  Blake  Plateau  is  considered  as 
a  portion  of  the  shelf,  the  maximum  width  would  increase  to  about 


442 

TABLE  l.-DEPTH  ZONES  OF  THE  OCEANS 
[Areas  in  millions  of  square  miles] 


Under  200  meters       200  to  1,000  meters     1,000  to  2,000  meters 


Total 
area  Area       Percent  Area      Percent  Area        Percent 


All  oceans  and  seas 105.569         7.909  7.49  4.669  4.42         4.630  4.38 


Pacific  Ocean  plus  seas 52.  880 

Pacific  Ocean  alone  ' 48.476 

Asiatic  Mediterranean  2 2. 648 

Bering  Sea .659 

Sea  of  Okhotsk _.         .406 

Yellow  and  East  China  Seas 351 

Sea  of  Japan 295 

Gulf  of  California 045 


Atlantic  Ocean  plus  seas 27.  502 

Atlantic  Ocean  alone  3 25.240 

American  Mediterranean  * 1.  271 

Mediterranean  Sea  5 .  732 

Black  Sea .148 

BalticSea 11 

Indian  Ocean  plus  seas 21 

Indian  Ocean  alone .' 21.411 

Red  Sea 

Persian  Gulf. 


2.954 

5.59 

1.791 

3.39 

2.084 

3.96 

.791 

1.63 

1.252 

2.58 

1.576 

3.25 

1.375 

51.91 

.245 

9.26 

.276 

10.43 

.306 

46.44 

.039 

5.98 

.050 

7.72 

.107 

26.48 

.160 

39.48 

.091 

22.38 

.285 

81.31 

.040 

11.43 

.021 

5.97 

.069 

23.50 

.045 

15.18 

.058 

19.65 

.021 

47.71 

.009 

20.85 

.012 

25.89 

2.383 

8.69 

1.624 

5.92 

1.418 

5.16 

1.773 

7.03 

1.305 

5.17 

1.084 

4.30 

.298 

23.44 

.136 

10.67 

.172 

13.52 

.150 

20.44 

.165 

22.48 

.127 

17.41 

.052 

34.97 

.019 

12.59 

.034 

23.08 

.111 

99.83 

.003 

.17  .. 

21.613 

21.411 

.132 

.889 
.765 
.055 
.069 

4.10 
3.57 
41.45 
All  .. 

.632 
.575 
.057 

2.92 

2.69 

43.06 

.786 
.766 
.020 

3.64 

3.58 

14  92 

.069 

Arctic  Ocean  plus  seas.. 3.574         1.683         47.10  .623         17.45  .333  9.34 

Arctic  Ocean  alone « 2.766  1.125  40.67  .458  16.54  2.82  10.21 

Arctic  Mediterranean > 808  .558         69.01  .165         20.45  .051  6.27 

1  Pacific  Ocean  includes  Bass  Strait. 

2  Asiatic  Mediterranean  includes  Andaman  Sea,  South  China  Sea,  Java  Sea,  Celebes  Sea  and  Arafura  Sea. 
'  Atlantic  Ocean  includes  North  Sea,  Greenland  Sea,  Norwegian  Sea,  Kattegat  and  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence. 
*  American  Mediterranean  includes  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  Caribbean  Sea. 

5  Mediterranean  Sea  includes  Sea  of  Marmara. 

"  Arctic  Ocean  includes  only  North  Polar  Basin  and  Barents  Sea. 

7  Arctic  Mediterranean  includes  Hudson  Bay,  Baffin  Bay  and  Canadian  Straits  Sea. 

Source:  L.  R.  Heselton,  Jr.,  "The  Continental  Shelf."  (Institute  of  Naval  Studies,  CNA  research  contribution  No.  106 
December  1968),  page  8. 


300  miles.  This  would  increase  the  area  by  about  50,000  square  miles, 
most  of  which  is  at  depths  of  between  300  and  500  fathoms. 

In  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  the  shelf  rarely  exceeds  100  fathoms  in 
depth.  To  the  west  of  the  Mississippi  River  the  edge  of  the  shelf 
is  about  100  fathoms  up  to  120  miles  offshore.  The  overall  U.S. 
portion  of  the  Gulf  contains  about  135,000  square  miles  of  shelf  of 
less  than  100  fathoms,  of  which  only  8,000  miles  is  within  territorial 
waters. 

On  the  West  Coast,  the  apparent  shelf  off  Southern  California  is 
about  10  miles  wide  with  an  edge  at  about  50  fathoms.  However, 
the  bottom  is  irregular,  and  there  are  shoals  and  rises  beyond  100 
miles  offshore  which  geologically  should  be  considered  as  part 
of  the  continental  shelf.  The  true  shelf — as  opposed  to  the  legal 
shelf— appears  to  terminate  beyond  500  fathoms  in  many  instances 
off  Southern  California,  and  in  the  southern  portion  is  as  much  as 
150  miles  offshore. 

For  the  remainder  of  North  America,  there  would  be  little  effec- 
tive change  in  shelf  area  by  assigning  an  outer  shelf  limit  greater 
than  100  fathoms.  The  shelf  of  the  Bering  Sea  is  very  flat  and  has 
a  pronounced  edge  at  around  TO  fathoms,  attaining  a  maximum  width 
of  400  miles. 


443 


TABLE  M— COUNTRIES  WITH  EXTENSIVE  OCEAN  AREA  AT  DEPTHS  LESS  THAN  1,000  FATHOMS 


Country 


Approximate 

coastline 

(nautical  miles)1 


Approximate  area  (square  nautical  miles) 
at  less  than— 


100  fathoms 


100  to  500 
fathoms 


500  to  1.000 
fathoms 


7,000 


Argentina 2,100  250,000  25,000  15,000 

Australia  (including  New  Guinea) 17,500  625,000  170,000  250,000 

(Indian  Ocean  islands) 2,000  20,000  65,000 

Bahamas(U.K.) ____ 1,400  37,000  5,000  14,000 

Brazil 3,700  200,000  33,000  35,000 

Burma 1,230  63,000  10,000  10,000 

Canada 11,000  >700,000  >200,000  >100,000 

China 3,500  200,000  20,000  10,000 

Faeroe  Island  (Denmark) 155  6,000  30,000      ■  15,000 

France 1,375  41,000  5,000  4,500 

(Indian  Ocean  islands) 18,000  43,000  63,000 

(Pacific  Ocean  islands) 29,000  40,000  75,000 

Greenland  (Denmark) 5,000  60,000  200,000  50,000 

Iceland... 1,080  22,000  40,000  >75,000 

India 2,750  80,000  20,000  30,000 

Indonesia 20,000  380,000  

Ireland 660  36,000  15,000 

Malaysia 1,850  125,000 

Mexico 5,000  100,000  25,000  25,000 

New  Zealand 2,770  60,000  225,000  175,000 

Norway. 1,650  30,000  80,000  35,000 

Portugal  dependencies.... _ 60,000  45,000  95,000 

South  Africa.... 1,430  46,000  44,000  33,000 

(South  West  Africa) 780  20,000  35,000  10,000 

South  Vietnam. 865  84,000  17,000  25,000 

Spain 1,500  20,000  23,000  23,000 

(Atlantic  dependencies) 24,000  11,000  15,000 

Thailand.... 1,300  75,000  15,000 

U.S.S.R ....                 23,000          >1, 000, 000  >400, 000  >300, 000 

United  Kingdom 2,800  40,000  25,000  50,000 

(Falkland  Island  and  dependencies) 30,000  65,000  40,000 

(Indian  Ocean  islands) 48,000  20,000  35,000 

(Pacific  Ocean  islands) 17,000  17,000  35,000 

United  States ._ _                11.650  650,000  >150,000  >150,000 

Venezuela 1,000  27,000  10,000  20,000 


i  Coastlines  from  U.S.  Department  of  State  Geographic  Bulletin  No.  3,  April  1965. 
Source:  Adapted  from:  Ibid.,  page  9. 

f 

Continental  Shelf  of  the  Soviet  Union 

The  Soviet  Union  has  a  coastline  approximately  23,000  miles  long, 
with  a  continental  shelf  exceeding  1  million  square  miles  up  to  the 
100-fathom  depth.  The  coastline  stretches  along  the  Arctic  Ocean, 
from  Norway  to  Alaska,  and  southward  along  the  Pacific  Ocean  from 
the  Bering  Sea  to  the  Sea  of  Japan. 

The  shelf  bordering  the  Arctic  is  not  of  uniform  extent,  being  sev- 
eral miles  wider  off  the  Eurasian  coast  than  off  that  of  North  America. 
North  of  Norway  and  adjacent  to  Russia,  the  Barents  Sea  forms  one 
of  the  widest  shelves  in  the  world  and  also  one  of  the  deepest.  Off  Nor- 
way, the  100-fathom  line  is  reached  almost  immediately  offshore  while 
to  the  east,  toward  Russian  waters,  it  is  as  much  as  150  miles  from 
land. 

The  Kara  Sea,  250,000  square  miles  in  area,  is  entirely  on  the  con- 
tinental shelf.  It  is  mostly  of  depths  less  than  100  fathoms,  with 
isolated  troughs  of  about  200  fathoms. 

To  the  east,  off  Siberia,  the  shelf  edge  is  generally  at  about  40 
fathoms,  and  reaches  a  maximum  width  of  about  400  miles.  A  combina- 
tion of  the  Chukchi  shelf  and  the  Bering  shelf  is  often  considered  as  the 
world's  widest  shelf,  extending  over  1000  miles  north  and  south.  The 
shelf  narrows  to  less  than  50  miles  in  width  north  of  Alaska,  with  the 


444 


edge  still  at  about  40  fathoms  and  with  depths  increasing  rapidly 
beyond. 

In  the  Sea  of  Okhotsk,  the  100-fathom  line  varies  from  20  to  100 
miles  offshore,  and  encompasses  about  one  fourth  of  the  whole  area. 
Except  for  a  deep  basin  near  the  Kuriles,  all  of  the  sea  is  less  than 
1,000  fathoms,  an  area  of  some  400,000  square  miles. 

Differing  Doctrines  of  the  "Legal  Shelf'' 

The  historical  and  conventional  territorial  limits  of.  the  coastal 
nations  have  long  been  a  subject  of  international  controversy.  Even 
in  the  United  States,  controversy  and  litigation  were  carried  on,  par- 
ticularly between  the  individual  States  and  the  Federal  Government. 
Since  this  paper  is  concerned  mainly  with  the  continental  shelf,  the 
near-shore  boundaries  will  l>e  discussed  only  as  they  pertain  to  the 
subject.  Most  of  the  maritime  nations  of  the  world  recognize  and  claim 
three  nautical  miles  as  the  territorial  sea,  with  a  nine-mile  contiguous 
zone  beyond  that.2  The  rest  of  the  109  sovereign  states  that  border  the 
sea  claim  a  wider  territorial  sea  which  may  be  as  much  as  200  miles 
offshore,  as  is  the  case  with  Argentina,  Brazil,  Ecuador.  El  Salvador. 
Korea.  Nicaragua,  Panama.  Peru,  and  Uruguay. 

Where  the  200-mile  figure  originated  is  not  very  clear.  But  during 
a  Senate  floor  debate  on  the  "Unlawful  Seizure  of  U.S.  Fishing  Ves- 
sels" off  the  South  American  shores,  the  late  Senator  Bartlett  asked 
if  those  countries  had  in  fact  established  a  200-mile  territorial  sea  limit. 
Senator  Warren  Magnuson  answered : 

Yes.  Now  I  have  a  strange  anecdote  to  relate  about  the  200-mile  limit.  In 
Peru,  I  held  talks  with  the  highest  officials  of  the  government  about  the  200-mile 
limit.  They  looked  mo  squarely  in  the  eye  and  said,  "We  did  not  establish  the 
200  miles.  You  did" — meaning  we,  the  United  States. 

I  said,  "How  is  that?"  They  pulled  out  a  musty  old  order  that  had  been  in  a 
drawer — I  guess  they  kept  it  handy — issued  during  World  War  II  by  President 
Roosevelt,  establishing  a  200-mile  neutrality  zone  around  the  western  part  <>f 
South  America  as  protection.  They  picked  that  up  and  said  it  should  be  200 
miles  off  their  coast  for  fishing  and  other  territorial  matters.3 

The  physical  dimensions  of  the  continental  shelf  have  not  been  used 
to  delineate  the  extent  of  jurisdiction  of  the  coastal  states  for  the  sea- 
bed. One  obstacle  was  the  lack  of  complete  and  accurate  data  which 
could  be  used  by  the  coastal  states  throughout  the  world.  A  more  com- 
pelling reason  was  the  absence  of  uniformity  in  the  widths  of  the 
continental  shelves.  Some  nations  have  hardly  any  shelf  to  speak  of: 
the  conveniently  adopted  100-fathom  ( 200-meter)  isobath  is  within 
e\  en  their  territorial  seas  and  contiguous  /ones. 

As  the  importance  of  the  continental  shelf  began  to  increase,  some 
nations  undertook,  by  unilateral  action,  to  establish  policy  and  juris- 
diction over  t hen-  continent:!!  shelves.  In  the  United  States  this  action 


•Com  irted  a  law  in  me,.;  establishing  this  fisheries  contiguous  zone.  This  is  the 

■    /one   establish!, i    in    the  l  m    the   Territorial    Ren    nnd    the  Con- 

tiguous Zone,  in  I0!)S.  wnlch  "mn.\   nol  extend  bevond  twelve  miles   *    •    *."  (Article  24.2). 

fPnllj  ed.  Apr  ::  i:m;si  p,  S3818.  Three  Smith  American  coun- 
tries (Chile.  Ecuador,  Peru)  arrived  at  the  200-mile  figure  by  taking  the  western  limit  of 
whal  tiny  termed  "bioma".  The  delegates  of  the.se  countries  at  the  Santiago  negotiations 
prvntion  problems  defl 1  the  "bioma"  .-is  "the  whole  of  the  living  com- 
munities ni  a  region  which,  under  the  Influence  of  the  climate  and  in  the  course  of  cen- 
lies  constantly  more  homogeneous,  until.  In  Its  final  phase,  it  becomes  a 
definite  type,  •  *  •  The  western  limit  of  these  "bioma"  are  variable,  and  they  are  wider 
opposite  the  Chi  ■    opposite  Ecundor,  hut   the  mean  width  ma\    be 

"  i"  !"•  about  200  in  CEP  Doc    No.  '-'.  Sept.  2::.  1955,  contained  in:  "Santiago 

itiations  on  fishery  conservation  problems,"  U.S.   Department  of  state.  Public  Service 
Division,  1955,  pages 


445 


was  accomplished  through  an  official  proclamation  of  policy  by  Presi- 
dent Harry  S.  Truman  in  1945,  subsequently  referred  to  as  the  Truman 
Proclamation.  This  proclamation  had  the  effect  of  opening  a  "Pan- 
dora's Box"  for  other  nations  bordering;  the  seas,  regardless  of  whether 
they  possessed  the  technological  capabilities  to  utilize  the  seabed  as 
did  the  United  States. 

The  decade  of  the  fifties  witnessed  several  attempts  to  define  the 
continental  shelf  and  the  coastal  boundaries.  The  United  States  Con- 
trress  passed  the  Submerged  Lands  Act  of  1953.  followed  a  few  months 
later  by  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf  Lands  Act.  In  1958,  representa- 
tives of  the  world's  maritime  nations  at  Geneva  produced  a  multi- 
lateral agreement  on  the  law  of  the  sea  in  what  are  referred  to  as  the 
Geneva  Conventions. 

These  events  leading  to  the  legal  delineations  of  the  continental  shelf 
are  discussed  below  in  chronological  order. 

THE  TRUMAN   PROCLAMATION 

On  September  28,  1945,  two  policy  proclamations  on  ocean  affairs 
were  issued  by  President  Harry  S.  Truman.  The  first  established  a 
national  policy  with  respect  to  the  natural  resources  of  the  subsoil 
and  seabed  of  the  continental  shelf ;  the  second  proclaimed  U.S.  policy 
with  respect  to  coastal  fisheries  in  certain  areas  of  the  high  seas. 

In  the  first  proclamation,  the  Government  regarded  as  "reasonable 
and  just"  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  over  the  natural  resources  of  the 
subsoil  and  seabed  of  the  continental  shelf  by  the  contiguous  nation.  It 
recognized  that  the  continental  shelf  was  to  be  regarded  as  an  extension 
of  the  land  mass  of  the  coastal  nation  and  thus  naturally  "appurtenant" 
to  it* 

*  *  *  the  Government  of  the  United  States  regards  the  natural  resources  of  the 
subsoil  and  seabed  of  the  continental  shelf  beneath  the  high  seas  but  contiguous 
to  the  coasts  of  the  United  States  as  appertaining  to  the  United  States,  subject  to 
its  jurisdiction  and  control. 

The  Proclamation  did  not  specifically  delineate  any  boundary  lines 
or  numerical  extent  of  the  continental  shelf.  However,  a  news  release 
issued  on  the  same  day  by  the  White  House  explained  that  this  proc- 
lamation did  not  prejudge  the  question  of  Federal  versus  State  con- 
trol, and  that  it  was  intended  to  enable — 

*  *  *  the  orderly  development  of  an  underwater  area  750,000  square  miles  in 
extent.  Generally,  submerged  land  which  is  contiguous  to  the  continent  and  which 
is  covered  by  no  more  than  100  fathoms  (600  feet)  of  water  is  considered  as  the 
continental  shelf. 

In  order  to  differentiate  between  the  seabed  and  the  subsoil  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  superjacent  water  on  the  other,  the  second  proclama- 
tion was  issued,  declaring  that — 

*  *  *  the  Government  of  the  United  States  regards  it  as  proper  to  establish 
conservation  zones  in  those  areas  of  the  high  seas  contiguous  to  the  coasts  of  the 
United  States  wherein  fishing  activties  have  been  or  in  the  future  may  be  de- 
veloped and  maintained  on  a  substantial  scale.  *  *  *  The  United  States  regards 
it  as  proper  to  establish  explicitly  bounded  conservation  zones  in  which  fishing 
activities  shall  be  subject  to  the  regulation  and  control  of  the  United  States. 

The  declaration  went  further  in  conceding  similar  prerogatives  to  all 
other  nations,  concerning  the  "right  of  any  state  to  establish  conserva- 


446 


tion  zones  off  its  shores  in  accordance  with  the  above  principles,  *  *  * 
provided  that  corresponding  recognition  is  given  to  any  fishing  in- 
terests of  nationals  of  the  United  States  which  may  exist  in  such  areas.'' 
The  Proclamation  emphasized  that  the  "  *  *  character  as  high  seas  of 
the  areas  in*  which  such  conservation  zones  are  established  and  the 
right  to  their  free  and  unimpeded  navigation  are  in  no  way  thus 
affected." 

These  two  assertions  seemed  to  imply  that  all  nations  should  come 
to  an  understanding,  negotiate  fisheries  treaties,  and  respect  agree- 
ments concerning  fisheries  regulation  and  conservation  on  the  high  seas. 
Furthermore,  in  context  with  the  events  of  the  time  and  despite  the 
disclaimer  in  the  "White  House  press  release,  the  continental  shelf  proc- 
lamation might  have  been  ai>  expression  of  "White  House  strategy  for 
the  claims  of  the  Federal  Government  to  the  right  over  offshore  oil 
reserves,  the  so-called  "tidelancl"  disputes.  Unfortunately,  the  two 
Presidential  proclamations  led  to  widely  varied  interpretations,  inter- 
nationally and  domestically,  despite  the  fact  that  the  proclamations 
did  not  legally  alter  the  3-mile  territorial  limits  of  the  United  States. 

Within  a  few  years  of  these,  presidential  actions,  numerous  coastal 
nations  issued  similar  proclamations,  but  without  distinguishing  sys- 
tematicallv  among  fishing  zones,  the  seabed  and  subsoil  of  the  con- 
tinental shelf,  and  the  concept  of  the  high  seas.  Although  these 
proclamations  varied  in  scope,  they  included  rights  which  were  not 
then  considered  within  the  acceptable  regulations  of  the  international 
community.  For  example,  Mexico  and  Argentina  claimed  jurisdiction 
over  their  respective  continental  shelves,  including  fisheries,  but  with- 
out interference  with  free  navigation  on  the  high  seas.  Other  South 
American  nations  went  even  further,  claiming  rights  over  the  shelf, 
the  water  above  it.  and  the  air  space  above/  Nations  having  very  nar- 
row shelves  simply  extended  their  claims  of  exclusive  sovereignty  and 
jurisdiction  200  miles  offshore,  to  include  the  seabed  and  the  subsoil 
and  fishing  rijrhts. 

In  the  United  States,  the  legal  principle  of  multiple  use  of  a  resource 
exists  on  public  lands  and  in  the  navigable  waters  of  streams.  The  Tru- 
man Proclamation  in  essence  extended  this  legal  principle  into  the  sea. 
Imparting  to  it  another  dimension,  the  Proclamation  established  a 
distinction  between  the  use  of  the  seabed  and  that  of  the  overlying 
water.  It  asserted  the  basic  premise  that  each  nation  possessed  sovereign 
rights  over  the  exploration  and  exploitation  of  the  natural  resources  of 
its  continental  shelves. 

Some  analysts  view  the  Proclamation  as  detrimental  to  international 
relations  and  the  interests  of  the  United  States.  They  contend  that 
those  not  acquainted  with  the  national  interests  of  the  United  States  in 
the  proper  context  of  international  relations  as  a  whole  tend  to  consider 
it  in  the  U.S.  interest  to  establish  boundaries  as  far  out  into  the  ocean 
as  possible  and  establish  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  everything  within 
them.  For  example : 

The  trouble  with  this  parochial  View  is  that  whatever  the  United  States  can  do 
in  this  respect  it  has  t<»  agree  that  other  countries  can  do  the  same  thine  The 
reaction    we   got    from    the   blunder   of    issuing    the   Truman    Proclamation   on 

'Frnrirls  T.  Christ  v.  Jr  and  Anthony  Scott  "The  Common  Wealth  In  Orenn  Fisheries  : 
V°m/  1  r"Mcms  of  Growtb  and  Economic  Allocation."  (Unltimore,  Johns  Hopkins  Press 
196u),  page  163.  v 


447 


Fisheries  in  September,  1045.  is  that  other  countries  will  claim  more  than  any 
new  claim  the  United  States  makes,  deliberately  interpret  the  new  claim  the 
United  States  makes  in  their  favor,  and  use  our  new  claim,  their  new  claim,  and 
their  misinterpretation  of  our  new  claim,  as  substantiation  for  any  action  they 
wish  to  take  over  and  above  what  the  United  States  wants  to  do.  The  parochial 
view  noted  *  *  *  above  pushed  us  into  this  invidious  position  in  1945,  and  we 
should  guard  carefully  against  repeating  that  mistake.5 

Regardless  of  the  diverse  reactions  and  interpretations,  the  Truman 
Proclamation  remained  de  facto  policy  for  many  years  to  come.  In  the 
ensuing  years,  the  lack  of  definitive  boundaries  and  agreement  on  such 
boundaries  resulted  in  a  series  of  spectacular  cases  between  the  Federal 
Government  and  the  States,  particularly  California,  Texas,  and  Loui- 
siana. These  litigations  concerned  the  coastal  zone,  but  included  areas 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  continental  shelf. 

THE    SUBMERGED    LANDS   ACT   OF    195  3 

In  an  effort  to  resolve  the  issue  of  State  boundaries,  the  Federal 
Government  instituted  an  action  in  the  United  States  Supreme  Court 
against  the  States  of  California,  Texas  and  Louisiana.  These  States 
were  chosen  because  they  were  then  the  only  States  in  the  Union  which 
had  offshore  areas  with  promising  oil  and  gas  deposits.8 

Between  1947  and  1950.  the  Court  had  decided  that  these  States  had 
no  title  to,  or  property  interest  in,  the  submerged  lands  off  their  respec- 
tive coasts  outside  the  inland  waters.  The  Federal  Government  claimed 
all  rights  over  the  lands,  minerals  and  other  things  underlying  the 
offshore  waters. 

These  Supreme  Court  decisions  were  reversed  by  the  Congress  in 
the  Submerged  Lands  Act  of  May  22, 1953.7 

The  Submerged  Lands  Act  attempted  to  define  certain  terms  and 
solve  some  of  the  problems,  providing  definitions  of  "coast  line,"  "land 
beneath  navigable  waters,"  and  the  seaward  boundaries  of  the  states. 
It  set  the  seaward  limit  as  three  marine  miles  from  the  coast,  or  as 
these  boundaries  "existed  at  the  time  such  State  became  a  member  of 
the  Union,  *  *  *  but  in  no  event  shall  the  term  'boundaries'  or  the 
term  'lands  beneath  navigable  waters'  be  interpreted  as  extending 
from  the  coast  line  more  than  three  geographical  miles  into  the  At- 
lantic Ocean  or  the  Pacific  Ocean,  or  more  than  three  marine  leagues 
into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico."  8 

The  Act  left  undefined  the  term  "inland  waters"  and  introduced  a 
new  element  of  uncertainty  as  to  the  historical  boundaries  of  the 
States.  It  did,  however,  render  considerable  statutory  weight  for  the 
first  time  to  the  Truman  Proclamation  by  providing  that  the  natural 
resources  of  the  continental  shelf  seaward  of  the  areas  granted  the 
States  "appertain  to  the  United  States,  and  the  jurisdiction  and  con- 


5  Wilbert.  M.  Chapman.  "A  Symposium  on  National  Interest*  In  Coastal  Waters."  In  "The 
Law  of  the  Sea,"  edited  by  Lewis  M.  Alexander.  (Ohio  State  University  Press,  1967), 
pape  125. 

•  California  claimed  three  marine  miles.  Louisiana  27  marine  miles,  and  Texas  to  the 
outer  edpe  of  the  continental  shelf.  This  litigation  was  referred  to  as  the  "tidelands  con- 
troversy," although  in  the  technical  sense  neither  the  tidelands  nor  the  inland  waters  was 
at  Issue.  The  Federal  Government  had  alreadv  conceded  the  ownership  of  these  areas  by 
the  States. 

T  Article  IV,  s.  3,  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  vests  In  Conpress  the  power 
to  dispose  of  property  belonging  to  the  I'nited  States.  The  power  of  Conpress  to  grant 
submerped  lands  to  the  States  as  it  did  in  the  Submerged  Lands  Act  of  1953  was  challenged 
the  year  after,  but  the  Act  was  sustained.  Alabama  is.   Texas    (1954),  347   U.S.  272. 

•One  marine  leapue  equals  2.4-4.6  miles.  Three  marine  leagues  in  the  sense  above  equal 
approximately  10.5  miles. 

96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  30 


448 


trol  of  which  by  the  United  States  is  hereby  confirmed.''  Despite  this 
confirmation,  the  lack  of  definition  and  the  uncertainty  about  the  his- 
torical boundaries  of  the  States  once  again  led  to  litigation. 

Relative  to  the  continental  shelf  beyond  the  undefined  inland  waters, 
that  is,  beyond  the  seaward  boundaries,  the  Submerged  Lands  Act  also 
omitted  any  provision  for  the  administration  of  the  seabed  and  the 
subsoil  and  the  natural  resources  thereof. 

On  the  same  day  of  the  issuance  of  the  Truman  Proclamation 
(September  •!£.  1945).  the  President  issued  an  Executive  Order 
reserving  and  placing  certain  resources  of  the  continental  shelf  under 
the  control  and  jurisdiction  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior.  A  few 
months  before  passage  of  the  Submerged  Lands  Act,  on  January  16, 
1953,  President  Truman  issued  another  Executive  Order  setting  aside 
submerged  lands  of  the  continental  shelf  as  a  naval  petroleum  reserve. 
This  action  concerned  particularly  oil  and  gas,  and  revoked  the  former 
Executive  Order  by  transferring  the  jurisdiction  from  the  Secretary 
of  the  Interior  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  The  main  thrust  of  the 
Order  provided  that — 

*  *  *  the  lands  of  the  continental  shelf  of  the  United  States  and  Alaska 
lying  seaward  of  the  line  of  mean  low  tide  and  outside  the  inland  waters  and 
extending  to  the  furthermost  limits  of  the  paramount  rights,  full  dominion, 
and  power  of  the  United  States  over  lands  of  the  continental  shelf  are  hereby 
set  aside  as  a  naval  petroleum  reserve  and  shall  be  administered  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy. 

This  Executive  Order  prevailed  until  revoked  a  few  months  later  by 
the  Outer  Continental  Shelf  Lands  Act. 

THE  OUTER  CONTINENTAL   SHELF  LANDS  ACT  OF    1953 

The  Truman  Proclamation  asserted  the  rights  of  the  United  States 
on  the  basis  of  the  geologic  unity  of  the  continental  shelf  with  the  ad- 
jacent continent.  Although  the  Proclamation  did  not  establish  an 
official  width  for  the  shelf,  the  accompanying  news  release  set  the 
limit  at  100  fathoms  (600  feet).  These  rights  were  given  statutory 
weight  by  the  Submerged  Lands  Act  of  1953,  but  the  continental 
shelf  as  a  whole  remained  vague  and  undefined. 

The  Submerged  Lands  Act  defined  the  width  of  the  shelf  to  be  be- 
tween the  base  line  at  low  water  and  the  three-mile  seaward  limit  of  the 
territorial  sea.  This  zone  was  therefore  considered  to  be  the  inner 
continental  shelf.  The  rest  of  the  continental  shelf,  seaward  of  the 
territorial  waters,  was  then  referred  to  as  the  outer  continental  shelf. 
The  Outer  Continental  Shelf  Lands  Act  was  signed  as  Public  Law 
212  on  August  7.  L953.  The  main  thrust  of  the  Act  was  to  provide  for 
the  administration  of  the  resources  of  this  area.  It  vested  this  author- 
ity in  the  Secretary  <>f  the  Interior,  revoking  the  previous  Executive 
( )rder  which  had  set  this  area  aside  as  a  naval  petroleum  reserve  under 
t  he  administ  ration  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

In  its  declaration  of  policy  the  Act  provided  "that  the  subsoil  and 
seabed  of  the  outer  Continental  Shelf  appertain  to  the  United  States 
and  are  subject  to  its  jurisdiction,  control  and  power  of  disposition 


449 


as  provided  in  this  Act."  But  it  made  it  clear  that  the  Act  shall  not 
affect  "the  character  as  high  seas  of  the  waters  above  the  outer  Con- 
tinental Shelf  and  the  right  to  navigation  and  fishing  therein." 

This  represented  a  radical  and  significant  departure  from  the  juris- 
dictions asserted  under  the  Truman  Proclamation  and  the  Submerged 
Lands  Act.  in  which  reference  was  made  only  to  the  "natural  re- 
sources" of  the  seabed  and  subsoil.  In  the  final  version  of  the  Outer 
Continental  Shelf  Lands  Act  this  phrase  was  omitted.  But  despite 
this  omission,  the  character  of  the  rights  claimed  remained  limited 
to  "jurisdiction,  control,  and  po\\  er  of  disposition". 

The  Act  did  not  define  the  extent  of  the  outer  continental  shelf, 
seaward  of  the  territorial  limits.  However,  in  the  publication  "De- 
scription of  Outer  Continental  Shelf,"  which  was  part  of  the  legisla- 
tive history  of  the  statute,  the  Senate  Committee  on  Interior  and  In- 
sular Affairs  defined  the  shelf  as — 

*  *  *  the  extension  of  the  land  mass  of  the  continents  out  under  the  waters 
of  the  ocean  to  the  point  where  the  continental  slope  leading  to  the  true  ocean 
bottom  begins.  This  point  is  generally  regarded  as  a  depth  of  approximately  100 
fathoms,  or  600  feet,  more  or  less.  In  countries  using  the  metric  system,  the 
outer  limit  of  the  shelf  is  generally  regarded  as  a  depth  of  200  meters,  which 
is  approximately  the  same  as  the  100-fathom  mark  adopted  by  England  and 
America.0 

In  describing  the  area  comprised  within  these  limits,  the  Committee 
concluded  that  "the  outer  shelf  can  be  estimated  to  contain  261,000 
square  miles."  1()  Computations  bv  the  U.S.  Coast  and  Geodetic  Survey 
of  inland  water  areas  of  the  United  States,  the  territorial  waters, 
and  the  continental  shelf  are  shown  below  in  Tables  III  and  IV. 

These  descriptions,  being  only  part  of  the  Senate  Report  accom- 
panying the  bill,  cannot  be  considered  as  having  the  full  stature  of 
the  law.  They  only  indicate  that  the  Congress  was  aware  of  the  geo- 
logical concept  of  the  continental  shelf.  Despite  this  awareness,  how- 

TABLE  III. — INLAND  WATER  AREAS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  BY  REGIONS' 

[In  square  miles] 


Locality 


Area 


Costal  States: 

New  England.. 

Middle  Atlantic 

Chesapeake 

South  Atlantic  and  Gulf. 
Pacific. 

Total,  coastal 

Inland  States:  2 

East  North  Central 

West  North  Central 


3,149 

6,719 

1,688 

18,  296 

19,680 


49,  532 


57,653 
9,789 


Locality 


Area 


Inland  States  2— Continued 

EastSouth  Central 1,116 

WestSouth  Central 1,637 

Mountain 6, 936 

Total,  inland 77,127' 

Total,  United  States 126, 659 

Great  Lakes 60,306 

Other 66,353 


1  Source:  National  Council  on  Marine  Resources  and  Engineering  Development.  "Marine  Science  Affairs— A  Year  of 
Transition  "  The  first  report  of  the  President  to  the  Congress  on  marine  resources  and  engineering  development.  (Wash- 
ington, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  February  1967),  p.  141. 

-  In  general,  includes  lakes,  reservoirs,  and  ponds  having  40  acres  or  more  of  area  and  streams  and  estuaries,  canals, 
etc.,  V%  of  a  statute-mile  or  more  in  width.  Does  not  include  water  surface  of  the  oceans,  bays,  Gulf  of  Mexico,  Long  Island 
Sound,  Puget  Sound,  and  the  Straits  of  Juan  de  Fuca  and  Georgia. 


9  U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  "Outer  Continental  Shelf  Lands  Act."  Report  of  the  Committee 
on  Interior  and  Insular  Affairs.  Senate  Report  No.  411.  June  15,  1953.  83d  Congress,  1st 
session.   (Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1953),  page  4. 

10  Ibid.,  page  5. 


3-nautical- 

100-fathom  » 

1,000-fathom » 

mile  band 

contour 

contour 

6 

140 

240 

5 

135 

210 

4 

25 

60 

20 

550 

755 

2 

10 

30 

2 

2 

7 

450 


TABLE  IV.-AREA  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  CONTINENTAL  SHELF,  BY  COASTAL  REGIONS 

[Thousands  of  square  statute  miles] 

Area  '  measured  from  coastline  bounded  by- 


Atlantic  coast. - 

Gulf  coast 

Pacific  coast 

Alaska  coast 

Hawaii 

Puerto  Rico  and  Virgin  Islands 

Total 39  862  1,302 

1  That  part  of  the  sea  floor  extending  from  the  low  water  line  at  the  coast  seaward  to  the  indicated  distance  or  depth. 

2  Fathom  is  a  unit  of  length  equal  to  6  feet. 

ever,  Congress  did  not  adopt  that  concept  when  it  defined  the  boun- 
daries of  the  continental  shelf  in  the  letter  of  the  Act.  Absence  of  such 
a  definition  left  flexible  the  seaward  reach  of  the  outer  continental 
shelf;  it  remained  subject  to  further  expansion  of  United  States  juris- 
diction, either  unilaterally  or  by  agreement  with  other  nations. 

This  flexibility  and  the  absence  of  any  precise  definition  were  ex- 
ploited in  later  years  in  the  administration  of  leases  by  the  Secretary 
of  the  Interior.  There  were  occasions  when  leases  far  exceeded  the  100- 
fathom  depth  previously  believed  to  be  the  intended  limit.  Accord- 
ingly, up  to,  and  after  the  passage  of  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf 
Lands  Act  of  1953,  the  continental  shelf  remained  undefined. 

GENEVA    CONVENTIONS    OF    19  58 

Discussion  of  the  territorial  sea  among  the  nations  of  the  world 
dates  back  to  the  Hague  Codification  Conference  of  1930,  sponsored 
by  the  League  of  Nations.11  The  Preparatory  Committee  for  the  Con- 
ference devoted  considerable  attention  to  the  limits  of  base  lines  and 
the  widths  of  territorial  waters,  but  failed  to  produce  the  desired  con- 
vention. Nevertheless,  the  Committee  can  be  credited  with  the  concept 
of  a  contiguous  zone,  and  with  focusing  attention  on  the  continental 
shelf  and  the  prospect  of  squabbles  among  the  nations  over  the  proper 
delineation  of  zones  and  assertion  of  rights  and  jurisdiction. 

Following  the  world's  reaction  to  the  Truman  Proclamation  of 
1945,  the  United  Nations  made  another  attempt  at  codifying  the  law 
of  the  sea.  In  1949,  the  U.N.  International  Law  Commission  began  a 
long  study  across  the  total  spectrum  of  maritime  problems,  including 
the  territorial  sea,  the  continental  shelf,  the  high  seas,  fisheries,  con- 
servation, and  piracy.  These  efforts  resulted  in  several  draft  reports 
and  a  final  report  published  in  1956." 

The  Commission  considered  that  international  law  did  not  permit 
an  extension  of  the  territorial  sea  beyond  twelve  miles.  It  also  noted 
that  "many  States  have  fixed  a  breadth  greater  than  three  miles  and 
[that]  many  States  do  not  recognize  such  a  breadth  when  that  of  their 


11  League  of  Nations  Docs.  C.74.M.39.1929.V  and  19.30. V. 

13  "International   Law  Commission,"  Report,  United  Nations  General  Assembly,  Official 
Record,  11th  sess.,  Supp.  No.  9  (A/3159),  (1956). 
« Ibid.,  Article  3. 


451 


own  territorial  sea  is  less."  13  The  implication  of  this  observation  is 
that  the  three-mile  limit  is  the  acceptable  conventional  breadth, 
that  a  "contiguous  zone"  to  twelve  miles  was  within  the  confines  of 
international  law.  Although  this  implication  does  not  constitute  a 
precise  definition,  the  guidelines  provided  in  the  Commission  Report 
are  generally  considered  the  primary  basis  for  recognizing  any  given 
breadth  of  the  territorial  sea  as  an  international  norm. 

In  1958,  representatives  of  86  nations  convened  in  Geneva  to  partici- 
pate in  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea.  They 
used  the  reports  drafted  previously  by  the  International  Law  Commis- 
sion as  a  basis  for  their  deliberations,  and  the  Conference  resulted  in 
four  conventions  approved  by  the  U.X.  General  Assembly: 

(1)  Convention  on  the  Territorial  Sea  and  the  Contiguous 
Zone; 

(2)  Convention  on  the  Continental  Shelf; 

(3)  Convention  on  the  High  Seas;  and 

(4)  Convention  on  Fishing  and  Conservation  of  the  Living  Re- 
sources of  the  High  Sea. 

This  study  deals  with  only  those  conventions  that  reflect  upon  the 
zonation  and  the  definition  of  the  continental  shelf  limits. 

The  Convention  on  the  Territorial  Sea  and  the  Contiguous  Zone 
established  criteria  for  a  baseline  at  the  low-water  line,  the  landward 
side  of  which  is  the  "inland  waters"  and  the  seaward  side  the  terri- 
torial sea.  The  outer  limit  of  the  territorial  sea  was  defined  descrip- 
tively relative  to  the  baseline,  but  no  figures  were  given  to  establish  its 
breadth.  The  contiguous  zone  Avas  defined  as  a  zone  of  the  high  seas 
contiguous  to  the  territorial  sea  of  a  coastal  state,  where  the  state  may 
exercise  control  in  such  functions  as  customs,  immigration,  and  sani- 
tary regulation.  "The  contiguous  zone  may  not  extend  beyond  twelve 
miles  from  the  baseline  from  which  the  breadth  of  a  territorial  sea  is 
measured."  (Article  24.2) 

The  Convention  on  the  Continental  Shelf  (Article  1)  defined  the 
shelf  as  referring  "  (a)  to  the  seabed  and  subsoil  of  the  submarine  areas 
adjacent  to  the  coast  but  outside  the  area  of  the  territorial  sea,  to  a 
depth  of  200  meters  or,  beyond  that  limit,  to  where  the  depth  of  the 
superjacent  waters  admits  of  the  exploitation  of  the  natural  resources 
of  the  said  areas  *  *  *.14 

Deficiencies  of  the  Geneva  Conventions 

The  1958  Conference  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  was  followed  by  another 
one  in  1960.  Both  failed  to  delineate  the  outer  limits  of  the  continental 
shelf.  The  Convention  on  the  Continental  Shelf  went  into  effect  in  1964, 
subject  to  review  and  revision  in  five  years  after  that  date.  It  served 
to  crystallize  international  law  after  a  fashion,  but  had  three  major 
shortcomings : 

First,  the  Convention  failed  to  delineate  the  territorial  sea,  which 
left  the  matter  to  the  discretion  of  the  individual  states  and  resulted  in 


u  The  natural  resources  of  the  continental  shelf  were  defined  In  Article  2  to  Include 
"the  mineral  and  other  non-living  resources  of  the  seabed  and  subsoil  together  with  living 
organisms  belonging  to  sedentary  species,  that  Is  to  say,  organisms  which,  at  the  harvest- 
able  stage,  either  are  immobile  on  or  under  the  seabed  or  are  unable  to  move  except  in 
constant  physical  contact  with  the  seabed  or  subsoil."  The  problems  caused  bv  this  defini- 
tion will  be  discussed  further  in  the  section  on  the  resources  of  the  continental  shelf. 


452 


a  few  outlandish  extensions,  hundreds  of  miles  into  the  sea  floor,  with 
exclusive  jurisdictions  over  what  is  below  it,  in  it.  on  it,  and  above  it. 

Second,  the  Convention  ignored  the  physical  characteristics  of  the 
continental  shelf  so  that  its  definition  amounted  to  a  legal  fiction.  The 
exclusive  use  of  the  100-fathom  (200-meter)  isobath  is  arbitrary,  sci- 
entifically unfounded,  and  inequitable  in  the  allocation  of  resource's 
from  the  sea  floor.  It  was  wise  to  divorce  the  superjacent  waters  from 
the  considerations  of  seabed  jurisdiction,  but  it  was  unwise  to  ignore 
the  water  surface  completely.  The  nations  having  a  narrow  shelf  ar- 
rive at  the  100-fathom  isobath  almost  within  eye  view  from  their 
shorelines.  The  addition  of  a  lateral  extent  on  the  water  surface,  a 
specified  distance  in  miles  from  shore,  would  have  been  a  fair  alterna- 
tive to  the  100-fathom  isobath.  But  the  Convention  left  seaward  limits 
undefined,  and  provided  no  compensation  for  countries  without  con- 
tinental shelves.  Conversely,  nations  with  very  shallow  continental 
shelves  were  given  jurisdiction  that  extended  hundred  of  miles  off- 
shore before  reaching  the  100-fathom  isobath.  The  Persian  Gulf,  for 
example,  is  in  its  entirety  one  continental  shelf,  according  to  the  defini- 
tion of  the  Convention,  and  the  Arctic  shelf  off  Siberia  is  close  to  700 
miles  in  width. 

Third,  the  Convention  contained  a  delinquent  ambiguity  inherent 
in  the  clause  appended  to  the  definition  of  the  continental  shelf.  Arti- 
cle 1  (a)  defined  the  shelf  as  reaching  to  a  depth  of  200  meters  "*  *  *  or, 
beyond  that  limit,  to  where  the  depth  of  the  superjacent  waters  ad- 
mits of  the  exploitation  of  the  natural  resources  of  the  said  areas  *  *  *." 

The  timing  of  the  Truman  Proclamation  coincided  with  the  increas- 
ing development  in  technological  capabilities  and  the  feasibility  of  ex- 
ploiting the  sea  floor.  It  served  to  point  up  a  significant  aspect  in  the 
development  of  national  and  international  law  for  the  sea — the  direct 
and  inevitable  correlation  between  the  evolution  of  law  and  the  devel- 
opment in  technology  in  response  to  the  need  for  exploitation. 

In  an  early  draft  of  the  report  of  the  International  Law  Commis- 
sion, a  similar  correlation  between  the  legal  definition  and  tech- 
nological feasibility  was  attempted.  The  principle  of  depth-by-ex- 
ploitability,  however,  would  have  permitted  countries  to  claim,  as 
continental  shelf,  lands  far  beyond  the  geological  shelf.  In  1053  the 
International  Law  Commission  rejected  this  concept  and  adopted  the 
200-meter  limit  and  the  exploitability  clause,  whence  evolved  the  defi- 
nition adopted  by  the  Geneva  Convention.  Even  then,  the  state  of  the 
art  in  offshore  drilling  had  exceeded  twice  the  depth  of  200  meters. 

The  exploitability  clause  can  be  interpreted  in  numerous  ways,  the. 
simplest  of  which  is  that  the  extent  of  the  continental  shelf  limit  is 
determined  by  the  capability  of  exploiting  its  seabed  and  subsoil.  In 
other  words,  one  can  claim  what  one  can  reach. 

In  the  United  States,  for  example,  the  exploitability  clause  was 
construed  as  authorization  under  the  language  of  the  Convention.  It 
has  facilitated  the  leasing  of  offshore  areas  far  in  excess  of  the  200- 
meter  depth  off  California,  and  a.s  far  from  shore  as  115  miles  off 
Louisiana.  Together  with  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf  Lands  Act 
of  1953,  the  Geneva  Convention  also  permitted  the  United  States  to 


453 


claim  jurisdiction  and  control  over  Cortes  Bank.15  By  ignoring  the 
ocean  depths  in  all  these  cases  exceeding  200  meters,  and  by  relying 
exclusively  on  the  technological  capabilities  and  the  feasibility  of  ex- 
ploitation, the  United  States  is,  in  essence,  asserting  rights  to  further 
expansion  into  adjacent  areas  as  its  technology  permits.  But  how  far 
is  "adjacent"? 

It  is  not  inconceivable  that  the  lack  of  limits  to  the  continental  shelf 
as  defined  in  both  the  Geneva  Convention  and  the  Outer  Continental 
Shelf  Lands  Act  has  left  the  door  open  for  a  possible  future  claim 
that  the  continental  shelf  of  the  United  States  extends  all  the  way  to 
Hawaii. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  dependence  of  the  delineation  of 
the  continental  shelf  on  the  technological  feasibility  of  exploiting  it 
can  be  used  as  license  for  encroachment.  It  has  already  led  to  confusion 
and  may  well  lead  to  grievances  among  the  nations  of  the  world.  Con- 
tinued encroachment  would  weaken  the  effectiveness  of  international 
law. 

These  are  major  shortcomings  in  the  state  of  the  art  in  the  legal 
definition  of  the  continental  shelf.  There  remains  the  most  important 
question  of  all:  What  is  the  fate  of  the  deep  sea  beyond  the  shelf? 
The  outer  limit  of  the  shelf  itself  being  non-existent,  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  the  Geneva  Conventions  have  not  addressed  themselves 
to  what  lies  beyond.  The  legal  literature  is  replete  with  numerous 
papers  and  theses  on  these  issues.  They  point  up  the  need  for  revision 
of  the  Geneva  Conventions  and  for  a  fresh  look  at  the  oceans  as  a 
world  entity  to  be  shared  by  the  nations  of  the  world  in  an  orderly 
and  equitable  manner. 

III.  Seabed  Resources 

The  focus  of  world  attention,  and  the  main  object  of  international 
concern  in  ocean  affairs,  has  been  the  seabed  and  the  subsoil  of  the 
ocean  floor,  particularly  their  mineral  content.  The  seabed  contains  a 
variety  of  mineral  resources  ranging  from  beach  sand  and  gravel, 
through  heavy  minerals  associated  with  beach  deposits,  to  surface 
deposits  of  manganese  and  phosphorite,  and  subsurface  petroleum 
resources. 

Deposits  on  the  Seabed  Surface 

BUILDING   MATERIALS 

The  most  obvious  and  readily  apparent  hard  deposits  are  sand  and 
gravel.  In  terms  of  tonnage,  this  important  commodity  is  by  far  the 

15  A  group  of  San  Diego  businessmen  intended  to  build  an  artificial  island  by  filling  on 
tOD  of  Cortes  Bank  which  lies  under  two  fathoms  of  water.  This  was  to  become  a  nation 
called  "Abalonia."  Cortes  Bank  lies  about  110  miles  off  San  Diego  and  50  miles  off  San 
Clemente  Island,  and  is  separated  from  the  Island's  territorial  sea  by  waters  reaching  a 
depth  of  1400  meters. 

Here,  the  Bank  "admits  of  the  exploitation  of  natural  resources"  and  is  adjacent  to 
the  United  States  of  America  and,  therefore,  can  be  considered  part  of  the  United  States 
juridical  continental  shelf.  Furthermore,  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf  Lands  Act  defines 
the  legal  shelf  as  all  submerged  lands  seaward  of  the  lands  granted  to  the  States  and 
"of  which  the  subsoil  and  seabed  appertain  to  the  United  States  and  are  subject  to  its 
jurisdiction  and  control."  The  Act  further  authorizes  the  Secretary  of  the  Army  to  "pre- 
vent obstruction  to  navigation  [as  to]  artificial  islands  and  fixed  structures  located  on 
the  outer  Continental  Shelf." 

Accordingly,  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Army  formally  ad- 
vised the  proposed  island  builders  that  their  work  could  not  be  undertaken  without  the 
consent  of  the  United  States.  [43  U.S.C.  Sec.  1333(f)  (1964).] 


454 


most  extensively  mined  throughout  the  world.16  It  forms  the  back- 
bone of  the  construction  industry  as  aggregate  and  filler  material. 
Smaller  percentages  go  into  glassmaking  and  other  relatively  minor 
industries. 

Although  most  of  the  sand  and  gravel  is  mined  at  or  near  the 
beaches,  the  ever-increasing  populations  and  their  concentration  in 
coastal  areas  create  demands  that  are  expected  to  push  this  industry 
into  the  offshore  areas.17  Construction  being  essential  to  accommodate 
these  demands,  the  seabed  will  increase  in  value  for  providing  the 
necessary  sand  and  gravel  aggregate  for  the  future. 

Calcium  carbonate  shells  and  sands  fragmented  from  them  are  also 
mined  for  use  in  the  production  of  port  land  cement  and  lime.  Oyster 
shells  and  other  calcareous  shell  deposits  are  mined  from  several 
coastal  locations  in  the  United  States  and  elsewhere  in  the  world.18 

HEAVY    MINERALS 


Several  minerals  occur  in  association  with,  or  under,  the  beach  sands 
overlying  the  bedrock.  These  minerals,  referred  to  as  heavy  minerals,19 
are  now  mainly  derived  from  sources  on  land.  As  the  rocks  on  land 
undergo  the  relentless  battering  of  wind,  rain,  ice,  and  other  destruc- 
tive agents,  the  rocks  yield  to  the  processes  of  chemical  and  mechanical 
weathering.  The  weathered  fragments  are  transported  by  streams  and 
wind  to  their  final  destination  in  the  sea.  There,  the  winnowing  action 
of  the  waves  serves  to  concentrate  the  heavier  minerals  and  metals  into 
profitably  minable  deposits. 

As  would  be  expected,  the  heavier  the  mineral  the  closer  to  shore  it 
is  deposited.  Consequently,  these  placer  deposits  are  expected  to  be 
located  on  present  beaches,  on  submerged  beaches,  and  a  few  miles 
offshore,  near  their  source  rocks  on  land.  They  usually  include  the 
heavier  metals  like  gold,  tin,  and  platinum,  and  the  relatively  lighter 
minerals  like  diamond,  the  titanium  minerals  ilmenite  and  rutile,  the 
tungsten  minerals  scheelite  and  wolframite,  the  iron  ore  magnetite, 
chromite,  and  zircon. 

Although  seabed  placer  deposits  are  normally  not  as  abundant  nor  as 
valuable  as  their  counterparts  on  land,  several  exceptions  are  found 
around  the  world  such  as  the  tin  deposits  off  the  coast  of  Cornwall  in 
England  and  off  the  coast  of  Indochina,  the  diamond  deposits  off 
the  coast  of  southwest  Africa,  and  the  zircon  sands  of  New  South 
Wales,  Australia. 

PHOSPHORITE 

Among  the  mineral  deposits  on  the  seabed,  phosphorite  has  been 
found  in  extensive  areas  of  the  continental  margin,  and  appears  to 
have   a   promising   potential    for   the   mining    industry.    Phosphate 

'•Current  production  In   the  United   States  exceeds  .r>0  million  cubic  yards. 
"John  Schlee  of  tin-  U.S.  Geological  Survey  estimates  thai  50,000  square  miles  of  the 
continental  shelf  off  New  England,  Long  Island,  and  New  Jersey  are  blanketed  with  sand 

and  gravel.  A  large  deposit  <>fT  the  New  Jersey  coast  lies  in  66  to  132  feet  Of  water  and 
may     ontalu  several  hillloii  tons  of  gravel. 

1H  Offshore    production    of   oyster    shells   exceeds   20    million    tons   annually. 

'"  Minerals  are  separated  from  a  mixture  of  crushed  rock  In  a  liquid  called  "bromoform." 
Bromoform  has  a  specific  gravity  of  2.S.r>  ;  minerals  with  specific  gravity  greater  than  that 
of  bromoform  are  referred  to  as  heavy  minerals. 


455 


rock  is  composed  mainly  of  calcium  phosphate,  and  more  than  half  of 
what  is  mined  on  land  goes  primarily  for  the  manufacture  of  agricul- 
tural fertilizers.  A  smaller  percentage  is  used  in  the  manufacture  of 
organic  and  inorganic  chemical  compounds  of  phosphorus. 

Phosphorite  is  formed  by  the  precipitation  of  phosphates  from 
sea  water.  These  dissolved  phosphates  have  probably  come  from  de- 
cayed phosphatic  matter  in  regions  where  sudden  and  extreme  en- 
vironmental changes  result  in  massive  kills  of  marine  organisms.  In 
its  circulation  through  the  oceanic  domain,  the  phosphate-rich  water 
passes  through  regions  where  little  or  no  detrital  sedimentation  is 
taking  place.  In  these  regions  of  depositional  quiescence  the  dissolved 
phosphates  begin  to  precipitate  from  sea  water  and  accumulate  on 
the  ocean  floor.20 

Submarine  phosphates  are  deposited  in  the  form  of  irregular  accre- 
tionary  noduies,  flat  slabs,  and  coatings  on  sand  grains  and  rock  frag- 
ments. They  vary  in  shape  and  size,  some  weighing  between  150  and 
250  pounds.  Large  areas  of  the  ocean  floor  are  blanketed  with  modular 
phosphorite.  Occurrences  are  known  from  closely  near  shore  to  more 
than  200  miles  offshore,  in  depths  ranging  from  60  feet  to  more  than 
11,000  feet.21  Sampling  and  preliminary  exploration  around  the  world 
indicate  the  presence  of  phosphate  rock  on  the  east  and  west  coasts  of 
North  and  South  America,  off  South  Africa,  northwest  Africa,  and 
Equatorial  West  Africa.  In  places  where  oceanographic  data  were  suc- 
cessful in  locating  seawater  upwelling  and  detecting  phosphate- rich 
waters,  the  prospects  are  considered  good  that  phosphate  rock  is  pres- 
ent. Examples  of  such  upweiling  areas  include  northwestern  Aus- 
tralia, the  Timor  Sea,  the  eastern  Araf  ura  Sea,  the  Coral  Sea,  and  the 
Tasman  Sea. 

Although  there  has  been  no  production  of  submarine  phosphate  rock 
on  a  commercial  scale,  some  deposits  have  been  surveyed  and  current 
investigations  reflect  the  increasing  interest  of  mining  companies 
in  these  offshore  minerals.  The  most  extensive  of  these  investigations 
have  been  offshore  southern  California,  U.S.A.,  and  Baja  California, 
Mexico.  Phosphorite  nodules  were  first  discovered  off  the  coast  of 
southern  California  in  1937.  Extensive  sampling  and  exploration  has 
been  conducted  since,  the  most  recent  being  the  investigations  of  the 
sand  deposits  offshore  Baja  California,  Mexico,  by  Bruno  d'Anglejan 
(Ph.  D.  Thesis,  1964)  and  by  the  Global  Marine  Company  in  1966. 

John  L.  Mero  (1965)  estimated  that  the  California  deposits  cover 
about  10  per  cent  of  the  potentially  workable  area  of  36,000  square 
miles.  The  concentration  averages  about  22  pounds  of  phosphorite 
nodules  for  every  square  foot  of  sea  floor,  and  the  deposits  available  for 
mining  exceed  one  billion  tons.22  More  recently,  the  California  deposits 
were  estimated  at  100  million  tons  classed  as  known  "marginal'  re- 


20  The  phenomenon  of  upwelling  of  ocean  waters  appears  to  be  the  most  accepted  theory 
for  the  origin  of  submarine  phosphates.  The  knowledge  of  the  processes  forming  phosphate 
rock  and  its  depositional  environment  is  essential  to  the  successful  exploration  for,  and 
locating,  these  deposits. 

21  During  the  oceanographic  expedition  of  the  British  corvette  H.M.S.  Challenger  (1872- 
1876)  phosphorite  nodules  wrere  recovered  from  a  depth  of  11,400  feet  on  the  Agulhas 
Bank  off  South  Africa. 

22  John  L.  Mero,  "The  Mineral  Resources  of  the  Sea."  (New  York,  Elsevier,  1965),  page  71. 


456 


sources,  more  than  1  billion  tons  as  known  "submarginal,"  and  nearly 
2  billion  tons  of  inferred  but  undiscovered  resources.23 

Considering  the  continental  shelves  of  the  world  as  occupying  10 
million  square  miles,  and  assuming  a  10  per  cent  deposit  similar  to  that 
of  the  California  shelf,  Mero  concluded  that  the  continental  shelves  of 
the  world  should  contain  300  billion  tons  of  phosphorite.  If  10  per 
cent  of  this  amount  was  economical  to  mine,  the  reserves  of  sea-floor 
phosphorite  would  be  30  billion  tons.  At  the  rate  of  present  world  con- 
sumption, this  supply  would  last  1,000  years.24 

Depending  on  its  grade  and  phosphate  content,  phosphate  rock  cur- 
rently mined  on  land  ranges  in  price  from  $6  to  $12  per  ton  at  the  mine 
site.  The  value  of  submarine  phosphorite  relative  to  land  deposits  will 
be  considered  later  in  context  with  technology  and  economics. 

MANGANESE    NODULES 

Undersea  deposits  of  manganese  and  iron  oxides  precipitate  from 
sea  water  in  much  the  same  way  as  do  phosphorite  nodules — the  col- 
loidal particles  adhering  to  any  grain  or  rock  fragments  and  growing 
by  accretion,  layer  over  concentric  layer,  to  form  an  onion-like  struc- 
ture. Each  form  assumes  the  shape  of  its  nucleus,  sometimes  forming 
crusts  on  surfaces  of  submarine  rock  outcrops  or  coatings  on  animal  or 
plant  remains.  They  range  in  size  from  half  an  inch  to  more  than  six 
inches,  with  an  overall  average  of  two  inches. 

Manganese  nodules  vary  greatly  in  composition,  from  region  to  re- 
gion as  well  as  from  nodule  to  nodule.  The  chemical  constituents  are 
mostly  oxides  of  manganese,  iron,  silicon,  and  aluminum,  with  calcium 
and  magnesium  salts.  Nodules  sampled  since  the  Challenger  expedition 
have  been  analyzed  extensively,  and  numerous  other  elements  have  been 
found.  Most  of  the  recent  investigations,  however,  have  focused  the 
attention  of  the  mining  industry  on  such  constituents  as  cobalt,  nickel, 
and  copper,  rather  than  manganese  alone. 

Although  present  knowledge  of  the  distribution  and  extent  of  man- 
ganese nodules  in  the  world  ocean  is  rudimentary,  the  nodules  appear 
to  be  almost  ubiquitous.  Some  oceanographic  expeditions  have  dredged 
mananese  nodules  at  practically  every  station  in  the  Pacific,  Atlantic, 
and  Indian  Oceans.  Manganese  nodules  have  been  found  even  in  Lake 
Michigan.  They  are  known  to  occur  particularly  beyond  the  continental 
shelf,  in  the  abyssal  plains  and  oceanic  deeps  such  as  the  Mariana 
Trench  in  the  Pacific,  deeper  than  22,000  feet.  Extensive  research  and 
analyses  have  been  done  on  nodules  from  numerous  localities,  par- 
ticularly on  their  growth  rates  and  concentrations.  Accretion  rates 
in  the  order  of  0.01  to  1  millimeter  per  1,000  years  are  considered 
normal  growth  in  deep  waters.  In  shallower  waters,  some  samples 
showed  accretion  rates  close  to  1  millimeter  per  year. 

**  Vincent   B.   McKelvey.   "Mineral  potential  of  the  submerged  parts  of  the  continents." 
in    "Mineral    Resources  of  the   World   ocean."   Proceedings  <>f  a   Symposium   Mold  at   the 
Naval   War  College    Newport.   R.I.,  July   11    12    1968.   Edited  by  Elizabeth   Keiffer.    (Uul 
v.Tsit-   of  Rhode  island,  Occasional  Publ.  No.   »,  1968),  page  ■"■  i 

McKelvey  defined   marginal  resources  as  material  that  might  bo  produced  at  prices  not 
more    than    fifty    percent    higher    than    those    prevailing    now,   or    with    comparable   ail  van   es 

In  technology.  Over  the  longer  period  and  with  technological  advances,  resources  recover- 
able at   custs  two  ur  three  times  more  than   those  produced   now  may  have  some  foreseeable 
use  and  prospective  value.  These  were  termed  submarginal  resources. 
21  Mero.  op.  dt.,  page  73. 


457 


Underwater  photographs  of  blankets  of  manganese  nodules  have 
been  studied,  and  concentrations  in  pounds  per  square  foot  have  been 
computed,  mainly  for  the  Pacific  Ocean.  An  American  expert  has 
estimated  that  the  Pacific  Ocean  may  contain  more  than  1,600  billion 
tons  of  manganese  nodules  which  are  being  formed  at  the  rate  of 
about  10  million  tons  per  year.  Russian  specialists,  on  the  other  hand, 
estimate  a  total  Pacific  Ocean  surficial  tonnage  at  about  one-twentieth 
of  this.-"' 

RED  SEA   GEOTHERMAL  DEPOSITS 

Perhaps  one  of  the  most  significant  of  recent  oceanographic  dis- 
coveries is  that  of  the  bizarre  pools  of  hot  brine  on  the  floor  of  the  Red 
Sea.  Unusually  saline  water  in  the  Red  Sea  has  been  known  since  the 
Russian  expedition  of  the  Vitiaz  in  the  1880's.  In  the  mid  1960s,  how- 
ever, more  startling  data  were  obtained  by  the  British  RRS  Discovery, 
followed  by  the  U.S.  (Woods  Hole)  vessel  Atlantis  II,  and  several 
others.  The  Discovery  sampled  water  with  a  temperature  of  111  degrees 
Fahrenheit  and  a  salinity  of  256  parts  per  1,000.26  Atlantis  II  measured 
a  brine  temperature  of  133  degrees  F.  and  obtained  bottom  sediment 
samples  having  a  temperature  of  144  degrees  F.  and  containing  a  mix- 
ture of  metal  compounds,  principally  oxides  and  sulfides  of  iron,  man- 
ganese, zinc,  and  copper. 

Geothermal  heat  from  the  molten  interior  of  the  Earth  is  trans- 
mitted to  the  Red  Sea  water  through  the  fissures  along  the  rift  of  the 
Red  Sea  floor.  The  heated  waters  dissolve  salts  from  sedimentary  rock 
formations  and  leach  heavy  metals  out  of  crustal  volcanic  rocks,  creat- 
ing metal-saturated  brine.  As  this  metalliferous  brine  cools  it  releases 
the  sulfides  of  lead  and  zinc,  and  the  carbonates  of  iron  contained  in  the 
water. 

This  has  been  the  theory  generally  accepted  by  oceanographers. 
The  Russian  scientist  D.  D.  Kvasov,  of  the  Leningrad  Academy  of 
Science,  has  proposed  another  theory  suggesting  that  the  brine  pools 
may  be  ancient,  lakes.27  Whatever  the  explanation,  the  total  brine- 
free  sediments  at  one  location  only,  the  Atlantis  II  Deep,  is  estimated 
to  be  over  50  million  tons.  It  contains  appreciable  amounts  of  zinc, 
copper,  lead,  silver,  and  gold  which,  at  current  smelter  prices,  would 
be  worth  about  $2.5  billion.28 

The  significance  of  the  Red  Sea  discoveries  lies  in  the  inter- 
related factors  of  scientific  knowledge,  exploitation,  and  legal  control. 
Scientific  knowledge  will  lead  to  discoveries  of  similar  deposits  in 
submarine  environments  having  analogous  geological  character- 
istics. This  development,  in  turn,  will  have  its  special  economic  con- 
notations and  present,  ultimately,  the  legal  and  international  prob- 
lems of  exploiting  these  resources. 


25  Mero,  op.  cit.,  page  174,  estimated  the  total  Pacific  Ocean  nodules  to  be  1,656  billion 
metric  tons.  N.  Zenkeviteh  and  N.S.  Skornyakova,  In  Natura  (3,  1961),  pages  47-50, 
obtained  an  estimate  of  90  billion  metric  tons. 

16  Average  ocean  salinity  is  35  o/oo,  which  means  35  grams  of  solid  material  contained 
in  1,000  grams   (1  kilogram)   of  sea  water.  Normal  Red  Sea  salinity  is  40  o/oo. 

21  D.  I).  Kvasov.  "Limnological  hypothesis  of  the  origin  of  hot  brines  in  the  Red  Sea." 
Nature  (Vol.  221.  March  1,  1969),  pages  850-851. 

28  J.  L.  Bischoff  and  F.  T.  Manheim,  "Economic  potential  of  the  Red  Sea  heavy  metal 
deposits."  In  E.  T.  Degens  and  D.  A.  Ross,  eds.  "Hot  Brines  and  Recent  Heavy  Metal 
Deposits  in  the  Red  Sea,  A  Geochemical  and  Geophysical  Account."  (New  York,  Springer- 
Verlag,  1969),  page  535. 


458 


OTHER   SURFACE  DEPOSITS 


The  unconsolidated  surface  sediments  of  the  ocean  floor  include 
several  known  deposits  which  could  become  potentially  economical. 
The  pelagic  sediments  of  deep,  offshore  waters  are  classified  as  red 
clays  if  their  organic  content  is  less  than  30  percent,  and  as  oozes 
if  their  organic  content  is  more  than  30  percent.  Their  widest  distri- 
bution is  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  usually  at  depths  averaging  between 
6,000  and  17,000  feet. 

Although  now  uneconomical,  these  clays  and  oozes  contain  some 
potentially  useful  constituents  such  as  calcium  carbonate,  alumina, 
iron  oxide,  and  silica.  They  literally  cover  the  ocean  floor,  and  are 
estimated  to  be  in  the  order  of  thousands  of  billions  of  tons. 

Nearer  to  shore,  and  in  shallower  water,  unconsolidated  green  sands 
(glauconite)  are  found  abundantly  in  areas  of  slow  detrital  deposi- 
tion. Glauconite  sand  is  a  hydrous  potassium  iron-silicate  with  a 
small  amount  of  potash  content.  It  has  been  sampled  off  the  coasts  of 
Africa,  the  Americas,  Australia,  Japan,  New  Zealand,  the  Philip- 
pines, Portugal,  and  Britain.  Green  sand  mined  from  land  has  been 
used  as  a  water  softener  and  soil  conditioner. 

Barite,  a  barium  sulphate  mineral,  is  another  surface  deposit 
which  occurs  in  nodular  form  like  phosphorite  and  manganese. 
Barite  concretions  have  been  dredged  from  the  continental  margin  off 
the  coasts  of  Ceylon,  southern  California,  and  the  Kai  Islands  in  Indo- 
nesia. The  concretions  range  up  to  two  pounds  in  weight  and  assay 
around  75  per  cent  barium  sulphate. 

Large  deposits  of  barite  are  known  on  land,  which  makes  the  ocean 
barite  unimportant  at  this  time.  However,  barite  is  being  mined  off- 
shore Barite  Island  in  Alaskan  waters  20  to  80  feet  deep,  with  known 
reserves  in  120  feet  of  water.  Current  production  from  this  operation 
alone  is  1,000  tons  per  day  m;  daily  production  of  primary  barite  in  the 
United  States  averaged  about  2,600  tons  for  1970.30 

Deposits  Below  the  /Seabed  Surface 

The  subsurface  deposits  of  the  seabed  are  those  contained  within  the 
structures  of  consolidated  sedimentary  and  basement  rocks.  They  can 
be  viewed  in  two  groups,  related  primarily  to  the  methods  of  their 
extraction.  On  the  one  hand,  petroleum,  natural  gas,  and  sulphur  are 
extracted  through  holes  drilled  into  the  sea  floor.  On  the  other  hand, 
coal,  iron  ore,  and  vein  deposits  are  extracted  in  conventional  mining 
manner  by  driving  shafts  and  drifts  into  the  seabed  from  adjacent 
land  areas. 

Undersea  mines  operated  from  land  entries,  either  from  shore  or 
from  artificial  islands,  have  been  in  use  for  centuries.  Magnetite  veins 
are  mined  near  Jussaro  Island,  Finland,  and  an  extensive  undersea 
iron  ore  is  mined  from  Bell  Island  in  Newfoundland.  Land-entry  coal 
mines  are  also  operated  in  England,  Japan,  and  Nova  Scotia.  How- 
ever, these  operations  are  closely  tied  to  land  and  do  not  figure  promi- 
nently in  the  I'nt  lire  of  the  seabed. 


20  Joseph    F.    Stevens,    "Mining   tbe    Alaskan    sons,"   Ocean    Industry    (November    1970), 
pageo  47  -49. 
30  U.S.  Bureau  of  Mines.  Commodity  Data  Summaries   (January  1971),  pages  10-11. 


459 


PETROLEUM 


By  far,  the  most  important  of  all  marine  resources  is  petroleum. 
Although  land  exploration  opportunities  for  petroleum  have  not  been 
exhausted,  petroleum  exploration  and  exploitation  has  invaded  the 
continental  shelves  at  a  rapid  pace.  Potentially  important  oil  fields  are 
being  discovered  every  year,  and  the  nations  of  the  world  are  investing 
considerable  capital  in  offshore  ventures.31  More  than  85  countries  are 
engaged  in  offshore  activities,  and  discoveries  have  been  reported  from 
the  shelves  of  North  and  South  America,  Australia,  Japan,  the  Medi- 
terranean countries,  the  Red  Sea,  the  Arabian  Gulf,  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics  and,  most  recently,  in  the  North  Sea  and 
the  South  China  Sea.  Thirty-two  of  these  countries  are  already  pro- 
ducing petroleum  from  their  continental  shelves,  which  accounts  for 
16  per  cent  of  the  world's  oil  and  6  per  cent  of  the  world's  natural  gas. 
It  is  expected  that  by  1980  this  percentage  will  double  or  quadruple.32 

The  extent  of  petroleum  deposits  offshore  cannot  be  determined,  and 
numerous  estimates  have  been  advanced.  Proved  reserves  in  the  "free 
world"  are  estimated  to  exceed  500  billion  barrels  of  oil  and  nearly  1.5 
million  billion  (quadrillion)  cubic  feet  of  gas.33  It  is  believed  that  out 


31 A  single  lease  sale  of  offshore  tracts  In  the  Santa  Barbara  Channel  of  California 
brought  the  Department  of  the  Interior  over  $600  million  In  February  1968,  and  In  March 
a  similar  amount  was  obtained  from  tracts  off  the'  Gulf  of  Mexico  shores.  Altogether  the 
revenues  for  that  fiscal  year  amounted  to  more  than  $1.5  billion.  On  December  15,  1970, 
the  Department  of  the  Interior  received  some  $850  million  from  oil  companies  in  bids 
for  127  underwater  tracts  off  the  Louisiana  coast.  A  single  tract  brought  a  bid  of  more 
than  $38  million. 

BUREAU  OF  LAND  MANAGEMENT 

OUTER  CONTINENTAL  SHELF  RECEIPTS   FISCAL  YEARS  1955  THROUGH  1967; 
UPDATED  THROUGH  JAN.  31,  1968 

Bonuses  rents 

141820      Royalties  142020  Escrow  Total 

1955 $142,404,630.48  0  $12,217,134.37  $154,621,764.85 

1956 111,171,041.53  $52,814.63  26,518,518.78  137,742,374.94 

■(57,434,228.69)  '  (1,656.94)  57,435,885.63 

1957 1,976,361.00  232,342.31  10,969,890.58  13,178,593.89 

1958 2,630,090.41  830,760.69  12,208,496.48  15,669,347.58 

1959 1,145,720.00  2,266,484.40  20,418,121.35  23,830,325.75 

1960 _■ 226,616,838.22  2,839,980.97  172,265,367.50  401,722,186.69 

1961 1,716,161.23  5,588,525.60  43,762,875.15  51,067,561.98 

1962_ 6,006.921.00  5,605,230.15  498,586,287.97  510,198.439.12 

1963 359,370,525.43  7,443,921.55  (229,540,465.57)  137,273,981.41 

1964 5,870,970.00  10,620,439.52  135,904,544.80  152,395,954.32 

1965. 42,223,700.64  11,246,201.92  89,032,099.84  142,502,002.40 

1966 161,893,155.47  86,424,061.11  (39,552,372.76)  208,764,843.82 

1967 596,202,951.97  41,107,770.26  148,129,983.44  785,440,705.67 

Through  Jan.  31. 1968 204,629,546.95  30,372,670.78  69,539,020.62  304,541,238.35 

Total 1,807,807,657.66       204,629,546.95    1,027,895,388.18     3,038,949,320.77 

1  GAO  adjustment  taken  from  general  fund  and  placed  in  escrow. 

Note:  Does  not  include  California  sale  of  Feb.  6, 1968,  of  $602,719,621.60  bonus  and  1st  year  rental  of  $1,089,543 

32  Industry  experts  predict  that  world  production  of  offshore  petroleum  will  exceed  20 
million  barrels  per  day,  compared  with  today's  6.5  million.  The  present  USSR  offshore  pro- 
duction exceeds  90  million  barrels  a  year,  less  than  4  percent  of  that  country's  total 
output.  In  Moody's  September  21,  1970,  "Stock  Survey"  oil  and  gas  produced  from  offshore 
wells  are  predicted  to  quadruple  by  1980. 

33  Oil  and  Gas  Journal  (December  29,  1969),  page  95.  Proved  crude  reserves  for  the 
"free  world"  for  the  year  1967  were  shown  to  exceed  525  billion  barrels.  (Oil  and  Gas 
Journal  (May  6,  1968),  page  77.) 


460 


to  a  depth  of  1,000  feet,  nearly  two  million  square  miles  of  the  shelf 
areas  are  geologically  favorable  for  petroleum  occurrence.  It  could 
be  safely  assumed  that  nearly  every  coastal  nation  has  offshore  areas 
that  are  favorable  for  petroleum  accumulation.  The  imprecision  in  the 
estimates  is  largely  due  to  the  lack  of  adequate  data,  and  the  lack  of 
knowledge  necessary  for  projecting  and  predicting  these  estimates. 
This  knowledge  depends  basically  on  understanding  the  origin  of 
petroleum  and  the  factors  required  for  its  accumulation.  Several  the- 
ories exist  on  the  origin  of  petroleum,  but  the  one  that  has  been  most 
widely  accepted  holds  that  the  origin  of  hydrocarbons  is  organic.  The 
hydrogen  and  carbon  originated  from  the  remains  of  plant  and  animal 
life  that  existed  millions  of  years  ago  in  former  seas  or  swampy 
environments.  Such  life  forms  were  presumed  to  have  been  very  small, 
probably  microscopic.  Support  for  this  theory  is  derived  from  inter- 
pretation of  the  geological  records,  and  studies  of  oil  fields  and  oil- 
bearing  formations  that  have  already  been  explored  and  developed 
throughout  the  world. 

After  having  been  formed,  oil  accumulates  in  reservoirs  formed  by 
sedimentary  layers  called  "formations."  The  mountains  and  the  sur- 
face of  the  earth  are  slowly  broken  down  into  smaller  fragments 
and  particles.  These  eroded  sediments  are  carried  by  the  rivers 
and  deposited  into  the  seas.  As  the  millions  of  years  pass,  bodies 
of  sand,  silt,  and  mud  gradually  build  up  in  the  coastal  areas  border- 
ing the  continents.  The  weight  of  these  sediments  forces  the  ocean 
floor  downward,  warping  it  into  a  trough  in  which  more  sediments  are 
deposited. 

This  pressure  results  in  two  distinct  processes :  One  is  deformation  of 
these  layers;  the  other  is  their  transformation  into  hard  rock. 

As  the  layers  are  compressed,  the  oil  accumulated  in  the  sediments  is 
forced  to  migrate  into  pervious  sand  bodies  with  pore  spaces  between 
the  particles  that  facilitate  the  mobility  of  the  oil.  Meanwhile,  com- 
paction and  particle  cementation  have  turned  the  loose  sediments  into 
rocks,  the  sand  becoming  sandstone,  the  silt  siltstone,  and  the  mud 
mudstone  or  shale.  While  sandstone  is  the  ideal  medium  to  contain  the 
oil,  limestone,  and  other  porous  rocks  also  are  often  oil-bearing.  The 
shale  or  mudstone  is  the  ideal  rock  to  seat  it.  So,  in  order  for  the  oil  to 
stay  in  the  pervious  sandstone  to  which  it  has  migrated,  it  has  to  have 
an  impervious  layer  over  it  to  check  its  migration. 

The  earth's  crust  is  mobile  and  dynamic,  forever  on  the  move.  These 
movements  result  in  deformation  which  manifests  itself  in  the  form 
of  uplifted  mountains,  dovvnwarped  valleys,  and  twisted  and  contorted 
sedimentary  strata.  The  beneficial  part  of  this  upheaval  is  the  creation 
of  structural  forms  which  provide  the  traps  and  reservoirs  necessary 
for  the  containment  of  oil.  The  types  of  t  raps  where  oil  has  l>een  found 
are  numerous;  however,  the  most  ideal  structure  is  a  dome  called  "anti- 
cline" (see  sketch  A.  Fig.  2) . 

In  an  ideal  situation,  a  reservoir  would  be  a  closed  sequence,  of 
sedimentary  rocks,  including  a  layer  of  oil-bearing  sandstone  capped 
with  a  layer  of  shale  or  mudstone.  The  contents  of  this  reservoir  in- 
clude some  water  left  over  from  the  former  seas,  the  oil  body  floating 


461 


Figure  2. — Diagrammatic  sketch  showing  typical  oil  and  gas  types  of  traps.  (A) 
Anticlinal  trap  showing  gas  accumulating  in  the  crest  of  the  structure  with 
oil  and  water  occurring  successively  lower  on  the  flanks  of  the  anticline ;  this 
diagram  also  shows  the  gradational  relationship  usually  present  at  the  oil 
and  gas  contact  and  at  the  oil  and  water  contact.  (B)  Simple  fault  trap 
showing  gas  and  oil  arrested  in  its  migration  up-dip  by  the  presence  of  a  fault 
which  has  brought  impervious  shale  opposite  the  porous  and  pervious  sand- 
stone which  now  forms  the  reservoir.  (C)  Stratigra phic  traps  where  migration 
of  oil  and  gas  is  arrested  in  the  left-hand  pool  by  impervious  shale  uncon- 
formably  overlaying  the  porous  reservoir  sand,  and  in  the  right-hand  pool  by 
porous  sandstone  gradually  changing  up-dip  to  an  impervious  shale  facies. 
(D)  Oil  and  gas  accumulating  against  impervious  crystalline  rock  ;  the  crystal- 
line rock  may  be  an  intrusive  such  as  a  volcanic  plug  or  it  may  be  an  erosional 
remnant  around  which  later  sediments  have  been  deposited. 

[Figure  adapted  from  "Oil,  Gas  and  Helium  in  Arizona  :  Its  Occurrence  and  Potential," 
(Arizona  Oil  and  Gas  Conservation  Commission,  c.  1966).] 


462 


over  the  water,  and  the  natural  gas  at  the  very  top,  all  in  the  pores  and 
cavities  of  the  host  rock. 

The  salt  domes  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  are  cylindrical  bodies  of  salt 
that  have  been  squeezed  from  their  parent  formations,  piercing  upward 
through  a  succession  of  overlying  sedimentary  layers  (see  sketch  B, 
Fig.  2).  Against  the  walls  of  a  salt  dome  the  oil-bearing  layers  are 
closed  off,  providing  a  reservoir  and  a  seal  for  trapping  the  oil.  Such 
diapiric  structures  have  been  known  to  occur  farther  offshore  and  in 
deeper  waters  in  the  Sigsbee  Abyssal  Plain  beneath  the  floor  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico.  Some  structures  have  protruded  above  the  flat  surface 
of  the  Plain  and  are  termed  "knolls."  Those  without  surface  expres- 
sion are  "domes."  Recent  seismic  discoveries  have  revealed  the  pres- 
ence of  diapiric  structures  in  numerous  offshore  locations  around  the 
world.34  The  Sigsbee  Knolls  were  discovered  in  1954  by  the  Vema,  the 
research  vessel  of  Columbia  University's  Lamont-Doherty  Geological 
Observatory.  In  1968,  Lamont  scientists  on  board  the  Glomar  Chal- 
lenger drilled  through  the  cap  rock  of  the  Challenger  Knoll  in  11,720 
feet  of  water  and  recovered  a  core  472  feet  long.  The  sediments  in  the 
core  contained  oil  and  were  similar  in  composition  to  other  salt  domes 
on  shore  and  offshore.35 

Except  for  this  type  of  reservoir,  almost  all  production  areas  off- 
shore are  geologically  related  to  fields  on  shore.  Since  the  continental 
margins  are  essentially  submerged  edges  of  the  continents,  knowledge 
of  petroleum  habitats  on  land  can  be  applied  offshore  with  considerable 
certainty. 

Beyond  these  near-shore  areas,  the  petroleum  potential  of  the  outer 
continental  shelf  and  slope  has  been  little  investigated.  But  there  are 
indications  that  the  presence  of  petroleum  source  beds  is  very  likely  in 
the  continental  slope,  and  progressively  less  beyond  the  slope  into' the 
abyssal  plains  and  oceanic  deeps.  Exceptions  of  course  can  be  found 
in  depositional  ocean  basins  with  great  sedimentary  accumulations  and 
salt-dome  structures  like  those  described  above.  However,  as  with 
other  ocean  resources,  the  exploration  and  exploitation  of  petroleum 
resources  of  the  seabed  depends  on  to  the  technological  capability 
and  economic  feasibility  for  future  development. 

OTHER   SUBSURFACE  DEPOSITS 

Deposits  of  sulphur,  coal,  salt,  potash,  and  oil  shale  are  known  to 
occur  on  the  continental  shelves  of  many  seas.  Sulphur  has  been  mined 
from  salt-dome  structures  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  similar  structures 
are  known  in  the  Arabian  Gulf,  the  Red  Sea,  and  the  Caspian  Sea. 

In  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  sulphur  occurs  in  considerable  quantities  in 
the  rock  formations  capping  the  salt  domes.  Several  of  these  domes 
are  now  being  mined  on  land,  and  an  elaborate  mining  operation  is 

3*  E.  D.  Schneider  and  G.  L.  Johnson.  "Deep-ocean  dlapir  occurrences."  American  Asso- 
ciation of  Petroleum  Geologists  Bulletin  (November  1!)70),  pages  2151.  2169.  See  also: 
H.  K.  Wong,  et  al.  "Newly  discovered  group  of  diapiric  Structures  In  Western  Medlter- 
^"^nn''  American  Association  of  Petroleum  Geologists  Bulletin    (November  1970),  pages 

88  M.  Ewing,  et  al.  Site  2."  In  "Initial  Reports  of  the  Deep  Sea  Drilling  Project,"  Vol.  I. 
i;Iulieo„1!)(59)l  IjaKes  84-111.  (Lamont  Doherty  Geological  Observatory  Contribution 
No.  1364.) 


463 


being  conducted  off  the  coast  of  Louisiana.36  Present  reserves  are 
estimated  at  nearly  40  million  tons,  and  more  sulphur  is  expected  to 
occur  in  similar  domes  offshore. 

In  the  bedrock  below  the  sedimentary  cover  of  the  ocean  floor,  the 
crystalline  rocks,  like  granite,  may  contain  metallic  minerals.  Farther 
offshore  into  the  abyssal  plains,  the  crystalline  bedrock  is  mostly 
basaltic  rather  than  granitic,  where  chromite,  nickel,  and  platinum  may 
be  found.  Unlike  the  dredging  techniques  for  mining  surface  deposits, 
and  the  conventional  land-based  mining  methods,  the  extraction  of 
deep-ocean  minerals  presents  formidable  problems.  Given  the  present 
availability  of  such  minerals  from  land  ore  deposits,  the  consideration 
of  deep-ocean  minerals  becomes  a  highly  academic  one  of  potential 
rather  than  actual  resource.  Nevertheless,  the  onrush  of  technology 
makes  it  hard  to  predict  whether  or  when  deep  submarine  deposits 
may  become  "ores."  They  should  not  be  ignored  in  the  formulation 
of  policy  for  the  long-range  future. 

Resources  of  the  Oceans 

Although  attention  in  this  report  is  focused  on  the  seabed,  it  is 
appropriate  to  give  some  consideration  to  the  resources  of  the  sea 
itself,  to  their  exploitation  by  man,  and  to  the  potential  they  offer  for 
the  future.  They  include  the  living  organisms  of  the  marine  environ- 
ment for  products  like  food,  food  derivatives,  and  pharmaceuti- 
cals ;  potable  water  from  the  sea ;  the  salts  and  other  minerals  contained 
in  the  water;  the  minerals  on  and  under  the  ocean  floor;  and  such 
related  activities  as  shipping  and  aquatic  recreation. 

FOOD  FROM   THE  SEA 

Since  his  emergence  on  Earth  and  his  first  encounter  with  the  sea, 
man  has  utilized  it  as  a  source  of  food  and  a  means  of  transportation. 

Life  on  Earth  emerged  from  its  primordial  ocean,  and  the  life-giv- 
ing characteristics  of  the  ocean  have  always  played  their  role  in  the 
maintenance  of  the  food  chain  of  living  organisms.  Man's  quest  for 
food  from  the  sea  went  through  the  hunting  stage  for  most  of  historic 
time,  and  is  now  extending  to  the  domestication  and  farming  stages 
analogous  to  those  known  on  land.  Methods  of  utilizing  the  food  re- 
sources of  the  sea  have  also  progressed.  They  vary  among  the  nations 
of  the  world  from  primitive  techniques  to  ultra-modern  electrical,  elec- 
tronic, and  acoustical  fishing  methods.  The  immediate  results  of  these 
technological  developments  are  the  obvious  overfishing  and  exter- 
mination of  a  number  of  species,  and  the  diversification  into  other 
types  of  living  organisms  that  have  been  heretofore  neglected.  The 
world  harvest  is  estimated  at  60  million  tons  of  fish  annually  from 
conventional  species.  Species  now  unused  could  provide  an  additional 
amount  close  to  200  million  tons. 


38  In  1968,  more  than  $35  million  worth  of  sulphur  came  from  two  mines,  one  located 
7  miles  seaward  of  Grand  Isle  and  the  other  at  the  Caminada  Pass.  The  sulphur  is  ex- 
tracted by  the  Frasch  method  in  liquid  form  through  a  drill  hole  similar  to  an  oil  well. 
The  most  important  single  sulphur  market  in  the  world  is  the  fertilizer  industry  in 
Florida,  where  sulphuric  acid  is  used  in  processing  local  phosphate  rock  into  fertilizer. 
Consumption  of  elemental  sulphur  until  the  early  1960's  has  increased  at  an  average  of 
5  per  cent  annually,  and  jumped  to  an  average  of  12  per  cent  annually  since  then. 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.   1-31 


464 


FISH  PROTEIN  CONCENTRATE 


Technological  progress  has  resulted  in  methods  of  utilizing  that  part 
of  the  fish  catch  that  is  not  considered  at  this  time  to  have  the  qualities 
preferred  for  the  dinner  table.  So-called  "trash"  fish  can  now  be  proc- 
essed into  a  tasteless,  odorless  powder  called  Fish  Protein  Concentrate. 
FPC  powder  is  75  per  cent  protein,  one  pound  of  which  is  equivalent 
to  5i/>  pounds  of  beef  or  2p2  pounds  of  non-fat  powdered  milk.  At 
about" 40  cents  a  pound,  it  is  a  cheap  source  of  protein  that  can  be  added 
to  staple  foods  such  as  bread,  pasta,  soup,  and  other  foods,  to  supply 
the  minimum  daily  requirement  of  protein.  The  potential  of  this 
product  in  alleviating  protein  deficiencies  and  combatting  worldwide 
disease  and  hunger  offers  one  answer  to  the  problem  of  feeding  the 
multiplying  numbers  of  the  human  population. 


AQUACULTURE 

The  change  in  man's  techniques  from  hunting  the  ocean  to  farm- 
ing it  has  progressed  in  great  strides.  Although  domesticat- 
ing and  herding  marine  animals,  and  planting  and  harvesting 
marine  plants,  are  not  nearly  on  a  scale  comparable  with  such  prac- 
tices on  land,  aquaculture  techniques  have  been  known  and  practiced 
for  hundreds  of  years.  Recent  developments,  however,  have  been 
evident  throughout  the  world,  and  aquaculture  farms  for  the  produc- 
tion of  sea  food  are  being  established  according  to  scientific  specifica- 
tions which  control  the  organisms  from  the  breeding  stages  through 
marketing  and  distribution.  Aquafarms  are  not  confined  totally  to 
estuaries  and  sea  shores,  and  many  of  them  are  found  farther  inland.37 

Acquaculture  is  by  no  means  confined  to  finfish.  It  includes  also  shell- 
fish like  ovsters  and  clams,  crustaceans  like  lobsters  and  shrimp,  and 
such  oddities  as  turtles  and  bloodworms.  Throughout  the  world,  the 
volume  of  the  products  of  aquaculture  has  grown  to  a  total  of  4  mil- 
lion tons.  The  United  Nations  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization 
estimates  that  by  1985  world  aquaculture  could  expand  to  20  million 
tons. 

DRUGS   FROM    THE    SEA 

In  utilizing  the  living  resources  of  the  sea,  the  extraction  of  medic- 
inal and  pharmaceutical  products  is  often  little  known  and  unpub- 
licized.  However,  the  use  of  ocean  organisms  for  medicinal  purposes 
has  been  known  since  the  early  civilization  of  the  Chinese  and  in  Bibli- 
cal times.  Nowadays,  thousands  of  marine  organisms  are  known  to 
contain  biotoxic  substances  and  yet  fewer  than  1  percent  have  been 
closely  examined  or  thoroughly  evaluated  for  their  medicinal  charac- 
teristics. Marine  biomedieinc  lias  been  gaining  prominence,  and  more 
attention  is  being  focused  on  the  potential  of  the  ocean  environment  as 
a  source  of  new  medical  discoveries  and  new  drugs. 


•■"A  good  example  in  the  United  states  Is  to  be  found  in  Arkansas  where  gross  sales 
from  aquaculture  exceeded  $15  million  in  1969.  Elsewhere,  during  a  recent  visit  to 
Lebanon,  the  author  was  surprised  to  learn  thnt  the  trout  served  in  the  restaurants  of 
Beirut  is  supplied  locally  from  an  Inland  aquafarm.  In  a  most  unlikely  place  near  the 
Inland  town  of  Jezzlne,  he  visited  a  trout  farm  hardly  noticeable  to  the  unsuspecting 
visitor  The  concrete  ponds  were  huilt  on  terraces,  clinging  precariously  to  the  steep  slope 
typical  of  the  rugged  Lebanese  mountains.  The  ponds  were  teeming  with  healthy  trout  in 
all  stages  of  growth,  and  the  whole  venture  appeared  to  be  a  viable  and  lucrative  business. 


465 


SEA    WATER   AND   ITS   MINERALS 


The  most  abundant  and  most  essential  of  world  resources  is  the  water 
of  the  ocean.  The  accelerating  increase  in  human  population,  and  the 
soaring  demands  for  industrial  and  agricultural  use  of  fresh  water, 
have  created  acute  water  shortages  around  the  world.  The  worsening 
pollution  of  the  fresh-water  supply  and  the  demands  of  arid  areas 
where  normal  water  supplies  are  nonexistent  highlight  the  need  for 
turning  to  sea  water. 

Desalination — the  production  of  potable  water  from  sea  water — 
is  now  an  active  concern,  and  many  countries  suffering  from  water 
shortages  are  erecting  and  utilizing  desalting  plants  for  their 
domestic  needs.  More  than  600  desalting  plants  of  25,000  gallons 
per  day  capacity  or  greater  are  in  operation  or  under  construction  in 
the  world.  Their  total  production  of  potable  water  exceeds  200  million 
gallons  per  day.  It  is  estimated  that  by  1975  worldwide  utilization 
of  desalting  plants  will  result  in  the  production  of  1  billion  gallons 
of  fresh  water  per  day.38 

The  sea  holds  about  330  million  cubic  miles  of  water,  which  contain 
an  average  of  Sy2  percent  of  various  elements  in  solution.  Each  cubic 
mile  weighs  some  4.7  billion  tons  and  holds  about  166  million  tons 
of  solids.39  The  most  abundant  of  these  is  common  salt — sodium  chlo- 
ride. Its  two  main  elements,  sodium  and  chlorine,  constitute  more  than 
85  per  cent  of  all  the  solids  dissolved  in  sea  water.  Salt  has  been  ex- 
tracted from  sea  water  since  time  immemorial  and,  although  some  of 
the  machines  and  tools  used  today  are  modern,  the  basic  techniques 
of  salt  mining  by  solar  evaporation  is  still  prevalent  around  the  world. 

Besides  common  salt,  sea  water  contains  commercially  extractable 
amounts  of  magnesium  metal  and  compounds,  and  smaller  amounts  of 
bromine,  iodine,  calcium,  and  potassium  compounds.  There  are  at  pres- 
ent some  300  near-shore  operations  in  60  countries  engaged  in  the 
production  of  these  minerals.40  Quantitative  chemical  analyses  reveal 
the  presence  in  sea  water  of  all  but  about  a  dozen  of  the  stable  ele- 
ments; advanced  analytical  techniques  may  eventually  reveal  the  pres- 
ence of  virtually  all  known  elements  in  sea  water. 

One  of  the  latest  milestones  in  mineral  extraction  from  sea  water 
was  the  invention  of  a  process  for  extracting  uranium  oxide.  Developed 
by  N.  J.  Keen  at  Britain's  Atomic  Energy  Research  Establishment  at 
Harwell,  the  process  promises  a  final  product  at  $20  per  pound. 

Of  the  more  appealing  constituents  of  sea  water,  precious  metals 
have  been  the  object  of  unrewarding  research  and  experimentation  for 
some  time.  Silver  is  the  most  abundant  precious  metal  in  sea  water,  but 
most  attempts  have  concentrated  on  the  extraction  of  gold.41 

38  Milton  S.  Sachs.  "Desalting  Plants.  Inventorv  Report  No.  1."  Report  of  Office  of 
Saline  Water,  U.S.  Department  of  the  Interior.  (Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  January  1,  1968.) 

30  Mero.,  op.  cit.,  page  4. 

40  Frank  Wane.  "Mineral  Resources  of  the  Sea."  (U.N.  Department  of  Economic  and 
Social  Affairs.  ST/EPA  /125.  April  1970.  page  4.)  This  is  an  updated  version  of  an  identi- 
cal report  of  the  Secretary-General  dated  February  19,  1968. 

41  Numerous  gold  extraction  processes  have  be^n  patented,  but  none  has  yet  been  found 
that  could  be  classified  as  economical.  Gold  concentration  in  sea  water  has  been  found  to 
vary  from  0.001  milligrams  per  ton  to  almost  60  mg/ton,  with  an  average  about  0.04  mg/ 
ton.  Of  all  these  attempts,  only  one  case  is  known  where  anv  measurable  amount  of  gold 
was  actuallv  obtained.  This  was  done  by  the  Dow  Company  in  their  bromine  extraction 
facilitv  in  North  Carolina.  Fifteen  tons  of  sea  water  were  processed,  producing  0.09  milli- 
grams of  gold,  worth  about  $0.0001.  [See  John  L.  Mero.  op.  cit,  page  42.] 


466 


Regardless  of  the  number  of  elements  and  compounds  present  in  sea 
water,  their  extraction  depends  on  a  technology  that  would  make  the 
effort  economically  profitable.  At  the  present  level  of  technological  ca- 
pability, and  taking  into  consideration  such  factors  as  operating  costs 
and  cheaper,  competitive  sources,  distribution  costs,  and  consumption 
rate,  it  has  been  shown  that  only  six  minerals  can  be  profitably  ex- 
tracted. These  are  :  salt,  magnesium,  sulphur,  potassium,  bromine,  and 
boron.  Any  mineral  with  concentration  below  that  of  boron  is  con- 
sidered economically  unprofitable  to  extract.42 

IV.  Technology  and  Economics 

The  discussions  thus  far  have  dealt  with  "deposits"  on,  in,  and 
under  the  ocean  floor.  Under  the  proper  circumstances  such  deposits 
are  converted  by  man  into  "ore  l>odies'\  To  a  geologist,  an  ore  is  dp-fined 
as  a  deposit  that  can  he  mined  at  a  profit.  In  order  to  accomplish  this 
conversion,  a  venture  requires  the  quantitative  presence  of  a  deposit  in 
a  certain  environment,  and  the  technology  to  extract  the  mineral, 
process  it,  and  market  it  for  a  profit. 

A  close  relationship  thus  exists  between  technology  and  economics, 
in  which  the  recovery  of  resources  is  a  business  venture  primarily 
economic  and  only  secondarily  technologic.  The  economic  factors,  how- 
ever, interact  in  a  complex  manner  sometimes  reflecting  the  immediate 
impact  of  technological  development. 

In  the  case  of  the  ocean  resources,  mining  of  hard  mineral  deposits 
depends  mainlv  on  economics.  The  extraction  of  subsurface  deposits, 
chiefly  petroleum,  is  in  a  closed  sequence  in  which  economic  demands 
spur  technology  and  technologv  subsequently  pushes  the  market  to 
demand  further  technology.  This  section  examines  the  economics  and 
technology  for  the  extraction  of  hard  minerals,  oil,  and  gas.  The  most 
significant  of  the  hard  minerals  are  the  phosphorites  and  the  man- 
ganese nodules,  both  of  which  will  need  to  be  harvested  by  mining 
techniques.  Oil  and  gas  resources  are  extracted  through  holes  drilled 
in  the  seabed — a  technique  already  in  practice,  within  water-depth 
limitations. 

Harvesting  Hard  Minerals  from  the  Seabed 

Mining  hard  mineral  deposits  from  the  sea  floor  resembles  more 
closely  the  harvesting  of  fish  than  mining  as  practiced  on  land.  The 
equipment  used  for  undersea  mining  operations  is  simple  and  un- 
sophisticated, adapted  for  the  most  part  from  similar  land  mining 
equipment.  Table  V  shows  the  types  of  mining  techniques  and  the  time- 
table projections  for  the  year  2000  to  a  depth  of  1.000  feet.43  For  the 
immediate  future,  however,  the  most  promising  of  these  techniques  is 
essentially  the  principle  of  dredging.  Some  of  the  dredges  have  the 
capability  to  dig  and  scoop  consolidated  sediments.  Other  types  employ 
hydraulic  pumping  and  air  lifting  actions,  strictly  for  surface  uncon- 
solidated sediments. 


42  W.  F.  Mellhenny  and  ]>.  A.  llallard.  "The  sod  as  a  source  of  dissolved  chemicals."  In 
"Symposia  on  Economic  Importance  of  Chemicals  from  the  Sea."  (Washington,  Division 
of  Chemical   Marketing  F.conomlcs,  American  Chemical  Society.  1963). 

'» Oor^on  O.  Pheroon.  "Mining  Industry's  role  in  development  of  undersea  minlnc."  In 
"Exp'oltlng  the  Ocean."  Transactions  of  the  2d  Annual  Marine  Technology  Conference 
and  Exhibit,  June  27-29,  1966.  (19«6),  page  195. 


467 


TABLE  V.-OCEAN  MINING  TECHNOLOGY  TIME  TABLE 


Depth  of  water 


50  feet 


300  feet 


600  feet 


1000  feet 


Mining  using  air  lift  device.." 1960 

Mobile  miner  (ocean  floor) 1970 

Barge  dredge  lift 1900 

Stationary  mining  platform 1960 

Buoyant  submersible  system 

Underwater  open  pit  hardrock  mining 1975 

Underwater  "aerial"  photographic  reconnaisance 1960 

Exploration  submarine  (corer) 

Underwater  site  development  station 1970 

Solution  mining  (sulfur,  potash).. 1961 

Hardiock  mining  (below  shelf) 1900 

Mining  shaft 1970 


1970 

1975 

1980 

1972 

1975 

1980 

1970  .... 

1970 

1975 

1980 

1975 

1977 

1980 

1985 

1995 

2005 

1964 

1970 

1975 

1968 

1968 

1968 

1972 

1975 

1980 

1980 

1985 

2000 

1985 

2000 

2000 

1980 

2000 

2000 

Conventional  dredging  is  done  by  four  main  types  of  dredges : 

1.  Bucket-ladder  dredge,  limited  to  150  feet. 

2.  Surface  pump  hydraulic  dredge,  limited  to  200  feet. 

3.  Wire  line  dredges  (grab  bucket,  clamshell,  orange  peel,  etc.), 
limited  to  500  feet. 

4.  Air  lift  dredge,  limited  to  1,000  feet. 

Although  these  dredge  types  have  functioned  successfully  at  much 
greater  depths,  the  depth  limits  given  above  are  those  for  practical 
operations. 

For  deep-sea  areas,  the  deep-sea  drag  dredge  and  the  deep-sea 
hydraulic  dredge  have  been  envisioned,  which  might  prove  practical 
for  mining  phosphorite  and  manganese  nodules.  The  cost  of  mining  a 
ton  of  nodules  by  deep-sea  drag  dredge  was  estimated  by  Mero  44  to 
range  from  about  $12  at  a  depth  of  1,000  feet  to  more  than  $40  at  10,- 
000,  provided  the  nodule  concentration  is  one  pound  per  square  foot. 
The  use  of  deep-sea  hydraulic  dredging,  on  the  other  hand,  lowers 
these  figures  to  an  acceptable  range  of  $2.29  per  ton  at  1,000  feet  and 
roughly  $5  at  20,000  feet. 

The  most  recent  breakthrough  in  sea  floor  dredging  is  an  elaborate 
system  of  air-lift  dredge  successfully  tested  in  July  1970  on  the  Blake 
Plateau,  approximately  170  miles  oft  the  cost  of  Georgia  and  Florida. 
From  depths  between  2,400  and  3,000  feet,  the  dredge  succeeded  in 
extracting  a  continuous  flow  of  nodules  from  the  ocean  floor.  The  sys- 
tem on  board  the  Deepsea  Miner  was  operated  by  Deepsea  Ventures, 
Inc.,  a  subsidiary  of  Tenneco,  Inc.  It  represents  approximately  a  decade 
of  research  and  an  investment  of  nearly  $18  million.  The  objective 
following  this  initial  success  is  the  capability  to  operate  at  greater 
depths  between  18,000  and  20,000  feet,  probably  in  the  Pacific  ocean 
where  nodules  are  plentiful.  With  a  processing  plant  planned  for  the 
mid-seventies,  the  operators  hope  to  attract  an  investment  of  $150  to 
$200  million  to  finance  full-scale  production  before  the  end  of  this 
decade.  The  Japanese  ship  No.  2  Chiyoda  Maru  has  succeeded  in  re- 
covering nodules  from  comparable  depths  in  the  vicinity  of  Tahiti  by 
using  a  continuous  bucket  trawling  system. 

While  this  manuscript  was  being  readied  for  the  press,  a  break- 
through was  achieved  in  processing  manganese  nodules.  After  investi- 


41  Mero,  op.  cit.,  page  257. 


468 


gating  more  than  100  processes,  Deepsea  Ventures,  Inc.,  reported  in 
the  June  issue  of  Ocean  Industry  magazine  that  it  has  developed  a 
chemical  hydro-metallurgical  process  to  extract  economically  manga- 
nese, copper,  cobalt,  and  nickel  from  seabed  nodules.  The  expected 
yield  from  full-scale  processing  will  be  260,000  tons  of  manganese; 
12,600  tons  of  nickel;  10,000  tons  of  copper;  and  2,400  tons  of  cobalt. 
.  Such  technological  developments  point  up  the  fact  that  technology 
is  a  product  of  incentive  and  time.  It  is  within  present  knowledge  to 
acquire  the  desired  technological  capability  to  exploit  the  seabed 
more  fully,  but  the  time  factor  and  the  speed  of  development  are 
dependent  on  the  incentive  to  invest  the  required  capital.  This  incen- 
tive is  a  combination  of  economic,  social,  and  political  factors. 

PHOSPHORITE 

Phosphate  rock  on  the  seabed,  to  justify  the  operational  costs  of  its 
recovery,  has  to  compete  with  present  land  deposits  in  purity  and 
grade  of  the  ore  body,  abundance,  cost  of  transportation,  processing 
and  bene  fie  i  at  ion,  and  cost  of  exploration  at  sea  versus  on  land. 

Although  most  of  the  phosphate  deposits  on  land  are  of  marine 
origin,  their  exposure  to  weathering  processes  through  geologic  time 
results  in  an  enriched  final  product  with  a  higher  content  of  phosphate 
than  the  marine  deposits.  Submarine  pellets  and  nodules  seldom  con- 
tain more  than  30  percent  P205  whereas  the  cutoff  grade  for  fertilizer 
production  is  about  31.5  percent,  and  land  deposits  now  being  worked 
contain  around  35  per  cent. 

World  demand  for  phosphate  products  (industry  20  per  cent, 
fertilizer  80  per  cent)  has  been  increasing  at  an  annual  rate  of 
i)  per  cent;  In  1965  world  consumption  totaled  63  million  metric  tons ; 
in  1975  a  minimum  of  120  million  tons  would  be  needed,  and  in  the 
next  decade  the  world  demand  is  expected  to  double.45  Earlier  cal- 
culations which  show  the  expected  increase  in  world  population,  and 
the  per  capita  consumption  projected  to  the  year  2000  A.D.,  are 
shown  in  Tables  VI-IX.46  As  indicated  in  Table  VIII,  by  the  year 
2000,  the  total  world  consumption  of  phosphate  rock  is  forecast  to 
reach  7.6  billion  long  tons,  containing  about  2.28  billion  long  tons  of 
phosphate,  and  total  U.S  consumption  is  forecast  to  reach  1.23  billion 
long  tons,  containing  about  380  million  long  tons  of  phosphate.  The 
world  reserve  and  potential  resources  of  phosphate  rock  and  apatite 
were  reported  by  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Mines  to  contain  nearly  50  billion 
long  tons  of  phosphate.47  This  supply  is  believed  more  than  adequate 
for  projected  demands.  Furthermore,  new  land  deposits  are  being  dis- 
covered,48 and  new  processing  and  more  efficient  beneficiation  are 
being  applied  in  developing  known  reserves. 

"•  M  P.  Overall.  "Mining  phosphorite  from  the  sea.  Part  2:  Economics  of  mining  and 
beneficiation."  Ocean  Industry  (October  1968),  page  60. 

40  Chester  0.  Ensign,  Jr.,  "Economic  barriers  delay  undersea  mining."  Mining  Engineer- 
ing (September  11)06),  page  60. 

'■'  ibid.,  page  61. 

<s  A  new  discovery  in  Saudi  Arabia  was  made  by  geologists  of  the  U.S.  Geological  Survey 
near  the  Jordanian  border.  The  Turayf  Area  I  covers  1,300  square  miles  and  is  estimated 
i"  hold  about  1.1  billion  tons.  Thaniyat  Turayf  Phosphate  Area  II  covers  1,500  square 
miles  and  contains  almost  100  million  tons  of  high  grade  ore.  (Charles  K.  MeiSsner.  Jr., 
IS.  Geological  Survey).  "Phosphate  Deposits  in  Sirhan  Turayf  Basin."  In  "Mineral  Ke- 
B0Urce8  Research  1967-8."  (Directorate  General  of  Mineral  Resources,  Saudi  Arabia), 
pages  52-3. 


469 


TABLE  VI.— POPULATION  PROJECTIONS:  WORLD,  UNITED  STATES,  ETC.  1965-2000 


Population  in  Millions 


United  States;  South   Asia;  Africa   and   Latin 
America;  World 


Mid-1965 

1970 

1980 

2000 

Estimated 

Continued 

Continued 

Continued 

Population 

Trends 

Trends 

Trends 

3,308 

3,626 

4,487 

7,410 

194 

211 

252 

362 

(5.8) 

(5.8) 

(5.6) 

(4.9) 
4,214 

1,534 

1,724 

2,263 

(46. 4) 

(47.5) 

(50.  5) 

(56.  8) 

1,580 

1,691 

1,972 

2,834 

(47.8) 

(46.7) 

(43.9) 

(38.  3) 

World...; 

United  States.. 

Percent 

Africa,  South  Asia,  and  Latin  America 

Percent 

Remainder  of  world 

Percent 


Note:  Percentage  in  (    )  is  percentage  of  total  world  population. 

Source:  Population  Bulletin,  vol.  XXI,  No.  4,  October  1965,  by  Population  Reference  Bureau,  Inc.  Although  the  U.S. 
population  figures  and  projections  are  weakened  somewhat  by  more  recent  census  data,  the  overall  trend  remains 
essentially  valid. 

TABLE  VII.— PER  CAPITA  CONSUMPTION  (APPARENT)  OF  PHOSPHATE  ROCK 


United  States 


Year 


Apparent 

consumption  ' 

(long  tons) 


Pounds 

phosphate 

rock  per 

capita 


World 


Production  * 
(long  tons) 


Pounds 

phosphate 

rock  per 

capita 


1960. 
1961. 
1962. 
1963. 
1964. 


13,337,000       166.0  41,170,000 

14,058,000 44,780,000 

15,260,000 J 47,320,000 

15,474,000 50,590,000 

16,546,000       192.0  57,910,000 


31.0 


40.0 


1  Apparent  consumption  is  measured  by  phosphate  rock  sold  or  used  plus  imports  minus  exports. 

2  Production  is  used  as  no  consumption  figures  were  available  in  the  sources  of  information.  It  is  assumed  that  world 
production  and  consumption  are  nearly  equal. 

Source  of  consumption  and  production  figures:  Minerals  Yearbook,  vol.  I  (1964  edition). 

TABLE  VIII.— PROJECTED  TOTAL  CONSUMPTION  OF  PHOSPHATE  ROCK,  1966  THROUGH  2000  A.D. 

[In  tons  of  2,240  pounds] 


Total  long  tons  consumed  based  on 


Continued  trends  in 
population  > 


Medium  trends  in 
population  > 


United  States: 

192  pounds  per  capita _ 804,  500, 000 

(249,  000, 000  P20J) 

300  pounds  per  capita _ 1,225,000,000 

(380, 000,  000  P20J) 
World: 

40  pounds  per  capita , 3,225,000,000 

(967,  000, 000  P205) 

100  pounds  per  capita 7, 600, 000, 000 

(2J80, 000, 000  P2Q5) 


770, 000, 000 

-  (238, 000, 000  P200 
1,  220,  000, 000 

(378, 000,  000  P2Os) 

2, 895, 000, 000 

(869, 000, 000  P2O5) 
7, 100,  000,  000 

(2, 130, 000,  000  P2Oj) 


1  Based  on  population  trends  shown  on  table  VI. 


c 


Total  reserves 

Potential 

resources 

Marketable 
product 

P2O5  content 

Marketable 
product 

PsOs  content 

20 
23,  350 

"I 

5,398 
20,  000 

5 

2,040 
'  2, 000 

660 
•600 

4,932 

O) 

2 

80 

3,000 

12 

870 

1,129 
5,800 

470 


TABLE  IX.-RESERVES  AND  POTENTIAL  RESOURCES  OF  PHOSPHATE  ROCK  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 

[In  millions  of  long  tons] 


Source 

Arkansas 

Florida 

North  Carolina - .  - - 

South  Carolina 

Tennessee - 

Western  field' 

Total  (rounded) 7,100  2,100  49,000  12,000 

Note:  A  largs  tonnage  of  lower  grade  phosphatic  material  in  the  western  field  is  not  included  in  resources.  The  Florida 
and  Tennessee  potential  resources  include  the  low-grade  mineable  material. 

1  Estimate. 

>  Data  not  available. 

3  Includes  Idaho,  Montana,  Utah,  and  Wyoming. 

Source:  Mineral  Facts  and  Problems  (1965  edition),  page  704. 

Transportation  costs  play  a  major  role  in  the  economics  of  phos- 
phates. Shipping  phosphate  rock  from  Florida  to  California,  for  ex- 
ample, costs  $4.50  a  ton;  rail  transportation  from  Idaho  is  much 
higher.  With  transportation  costs  added  to  production  costs,  the  price 
of  Florida  phosphate  rock  in  California  approaches  $12  a  ton,  and  in 
Japan  about  $14  per  ton.  For  this  reason,  submarine  phosphorite  de- 
posits in  certain  areas  like  the  Thirty-  and  Forty-Mile  Banks  off  San 
Diego  and  the  phosphorite  sand  deposit  in  Santo  Domingo  Bay,  Baja 
California,  even  if  mined  at  costs  higher  than  those  on  land,  can  have 
promising  and  important  potential  advantage.  These  deposits  can  com- 
pete with  Florida  land  deposits  for  Mexican,  Japanese,  Australian, 
and  Pacific  markets,  if  they  can  be  mined  at  recovery  and  primary 
beneficiation  costs  less  than  $8.50  per  ton.49  The  price  of  phosphate 
rock  at  Florida  mines  is  about  $7  per  ton.  Aside  from  this  advantage 
for  special  localities,  transportation  cost  is  considered  a  disadvantage 
for  worldwide  marketing  of  submarine  phosphorite.  On  the  other 
hand,  logistics  are  sometimes  outweighed  by  efficient  mining  practices 
and  particularly  marketing.  A  case  in  point  is  that  Florida  producers 
are  able  to  sell  large  tonnages  of  phosphate  rock  to  West  Germany 
and  Italy  despite  the  large  nearby  reserves  of  North  Africa,  particu- 
larly Morocco  (21  billion  tons  of  P205).5°  The  Hashemite  Kingdom 
of  Jordan  also  possesses  an  excellent  grade  of  phosphate  but  the  in- 
dustry suffers  from  logistics  and  marketing  problems.51 

The  most  serious  deterrent  to  offshore  phosphorite  mining  is  a  lack 
of  knowledge  of  the  marine  environment.  The  lack  of  experience  and  a 
preference  for  land  exploration  and  exploitation  deter  the  decision 
makers.  This  is  particularly  true  of  small  entrepreneurs  whose  finan- 
cial resources  are  too  limited  to  permit  risk-taking*  Nevertheless,  re- 
gardless of  the  arguments  and  conflicting  opinions,  the  submarine 
phosphorite  deposits  seem  to  have  potential  economic  value,  the  eco- 
nomic exploitation  of  which  is  only  a  matter  of  time. 


40  Overall,  op.  clt,  page  61. 

M  Ibid.,  page  60. 

51  Political  reasons  also  plagued  the  Jordanian  phosphate  indu°trv  in  its  China  market. 
When  Jordan  voted  with  the  West  against  seating  the  People's  Republic  of  China  at  the 
U  N.    China  retaliated  Immediately  by  closing  its  market  for  Jordan's  phosphates. 


471 


MANGANESE   NODULES 

Manganese  is  used  as  an  additive  metal  in  the  manufacture  of  steel 
to  reduce  its  brittleness.  It  seldom  costs  more  than  5  cents  per  pound 
and  is,  therefore,  much  cheaper  than  other  additives  that  can  perform 
its  functions.  Steelmaking  accounts  for  more  than  95  per  cent  of  manga- 
nese consumption.  Although  the  United  States  is  the  major  world  con- 
sumer, world  consumption  is  expected  to  rise  with  the  development 
of  steel  plants  in  the  emerging  nations.  The  United  States  consumes 
approximately  one-seventh  of  the  world's  ore,  importing  99  per  cent 
of  its  needs  (35  per  cent  or  more  manganese  content),  with  domestic 
stocks  enough  for  about  six  months.  Domestic  supplies  are  inadequate, 
and  low-grade  recoverable  ores  are  too  expensive  to  process.  Using 
the  cheapest  of  the  tested  processes,  and  allowing  for  further  techno- 
logical progress,  it  would  cost  the  United  States  about  $1  extra  per  ton 
of  steel  to  turn  either  to  domestic  deposits  or  to  slags  for  manganese.62 

The  extent  of  world  manganese  reserves  is  not  known;  however, 
they  are  so  large  and  high-grade  that  at  the  present  rate  of  consumption 
they  can  be  considered  virtually  unlimited.  This  is  the  reason  for  the 
assertion  that  submarine  manganese  nodules  can  be  mined  profitably 
for  their  minor  constituents,  particularly  copper,  nickel,  and  cobalt. 

The  average  high-grade  nodules  contain  35  per  cent  manganese,  2.3 
per  cent  copper,  1.9  per  cent  nickel,  and  0.2  per  cent  cobalt  (see  Table 
X).  Brooks  used  the  percentages  35,  2,  2,  and  0.5,  respectively.53  One 
ton  of  such  nodules,  he  estimated,  contains  700  pounds  of  manganese, 
10  pounds  of  cobalt,  40  pounds  of  nickel,  and  40  pounds  of  copper.  The 
average  1970  market  prices  of  these  components  were:54  manga- 
nese, 2.5  cents  per  pound ;  cobalt,  $2.20 ;  nickel,  $1.30 ;  and  copper,  60 

TABLE  X.— RESERVES  OF  METALS  IN  MANGANESE  NODULES  OF  THE  PACIFIC  OCEAN 


U.S.  rate  of 

Rate  of 

consumption 

accumulation 

Ratio  of 

Amount 

Reserves  in  , 

Approximate 

Ratio  of 

of  element 

of  element 

rate  of 

Ratio  of 

of  element 

nodules  at 

world  land 

reserves 

in  1960 

in  nodules 

accumula- 

world 

in  nodules 

consumption 
rate  of  1960 

reserves 

in  nodules/ 

(millions  of 

(millions  of 

tion  rate/  of  consumption/ 

(billions 

of  element 

reserves 

tons  per 

tons  per 

U.S. 

U.S. 

Element 

of  tons)' 

(years)2 

(years) 3 

on  land 

year)  « 

year)  consumption 

consumption 

Magnesium. 

.      25.0 

600, 000 

JL  . 

0.04 

0.18 

4.5 

2.5 

Aluminum... 

.      43.0 

20,  000 

100 

200 

2.0 

.30 

.15 

2.0 

Titanium 

9.9 

2,  000,  000 

L  . 

.30 

.069 

.23 

4.0 

Vanadium... 

.8 

400,  000 

L  . 

.002 

.0056 

2.8 

4.0 

Manganese. . 

.     358.0 

400, 000 

100 

4,000 

.8 

2.5 

3.0 

8.0 

Iron 

.     207.0 

2,000 

8  500 

4 

100.0 

1.4 

.01 

2.5 

Cobalt 

5.2 

200, 000 

40 

5,000 

.008 

.036 

4.5 

2.0 

Nickel 

.       14.7 

150,  000 

100 

1,500 

.11 

.102 

1.0 

3.0 

Copper 

.        7.9 

6,000 

40 

150 

1.2 

.055 

.05 

4.0 

Zinc 

.7 

1,000 

100 

10 

.9 

.0048 

.005 

3.5 

Gallium 

.015 

150  000 

.0001 

.0001 

1.0 

93 

100, 000 
30,  000 

100 

1  000 

.0013 

.0065 

5.0 

Molybdenum 

.77 

500 

60 

.025 

.0054 

.2 

2.0 

Silver 

.001 

100 

100 

1 

.006 

.00003 

.005 

Lead 

1.3 

1,000 

40 

50 

1.0 

.009 

.0009 

2.5 

1  All  tonnages  in  metric  units. 


1  Amount  available  in  the  noduhs  divided  by  the  consumption  rate. 
3  Calculated  as  the  element  in  metric  tons.  I  " 
<  Calculated  as  the  element  in  metric  tons. 


3  Calculated  as  the  element  in  metric  tons.  (U.S.  Bureau  of  Mines,  Staff,  1956.) 


by  th 
.(U.S 


s  Present  reserves  so  large  as  to  be  essentially  unlimited  at  present  rates  of  consumption. 
1  Including  deposits  of  iron  that  are  at  present  considered  marginal. 

Source:  From  Mero,  op.  cit.,  page  278. 


52  David  B.   Brooks.  "Low-Grade  and  Nonconventlonal  Sources  of  Manganese."    (Balti- 
more, Johns  Hopkins  Press,  1966). 
68  Ibid.,  page  103. 
»  Commodity  Data  Summaries  (January  1971),  pages  38,  42,  88,  and  102. 


472 


cents  per  pound.  Thus  the  gross  value  of  one  ton  of  manganese  nodules 
is  $115  (at  1963  prices,  Brooks  estimated  $83  per  ton.  with  a  range 
bet  ween  $45  and  $100,  depending  on  variation  in  composition) . 

The  amount  to  be  mined  will  have  an  immediate  effect  on  the  cur- 
rent prices.  Mero  55  estimated  that  if  an  operation  were  designed  to 
mine  an  average  grade  of  the  nodules  to  produce  100  per  cent  of  the 
U.S.  consumption  of  nickel,  that  operation  would  also  produce  about 
300  per  cent  of  its  annual  consumption  of  manganese,  200  per  cent  of 
that  of  cobalt,  100  per  cent  of  that  of  titanium,  300  per  cent  of  that  of 
vanadium,  and  about  500  per  cent  of  that  of  zirconium.  This  sort  of 
calculation  has  been  repeated  by  Francis  L.  LeQue  who  assumed  a 
nodule  composition  of  30  per  cent  manganese,  1  per  cent  nickel,  0.75 
per  cent  copper,  and  0.25  per  cent  cobalt.  If  100  per  cent  of  the  world's 
copper  needs  were  filled  from  such  a  source,  there  would  also  be  pro- 
duced 133  times  the  world  consumption  of  cobalt  and  15  times  the 
world  consumption  of  nickel.56 

These  calculations,  however,  did  not  take  into  consideration  the 
gross  returns  and  the  effects  of  massive  mining  on  current  prices. 
Brooks,  using  his  3S/2/2/.5  percentages  again,57  estimated  that  2,000  to 
5,000  tons  of  nodules  mined  per  day  would  drop  manganese  prices 
from  90  cents  to  50  cents  per  unit.  At  this  price  several  of  the  large 
African  and  South  American  producers  could  continue  to  operate, 
but  Indian  mines  and  most  smaller  producers  would  probably  be 
forced  out  of  the  market.  The  ton  of  rich  ore  that  was  valued  at  $83 
drops  below  $64.  There  would  follow  an  annual  decrease  in  profits  from 
$26  million  to  $14  million  (production  rate  2,000  tons  per  day),  and 
from  $65  million  to  $36  (at  5,000  tons  per  day ) . 

Regardless  of  the  arguments  for  or  against  mining  submarine  man- 
ganese nodules,  there  is  general  agreement  that  these  nodules  are  a 
tremendous  potential  resource.  Brooks  concluded  that : 

Though  the  claims  for  the  returns  from  deep  sea  raining  of  manganese  nodules 
have  been  exaggerated,  this  by  no  means  eliminates  them  as  possible  manganese 
sources.  To  the  contrary,  it  is  my  conclusion  that  they  are  the  only  alternative 
source  that  is  likely  to  be  developed  in  the  middle-terra  future.68 

Commercial  Reco  rery  of  Offnliore  Petroleum 

The  origin  and  occurrence  of  petroleum  and  the  reservoir  para- 
meters requisite  to  its  accumulation  were  described  in  an  earlier  sec- 
tion. In  the  pursuit  of  oil  and  gas,  the  first  step  is  to  search  for  it. 
Geological  exploration  is  followed  by  exploratory  drilling  to  see  if 
the  structures  discovered  actually  contain  commercially  producible 
oil.  If  they  do,  the  next  stage  is  the  development  or  exploitation. 

EXPLORATION 

In  the  search  for  oil,  exploration  techniques  employ  a  variety 
of  sophisticated  equipment  necessary  for  geophysical  investigations. 
Modern  echo  sounding  and  seismic  equipment  are  capable  of  recording 
the  profile  of  the  sea  floor  and  the  shapes  of  the  underlying  sedimen- 
tary strata.  These  devices  vary  with  the  type  of  work  to  he  performed 


•"■'•  Mero,  op.  cit.,  page  279, 

P« Quoted  by  Ocean  Science  News  (June  \-.  1!»7<>>  from  a  presentation  by  LeQue  al  the 
Marine  Technology  Society  meeting,  similar  calculations  were  submitted  by  LeQue  at  the 
Conference  at    Dltchley    Park,   September  26  '-'it,    1969.    (See:  K.  R.  Simmonds.   "The  He- 

.    lL.    i\ i,..i    ■•    ,  ,«..•«..      i  r.     1  «7    * 


sources  <»f  the  Ocean  Bed,"  (1969),  pages  i:>-17.) 
rT  Hrooks,  op.  cit.,  pane  106. 
"•Ibid.,  pages  100-107. 


473 


and  the  desired  resolution,  accuracy,  depth,  and  areal  extent.  Data 
are  interpreted  with  the  aid  of  computers,  and  computerized  oper- 
ations are  becoming  routine. 

The  geophysical  survey  is  of  no  practical  use  if  the  structure  dis- 
covered under  water  cannot  be  returned  to,  located,  and  occupied  for 
drilling  and  development.  The  location  of  potential  and  actual  drill- 
ing sites  is  becoming  progressively  more  dependent  on  geodetic  posi- 
tioning techniques  as  the  oil  industry  moves  farther  offshore.  The 
fluid  nature  of  the  surface  element — the  superjacent  water — com- 
pounds this  difficulty.  To  solve  this  problem,  several  methods  have 
been  developed  to  use  satellites  directly  as  control  for  surveys  at  sea.59 

DRILLING 

A  major  element  in  the  exploration  for  petroleum  is  the  exploratory 
drilling  that  follows  the  geophysical  work.  This  drilling  determines 
the  economic  value  of  the  discovery.  A  structure  that  has  all  the  ele- 
ments requisite  for  the  accumulation  of  hydrocarbons  may,  when 
drilled,  produce  a  dry  hole;  hence  the  old  saying  among  oilmen  that 
"oil  is  where  you  rind  it." 

Offshore  drilling  equipment  is  a  direct  descendent  of  equipment 
for  land  drilling,  with  adaptation  to  the  marine  environment.  The 
basic  rig  (including  derrick,  kelley,  rotary  table,  blowout  preventor, 
drill  pipe,  bit,  and  casing)  is  used  from  several  types  of  platforms. 
There  are  fixed  platforms  constructed  on  piles  driven  securely  into 
the  ocean  floor.  Most  fixed  platforms  have  a  maximum  efficiency  in 
waters  less  than  300  feet  deep,  with  more  recent  designs  reaching 
600  feet.  A  second  stage  of  evolution  is  the  semi-fixed  platform 
designed  to  rest  on  the  sea  floor  while  drilling;  when  drilling  is 
finished,  the  platform  is  refloated  and  moved  to  another  site.  The 
design  that  employs  the  jack-up  concept  is  the  most  versatile  and 
most  common  among  offshore  platforms.  The  third  type  is  the  floating 
platform.  Floating  platforms  are  far  less  costly  for  exploratory  drill- 
ing than  the  fixed  or  semi-fixed  platforms.  They  also  have  the  added 
advantage  of  capability  in  much  deeper  water.  The  basic  concept  is 
that  of  a  conventional  rig  in  the  center  of  a  ship  or  barge  modified  to 
perform  the  task.  Recent  drill  vessels  can  operate  without  being 
anchored,  by  dynamic  positioning  over  the  drill  site. 

Although  exploratory  drilling  has  been  conducted  mostly  in  depths 
less  than  1,000  feet,  and  completion  of  producing  wells  in  less  than 
300  feet,  further  advances  in  both  technologies  are  imminent.  A 
wildcat  for  a  commercial  well  was  recently  drilled  from  a  drill  barge 
off  Santa  Barbara,  California,  for  Humble  Oil  Company  (Tract  322) 


59  Alton  B.  Moody.  "Geodesy  and  oil  exploration.''  In  "Papers  from  the  Technical  Con- 
ference of  the  American  Society  of  Photbgrammetry — American  Congress  on  Surveying 
and  Mapping,  October  7-10,  1970."  (Denver,  Colorado),  pages  301-312.  Moody  states  that 
as  operations  extended  seaward  beyond  the  range  of  visual  observations,  shore-based  radio 
systems  were  pressed  into  service,  such  as  shoran,  Raydist,  lorac,  and  Decca,  which  are 
still  widely  used.  These,  however,  suffer  from  a  number  of  limitations,  including  propaga- 
tion problems,  geometry,  limited  range,  logistics,  and  political  difficulties.  Errors  vary  from 
500  meters  to  100  meters  (roughly  1,700  to  330  feet)  in  locating  a  position.  The  most 
sophisticated  system  thus  far  developed  is  now  in  operational  use  by  the  Western  Geo- 
physical Company  of  America.  It  consists  of  a  satellite  receiver,  Doppler  sonar  equip- 
ment, an  inertial  navigator,  and  various  ancillary  equipment.  Post  analysis  of  data  Per- 
mits determination  of  the  position  of  the  vessel  during  the  survey  to  an  accuracy  of  about 
150  feet  on  the  continental  shelf,  and  with  an  error  about  10  per  cent  larger  in  deeper 
water.  Thus,  the  system  exceeds  the  accuracy  requirements  specified  for  oil  exploration 
at  sea. 

(See  also:  Alton  B.  Moody  and  W.  A.  Knox.  "Geodetic  position-finding  at  sea  and  the 
search  for   oil."   Surveying  and   Mapping    (December   1970),    pages   581-591.) 


474 


in  1,500  feet  of  water,  in  the  vicinity  of  a  prolific  strike  (Humble/Stan- 
cal  Tract  325)  in  1,050  feet  of  water.  Humble  Oil  has  also  announced 
plans  to  install  a  60-well  platform  for  drilling  and  production  in  TOO 
feet  of  water  in  the  Santa  Barbara  Channel.  With  exploratory  drill- 
ing it  is  easier  to  achieve  added  depth  capability  than  with  pro- 
duction drilling,  because  once  the  hole  is  drilled  no  more  equipment  is 
needed  as  in  the  production  wells.  Reentry  is  a  basic  requirement  in 
drilling  for  petroleum.  At  certain  intervals,  when  the  bit  wears  out, 
a  new  bit  has  to  replace  the  old  bit.  In  order  to  accomplish  this,  the 
whole  pipe  length  in  the  hole  has  to  be  withdrawn,  the  old  bit  is 
replaced,  and  the  drill  string  is  reintroduced  into  the  hole.  Guidance 
back  into  the  hole  is  hard  to  achieve  in  deep  waters. 

In  research  drilling,  no  reentry  into  the  hole  is  required.  This  is 
why  the  Glomar  Challenger  was  able  to  drill  and  core  in  11,720  feet 
of  water  on  Sigsbee  Knolls,  and  later  set  a  record  in  the  North  Atlantic, 
drilling  2,759  feet  below  the  ocean  floor  in  16,316  feet  of  water.  Power- 
ing about  4  miles  of  drillpipe  from  a  floating  vessel  is  no  small  feat! 
However,  as  evidence  of  the  rapid  development  in  drilling  technology, 
a  breakthrough  was  achieved  by  the  Glomar  Challenger  when,  on 
June  14,  1970,  a  deep-water  hole  was  successfully  reentered.  The  crew 
changed  the  worn-out  bit  and  succeeded  in  finding  and  reentering  the 
hole  in  10,000  feet  of  water.  Several  months  later,  a  similar  operation 
was  successfully  completed  in  13,000  feet  of  water;  the  bit  wore  out 
after  drilling  2,300  feet  into  the  sea  floor,  was  changed  and  reentered 
into  the  same  hole  to  drill  200  additional  feet.  Reentry  was  accom- 
plished with  the  aid  of  a  high-resolution  scanning  sonar  system  looking 
through  the  drill  bit  and  guiding  it  into  a  funnel-shaped  receiving 
cone  mounted  on  the  ocean  floor,  and  a  system  for  steering  the  drill  pipe 
toward  the  cone.  This  achievement  heralded  a  new  era  in  offshore 
technology,  but  only  for*  drilling,  not  for  production.  The  aim,  how- 
ever, is  production— a  challenge  more  formidable  though  not  insur- 
mountable. 

PRODUCTION 

Following  successful  and  promising  exploratory  drilling,  a  well  is 
completed  and  equipped  for  production.  Production  requires  the 
installation  of  a  well  head,  a  valve  complex  often  called  the  "christmas 
tree,"  flow  lines  to  move  the  oil  to  the  separators,  separators  to  separate 
the  gas  from  the  oil,  and  pipelines  to  transfer  the  products  to  storage 
tanks  and  refineries. 

Some  of  this  equipment  is  installed  on  platforms  above  water  at 
shallow  depths  to  about  300  feet,  and  on  the  ocean  floor  in  deeper 
waters.  There  are  problems  of  installation,  production,  and  servicing. 
The  last  is  a  major  activity  which  is  performed  periodically  through- 
out the  life  of  the  well.  Oil  well  ancillary  services  involve  a  number 
of  complicated  activities  often  critically  limited  by  water  depth.  One 
such  activity  includes  the  services  of  divers,  underwater  submersibles, 
and  the  attending  support  vessels  and  equipment. 

The  majority  of  above-water  production  facilities  is  effective  for 
wells  in  waters  no  deeper  than  340  feet,  although  new  designs  have 
pushed  this  limit  to  twice  the  depth.  As  water  depth  increases,  how- 
ever, drilling  costs  increase  drastically.  In  the  Gulf  of  .Mexico,  for 
example,  the  cost  tor  exist  ing  plat  forms  rises  from  $1.5  million  in  100 


475 


feet  of  water  to  $4  million  in  350  feet,  and  an  expected  $12  million  in 
600  feet.00 

The  cost  of  drilling  and  completing  a  platform  well  rises  from 
$200,000  in  100  feet  of  water  to  $425,000  in  350  feet.  Adding  a  share 
of  the  platform  cost,  the  cost  of  drilling  and  completing  a  12,000-foot 
underwater  exploratory  well  is  $550,000  in  100  feet  of  water.  When 
projected  to  600  and  1,000  feet  of  water  the  cost  rises  to  $990,000  and 
$1.10(1.000,  respectively. 

As  petroleum  operations  are  conducted  in  progressively  deeper 
water,  they  require  more  and  more  sophisticated  equipment.  Remote 
control  devices  are  an  emerging  necessity.  Such  refinements  add  sig- 
nificantly to  the  cost  of  recovery.  One  very  important  factor  in  under- 
water operations  is  the  mobility  and  overall  efficiency  of  divers.  The 
deepest  working  dive  on  record  was  to  700  feet,  and  laboratory  simu- 
lated dives  have  exceeded  1,700  feet.  In  April  1970,  divers  from  the 
British  Royal  Navy  succeeded  in  making  a  "dry  dive"  to  1,500  feet. 
Later  in  1970,  two  French  divers  participating  in  project  Physalie  5 
made  a  record  dive  to  more  than  1,700  feet.  The  project  is  aiming 
at  depths  close  to  2,000  feet. 

Saturation  diving  capabilities  have  been  extended  at  a  rate  of 
approximately  125  feet  per  year  during  the  past  six  or  seven  years, 
but  diver  capability  will  probably  be  limited  for  the  foreseeable  future 
to  less  than  1,500  feet.  Furthermore,  new  drilling  and  completion  sys- 
tems have  been  developed  to  minimize  the  need  for  divers. 

FUTURE  TRENDS 

It  is  hard  to  keep  up  with  the  speed  at  which  the  offshore  oil  tech- 
nology is  advancing;  what  is  postulated  as  an  artist's  conception 
today  may  become  a  working  model  by  the  time  these  words  appear 
in  print.  As  water  depth  increases,  it  becomes  necessary  to  abandon 
above- water  platform  equipment  and  resort  to  bottom  installation  and 
production  systems. 

Underwater  wellheads  to  control  the  flow  of  oil  or  gas  from  a  well 
have  been  installed  in  numerous  locations  around  the  world,  some 
connected  directly  to  shore  facilities.  An  interesting  concept  in  pro- 
ducing oil  and  gas  in  deep  water  is  represented  by  WODECO's  under- 
water sphere  for  drilling  and  production.61  This  sphere  includes  a 
shirt-sleeve  environment  at  a  submerged  depth  of  150  feet  (25-pound 
pressure  per  square  inch),  wellheads,  separating,  metering,  and  pump- 
ing equipment.  It  is  designed  to  be  effective  in  water  depths  exceed- 
ing the  1,300  feet  which  is  the  oil  industry's  immediate  target  for 
operating  depths.62 


40  John  L.  Kennedy.  "Offshore-rig  construction  costs  will  continue  to  climb."  The  Oil 
and  Gas  Journal  (March  16,  1970),  pages  136-140.  Recent  Federal  changes  in  offshore 
regulations  (expanded  OCS  Order  No.  8)  require  safety  and  anti-pollution  equipment 
which  is  believed  by  the  oil  industry  to  increase  production  costs  about  $150  million. 
Annual  pollution  control  expenditures  by  petroleum  companies  in  the  United  States 
totalled  $271.4  million  for  1966,  $357.9  million  for  1967,  and  $381.6  for  1968.  ("An 
interim  report  on  current  key  issues  relating  to  environmental  conservation — the  oil 
and  gas  industries."  Prepared  by  the  National  Petroleum  Council's  Committee  on  Environ- 
mental Conservation — The  Oil  and  Gas  Industries.  ( Jun^  22,  1970),  page  5.) 

61  Western  Offshore  Drilling  and  Exploration  Co.  (Fluor  Drilling  Services,  Inc.).  The 
company's  project  manager  indicated  that  the  concept  is  still  under  development,  and 
has  undergone  changes  in  design.  Its  use  depends  on  favorable  conditions  other  than 
technology. 

92  This  target  depth  is  directly  related  to  known  resources  in  the  California  offshore 
fields,  which  illustrates  the  influence  of  discovery  on  the  push  for  technological  develop- 
ment. 


476 


A  similar  spherical  habitat  has  been  tested  as  part  of  a  proto- 
type seabed  oil  production  system  designed  by  Lockheed  Offshore 
Petroleum  Systems  (Fig.  3).  The  manned  capsule  (Fig.  4)  is  designed 
for  a  one-atmosphere  environment  at  depths  of  1,200  feet,  and  the 
whole  system  can  be  extended  to  2,000  feet.  The  system  includes  well- 
head cell  a  re,  pipeline  assembly,  manifold  center  on  the  sea  floor,  and 
gathering  lines  that  carry  the  petroleum  either  to  subsea  storage  or 
directly  to  surface  separators. 


Figure  3. — Conceptual  design  of  an  underwater  petroleum  production  system.  The 
system  involves  construction  and  emplacement  on  the  ocean  floor  of  man-rated 
pressure  hulls  containing  normal  oilfield  components.  Components  are  serviced 
by  manned  capsule  (see  Fig.  4).  Adapted  from  material  supplied  by  Lockheed 
Petroleum  Services,  Ltd.,  British  Columbia,  Canada. 


Separators  are  systems  that  separate  the  gas  from  the  oil  to  facili- 
tate pumping  the  oil  to  storage  facilities  ashore  or  to  mooring  tankers. 
The  most  recent  application  of  a  subsea  production  system  was  under- 
taken by  the  Dubai  Petroleum  Company  in  the  Arabian  Gulf  (Fig. 
5).63  In  1960  the  storage-tank.  Khazzan  Dubai  No.  1,  was  placed  on  the 
sea  floor  58  miles  from  shore,  and  in  1970  the  first  self-setting  oil/gas 


83  The  need  for  this  subsea  production  system  arose  following  the  discovery  in  June  19C>fi 
of  the  Pateh  Field  about  GO  miles  off  the  shore  of  Dubai.  To  develop  this  field,  the  com- 
pany would  have  had  to  lay  pipeline  .ill  the  way  to  shore  for  storage   then  lay  more  pipe 

lines  back  from  shore  storage  facilities  to  reach  water  10  miles  offshore  lieep  enough  to 
accommodate  tankers  for  loading.  The  whole  production  system  was  exhibited  at  the 
oeennoiogv  International  1969  exh'b'l  Th«  storage  tank  vas  emnlaeed  in  August  of  thai 
year.  It  was  hullt  al  0  COSt  of  about  $7  million  by  the  Chicago  Bridge  and  Iron  Company. 
In  April  ior.9,  British  Petroleum  Company  Ltd.  r personal  communication]  was  planning  to 
tevt  n  limited  subsea  product  ion  scheme  Involving  an  oil  and  gas  separation  unit  on  the 
-. abed  elsewhere  In  the  Arabian  Gulf.  This  separator  was  emplaced  in  August  1970  on  well 
No.  .■'.i'.  with  all  processing  equipment  resting  on  the  sea  floor.  The  separator  started  proc- 
essing crude  oil  initially  at  5,000  barrels  per  day,  separating  oil  and  gas.  measuring  them, 
and  discharging  t'e  oil  Into  a  pinpllne  to  shore.  This  development  illustrates  further  the 
speed  with  which  petroleum  technology  is  advancing  from  the  conceptual  stage  to  the 
operational  stage. 


477 


Figure  4. — Service  capsule  (Top  sphere)  being  lowered  to  couple  with  well- 
head cellar  (Bottom  sphere)  encapsulating  production  equipment.  The  service 
capsule  provides  transportation  from  the  surface  to  the  ocean  floor,  and  con- 
tains life  support  and  oilfield  equipment.  The  one-atmosphere,  shirt-sleeve  en- 
vironment eliminates  the  need  for  highly  specialized  diving  personnel  and 
support  facilities.  Photo  courtesy  of  Lockheed  Petroleum  Services,  Ltd.,  British 
Columbia,  Canada. 

separator  was  successfully  emplaced  on  the  sea  floor  in  the  Zakum 
Field  near  Das  Island,  under  75  feet  of  water. 

These  are  only  a  few  of  the  many  approaches  to  the  development  of 
technology  for  the  recovery  of  offshore  petroleum.  To  minimize  re- 
liance on  divers  added  emphasis  is  being  given  to  the  design  and  use 
of  submersibles.  Submersibles  have  been  used  in  underwater  oilfield 


478 


Figure  5. — Artist's  impression  of  offshore  oilfield  development  showing  under- 
water production,  separation,  and  storage  systems.  Photo  courtesy  of  British 
Petroleum  Company,  Ltd.  (1969). 

operations,  and  offer  a  potential  to  perform  at  virtually  unlimited 
depths.  It  is  estimated  that  technological  capabilities  for  production 
will  be  achieved  within  five  years  to  the  same  depths  of  1,300  or  1,500 
feet  already  within  the  capabilities  of  exploration  drilling.  Even  before 
the  middle  of  this  decade  it  is  expected  that  the  Glomar  Challenger  will 
be  able  to  obtain  a  seabed  core  5,000  feet  long  in  30,000  of  water. 

Beyond  the  mid-seventies  and  toward  the  end  of  this  decade,  a  total 
of  500  offshore  drilling  rigs  are  expected  to  be  in  operation  around  the 
world.  Technology  will  have  reached  the  point  at  which  the  water 
depth  is  no  longer  the  determining  factor.  Factors  of  economic  and 
political  feasibility  will  then  play  the  decisive  role  in  formulating 
policy  for  offshore  exploration  and  exploitation. 

SUPPLY   AND   DEMAND 

The  "free  world"  consumption  of  liquid  petroleum  for  1069  totaled 
37,192,(MM)  barrels  per  day  (b/d),  representing  an  increase  in  demand 
by  8.4  per  cent  over  the  previous  year.0'  During  the  first  nine  months 
of  1070  it  exceeded  40  million  barrels  per  day  (mb/d).  a  growth  of 
more  than  !»  per  cent.  For  the  United  States  the  demand  for  oil  re- 
corded a  5  pci-  cent  increase  ;  toe  t  he  rest  of  the  ''free  world"  the  demand 
growth  was  almost  12  per  cent.68  Projections  for  the  1980s  indicate 
that,  at  an  average  rate  of  growth  of  7  per  cent  annually,  world  eon- 


•»  Richard  C.  Sparlinp.  Norma  J.  Anderson,  and  John  G.  Winger,  "Capital  Investment 
of  the  World  Petroleum  Industry — 1969,"  (The  Chase  Manhattan  Bank,  December  1970), 
pages  2,  19. 

"John  D.  Kmerson.  "The  Petro'enm  Situation  In  October  1970,"  Energy  Division,  The 
Chase  Manhattan  Bank  (November  30,  1970),  pages  2-3. 


479 


sumption  of  oil  will  be  nearly  four  times  that  of  today,  and  the  use 
of  petroleum  gas  will  increase  as  much  as  five  times  in  the  same 
period.66 

Against  this  demand,  world  production  is  variously  estimated  at 
between  34.4  mb/d  and  41.3  mb/d.67  Offshore  production  accounts 
for  16-18  per  cent  of  the  world's  total.  Weeks  has  predicted  that  by 
1978  an  offshore  daily  yield  of  23  mb/d  is  expected,  representing  33 
per  cent  of  a  world  total  of  70  mb/d.  He  also  estimated  that  proved 
world  oil  reserves  total  425  billion  barrels,  which  would  last  at  least 
through  this  century.  Moreover,  the  ultimate  world  potential  of  all 
resources  offshore  totals  1,600  billion  barrels.  For  comparison,  ultimate 
world  potential  of  comparable  resources  on  land  was  estimated  at 
4,000  biH  ion  barrels. 

Despite  this  enormous  land  potential,  the  oil  industry  is  vigorously 
delving  into  the  offshore  fields.  Current  investments  in  offshore  opera- 
tions were  reported  by  the  Department  of  the  Interior  to  be  nearly 
$20  billion.  Investment  is  expected  to  increase  at  the  rate  of  $3  billion 
annually,  reaching  a  total  of  $50  billion  by  1980.  Estimates  given  by 
L.  G.  Weeks  show  a  "probable  total  upward  of  $25  billion"  up  to 
1968,  expected  to  reach  $50  billion  by  1978. 

Operations  on  land  are  generally  less  costly  than  those  offshore. 
More  costs  are  added  to  offshore  operations  as  the  new  consciousness 
of  environmental  concern  gains  momentum.  Hazards  of  offshore  oper- 
ations include  those  encountered  in  land  operations,  aggravated  fur- 
ther by  the  marine  environment,  plus  a  new  breed  of  hazards  peculiar 
to  the  underwater  world.  Safety  and  anti-pollution  requirements  have 
already  added  a  heavy  burden  on  the  industry's  outlays,  and  more 
stringent  regulations  will  add  further  to  the  spiralling  costs  of  pene- 
tration into  deeper  water.08 

Although  exploration  expenditures  offshore  are  less  than  those  for 
land,  drilling  and  production  make  up  for  this  margin.  Technological 
innovations  often  tend  to  be  glamorous,  and  their  novelty  tends  to 
overshadow  and  supersede  older  and  more  reliable  technology.  In  the 
words  of  Eduardo  J.  Guzman: 

There  are  many  examples  in  the  world  of  these  premature  adventurous  off- 
shore campaigns  involving  the  use  of  costly  geophysical  methods  where  less  ex- 
pensive exploration  approaches  still  could  yield  considerable  success  in  the 
discovery  of  new  reserves.  This  worldwide  trend  is  not  new  in  the  history  of 
exploration.  It  has  happened  repeatedly  even  within  the  United  States,  where 
every  new  method  or  tool  has  tended  to  displace  all  other  previous  ones,  and 
usually  at  higher  operating  costs.  *  *  *  Marine  or  offshore  exploration,  particu- 
larly involving  seismic  work,  is  easier,  faster,  and  cheaper  than  almost  any 


98  Lewis  G.  Weeks,  "The  gas,  oil  and  sulfur  potentials  of  the  sea,"  Ocean  Industry  (June 
1968),  page  43.  Of  this  world  consumption,  the  communist  countries  take  16—17  per 
cent.  In  the  first  quarter  of  1971  (as  reported  in  the  Oil  &  Gas  Journal,  May  31,  1971, 
page   18).    the   communist   production   averaged    7,874    mb/d. 

87  Weeks,  op.  cit.,  put  current  (1968)  production  at  35.3  mb/d  ;  The  Oil  and  Gas  Journal 
(December  29,  1969),  page  95,  estimated  the  1969  production  at  41,266,100  b/d  ;  and 
The  Chase  Manhattan  Bank  (Sparling,  et  al.,  op.  cit.,  page  95),  gave  the  figure  of 
34,390,000  b/d  for  crude  oil  production  for  the  "free  world."  J.  D.  Moody  gives  a  "best 
guess"  for  1990  as  9S  mb/d.  ("Petroleum  demands  of  future  decades."  American  Associa- 
tion of  Petroleum  Geologists  Bulletin  (December  1970),  pages  2239-2249.)  Figures  as 
of  June  1970.  More  recently  (June  14,  1971),  Weeks  was  reported  to  have  revised  his 
estimates  to  a  world  production  of  43  mb/d,  of  which  the  offshore  production  represented 
17  per  cent  (Ocean  Weekly  Report),  while  Larry  Auldrldge  (Oil  &  Gas  Journal,  May  31, 
1971)  forecasts  world  production  to  average  50  mb/d  for  1971. 

88  See  footnote  59. 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  32 


480 


method  on  land,  but  we  tend  to  forget  that  offshore  drilling  and  production-are 
several  times  more  expensive."0* 

Besides  exploration,  one  is  further  faced  with  the  following  factors: 

— Skyrocketing  costs  of  lease  sales  and  bonuses,  particularly  in 

the  Tinted  States  ($000  million  each  in  Santa  Barbara  Channel 

and  Gulf  of  Mexico  in  1968,  and  the  December  1970  sale  of  $S50 

million  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico) ; 

— Higher  overall  costs  for  offshore  operations; 
— Projected   increase    in    future   expenditures  toward  deeper 
water; 
— Higher  costs  eventually  passed  on  to  the  consumer;  and 
— Offshore  hazards  like  blowouts,  fires,  and  oil  spills  increasing 
in  frequency  and  magnitude. 
The  question  is:  Has  the  industry  exhausted  land  resources?  The  an- 
swer of  course  is  No.  The  land  potential  of  4,000  billion  barrels  of  oil 
estimated  by  Weeks  does  not  include  the  vast  amounts  of  synthetic 
petroleum  in  bituminous  rocks  such  as  oil  shales  and  tar  sands.  The 
U.S.  Bureau  of  Mines  (Information  Circular  8425)  estimates  that  the 
Green  River  Formation  oil  shales  contain  '2  trillion  barrels  of  oil :  800 
billion  barrels  at  15  gallons  of  oil  for  a  ton  of  shale,  and  about  50C 
billion  barrels  at  25  gallons  of  oil  per  ton  of  shale  are  considered  prac- 
tically exploitable.  The  proved  recoverable  reserves  alone  are  about 
four  times  the  total  proved  U.S.  petroleum  reserves.70  The  develop- 
ment of  these  deposits,  as  Weeks  put  it,  has  been  caught  in  ''the  polit- 
ical jungle  that  has  invaded  the  outlook,  and  which  is  partly  respon- 
sible for  the  lack  of  progress  in  this  field."'  He  also  adds:  "Perhaps 
the  petroleum  industry  on  its  part  has  not  supplied  the  kind  of  ener- 
getic and  particularly  united  leadership  required  in  dealing  with  gov- 
ernment." 71 

Other  than  oil  shale,  there  are  still  greater  amounts  of  potential 
synthetic  oil  and  gas  in  coal.  It  is  estimated  that  the  world  has  enough 
coal  to  last  1,500  years.  Then  there  are  tar  sands,  nuclear  power  sup- 
plemented in  time*  by  the  virtually  inexhaustible  fast  breeder  reactor, 
and  other  land  sources  of  energy  (possibly  even  fusion)  which  will  be 
eventually  developed  and  become  competitive  with  oil  and  gas.  There 
are  also  those  regions  on  land  that  have  not  been  explored,  and  new 
discoveries  like  the  Alaska  North  Slope  are  not  to  be  ruled  out.  Some 
scientists  believe  that  a  very  high  percentage  of  the  land  surface  is  stili 
unexplored  and  is  considered  potentially  promising. 

The  oil  industry  contends  that  despite  higher  initial  investment,  the 
development  of  an  offshore  field  eventually  reduces  offshore  costs.  Off- 
shore platforms  can  drill  50-60  wells  from  one  location;  oil  accumula- 
tions in  younger  strata  offshore  provide  greater  yields  and  higher  sue- 


m  Kduardo  J.  Guzman.  "Are  sophisticated  exploration  methods  the  awwer?"  In  Vir- 
ginia S.  Cameron.  ed.  "Exnloratlon  and  Economies  of  tlie  Petroleum  Industry:  New  Ideas, 
New   Methods,   Sew    Developments."    (10C>9).   papes  21-22. 

70  Several  countries  are  already  exploiting  Mieir  oil  shale  deposits.  At  the  1970  Inter- 
national Gns  Conference  in  Moscow  the  USSR  revealed  that  improved  minlnp  and 
mechanized  handling  methods  hive  pushed  Soviet  oil  shale  output  beyond  22  million  tony 
per  ve-r  (Oil  -ml  Gns  International  (September  1070).  p>pe  117).  Australia  also  has 
announced  a  new  project  to  begin  production  in  1074  from  its  vast  oil  shale  reserves:  the 
reserves  Indicate  a  field  life  of  50  years.  In  the  L'nited  States,  about  80  billion  barrels  of 
oil  from  the  more  accessible  hlcll  grade  deposits  Of  the  Central  Rocky  Mountains  can  be 
considered  available  with  demonstrated  methods  of  extraction,  and  at  costs  approaching 
the  present-day  costs  of  petroleum  of  comparable  quality. 

71  Weeks  op.  eit.  pipe  46.  See  also:  Chris  Welles.  "The  Elusive  Bonnnza  :  The  Story 
of  Oil  Shale."  (Dut'ton,  1970),  236  pages. 


481 


cess  ratios.  When  distributed  over  the  entire  operation,  these  costs  are 
expected  to  be  eventually  lowered  to  reasonable  and  acceptable  levels. 

V.  Policy  for  Seabed  Resources 

Given  the  abundant  resources  of  the  seabed  and  the  challenges  they 
present,  especially  to  the  dynamic  petroleum  industry,  what  are  the 
implications  of  tliis  situation  for  national  policy  and  international  di- 
plomacy ?  Before  entering  the  complex  issues  of  global  agreements  for 
apportionment  of  the  ocean's  resources,  some  considerations  of  U.S. 
national  interests  and  policy  should  be  reviewed. 

Policy  For  Submarine  Mining 

A  foremost  consideration,  present  in  all  mining  operations,  is  the 
necessity  for  maintaining  an  approximate  balance  of  supply  against 
demand.  A  prime  economic  characteristic  of  all  minerals,  except  those 
that  are  scarce  and  precious,  is  their  price  sensitivity.  Although  sup- 
ply may  be  elastic,  demand  is  not.  The  housewife  does  not  buy  an 
extra  tank  of  oil,  and  the  steel  mill  does  not  double  its  order  for  man- 
ganese merely  because  the  supply  is  plentiful.  This  characteristic  is  of 
particular  signilicance  for  projects  to  mine  the  seabed  or  drill  into  it 
for  oil.  The  Ingher  initial  cost  of  such  operations  needs  to  be  evaluated 
against  the  possibility  of  a  fall  in  prices  such  as  would  make  the  entire 
operation  uneconomical  after  heavy  capital  investments  have  been 
poured  into  it. 

Moreover,  the  disruptive  effect  of  severe  price  fluctuations  would 
extend  far  beyond  the  extractive  industry  directly  involved.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  it  turned  out  that  submarine  mining  was  a  lower-cost 
operation,  the  impact  would  be  no  less  severe  on  conventional  mining 
operations.  The  problem  of  over  production,  even  of  one  component, 
would  be  analogous  to  a  free  import  policy  without  safeguarding  the  lo- 
cal industry.  Prices  would  go  down,  mining  centers  on  land  would 
close  down,  and  whole  communities  might  have  to  migrate  in  quest 
of  livelihood  elsewhere.  As  submarine  mining  wyould  immediately  re- 
late to  coastal  areas,  populations  from  inland  would  seek  the  already 
overpopulated  coastal  areas.  Land,  housing,  equipment,  business,  and 
all  such  related  activities  left  behind  wrould  feel  the  impact. 

The  fact  that  seabed  deposits  are  being  researched  and  seriously  con- 
sidered is  enough  to  influence  business  decisions  and  put  a  firm  ceiling 
on  the  long-run  price  of  manganese,  cobalt  and  nickel.  If  deep-sea 
mining  becomes  a  reality,  future  prices  could  well  be  lower  than  to- 
day's, and  certainly  would  not  exceed  production  costs. 

The  many  unknowns  surrounding  offshore  mining  are  a  source  of 
uncertainty  causing  decision-makers  to  prefer  land  operations.  Re- 
search dollars  are  directed  by  generally  conservative  mining  com- 
panies toward  more  familiar  and  less  risky  land  applications.  Several 
mining  economists  believe  that  the  high  investment  in  the  research 
and  development  of  deep-sea  mining  will  exclude  most  mining  com- 
panies. They  maintain  that  such  development  will  come  from  larger, 
non-mining  companies  such  as  the  oil  and  aerospace  industries,  or 
from  consortia  of  several  small  companies-  This  is  also  the  thinking 
behind  the  future  production  envisioned  by  Deepsea  Ventures,  Inc., 
following  its  successful  mining  operation  in  1970.  The  risk,  the  high 


482 


capital  investment,  the  unknowns,  and  the  lack  of  experience  in  the 
marine  environment  will  deter  the  small  entrepreneur  from  ventur- 
ing into  the  deep-sea  operations. 

Another  deterrent  stems  from  a  source  totally  non-technical  and 
non-economic;  that  is  the  legal  uncertainties.  Most  essential  and 
fundamental  to  efficient  mining  practice  is  the  exclusive  right  of  the 
discoverer  to  exploit  the  minerals  discovered  and  the  security  of 
tenure  while  he  does  so.  The  deep-sea  operations  of  the  future  are  in 
off-shore  areas  undefined  and  undecided  in  proprietary  and  jurisdic- 
tional terms.  Who  owns  the  ore  body  that  has  been  found  far  out  in 
the  middle  of  the  ocean?  Many  companies  have  suffered  from  legal 
problems  on  land,  and  the  failure  of  the  world  community  to  agree 
to  an  ocean  regime  is  a  serious  deterrent  to  ocean  mining  ventures. 

In  the  final  analysis,  it  is  the  consensus  that  deep-sea  mineral  de- 
posits are  substantial  and  that  they  form  a  great  potential  resource. 
Once  a  substantially  rich  deposit  is  found,  the  technology  to  exploit 
it  is  likely  to  be  developed  promptly — much  sooner  than  anticipated. 
A  rich  deposit  and  successful  and  profitable  operation  are  enough  to 
dissipate  the  doubts  and  overcome  the  deterrents  now  gripping  the 
industry.  The  outlook  is  one  of  cautious  optimism,  but  a  legal  regime 
must  be  established  and  international  agreements  effected  before  the 
mining  industry  ventures  into  the  ocean  deeps. 

Policy  for  Offshore  Petroleum 

All  considerations  of  present  and  future  technological  develop- 
ments indicate  that  penetration  into  the  deep-sea  basins  is  only  a 
matter  of  time.  The  capabilities  that  are  not  available  today  are  cer- 
tainly a  short  distance  away.  The  question  that  is  asked  then  is: 
Does  technology  justify  expansion  ?  Tn  other  words,  just  because  the 
industry  has  the  capability  to  do  something,  must  it  do  it? 

Certain  inescapable  and  uncontestable  facts  cannot  be  ignored : 
(1)  Petroleum  is  the  basis  of  numerous  activities,  products,  and  needs 
throughout  the  world.  (2)  An  increasing  demand  for  petroleum  prod- 
ucts follows  the  increase  in  population,  trends  toward  urbanization, 
and  the  rapid  industrialization  of  developing  nations.  (3)  The  nu- 
merous organizations  engaged  in  petroleum  activities  and  their  an- 
cillary services  are  organizations  that,  in  the  process  of  making  profit, 
invest,  generate,  and  circulate  vast  amounts  of  money  which  may 
shaoe  the  economies  and  politics  of  communities  and  even  nations. 

Regardless  of  the  policies  and  arguments  for  or  against,  the  rapid 
expansion  into  the  seabed,  a  few  facts  are  clear:  (1)  Offshore  opera- 
tions are  likely  to  continue  at  an  ever-increasing  pace.  (2)  Hazards  of 
offshore  operations  are  inevitable  but  not  unavoidable,  and  damage 
to  the  environment  may  be  long-lasting  or  irreversible.  (3)  Present 
and  future  technology  is  capable  of  providing  the  needed  petroleum 
and  at  the  same  time,  preserving  the  environment.  (4)  Numerous  other 
enterprises  besides  the  oil  industry  are  engaged  in  activities  using 
coastal  waters. 

On  the  international  scene,  many  countries  are  plunging  head- 
long into  offshore  exploitation  with  inadequate  understanding  of 
the  disastrous  hazards  to  their  waters  and  shores,  and  often 
disregarding  principles  of  safety  and  pollution  abatement.  Most  of 
these  nations  have  only  one  aim :  The  immediate  returns  and  revenues 


483 


for  industrialization.  This  is  understandable.  But  whether  such  rapid 
industrialization  is  a  sound  policy  for  the  management  of  the  re- 
sources of  "Spaceship  Earth,"  or  whether,  instead,  the  developing 
nations  should  carefully  evaluate  it  and  beware  of  the  fate  to  which 
it  might  lead,  should  be  a  matter  of  meticulous  international  assess- 
ment and  decision-making.  The  developing  nations  have  the  op- 
portunity to  witness  the  results  of  experiments  already  performed 
for  them  by  the  developed  nations,  and  lessons  they  can  learn  before 
the  fact.  Nevertheless,  it  is  also  understandable  that  petroleum  com- 
panies operating  for  these  nations  should  find  the  lack  of  restraints 
less  costly,  more  profitable,  less  restrictive,  and  the  cause  of  fewer 
headaches  than  similar  operations  off  the  shores  of  developed  states. 
The  question  must  be  raised  about  the  responsibility  of  those  organ- 
izations for  adopting  their  own  self-policing  methods  and  educating 
the  developing  nations  in  the  necessity  of  preserving  the  environment 
for  their  own  good  and  for  the  ultimate  benefit  of  all  mankind. 

There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  technologically  the  industry 
cannot  conduct  its  business  and  preserve  the  ocean  ecology  in  a  system 
of  mutual  benefit.  The  ocean  has  become  the  focus  of  man's  attention 
and  hope,  not  merely  for  its  mineral  and  petroleum  resources,  but 
more  so  for  its  increasing  importance  as  a  source  of  food,  a  possible 
future  habitat,  and  a  major  source  of  the  Earth's  weather  systems  and 
their  life-giving  processes.  There  are  other  tenants  using  the  con- 
tinental shelf,  and  their  joint  activities  need  to  be  mutually  com- 
patible.72 

One  point  of  view  is  that  land  resource  exploitation  deserves  first 
priority;  it  may  be  in  the  ultimate  interest  of  all  mankind  to  pursue 
the  land  areas  and  explore  their  subsurface  thoroughly,  leaving  the 
ocean  as  clean  as  possible  for  as  long  as  possible.  Until  the  continents 

7J  In  a  publication  entitled  "Petroleum,  Drilling  and  Leasing  on  the  Outer  Continental 
Shelf — A  Summary,"  (May  1966,  page  20),  the  Department  of  the  Interior  describes  the 
other  tenants  of  the  continental  shelf  regions  as  follows  : 

"One  of  the  singular  aspects  of  the  Offshore  Louisiana  situation  is  that  the  oil  industry 
has  enjoyed  extensive  and  largely  undisturbed  use  of  the  area  for  over  a  decade,  during 
which  time  it  has  put  up  over  a  thousand  permanent  structures  which  would  in  varying 
degrees  interfere  with  other  uses  of  the  shelf,  the  overlying  sea,  and  the  air  above  it.  This 
was  possible  to  do  because  by  and  large,  and  almost  fortuitously,  no  other  prospective 
tenants  asserted  a  significant  need  to  use  the  area  for  their  own  purposes. 

"This  is  not  to  say  that  operators  have  not  had  trouble  with  merchantmen  and  fishing 
boats  bumping  into  their  platforms,  (the  frequency  is  increasing)  or  by  having  ships' 
anchors  dragged  over  their  pipelines.  These  difficulties  are  of  a  historic  nature  and  a  large 
body  of  navigational  law  and  practice  has  been  evolved  to  enable  the  traditional  users  of 
the  sea  to  share  its  benefits  with  the  least  amount  of  damage  to  everyone. 

"What  Is  unique  about  the  present  situation  is  that  of  the  200,000-plus  square  miles  of 
Continental  Shelf  and  sea  area  adjacent  to  the  United  States,  that  portion  off  the  coast 
of  Louisiana  is  the  only  part  that  has  experienced  significant  drilling  activity,  and  it  is 
also  the  on.y  part  that  is  not  almost  completely  claim-staked  by  other  users.  Around  the 
entire  length  of  the  remaining  coastline,  there  is  scarcely  a  square  mile  that  is  not 
being  used  for  some  purpose  and  usually  for  more  than  one  purpose.  The  chief  tenant 
is  the  Department  of  Defense,  but  not  in  every  case.  There  are  bombing  and  gunnery 
ranges,  test  and  calibration  ranges,  carrier  operating  areas,  submarine  operating 
areas,  torpedo  firing  ranges,  transit  lanes,  and  vast  and  complicated  underwater  sound 
surveillance  systems  tied  to  each  other  and  to  the  shore  by  a  network  of  cables.  On  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  Coasts  there  are  also  a  great  many  more  commercial  shipping  routes 
than  in  the  Gulf,  and  the  number  of  clear  days  is  measurably  less.  There  are  commercial 
cables,  oyster  beds,  and  fishing  shoals  to  be  considered  and  a  growing  number  of  privately 
owned  submersible  craft  operating  in  the  relatively  shallow  waters  above  the  shelf.  More- 
over, beauty-conscious  dwellers  along  the  shore  are  acutely  sensitive  to  the  spectacle  of 
oil  rigs  working  offshore  at  any  point  within  their  range  of  sight.  And  because  the  entire 
area  is  already  in  use,  the  entry  of  a  new  tenant  cannot  be  easily  accommodated  because 
of  the  "domino  effect"  produced  upon  adjacent  areas.  Therefore,  as  oil  activity  on  the 
Continental  Shelf  expands  into  these  areas,  oil  men  and  their  government  lessors  are  likely 
to  be  faced  with  problems  of  a  kind  and  dimension  they  have  never  really  encountered 
before.  Their  resolution  will  take  much  patient  negotiating,  and  a  large  measure  of 
tolerance  by  all  parties.  The  Continental  Shelf  and  the  sea  and  air  above  it  may  give  the 
appearance  of  being  spacious  and  emDty,  when  in  fact  they  are  not.  Far  from  being  empty, 
the  Shelf  deserves  to  be  called  our  Crowded  Frontier." 


484 


are  thoroughly  explored  and  their  resources  exhausted,  according  to 
this  view,  there  seems  little  justification  for  stampeding  to  invade 
the  ocean  domain,  perhaps  to  cause  irreparable  damage  to  its  ecology. 
In  the  balance  of  compatible  uses  of  this  environment,  the  demand 
and  the  profits  have  to  be  carefully  and  conscientiously  weighed 
against  the  damage  to  ecology  and  the  ultimate  cost  to  reclaim  it. 

General  Policy  for  Seabed  ResoiLrces 

The  previous  section  on  the  technology  and  economics  of  offshore 
exploitation  reveals  two  distinct  situations,  one  involving  the  hard 
minerals  and  the  other  involving  offshore  petroleum.  For  hard  min- 
erals there  is  cautious  optimism  which  calls  for  a  policy  of  encourage- 
ment toward  the  ocean  domain,  although  the  technology  and  eco- 
nomics may  not  justify  deep-sea  mining  in  the  near  future,  and  certain 
other  deterrents  may  hinder  the  process  of  decision-making  by  the 
mining  industry. 

In  the  case  of  the  petroleum  industry,  the  present  abundance  of  its 
product  is  reassuring.  Underwater  technology  is  advancing  at  a  very 
rapid  pace,  pushing  the  industry  into  offshore  development  at  increas- 
ing costs  in  most  phases  of  operation.  Land  resources  are  still  plentiful 
and  relatively  less  costly;  American  national  security  appears  in  no 
grave  danger,  now  or  in  the  foreseeable  future;  and  the  hazards  of 
offshore  operations  are  becoming  a  major  cause  for  concern  on  the 
national  and  international  levels.  There  are  also  numerous  other  ten- 
ants who  utilize  the  ocean  domain  and  demand  equity  and  compat- 
ibility in  the  diverse  uses  of  this  environment.  All  these  factors  seem 
to  call  for  a  deliberate  and  cautious  program  of  offshore  exploitation, 
encompassing  a  carefully  protracted  advance  within  an  established 
sequence  of  priorities  and  an  acceptable  framework  of  jurisdiction  on 
the  national  and  international  levels. 

This  go-slow  policy  is  particularly  crucial  for  the  continental  shelf 
because  technological  development  there  is  progressing  at  a  speed  that 
has  already  rendered  obsolete  the  definition  of  jurisdictional  limits,  le- 
gal or  otherwise.  It  is  conceded  that  development  will  be  confined,  for 
some  time  to  come,  to  the  continental  shelf  areas,  and  that  progress  into 
the  deep  sea  is  not  imminent.  However,  the  confusion  created  by  the 
Geneva  Conventions,  particularly  the  exploitability  clause,  invites 
review;  definitive  political  boundaries  are  needed  for  the  seaward 
limit  of  national  jurisdictions.  Beyond  this  limit,  the  deep  sea  areas 
would  then  l>e  confirmed  as  the  common  domain  of  the  community  of 
nations.  Whatever  regime  is  suggested  for  this  international  deep-sea 
domain  is  subject  to  legal  considerations  and  international  approval, 
but  the  issue  is  not  as  urgent  as  is  the  delineation  of  national  jurisdic- 
tions at  this  time. 

VI.  International  Concern 

The  rapid  advances  in  the  acquisition  of  scientific  data,  and  the 
spectacular  development  of  technological  capabilities  to  exploit  the 
ocean  domain,  commercially  and  militarily,  have  compelled  a  general 
awareness  of  the  potential  of  the  oceans  in  living  and  non-living 
resources.  Countries  throughout  the  world  have  come  to  recognize  the 
importance  of  this  domain,  and  there  is  at  least  some  indication  of  a 
trend  toward  a  policy  of  leaving  it  free  from  national  domination. 


485 


More  than  two-thirds  of  the  planet  Earth  is  at  stake,  and  the  theme 
is  to  explore  and  exploit  its  resources  for  the  benefit  of  all  mankind. 

The  basic  attitude  is  sound  and  desirable.  How  to  implement  it  to 
the  satisfaction  of  all  nations  is,  however,  a  complex  issue  of  legal, 
technical,  economic,  and  political  problems. 

In  October  1965,  before  the  U.N.  Economic  and  Financial  Commit- 
tee, Ambassador  James  Roosevelt  urged  cooperation  for  undersea  ex- 
ploration. "It  is  not  too  early  for  this  Committee,"  said  Ambassador 
Roosevelt,  "to  start  dreaming  and  thinking  exciting  thoughts  about 
the  role  the  U.N.  can  take.  In  saying  this,  I  am  not  unaware  that  this 
organization  has  already  demonstrated  a  sensitivity  to  the  fact  that 
no  one  nation  can  hope  to  attack  the  many  problems  posed  by  the 
ocean  and  that  a  large  enough  attack  can  be  launched  only  if  all  the 
nations  cooperate." 

In  1066,  President  Johnson  said : 

Under  no  circumstances,  we  believe,  must  we  ever  allow  the  prospect  of  rich 
harvest  and  mineral  wealth  to  create  a  new  form  of  colonial  competition  among 
the  maritime  nations.  We  must  be  careful  to  avoid  a  race  to  grab  and  to  hold 
the  lands  under  the  high  seas.  We  must  insure  that  the  deep  seas  and  the  ocean 
bottoms  are,  and  remain,  the  legacy  of  all  human  beings.'3 

Senator  Frank  Church  carried  this  reasoning  further  in  1967  by 
urging  an  international  agreement  to  confer  title  on  the  United  Na- 
tions to  mineral  resources  on  the  ocean  floor  beyond  the  continental 
shelf.  The  agreement  he  envisioned  would  regulate  the  development 
of  these  resources  and  "might  not  only  remove  a  coming  cause  of  inter- 
national friction,  but  also  endow  the  United  Nations  with  a  source  for 
substantial  revenue  in  the  future."  74 

The  World  Peace  Through  Law  Conference,  held  on  July  13,  1967, 
by  2,500  lawyers  from  100  countries,  adopted  a  resolution  urging  a 
proclamation  declaring  that  the  resources  of  the  high  seas  beyond  the 
continental  shelf  appertain  to  the  United  Nations.  The  Conference 
had  two  broad  objectives :  The  efficient  exploitation  of  the  sea  for  the 
benefit  of  all,  including  private  entrepreneurs,  and  improvement  of 
the  lot  of  mankind  as  a  whole. 

The  United  Nations,  however,  had  already  become  involved  in 
ocean  affairs,  although  the  main  impetus  toward  internationaliza- 
tion of  the  seabed  began  in  earnest  in  1967,  following  a  proposal  by 
the  Malta  delegation  (discussed  under  a  separate  heading)  to  reserve 
the  seabed  for  peaceful  uses  and  use  its  resources  for  the  benefit  of  all 
mankind. 

Organizations  for  Marine  Activities 

International  bodies  and  mechanisms  for  promoting  and  coordi- 
nating marine  activities  among  the  participating  nations  are  divided 
into  two  major  groups:  Non-governmental  and  intergovernmental. 
In  1968,  the  United  Nations  Economic  and  Social  Council  submitted 
a  report,  to  the  Secretary  General  which  contained  a  detailed  survey 
of  existing  mechanisms  for  the  promotion  and  coordination  of  marine 


73  Speech  given  at  the  commissioning  of  the  research  ship  Oceanographer,  at  the  Wash- 
ington Navy  Yard  on  July  13,  1966. 

74  U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  "The  United  Nations  at 
Twenty-one."  Report  by  Senator  Frank  Church,  90th  Congress,  1st  session.  (Washington, 
Government  Printing  Office,  February  1967),  page  25. 


486 


activities  at  the  international  level.75  The  principal  non-governmental 
organizations  were  contained  within  the  framework  of  the  Interna- 
tional Council  of  Scientific  Unions  (ICSU).  The  intergovernmental 
organizations  were  for  the  most  part  within  the  United  Nations  sys- 
tem, although  some  tended  to  maintain  considerable  independence.  A 
third  category  included  bodies  to  coordinate  the  work  of  international 
organizations  within  each  of  the  two  groups. 

Non-Governmental  Organizations 

The  non-governmental  organizations  engaged  in  marine  activities 
can  be  grouped  into  two  groups,  the  largest  of  which  is  the  Inter- 
national Council  of  Scientific  Unions  (ICSU)  ;  the  others  are  more 
or  less  informal  bodies  such  as  associations  of  regional  extent. 

ICSU  consists  of  a  number  of  unions  classified  according  to  scien- 
tific disciplines,  and  of  several  special  and  scientific  committees  con- 
cerned with  interdisciplinary  problems.  The  unions  having  major  in- 
terests in  marine  sciences  are : 

1.  International  Union  of  Geodesy  and  Geophysics  (IUGG) 

2.  International  Union  of  Biological  Sciences  (TUBS) 

3.  International  Union  of  Geological  Sciences  (IUGS) 
ICSU  committees  concerned  witli  marine  sciences  are : 

1.  Scientific  Committee  on  Oceanic  Research   (SCOR) 

2.  Scientific  Committee  on  Antarctic  Research  (SCAR) 

3.  Special  Committee  for  the  International   Biological  Pro- 

gram (SCIBP) 

4.  Federation    of    Astronomical    and    Geophysical    Services 

(FAGS) 

5.  Comite  international  de  geophysique  (CIG) 

The  other  non-governmental  international  organizations  are : 

1.  International  Union  for  Conservation  of  Nature  and  Natu- 

ral Resources  (IUCN) 

2.  Nordic  Council  for  Marine  Biology 

3.  Congress  of  Baltic  Oceanographers 

4.  Pacific  Science  Association  (PSA) 

5.  Mediterranean  Association  for  Marine  Biologv  and  Ocean  - 

ology  (MAMBO) 

In  tergovernmental  Organizations 

Organizations  that  promote  and  coordinate  marine-related  activities 
on  the  intergovernmental  level  are  primarily  within  the  United  Nations 
system.  As  with  the  non-go vernment a  1  bodies,  the  non-United  Nations 
intergovernmental  bodies  are  confined  mainly  to  specific  regions,  and 
are  generally  concerned  with  fisheries  and  living  resources. 

The  United  Nations  system  and  its  specialized  bodies  have  always 
conducted  activities  in  marine  affairs,  particularly  in  the  scientific  and 
exploratory  aspects  of  oceanography,  and  in  the  fisheries  and  living 
resources  of  the  oceans.  Most  of  these  activities  are  interrelated,  and 
the  U.N.  bodies  concerned  with  international  programs  also  receive 
advice  from  non-governmental  organizations,  particularly  ICSU. 
At  the  present  time,  the  issue  of  the  seabed  is  the  concern  of  the  Com- 
mitter on  the  Seabed,  reporting  directly  to  the  General  Assembly 
(Fig.  6). 


"United  Nations  Economic  and  Social  Council.  "Marine  Science  and  Technology: 
Survey  and  Proposals."  (United  Nations,  New  York,  April  24,  1968),  pages  50-59  and 
Annex  X  (UNESC,  E/4487). 


487 


United    Nations   Bodies   with    Responsibilities   in   the    Marine   Sciences r 


SPECIALIZED 
AGENCIES 


WORLD  HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION 


INTERNATIONAL 

TELECOMMUNICATION 

UNION 


INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
MARITIME  CONSULT 
ATIVE  ORGANIZATION 


INTERNATIONAL  BANK 

-FOR  RECONSTRUCTION 

AND  DEVELOPMENT 


UNESCO  


FOOD  ANO 
AGRICULTURAL 

ORGANIZATION 


ECONOMIC  AXU 
SOCIAL  COINCII. 


ADVISORY  COMMITTEE 

ON    SCIENCE 

AND  TECHNOLOGY 


U.N.  DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAM 


U.N. 
CHILDREN'S  FUND 


ECONOMIC 

COMMISSION  FOR  ASIA 

AND  THE  FAR  EAST 


INTERGOVERNMENTAL 

OCEANOGRAPHIC 

COMMISSION 


FISHERIES 
COMMITTEE 


WORLD 

METEOROLOGICAL 

ORGANIZATION 


COMMISSION  ON 
MARITIME  METEOROLOGY 


GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY 


INTERNATIONAL 

ATOMIC   ENERGY 

COMMISSION 


U.N.  CONFERENCE 

ON  TRADE 
ANO  DEVELOPMENT 


SHIPPING 
COMMITTEE 


INTERNATIONAL 
LAW  COMMISSION 


U.N    SECRETARIAT 


RESOURCE  AND 
TRANSPORT  OIV. 


COMMITTEE 
ON  THE  SEABED 


•From:  Marine  Science  Affairs — A  year  of  Plans  and  Progress.  The  second  report  of  the  President  to  the  Congress  on  marine  resources 
and  engineering  development.  March  1968.  p.  24. 


Figure  6. — United  Nations  bodies  with  responsibilities  in  the  marine  sciences. 

One  of  the  more  active  arms  of  the  United  Nations  is  the  UN  Educa- 
tional, Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization  (UNESCO).  The  UN- 
ESCO program  is  concerned  with  stimulating  and  coordinating  basic 
oceanic  research  and  associated  scientific  work  throughout  the  world, 
and  with  providing  technical  assistance  in  oceanography  to  the  de- 
veloping countries.  The  work  involves  large  numbers  of  scientists  and 
experts  in  the  diverse  fields  of  oceanography  on  an  international  scale. 
Marine  science  programs  are  conducted  by  UNESCO's  Office  of 
Oceanography,  which  also  serves  as  secretariat  for  the  Intergovern- 
mental Oceanographic  Commission  (IOC). 

The  desire  of  the  participating  scientists  and  the  oceanographic  com- 
munity at  large  in  involving  the  support  of  governments  for  world- 
wide cooperation  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  the  IOC  in  1960. 
This  occurred  as  a  direct  outcome  of  experiences  gained  during  the  In- 
ternational Geophysical  Year.  Since  then,  the  IOC  has  been  actively 
coordinating  major  oceanographic  expeditions  on  a  global  basis,  such 
as  the  International  Indian  Ocean  Expedition,  the  Cooperative  In- 
vestigations of  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  International  Decade  of 
Ocean  Exploration. 

The  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  established  in  1961  an  Ad- 
visory Committee  on  Marine  Resources  Research  manned  by  another 
group  of  scientists  and  experts  concerned  with  all  aspects  of  ocean 
fisheries.  The  sea /air  interface  is  the  target  of  extensive  research  and 
observation  networks  coordinated  by  the  World  Meteorological  Orga- 
nization on  a  global  basis.  The  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
has  an  acknowledged  competence  in  the  field  related  to  discharge  or 
release  of  radioactive  materials  in  the  sea,  and  the  Inter-go vernmen- 


488 


tal  Maritime  Consultative  Organization  has  an  international  responsi- 
bility to  prevent  and  control  oil  pollution  in  the  sea  through  the 
International  Convention  for  the  Prevention  of  Pollution  of  the  Sea 
by  Oil.  IMCO  is  also  concerned  with  the  safety  aspects  of  ships,  drill 
rigs,  buoys,  and  other  such  platforms  at  sea. 

All  United  Nations  organizations  coordinate  their  programs  through 
the  Subcommittee  on  Marine  Science  and  its  Applications,  of  the  Ad- 
ministrative Committee  on  Coordination,  which  reports  to  the  Eco- 
nomic and  Social  Council. 

Although  intergovernmental  organizations  other  than  those  within 
the  United  Nations  system  are  mainly  regional  in  their  extent,  one 
exception,  The  International  Hydrographic  Organization,  has  world- 
wide interests  in  (and  limited  to)  hydrography  and  associated  prob- 
lems of  tides  and  sea  level.  Its  interest  in  the  sea  floor  is  also  restricted 
to  its  relation  to  bathymetry.  Regional  organizations  include  the  In- 
ternational Council  for  the  Exploration  of  the  Sea,  which  is  concerned 
with  the  North  Atlantic  Ocean  and  adjacent  seas,  and  the  International 
Commission  for  the  Scientific  Exploration  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea. 
Both  of  these  organizations  cooperate  with  IOC  in  coordinating  re- 
search in  their  respective  areas. 

VII.  U.N.  Activities  Concerning  Seabed  Resources 

The  decade  of  the  1960's  marked  a  worldwide  recognition  of  the 
potential  of  seabed  resources.  The  United  Nations  was  the  obvious 
forum  for  expressing  concern  over  these  resources.  The  General 
Assembly  and  the  Economic  and  Social  Council  came  to  recognize 
that  exploration  and  exploitation  of  seabed  resources  should  be  carried 
out  for  the  benefit  of  mankind,  particularly  toward  satisfying  the  needs 
of  the  developing  nations.  Several  resolutions  were  adopted  and  de- 
cisions made  in  matters  related  to  seabed  resources,  with  the  aim  of 
promoting  and  facilitating  their  effective  development  through  co- 
ordinated international  cooperation. 

United  Nations  activities  prior  to  the  1960's  were  described  earlier, 
in  the  discussion  on  the  1958  Geneva  Conventions,  particularly  con- 
cerning the  continental  shelf.  Concerning  ocean  resources  beyond  the 
continental  shelf,  the  Economic  and  Social  Council  passed  a  resolution 
[1112(XL)  on  non-agricultural  resources.  March  7,  1966]  requesting 
the  Secretary  General — 

(a)  To  make  a  survey  of  the  present  state  of  knowledge  of  these 
resources  of  the  sea,  beyond  the  continental  shelf,  and  of  the  tech- 
niques for  exploiting  these  resources,  in  co-ordination  with  those 
already  made  by  the  United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and 
Cultural  Organization  and  other  specialized  agencies  and  those 
being  prepared; 

(b)  As  part  of  that  survey,  to  attempt  to  identify  those  re- 
sources now  considered  to  be  capable  of  economic  exploitation, 
especially  for  the  benefit  of  developing  countries  ; 

(<?)  To  identify  any  gaps  in  available  knowledge  which  merit 
early  attention  by  virtue  of  their  importance  to  the  development 
of  ocean  resources,  and  of  the  praCf  icality  of  their  early  exploita- 
tion. 


489 


The  General  Assembly  endorsed  Resolution  1112  (XL)  in  a  new 
resolution  [2172  (XXI)  :  Resources  of  the  sea.  Dec.  6,  1966],  and  fur- 
ther requested  the  Secretary  General — 

1.  To  undertake,  in  addition  to  the  survey  requested  by  the 
Economic  and  Social  Council,  a  comprehensive  survey  of  activi- 
ties in  marine  science  and  technology,  including  that  relating  to 
mineral  resources  development,  undertaken  by  members  of  the 
United  Nations  family  of  organizations,  various  Member  States 
and  intergovernmental  organizations  concerned,  and  by  universi- 
ties, scientific  and  technological  institutions  and  other  interested 
organizations; 

2.  *  *  *  in  the  light  of  the  above-mentioned  survey,  to  formulate 
proposals  for — 

(a)  Ensuring  the  most  effective  arrangements  for  an  ex- 
panded programme  of  international  co-operation  to  assist  in 
a  better  understanding  of  the  marine  environment  through 
science  and  in  the  exploitation  and  development  of  marine 
resources,  with  due  regard  to  the  conservation  of  fish  stocks; 

(b)  Initiating  and  strengthening  marine  education  and 
training  programmes,  bearing  in  mind  the  close  interrelation- 
ship between  marine  and  other  sciences ; 

3.  To  set  up  a  small  group  of  experts  to  be  selected,  as  far 
as  possible,  from  the  specialized  agencies  and  intergovernmental 
organizations  concerned,  to  assist  him  in  the  preparation  of  the 
comprehensive  survey  called  for  in  paragraph  [1]  above  and  in 
the  formulation  of  the  proposals  referred  to  in  paragraph  [2] 
above. 

The  survey  and  proposals  were  to  be  submitted  to  the  Advisory  Com- 
mittee on  the  Application  of  Science  and  Technology  to  Development 
for  its  comments,  and  then,  together  with  the  comments,  to  the  General 
Assembly  at  its  twenty-third  session  (1968),  through  the  Economic 
and  Social  Council. 

Emergence  of  the  Malta  Proposal 

While  those  two  reports  were  being  prepared,  the  Permanent  Mis- 
sion of  Malta  to  the  United  Nations  submitted  a  note  verbale,  dated 
August  17,  1967,  to  the  Secretary  General,  proposing  the  inclusion  in 
the  agenda  of  the  twenty-second  session  (1967)  of  the  General  Assem- 
bly an  item  entitled  "Declaration  and  treaty  concerning  the  reserva- 
tion exclusively  for  peaceful  purposes  of  the  sea -bed  and  of  the  ocean 
floor,  underlying  the  seas  beyond  the  limits  of  present  national  juris- 
diction, and  the  use  of  their  resources  in  the  interest  of  mankind." 76 

In  the  memorandum  which  accompanied  the  note  verbale,  the  Malta 
proposal  pointed  out  that  the  seabed  and  ocean  floor  beyond  the  ter- 
ritorial waters  and  the  continental  shelves  had  not  yet  been  appro- 
priated for  national  use  because  of  their  inaccessibility,  and  because 
their  use  for  defense  purposes  or  economic  development  had  not  been 
technologically  feasible.  However,  the  memorandum  recognized  the 
rapid  progress  in  technological  developments,  particularly  by  the  ad- 
vanced countries.  This  progress,  it  was  felt,  would  cause  the  seabed  to 

79  "Malta :  request  for  the  Inclusion  of  a  supplementary  Item  In  the  agenda  of  the 
twenty -second  session."  (New  York,  United  Nations.  August  18,  1967).  (U.N.  Document 
A/6695.) 


490 


become  progressively  and  competitively  subject  to  national  appropria- 
tion. National  appropriation  would,  in  turn,  result  in  the  militariza- 
tion of  the  accessible  ocean  floor  through  the  establishment  of  fixed 
military  installations  and  in  the  exploitation  and  depletion  of  re- 
sources of  immense  potential  benefit  to  the  world,  for  the  national  ad- 
vantage of  the  technologically  developed  countries. 

It  was,  therefore,  considered  timely — the  memorandum  continued — 
to  declare  the  seabed  and  the  ocean  floor  a  "common  heritage  of  man- 
kind." Accordingly,  immediate  steps  should  be  taken  to  draft  a  treaty 
embodying  the  following  principles : 

(a)  The  sea-bed  and  the  ocean  floor,  underlying  the  seas  be- 
yond the  limits  of  present  national  jurisdiction,  are  not  subject 
to  national  appropriation  in  any  manner  whatsoever : 

(b)  The  exploration  of  the  sea-bed  and  of  the  ocean  floor,  under- 
lying the  seas  beyond  the  limits  of  present  national  jurisdiction, 
shall  be  undertaken  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  Principles 
and  Purposes  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations; 

(c)  The  use  of  the  sea-bed  and  of  the  ocean  floor,  *  *  *  and  their 
economic  exploitation  shall  be  undertaken  with  the  aim  of  safe- 
guarding the  interests  of  mankind.  The  net  financial  benefits  de- 
rived from  the  use  and  exploitation  of  the  sea-bed  and  of  the 
ocean  floor  shall  be  used  primarily  to  promote  the  development  of 
poor  countries ; 

(d)  The  sea-bed  and  the  ocean  floor,  *  *  *  shall  be  reserved  ex- 
clusively for  peaceful  purposes  in  perpetuity. 

The  proposed  treaty  was  envisaged  to  include  the  creation  of  an  in- 
ternational agency  which  would  assume  jurisdiction  over  the  seabed; 
regulate.,  supervise  and  control  all  activities  thereon;  and  enforce  the 
principles  and  provisions  of  the  treaty. 

Item  92  of  the  agenda  of  the  twenty-second  session  of  the  General 
Assembly  was  entitled  "Examination  of  the  question  of  the  reserva- 
tion exclusively  for  peaceful  purposes  of  the  sea-bed  and  the  ocean 
floor,  and  the  subsoil  thereof,  underlying  t}le  hio:]1  seas  beyond  the 
limits  of  present  national  jurisdiction",  and  the  use  of  their  resources 
in  the  interests  of  mankind." 

On  October  31,  1967,  the  Secretary  General  delivered  a  note  (Docu- 
ment A/C.l/952)  in  connection  with  this  agenda  item.  He  pointed 
out  that  the  consideration  of  this  item  might  be  facilitated  and  even 
sharpened  by  distinguishing  between  (a)  the  question  of  peaceful  use, 
(b)  the  scientific  activities,  and  (c)  those  of  resources  exploitation.  He 
referred  to  the  studies  called  for  by  resolutions  111-2  (XL)  and  2172 
(XXI)  and  the  progress  that  had  been  made  in  that  direction.  The 
Secretary  General  explained  that  he  had  set  up  a  small  group  of  ex- 
perts to  assist  him  in  carrying  out  the  provisions  of  the  resolutions. 
The  group  was  composed  of  representatives  of  the  specialized  agencies 
concerned,  and  of  private  experts;  it  held  its  first  meeting  in  June  1967 
at  Geneva.  The  Intergovernmental  Oceanographic  ( Jommission  ( IOC) 
of  UNESCO  adopted  on  October  27.  1967.  a  resolution  establishing  an 
IOC  working  group  on  the  legal  questions  related  to  scientific  investi- 
gations of  the  ocean. 

In  connection  with  these  studies,  the  Secretary  General's  preliminary 
work  on  the  tasks  outlined  in  the  resolutions  led  him  to  the  conclusion 


491 


that  there  were  two  major  gaps  in  (a)  the  legal  status  of  the  deep  sea 
resources  and  (b)  ways  and  means  of  ensuring  that  the  exploitation 
of  these  resources  would  benefit  the  developing  countries.  Those  gaps 
had  been  judged  to  cause  possible  delay  in  the  progress  of  the  studies. 
As  to  item  (b) ,  the  Secretary  General  suggested  the  possibility  of  pre- 
paring a  more  comprehensive  report  which  would  include  "a  study 
of  the  legal  framework  which  might  be  established  for  the  deep  sea 
resources,  the  administrative  machinery  which  may  be  necessary  for 
effective  management  and  control,  the  possible  system  of  licensing 
and  various  possible  arrangements  for  redistributing  and/or  utilizing 
the  funds  which  would  be  derived  therefrom,  including  those  ear- 
marked for  the  benefit  of  the  developing  countries." 

Organization  of  the  U.N.  Seabed  Committee 

An  immediate  outcome  of  the  Malta  proposal  was  resolution 
2340  (XXII),  dated  Dec.  18,  1967,  by  which  the  General  Assembly 
created  an  Ad  Hoc  Committee  to  Study  the  Peace  fid  Uses  of  the  Sea- 
Bed  and  the  Ocean  Floor  beyond  the  Limits  of  National  Jwrisdiction. 
The  resolution  recognized  the  extent  and  speed  of  developing  tech- 
nology, and  that  this  technology  was  making  the  seabed  and  the  ocean 
floor  accessible  and  exploitable  for  scientific,  economic,  military,  and 
other  purposes.  The  Ad  Hoc  Committee  was  requested  to  prepare  for 
the  twenty-third  session  of  the  General  Assembly  a  study  which  would 
include : 

(a)  A  survey  of  the  past  and  present  activities  of  the  United 
Nations,  the  specialized  agencies,  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  and  other  intergovernmental  bodies  with  regard  to  the 
sea-bed  and  the  ocean  floor,  and  of  existing  international  agree- 
ments concerning  these  areas ; 

(b)  An  account  of  the  scientific,  technical,  economic,  legal,  and 
other  aspects  of  this  item ; 

(c)  An  indication  regarding  practical  means  of  promoting  in- 
ternational co-operation  in  the  exploration,  conservation  and  use 
of  the  sea-bed  and  the  ocean  floor,  and  the  subsoil  thereof,  as  con- 
templated in  the  title  of  the  item,  and  of  their  resources,  having 
regard  to  the  views  expressed  and  the  suggestions  put  forward 
by  Member  States  during  the  consideration  of  this  item  at  the 
twenty-second  session  of  the  General  Assembly. 

The  Ad  Hoc  Committee  was  composed  of  35  members  and  officers 
were  divided  into  two  major  groups  to  consider  the  requests  of  the 
resolution.  One  was  the  Economic  and  Technical  Working  Group ;  the 
other  the  Legal  Working  Group.  Numerous  meetings  were  held  during 
1968  in  three  sessions ;  it  examined  the  scientific,  economic,  technical, 
and  legal  aspects  of  the  peaceful  uses  of  the  sea. 

In  February  1968,  the  report  Resources  of  the  Sea,  requested  by  the 
Economic  and  Social  Council's  resolution  1112  (XL),  was  submitted 
for  consideration  by  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee.77  Part  One  of  the  report 
dealt  with  the  mineral  resources  of  the  sea  beyond  the  continental 


77  "Resources  of  the  Sea  (Beyond  the  continental  shelf)."  Report  of  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral. (New  York.  United  Nations.  February  21,  1968.)  (U.N.  Economic  and  Social  Council, 
Document  E/4449.)  Part  One:  Mineral  resources  of  the  sea  beyond  the  continental  shelf, 
E/4449 /Add. 1  ;  Part  Two  :  Food  resources  of  the  sea  beyond  the  continental  shelf  ex- 
cluding fish,  E/4449/Add.2. 

Part  One  was  prepared  jointly  by  Frank  Wang,  marine  geologist  of  the  U.S.  Geological 
Survey,  and  the  United  Nations  Secretariat.  Part  Two  was  prepared  by  C.  B.  Idyll  of  the 
Institute  of  Marine  Sciences,  University  of  Miami,  Florida. 


492 


shelf,  and  Part  Two  dealt  with  food  resources,  excluding  fish.  The  Ad 
Hoc  Committee  also  considered  background  papers  prepared  for  it 
by  the  Secretariat,  the  IOC,  and  other  U.N.  specialized  agencies,  and 
the  report  on  marine  science  and  technology.78  Its  final  report  reflected 
emerging  conflicts  of  interest  and  a  heightened  awareness  of  the  tech- 
nical and  legal  problems  associated  with  exploiting  the  deep  ocean 
floor.  Earlier  anxieties  over  the  seabed  resources  and  expectations 
of  early  and  large  returns  from  the  riches  of  the  seabed  became  tem- 
pered with  realism. 

When  the  General  Assembly  convened  in  the  fall  of  1968,  it  re- 
viewed the  Committee  report  and  decided  to  give  the  Ad  Hoc  Com- 
mittee permanent  status.  In  a  series  of  resolutions,  2467 A-D  (XXIII) 
adopted  Dec.  21,  1968,  the  General  Assemblv  established  a  standing 
committee— the  Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  the  Sea-Bed  and 
the  Ocean  Floor  beyond  the  Limits  of  National  Jurisdiction,  composed 
of  42  member  states.  The  Committee  was  instructed  to — 

(a)  Study  the  elaboration  of  the  legal  principles  and  norms 
which  would  promote  international  co-operation  in  the  explora- 
tion and  use  of  the  sea-bed  and  the  ocean  floor  and  the  subsoil 
thereof  beyond  the  limits  of  national  jurisdiction  and  to  ensure 
the  exploitation  of  their  resources  for  the  benefit  of  mankind, 
and  the  economic  and  other  requirements  which  such  a  regime 
should  satisfy  in  order  to  meet  the  interests  of  humanity  as  a 
whole ; 

(b)  Study  the  ways  and  means  of  promoting  the  exploitation 
and  use  of  the  resources  of  this  area,  and  of  international  co- 
operation to  that  end,  taking  into  account  the  foreseeable  de- 
velopment of  technology  and  the  economic  implications  of  such 
exploitation  and  bearing  in  mind  the  fact  that  such  exploitation 
should  benefit  mankind  as  a  whole ; 

(c)  Review  the  studies  carried  out  in  the  field  of  exploration 
and  research  in  this  area  and  aimed  at  intensifying  international 
co-operation  and  stimulating  the  exchange  and  widest  possible 
dissemination  of  scientific  knowledge  on  the  subject ; 

(d)  Examine  proposed  measures  of  co-operation  to  be  adopted 
by  the  international  community  in  order  to  prevent  the  marine 
pollution  which  may  result  from  the  exploration  and  exploitation 
of  the  resources  of  this  area. 

The  rest  of  this  series  of  resolutions  dealt  with  each  of  the  requests 
individually:  (B)  Prevention  of  Pollution,  (C)  Study  of  Interna- 
tional Machinery,  and  (D)  Expanded  Cooperation  and  an  Interna- 
tional Decade  of  Ocean  Exploration,  respectively.  These  resolutions 
had  been  ©©sponsored  by  the  United  States,  and  the  International 
Decade  of  Ocean  Exploration  was  originally  proposed  by  the  United 
States.  However,  on  the  question  of  establishing  international  ma- 
chinery to  promote  exploration  and  exploitation  of  seabed  resources 
and  their  use,  the  United  States  considered  the  Committee  proposal 
premature  and  <  here  fore  abstained. 

Since  the  establishment  of  the  standing  Committee  on  the  Seabed, 
the  United  Nations  has  been  actively  pursuing  ocean  affairs  in  the  area 
of  scientific  and  technological  research,  disarmament,  and  the  establish- 

~H  "Marino  Science  and  Technnlocy  :  Survey  and  Proposals."  (New  York,  United  Nations, 
April  24,  1968).  (Document  UNESC  E/4487.) 


493 


ment  of  an  international  regime  for  the  resources  of  the  seabed.  This 
intensified  effort  has  been  matched  by  activities  of  the  IOC  to  enable 
it  to  serve  as  focal  point  for  coordinating  international  marine  science 
activities,  in  cooperation  with  other  international  organizations,  and 
with  U.S.  participation. 

In  1969,  the  Seabed  Committee  established  a  Legal  Subcommittee 
and  an  Economic  and  Technical  Subcommittee,  which  met  several 
times  and  reported  their  deliberations  and  findings  to  the  Committee. 

LEGAL    SUBCOMMITTEE 

The  Legal  Subcommittee  was  assigned  the  task  of  studying  the 
elaboration  of  legal  principles  and  norms  (as  described  in  operative 
paragraph  2(a)  of  resolution  2467  A  (XXIII) )  which  would  promote 
international  cooperation  in  the  exploration  and  use  of  the  seabed  and 
the  ocean  floor,  and  subsoil  thereof,  beyond  the  limits  of  national 
jurisdiction  and  ensure  the  exploitation  of  resources  for  the  benefit 
of  mankind,  having  regard  to  the  economic  and  other  requirements 
which  such  a  regime  should  satisfy  in  order  to  meet  the  interests  of 
humanity  as  a  whole.  It  was  also  asked  to  examine  the  legal  impli- 
cations of  all  other  questions  mentioned  in  the  terms  of  the  resolution, 
and  the  reports  submitted  by  the  Secretary  General  pursuant  to  reso- 
lution 2467 B,  C,  &  D  (XXIII)  and  2414  (XXIII). 

The  Subcommittee's  deliberations  centered  around  the  drafting  of  a 
declaration  of  principles,  taking  into  consideration  principles  of  the 
Antarctic  Treaty,  and  the  concept  of  "common  heritage  of  mankind." 
The  delegations  argued  these  points  at  length,  but  owing  to  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  time  the  Subcommittee  decided  to  postpone  consideration  of 
other  items  until  future  sessions. 

ECONOMIC   AND   TECHNICAL   SUBCOMMITTEE 

The  Economic  and  Technical  Subcommittee  was  asked  to  consider 
the  following  topics : 

1.  Economic  and  technical  requirements  which  such  a  regime 
as  is  referred  to  in  operative  paragraph  2(a)  of  resolution  2467 A 
(XXIII)  should  satisfy  in  order  to  meet  the  interest  of  humanity 
as  a  whole. 

2.  Operative  paragraph  2(b)  of  the  resolution — to  study  the 
ways  and  means  of  promoting  the  exploitation  and  use  of  the 
resources  of  this  area,  and  of  international  cooperation  to  that 
end,  taking  into  account  the  foreseeable  development  of  tech- 
nology and  the  economic  implications  of  such  exploitation  should 
benefit  mankind  as  a  whole. 

3.  Economic  and  technical  implications  of — 

(a)  all  other  questions  mentioned  in  the  terms  of  reference 
of  the  Committee  as  contained  in  resolution  2467A (XXIII)  ; 
and 

(b)  the  reports  submitted  by  the  Secretary  General  pur- 
suant to  resolutions  2467B,C,&D(  XXIII)  and  2414 (XXIII). 

The  Subcommittee  found  that  little  change  had  taken  place  in  tech- 
nological development  since  the  submission  of  the  report  on  the 
Resources  of  the  Sea  particularly  in  the  mining  techniques.  Explora- 


494 


tion  and  exploitation  of  petroleum,  on  the  other  hand,  were  progress- 
ing at  an  increasing  pace.  Industry  was  becoming  increasingly  aware 
of  the  vast  mineral  deposits  contained  in  the  ocean  floor,  which  could 
in  the  future  become  technically  and  economically  exploitable. 

The  report  of  the  Subcommittee  recognized  the  lack  of  basic  docu- 
ments— geological,  topographical  and  geophysical,  etc. — which  were 
needed  to  identify  areas  favorable  for  the  occurrence  of  various  min- 
erals and  to  appraise  their  potential.  The  report  urged  international 
cooperation  in  collecting  these  data  and  recommended  that  the  devel- 
oping countries  should  become  more  involved  in  their  participation  in 
such  projects. 

INTERNATIONAL   MACHINERY 

The  Subcommittee  considered  extensively  the  report  of  the  Secre- 
tary General,  which  suggested  possible  functions  and  forms  of  inter- 
national machinery.79  The  functions  and  powers  would  include  regis- 
tration, licensing,  operation  by  an  international  agency,  and  the  settle- 
ment of  disputes. 

One  function  which  international  machinery  could  fulfill  would  be 
to  provide  a  system  of  registration  whereby  States  or  other  applicants 
could  notify  an  international  body  of  the  activities  undertaken  or 
proposed,  and  of  the  area  in  which  they  would  be  conducted.  The 
committee  found  that  the  main  feature  of  the  numerous  proposals  put 
forward  by  governments  for  licensing  was  that  title  or  control  of  sea- 
bed resources  would  be  held  by  the  international  community,  repre- 
sented by  the  international  authority,  which  would  issue  licenses  to 
individual  operators.  For  operations  on  the  seabed,  an  international 
body  would  be  established  which  would  exercise  its  functions  in  one  or 
a  combination  of  ways:  The  agency  itself  might  carry  out  direct  ex- 
ploration and  exploitation  operations,  with  its  own  staff  and  facilities; 
it  might  arrange  for  others  to  perform  these  operations  on  its  behalf 
by  a  system  of  service  contracts  or  possibly  by  issuing  licenses ;  or  joint 
ventures  could  be  undertaken  with  other  bodies,  such  as  government 
enterprises  or  international  consortia.  It  was  also  suggested  that  inter- 
national machinery  could  be  established  to  provide  a  means  for  the 
settlement  of  disputes  arising  out  of  the  development  of  seabed  re- 
sources. 

The  proposed  functions  might  be  carried  out  by  various  forms  of 
international  machinery.  Possible  forms  identified  in  the  report  in- 
cluded: 

1.  A  secretariat  center  or  unit  which  might  be  established  within 
an  existing  organization,  such  as  the  Center  for  Development 
Planning,  Projections  and  Policies;  the  Center  for  Housing, 
Building  and  Planning;  and  the  Center  for  Industrial  Develop- 
ment. 

2.  A  United  Nations  subsidiary  organ,  such  as  the  U.N.  Con- 
ference on  Trade  and  Development  (TNCTAD)  ;  the  U.N.  Chil- 
dren's Fund  (UNICEF)  ;  and  the  U.N.  Relief  and  Works  Agency 
for  Palestine  Refugees  in  the  Near  Fast  (UNRWA). 


70  United  Nations.  Secretary  General.  "Study  on  the  question  of  establishing  in  due 
time  appropriate  International  machinery  for  the  promotion  of  the  exploration  and  ex- 
ploitation of  the  resources  of  the  Beabed  and  the  ocean  floor  beyond  the  limits  of  national 
jurisdiction  and  the  use  of  these  resources  In  the  interests  of  mankind."  (United  Nations, 
New  York).  (A/AC.138/12.) 


495 


3.  A  United  Nations  subsidiary  organ  performing  functions 
under  treaties  such  as  the  bodies  concerned  with  narcotic  drugs 
and  the  Office  of  the  U.N.  Higli  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
(UNHCR). 

4.  An  international  organization  established  by  treaty,  enjoy- 
ing an  independent  legal  status,  such  as  the  United  Nations  itself 
and  the  specialized  agencies. 

The  Economic  and  Technical  Subcommittee  found  the  report  of  the 
Secretary  General  a  useful  basis  for  deliberation,  and  concluded  that 
of  the  three  functions  considered  (licensing,  registry,  and  operational 
agency)  the  first  two  had  been  covered  in  an  overall  comprehensive 
manner.  The  question  of  an  organization  to  perform  these  functions 
was  discussed  extensively,  but  the  consensus  was  that  the  whole  sub- 
ject of  international  machinery  needed  to  be  considered  simultane- 
ously with  the  legal  regime,  and  that  such  problems  as  definitions  of 
the  limits  of  the  area  and  the  authority  of  the  agency  should  be  con- 
sidered further. 

The  General  Assembly  then  passed  resolutions  for  the  continuation 
of  the  activities  of  the  Seabed  Committee,  concentrating  on  three 
major  issues: 

1.  Ascertaining  member  views  on  convening  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference  to  update  the  Geneva  Conventions — resolution  2574A 
(XXIV); 

2.  Requesting  the  U.N.  Seabed  Committee  to  prepare  seabed 
principles  and  rules  for  exploitation  of  seabed  resources — reso- 
lution 2574B  (XXIV)  ; 

3.  Requesting  a  further  study  on  international  machinery — 
resolution  2574C  (XXIV). 

Another  resolution  was  passed  (2574D  (XXIV))  calling  for  a 
moratorium  on  exploitation  of  seabed  resources  pending  establish- 
ment of  an  international  regime. 

VIII.  U.S.  Participation  in  International  Ocean  Activities 

The  formulation  of  ocean  policy  in  the  United  States  is  a  complex 
process  which  involves  Federal  agencies  in  the  Executive  Branch, 
congressional  committees,  and  other  non-Federal  and  academic  orga- 
nizations. Each  one  of  these  bodies  contributes  a  share  toward  the 
evolution  of  U.S.  policy,  and  their  individual  positions  on  major 
issues  are  not  necessarily  similar.  In  order  to  understand  these  com- 
plexities,  it  is  necessary  to  indentify  the  organizational  structure  of  the 
policymaking  apparatus  and  to  review  the  positions  taken  by  the 
Legislative  and  Executive  Branches  of  the  U.S.  Government.  " 

U.S.  Policy  Apparatus  for  Seabed  Issues 

The  building  of  a  consensus  on  marine  affairs  through  studies,  ex- 
pert testimony,  and  expressions  of  opinion  is  a  function  of  several  con- 
gressional committees.  This  is  usually  the  formative  stage  in  the 
process  of  establishing  facts  and  formulating  policy  guidelines  to 
assist  the  Executive  Branch  in  its  tasks.  In  the  Executive  Branch,  the 
policy  apparatus  includes  the  National  Council  on  Marine  Resources 
and  Engineering  Development ;  the  Commission  on  Marine  Science, 
Engineering,  and  Resources;  the  Committee  on  International  Policy  in 
the  Marine  Environment;  and  the  existing  Interagency  Law-of-the- 

96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  33 


496 


Sea  Task  Force  under  the  Department  of  State.  Outside  the  Federal 
Government,  assistance  is  also  provided  by  the  National  Academy 
of  Sciences  and  the  National  Academy  of  Engineering. 

CONGRESSIONAL    COMMITTEES 

In  the  Legislative  Branch,  numerous  committees  and  subcommittees 
are  involved,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  with  ocean-related  activities. 
Committees  directly  concerned  with  the  outer  continental  shelf  and 
the  international  aspects  of  ocean  affairs  are  the  following : 
In  the  House  of  Representatives : 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 

Subcommittee  on  International  Organizations  and  Move- 
ments 
Subcommittee  on  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific 

Developments 
Subcommittee  on  State  Department  Organization  and  For- 
eign Operations 
Committee  on  Merchant  Marine  and  Fisheries 
Subcommittee  on  Merchant  Marine 
Subcommittee  on  Oceanography 
In  the  Senate: 

Committee  on  Commerce 

Subcommittee  on  Oceans  and  Atmosphere 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 

Subcommittee  on  Oceans  and  International  Environment 
Committee  on  Interior  and  Insular  Affairs 

Special  Subcommittee  on  Outer  Continental  Shelf 
The  Senate  Subcommittee  on  Oceans  and  Atmosphere,  chaired  by 
Senator  Ernest  F.  Hollings,  was  formerly  the  Subcommittee  on  Ocean- 
ography which  was  created  as  the  Special  Study  on  United  Nations 
Suboceanic  Land  Policy.  The  Subcommittee  on  Oceans  and  Interna- 
tional Environment  was  formerly  the  Subcommittee  on  Ocean  Space, 
created  also  in  the  91st  Congress  to  consider  the  major  aspects  of  the 
ocean  space  issue,  including  the  military,  economic,  scientific,  .and 
legal,  interacting  to  form  the  international  issue  before  the  United 
Nations.  It  is  chaired  by  Senator  Claiborne  Pell,  and  the  Special  Sub- 
committee on  Outer  Continental  Shelf  was  chaired  by  Senator  Lee 
Metcalf.  All  three  Subcommittees  were  established  in  1969  and  held 
hearings  on  issues  related  to  the  United  Nations  and  the  seabed. 

In  matters  of  scientific  and  technological  nature,  advice  and  assist- 
ance for  the  formulation  of  policy  are  provided  to  the  Committee  staff 
and  Members  by  the  staff  of  the  Science  Policy  Research  Division  of 
the  Congressional  Research  Service  at  the  Library  of  Congress,  which 
wascreated  forthat  purpose  in  1964. 

COUNCIL    ON     MARINE    RESOURCES    AND    ENGINEERING    DEVELOPMENT 

In  June  of  1966,  Congress  passed  the  Marine  Resources  and  Engi- 
neering Development  Act,  which  became  Public  Law  89  l.vi.  estab- 
lishing policies  and  objectives  for  the  U.S.  effort  to  develop  the 
Nation's  marine  resources.  It  also  provided  for  the  establishment  of 

a  National  Council  on  Marine  Resources  and  Engineering  Develop- 
ment under  the  chairmanship  of  the  Vice  President. 


497 


The  duties  and  responsibilities  of  the  Council  were  outlined  in  detail 
in  the  Act,  and  represented  a  wide-ranging  mandate  over  the  total 
national  program  in  oceanography.  The  Council  advised  and  assisted 
the  President  in  carrying  out  his  responsibilities  under  the  Act,  These 
included  evaluation  of  Federal  marine  sciences  activities,  the  develop- 
ment of  a  comprehensive  program,  the  establishment  of  long-range 
studies,  coordination  of  a  program  of  international  cooperation,  and 
guidance  for  sea-grant-program  policies. 

The  staff  of  the  Council  was  composed  of  specialists  in  ocean 
sciences,  engineering,  national  security  affairs,  economics,  foreign  af- 
fairs, and  public  administration.  It  maintained  working  relations 
with  the  Congress,  key  officials  of  the  Executive  Office  of  the  Presi- 
dent, Federal  and  State  agencies,  industry,  the  academic  community, 
and  professional  societies  to  insure  that  considerations  affecting  all 
marine  science  interests  were  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  Council. 

COMMISSION  ON  MARINE  SCIENCE,  ENGINEERING,  AND  RESOURCES 

To  complement  the  role  of  the  Council,  the  Act  provided  for  an 
independent  advisory  Commission  on  Marine  Sciences,  Engineering, 
and  Resources.  The  Commission  was  made  up  of  15  members  from 
Federal  and  State  Governments,  industry,  laboratories  and  other 
marine  science  institutions.  Four  members  of  Congress  served  as  ad- 
visors to  the  Commission. 

The  Commission  was  charged  with  the  responsibility  to  "make  a 
comprehensive  investigation  and  study  of  all  aspects  of  marine  science 
in  order  to  recommend  an  overall  plan  for  an  adequate  national  ocean- 
ographic  program  that  will  meet  the  present  and  future  national 
needs."  The  findings  of  the  Commission  would  then  be  submitted  to 
the  President,  and  the  Council  would  assist  the  President  in  evaluating 
and  reviewing  the  Commission's  findings.  Thereafter,  the  Commission 
would  disband,  and  the  Council's  authority  would  be  terminated  120 
days  after  the  submission  of  the  Commission's  report. 

The  Commission's  report,  entitled  "Our  Nation  and  the  Sea",  was 
submitted  in  January  1969.  Some  of  its  recommendations  concerning 
international  affairs  in  the  marine  environment  will  be  discussed  later. 

COMMITTEE  ON  INTERNATIONAL  POLICY  IN  THE  MARINE 

ENVIRONMENT 

As  the  Marine  Council  began  to  coordinate  the  Federal  marine  af- 
fairs, it  created  several  committees  and  panels,  one  of  which  was  the 
Committee  on  International  Policy  in  the  Marine  Environment  (Fig. 
7).  This  committee  was  responsible  for  U.S.  foreign  policy  pertaining 
to  the  marine  environment ;  international  activities  and  initiatives  per- 
taining to  the  marine  environment,  including  cooperation  by  the 
United  States  with  other  nations  and  participation  in  international 
organizations  and  meetings.  The  committee,  chaired  by  the  Deputy 
Under  Secretary  of  State,  established  a  special  working  group 
to  handle  the  problem  of  the  U.N.  proposals  and  the  U.S.  position. 
This  working  group  consisted  of  representatives  from  the  Depart- 
ments of  State,  Interior,  Commerce,  Defense,  and  Transportation,  and 
the  National  Science  Foundation. 


498 


MRINE  SCIENCE  AFFAIRS  m  the  FEDERAL  fflmMEHT 


XtKMSiocur   ] JQfcJ       .--J 


TOE  CONGRESS 


PANEL  ON 

INTERNATIONAL 

LAW 


PANEL  ON 

DOMESTIC 

LAW 


aWMUMEDMgMJlCHMWefMSKYIKTl    QHM. THE  VICE PBESIDEM 


NATIONAL  COUNCIL 
ON  MARJNE  RESOURCES 
$EN&IME£RING  OEVEL'T 


!U 


(final  e&ver) 


r 


COMM  ON  INTERNATIONAL 
POLICY  IN  THE  MARINE  SCIENCES 
UOIFtDHliB  Kru/stcYsiAir 


PANEL  ON 
NATIONAL  SECURITY 


PANEL  ON 

US  RE6I0NAL 

fUlCIESt  PROGRAMS 


PANEL  ON 
INTERNATL  SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH*  EIPLOR/ 
EXPLOITATION  OF 
MINERAL  RESOURCES 


COMM  ON  OCEAN  EtfLORATlffl 
£  ENVIRONMENTAL  SERVICES 
am  k  t  v  j.-  :Tf  unin  essa 


COMM  ON  MARINE  RESEA- 
RCH.EDUCATIOMJFACILmES 

«<  re  e  s  toscu  u\'ud) 


PANEL  ON 
UVIH&  RESOURCES 


PANEL  ON 

OCEAN  ENGINEERS 


rl 


PANEL  ON 
POLUTION  IN  THE 

!0C£AN  ENVIRONMENT 


PANEL  ON 
EDUCATION 


PANEL  ON 
COOPEEATION  IN 

TOE  USE  OF  »)&'.',» 
SIBliS  t  OTHER 
AD'/A'ICEO  WIPER- 
WATER  TECHNOLOGY 


SUB  PANEL  ON 
FACILITIES 


I 


COUll  ON  MULTIPLE 
USES  OF  COAST!  ME 


T_ 


C0.VM  ON  TOO 
FROM  THE  SEA 
QUI  u  J  w/gtB,AID 


PANEL  ON 
RESEARCH 


PANEL  ON  IHTERNATl 

FEOSUMS*  INTERNA!! 

COOPERATIVE 

0R6ANIZAT10NS 


JOINT  PANEL 
CMREF/lCAS 
ON  AIR  SEA 
INTERACTION 


SUS  PAN  EL  ON 
SCIENTIFIC  RESEA'H 


X 


SUB  PANELON 
EXPIOR/EXPIOIT 


PRESIDENTS  COMMISSION 
OH  MAM  SCIENCE. 

INGNEW*  SOURCES 


INTERNATIO.VAL 

ASPECTS  OF  MARINE 

AFFAIRS 


BASIC  SCIENCE 
i  EESEARCH 


MARINE  ENGINEERING 
i  TECHN0LO6Y 


■{MARINE  RESOURCES  | 


ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROBLEMS 


INDUSTRIAL  i 
PRIVATE  DEVELDPWEXT 


EDUCATION  I 
TEAMING 


Figure  7. — Organizational  chart  showing  the  relationships  within  the 
Federal  Government  for  decisionmaking  in  marine  affairs  (1967). 


INTERAGENCY    LAW-OF-THE-SEA    TASK    FORCE 

One  of  the  major  recommendations  presented  in  the  Marine  Com- 
mission's report  called  for  the  establishment  of  a  Federal  agency  to 
unify  the  national  effort  in  marine  affairs,  and  a  non-Federal  body 
called  the  National  Advisory  Committee  on  the  Oceans  and  Atmos- 
phere (NACOA). 

While  the  Executive  Branch  was  weighing  these  recommendations, 
the  Congress  extended  the  life  of  the  Council  to  preserve  its  coordinat- 
ing functions.  In  October  1970,  the  National  Oceanic  and  Atmospheric 
Administration  (NOAA)  was  established  in  the  Department  of  Com- 
merce, but  NOAA  did  not  receive  as  wide  a  range  of  functions  as  the 
Commission  recommended.  Still  pending  are  bills  in  both  the  House 
and  the  Senate  to  establish  the  other  body — NACOA.  And  although 
numerous  ocean  activities  remained  outside  the  NOAA  which  would 
require  coordination  functions  similar  to  those  the  Council  had  been 

Serforming,  the  Council  was  not  funded  for  1971  and  is  considered 
efunct.  Its  Committee  on  International  Policy  in  the  Marine  Environ- 
ment had  not  functioned  during  1970,  and  a  new  body  was  formed  to 
take  its  place. 

The  new  body  is  now  the  only  policy  apparatus  responsible  for  form- 
ulating the  U.S.  position  regarding  international  marine  affairs  and 
seabed  resources.  It  is  called  the  Interagency  Law-of-the-Sea  Task 
Force,  under  the  chairmanship  of  the  Legal  Adviser  of  the  Department 
of  State  (now  John  R.  Stevenson).  Its  members  include  representa- 
t  ives  from  the  Departments  of  Stat*',  Commerce,  Interior,  Transporta- 
tion, and  Justice;  and  the  National  Science  Foundation  and  the  Na- 
tional Security  Council. 


499 


THE    NATIONAL    ACADEMIES 


Outside  the  Federal  structure,  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences 
(NAS)  and  the  National  Academy  of  Engineering  (NAE),  through 
their  committees  on  oceanography  and  ocean  engineering,  respectively, 
have  served  as  a  source  of  scientific  advice  to  Government  agencies  on 
ocean  affairs.  Toward  the  end  of  1970,  the  two  Academies  reorganized 
their  ocean  policy  structures,  raising  them  to  the  board  level.  The 
National  Academy  of  Sciences'  Ocean  Affairs  Board  became  admin- 
istratively lodged  in  the  National  Research  Council's  Division  of 
Earth  Sciences,  replacing  the  Committee  on  Oceanography,  and  the 
National  Academy  of  Engineering  redesignated  its  Committee  on 
Ocean  Engineering  as  the  NAE  Marine  Board.  The  NAS  board  is 
concerned  primarily  with  science-related  ocean  problems,  and  NAE 
board  with  engineering-related  problems.  Appointees  from  both 
boards  make  up  a  new  ad  hoc  NAS-NAE  ocean  affairs  planning  group 
to  coordinate  ocean  studies  and  advisory  services  of  both  boards. 

The  NAS  Ocean  Science  Affairs  Board  focuses  on  at  least  three 
areas :  Ocean  sciences,  ocean  resources,  and  international  marine  sci- 
ence affairs  policy.  In  addition,  the  Board  serves  as  the  U.S.  Com- 
mittee for  the  Scientific  Committee  on  Oceanic  Research  of  the  Inter- 
national Council  of  Scientific  Unions. 

The  NAE  Marine  Board  comprises  panels  which  cover  such  func- 
tional engineering  areas  as  transportation,  construction,  resource  de- 
velopment, and  instrumentation.  It  serves  as  the  U.S.  committee 
for  the  Engineering  Committee  on  Oceanic  Resources,  now  affiliated 
with  the  World  Federation  of  Engineering  Organizations.80 

Formulation  of  U.S.  Policy  for  the  Seabed 

LEGISLATIVE  CONCERN  IN  THE  9  0TH  CONGRESS 

Reaction  in  the  90th  Congress  to  the  Malta  proposal  was  immediate 
in  the  face  of  imminent  and  possibly  hasty  action  by  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly.  About  three  dozen  resolutions  were  introduced  in  the  House 
and  the  Senate,  mostly  in  opposition  to  vesting  control  over  the 
deep  ocean  resources  in  the  United  Nations.  House  resolutions  were 
for  the  most  part  identical,  expressing  the  sense  of  Congress  that  any 
action  at  that  time  to  vest  control  of  deep  ocean  resources  in  an  inter- 
national body  was  premature  and  ill  advised,  and  that  the  Congress 
should  memorialize  the  President  to  instruct  the  American  represent- 
atives to  the  United  Nations  to  oppose  any  action  to  vest  in  the  United 
Nations  control  of  the  resources  of  the  deep  sea  beyond  the  continental 
shelves  of  the  United  States. 

Hearings  were  held  in  the  House  by  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, Subcommittee  on  International  Organizations  and  Movements, 
in  September  and  October  1967,  and  jointly  with  the  Subcommittee  on 
Oceanography  of  the  House  Committee  on  Merchant  Marine  and 
Fisheries  in  June  and  July  1968.81  In  the  Senate,  the  Committee  on 

80News  Report,  National  Academy  of  Sciences,  National  Research  Council,  National 
Academy  of  Engineering.  (Vol.  XX,  No.  9.  November  1970.) 

81  U.S.  Congress.  House.  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs.  "The  United  Nations  and  the 
Issue  of  Deep  Ocean  Resources  ;  interim  report  together  with  hearings."  Held  by  the  Sub- 
committee on  International  Organizations  and  Movements  of  the  *  *  *  on  H.J.  Res.  816 
and  companion  resolutions.  Sept.  22,  Oct.  10.  19,  25,  and  31.  1967.  90th  Cong.,  first  sess. 
H.  Rept.  No.  999.   (Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,   1967),   289  pages. 


500 


Foreign  Relations  held  hearings  on  Senate  resolutions  submitted  in 
support  of  international  control.82 

House  Support  for  the  Malta  Proposal 

Witnesses  testifying  in  the  House  included  several  Members  of  Con- 
gress in  support  of  their  own  resolutions,  representatives  of  Federal 
agencies  directly  involved  with  the  U.N.  issue,  and  several  representa- 
tives of  private,  legal,  and  industrial  organizations.83  The  Subcom- 
mittee on  International  Organizations  and  Movements  addressed  itself 
to  the  wording  of  the  resolutions;  the  procedures  used  in  arriving  at 
the  U.S.  Government's  position  on  the  pending  legislation  and  the 
Malta  proposal;  the  operational  marine  programs  of  various  U.S. 
agencies;  and  to  the  complex  legal,  political,  and  economic  considera- 
tions involved  in  this  legislation. 

A  number  of  witnesses  who  favored  the  Malta  proposal  identified 
advantages  that  might  be  derived  from  international  control,  such 
as :  regulation  of  the  depletion  of  mineral  resources ;  avoidance  of  an 
anarchic  rush  to  claim  and  exploit  subsea  reasources;  reduced  danger 
of  marine  pollution  (through  proper  international  control)  ;  re- 
duced threat  of  a  military  race  to  exploit  strategic  advantages  of 
submarine  weapons  placement;  provision  of  an  independent  income 
for  the  United  Nations;  and  a  general  strengthening  and  maturity  in 
the  U.N.  itself,  through  the  experience  of  administering  the  vast 
area  of  the  ocean  floor. 

Proposal  for  U.N.  Marine  Resources  Agency 

All  the  advantages  mentioned  above  could  be  provided  through  a 
specialized  agency  like  a  U.N.  Marine  Resources  Agency.  This  agency 
would  "hold  ownei-ship  rights  and  grant,  lease,  or  use  these  rights  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  of  economic  efficiency  and  the  well- 
being  of  mankind.  It  should  distribute  the  returns  from  such  exploita- 
tion in  accordance  with  the  directives  issued  by  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly."  84 

Concerning  the  establishment  of  an  international  or  U.N.  agency, 
the  Department  of  the  Interior  pointed  out  that  the  result  would  be 
something  comparable  to  what  already  exists  in  the  Food  and  Agri- 
culture Organization  and  to  some  extent  in  other  organizations  like 
UNESCO  (see  Fig.  7).  The  agency  would  have  responsibility  for 
coordinating  exploration  and  research  in  the  oceans  along  the  same 
lines  as  these  other  organizations;  so  that  there  would  not  be  anything 
new  and  different  about  it.  By  analogy  with  agricultural  research,  it 
was  suggested  that  multinational  programs  tend  to  disseminate  useful 
results  more  globally  than  do  single-nation  or  bilateral  research 
programs. 

U.N.  agencies  have  primarily  directed  their  attention  to  problems 
of  nations  which  have  a  low  technical  capacity  of  their  own  to  carry 


83  lis.  Congress,  Senate.  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  "Governing  the  Use  of  Ocean 
Spar,.."  Hearings  on  S.J.  Res.  in.  S.  Res.  172,  and  S.  Res.  196.  Held  Nov.  29.  I9f>7.  90th 
Cong.,  first  Bess.    (Washington,   U.S    Government   erinting  Office,  1967),  71   pares. 

MU.S,  Congress.  House,  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs.  "The  Oceans:  A  Challenginc 
New  Frontier;  a  report  together  with  hearings  and  additional  documents  and  materials." 
By  Subcommittee  on  International  Organizations  and  Movements.  Hearings  held  June  12, 
July  '2~>.  1968.  noth  Cong,  second  Bess.  H.  Kept.  No.  1957.  (Washington,  U.S.  Government 
rrintlng  Office.  1968).  128  pages. 

84  "The  United  Nations  and  the  Issue  of  Deep  Ocean  Resources  •   *   *,"  op.  cit.,  page  5. 


501 


on  research.  The  agencies  are  also  able  to  direct  collective  attention 
to  the  acquisition  of  information  which  would  help  answTer  interna- 
tional problems  of  resources  management.  Those  activities  do  not 
lessen  the  need  for  any  nation  to  carry  on  research  activities  in  its 
own  interests. 

Support  and  Opposition  in  the  Senate 

Although  the  majority  of  House  resolutions  opposed  this  approach, 
the  Senate  resolutions  introduced  by  Senator  Claiborne  Pell  were 
strongly  in  favor  of  international  cooperation,  including  a  "Declara- 
tion of  Legal  Principles  Governing  Activities  of  States  in  the  Explora- 
tion and  Exploitation  of  Ocean  Space."  85 

Hearings  were  held  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Re- 
lations on  S.J.  Res.  Ill,  172,  and  186.86  S.J.  Res.  Ill  was  identical  to  the 
House  resolutions  opposing  the  Malta  proposal.  It  was  described  as 
overstating  the  immediacy  of  the  problem  by  addressing  itself  to  a 
danger  which  was  not  present.  The  sponsor  of  the  bill,  Senator  Norris 
Cotton,  had  no  objection  to  the  United  Nations  plowing  the  ground 
and  preparing  the  way  in  this  matter  of  jurisdiction  over  the  riches 
of  the  sea.  He  said  he  wished  Congress  to  become  accessory  before  the 
fact  and  not  just  after  the  fact : 

As  to  the  form  of  my  resolution  [he  said],  I  would  say  very  frankly  to  the 
committee,  that  the  first  draft  of  this  resolution  was  prepared  for  me  by  repre- 
sentatives of  the  National  Oceanographic  Association.  As  far  as  I  am  concerned, 
this  matter  in  my  resolution  of  directing  the  American  representatives  in  the 
United  Nations  to  oppose  action  or  to  take  any  particular  attitude,  I  think, 
might  well  be  deleted.67 

Reasons  for  Opposition 

The  objections  to  any  U.N.  action  stemmed  primarily  from  fears  that 
the  United  States  might  be  giving  away  some  valuable  assets  and 
rights  the  extent  of  which  were  not  yet  known.  A  hasty  action  to 
relinquish  these  rights  to  the  United  Nations  was  deemed  inadvisable. 

Some  Members  of  Congress  considered  the  United  Nations  unquali- 
fied to  assume  such  broad  responsibilities.88  Scientific  exploration, 
claimed  some,  could  be  seriously  hampered  by  a  premature  definition 
of  political  jurisdiction.  The  issue  of  national  security  was  also  in- 
voked as  an  objection  to  any  action  that  might  not  be  compatible  with 
the  military  programs  of  the  United  States.  One  Member,  Representa- 
tive Paul  Rogers  of  Florida,  urged  that  for  exploitation  purposes  the 
United  States  should  have  the  right  to  occupy  the  ocean  floor  to  the 
Mid-Atlantic  Ridge  and  assume  the  responsibility  to  defend  it. 

The  objections  finally  boiled  down  to  the  timing  of  a  move  to  deter- 
mine where  sovereignty  lay  or  to  effect  a  transfer  of  sovereignty  to  the 
United  Nations.  There  were  also  certain  misgivings  expressed  about 
the  validity  of  existing  definitions  of  the  continental  shelf,  and  a  desire 


85  U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  Committee  on  Commerce.  "Special  Study  on  United  Nations 
Suboceanic  Lands  Policy."  Hearings  held  Sept.  23,  24,  Oct.  3,  and  Nov.  21,  1969  91st 
Cong.,  first  sess.    (Washington,  U.S.   Government  Printing  Office,   1970). 

88  "Governing  the  Use  of  Ocean  Space,"  hearings,  op.  cit. 

87  "Special  Study  on  United  Nations  Suboceanic  Lands  Policy,"  hearings,  op.  cit. 

**  Representative  H.  R.  Gross  stated  :  "Of  course,  I  don't  think  the  United  Nations  stands 
for  much  of  anything.  It  never  has  and  probably  never  will,  and  that  is  one  of  the  reasons 
Yv.  y  £  d.on't  want  t0  sep  anv  authority  in  this  matter  vested  in  the  United  Nations."  "In 
the    Lmted   Nations   and   the   Issue   of   Deep   Ocean    Resources.''    Op.    cit,    p     100 


502 


to  clarify  and  review  these  definitions  before  any  final  actions  were 
contemplated. 

Congressman  Alton  Lennon,  Chairman  of  the  Subcommittee  on 
Oceanography,  reminded  the  Congress  that  studies  were  being  con- 
ducted by  the  Marine  Council  and  the  Commission  on  the  best  solu- 
tion for  controlling  the  exploitation  of  mineral  resources  from  the 
continental  shelves.  Consequently,  he  said,  it  was  in  the  national  inter- 
est to  wait  for  these  studies  to  be  completed  "as  keenest  minds  available 
in  international  law  and  marine  science  study  all  aspects  of  this  com- 
plex problem  in  the  hope  that  an  equitable  solution  can  be  resolved  for 
all  nations." 89 

LEGISLATIVE   CONCERN   IN  THE   9 1ST   CONGRESS 

As  the  91st  Congress  convened,  it  had  before  it  "Our  Nation  and  the 
Sea" — the  report  of  the  Commission  on  Marine  Science,  Engineering, 
and  Resources  presented  to  the  President  and  to  Congress  on  Janu- 
ary 9,  1969.90  This  report  recognized  the  inadequacy  of  the  present 
framework  for  the  continental  shelf  and  the  seabed  beyond.  It  recom- 
mended a  precise  definition  of  the  continental  shelf — a  limit  of  each 
coastal  nation  to  be  fixed  at  the  200-meter  isobath,  or  50  nautical  miles 
from  the  baseline  for  measuring  the  breadth  of  the  territorial  sea, 
whichever  alternative  gave  it  the  greater  area.  For  the  seabed  beyond 
these  limits,  the  Commission  proposed  a  new  international  legal-polit- 
ical framework  for  exploration  and  exploitation  of  the  mineral  re- 
sources underlying  the  deep  seas.  It  proposed  further  the  establish- 
ment of  an  International  Registry  Authority,  and  an  intermediate 
zone  between  the  limits  of  the  continental  shelf  and  the  deep-sea  area. 
The  intermediate  zone  would  begin  at  the  200-meter  isobath  (or  50 
nautical  miles  from  the  coast)  seaward  to  the  2.500-meter  isobath  (or 
100  nautical  miles,  whichever  was  farther  from  shore) .  The  report  pro- 
posed policy  guidelines  and  goals  for  the  United  States  to  follow  in 
considering  the  needs  to  implement  these  recommendations. 

The  recommendations,  the  activities  of  nations  on  the  U.N.  Sea- 
bed Committee,  and  an  executive  branch  proposal  concerning  the  sea- 
bed submitted  on  August  3,  1970,  raised  a  series  of  questions  which 
became  the  focus  of  attention  by  the  91st  Congress.  What  were  the 
limits  of  the  continental  shelf?  Should  the  limit  be  geological  or  legal? 
Should  it  be.  based  on  considerations  of  equity,  security,  or  economic 
advantage?  How  much  did  the  United  States  stand  to  lose  by  the 
creation  of  an  international  regime?  Was  a  new  Law  of  the  Sea  Con- 
ference necessary?  Should  the  states  have  a  narrow  or  a  wide  conti- 
nental shelf?  For  areas  beyond  the  continental  shelf,  what  sort  of  an 
international  regime  would  be  best?  What  principles  should  be 
adopted?  What  kind  of  international  machinery  should  be  estab- 
lished? How  did  all  these  aspects  affect  the  economy  and  national 
security  of  t  he  I  'nited  States? 

A  series  of  hearings  in  the  Senate  sought  the  answers  to  those  ques- 
tions. The.  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  Subcommittee  on  Ocean 
Space,  chaired  by  Senator  Claiborne  Pell,  heard  testimony  on  his  S. 


•  "The  United  Nations  and  the  Issue  of  Deep  Ocpnn  Resources  *  *  *."  op.  cit.,  page  08. 

m  Commission  on  Murine  Science,  Engineering,  and  Resources.  "Our  Nation  and  the  So&." 
Report  of  the  Commission  on  Marine  Science,  Engineering,  and  Resources.  (Washington, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  January  1069.) 


503 


Res.  33,  which  proposed  basic  principles  to  govern  the  development 
and  utilization  of  the  ocean  space  environment.91 

The  Committee  on  Commerce  also  held  hearings  through  its  Special 
Study  on  United  Nations  Suboceanic  Lands  Policy,  chaired  by  Sena- 
tor Ernest  F.  Hollings.  This  study  group  was  formed  in  July  1969  for 
"*  *  *  the  purpose  of  considering  the  policy  which  the  United  States 
should  advocate  within  the  United  Nations  when  that  organization 
considers  the  ground  rules  which  should  apply  to  those  nations  which 
desire  to  exploit  the  resources  of  the  deep  oceans."  92  The  hearings  were 
intended  to  enable  the  Committee  to  make  recommendations  to  Senator 
Pell's  Subcommittee  and  to  the  Senate.  Senator  Pell's  Subcommittee 
members  and  members  of  the  newly  formed  Special  Subcommittee  on 
Outer  Continental  Shelf,  Committee  on  Interior  and  Insular  Affairs, 
were  invited  to  participate.  Similar  participation  took  place  when  the 
Special  Subcommittee  on  Outer  Continental  Shelf  held  its  hearings,93 
chaired  by  Senator  Lee  Metcalf . 

The  intent  of  the  three  sets  of  hearings  was  similar,  and  most  of  the 
witnesses  testified  on  the  same  subject  before  more  than  one  subcom- 
mittee. The  Metcalf  Subcommittee  in  particular  compiled  a  volumi- 
nous record  of  statements  by  representatives  of  the  Departments  of 
State,  Defense,  Commerce,  Interior,  Transportation,  the  scientific  and 
industrial  sectors,  and  numerous  distinguished  international  lawyers. 
The  subject  matter  included  legal  and  political  aspects  of  the  defini- 
tion of  the  continental  shelf  boundaries,  the  economic  and  conserva- 
tion aspects  related  to  alternative  boundary  locations,  comments  on 
the  moratorium  resolution  and  the  interim  policy  for  the  seabed,  and 
the  position  of  the  Executive  Branch  regarding  all  these  aspects.  The 
hearings  were  followed  by  a  painstaking  and  thorough  analysis  of 
findings  in  a  subcommittee  report  which  is  discussed  below.  The  hear- 
ings of  Senator  Hollings'  Special  Study  on  United  Nations  Sub- 
oceanic  Lands  Policy  and  those  of  Senator  Pell's  Subcommittee  on 
Ocean  Space  were  less  comprehensive  and  did  not  result  in  position 
papers.  Senator  Pell  took  the  same  position  as  he  had  during  the  90th 
Congress  and  in  testimony  before  the  Metcalf  Subcommittee. 

Senator  PelVs  Proposals 

In  his  Senate  Resolution  33,  Senator  Pell  submitted  a  "Declaration 
of  legal  principles  governing  activities  of  states  in  the  exploration 
and  exploitation  of  ocean  space."  These  principles  called  for  the  use 
of  the  seabed  and  subsoil  for  peaceful  purposes  only,  under  licenses 
issued  by  a  technically  competent  licensing  authority  to  be  designated 
by  the  United  Nations ;  regulations  on  the  disposal  of  radioactive  waste 
material  in  ocean  space;  the  establishment  of  a  Sea  Guard^ under  the 
control  of  the  U.N.  Security  Council ;  and  a  definition  of  limits  of 
the  continental  shelves. 

Although  Senator  Pell,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Metcalf  Subcom- 
mittee, upheld  the  recommendations  made  by  the  Marine  Commission, 

91  "Governing  the  Use  of  Ocean  Space."  hearings,  op.  cit. 

92  "Special  Study  on  United  Nations  Suboceanic  Lands  Policy,"  hearings,  op.  cit. 

93  U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  Committee  on  Interior  and  Insular  Affairs.  "Outer  Continental 
Shelf."  Hearings  by  Special  Subcommittee  on  Outer  Continental  Shelf.  Parts  1,  2,  and  3, 
1969  and  1970.  91st  Congress,  first  and  second  sessions.  (Washington,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  1970).  (Part  3  contains  the  hearings  continued  by  the  Subcommittee  on 
Minerals,  Materials,  and  Fuels  on  the  same  subject.) 


504 

the  limits  of  the  continental  shelf  proposed  in  his  resolution  differed 
from  those  proposed  by  the  Commission.  He  preferred  the  550  meter 
isobath  or  a  distance  of  50  nautical  miles  from  the  baselines  used  to 
measure  the  breadth  of  the  territorial  sea,  whichever  gave  the  coastal 
state  a  greater  area  offshore  for  purposes  of  mineral  resources  exploita- 
tion. "I  selected  the  550-meter  figure,"  he  testified,  "on  the  basis  that 
the  edge  of  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf  is  not  known  to  occur  at  any 
greater  depth."  94  In  effect  this  isobath  encompasses  the  topographic 
configuration  of  most  of  the  world's  shelves,  to  the  greatest  depth, 
rather  than  to  the  average  depth  of  200  meters.  Mr.  Pell  made  a  dis- 
tinction between  the  "continental  terrace"  and  the  "continental  shelf," 
that  differed  from  the  position  of  the  oil  industry  of  equating  the  two. 

And  here,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  mnst  emphasize  the  shell  game  in  which,  I  believe, 
the  oil  industry  has  been  engaged  in  the  past  few  years :  when  you  and  I  went  to 
school,  continental  shelf  meant  that  portion  of  the  submerged  continental  land 
mass  that  is  in  relatively  shallow  water  and  terminates  at  the  beginning  of  the 
continental  slope.  The  oil  industry  has  thrown  up  a  smoke  screen  by  trying  to 
equate  the  continental  shelf  with  the  continental  terrace  concept,  which  includes 
the  slope.95 

On  how  wide  the  national  jurisdiction  of  a  state  should  be  offshore, 
Mr.  Pell  favored  the  narrowest  possible  zone.  If  the  United  States 
claimed  a  certain  width,  he  argued,  it  should  be  assumed  that  other 
nations  would  do  likewise.  "Thus  the  larger  the  offshore  zone  we  con- 
template bringing  under  our  national  jurisdiction  means  that  on 
balance  we  are  closing  off  a  much  larger  zone  worldwide,  assuming  as 
we  must  that  other  states  would  be  entitled  to  claim  a  similar  area."  96 

Later  in  1970,  Senator  Pell  reiterated  his  support  for  the  early 
achievement  of  an  international  legal  order  in  the  ocean  floor  in  his 
comments  on  the  President's  proposal  for  a  seabed  regime : 

I  bring  up  this  point,  Mr.  President,  merely  to  show  how  an  issue  as  important 
as  nuclear  arms  control  can  suffer  because  of  the  chaos  nations  have  made  of 
the  law  of  sea  ;  and  here  I  should  point  out  that  in  earlier  years  the  United  States 
has  been  just  as  guilty  in  helping  to  create  this  sad  state  of  affairs  as  Chile  and 
Ecuador  or,  more  recently,  Brazil  and  Canada. 

But  we  now  understand  the  error  of  our  ways,  and  I  am  convinced  that  the 
policy  initiatives  which  this  administration  has  taken  in  trying  to  bring  about  a 
meaningful  legal  order  of  the  oceans  deserve  the  full  support  of  everv  Member  of 
this  Chamber.07 

Position  of  the  Subcommittee  on  Outer  Continental  Shelf 

A  systematic  analysis  of  the  hearings  was  presented  in  the  Metcalf 
Subcommittee's  report  to  the  Committee  on  Interior  and  Insular 
Affairs.  o;  The  Subcommittee  considered  the  1958  Geneva  Convention 
validly  operative,  and  saw  no  need  to  convene  another  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference.  It  also  considered  the  geological  interpretation  of  the 
continental  margin  as  making  that  portion  of  the  seabed  essentially 
property  of  the  United  States.  The  Subcommittee  further  indicated 
its  preference  for  the  exploitability  clause  in  the  Convention  which 

B»  Ibid.,  page  380. 

03  Ibid.,  page  395. 

"•Ibid.,  page  300. 

97  Claiborne  Pell.  "Harrinp  of  nuclear  weapons  from  the  seabed  and  ocean  floor."  State- 
ment of  the  Hon.  Claiborne  Pell  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate.  Congressional  Record  (Septem- 
ber 10.  1970),  page  S  15616. 

m  U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  Committee  on  Interior  and  Insular  Affairs.  "Outer  Continental 
Shelf."  Report  by  the  Special  Subcommittee  on  Outer  Continental  Shelf.  91st  Congress, 
second  session.  December  21,  1970.   (Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1971). 


505 


expands  the  limits  of  the  shelf  depending  on  the  technological  capa- 
bility to  exploit  in  deeper  waters — the  principle  of  expanding 
boundaries. 

The  Subcommittee  first  asserted  its  jurisdiction  over  policy  issues 
affecting  the  continental  shelf  of  the  United  States.  It  cited  the  Interior 
Committee's  work  on  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf  Lands  Act  and  the 
Submerged  Lands  Act  of  1953,  giving  it  the  responsibility  for  legisla- 
tive oversight  of  operations  under  that  law  and  any  subsequent  amend- 
ments of  these  Acts.  Assuming  that  the  shelf  was  an  integral  part  of 
the  continental  United  States,  and  interpreting  the  Constitution  (Art. 
IV,  sec.  3,  cl.  2)  concerning  this  issue,  the  Subcommittee  declared  that 
any  modification  of  the  property  rights  of  the  United  States  created 
by  or  reaffirmed  in  these  Acts  would  require  an  Act  of  Congress. 

The  Subcommittee  adopted  the  interpretation  agreed  upon  by  the 
American  Branch  of  the  International  Law  Association  that  "right 
[i.e.,  sovereignty]  under  the  1958  Geneva  Convention  on  the  Con- 
tinental Shelf  [should]  extend  to  the  limit  of  exploitability  existing 
at  any  given  time  within  an  ultimate  limit  of  adjacency  which  would 
encompass  the  entire  continental  margin."  "  The  Subcommittee  sup- 
ported the  objectives  calling  for  a  stable  system  of  law  applying  to  the 
deep  seabed  and  assurance  of  the  continued  freedom  for  scientific 
research ;  however,  it  also  held  that — 

*  *  *  undisputed  access  to  the  vast  energy  resource  [oil,  in  particular]  located 
on  the  U.S.  continental  margin  is  of  paramount  importance.  Oil  is  a  strategic  mate- 
rial which  is  absolutely  essential  to  fuel  our  industrial  machine  and  thereby  sus- 
tain a  sound  economy.100 

As  to  the  boundary  limits  of  the  shelf,  the  Subcommittee  argued 
against  a  narrow  shelf  and  the  premise  of  upholding  the  freedom  of 
the  seas  through  larger  internationally-controlled  ocean  space.  It 
upheld  the  Geneva  Convention  as  "*  *  *  sufficiently  precise  as  to  per- 
mit a  positive,  reliable,  and  adequate  interpretation  of  the  breadth  of 
the  legal  shelf."  It  also  interpreted  the  Convention  to  hold  that  "the 
sovereign  rights  of  coastal  nations  to  explore  and  exploit  their  legal 
Continental  Shelf  extend  to  the  limit  of  exploitability  existing  at  any 
given  time  within  an  ultimate  limit  of  adjacency  which  encompasses  the 
entire  continental  margin."  101  Furthermore,  it  contended  that  the 
drafters  of  the  Convention  had  limited  the  jurisdictional  claims  to  the 
natural  resources  of  the  submerged  land  in  order  to  preclude  any 
abrogation  of  the  high  seas  freedom.  Hence,  the  expanding  boundary 
concept  was  "*  *  *  consistent  with  the  intent  of  the  Convention's 
drafters  as  it  is  an  additional  means  of  prohibiting  jurisdictional 
claims  not  related  to  the  exploration  and  exploitation  of  the  natural 
resources  of  the  submerged  land  continent."  102 

On  the  new  policy  statement  submitted  by  the  President  in  May 
1970,  calling  for  a  seabed  treaty,  an  international  authority,  and  the 
renunciation  of  sovereign  rights  of  all  nations  beyond  the  200-meter 
isobath,  the  Subcommittee  endorsed  the  general  features  of  the  pro- 
posal. However,  it  had  objections  to  the  renunciation  of  "the  heart  of 
our  sovereign  rights,"  particularly  relative  to  the  continental  margin. 


89  Ibid.,  page  3. 

100  Ibid.,  page  5. 

101  Ibid.,  page  16. 

103  Ibid.,  pages  16-17. 


506 


For  the  United  States  [asserted  the  Subcommittee],  or  any  other  law-abiding 
naltion  to  offer  to  renounce  its  inherent  sovereign  rights  to  the  mineral  estate 
of  its  continental  margin  in  the  hope  that  these  few  recalcitrant  nations  would 
mend  their  ways  and  begin  to  adhere  to  the  freedom  of  the  seas  doctrine  is  like 
offering  to  pay  ransom  to  bandits  in  order  to  encourage  them  to  stop  stealing. 
When  bandits* receive  ransom,  they  only  grab  for  more.  Thus,  to  renounce  what 
constitutes  the  heart  of  our  sovereign  rights  in  response  to  illegal  demands  by 
a  handful  of  nations  can  only  encourage  greater  violation  of  the  freedom  of  the 
seas  doctrine.103 

On  resources  of  the  seabed  beyond  the  continental  margin,  the  Sub- 
committee shared  with  the  President  the  desire  that  such  ocean  re- 
sources be  used  rationally  and  equitably  for  the  benefit  of  mankind. 
However,  prior  to  the  adoption  of  a  seabed  treaty,  cautioned  the  Sub- 
committee, "the  U.S.  Government  should  provide  measures  designed 
to  insure  protection  of  investors  who  desire  to  exercise  present  high 
seas  rights  to  explore  and  exploit  the  wealth  of  the  deep  seabed  be- 
yond the  limits  of  the  submerged  land  continent,"  104 

The  Subcommittee  concluded  that  the  major  tasks  to  be  considered 
in  the  92d  Congress  were : 

1.  A  continuing  extensive  review  of  the  working  paper  intro- 
duced by  the  U.S.  delegation  at  the  August  [1970]  session  of  the 
United  Nations  Seabed  Committee  with  a  view  toward  seeking 
modifications  of  it  to  conform  to  our  interpretation  of  the  Presi- 
dent's intent  and  with  our  recommendations  outl ined  above. 

2.  An  investigation  of  the  special  problem  of  an  interim  policy 
which  would  insure  continued  exploration  and  exploitation  of  the 
natural  resources  of  our  continental  margin  under  present  law ; 
and  would  establish  appropriate  protection  for  investments  re- 
lated to  mineral  recovery  by  U.S.  nationals  in  areas  of  the  deep 
seabed  beyond  the  limits  of  exclusive  national  jurisdiction.105 

POSITION    OF   THE   EXECUTIVE   BRANCH 

In  the  section  of  this  study  that  discussed  the  Continental  Shelf, 
it  was  shown  that  U.S.  policy  on  ocean  resources  began  in  earnest  with 
the  Truman  Proclamation  of  1945.  The  proclamation  was  designed 
primarily  to  provide  a  policy  and  legal  framework  for  regulating 
offshore  operations  of  the  U.S.  petroleum  industry.  When  viewed 
in  the  perspective  of  international  legal  concepts  and  the  world's 
technological  capabilities  at  that  time,  the  Truman  Proclamation 
might  have  been  considered  unnecessary.  Ocean  technology  was  then 
almost  exclusively  possessed  by  the  United  States,  and  no  other  nation 
had  the  technical  capability  to  exploit  the  resources  of  the  U.S. 
continental  shelf.  The  Proclamation  had  the  effect  of  stimulating 
proclamations  by  other  countries,  such  as  the  Declaration  of  Santiago 
in  L952,  whereby  national  sovereignty  and  jurisdiction  were  extended 
out  to  200  miles  offshore.  Thus,  the'Truman  Proclamation  could  be 
taken  as  the  beginning  of  legal  chaos  in  international  maritime 
affairs,  which  has  persisted  to  date  despite  the  efforts  made  at  the 
19.r>s  ( reneva  Conventions. 

Experience  pointed  to  the  conclusion  that  unilateral  action — perhaps 
accompanied  by  a  scramble  to  stake  out  national  claims  to  the  "riches 


•Mlbid.,  page  30. 
1M  Ibid.,  page  32. 
'« Ibid.,  page  33. 


507 


of  the  sea" — have  the  effect  of  eroding  the  freedom  of  the  seas  and 
prove  a  practical  detriment  to  the  world  community  at  large.  Presi- 
dent Johnson,  in  his  "Washington  Navy  Yard  speech  had  warned  of 
precisely  this  consequence  of  the  "race  to  grab  and  to  hold"  and  had 
called  instead  for  their  preservation  as  a  "legacy  of  all  human 
beings."  106 

This  statement  set  the  course  for  the  position  taken  by  the  United 
States  during  deliberations  following  the  Malta  proposal.  Testifying 
before  the  90th  Congress,  spokesmen  of  the  Departments  of  Interior 
and  State  had  generally  affirmed  that  in  dealing  with  areas  beyond 
the  jurisdiction  of  national  states,  i.e.,  beyond  the  continental  shelf, 
regardless  of  its  definition,  the  United  Nations  should,  logically,  be 
concerned  with  the  subject.  The  United  States  was  in  the  process  of 
developing  its  own  policy  objectives  through  the  Marine  Resources 
Act  of  1966 ;  consequently,  no  support  was  contemplated  for  tlie  treaty 
envisaged  by  Malta. 

Fears  of  hasty  action  were  allayed  by  the  State  Department's 
expression  of  doubt  that  the  General  Assembly  could  get  very  far 
with  a  proposal  of  this  specificity  on  such  short  notice.  It  was  pointed 
out  that  there  would  have  to  be  a  process  of  study  through  commit- 
tees and  specialists,  and  the  deliberative  process  in  the  United  Nations 
tends  to  be  lengthy. 

On  September  21,  1967,  the  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  United  Nations 
supported  the  inscription  of  the  Malta  proposal  on  the  agenda  of  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly  and  asserted  that  the  United  Nations  was  in 
a  position  to  assume  leadership  in  enlisting  the  peaceful  cooperation 
of  all  nations  in  developing  the  world's  oceans  and  their  resources. 

Following  establishment  of  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee  in  December 
1967,  the  United  States  participated  in  its  deliberations  and  on  June 
28,  1968.  submitted  a  number  of  proposals  including  a  draft  resolution 
containing  («.)  a  declaration  of  principles  on  the  use  of  the  deep  ocean 
floor;  (b)  a  draft  resolution  referring  to  the  Eighteen-Nation  Dis- 
armament Committee  (ENDC)  the  question  of  arms  limitations  on 
the  seabed  and  ocean  floor  with  a  view  to  defining  these  factors  vital 
to  a  workable,  verifiable,  and  effective  international  agreement  which 
would  prevent  the  use  of  this  new  environment  for  the  emplacement 
of  weapons  of  mass  destruction;  and  (c)  a  suggestion  to  establish  in- 
ternational marine  preserves. 

The  United  States  also  supported  a  less  extensive  declaration  of 
principles  submitted  by  a  number  of  delegations.  These  principles 
differed  from  previous  U.S.  positions  in  that  the  United  States  came 
to  recognize  the  "interest  of  the  international  community  in  the  devel- 
opment of  deep  ocean  resources,"  and  the  "dedication  as  feasible  and 
practicable  of  a  portion  of  the  value  of  the  resources  recovered  from 
the  deep  ocean  floor  to  international  community  purposes."  Draft  res- 
olution C  proposed  the  International  Decade  of  Ocean  Exploration 
(IDOE)  for  broadening  and  accelerating  investigations  of  the  oceans, 
and  for  strengthening  international  cooperation.  IDOE  was  adopted 
by  the  General  Assembly  as  part  of  the  long-term  and  expanded  pro- 
gram of  world-wide  exploration  of  the  oceans  and  their  resources 
under  the  direction  of  UNESCO's  Intergovernmental  Oceanographic 
Commission. 

106  Op.  cit. 


508 


Seabed  Disarmament  Treaty 

In  its  opening  paragraph  on  ocean  science  and  technology  and  na- 
tional security,  the  President's  Science  Advisory  Committee  stated : 

The  most  urgent  aspect  of  Federal  involvement  in  ocean  science  and  technol- 
ogy for  the  next  5  to  10  years  relates  to  national  security  in  the  narrow,  strictly 
military  sense.  The  U.S.  Navy,  which  has  responsibility  for  essentially  all  our 
defense  efforts  involving  the  ocean  environment,  will  have  increasing  need  for 
specialized  oceanographic  data  for  specific  devices  being  developed  or  improved 
and  will  continue  to  require  better  understanding  of  characteristics  of  the  ocean 
environment  in  which  it  operates.107 

Although  this  statement  referred  to  needs  in  support  of  specific 
projects,  it  also  reflected  the  need  for  the  U.S.  Navy  to  explore  the 
oceans  throughout  the  world  and  not  merely  in  the  coastal  areas  of 
the  United  States.  This  need,  coupled  with  the  military  presence 
required  in  numerous  parts  of  the  oceans,  formed  the  basic  justifica- 
tion for  freedom  on  the  high  seas,  and  for  the  privilege  of  approach- 
ing as  close  as  possible  the  coasts  of  other  nations.  The  military  view 
has  been,  and  continues  to  be,  that  any  extension  of  territorial  seas 
should  be  kept  to  a  minimum,  that  sovereignty  over  the  continental 
shelves,  regardless  of  their  boundaries,  should  be  closely  limited,  and 
that  the  air  space  above  the  high  seas  should  remain  free.  In  the 
words  of  Dr.  Robert  A.  Frosch,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy  for 
Research  and  Development : 

The  security  of  the  United  States  rests  in  part  on  the  Navy's  use  of  the  high 
seas,  and  we  would  like  to  see  the  use  and  legal  coverage  of  the  high  seas  develop 
in  such  a  way  as  not  to  impede  this  portion  of  our  security  unnecessarily.108 

With  this  attitude  and  background,  the  United  States  began  to 
evaluate  a  draft  treatv  submitted  by  the  USSR  on  March  18,  1969, 
providing  for  prohibition  of  the  emplacement  on  the  seabed  and  the 
ocean  floor  and  the  subsoil  thereof  of  objects  with  nuclear  weapons 
or  any  other  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  and  the  establishment  of 
military  bases,  structures,  installations,  etc.,  beyond  the  twelve-mile 
zone.  The  measure  appeared  to  call  for  total  disarmament  of  the 
seabed,  the  Soviet  Union  having  equated  the  uses  of  the  seabed  for 
"peaceful  uses"  with  "non-military  purposes,"  by  analogy  with  the 
provisions  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty  of  1959. 

The  United  States  considered  the  proposed  complete  demilitariza- 
tion "unworkable  and  probably  harmful."  The  U.S.  representative 
pointed  out  that  defense  against  submarines  involved  placing  warn- 
ing svstems  on  the  seabed,  and  that  military  personnel  participated 
in  scientific  research  in  that  environment.  On  May  22,  1969,  the 
United  States  countered  with  its  own  version  of  a  seabed  treaty, 
prohibiting  the  emplacement  of  -fixed  nuclear  weapons  or  other  weap- 
ons of  mass  destruction  or  associated  fixed  launching  platforms  on, 
within,  or  beneath  the  seabed  and  ocean  floor. 

In  presenting  the  draft  treaty,  the  U.S.  representative  pointed  out 
that  the  •">  mile  territorial   sea   would   leave  a  larger  area   subject  to 


107  U.S.   Prosidrnt's    Srionro   Advisory   Committee.    "Effective    Use   of   tln>   Sea."   Rpport   of 
tho  PanH   on   Oceanography.    (Washington,   U.S.  Govprnmpnt  Printing  Offipp.  .Tunp  1900) 
pace  30 

ineRobprt  A.  Frosch.  "Exploiting  marine  mineral  tpsoutpps  :  Problems  of  national  sp- 
ruritv  and  inrisdiof ion."  Speech  delivered  at  the  Naval  War  Collptrp  Confprpnpp  on  Minpral 
Kosources  of  the  World  Ocean,  July  12,  196*.  Vila]  Speeches  <>f  tli«>  Day,  (Novpmbpr  15, 
1968),  page  71. 


509 

prohibition  than  the  12-mile  zone  proposed  by  the  Soviet  Union. 
However,  the  minor  disagreements  were  not  unsurmountable.  On 
July  3  President  Nixon  sent  a  message  to  the  Disarmament  Commit- 
tee stating  that  it  should  not  be  impossible  to  find  common  ground 
between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  in  spite  of  these  dif- 
ferences, and  that  the  goal  should  be  to  present  a  sound  proposal  to 
the  United  Nations- 

An  acceptable  proposal  came  after  a  full  discussion  of  the  two 
drafts  in  the  form  of  a  joint  draft  treaty  submitted  by  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  on  October  7,  1969.  The  draft  was  a 
compromise  between  the  positions  of  the  two  major  powers.  It  pro- 
vided that : 

The  states  parties  to  this  treaty  undertake  not  to  emplant  or  emplace  on  the 
seabed  and  the  ocean  floor  and  in  the  subsoil  thereof  beyond  the  maximum 
contiguous  zone  provided  for  in  the  1958  Geneva  Convention  on  the  Territorial 
Sea  and  the  Contiguous  Zone  any  objects  with  nuclear  weapons  or  any  other 
types  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  as  well  as  structures,  launching  installa- 
tions or  any  other  facilities  specifically  designed  for  storing,  testing  or  using 
such  weapons. 

Later  in  October,  an  amended  version  was  submitted  at  the  Geneva 
Conference  of  the  Committee  on  Disarmament  (CCD,  formerly 
known  as  the  Eighteen-Nation  Disarmament  Committee — ENDC), 
now  having  26  member  nations.  This  draft  was  referred  by  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  back  to  the  CCD  as  the  "Draft  Treaty  on  the  Prohibi- 
tion of  the  Emplacement  of  Nuclear  Weapons  and  other  Weapons  of 
Mass  Destruction  on  the  Seabed  and  Ocean  Floor  and  Subsoil 
Thereof." 

Except  for  minor  changes,  the  definition  of  the  scope  of  the  prohi- 
bition remained  unaltered  in  the  revised  version  submitted  on  April 
23,  1970.  Strong  pressure  was  applied  by  the  non-aligned  nations, 
which  set  out  amendments  resulting  in  the  adoption  in  the  Septem- 
ber 1,  1970,  revision  of  a  separate  article  reading: 

The  parties  to  this  treaty  undertake  to  continue  negotiations  in  good  faith 
concerning  further  measures  in  the  field  of  disarmament  for  the  prevention  of 
an  arms  race  on  the  sea-bed,  the  ocean  floor,  and  the  subsoil  thereof. 

On  December  7,  1970,  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations 
finally  recommended  the  treaty.  On  February  12,  1971,  ceremonies 
were  held  simultaneously  in  Washington,  Moscow,  and  London,  and 
more  than  60  nations  signed  the  treaty.  In  the  United  States,  by  mid- 
June,  1971,  it  was  in  the  process  of  being  submitted  for  Senate  ap- 
proval; if  agreed  to  by  that  body,  it  will  go  to  the  President  for 
ratification. 

Seabed  Regime 

On  May  23,  1970,  President  Nixon  released  an  important  policy 
statement  on  the  seabed.  He  recognized  the  speed  with  which  modern 
underwater  technology  was  advancing,  and  that  the  prevailing  law  of 
the  sea  was  in  need  of  being  reshaped  and  updated  to  meet  the  needs  of 
modern  technology.  He  therefore  proposed  the  convening  of  a  new 
conference  on  the  law  of  the  sea,  and  consideration  of  international 
machinery  for  authorizing  exploitation  of  seabed  resources.  The  Pres- 
ident proposed  that  "all  nations  adopt  as  soon  as  possible  a  treaty 
under  which  they  would  renounce  all  national  claims  over  the  natural 
resources  of  the  seabed  beyond  the  point  where  the  high  seas  reach  a 


510 


depth  of  200  meters  (218.8  yards),  and  would  agree  to  regard  these 
resources  as  the  common  heritage  of  mankind."'  The  regime  proposed 
for  the  exploitation  of  seabed  resources  would  provide  for  the  collec- 
tion of  substantial  mineral  royalties  to  be  used  for  international  com- 
munity purposes,  particularly  economic  assistance  to  developing 
countries.  It  would  also  establish  rules  and  regulations  for  protecting 
the  ocean  environment,  safeguarding  the  investments  necessary  for 
exploitation,  and  a  mechanism  for  the  settlement  of  disputes. 

To  accomplish  these  goals,  the  President  proposed  two  types  of  in- 
ternational machinery : 

First,  I  propose  that  coastal  nations  act  as  trustees  for  the  international  com- 
munity in  an  international  trusteeship  zone  consisting  of  the  continental  margins 
beyond  a  depth  of  200  meters  off  their  coasts.  In  return,  each  coastal  state  would 
receive  a  share  of  the  international  revenues  from  the  zone  in  which  it  acts 
as  trustee  and  could  impose  additional  taxes  if  these  were  deemed  desirable. 

As  a  second  step,  agreed  international  machinery  would  authorize  and  regu- 
late exploration  and  use  of  seabed  resources  beyond  the  continental  margins.109 

In  the  meantime,  an  interim  policy  was  proposed  for  all  nations 
to  join  the  United  States  in  seeing  to  it  that  all  permits  for  explora- 
tion and  exploitation  of  the  seabed  beyond  200  meters  be  issued  subject 
to  approval  under  the  international  regime  to  be  agreed  upon. 

In  June  1970,  the  Committee  on  Oceanography  of  the  National 
Academy  of  Sciences-National  Research  Council  recommended  that 
the  United  States  consider  opening  ocean  waters  subject  to  U.S.  juris- 
diction to  scientific  research  by  foreign  nations  as  a  means  of  encourag- 
ing other  countries  to  ease  their  own  restrictions.  The  resolution  called 
for  maintaining  appropriate  and  adequate  safeguards  for  national 
security,  but  without  requiring  researchers  to  obtain  a  permit,  This 
policy  would  not  apply  to  internal  waters.110 

As  indicated  earlier,  hearings  were  held  in  the  Senate  concerning 
the  provisions  of  the  President's  proposal,  which  was  formally  intro- 
duced on  August  3,  1970,  as  the  draft  United  Nations  Convention  on 
the  International  Seabed  Area.  On  the  final  day  (Aug.  28,  1970)  of 
the  session  of  the  Seabed  Committee  in  Geneva,  the  U.S.  Representa- 
tive commented  on  the  President's  proposal : 

When  President  Nixon  made  the  difficult  political  decisions  inherent  in  his 
May  23  announcement  and  in  our  draft  convention  he  placed  great  importance 
on  international  community  interests.  We,  as  a  party  to  the  1958  Geneva  Conti- 
nental Shelf  Convention,  could  have  relied  on  the  exploitability  test  to  extend 
our  boundary  unilaterally.  We  felt,  however,  that  in  view  of  the  uncertainties 
surrounding  seabed  boundaries,  and  in  light  of  the  great  opportunity  the  inter- 
national community  now  has  to  rectify  the  inequities  of  the  law  of  the  sea.  it 
would  l>e  better  for  states  to  renounce  under  a  treaty  all  national  claims  beyond 
the  200  meter  isobath,  leaving  the  international  seabed  area  as  the  widest  area 
possible.  By  this  move  we  could  wipe  the  slate  clean  and,  in  essence,  re-think 
the  proper  relationship  of  international  community  interests  to  those  of  coastal 
states.111 

The.  working  paper  detailed  the  basic  principles  concerning  mineral 
resources,  living  resources,  protection  of  the  marine  environment, 
life,  and  property,  and  the  establishment  of  an  International  Seabed 


in  Presidential  announcement  on   I'.S    ocean  policy,  May  23,  1970. 

uo  "Freedom  of  scientific  research  ami  exploration  of  the  sea  and  the  seabed."  By  Com 
mlttee  on  Oceanography,  National  Academy  of  Sciences-National  Research  Council,  News- 
release  (June  1 1,  l  *. •  7 0 ) 

'"  Ambassador  Christopher  II.  Phillips,  "Statement  to  the  U.N.  Committee  on  the 
Peaceful  Uses  of  I  lie  Seabed  and  the  Ocean  Floor  beyond  the  Limits  of  National  Jurisdic- 
tion"  (Palais  des  Nations,  Geneva,  August  28,  1970). 


511 


Resource  Authority  to  manage  the  resources,  safeguard  the  invest- 
ments, and  settle  conflicts  and  disputes.  During  the  25th  session  of  the 
United  Nations  General  Assembly,  these  principles  were  considered, 
culminating  in  the  passage  on  December  1,  1970,  of  two  resolutions, 
one  establishing  a  time  and  calling  for  convening  in  1973  a  new 
conference  on  the  law  of  the  sea.  The  other  adopted  a  set  of  principles 
in  a  declaration  setting  forth  the  ground  rules  for  ocean  resources 
management  and  scientific  research. 

It  is  too  early  to  predict  what  success  the  U.S.  proposal  will  achieve. 
Even  if  the  United  Nations  succeeds  in  framing  a  generally  ac- 
ceptable treaty  for  the  seabed,  the  final  decision  in  the  United  States 
will  be  subject  to  approval  by  the  Senate.  As  mentioned  earlier,  con- 
siderable opposition  has  been  voiced  in  Congress,  and  some  alternative 
plan  may  be  necessary  in  the  event  of  an  impasse  between  the  execu- 
tive and  legislative  branches  of  Government.  What  form  this  alterna- 
tive might  take  is  difficult  to  conjecture  at  this  time. 

What  the  proposal,  resolutions,  and  discussions  left  unresolved  was 
the  limit  of  national  jurisdiction.  The  United  States  came  to  look  fav- 
orably on  the  12-mile  territorial  limit  as  a  probable  goal,  and  several 
nations  appeared  receptive  to  the  idea.  The  Latin  American  nations 
clung  to  their  200-mile  limits,  and  agreements  on  these  limits  in  future 
debate  may  prove  hard  to  reach. 

IX.  Role  of  Science  and  Technology  in  Seabed  Diplomacy 

As  science  and  technology  have  reached  and  affected  remote  regions 
of  the  world,  scientists  and  engineers  have  begun  to  play  an  increas- 
ingly significant  role  in  diplomacy.  Long  the  purview  of  international 
lawyers  and  diplomats,  ocean  sovereignty  has  been  discovered  to 
possess  important  technical  aspects  as  well.  In  the  field  of  ocean- 
ography, the  jurisdictional  solutions  to  man's  problems  have  been  essen- 
tially an  attempt  to  reconcile  man-made  laws  with  the  laws  of 
nature.  Oftentimes,  these  two  sets  of  laws  have  proved  incompatible, 
and  the  need  for  knowing  and  understanding  the  scientific  aspects 
of  the  ocean  environment  has  become  an  obvious  prerequisite  for  suc- 
cessful jurisdiction  among  nations. 

Understanding  of  all  aspects  of  the  marine  environment  has  also 
been  a  major  requirement  for  the  proper  conduct  of  naval  operations. 
These  operations  figure  prominently  in  matters  of  national  security 
and  the  formulation  of  foreign  policy,  particularly  where  global  com- 
mitments are  concerned.  Since  World  War  II,  the  outlook  toward  the 
use  of  the  oceans  for  military  purposes  has  assumed  progressively 
larger  dimensions.  Military  strategy  has  evolved  along  lines  deter- 
mined largely  by  developments  in  technology,  and  by  policy  goals  for 
inter^l  security  and  global  politics.  As  one'analyst  observed: 

If  asked,  an  oceanic  strategist  would  tell  the  President  that  in  order  to  pur- 
sue his  policy  of  nuclear  sufficiency  and  at  the  same  time  deter  World  War  III, 
a  blue  water  oceanic  option  is  the  only  option  for  deterrence  or  defense  during 
the  next  six  years  and  in  the  first  decades  of  our  Nation's  third  century.112 

Military  Technology  and  Ocean  Strategy 

The  days  of  bombers  and  strategic  air  strikes  followed  the  develop- 
ment of  nuclear  fusion  in  1954,  coupled  with  the  threat  of  communist 

i"  George  E.  Lowe,  "The  only  option?"  U.S.  Naval  Institute  Proceedings  (April  1971), 
page  23. 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1-34 


512 


expansion.  After  1957,  missiles  replaced  bombers  for  strategic  deter- 
rence, resulting  in  the  development  of  land-based  systems  of  inter- 
continental ballistic  missiles,  and  submarine-based  nuclear  missiles. 
Military  technological  breakthroughs  continued  to  reshape  military 
strategy  in  the  1960's.  Improved  accuracy  and  longer  range  and 
larger  delivery  systems  permitted  the  production  of  large  numbers  of 
sophisticated  missiles  such  as  the  Minuteman  and  the  Polaris  sub- 
marine-launched sj'stem.  The  development  of  reconnaissance  satellites 
permitted  both  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  to  maintain 
surveillance  on  each  other's  land-based  systems. 

Land-based  systems  (Minuteman  and  SS-9,  for  example),  how- 
ever, have  their  vulnerability :  They  can  be  detected  by  reconnaisanee 
satellites  and  other  means;  accuracy  of  attacking  missiles  is  advanc- 
ing so  fast  that  it  can  be  measured  in  a  fraction  of  a  mile;  MIRV 
systems  can  deliver  an  overwhelming  load  of  warheads,  dispropor- 
tionate to  land-based  missiles,  rendering  them  increasingly  vulnerable. 

The  shift  in  strategy  toward  the  ocean  environment,  therefore,  has 
become  obvious  and  necessary.  Numerous  analysts  have  expounded 
the  advantages  of  undersea  weapons  systems  as  being  less  targetable 
than  their  land-based  counterparts.  The  most  obvious  advantages  are 
their  mobility,  concealability,  and  survivability  following  a  sudden 
nuclear  attack.  Furthermore,  their  range  throughout  ocean  space  has 
an  added  safety  factor  in  deploying  away  from  populated  areas. 

The  absorption  of  water  with  respect  to  light,  high-energy  particles,  electro- 
magnetic radiation,  heat  and  other  known  forms  of  energy  is  such  that,  except 
for  acoustic  radiation,  none  of  the  mechanisms  postulated  has  a  detection  range 
potential  which  is  significant  when  compared  with  the  vast  areas  available 
in  the  ocean.  The  ultimate  test  in  this  regard  is  the  ability  of  the  submersible  to 
blend  with  and  be  masked  by  the  environment.  At  near  zero  speed  this  ought 
to  be  quite  modest,  and  if,  for  example,  power  is  supplied  by  fuel  cell,  the  ma- 
chinery  associated  with  it  should  be  extremely  quiet.  Drifting  in  the  current, 
at  great  depth  or  at  low  speeds,  the  hydrodynamic  wake  would  be  insignificant. 
A  further  aid  would  be  the  capability  to  move  very  close  to  the  bottom,  rendering 
the  submersible  difficult  to  detect  by  long-range,  active  sonar.  Ultimately,  the 
underseas  weapons  systems  could  develop  into  something  akin  to  a  manned,  on- 
the-bottom,  slowly  mobile  mine.113 

For  the  United  States,  ocean  advantages  are  enhanced  by  worldwide 
interests  which  have  been  conventionally  served  by  land  bases  overseas. 
These  bases  have,  Ix^en  dwindling;  in  number,  and  those  left  art'  subject 
to  political  uncertainties.  The  Second  Fleet  in  the  Atlantic,  the  Sixth 
Fleet  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  Seventh  Fleet  in  the  Pacific  are 
affected  by  basing  problems.  Floating  support  can  be  maintained  simi- 
lar to  the  system  which  largely  aids  the  operation  of  the  Sixth  Fleet. 
Objections  to  this  type  of  support  include  its  high  cost  and  vulnerabil- 
ity. Many  alternatives  have  been  envisaged  for  overeas  bases,  such  as 
floal  ing  platforms  of  large  dimensions  derived  from  the  technology  of 
offshore  exploration  and  exploitation. 

Very  great  changes  are  expected  in  naval  capabilities  as  a  result  of 
technological  developments  in  submarine  warfare.  Gordon  J.  F.  Mac- 
I >onald  envisions  for  the  L970's  that — 


u* John  P.  Craven.  "Ocean  technology  and  submarine  warfare."  /»  "Implications  of 
Military  Technology  Into  the  1970s."  A  del  phi  Paper  No.  46,  (London,  institute  for 
Strategic  Studies,  March  1968),  pages  38  16.  Dr.  Craven  «:is  for  some  years  chief  scientist 
of  the  Special  Projects  Office  of  the  Department  of  the  Navy,  that  developed  the  Polaris 
system. 


513 


A  nation  cou'd  control  the  surface  of  the  oceans  without  having  a  single  ship. 
The  required  system  would  involve  satellites  equipped  with  a  variety  of  sensors 
that  would  maintain  coverage  of  the  world's  oceans.  Satellites  would  relay  the  in- 
formation to  a  central  computer  system  which  would  then  target  the  land-based 
missiles  on  ships  to  be  destroyed.  The  missiles  would  then  be  equipped  with  ter- 
minal guidance  or  be  under  direct  control  of  the  satellite  and  land-based  computer 
systems.  While  it  is  most  unlikely  that  any  nation  would  adopt  such  a  strategy, 
this  example  illustrates  the  fact  that  naval  posture  may  change  radically  in  the 
future.11' 

MacDonald  also  postulates  future  placement  of  missiles  as  large  as 
the  Polaris,  or  larger,  on  a  relatively  shallow  shelf  floor  in  a  barge  sys- 
tem that  could  be  moved  occasionally  to  prevent  its  detection.  Another 
possibility  would  be  mobile  ocean  bottom  systems  which  crawl  or  creep 
on  the  seabed.  The  technology  and  engineering  requirements  for  man- 
ning, maintaining,  and  servicing  these  installations  would  not  differ 
from  those  used  in  offshore  mineral  exploration  and  exploitation.  In 
fact,  even  if  bottom  installations  were  not  militarily  desirable  (under- 
water mobility  being  the  key  advantage),  the  thrust  into  deeper 
waters  of  the  continental  shelf  by  the  petroleum  industry  might 
eventually  require  some  kind  of  protection  by  the  United  States,  and 
the  Navy  might  be  called  on  to  provide  it. 

In  shaping  U.S.  policy  for  the  disarmament  of  the  seabed  the  effect 
of  technology  was  much  in  evidence.  The  banning  of  fixed  bottom 
installations  did  not  pose  any  dangers,  particularly  when  the  United 
States  had  come  to  realize  the  importance  of  mobility  for  its  under- 
water deterrent  systems.  In  testimony  before  Senator  Pell's  Subcom- 
mittee on  Ocean  Space,  the  following  exchange  took  place : 

Senator  Pell.  Do  you  have  any  concern  about  moving  in  terms  of  prohibiting 
mobile  weapons  systems  from  operating  on  the  seabed? 

Dr.  [Robert  W.]  Moese.  No ;  I  do  not  really — otherwise  I  think  we  may  end 
up  banning  things  that  do  not  have  any  military  use  and  certainly  we  can  get 
widespread  agreement  on  that.  One  has  to  remember  that  the  great  advantage  of 
deploying  a  weapons  system  at  sea  is  mobility,  and  that  if  one  bans  only  fixed 
nuclear  weapons  systems  at  sea  he  may  well  be  banning  something  that  doesn't 
have  any  value  anyway.115 

Essentially,  if  the  Polaris  and  Poseidon  systems  were  to  be  anchored 
at  fixed  points,  they  would  not  represent  the  threat  they  pose  as  mobile 
systems.  The  United  States  had  apparently  abandoned  interest  in 
fixed  nuclear  installations  on  the  sea  bottom,  and  there  is  evidence 
to  indicate  that  the  decision  to  develop  post-Polaris  deterrent  systems 
rather  than  fixed  nuclear  installations  had  been  reached  long  before 
the  denuclearization  of  the  seabed  was  considered  on  the  international 
disarmament  agenda.116  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  Navy 
was  not  using  the  sea  bottom.  In  testimony  before  Representative 
Dante  Fascell's  Subcommittee  on  International  Organizations  and 
Movements,  Dr.  Robert  Frosch  was  asked  to  describe  some  of  the 
Navy  undertakings  which  might  be  involved  in  the  Malta  proposal. 
Dr.  Frosch  answered  "*  *  *  that  the  Navy  has  used  the  sea  bottom 


114  Gordon  J.  F.  MacDonald,  "An  American  Strategy  for  the  Oceans."  In  American 
Assembly.  "Uses  of  the  Seas."  (New  York,  Columbia  University  Press,  1968),  pages 
183-4.  • 

115  U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  "Activities  of  Nations  in 
Ocean  Space."  Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Ocean  Space  of  the  ...  on  S.  Res.  33, 
91st  Congress,  first  session,  July  24,  25,  28,  and  30,  1969.  (Washington,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office.  1969).  pages  45-6. 

116  Jozef  Goldblat.  "The  militarization  of  the  deep  ocean  :  the  sea-bed  treaty."  In  "SIPRI 
Yearbook  of  World  Armaments  and  Disarmament,  1969/1970."  (Stockholm,  Stockholm 
International  Peace  Research  Institute,  1970),  page  176. 


514 


for  many  purposes  for  many  years,  and  it  is  incorrect  to  assume  that 
we  are  not  using  the  sea  bottom.  Any  attempt  to  deal  in  a  radical  legal 
way  with  the  sea  bottom  would  interfere  with  some  national  security 
enterprise.''  117 

Consequently,  the  factor  of  national  security  and  the  Navy's  de- 
mands were  focal  points  in  formulating  the  U.S.  draft,  treaty  and 
the  final  outcome.  The  technological  gap  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union,  the  high  costs  of  developing  underwater  sys- 
tems, and  the  political  developments  on  the  international  scene  vis-a- 
vis mainland  China  were  among  the  other  factors  shaping  the  U.S. 
and  U.S.S.R.  positions. 

Although  the  time  lag  between  Soviet  and  U.S.  marine  capabili- 
ties has  been  considerable  in  recent  years,  the  gap  has  been  closing  at 
a  fast  rate.  In  his  annual  report  on  the  U.S.  military  posture.  Melvin 
Laird,  Secretary  of  Defense,  indicated  that  the  overall  (land,  sea,  and 
air)  technological  challenge  from  the  Soviet  Union  was  so  strong  as  to 
obliterate  any  U.S.  technology  lead  over  the  U.S.S.R.  by  the  mid-to- 
late  1970's.118 

Recent  developments  at  the  United  Nations  and  the  shift,  in  U.S. 
policy  suggest  that  the  People's  Republic  of  China  will  not  remain 
long  out  of  the  U.N.  membership,  and  that  sooner  or  later  it  will  be 
a  member  of  the  community  of  nations.  In  anticipation  of  this  even- 
tuality, it  is  conceivable  that  both  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  could  have  a  strong  incentive  to  form  an  international  regime 
and  a  legal  framework  for  the  oceans  so  that  when  the  People's  Repub- 
of  China  joins  the  United  Nations  it  would  be  faced  with  a  fait  ac- 
compli, to  comply  with  the  world  community.  This  prospect  may  also 
contribute  to  the  urgency  and  pressure  to  resolve  issues  of  terriorial 
limits,  continental  shelf  boundaries,  and  seabed  resources,  as  well  as 
the  banning  of  nuclear  weapons  from  the  ocean  floor. 

Scientists  in  the  Diplomatic  Process 

In  the  section  on  seabed  resources  it  was  indicated  how  progress  in 
obtaining  scientific  data  and  the  increasing  knowledge  of  the  marine 
environment  produced  technological  developments  that  pushed  man 
into  progressively  deeper  waters  offshore.  Scientific  manpower  has  also 
been  essential  in  formulating  U.S.  positions  on  issues  of  ocean  policy. 
A  number  of  scientists  have  participated  in  advising  both  the  legis- 
lative and  executive  branches  of  Government.  Scientists  from  aca- 
demic, industrial,  and  Government  institutions  were  instrumental  in 
assisting  and  contributing  to  the  formulation  of  U.S.  policy  on  the 
seabed.  Some  have  participated  in  the  actual  deliberations  and  draft- 
ing of  resolutions  such  as  the  Draft  U.N.  Convention  on  the  Inter- 
national Seabed  Area. 

ROLE    OF    THE    MARINE    COUNCIL    STAFF 

Prior  to  1966,  the  Federal  effort,  in  marine  affairs  was  distributed 
among  more  than  -10  agencies,  and  was  for  the  most  part  uncoordi- 
nated. In  the  Legislative  Branch,  the  Library  of  Congress'  Congres- 
sional Research  Service  (then  the  Legislative  Reference  Service)  es- 
tablished  in  L964  the  Science  Policy  Research  Division,  with  Dr.  Ed- 


,,T  "The  United  Nations  and  the  Issue  of  Deep  Ocean  Resources  *   *   *,"  op.  cit.,  p.  192. 
118  Ocean  Science  News  (March  1-.  l '»?  l  ) .  page  3. 


515 

ward  Wenk,  Jr.,  as  Chief.  Dr.  Wenk  provided  considerable  ground- 
work toward  the  passage  of  the  Marine  Resources  Act  of  1966,  and 
later  became  Executive  Secretary  of  the  Marine  Council,  created  by 
the  Act,  under  the  chairmanship  of  the  Vice  President. 

Although  world  attention  was  focused  on  the  seabed  resources  fol- 
lowing the  Malta  proposal  in  1967,  in  the  United  States  the  Marine 
Council  staff  had  already  been  active  in  laying  the  groundwork  for 
U.S.  policy  on  this  issue.  Section  6  of  the  Marine  Resources  Act 
assigned  to  the  Council  an  explicit  responsibility  to  coordinate  a  pro- 
gram for  international  cooperation.  Soon  after  its  activation  in  August 
1966,  the  Council  staff  guided  a  series  of  studies  and  actions  to  take 
into  account  universally  agreed  upon  goals  to  which  the  oceans  could 
contribute,  such  as  to  remedy  the  disparity  between  world  population 
and  food  supply.  Inquiries  were  also  begun  as  to  threats  to  world  order 
arising  out  of  conflicts  over  the  extraction  of  marine  resources,  and 
ways  and  means  by  which  the  common  interest  of  all  nations  in  gain- 
ing greater  knowledge  about  the  marine  environmen  coutld  be  satis- 
fied by  intergovernmental  cooperative  programs  of  ocean  research. 

By  late  fall  of  1966,  the  Council  staff,  working  with  representatives 
of  the  State  Department,  helped  draft  a  U.S.  initiative  at  the  1966 
U.N.  General  Assembly,  calling  for  an  examination  of  international 
marine  science  activities.  By  December  of  the  same  year,  the  Council 
staff  understood  from  U.N.  discussions  in  New  York  that  there  was 
likely  to  be  interest,  particularly  among  the  developing  nations,  in 
clarifying  uncertainties  over  ocean  boundaries  through  the  medium 
of  a  new  continental  shelf  convention.119 

Again  on  the  initiative  of  the  Council  staff,  and  after  prior  exchanges 
with  State  Department  staff  as  to  agenda,  the  Vice  President,  as 
Chairman  of  the  Marine  Council,  met  on  February  10,  1967,  with 
Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  State  Foy  D.  Kohler  concerning  these 
issues,  with  the  result  that  Dean  Rusk,  Secretary  of  State,  appointed 
an  Ad  Hoc  Committee  for  International  Policy  in  the  Marine  Environ- 
ment to  serve  the  interests  of  both  the  Marine  Council  and  the  Depart- 
ment of  State.  Soon  after  its  formation,  this  Committee  began  sub- 
stantive inquiry  into  legal  regime  questions — building  on  a  concept  of 
"revenue  belts"  or  "buffer  zones"  that  had  been  informally  proposed  by 
representatives  from  the  Department  of  State  and  the  Council. 

By  that  time  also,  the  Council  had  begun  to  implement  Section 
4(a) 5  of  the  Marine  Resources  Act  to  undertake  a  comprehensive 
study  of  the  legal  problems  arising  out  of  the  management,  use,  devel- 
opment, recovery,  and  control  of  the  resources  of  the  marine  environ- 
ment. Four  contract  studies  were  accordingly  undertaken  to  provide 
in-house  policy  guidance.  The  Vice  President  requested  that  the  De- 
partment of  State  provide  guidelines  for  these  studies,  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  appointed  an  interagency  advisory  committee  chaired 
by  the  legal  adviser  of  the  Department  of  State,  Leonard  Meeker. 

When  the  Committee  for  International  Policy  in  the  Marine  En- 
vironment met  for  the  first  time  in  April  1967,  all  of  the  in-house  in- 
struments for  the  study  of  the  legal  regime  for  the  seabed  had  been 


u9  This  information  about  the  in-house  activities  of  the  Council  staff  was  supplied 
through  personal  communication  by  Dr.  Edward  Wenk,  Jr.,  former  Executive  Secretary 
of  the  Marine  Council.  Further  details  appear  in  Dr.  Wenk's  book,  The  Politics  of  the  Ocean's 
(Harvard  University  Press). 


516 


created,  and  some  of  the  directions  and  alternatives  laid  out  for  study — 
"in  turn  all  goaded  by  an  activist  style  of  the  Council  itself.''120 
During  the  early  months  of  the  Council,  studies  were  also  begun 
on  the  International  Decade  of  Ocean  Exploration,  and  Seabed  Dis- 
armament. By  late  summer  of  1967,  concepts  were  beginning  to 
emerge  regarding  the  legal  regime,  the  Decade,  and  the  disarmament 
issue.  These  concepts  emerged  along  with  conflicts  among  different 
Federal  agencies  as  they  generated  their  own  independent  positions 
regarding  each  of  the  three  issues. 

ROLE   OF   SCIENTISTS   IN   OTHER  AGENCIES 

For  the  purpose  of  this  study,  inquiries  were  addressed  to  several 
Federal  agencies  concerning  their  utilization  of  scientists  in  their  in- 
ternational policymaking.  In  arms  control  negotiations,  the  Arms 
Control  and  Disarmament  Agency  ( ACDA)  found  the  issues  complex, 
involving  aspects  of  legal,  scientific,  economic,  military,  and  political 
disciplines.  ACDA  is  organized  along  these  disciplinary  lines,  and  the 
corresponding  bureaus  of  the  agency  contributed  to  the  evolutionary' 
formulation  of  the  U.S.  position  through  comprehensive  studies  and 
analyses,  utilizing  internal  staff  members  and  cooperating  with  their 
counterparts  in  other  agencies.  They  made  extensive  use  of  scientific 
capabilities  of  the  U.S.  Navy,  including  contributions  from  their 
Chief  Scientist  and  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy  for  Research 
and  Development,  Dr.  Robert  Frosch. 

The  U.S.  Geological  Survey  participated  extensively  in  the  activi- 
ties at  the  United  Nations,  and  several  Survey  geologists  have  con- 
tributed to  the  work  of  the  Secretariat  as  well  as  to  that  of  the  U.S. 
Government.  With  respect  to  the  United  Nations,  Frank  H.  Wang,  a 
geologist  with  the  Survey's  Office  of  Marine  Geology,  has  been  loaned 
to  the  Resource  and  Transport  Division  of  the  United  Nations  Secre- 
tariat for  several  periods,  beginning  in  late  1967  and  continuing  to  the 
present,  to  prepare  a  background  report  on  mineral  resources  of  the 
sea.121 

In  the  late  spring  of  1968,  David  Popper,  then  Deputy  Assistant  Sec- 
retary of  State  for  International  Organizations,  asked  the  Geological 
Survey  to  represent  the  United  States  at  the  Economic  and  Technical 
Subcommittee  of  the  newly  formed  Ad  Hoc  Committee  on  the  Peace- 
ful Uses  of  the  Seabed  Beyond  the  Limits  of  National  Jurisdiction. 
The  Director  of  the  U.S.  Geological  Survey,  Dr.  William  Pecora,  was 
able  to  attend  some  of  the  June  meetings,  while  Vincent  E.  McKelvey, 
his  alternate,  attended  the  remainder.  Gilbert  Corwin  of  the  Survey 
also  attended  this  session  as  an  adviser. 

While  Dr.  Pecora  continued  to  be  listed  as  the  U.S.  representative 
to  the  Economic  and  Technical  Subcommittee  during  the  following 
year  (hoping  that  by  so  doing  he  would  encourage  other  delegations 
to  send  high  level  scientists),  he  was  unable  to  attend  subsequent  meet- 
ings of  the  Subcommittee.  Vincent  McKelvey,  therefore,  represented 
the  United  States  on  the  Economic  and  Technical  Subcommittee  at 
the  second  meeting  of  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee,  and  has  continued  to 
do  so  at  the  meetings  of  the  permanent  Committee  after  its  establish- 


120  Ibid. 

121  Wang,  "Mineral  Resources  of  the  Sea,"  op.  clt. 


517 


ment  by  the  General  Assembly  in  1968.  Joshua  I.  Tracey  of  the  Survey 
assisted  McKel vey  during  the  March  and  August  i  meetings  of  the 
Committee  in  1969,  and  Wang  was  also  on  the  delegation  for  the 
August  1969  meeting.  / 

McKelvey  was  also  a  member  of  the  five-man  drafting  committee, 
brought  together  by  John  R.  Stevenson,  Legal  Adviser  of  the  De- 
partment of  State,  in  June  1970,  to  prepare  the  draft  treaty  imple- 
menting the  U.S.  ocean  policy  announced  by  President  Nixon  on 
May  23,  1970.  McKelvey  is  the  only  scientist  on  that  committee,  and 
has  been  primarily  responsible  not  only  for  input  on  the  geological 
aspects  of  the  problem,  but  also  for  the  economic  and  technical  aspects 
of  seabed  exploration  and  exploitation. 

During  the  first  two  years  of  the  U.N.  Seabed  Committee's  work, 
the  principal  effort  of  the  U.S.  Geological  Survey  was  directed  toward 
developing  information  that  would  assist  other  delegations,  and  the 
Committee  as  a  whole,  in  understanding  the  problems  of  the  seabed. 
As  part  of  that  effort,  McKelvey  and  Wang  prepared  a  set  of 
maps  showing  the  distribution  of  potential  subsea  mineral  resources, 
the  first  edition  of  which  was  distributed  to  the  Committee  in  August 
1969.122  Another  contribution  to  this  effort  was  the  Symposium  on 
Mineral  Resources  of  the  World  Ocean,  held  at  Newport,  Rhode  Is- 
land in  1968,  under  the  joint  sponsorship  of  the  U.S.  Geological  Survey,, 
the  University  of  Rhode  Island,  and  the  U.S.  Navy.123 

Besides  the  staffs  of  the  Marine  Council  and  the  Geological  Survey, 
the  Department  of  State  had  available  the  expertise  of  its  own  geog- 
rapher, Dr.  Robert  Hodgson,  who  was  intimately  associated  with 
seabed  activities  on  an  official  basis  for  over  a  decade,  and  its  Bureau 
of  International  Scientific  and  Technological  Affairs,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  Herman  Pollack.  Together  with  the  National  Science  Founda- 
tion, these  sources  have  been  represented  on  the  U.S.  Government's 
Law  of  the  Sea  Task  Force  since  its  creation  in  1970.  The  State  De- 
partment drew  further  on  the  following  agencies  and  scientists,  in 
varying  degrees,  in  the  formulation  of  the  Administration's  ocean 
policy :  Dr.  Bruce  C.  Heezen,  Columbia  University ;  Hollis  Hedberg, 
Princeton  University ;  Howard  R.  Gould,  Esso  Corporation,  Houston ; 
K.  L.  Emery,  Wood's  Hole  Oceanographic  Institute,  Massachusetts; 
John  Byrne,  University  of  Rhode  Island;  John  Knauss,  University 
of  Rhode  Island ;  and  the  National  Oceanography  Association. 

Scientific  Advice,  Policy,  and  Diplomacy 

It  is  particularly  true  of  a  democratic  society  that  conflicts  arise 
among  parties  engaging  in  the  formulation  of  national  and  inter- 
national policy.  When  the  matter  at  issue  involves  diplomacy  and 
international  negotiation,  conflicts  are  particularly  prone  to  impede 
the  formulation  of  a  generally  accepted  position.  National  honor, 
national  security,  sovereignty,  and  territorial  claims  all  combine  to 
intensify  feelings  and  delay  the  building  of  a  consensus. 

Despite  the  initiatives  of  the  Marine  Council  staff  and  the  participa- 
tion of  numerous  scientists  and  scientific  institutions  toward  the  for- 
mulation of  U.S.  seabed  policy,  the  evolution  of  this  policy  was  rela- 

122  Vincent  E.  McKelvey  and  Frank  F.  H.  Wang.  Preliminary  maps,  world  subsea 
mineral  resources ;  miscellaneous  geological  investigations,  Map  1-632.  U.S.  Geological 
Survey,  Department  of  the  Interior  (1969). 

^McKelvey,  op.  cit. 


518 


tively  slow.  As  late  as  July  1969,  almost  two  years  after  the  Malta 
proposal,  the  Department  of  State  had  not  yet  formulated  a  policy, 
or  was  not  ready  to  divulge  its  position  if  it  had  one.  Testifying  before 
Senator  Pell's  Subcommittee  on  Ocean  Space,  the  Honorable  U.  Alexis 
Johnson,  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Political  Affairs,  was  asked 
whether  the  issue  of  the  outer  continental  shelf  boundaries  was  a 
question  of  language  or  modality. 

*  *  *  Frankly,  Mr.  Chairman  [answered  Mr.  Johnson],  the  question  of  the 
boundaries,  the  question  of  the  international  regime,  are  questions  the  answers 
to  which  are  not  yet  dear  to  me,  nor  am  I  c'ear  if  I  may  say,  both  personally  and 
officially,  as  to  where  the  U.S.  interests  lie  best  in  this.  *  *  *  "4 

Senator  Pell  termed  this  a  "no-policy  policy"  in  the  exchange  that 
ensued : 

*  *  *  In  closing  I  would  just  make  the  point  that  I  appreciate  your  frankness 
and  cooperation  in  coming  here  today,  and  I  hope  you  will  push  ahead  with  the 
policy  paper  for  the  United  Nations  meeting. 

At  the  same  time,  I  must  stick  to  my  guns,  when  it  comes  to  the  questions  of 
the  continental  shelf  and  the  moratorium  on  claims  and  say  that  we  have  a  "no- 
policy"  policy,  but  I  am  glad  to  know  that  you  are  pressing  ahead  to  change  that 
to  a  more  specific  statement  of  policy.  If  you  think  I  have  overstated  the  situa- 
tion, please  tell  me. 

Mr.  Johnson.  No,  frankly,  I  feel  we  have  taken  more  of  a  leadership  role  in  this 
matter  than  you  apparently  feel,  but  nevertheless,  I  respect  your  point  of  view. 

Senator  Pell.  You  mean  a  leadership  role  for  going  ahead  or  a  leadership  role 
for  going  backwards?  By  this  I  mean  a  leadership  role  for  establishing  a  regime 
or  a  leadership  role  in  preventing  the  establishment  of  a  regime. 

Mr.  Johnson.  I  would  say  a  leadership  role  in  keeping  our  options  open  until 
we  decide  where  our  national  interests  lie  best  and  where  international  agree- 
ment may  be  reached. 

Senator  Pell.  Right.  Well,  I  do  not  want  to  be  rude  in  any  way,  but  basically, 
to  keep  options  open,  means  to  my  mind  to  have  a  "no-policy"  policy. 

Mr.  Johnson.  That  is  correct.  We  are  keeping  options  open  for  that  purpose 
until  we  decide  what  our  policy  should  be  on  this. 

Senator  Pell.  I  agree  that  this  is  probably  a  question  of  semantics  and  what 
the  executive  branch  would  call  keeping  options  open,  from  where  I  sit  and  the 
work  that  I  have  been  doing  on  this  for  the  last  several  years,  I  would  say  that 
it  is  a  "no-policy"  policy.  I  know  we  are  both  doing  the  best  that  we  can  to  try 
to  arrive  at  a  state  of  affairs  of  advantage  not  only  to  the  United  States,  but  to 
the  world  as  a  whole. 

Mr.  Johnson.  Yes.1" 

A  policy  statement  enunciated  by  the  President  is  transmitted  by 
directive  to  the  departments  concerned  for  implementation.  The  de- 
partments evaluate  it  relative  to  their  statutory  responsibilities,  pol- 
icies, and  practices,  then  try  to  relate  it  to  the  overall  national  and 
international  perspective,  at  the  same  time  accommodating  their  own 
interests. 

Congress,  meanwhile,  provides  a  forum  where  all  sectors  and  indi- 
viduals are  afforded  a  chance  to  air  their  views  on  the  subject.  In  the 
case  of  oceanography,  Congress  has  had  the  initiative  for  more  than  a 
decade,  and  its  efforts  culminated  in  the  passage  of  the  Marine  Re- 
sources Act  of  19GG,  despite  some  opposition  by  the  executive 
branch.  However,  not  all  of  the  views  expressed  at  hearings  are  thor- 
oughly studied,  or  influence  final  national  policy  in  any  real  way,  un- 
less such  views  are  vigorously  pursued  and  advocated  by  special  in- 
terest groups. 


"*  "Governing  the  Use  of  Ocean  Space,"  hearings,  op.  dt.,  pp.  221-222. 
^Ibid.,  page  232. 


519 


In  ocean  affairs,  the  "ocean  industry"  in  general  lacks  a  unified  front, 
or  a  spokesman  or  representative  in  Washington  capable  of  present- 
ing the  industry's  point  of  view.  It  remains  as  uncoordinated  as  were 
the  Federal  agencies  prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  National  Coun- 
cil on  Marine  Resources  and  Engineering  Development,  and  the  Na- 
tional Oceanic  and  Atmospheric  Administration  (NOAA).  Although 
a  NOAA  had  been  recommended  by  the  Commission  on  Marine  Sci- 
ence, Engineering,  and  Resources,  the  NOAA  that  came  into  existence 
in  October  1970  fell  short  of  the  Commission's  recommendations,  leav- 
ing many  ocean  activities  scattered  among  other  Federal  agencies. 

The  machinery  of  most  governments  does  not  provide  adequately 
for  coordination  between  individuals  qualified  to  judge  in  the  real 
world  of  politics  and  people,  and  those  qualified  to  judge  in  the  real 
world  of  technical  facts.  Often,  one  world  seems  to  be  completely 
oblivious  or  unaware  of  the  existence  of  the  other.  It  has  been  demon- 
strated, however,  that  scientists  can  work  very  effectively  in  formu-' 
lating  policy  and  participating  in  the  diplomatic  process.  Modern 
diplomats  are  becoming  increasingly  aware  of  the  effect  of  science  and 
technology  on  shaping  their  daily  endeavors.  Although  most  nations 
have  come  to  recognize  the  importance  of  scientists  in  conducting 
their  international  affairs,  no  country  seems  to  have  included  a  sci- 
entist as  part  of  its  diplomatic  staff  at  the  United  Nations  headquar- 
ters in  New  York. 

X.  Summary 

Planet  Earth  is  essentially  a  water  planet — one  large  ocean  inter- 
spersed with  continental  land  masses.  The  global  ocean  is  a  common 
link  among  these  land  masses,  shared  by  the  nations  touching  this 
ocean  space.  Despite  its  inherent  international  characteristics,  ocean 
space  has  been  zoned  off,  and  national  jurisdictions  and  boundaries 
have  been  established  by  the  coastal  states. 

Progress  in  marine  technology  and  the  widening  horizons  of  scien- 
tific inquiry  have  enlarged  the  sphere  of  man's  knowledge  and  re- 
vealed the  presence  of  natural  resources  in  sea  water,  on  the  ocean 
floor,  and  in  the  underlying  layers.  Peace  and  equity  require  inter- 
nationally acceptable  boundaries  and  definitions  of  territorial  limits, 
fishing  zones,  the  high  seas,  the  continental  shelf,  and  the  sea  floor  be- 
yond the  limits  of  national  jurisdiction.  It  has  become  necessary  to 
survey  the  ocean  space,  to  collect  the  scientific  data  on  which  these 
definitions  should  be  based,  and  to  inventory  the  known  and  potential 
resources  of  the  seabed. 

The  crust  of  the  Earth  as  a  whole  is  composed  of  continental  plat- 
forms and  ocean  basins.  Geologically,  the  continental  land  masses  ex- 
tend beyond  the  shoreline.  A  relatively  narrow  strip,  the  "continental 
margin,"  of  each  platform,  is  under  water,  belonging  geologically  to 
the  adjacent  continent  and  not  to  the  ocean  basin.  The  continental 
margin  has  three  components :  The  shelf,  the  slope,  and  the  rise.  The 
width  of  the  shelf  varies  throughout  the  world,  but  an  average  water 
depth  of  100  fathoms  (600  feet)  has  been  adopted  as  conveniently 
marking  the  legal,  rather  than  the  geological,  width  of  the  continental 
shelf. 


520 


Unilateral  actions  have  been  taken  by  coastal  nations  to  assert  juris- 
diction, establish  territorial  boundaries,  and  claim  exploration  and  ex- 
ploitation rights  in  offshore  areas.  In  the  United  States,  these  activi- 
ties began  with  the  Truman  Proclamation  of  1945  which  claimed  the 
natural  resources  of  the  seabed  of  the  continental  shelf  as  appertain- 
ing to  the  United  States  and  subject  to  its  jurisdiction  and  control. 
In  1953,  the  Submerged  Lands  Act  set  the  seaward  limit  of  state  bound- 
aries as  three  miles,  but  did  not  define  inland  waters  or  continental 
shelf  lands  beyond  the  three-mile  limit.  The  Outer  Continental  Shelf 
Lands  Act  of  1953  claimed  for  the  United  States  rights  of  jurisdiction, 
control,  and  power  of  disposition  of  the  natural  resources  of  the  con- 
tinental shelf,  but  left  the  seaward  limits  of  the  shelf  undefined,  and 
preserved  the  character  of  the  overlying  waters  as  high  seas. 

The  Geneva  Conventions  of  1958  sought  to  resolve  several  problems 
pertaining  to  the  seabed  and  the  overlying  waters.  The  Conventions 
established  criteria  for  measuring  the  territorial  sea  and  the  con- 
tiguous zone,  but  left  undefined  the  outer  limits  of  the  continental 
shelf.  The  Convention  on  the  Continental  Shelf  aggravated  the  prob- 
lem further  by  establishing  the  200-meter  depth  as  the  recommended 
limit,  which  could  be  expanded  beyond  that  depth  to  where  the  depth 
of  the  superjacent  waters  admits  of  the  exploitation  of  the  natural 
resources  of  that  area.  In  other  words,  it  proposed  that  the  boundaries 
of  the  continental  shelf  of  a  coastal  state  would  be  determined  by 
the  technological  capabilities  of  that  state  to  exploit  the  resources  in 
deeper  waters. 

But  What  are  these  resources,  and  what  exaetlv  is  their  present  and 
prospective  value?  What  is  the  present  state  of  offshore  technology, 
and  what  lies  ahead  for  future  exploration  and  exploitation  of  the  sea- 
bed? 

Ocean  resources  are  classified  broadly  as  living  and  non-living.  The 
living  resources  include  the  living  orira,nisms  of  the  marine  environ- 
ment for  products  such  as  food,  food  derivatives,  and  pharmaceuticals. 
The  non-living  resources  provide  such  varied  opportunities  for  use  as 
the  production  of  potable  water  from  the  sea.  the  salts  and  other  min- 
erals contained  in  the  water,  the  minerals  on  and  under  the  ocean  floor, 
and  such  related  activities  as  shipping  and  aquatic  recreation. 

Although  this  studv  encompasses  the  living  resources  of  the  sea,  it 
focuses  on  the  seabed  and  the  resources  contained  in,  on,  and  under 
it.  The  sealed  contains  a  variety  of  mineral  resources  including  beach 
sands  and  gravel,  heavy  minerals  associated  with  l>eaeh  deposits,  sur- 
face deposits  of  manganese  and  phosphorite,  and  subsurface  ]x>troleum 
resources. 

Building  materials  are  the  most  extensively  mined  commodity 
throughout  the  world,  mostlv  at  or  near  the  lurches.  Current  pro- 
duction in  the  United  States  alone  exceeds  50  million  cubic  vards  of 
sand  and  gravel,  and  20  million  tons  of  oyster  shells  annually.  Asso- 
ciated with  beach  sands  are  such  heavy  minerals  as  gold,  tin,  platinum, 
diamonds,  titanium,  tungsten,  iron,  ehromite.  and  zircon.  Surface 
deposits  of  phosphorite  and  manganese  nodules  blanket  v.he  ocean  floor. 
The  continental  shelves  of  the  world  contain  an  estimated  300  billion 
tons  of  phosphorite :  i  f  10  percent  of  this  amount  is  economic  to  mine, 
the  30  billion  tons  of  reserves  of  sea-floor  phosphorite  (worth  some- 
thing like  $300  billion)  would  last  1,000  years. 


521 


Equally  extensive  on  the  ocean  floor  are  nodules  containing  man- 
ganese and  iron  oxide,  cobalt,  nickel,  and  copper.  The  floor  of  the 
Pacific  Ocean  alone  contains  some  90  billion  to  1,600  billion  tons  of 
nodules.  Although  submarine  manganese  ore  is  lower  in  grade  than 
manganese  mined  on  land,  its  mining  may  become  attractive  for  its 
combination  of  useful  elements.  Gross  value  of  the  constituent  minerals 
in  these  nodules  approaches  $115  per  ton.  Although  under  the  proper 
circumstances  the  potential  of  these  nodules  might  be  promising,  pres- 
ent factors  of  supply,  demand,  and  pricing  suggest  that  the  economic 
exploitation  of  phosphorite  and  manganese  nodules  is  not  imminent. 

Recently  discovered  deposits  in  the  Red  Sea  indicate  that  volcanic 
action  in  areas  of  rifts  in  the  crust  of  the  earth  may  have  created  eco- 
nomically profitable  opportunities.  Sediments  sampled  in  the  Red 
Sea  contain  appreciable  amounts  of  zinc,  copper,  lead,  silver,  and  gold 
which  at  current  smelter  prices  would  be  worth  about  $2.5  billion. 

By  far,  the  most  important  of  all  marine  resources  is  petroleum. 
More  than  85  countries  are  engaged  in  offshore  activities ;  discoveries 
have  been  reported  from  the  shelves  of  North  and  South  America, 
Australia,  Japan,  the  Mediterranean  countries,  the  Red  Sea,  the 
Arabian  Gulf,  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  and,  most 
recently,  in  the  North  Sea  and  the  South  China  Sea.  Thirty-two  of 
these  countries  are  already  producing  petroleum  from  their  continental 
shelves,  which  accounts  for  16  percent  of  the  world's  oil  and  6  per- 
cent of  the  world's  natural  gas;  by  1980  this  percentage  is  expected 
to  double  or  quadruple. 

Proved  petroleum  reserves  in  the  "free  world"  are  estimated  to 
exceed  500  billion  barrels  of  oil  and  nearly  1.5  million  billion  (quadril- 
lion) cubic  feet  of  gas.  Ultimate  world  potential  of  all  offshore 
petroleum  resources  approaches  1,600  billion  barrels.  In  comparison, 
ultimate  world  potential  of  comparable  resources  on  land  is  estimated 
at  4,000  billion  barrels. 

Given  the  abundant  resources  of  the  seabed  and  the  challenges  they 
present,  especially  to  the  dynamic  petroleum  industry,  what  are  their 
implications  for  national  policy  and  international  diplomacy?  In 
mining  operations,  a  foremost  consideration  is  the  necessity  for  main- 
taining an  approximate  balance  of  supply  against  demand.  A  prime 
economic  characteristic  of  all  minerals,  except  those  that  are  scarce 
and  precious,  is  their  price  sensitivity.  The  risk,  the  high  capital 
investment,  the  unknowns,  and  the  lack  of  experience  in  the  marine 
environment  are  major  deterrents  which  will  keep  the  small  entre- 
preneur from  venturing  into  the  deep-sea  operations.  Another  deter- 
rent, non-technical  and  non-economic,  is  the  legal  question  of  exclusive 
right  of  exploitation,  or  security  of  tenure  of  operation.  Undoubtedly, 
deep-sea  mineral  deposits  are  substantial  and  represent  a  great  poten- 
tial resource.  Once  a  substantially  rich  deposit  is  found,  the  technol- 
ogy to  exploit  it  will  be  readily  developed.  The  outlook  is  one  of 
cautious  optimism,  but  a  legal  regime  needs  to  be  established  and  inter- 
national agreements  effected  before  the  mining  industry  will  venture 
into  the  ocean  deeps. 

For  offshore  petroleum,  the  capabilities  that  are  not  available  now 
are  certainly  a  short  distance  away.  But  does  technology  justify  ex- 
pansion ?  As  matters  stand  now,  offshore  operations  seem  likely  to  con- 
tinue at  an  ever-increasing  pace.  While  subject  to  some  degree  of  tech- 


522 

nological  control,  hazards  of  offshore  operations  are  inevitable,  and 
damage  to  the  environment  may  be  long-lasting  or  irreversible  Nu- 
merous other  tenants  besides  the  oil  industry  use  coastal  waters  The 
ocean  has  become  the  focus  of  man's  attention  and  hope,  not  merely 
for  its  mineral  and  petroleum  resources,  but  as  a  source  of  food,  a  pos- 
sible  future  habitat,  and  a  major  source  of  the  Earth's  weather  systems 
and  their  life-gi  vmg  processes.  Other  users  of  the  continental  shelf  have 
to  recognize  and  conform  with  the  compatibility  of  their  various  ac- 
tivities It  may  be  in  the  ultimate  interest  of  all  mankind  to  develop 
the  land  areas  and  explore  their  subsurface  thoroughly,  leaving  the 
ocean  as  clean  as  possible  for  as  long  as  possible. 

This  go-slow  policy  is  particularly  crucial  for  the  continental  shelf 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  technological  development  is  progressing  at 
a  rate  that  has  already  rendered  obsolete  the  definition  of  jurisdic- 
tional limits,  legal  or  otherwise.  While  this  development  will  probably 
be  limited,  for  some  time  to  come,  to  the  continental  shelf  areas,  and 
progress  into  the  deep  sea  is  not  alarmingly  imminent,  the  confusion 
created  by  the  Geneva  Conventions,  particularly  the  exploitability 
clause,  might  well  be  eliminated.  Definitive  political  boundaries  need 
to  be  established  for  the  seaward  limit  of  national  jurisdictions.  Be- 
yond this  limit,  the  deep  sea  areas  would  then  become  the  common 
domain  of  the  community  of  nations. 

The  rapid  advances  in  the  acquisition  of  scientific  data  about  the 
ocean  domain,  and  the  spectacular  development  of  technological  ca- 
pabilities to  exploit  it,  commercially  and  militarily,  have  directed 
attention  to  the  potential  of  ocean  resources.  As  nations  have  moved 
toward  a  policy  of  leaving  ocean  space  free  from  national  domination, 
the  aspiration  has  been  repeatedly  voiced  of  exploring  and  exploiting 
ocean  resources  for  the  benefit  of  all  mankind,  rather  than  to  benefit 
the  handful  of  technologically  advanced  nations. 

The  United  Nations  is  the  obvious  forum  to  reconcile  issues  over 
these  resources.  A  specific  plan  was  offered  to  the  1  Tnited  Nations  by  the 
delegation  of  Malta,  which  called  for  a  declaration  and  treaty  concern- 
ing the  reservation  exclusively  for  peaceful  purposes  of  the  seabed  and 
of  the  ocean  floor  underlying  the  seas,  beyond  the  limits  of  present 
national  jurisdiction,  and  the  use  of  their  resources  in  the  interest  of 
mankind.  An  ad  hoc  committee  to  study  this  proposal  was  formed  in 
1967,  which  became  in  1968  the  Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  the 
Sea-Bed  and  the  Ocean  Floor  beyond  the  Limits  of  National  Jiu*is- 
diction. 

By  then  the  United  States  Congress  had  passed  the  Marine  Re- 
sou  rces  and  Engineering  Development  Act  of  1966  and  established 
the  National  Council  on  Marine  Resources  and  Engineering  Develop- 
ment; the  U.S.  Government  had  begun  to  coordinate  its  ocean  affairs 
and  formulate  policy  for  participation  in  international  activities.  Be- 
sides the  Marine  Council,  the  policy  apparatus  included  committees 
of  Congress,  the  Committee  on  International  Policy  in  the  Murine 
Environment,  and  the  present  Interagency  Law-of-the-Sea  Task- 
Force.  Outside  the  Federal  struct  lire,  the  United  States  sought  advice 
from  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences  and  the  National  Academy 
of  Engineering. 

Congressional  reaction  in  the  90th  Congress  to  the  Malta  proposal 
took  the  form  of  numerous  bills  and  resolutions,  some  in  support  and 


523 


others  in  opposition  to  the  proposal.  Hearings  were  conducted  in  the 
90th  and  91st  Congresses,  and  new  subcommittees  were  established, 
particularly  in  the  Senate.  The  Subcommittee  on  Outer  Continental 
Shelf  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Interior  and  Insular  Affairs  held 
extensive  hearings  throughout  the  91st  Congress,  and  issued  a  report 
based  on  these  hearings.  The  Subcommittee  took  the  position  that  the 
Geneva  Convention  on  the  Continental  Shelf  was  validly  operative, 
and  saw  no  need  to  convene  another  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference.  It 
also  concluded  that  the  geological  interpretation  of  the  continental 
margin  made  that  portion  of  the  seabed  the  property  of  the  United 
States.  It  endorsed  the  exploitability  clause  in  the  Convention,  which 
expanded  the  limits  of  the  shelf  depending  on  the  technological  capa- 
bility of  a  state  to  exploit  in  deeper  waters.  It  shared  with  the  Presi- 
dent the  expressed  desire  that  ocean  resources  beyond  the  continental 
margin  be  used  rationally  and  equitably  for  the  benefit  of  mankind, 
conditional  on  measures  to  protect  investors  exercising  high  seas  rights 
to  explore  and  exploit  the  wealth  of  the  deep  seabed. 

The  Executive  Branch  leaned  toward  international  cooperation  and 
the  proper  utilization  of  the  diplomatic  process.  U.S.  delegates 
to  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  took  the  initiative  in  intro- 
ducing several  draft  resolutions  toward  international  cooperation  in 
research,  the  exploitation  of  the  seabed,  and  the  limitations  of  military 
uses  of  the  sea  floor.  These  efforts  culminated  in  the  signing  of  the 
Seabed  Disarmament  Treaty  on  February  12,  1971,  banning  the  em- 
placement of  nuclear  weapons  on  the  ocean  floor,  and  paving  the  way 
for  wider  measures  toward  disarmament. 

As  to  an  international  seabed  regime,  President  Nixon  proposed  on 
May  23,  1970,  that  all  nations  adopt  as  soon  as,  possible  a  treaty  re- 
nouncing all  national  claims  over  the  natural  resources  of  the  seabed 
beyond  the  point  where  the  high  seas  reach  a  depth  of  200  meters,  and 
agree  to  regard  these  resources  as  the  common  heritage  of  mankind. 
The  regime  proposed  for  the  exploitation  of  seabed  resources  would 
provide  for  the  collection  of  substantial  mineral  royalties  to  be  used 
for  international  community  purposes,  particularly  for  economic  as- 
sistance to  developing  countries.  It  would  also  establish  rules  and  reg- 
ulations for  protecting  the  ocean  environment,  and  a  mechanism  for 
the  settlement  of  disputes,  in  the  form  of  an  International  Seabed 
Resource  Authority.  In  the  meantime,  an  interim  policy  was  proposed 
for  all  nations  to  join  the  United  States  to  insure  that  all  permits 
for  exploration  and  exploitation  of  the  seabed  beyond  the  200-meter 
limit  be  issued  subject  to  an  international  authority. 

During  the  25th  session  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly,  these  princi- 
ples were  considered,  and  on  December  18,  1970,  two  resolutions  were 
passed:  One,  establishing  a  timetable  and  calling  for  convening  in 
1973  of  a  new  conference  on  the  law  of  the  sea ;  the  other  promulgating 
a  set  of  principles  in  a  declaration  of  ground  rules  for  ocean  resources 
management  and  scientific  research. 

In  its  diplomatic  participation,  the  United  States  developed  policy 
contingent  on  developments  in  science  and  technology.  Since  World 
War  II,  the  outlook  toward  the  use  of  the  oceans  for  military  purposes 
has  been  gaining  progressively  larger  dimensions.  Military  strategy 
has  evolved  along  lines  drawn  by  developments  in  technology,  and 


524 


by  policy  goals  for  internal  security  and  global  politics.  Recent  de- 
velopments at  the  United  Nations  suggest  that  the  People's  Republic 
of  China  will  not  remain  long  out  of  the  U.N.  membership.  In  anti- 
cipation of  this  eventuality,  it  is  conceivable  that  both  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  could  have  reason  to  form  an  international 
regime  and  a  legal  framework  for  the  oceans  so  that  when  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  joins  the  United  Nations  she  would  encounter  a  fait 
accompli,  whose  acceptance  the  community  of  nations  desires.  Com- 
munist China's  progress  in  diplomatic,  economic,  and  nuclear  status 
may  also  explain  the  urgency  and  pressure  to  resolve  issues  of  terri- 
torial limits,  continental  shelf  boundaries,  and  seabed  resources,  as 
well  as  the  banning  of  nuclear  weapons  from  the  ocean  floor. 

In  formulating  policy,  the  United  States  has  had  the  benefit  of 
considerable  scientific  guidance.  A  number  of  scientists  have  par- 
ticipated in  advising  both  the  legislative  and  executive  branches  of 
Government.  Scientists  from  academic,  industrial,  and  Government 
institutions  were  instrumental  in  assisting  and  contributing  to  the 
formulation  of  U.S.  policv  on  the  seabed.  Some  scientists  have  par- 
ticipated in  the  actual  deliberation  and  drafting  of  resolutions  such 
as  the  Draft  U.N.  Convention  on  the  International  Seabed  Area. 

Despite  the  initiatives  of  the  Marine  Council  staff  and  the  increased 
participation  of  scientists  in  the  formulation  of  U.S.  seabed  policv. 
the  evolution  of  this  policy  has  been  relativelv  slow.  Undoubtedly 
the  marine  scientists  and  technologists  would  have  preferred  a 
brisker  pace  than  the  diplomats  were  prepared  to  take.  For  its  part, 
the  Congress  was  ready  to  move  faster  than  was  the  Department  of 
State,  although  in  what  direction  is  still  not  evident.  In  the  case  of 
oceanography,  Congress  has  had  the  initiative  for  more  than  a 
decade;  its  efforts  culminated  in  passage  of  the  Marine  Resources 
Act  of  1966,  despite  some  opposition  by  the  executive  branch. 

It  has  been  demonstrated  that  scientists  can  work  effectively  in 
helping  to  formulate  policy  and  in  participating  in  the  diplomatic 
process.  Modern  diplomats  are  becoming  increasingly  aware  of  the 
effect  of  science  and  technology  in  shaping  their  endeavors.  The 
diplomatic  process  is  in  some  ways  inherently  ambiguous  and  in- 
direct. Traditional  diplomatic  ambiguity  is  often  difficult  to  reconcile 
with  scientific  precision  and  explicitness,  and  few  persons  can  com- 
bine the  subtleties  and  intuitive  approach  of  the  diplomat  with  the 
straightforward  factual  approach  of  the  scientist  to  perform  ade- 
quately across  both  fields.  Nevertheless,  the  number  of  those  who 
can — the  new  breed  of  scientist-diplomat,  or  policymaking  scientist — 
is  rising  rapidly.  It  is  to  the  advantage  of  a  nation  to  capitalize  on 
the  skills  of  such  individuals  in  the  pursuit  of  the  national  interest, 
for  they  may  represent  mankind's  hope  for  the  effective  conduct  of 
decisionmaking  in  a  world  society  of  nations  increasingly  interde- 
pendent and  influenced  by  scientific  discovery  and  technological 
change. 


) 


Chapter   8 — United    States-Soviet    Commercial 

Relations:    The    Interplay    of   Economics, 

Technology  Transfer,  and  Diplomacy 


■/ 


CONTENTS 


Page 

I.  Introduction 529 

A  New  Opportunity  for  U.S. -Soviet  Relations 529 

A  Net  Assessment  of  U.S.  Interests  in  Expanding  Commercial 

Relations  With  the  U.S.S.R 530 

Trade  and  Technology 531 

II.  Setting 533 

U.S.-Soviet  Commercial  Relations  After  World  War  II 533 

Soviet- American  Trade  Prospects  Come  of  Age 535 

The  Disengagement  of  Congress  From  U.S.-Soviet  Trade  Ne- 
gotiations    538 

Trade  and  Diplomacy 539 

III.  The  Soviet  Rationale  for  Expanded  Foreign  Economic  Relations 543 

Technological  Requirements  of  the  Ninth  Five- Year  Plan 544 

Modernization  of  Soviet  Industry 544 

Quality  of  Soviet  Life 547 

Transportation 549 

Improvement  in  Planning  and  Management 550 

Changing    Priorities    in    Resource    Allocation:    Growth    Versus 

Defense 552 

U.S.-Soviet  Technology  Transfers 557 

U.S.  Technology  and  Soviet  Economic  Development  Prior 

to  1946 558 

Current  Soviet  Technological  Requirements 559 

Soviet  Balance-of -Payments  Potential 560 

Soviet  Export  Potential 561 

Soviet  Earnings  From  Invisible  Trade 565 

Multilateral  Relations 566 

Coproduction  Agreements 566 

Potential  Level  of  U.S.-Soviet  Trade 567 

IV.  U.S.  Interest  in  Expanded  Economic  Relations  With  the  Soviet  Union.  570 

Economic  Benefits  for  the  United  States 570 

Stability  of  U.S.  Trade  Gains 570 

Technological  Export  Policy _ . 572 

High  Technology  Trade  and  a  Pattern  of  Economic  Involvement..  573 

V.  Restrictions  on  Soviet  Trade  With  the  United  States 576 

U.S.  Controls  on  Exports  to  the  Soviet  Union 576 

U.S.  Restrictions  on  Imports  From  the  Soviet  Union;  the  Issue 

of  Most-Favored  Nation  Treatment 580 

U.S.  Restrictions  on  Credit  Transactions  With  the  Soviet  Union. .  583 

Shipping  Arrangements  in  U.S.-Soviet  Trade 586 

Soviet  Institutions  and  Practices 587 

Problems  of  Soviet  Law  and  U.S.-Soviet  Trade 588 

Soviet  State  Trading 590 

Prospects  for  Removal  of  Barriers  to  U.S.-Soviet  Trade 592 

VI.  Issues  in  the  Interplay  of  Technology,  Trade,  and  Diplomacy 594 

Benefits  to  the  United  States  From  Expanded  Trade  With  the 

Soviet  Union 594 

The  1972-73  Grain  Sales 595 

Joint  Development  of  Siberian  Natural  Gas  Resources 597 

Political  Benefits  From  Expanded  U.S.-Soviet  Commercial 

Relations 600 

(527) 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  35 


528 

Page 
VI.  Issues  in  the  Interplay  of  Technology,  Trade,  and  Diplomacy — Con. 

Concluding  Observations 601 

Political   Gains  Likely  to  Outweigh  Economic  Benefits  to 

United  States 001 

Relative  Increase  in  U.S.-Soviet  Trade  May  Be  Impressive 

by  1980 602 

Future  U.S.-Soviet  Economic  Ties  Dependent  on  Continued 

Relaxation  of  Institutional  and  Legal  Barriers 602 

New  Soviet  Emphasis  on  Technological  Change  and  Mate- 
rial Incentives  Stimulates  Trade  Prospects 603 

Defense  and  Control  Versus  Economic  Growth  and  Profes- 
sional Performance  Are  Soviet  Choices 603 

Cost  to   Soviets  of   Supplying  Raw   Materials  to   Eastern 

Europe  Is  High  and  Rising 603 

State  Trading  Poses  Problems  for  a  Country  With  a  Market 

Economy  Such  as  the  United  States 604 

Improvements  Are  Needed  in  U.S.  Procedures  and  Institu- 
tions for  Administration  and  Negotiation 605 

The  Current  Opportunity  for  Improved  Soviet-U.S.  Rela- 
tions Is  Crucial 606 

Risks  and  Uncertainties  of  the  New  Relationship  Can  Be 

Reduced  But  Not  Eliminated 606 

TABLES 

1.  Soviet  Energy  Production,  1970  and  1975 546 

2.  Consumption  of  Selected  Foods  in  the  Soviet  Union 547 

3.  Transportation  in  the  Ninth  Five-  Year  Plan 549 

4.  Soviet  Trade  With  Selected  Western  Countries  and  Japan 560 

5.  Selected  Soviet  Commodities  Traded  With  the  Developed  West 562 

6.  U.S.  Imports  From  U.S.S.R 563 

7.  Estimates  of  Soviet  Gold  Output  and  Dispositions 565 

8.  Total  Projected  United  States  Exports  to   Eastern   Europe  and  the 

Soviet  Union 568 

9.  Soviet  Exports  and  Imports  of  Grain 571 

FIGURES 

1.  The  Levels  of  Technological  Development:  The  U.S.S.R.   Compared 

With  Other  Developed  Countries 544 

2.  Primary  Energy  Consumption,  United  States  and  U.S.S.R 545 

3.  Proposed  Joint  Ventures  in  Natural  Gas 598 


CHAPTER  8— UNITED  STATES-SOVIET  COMMERCIAL  RE- 
LATIONS: THE  INTERPLAY  OF  ECONOMICS,  TECHNOL- 
OGY TRANSFER,  AND  DIPLOMACY 

I.    Introduction 

The  general  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  examine  the  interaction  of 
science  and  technology — including  agricultural,  commercial,  man- 
agerial, and  industrial  technology — with  diplomacy,  in  the  context  of 
the  current  and  potential  growth  of  U.S.-Soviet  commercial  relations. 
A  more  specific  purpose  is  to  assess  the  prospects  for  future  U.S.- 
Soviet economic  relations,  primarily  in  terms  of  costs  and  benefits  to 
the  United  States,  as  a  subject  of  importance  and  immediate  concern 
in  itself. 

The  establishment  of  the  Joint  U.S.-U.S.S.R,  Commercial  Commis- 
sion at  the  May  1972  Summit  Conference  and  the  signing  of  a  compre- 
hensive set  of  trade  agreements  on  October  18,  1972  opened  a  promis- 
ing new  period  of  economic  relations  between  the  two  nations.  The 
agreements  provided  a  mechanism  for  removing  many  of  the  barriers 
to  normal  economic  interaction.  More  importantly,  the  agreements  on 
economic  matters  represented  another  step  toward  general  rapproche- 
ment between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  While  the 
agreements  were  limited  to  questions  of  foreign  trade  and  payments, 
officials  of  both  countries  asserted  that  they  would  influence  the 
broader  spectrum  of  diplomatic  relations. 

A  New  Opportunity  for  U.S.-Soviet  Relations 

The  creation  of  a  new  U.S.-Soviet  commercial  relationship  was  an 
important  event  with  historical  parallels.  In  the  1920's  and  1930's,  a 
number  of  U.S.  companies  established  close  commercial  ties  with 
Soviet  industries.  After  the  two  countries  established  diplomatic  re- 
lations in  1933,  the  U.S.  Export- Import  Bank  was  created  to  finance 
U.S.-Soviet  trade  and  a  trade  agreement  was  signed  in  order  to  ex- 
pand commercial  relations.  During  World  War  IT  a  key  aspect  of  the 
alliance  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  was  the  de- 
livery of  U.S.  military  and  civilian  goods  to  the  Soviet  Union  through 
the  Lend-Lease  program.  Again,  at  the  end  of  World  War  II,  steps 
were  taken  to  involve  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  world  economic  commu- 
nity and  to  improve  U.S.-Soviet  economic  relations. 

None  of  these  earlier  attempts  to  normalize  East-West  economic 
relations  was  successful.  In  each  case,  a  change  in  the  international 
political  environment  destroyed  the  basis  for  long-term  economic 
cooperation. 

Now,  once  more,  a  favorable  political  and  economic  climate  exists 
for  progress  in  Soviet-U.S.  relations.  The  new  commercial  relation- 
ship is  one  vehicle  for  progress  in  relations  between  the  two  major 
world  powers.  The  October  1972  commercial  agreement  was  but  one 
of  a  series  of  agreements,  with  others  on  science  and  technology,  nu- 
clear weapons,  space  cooperation,  medical  science,  and  the  environ- 
ment, In  previous  attempts  to  improve  U.S.-Soviet  relations,  political 
understandings   were   followed   by   improved   commercial    relations 


Note  :  This  chapter  was  prepared  in  1973  by  John  P.  Hardt  and  George  D.  Holliday. 

(529) 


530 


which,  in  turn,  were  expected  further  to  facilitate  improved  political 
relations.  On  those  earlier  occasions  the  seeming  reconciliation  of  the 
differences  between  the  two  systems  led  to  an  apparent  assumption  in 
the  United  States  that  Sovietleaders  would  be  willing  to  modify  their 
system  for  economic  gains.  In  this  earlier  adversarial  relationship 
Soviet  political  concessions  appeared  to  be  equated  with  political  gains 
to  U.S.  interests.  Now  the  idea  that  their  loss  is  our  gain — a  zero-sum 
game  approach — has  given  way  in  official  thinking  to  Dr.  Henry  Kis- 
singer's notion  of  mutual  interest  and  constraint.  In  reference  to  the 
Joint  Commercial  Commission  and  the  Summit  accords,  Mr.  Willis  C. 
Armstrong,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Economic  and  Business 
Affairs,  observed : 

. .  .These  programs  are  leading  us  into  a  stage  of  practical  forms  of  intimate 
cooperation  with  the  Soviet  Union  for  years  ahead.  They  constitute  a  framework 
of  interlocking  agreements  to  build  a  vested  interest  on  both  sides  in  reducing 
tensions  and  freeing  us  from  confrontation.1 

The  linkage  of  the  new  commercial  relationship  to  U.S. -Soviet  polit- 
ical relations  highlights  the  need  for  careful  scrutiny  by  the  U.S.  Con- 
gress. Members  of  Congress  have  expressed  interest  in  improved  East- 
West  trade  relations  in  a  series  of  legislative  proposals  and  hearings 
dealing  with  import  restriction,  export  controls,  and  credits.  Congress 
has  already  acted  to  reduce  substantially  the  impact  of  export  controls 
on  U.S. -Soviet  trade.  As  of  May  1973,  other  issues  of  East-West  trade 
await  congressional  action.  The  most  important  of  these  is  considera- 
tion of  the  President's  request  for  authorization  to  extend  most- 
favored-nation  (MFN)  status  to  the  Soviet  Union.  Favorable  congres- 
sional action  on  the  President's  proposal  is  necessary  for  the  trade 
agreement  to  enter  into  force.  Congress  may  also  be  asked  to  consider 
Export-Import  Bank  (Eximbank)  financing  of  U.S. -Soviet  trade. 
While  no  additional  authorization  is  needed  for  Eximbank  participa- 
tion in  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union,  it  is  likely  that  Congress  will  be 
asked  to  increase  the  Bank's  overall  lending  authority  and  terms  of 
loans  so  that  it  may  accommodate  some  proposed  large  transactions 
between  U.S.  companies  and  Soviet  foreign  trade  organizations. 

A  Net  Assessment  of  U.S.  Interests  in  Expanding  Commercial  Rela- 
tions With  the  U.S.S.R. 

This  study  will  consider  U.S.  policymakers'  expectations  of  diplo- 
matic, national  security,  and  economic  gains  to  the  United  States  from 
expanded  economic  exchanges  with  the  Soviet  Union,  and  will  attempt 
to  assess  the  net  advantage  to  the  United  States.  Are  the  projected 
changes  likely  to  be  in  the  best  economic  interests  of  the  United  States? 
What  effect  are  increased  economic  exchanges,  especially  in  technology- 
intensive  products,  likely  to  have  on  U.S.  foreign  policy  goals  and  on 
U.S.  national  security? 

A  crucial  consideration  for  U.S.  policymakers  is  the  Soviet  leader- 
ship's motivation  for  seeking  better  economic  ties  with  the  United 
States.  ( Jonsequently,  this  study  will  also  attempt  to  provide  a  rationale 
for  the  apparent  Soviet  change  in  foreign  economic  policy.  How  is  the 


1  Speech  before  the  World  Trade  Institute  of  the  World  Trade  Center  at  New  York.  N.Y., 
on  November  28,  1972  (State  Department  press  release  294  dated  November  29). 


531 


new  policy  related  to  Soviet  military-strategic  goals?  Does  the  Soviet 
leadership's  interest  in  economic  ties  with  the  United  States  portend 
a  new  era  of  international  stability  and  cooperation,  or  is  it  merely 
an  effort  to  gain  temporary  economic  advantage?  Are  there  changes  in 
Soviet  security  and  foreign  policy  concomitant  with  expanding  com- 
mercial relations  which  are  likely  to  provide  net  benefit  to  the  United 
States?  Are  there  elements  in  the  situation  which  could  lead  to  poten- 
tially dangerous  forms  of  interaction  and  interdependence  in  future 
U.S.-Soviet  relations?  If  U.S.  and  Soviet  leaders  decide  that  ex- 
panded economic  relations  are  mutually  advantageous,  major  institu- 
tional changes  may  have  to  be  made. 

Trade  mid  Technology 

A  central  feature  of  Soviet  economic  relations  with  Western  indus- 
trial countries,  including  the  United  States,  has  always  been  the  trans- 
fer of  technology  from  highly  advanced  Western  industrial  sectors  to 
relatively  backward  Soviet  industries.  The  Soviet  Union  has  tradi- 
tionally paid  for  its  imports  of  technology  primarily  by  exporting 
valuable  raw  materials,  including  energy  resources.  Despite  important 
Soviet  advances  in  certain  industrial  sectors,  the  technology  gap  be- 
tween the  Soviet  Union  and  the  West  persists.  Consequently,  the  basic 
structure  of  U.S.-Soviet  trade  is  likely  to  remain  unchanged  in  the 
foreseeable  future. 

Technology  is  transferred  between  countries  in  a  number  of  ways. 
Flows  of  published  information,  such  as  technical  journals  and  books, 
the  foreign  travel  of  students,  scientists  and  engineers,  technical  aid 
and  cooperation  programs  arranged  by  governments,  and  foreign  com- 
merce, are  frequently-used  channels  for  transferring  technical  infor- 
mation. While  all  of  these  channels  may  be  used  in  future  U.S.-Soviet 
relations,  commercial  .exchanges  of  technology — the  importation  of 
machinery,  equipment,  and  relevant  literature,  agreements  on  patents, 
licensing  and  know-how,  and  direct  foreign  investments  and  opera- 
tions of  multinational  corporations — are  the  focus  of  this  study. 

A  wide  variety  of  U.S.-Soviet  commercial  exchanges  are  likely  to 
involve  technology  transfers.  Transfers  may  take  place  in  new,  dy- 
namic industries,  such  as  those  producing  computers,  chemicals  and 
electronics,  or  in  traditional  sectors,  such  as  agriculture.  Consequently, 
while  giving  special  attention  to  prospective  technological  transfers, 
the  study  will  consider  the  broad  range  of  U.S.-Soviet  economic 
relations. 

Current  projections  indicate  a  substantial  increase  in  U.S.-Soviet . 
economic  exchanges.  Improved  economic  relations  are  officially  con- 
sidered to  be  part  of  a  pattern  of  changing  U.S.-Soviet  relations  in 
many  areas.  The  trade  agreement,  along  with  the  Summit  agreements 
on  strategic  arms  limitations  and  other  matters,  links  national  security 
considerations,  economic  relations,  technology  policy,  and  the  conduct 
of  diplomacy  between  the  two  major  powers.2  President  Richard  Nixon 

2  The  interaction  of  various  aspects  of  U.S.-Soviet  relations  is  perhaps  best  demonstrated 
in  the  Joint  U.S.-Soviet  Communique  issued  at  the  conclusion  of  President  Nixon's  visit  to 
the  Soviet  Union  on  May  29,  1972.  The  communique  enumerates  a  number  of  areas  in  which 
the  prospects  for  greater  cooperation  seemed  favorable.  See  "Joint  Communique,"  in  Presi- 
dent Nixon  in  Moscow  (Washington,  D.C.  :  United  States  Information  Service,  1972), 
pp.  18-24. 


532 


and  Soviet  Communist  Party  Secretary  Leonid  Brezhnev  both  postu- 
late that  the  changes  occurring  in  U.S.-Soviet  relations  will  influence 
the  stability  of  the  international  community  for  some  years  to  come. 

The  prospect  of  increased  U.S.-Soviet  technology  transfers  raises 
important  questions  of  national  security  and  creates  special  require- 
ments for  institutional  changes  that  can  insure  mutual  benefits  in  fu- 
ture economic  interactions.  U.S.  policymakers,  legislative  as  well  as 
executive,  will  be  faced  with  hard  questions :  What  kinds  of  U.S.  tech- 
nology do  Soviet  leaders  want  to  import?  Can  such  technical  informa- 
tion be  safely  exported  to  the  Soviet  Union  without  enhancing  its  mili- 
tary capabilities?  What  technological  contributions  will  U.S.-Soviet 
commercial  exchanges  make  to  U.S.  industry?  What  risks  will  these 
exchanges  pose  to  specific  U.S.  industries  and  industrial  corporations? 
Such  questions  suggest  some  of  the  complex  and  difficult  problems 
which  continue  to  be  involved  in  the  growing  interaction  of  U.S.  for- 
eign economic  policy,  technology  policy,  and  diplomacy. 


II.  Setting 

The  signing  of  the  U.S. -Soviet  trade  agreement  in  Washington,  on 
October  18,  1072,  represented  the  culmination  of  a  gradual  change  in 
U.S.  foreign  economic  policy  toward  the  Soviet  Union.  It  came  after 
several  years  of  discussion  and  review  of  a  foreign  trade  policy  de- 
signed in  the  early  years  of  the  Cold  War.  The  new  commercial  ar- 
rangements are  a  part  of  an  overall  change  in  U.S. -Soviet  diplomatic 
relations.  The  political  detente  between  the  two  countries  has  provided 
a  favorable  atmosphere  for  long-term  and  mutually  beneficial  tech- 
nology transfers.  At  the  same  time,  the  evolving  commercial  and  tech- 
nological relationship  is  likely  to  influence  political  decisionmaking 
in  both  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

TLR. -Soviet  Commercial  Relations  After  World  War  II 

The  central  feature  of  U.S.  foreign  trade  policy  toward  the  Soviet 
Union  during  the  Cold  War  period  was  an  attempt  to  deny  the  Soviet 
Union  the  benefits  of  trade  with  the  more  advanced  industrial  West. 
Those  who  advocated  restrictions  on  U.S. -Soviet  trade  argued  that  the 
United  States  should  not  contribute  to  the  economic  and  military 
power  of  a  country  whose  domestic  and  foreign  policies  were  inimical 
to  U.S.  interests.  This  argument  was  based  on  the  assumption  that  the 
United  States  could  retard  the  growth  of  Soviet  economic  and  military 
power  by  preventing  U.S.  companies  from  trading  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  Exports  of  U.S.  technology  were  considered  to  be  particularly 
important  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  were  therefore  singled  out  for  ex- 
tremely strict  controls. 

Another  major  argument  against  trading  with  the  Soviet  Union 
was  the  alleged  existence  of  unethical  Soviet  foreign  trade  practices. 
Among  the  charges  directed  at  Soviet  foreign  trade  organizations 
were  those  of  dumping,  pirating  of  foreign  inventions,  disruption  of 
Western  markets  for  political  purposes,  and  use  of  slave  labor.  Such 
arguments  were  widely  accepted  in  the  early  days  of  the  Cold  War.  As 
a  result,  numerous  artificial  barriers  were  erected  to  inhibit  normal 
economic  ties  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  Eco- 
nomic rationality  gave  way  to  national  security  considerations  as  a 
major  determinant  of  U.S. -Soviet  economic  relations  in  the  early 
postwar  period.  The  curtailment  of  commercial  transactions  with  the 
Soviet  Union  was  consequently  made  an  important  U.S.  foreign  policy 
goal. 

U.S.-imposed  restrictions  were  not  the  only  causes  of  Soviet  eco- 
nomic isolation.  To  a  large  extent,  Soviet  foreign  economic  policy  in 
the  late  1940's  and  early  195CFs  was  a  continuation  of  its  prewar  strat- 
egy of  minimizing  its  economic  ties  to  the  industrial  West.  During  the 
1930's,  Soviet  foreign  economic  relations  had  been  characterized  by  a 
policy  of  self-sufficiency  or  autarky.  Although  the  importation  of 

(533) 


534 


high-technology  products  and,  for  a  time,  the  services  of  foreign  engi- 
neers were  permitted  to  meet  high-priority,  short-run  needs,  minimum 
reliance  on  the  non-Communist  world  economy  was  a  primary  indi- 
cator of  economic  success.  Throughout  his  rule,  Soviet  Party  Leader 
Joseph  Stalin  adhered  to  the  principle  that  the  world  was  divided  into 
two  hostile  camps — the  capitalist  and  socialist  economic  and  political 
systems. 

The  Soviet  leadership's  ideological  hostility  toward  the  United 
States  and  the  unresolved  issue  of  Tsarist  and  Russian  Provisional 
Government  debts  (which  Soviet  leaders  refused  to  pay)  inhibited 
economic  relations  between  the  two  countries.  The  situation  was 
exacerbated  by  a  sharp  fall  in  the  world  market  prices  for  Soviet  raw 
materials,  which  accounted  for  most  of  Soviet  exports  to  the  United 
States.  Despite  these  problems,  the  establishment  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions in  1933  and  the  signing  of  bilateral  trade  treaties  in  1935  and 
1937  provided  the  basis  for  some  expansion  of  trade.  However,  the 
Soviet  Union's  general  pattern  of  autarkical  foreign  trade  and  isola- 
tion from  the  West  did  not  change. 

The  interwar  policies  were  interrupted  only  temporarily  by  Soviet 
alliances  with  Western  countries  during  World  War  II.  Expectations 
that  the  wartime  alliance  might  be  followed  by  peacetime  cooperation 
proved  unfounded.  Discussions  of  U.S.  aid  and  credits  to  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Soviet  participation  in  a  now  multilateral  world  economic 
system  came  to  an  end  with  the  emergence  of  the  Cold  War.  The 
Soviet  leadership's  suspicion  of  Western  "capitalist"  countries  and  the 
Soviet  predilection  for  comprehensive  planning  and  control  of  the 
domestic  economy  probably  led  them  to  revert  to  a  deliberate  policy 
of  economic  independence.  The  economic  isolation  of  the  U.S.S.R. 
from  the  West  reached  a  peak  in  the  early  1950's,  when  less  than  20 
percent  of  its  foreign  trade  was  conducted  with  countries  outside  the 
Communist  area. 

In  the  late  1950's  and  throughout  the  1960's  attitudes  toward  U.S.- 
Soviet trade  gradually  changed  in  both  countries.  In  the  Soviet  Union, 
the  post-Stalin  leadership  began  actively  to  seek  business  deals  with 
Western  industrial  countries.  Soviet  Party  Leader  Nikita  Khrushchev, 
in  his  travels  abroad,  personally  lobbied  for  improved  economic  rela- 
tions. Typical  was  his  appearance  at  the  Leipzig  Trade  Fair  in  1959, 
where  he  presented  himself  as  a  businessman  rather  than  a  political 
leader.  The  West  European  countries  and  Japan  took  advantage  of 
this  economic  opening  to  the  East.  Reduced  trade  restrictions,  liberal 
credit  policies,  and  participation  in  joint  industrial  ventures  allowed 
them  rapidly  to  expand  their  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  other 
East  European  countries.  The  attitudes  of  U.S.  policymakers  toward 
East-West  trade,  however,  tended  to  be  more  sensitive  to  political 
differences  with  the  Soviet  Union.  The  Cuban  crisis,  the  Vietnam  War, 
and  the  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  set  back  efforts  to  improve  eco- 
nomic ties  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  spite  of  the  unfavorable  political  climate,  small  but  significant 
steps  were  made  to  remove  some  of  the  impediments  to  IT. S. -Soviet 
trade.  Several  administrative  changes,  such  as  loosening  export  con- 
trols and  extending  credits  for  Soviet  agricultural  purchases  from  the 
United  States,  facilitated  a  gradual  increase  in  U.S. -Soviet  trade  dur- 
ing the  19fi(Vs.  Moreover,  the  rationale  for  East-West  trade  restrictions 


535 


slowly  eroded.  Restraints  on  U.S.-Soviet  trade  were  criticized  on  sev- 
eral grounds.  Advocates  of  expanded  East-West  trade  claimed  that 
U.S.  controls  were  not  effective.  Communist  countries  which  were  de- 
nied certain  U.S.  poods  could  often  import  the  same  products  from 
other  Western  countries.  It  was  argued  that  U.S.  companies  were 
needlessly  forced  to  forego  mutually  advantageous  trade  opportunities. 
Those  who  favored  more  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  also  claimed 
that  such  trade  would  improve  political  ties  between  the  two  coun- 
tries and  would  help  to  achieve  a  more  stable  international  order.  Pres- 
ident Lyndon  Johnson  appointed  a  special  committee,  headed  by  J. 
Irwin  Miller,  to  reexamine  U.S.  trade  policy  toward  the  Soviet  Union 
and  other  East  European  countries.  The  committee  recommended  sev- 
eral trade  liberalization  measures  and  concluded: 

The  intimate  engagement  of  trade,  over  a  considerable  period  of  time,  when 
taken  with  the  process  of  change  already  under  way,  can  influence  the  internal 
development  and  the  external  polices  of  European  Communist  societies  along 
paths  favorable  to  our  purpose  and  to  world  peace.  Trade  is  one  of  the  few 
channels  available  to  us  for  constructive  contacts  with  nations  with  whom  we 
find  frequent  hostility.  In  the  long  run,  selected  trade,  intelligently  negotiated 
and  wisely  administered,  may  turn  out  to  have  been  one  of  our  most  powerful 
tools  of  national  policy.3 

Such  arguments  led  President  Johnson  to  urge  increased  economic 
exchanges  in  order  to  "build  bridges"  to  the  East  European  countries. 

Soviet- American  Trade  Prospects  Come  of  Age 

The  U.S.  domestic  economic  recession  of  1969-70  and  the  recur- 
ring balance-of-payments  deficits  gave  rise  to  a  far-reaching  review 
by  the  Nixon  Administration  of  foreign  economic  policy.  Expanded 
trade  with  Communist  countries  was  considered  as  a  means  of  increas- 
ing U.S.  exports  and  stimulating  domestic  production  and  employ- 
ment. Initially,  however,  the  administration  made  no  major  effort  to 
increase  U.S.-Soviet  trade.  The  report  of  the  Commission  on  Inter- 
national Trade  and  Investment  Policy,  established  by  the  President 
in  May  1970  to  study  major  problems  in  the  field  of  U.S.  foreign  trade 
and  investment,  was  cautious  in  its  appraisal  of  U.S.  foreign  trade 
policy  toward  the  Communist  world  : 

We  see  few  economic  problems  in  our  trade  relations  with  Communist  coun- 
tries. The  course  of  these  relations  is  mostly  determined  by  political  factors. 
The  volume  of  U.S.  trade  involved  is  small  and  is  likely  to  remain  so  for  the 
1970's.4 

While  recommending  change,  the  Commission  expressed  specific 
reservations  on  expanding  technological  transfers  and  on  the  use  of 
bilateral  arrangements  in  trade: 

Within  the  bounds  set  by  strategic  considerations,  the  United  States  should 
attempt  to  expand  its  trade  with  the  Communist  countries.  To  this  end,  we  should 
align  our  export  restrictions  and  related  regulations  with  those  of  other  Western 
nations. 

However,  transfers  of  technologies,  production  processes,  and/or  assistance  in 
the  establishment  of  manufacturing  facilities  should  continue  to  be  subject  to 


•■""Report  of  the  Special  Committee  on  U.S.  Trade  With  East  European  Countries  and 
the   Soviet   Union,"   Department  of  State  Bulletin,  May   30.   1966,   p.   855. 

4  A.  L.  Williams  (Commission  Chairman),  United  States  International  Economic  Policy 
in  an  Interdependent  World  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Govt.  Print.  Off.,  July  1971), 
Vol.   I,  p.   10.    [Hereafter  cited  as:  Williams  Report.] 


536 


careful  review  by  appropriate  government  agencies  to  ensure  that  they  do  not 
contribute  significantly  to  the  military  capabilities  of  Communist  countries. 

The  President  should  be  given  authority  to  remove  the  existing  tariff  discrimi- 
nation against  imports  from  Communist  countries,  in  return  for  appropriate 
benefits  for  the  United  States. 

We  should  explore  with  other  Western  governments  possible  multilateral  ar- 
rangements designed  to  loosen  the  existing  bilateral  constraints  on  East-West 
trade.5 

The  Nixon  Administration's  "New  Economic  Policy,"  inaugurated 
in  August  1971,  proposed  a  program  for  attacking  foreign,  as  well  as 
domestic,  economic  problems.  With  the  new  initiative  in  foreign  trade 
matters,  interest  in  East-West  trade  grew.  The  issue  of  expanding 
East-West  trade  ties  became  more  closely  linked  to  the  broader  range 
of  security  and  political  issues  that  were  to  make  up  the  agenda  of 
the  May  1972  Summit  meeting  of  President  Nixon  and  Party  Secre- 
tary Brezhnev.  In  December  1971,  Mr.  Peter  G.  Peterson,  Assistant  to 
the  President  for  International  Economic  Affairs  (later  Secretary  of 
Commerce),  issued  a  report  ranging  broadly  over  the  foreign  economic 
policy  interests  of  the  United  States.  The  Peterson  Report  called  for 
a  new  U.S.  approach  to  Communist  trade  in  order  to  improve  the  trade 
prospects  of  the  United  States  and  to  open  the  way  for  the  Communist 
countries  to  join  the  world  trading  and  monetary  community. 

Relations  with  the  Communist  world  are  now  opening  up  rapidly.  The  United 
States  has  a  long  way  to  go  in  matching  the  trade  levels  of  East  and  West  Europe 
with  each  other.  Presently,  much  of  European  trade  with  Eastern  Europe  and 
the  Soviet  Union  is  on  the  basis  of  bilateral  agreements.  A  major  effort  may 
now  be  needed  to  see  how  to  fit  the  non-market  Communist  countries  into  the 
multilateral  framework  of  economic  exchange  among  the  Western  economies. 
We  shall  also  have  to  review  at  home  the  kinds  of  guidelines  to  apply  in  trading 
with  non-market  enterprises." 

Mr.  Peterson  noted  that  the  share  of  the  United  States  in  Western 
trade  with  the  U.S.S.R.  and  Eastern  Europe  was  about  3  percent  of 
exports  and  2  percent  of  imports — roughly  unchanged  from  1960. 
With  the  tripling  of  total  Western  exports  to  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Eastern  Europe  during  the  period  1960-1970  (from  $3.7  to  $10.0  bil- 
lion). Western  European  and  Japanese  exports  accounted  for  most 
of  the  increase.7 

The  trips  to  Moscow  by  Maurice  Stans,  Secretary  of  Commerce,  in 
November  1971  and  Earl  Butz,  Secretary  of  Agriculture,  in  April 
1972  resulted  in  optimistic  appraisals  of  the  future  course  of  U.S.- 
Soviet economic  relations.  Secretary  Stans  predicted  that  the  level 
of  U.S. -Soviet  trade  would  rise  substantially  in  the  next  few  years. 
Secretary  Butz  was  also  optimistic,  suggesting  that  significant  grain 
sales  to  the  Soviet  Union  might  take  place  for  a  number  of  years. 

The  Summit  agreements  in  May  1972  did  not,  however,  include  a 
commercial  agreement.  Instead,  the  Joint  Commercial  Commission 
w;is  set  up  to  negotiate  : 

(a)  an  overall  trade  agreement  including  reciprocal  most -favored- 
nation  agreement; 

(b)  arrangements  for  the  reciprocal  availability  of  government 
credits; 


s  Ibid.,  pp.  15-16. 

•  Peter    G.    Peterson,   A    Foreign   Economic  Perspective    (Washington,   D.C.  :   U.S.   Govt. 
Print.  Office,  December  1971),  p.  28.    [Hereafter  cited  as  Peterson   (1971).] 
7  Ibid.,  p.  23. 


537 


(c)  provisions  for  the  reciprocal  establishment  of  business  facili- 
ties to  promote  trade ; 

(d)  an  agreement  establishing  an  arbitration  mechanism  for  settling 
commercial  dudoates.8 

The  Joint  Commercial  Commission  has  no  precise  parallels  in  earlier 
periods  of  temporary  improvement  in  U.S.-Soviet  relations,  although 
it  does  parallel  recent  Soviet  arrangements  with  the  Japanese  and 
West  Europeans.  The  Commission  consists  on  each  side  of  one  princi- 
pal, three  deputies,  and  staff.  The  U.S.  Secretary  of  Commerce  and 
the  Soviet  Minister  of  Foreign  Trade,  Mr.  Peter  G.  Peterson  and  Mr. 
Nikolai  Patolichev,  respectively,  were  the  first  principals.9  The  U.S. 
staff  for  the  new  commission  was  supplied  by  a  component  of  the  new 
East- West  Trade  Bureau  of  the  Department  of  Commerce. 

On  March  6,  1973  an  East- West  trade  policy  committee  was  created 
with  George  Shultz  as  chairman,  and  Frederick  B.  Dent,  Secretary  of 
Commerce,  as  vice  chairman.  Other  members  are  Secretary  of  State 
Rogers,  presidential  assistants  Henry  A.  Kissinger  and  Peter  M.  Flani- 
gan,  and  Ambassador  William  D.  Eberle,  Special  Representative  for 
Trade  Negotiations.  James  E.  Smith,  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of 
Treasury  is  the  executive  secretary  of  the  Committee.10 

Even  though  the  problems  and  issues  of  U.S.-Soviet  trade  were  not 
resolved  at  the  May  1972  Summit  meeting,  there  appeared  to  be  a  seri- 
ous disposition  on  the  part  of  Soviet  authorities  to  press  for  their  early 
resolution.  New  York  Times  reporter  Theodore  Shabad  reported  a 
discussion  with  Mikhail  Misnik,  deputy  chairman  of  the  Soviet  State 
Planning  Commission,  in  which  Mr.  Misnik  said : 

It's  about  time  we  moved  beyond  the  Stone  age  practice  of,  say,  bartering  a 
sheep  for  half  a  camel  ...  if  we  advance  beyond  that  stage  into  large-scale 
arrangements  in  which  the  United  States  would  provide  plant  and  equipment  and 
we  would  pay  with  raw  materials  and  the  end  products  of  such  plants,  then  the 
possibilities  are  indeed  immense. 

.  .  .  Once  we  feel  that  there  is  serious  interest  in  a  joint  venture,  the  problem 
of  access  can  be  overcome.11 

The  issues  were  formally  joined  again  during  the  summer.  In  a 
report  released  by  Secretary  Peterson  on  his  return  from  the  first 
meeting  of  the  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Commercial  Commission,  he  suggested 
that  the  United  States  was  also  willing  to  compromise — even  in  the 
area  of  high  technology  transfers  formerly  restricted  by  association 
with  national  security. 

With  the  industrial  and  technological  development  of  other  major  economies, 
the  U.S.  no  longer  has  the  monopoly  it  once  enjoyed  in  the  production  of  certain 
goods.  Our  overall  trade  balance  is  a  melancholy  reminder  of  these  changed  cir- 
cumstances. The  increased  availability  of  high  technology  products  elsewhere 
rendered  some  of  our  original  curbs  on  exports  to  the  Soviet  Union  increasingly 
anachronistic.  The  real  loser  from  these  particular  restraints  would  have  in- 
creasingly been  the  U.S.  producer  and  worker,  not  the  Soviet  consumer  or  the 
Soviet  economy.  There  comes  a  point  at  which  we  must  face  the  fact  that  business 


8  "Communique  Regarding  Joint  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Commercial  Commission,  May  26,  1972," 
Denartment  of  State  Bulletin    (June  26,  1972),  p.  898. 

8  On  March  6,  1973,  George  Shultz,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  was  designated  to  succeed 
Mr.  Peterson. 

w  Washington  Post,  Mar.  7,  1973. 

11  New  York  Times,  May  30,  1972,  p.  19. 


538 


is  business,  and,  if  it  is  going  to  go  on  in  any  event,  we  might  as  well  have  a  piece 
of  the  action.12 

The  new  attitudes  expressed  by  Mr.  Misnik  and  Mr.  Peterson  pro- 
vided the  impetus  .for  conclusion  of  a  series  of  agreem™  r^  regulating 
and  promoting  U.S.-Soviet  trade.  On  July  8,  1972,  an  agreement  was 
reached  providing  credit  through  the  U.S.  Commodity  Credit  Cor- 
poration for  Soviet  purchases  of  American  grain.  A  maritime  agree- 
ment was  concluded  on  October  14,  1972,  which  removed  several  bar- 
riers to  commercial  shipping  between  the  two  countries.  On  October  18, 
1972,  a  commercial  agreement  and  a  settlement  of  the  Soviet  Lend- 
Lease  debt  were  signed.  The  commercial  agreement  projected  a  trip- 
ling of  U.S.-Soviet  trade  within  a  three-year  period  and  provided  a 
number  of  regulatory  measures.  The  Lend-Lease  settlement  arranged 
a  repayment  schedule  for  the  Soviet  World  War  II  debt  to  the  United 
States. 

The  Disengagement  of  Congress  From  U.S.-Soviet  Trade  Negotiations 
Dealing  with  the  broad  question  of  American  international  eco- 
nomic policy,  the  Williams  Commission  Report  in  July  1971  made 
clear  that  a  major  and  direct  role  of  Congress  in  trade  negotiations  was 
necessary  and  desirable : 

.  .  .  The  U.S.  Congress  has  the  constitutional  responsibility  for  regulating 
trade.  It  delegates  the  administration  of  this  responsibility  to  the  Executive, 
which  has  the  constitutional  responsibility  for  negotiations  with  foreign  govern- 
ments. This  makes  it  all  the  more  important  that  we  do  our  utmost  to  provide  for 
continuous,  close  communications  between  the  Executive  and  the  Congress,  so  as 
to  ensure  the  effective  pursuit  of  our  national  objectives. 

We  recommend  that  the  negotiations  be  buttressed  in  advance  by  appropriate 
congressional  action.  In  some  areas,  such  as  tariffs,  a  specific  delegation  of 
authority  to  negotiate  and  proclaim  changes  in  U.S.  restrictions  will  be  needed. 
In  other  areas,  the  Administration  should  negotiate  on  the  basis  of  a  congres- 
sional declaration  of  intent;  the  results  of  the  negotiations  would  be  submitted  to 
Congress,  either  for  affirmative  action,  or  preferably  subject  to  an  understanding 
that  they  could  be  implemented  by  the  Executive  unless  rejected  by  Congress 
within,  say,  60  days.  Furthermore,  some  Congressmen  should  be  included  in  the 
United  States  delegations  to  the  negotiations.1* 

The  Peterson  Report  in  December  1971  also  referred  to  a  special 
congressional  role  in  fashioning  a  new  international  economic  order: 

Of  critical  importance  in  our  efforts  will  be  the  new  legislation  needed  to 
equip  American  negotiators  with  the  tools  for  constructing  a  new,  open  and  fair 
world  trading  system.  Defining  the  negotiating  authority  we  need  will  require 
close  collaboration  with  the  Congress.  In  the  international  negotiations  under- 
taken with  this  authority,  our  intention  will  be  to  construct  a  new  trading  sys- 
tem to  take  the  place  of  the  old." 

However,  no  effort  was  made  to  involve  Congress  in  U.S.-Soviet 
trade  negotiations.  Congress  did  not  pass  enabling  legislation  to  facili- 
tate a  trade  agreement  between  the  two  countries.  Only  after  the  trade 
agreement  had  been  concluded  did  the  Nixon  Administration  turn  to 


"Peter  G.  Peterson,  U.S.Soviet  Commercial  Relationships  in  a  New  Era  (Washington, 
D.C.  :  Department  of  Commerce,  August  1972),  p.  13.  [Hereafter  cited  as  Peterson  Report 
(1972). 1 

13  Williams  Report,  op.  clt.,  pp.  lfr-17. 

u  Peterson  (1971)  op.  clt.,  p.  v. 


539 


Congress  for  enactment  of  a  law  providing  most-favored-nation  treat- 
ment for  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  various  executive  department  delegations  to  the  Soviet  Union 
did  not  include  congressional  representation,  nor  was  the  Summit 
meeting  attended  by  representatives  of  Congress.  Moreover,  the  bi- 
partisan official  visits  to  China  by  congressional  leaders  were  not 
repeated  in  the  wake  of  the  Moscow  Summit,  and  the  Joint  U.S.- 
U.S.S.R.  Commercial  Commission  set  up  at  the  Summit  did  not  include 
congressional  representation.  Finally,  the  Peterson  Report  in  August 
1972  on  the  first  meeting  of  the  Commission  made  no  direct  reference 
to  Congress. 

The  absence  of  congressional  participation  in  U.S.-Soviet  negotia- 
tions was  in  contrast  with  trade  negotiations  conducted  under  the 
authority  of  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  of  1962  (19  U.S.C.  1873). 
Section  243  of  that  Act  stipulated  that  four  members  of  Congress  (two 
members  of  the  House  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  and  two  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Finance)  must  be  accredited  as  members  of  the 
U.S.  delegation  to  trade  negotiations  authorized  by  the  Act. 

Congress  necessarily  will  be  involved  in  certain  aspects  of  U.S.- 
Soviet economic  relations  in  the  future.  Congressional  approval  is 
required  for  extension  of  MFN  treatment  to  the  Soviet  Union.  More- 
over, Congress  may  be  asked  to  consider  new  arrangements  to  facilitate 
U.S.-Soviet  trade,  such  as  expansion  of  U.S.  Government  credit 
facilities. 

Trade  and  Diplomacy 

Increased  trade  has  generally  been  assumed  to  encourage  more  ami- 
cable and  stable  relations  among  nations.  U.S.  economic  relations  with 
the  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe  have  specifically  been  assumed 
to  be  an  effective  lever  to  further  U.S.  national  interests.  For  example, 
after  World  War  II,  U.S.  leaders  proposed  including  the  Soviet  Union 
and  East  European  countries  in  the  Marshall  Plan  for  European  re- 
covery, presumably  in  return  for  adherence  to  U.S.  views  on  the  politi- 
cal settlements  in  Eastern  Europe  and  other  matters.  U.S.  leaders  also 
specifically  linked  economic  benefits  from  trade  to  assured  access  routes 
in  the  settlement  of  the  1948  Berlin  Crisis.  Again,  Communist  coun- 
tries were  apparently  denied  equal  commercial  relations  because  of 
their  participation  in  the  Korean  War  and  their  repressive  domestic 
policies.  Withdrawal  of  MFN  status  and  imposition  of  export  controls 
Avere  among  the  penalties  applied  by  U.S.  policymakers.  Later  Yugo- 
slavia and  Poland  were  rewarded  for  their  independence  from  Soviet 
domination  and  for  a  degree  of  moderation  in  domestic  policies  by  a 
moderating  of  U.S.  foreign  trade  policy.  Romania  has  also  been  sin- 
gled out  on  various  occasions  for  less  restrictive  commercial  treatment 
in  recognition  of  its  relatively  independent  foreign  policy.  Thus, 
changes  in  U.S.  foreign  economic  policy  toward  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Eastern  Europe  have  been  used  for  a  number  of  political  ends  deemed 
consistent  with  U.S.  foreign  policy.  Overarching  the  specific  applica- 
tions of  economic  leverage  has  been  the  general  attitude  that  the  Com- 
munist nations  were  enemies  of  the  United  States  and  should  be  de- 


540 


nied  any  assistance  in  development  of  capabilities  which  might  be  a 
threat  to  U.S.  security.  Although  somewhat  inconsistent  in  applica- 
tion, a  policy  of  reward-penalty  appeared  to  be  followed  by  the  United 
States,  apparently  with  three  main  objectives : 

(1)  to  encourage  detente  by  reducing  weapons  development,  lower- 
ing force  levels,  and  moderating  crisis  management ; 

(2)  to  encourage  detente  through  moderation  and  reform  of  the  So- 
viet regime's  domestic  policies,  including  religious  tolerance,  economic 
reform,  freedom  of  expression,  and  the  right  to  emigrate; 

(3)  to  encourage  polycentrism  in  the  Communist  world,  detente  in 
the  foreign  policies  of  the  individual  Communist  countries  other  than 
the  U.S.S.R.,  and  moderation  in  their  domestic  policies.  The  impor- 
tance of  these  several  objectives  has  varied  over  time,  but  each  appears 
relevant  today. 

Although  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  still  have  political 
differences  in  various  world  crises,  there  is  some  evidence  of  a  moderat- 
ing of  international  tension.  The  U.S.-Soviet  Strategic  Arms  Limita- 
tion Talks  (SALT)  provide  a  mechanism  for  moderation  in  the  devel- 
opment of  both  strategic  offensive  and  defensive  weapons ;  the  Treaty 
on  the  Limitation  of  Anti-Ballistic  Missile  Systems  and  the  Interim 
Agreement  on  Certain  Measures  with  respect  to  the  Limitation  of 
Strategic  Offensive  Arms  signed  in  Moscow  on  May  26,  1972,  are  evi- 
dence of  apparent  progress.15  The  multilateral  European  Security 
Conference  (ESC)  and  discussions  of  mutual  and  balanced  force  re- 
ductions (MBFR)  may  reflect  a  similar  development  in  the  area  of 
military  force  reductions.16 

At  the  same  time,  questions  remain  on  the  significance  and  enduring 
character  of  the  change  in  relations.  In  the  three  areas  of  detente — 
hostilities  and  security,  internal  moderation  and  reform,  and  easing 
of  the  control  system  in  Eastern  Europe — opinions  vary  on  the  changes 
to  date  and  future  prospects.  Indeed,  quite  divergent  views  on  these 
various  aspects  of  the  new  relationship  are  expressed  by  different 
observers : 

(a)  On  hostilities  and  security. — Some  observers  argue  that  the 
Soviet  Union  acts  as  a  moderating  influence  on  North  Vietnamese  and 
Middle  Eastern  leaders  and  uses  its  leverage  to  dampen  tensions  and 
hostilities.  Others  maintain  that  the  Soviet  Union  fosters  proxy  wars 
to  its  own  benefit,  and  that  the  continuations  of  the  Arab-Israeli  and 
Indoehinese  conflicts  are  not  incompatible  with  Soviet  aims. 

Moreover,  some  argue  that  Soviet  leaders  have  a  pressing  need  to 
reorder  priorities  and  that  the  SALT  agreements  permit  them  to  pro- 
ceed on  badly  needed  civilian  programs  for  modernization  of  the  tech- 
nologically backward  Soviet  economy.  Others  contend  that  the  Soviet 
Union,  with  a  well-developed  military  research  and  development  base, 
will  seek  to  turn  its  numerical  advantage  in  strategic  offensive  weapons 
into  a  position  of  overall  superiority  by  closing  the  technological  lead 

"The  ABM  Treaty  limits  the  deployment  of  anti-ballistic  missile  systems  to  two  deslg 
nated  areas  in  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  and  at  a  low  level.  The  Interim 
Agreement  limits  the  overall  level  of  strategic  offensive  missile  forces. 

14  Preliminary  talks  on  the  European  Security  Conference  began  in  Helsinki  on  Novem- 
ber 22,  1972.  The  purpose  of  the  Conference,  which  will  include  most  of  the  countries  of 
East  and  West  Europe,  the  United  Stntes.  and  Canada,  Is  to  attempt  to  solve  problems  of 
European  security  and  cooperation.  Negotiations  on  mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions 
began  on  January  31.  1973  in  Vienna.  The  purpose  of  the  talks  Is  to  negotiate  a  reduction 
of  military  forces  in  Europe. 


541 


of  the  United  States  with  respect  to  such  advances  in  weaponry  as  the 
Multiple  Independently  Targetable  Reentry  Vehicle  (MIRV). 

(b)  On  internal  moderation  or  reform. — Some  observers  point  to 
a  continuing  need  for  moderation  to  encourage  professionalism  and 
accommodate  modernization.  Others,  however,  point  to  the  restrictions 
on  civil  liberties,  religious  freedom,  the  right  to  emigrate,  and  access 
to  foreign  media  as  evidence  of  a  retrogression  or  toughening  of  the 
Stalinist  elements  in  the  system. 

(c)  On  the  control  of  the  bloc. — Some  observers  maintain  that  the 
relaxation  of  Soviet-U.S.  tensions,  the  potential  reordering  of  Soviet 
priorities,  and  a  moderating  of  domestic  controls  may  permit  more 
foreign  policy  independence  and  internal  reform  in  Eastern  Europe. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Soviet  Union,  given  some  relaxation  of  ten- 
sions vis-a-vis  the  West,  may  decide  it  can  get  away  with  perpetuating 
the  post-Czech  invasion  "Brezhnev  Doctrine,"  which  severely  limits 
Eastern  European  independence  from  Moscow. 

Recent  expressions  by  Dr.  Henry  Kissinger  appear  to  incline  toward 
the  more  hopeful,  less  threatening  interpretation  of  the  progress  to- 
ward detente  to  date,  while  accepting  the  view  that  opposing  trends 
and  pressures  exist.  The  Soviet  leadership,  Dr.  Kissinger  pointed  out 
in  a  congressional  briefing  in  June  1972,  is  responding  to  the  pressures 
which  make  for  detente  as  well  as  to  the  older,  conservative  pressures : 

.  .  .  Some  factors — such  as  the  fear  of  nuclear  war,  the  emerging  consumer 
economy,  and  the  increased  pressures  of  a  technological,  administrative  society — 
have  encouraged  the  Soviet  leaders  to  seek  a  more  stable  relationship  with  the 
United  States.  Other  factors — such  as  ideology,  bureaucratic  inertia,  and  the 
catalytic  effect  of  turmoil  in  peripheral  areas — have  prompted  pressures  for 
tactical  gains." 

Earlier  in  the  same  briefing,  Dr.  Kissinger  noted : 

But  now  both  we  and  the  Soviet  Union  have  begun  to  find  that  each  increment 
of  power  does  not  necessarily  represent  an  increment  of  usable  political 
strength.18 

Dr.  Kissinger  also  saw  enhanced  security  in  the  collective  benefits  or 
linkage  among  various  agreements  such  as  those  on  arms  limitations, 
trade,  and  the  environment : 

We  hoped  that  the  Soviet  Union  would  acquire  a  stake  in  a  wide  spectrum  of 
negotiations  and  that  it  would  become  convinced  that  its  interests  would  be  best 
served  if  the  entire  process  unfolded.  We  have  sought,  in  short,  to  create  a  vested 
interest  in  mutual  restraint.19 

.  .  .  The  SALT  agreement  does  not  stand  alone,  isolated  and  incongruous  in 
the  relationship  of  hostility,  vulnerable  at  any  moment  to  the  shock  of  some 
sudden  crisis.  It  stands,  rather,  linked  organically  to  a  chain  of  agreements  and 
to  a  broad  understanding  about  international  conduct  appropriate  to  the  dangers 
of  the  nuclear  age.20 

The  process  of  creating  a  "vested  interest  in  mutual  restraint"  is 
likely  to  be  a  very  gradual  and  protracted  one.  Moreover,  future 
changes  in  Soviet  foreign  policy  and  the  motivations  of  Soviet  leaders 
in  their  conduct  of  diplomacy  will  not  be  easily  discerned.  The  political 


17  Kissinger    briefing    to    Congressional    leaders,    Congressional   Record,   June    19,    1972, 
p.   SOfiOO. 

18  Ibid. 

19  Ibid.,  p.  S9600. 

20  Ibid.,  pp.  S9599-9600. 


542 


benefits  to  the  United  States  must  by  their  nature  be  uncertain  of  ful- 
fillment, especially  in  the  short  run.  On  the  other  hand,  the  economic 
benefits  to  the  Soviet  Union  from  improved  commercial  relations  may 
be  certain  and  significant,  even  in  the  short  run.  Thus,  the  risk  of  un- 
fulfilled expectations  appears  greater  for  the  United  States  than  for 
the  Soviet  Union.  More  specifically,  increased  technology  transfers  to 
the  Soviet  Union  may  show  only  long-term  benefits  to  the  United 
States  in  the  diplomatic  and  political  area. 


III.  The  Soviet  Rationale  for  Expanded  Foreign  Economic 

Relations 

The  Ninth  Five- Year  Plan  Directives  discussed  at  the  Twenty- 
Fourth  Soviet  Party  Congress  in  March-April  1971  called  for  many 
advances  in  technology.  Technological  change  was  projected  to  mod- 
ernize the  Soviet  civilian  economy,  improve  the  quality  of  consumers' 
real  income,  and  raise  the  efficiency  of  economic  planning  and  man- 
agement. Meeting  the  targets  in  each  of  these  areas  required  tech- 
nological assistance  from  abroad,  including  the  United  States.  This 
reordering  of  priorities  underlies  Soviet  interest  in  increased  com- 
mercial relations  with  the  United  States. 

The  Soviet  leadership's  emphasis  on  technological  change  in  the 
Soviet  economy  reflects  a  growing  concern  that  Soviet  technology  lags 
considerably  behind  that  in  the  industrial  West.  While  there  are  no 
precise  measures  of  technology  levels,  there  is  much  evidence  that  a 
technology  gap  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  West  does  exist. 
Michael  Boretsky,  for  example,  examined  a  number  of  key  techno- 
logical innovations  in  the  Soviet  economy  and  concluded  that  the 
overall  level  of  Soviet  technology  in  1962  lagged  behind  that  in  the 
United  States  by  some  25  years.21  The  existence  of  a  technology  gap 
has  been  confirmed  by  many  others,  including  Soviet  observers. 
Premier  Alexei  Kosygin  asserted  in  1965 :  "The  pattern  of  production 
of  machinery  and  equipment  being  turned  out  by  the  many  branches 
[of  Soviet  industry]  does  not  conform  to  modern  standards."  22  Three 
Soviet  scientists  who  have  been  critical  of  the  leadership's  policies 
described  the  technology  gap  in  more  detail : 

When  we  compare  our  economy  with  that  of  the  United  States,  we  see  that 
ours  is  lagging  behind,  not  only  quantitatively,  but — and  this  is  the  saddest 
part — also  qualitatively.  The  more  novel  and  revolutionary  the  aspect  of  the 
economy,  the  wider  becomes  the  gap  .  .  .  We  are  ahead  of  the  U.S.  in  the 
production  of  coal,  but  behind  in  the  production  of  oil,  gas,  and  electric  power, 
ten  times  behind  in  chemistry,  and  immeasurably  behind  in  computer 
technology  .... 

In  the  late  1950's,  our  country  was  the  first  to  launch  a  sputnik  and  to  send 
a  man  into  space.  By  the  end  of  the  1960's,  we  have  lost  the  lead  in  this  field 
(as  in  many  others).  The  first  men  to  set  foot  on  the  moon  were  Americans. 
This  is  one  of  the  outward  signs  of  an  essential  and  ever-growing  gap  between 
our  country  and  the  West  extending  through  the  whole  spectrum  of  scientific 
technological  activity.23 


21  Michael  Boretsky,  "Comparative  Progress  in  Technology,  Productivity,  and  Economic 
Efficiency:  U.S.S.R.  Versus  U.S.A.,"  in  U.S.  Congress.  Joint  Economic  Committee.  New 
Directions  in  the  Soviet  Economy.  Part  II-A.  Economic  Performance.  89th  Cong.,  2d  sees. 
Washington,  U.S.  Govt.  Print.  Office,  1966,  p.  149. 

23  Alexei  Kosygin,  "On  Improving  Management  of  Industry,  Perfecting  Planning  and 
Enhancing  Economic  Incentives  in  Industrial  Production,"  in  New  Methods  of  Economic 
Management  in  the  USSR.  Moscow,  Novosti  Press  Agency  Publishing  House,  1965,  p.  19. 

-"•  "Appeal  of  Scientists  A.  D.  Snkharov.  V.  F.  Turchin  and  R.  A.  Medvedev  to  Soviet 
Party  and  Government  Leaders,"  March  19,  1970.  Translated  in  Survey,  Summer,  1970, 
pp.  160-170. 

(543) 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  36 


544 


Another  indicator  of  the  technology  gap  is  the  difference  in  factor 
productivity — the  amount  of  output  generated  per  unit  of  capital  and 
labor  input.  One  comparison  showed  overall  productivity  in  the  Soviet 
economy  to  be  about  one-third  of  that  in  the  United  States  in  the  mid- 
1960's.  (See  Figure  1.) 


Mid-1960s 

GNP  from  each  combined  unit 

of  capital  and  labor  employed 

Index:  USA  -  100 


USA 


Northwest 
Europe 


Japan 


Italy 


USSR 


Figure  1. — The  Levels  of  Technological  Development:  The  U.S.S.R.  Compared 

With  Other  Developed  Countries. 

Source  :  Peterson  Report,  1972.  Annex  A,  p.  34. 

The  lower  level  of  Soviet  civilian  technology  is  surprising  in  view 
of  a  consistently  higher  share  of  Soviet  GNP  devoted  to  investment 
than  in  the  United  States — 33  and  17  percent,  respectively,  in  1971.24 
Presumably,  both  the  military  burden  and  the  inefficiency  in  utiliza- 
tion of  investment  had  something  to  do  with  the  disproportion.  Like- 
wise, labor  productivity  in  Soviet  industry  and  agriculture  were  a 
fraction  of  the  U.S.  level — 41  and  11  percent,  respectively,  in  1971.25 

Technological  Requirements  of  the  Ninth  Fire-Year  Plan 

The  Ninth  Five- Year  Plan  enumerated  several  sectors  of  the  econ- 
omy which  were  to  receive  primary  attention  for  technological  change. 
Most  of  the  proposed  changes  have  important  implications  for  Soviet 
foreign  economic  relations. 

MODERNIZATION    OF    SOVIET   INDTJSTRY 

Soviet  ability  to  stimulate  economic  growth  through  technological 
change  will  depend  largely  on  expansion  of  energy  from  hydrocarbon 
sources.  The  exploitation  of  hydrocarbon  resources  with  American 
assistance  would  facilitate  technological  change  in  the  Soviet  Union 
in  at  least  three  important  ways:  (1)  it  would  bring  in  advanced  U.S. 
technology  for  the  Soviet  oil  and  gas  industry;  (2)  it  would  provide 
critically  needed  energy  snpplies  to  Soviet  industry;  and  (3)  it  would 
provide  a  source,  of  foreign  exchange  earnings,  which  are  needed  to 
import  Western  technology  for  other  branches  of  Soviet  industry. 

M  Peterson  Report  (1972),  op.  cit,  p.  32. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  33. 


545 


Increased  output  of  the  more  efficient  hydrocarbon  fuel  sources,  such 
as  petroleum  and  natural  gas,  is  particularly  important.  Soviet  energy 
consumption  in  1971  was  about  half  that  of  the  United  States — 1,291 
as  compared  with  2,130  million  metric  tons  of  coal  equivalent — while 
the  respective  GNPs  of  the  two  countries  were  548.6  and  1,000.4  billion 
1970  U.S.  dollars.  However,  the  structure  of  primary  energy  consump- 
tion in  the  U.S.S.R.  is  less  developed :  coal  still  supplied  44  percent  of 
the  energy  as  compared  with  19  percent  in  the  United  States.  (See 
Figure  2.)  Petroleum  and  natural  gas  accounted  for  all  but  about  one 
percent  of  the  remainder  in  each  case,  with  hydro  and  nuclear  power 
of  negligible  importance. 


Percent 


USSR 


Natural  Gas     l  Hydro 


1960 


1960 


Nuclear 
Negl      1  Hydro 


Nuclear 

Negl.    1  Hydro 


1971  1971 

Figure  2. — Primary  Energy  Consumption,  United  States  and  U.S.S.R. 
Source  :  Peterson  Report  (1972).  Annex  A,  p.  14. 

The  trend  toward  reduced  coal  utilization  (from  66  to  44  percent 
from  1960-1971)  may  continue  if  petroleum  and  natural  gas  produc- 


546 


tion  goes  according  to  the  Plan,  but  at  a  diminished  rate — another  5  to 
6  percent  reduction.  (See  Table  1.) 

Success  in  this  modest  improvement  in  the  energy  balance  will  de- 
pend on  Soviet  ability  to  expand  hydrocarbon  output  in  Western 
Siberia,  where  two-thirds  of  the  increased  output  is  projected  for  the 
Ninth  Five- Year  Plan.26  The  West  Siberian  development,  in  turn, 
requires  considerable  importation  of  extraction,  transmission,  and  re- 
finery equipment.  Moreover,  the  technology  of  construction  in  perma- 
frost may  dictate  some  industrial  cooperation  with  American  firms 
familiar  with  Alaskan  Northern  Slope  technology.  The  projected  ex- 
pansion of  the  West  Siberian  energy  project  would  require  a  huge  in- 
vestment. Consequently,  Soviet  decision  makers  may  have  to  choose 
between  a  major  economic  growth  and  modernization  project  and 
costly  defense  programs.2 


27 


TABLE  1.-S0VIET  ENERGY  PRODUCTION,  1970  AND  1975 


1970 


Percentage  of 

Extraction  Fuel  and  Extraction 

and  pro-      Fuel  re-         power     and  pro- 
duction      sources    resources       duction 


1975 


Percentage  of 

Fuel  and  1975  as 

Fuel  re-         power  percentage 

sources    resources  of  1970 


Oil,  including  condensed  gas  (million 
metric  tons) 

Gas,  natural  (billion  cubic  meters) 

Coal  (million  metric  tons) 

Peat,  for  fuel  (million  metric  tons) 

Oil  shale  (million  metric  tons)... 

Firewood,  for  fuel  (million  cubic  meters). 

Fuel  resources— total  (million  metric  tons 
of  conventional  fuel) 

Hydroenergy  (billion  kWh) 

Atomic  energy  (billion  kWh)__ 

Fuel  and  power  resources— total  (million 
metric  tons  of  conventional  fuel) 


352.6 

198.0 

624.1 

57.3 

24.3 

69.0 

227.0 
124.4 

41.0 
19.4 
35.9 

1.5 
.7 

1.5 

100.0 

39.6 

18.6 

34.6 

1.4 

.7 
1.4 

96.3 

3.6 

.1 

100.0 

505.0 
320.0 
694.9 

78.3 

32.7 

55.5 

1,639.0 

165.0 

25.0 

1.703.5  .. 

44.1 

23.3 

29.5 

1.5 

.7 

.9 

100.0 

42.4 

22.4 

28.4 

1.4 

.7 

.9 

96.2 

3.3 

.5 

100.0 

143.2 
161.6 
111.3 
136.6 
134.6 
80.4 

133.6 
132.6 

3.5 

700.0 

274.3  .. 

133.7 

Source:  Baibakov,  p.  98. 

In  metal  output,  non-ferrous  metals  are  particularly  important  in 
the  Ninth  Five- Year  Plan.  In  1969  non-ferrous  metals  represented 
only  8.75  percent  of  the  total  value  of  base  metals  in  the  Soviet  Union 
(as  compared  with  20  percent  in  the  United  States).28  An  effort  is 
currently  underway  to  increase  the  proportion  of  non-ferrous  metals : 
output  of  most  important  metals  in  this  category  are  projected  to  in- 
crease by  50  percent.29  Development  of  the  aluminum,  copper,  and 
other  metal  sources  which  are  abundant  in  East  Siberia,  close  to  the 
Soviet  Union's  low-cost  hydroelectric  system,  is  particularly  attractive. 
Increases  in  non-ferrous  metal  production  are  projected  to  provide 
valuable  inputs  for  modernizing  other  industrial  sectors.  A  shift  in 
building  materials  to  non-ferrous  metals,  paralleling  the  pattern  in 
other  industrial  countries,  is  prescribed. 


n  The  first  published  Soviet  plan  In  30  years  provides  some  detailed  Insights  on 
projected  Soviet  cnorcv  consumption  :  N.  K.  Baibakov,  Gosudarstvcnnpi  pyatiletnyi  plan 
raziitiia  narodnoqo  khoziaistr,,  SSSR  na  1971-1975  qodu.  (State  Five-Year  Plan  for 
Development  of  the  USSR  National  Economy  for  the  Period  1971-1075)  (Moscow, 
GOftPlan,  April  1072).  (Hereafter  cited  as  Baibakov.) 

27  For  a  discussion  of  this  .Soviet  dilemma  see  below,  Chanqinq  Priorities  in  Allocation: 
Growth   in.   Defense,  pp.  24-20. 

m  Alexander  Sutulov,  The  Soviet  Challenge  in  Base  Metals  (Salt  Lake  City:  The  Univ. 
of  Utah  Printing  Service,  1971),  183. 

29  Baibakov,  p.  115. 


547 


The  Directives  of  the  Party  Congress  and  the  Five- Year  Plan 
specifically  refer  to  "speeding  the  technological  progress  in  machine- 
building.30  Among  the  indicators  of  technological  success  for  the 
machine-building  industry  are  lowering  weight-to-power  ratios,  rais- 
ing capacity  and  efficiency  levels,  and  improving  reliability.  Some  26 
lines  of  machines  and  equipment  are  listed  as  specific  objects  for  tech- 
nological change  in  the  period  1971-1975.31 

Other  industries,  such  as  chemicals  and  petrochemicals,  are  a  part 
of  the  technological  plan,  but  with  less  specific  technological  targets. 

QUALITY  OF  SOVIET  LITE 

The  Ninth  Five-Year  Plan  projected  significant  improvements  in 
the  quality  of  consumer  goods;  it  stressed  the  need  for  better  diets, 
clothing,  personal  transportation,  and  housing  for  the  Soviet  citizen. 
The  proposed  improvements  require  not  only  increased  output,  but 
also  technological  change  in  consumer  industries. 

The  quality  of  the  Soviet  diet  had  been  gradually  improving  for 
several  years  before  the  Ninth  Five- Year  Plan,  but  the  Plan's  projec- 
tions of  considerable  increases  in  quality  foods  underlie  Soviet  claims 
that  it  is  more  consumer-oriented.  (See  Table  2.) 

TABLE  2.-C0NSUMPTI0N  OF  SELECTED  FOODS  IN  THE  SOVIET  UNION 
[Yearly,  per  capita,  in  kilograms] 

1975  as  a 

percentage  of 

1965  1970  1975  1970 

Meat  and  meat  products 

Milk  and  milk  products 

Eggs 

Fish  and  fish  products 

Sugar 

Vegetable  and  melon  products. 

Source:  Baibakov,  p.  300. 

In  spite  of  an  impressive  increase  of  14  percent  in  meat  output  from 
1965  to  1971,  the  Soviet  citizen  averaged  just  one-third  of  the  quantity 
of  meat  consumed  by  his  counterpart  in  the  United  States.32  More- 
over, if  the  ambitious  increase — about  twice  the  earlier  rate — is 
achieved,  the  meat  output  per  capita  in  1975  will  only  approach  the 
level  common  in  Eastern  Europe  today.33  In  order  to  reach  this  goal, 
improvement  in  animal  husbandry,  as  well  as  a  significant  increase  of 
feed  grain  output  and  feed  grain  imports  for  a  number  of  years,  is 
required.  Foreign  technology — the  animal  husbandry  of  American 
agricultural  business — could  greatly  assist  Soviet  agriculture.  Specific 
Soviet  import  needs  include  high-protein  feed  grains,  better  breeding 
stock,  and  livestock  raising  and  processing  equipment.34  Although 

30  Ibid.,  pp.  121ff. 

31  Ibid.,  pp.  124-5. 

32  Peterson  Report  (1972),  op.  clt.,  p.  23. 

al  Comecon,  Statisticheskii  ezhegodnik,  1970,  p.  300. 

34  See  Hubert  H.  Humphrey  and  Henry  Bellmon,  Observations  on  Soviet  and  Polish  Agri- 
culture, November-December,  1972.  A  trip  report  prepared  for  Committee  on  Agriculture 
and  Forestry  of  the  U.S.  Senate  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
1973). 


41.0 

48.0 

59 

123 

251.0 

307.0 

340 

111 

124.0 

159.0 

192 

121 

12.6 

15.4 

22 

143 

34.2 

38.8 

43 

111 

72.0 

82.0 

109 

133 

548 


Soviet  agriculture  suffered  a  very  bad  weather  year  in  1972,  Soviet 
leaders  appear  committed  to  retain  their  livestock  expansion  plans.35 

Increases  in  output  of  other  consumer  goods,  such  as  clothing, 
shoes,  and  household  goods  are  also  projected  in  the  Ninth  Five- Year 
Plan.  However,  recent  experience  indicates  that  increases  in  output 
alone  will  not  satisfy  the  growing  needs  of  Soviet  consumers.  Since 
the  early  1960's,  poor  quality,  rather  than  insufficient  quantity,  of  con- 
sumer goods  has  been  the  major  irritant  to  Soviet  citizens.  In  the  past, 
increased  output  of  consumer  goods  frequently  resulted  in  increased 
stocks  and  inventories.  Soviet  consumers  refused  to  buy  shoddy  con- 
sumer goods,  choosing  instead  to  put  their  money  into  savings  accounts. 
One  attempt  to  solve  this  problem  has  been  enterprise  management 
reform : 36  consumer  industries  were  among  the  first  to  experiment 
with  market-oriented  reforms.  Another  possible  approach  to  improv- 
ing light  industry  performance  lies  in  importing  foreign  technology. 
The  1972  agreement  to  purchase  designs,  engineering  services  and 
equipment  from  two  American  firms  for  building  tableware  factories 
in  the  Soviet  Union  37  is  an  example  of  the  latter  approach. 

The  problem  of  low-quality  consumer  goods  has  also  been  attacked 
by  changing  priorities  on  the  types  of  consumer  goods  produced.38 
Instead  of  further  rapid  expansion  of  inferior  consumer  goods,  Soviet 
officials  have  begun  to  rely  more  on  production  of  key  commodities,  in 
which  quality  is  still  not  a  major  factor  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Some 
commodities,  such  as  meat  and  automobiles,  are  so  highly  valued  by 
Soviet  consumers  that  high  prices  and  low  quality  are  not  likely  to 
deter  them  from  spending  their  rubles.  The  manner  in  which  auto- 
mobile sales  can  be  used  to  absorb  excess  spending  power  can  be 
readily  comprehended  by  comparing  the  price  of  Soviet  cars  with 
Soviet  wages.  Whereas  the  average  industrial  worker's  gross  monthly 
pay  is  135.4  rubles,  he  must  pay  9,250  rubles  for  a  new  Volga  auto- 
mobile.39 Still,  current  payments  are  being  offered  against  future 
delivery  for  automobiles.  The  chronic  repair  problems  for  Soviet 
domestic  brands  is  presumably  a  reason  why  foreign  producers  were 
sought  to  facilitate  the  current  expansion.  But  even  Soviet-produced 
Fiats  must  meet  problems  of  inadequate  repair  facilities  and  mechan- 
ics. Domestic  requirements  for  meat  and  automobiles  underlie  Soviet 
interest  in  foreign  animal  husbandry  and  automobile  technology. 

Passenger  car  production  in  the  Soviet  Union  is  far  below  the  level 
needed  to  satisfy  consumer  demand.  The  Volga  Automobile  Plant  in 
ToFiatti,  a  cooperative  venture  between  the  Italian  firm  of  Fiat  and 
the  Soviet  automobile  industry,  produced  its  first  cars  in  1970.  While 
the  Fiat  plant  represents  a  significant  increase  in  Soviet  automobile 
production,  output  will  still  fall  short  of  Soviet  needs.  Future  expan- 

85  A  January  1973  inventory  Indicated  that  cattle  holdings  had  Increased  by  1.6  percent 
In  1972,  while  swine  holdings  showed  only  a  7  percent  decline.  See  Pravda,  Jan.  30,  1973. 

•■"  See  below,  Improvement  in  Planning  and  Management,  pp.  22-24. 

37  Richard  S.  Frank,  "Trade  Report :  U.S.  Sees  Surplus,  More  Jobs  in  Early  Years  of 
Expanded  Trade  With  Soviet  Union,"  National  Journal,  vol.  4,  No.  48  (Nov.  25,  1972), 
p.  1800. 

m  Douglas  B.  Diamond,  "Principal  Targets  and  Central  Themes  of  the  Ninth  Five- Year 
Plnn."  In  Norton  T.  Dodge,  ed.,  Analysis  of  the  USSR's  2kth  Party  Congress  and  9th 
Fiii   Year   Plan    ( Mechanicsville,   Md.  :    Cremona   Foundation.   1971),   p.   52. 

»  \arodnoe  khoziaistvo  SSSR,  1922-1972  gg.  (Moscow  Tsentral  'noe  Statisticheskoe 
Upravlenle,  1972,  p.  350  ;  Keith  Bush,  "Soviet  Inflation,"  Radio  Liberty  Dispatch,  Jan.  5, 
1973.  p.  5. 


549 


sion  of  the  Tol'iatti  and  other  automobile  factories  is  expected.40  More 
importation  of  foreign  equipment  and  more  industrial  cooperation 
with  Western  firms  will  undoubtedly  be  necessary  for  further  prog- 
ress. In  addition  to  assisting  in  Soviet  automobile  production,  Western 
companies  are  likely  to  participate  in  related  activities,  such  as  road 
building  and  construction  of  repair  facilities. 

Housing  construction  has  been  a  treadmill  for  Soviet  planners. 
Urban  growth  accounts  for  most  of  the  expansion  in  space.  The  in- 
crease from  about  6  to  7.5  square  meters  per  capita  for  1960-1970  is  not 
likely  to  be  improved  on  much  by  1975.  Still  more  important  is  the 
availability  of  reliable  consumer  durables  and  bathroom  and  kitchen 
space.  In  1972,  Soviet  citizens  had  about  one-third  to  one-half  of  the 
number  of  refrigerators,  washing  machines,  and  television  sets  per 
capita  found  in  American  households.  Moreover,  many  urban  apart- 
ments in  the  U.S.S.R.  require  the  sharing  of  bathrooms  and  kitchens,41 
and  many  household  durable  goods  sold  to  Soviet  consumers  are  ap- 
parently of  inferior  quality.  Much  can  be  gained  from  technology 
transfers  from  other  industrial  nations.  For  example,  Soviet  officials 
arranged  for  adoption  of  French  color  television  in  1965.  As  it  has  not 
yet  been  perfected  at  competitive  cost,  the  Soviets  may  have  to  look 
elsewhere  for  assistance. 

TRANSPORTATION 

A  key  element  in  Soviet  plans  to  modernize  industry  and  improve 
consumer  welfare  is  the  modernization  of  the  Soviet  transportation 
system.  Increases  in  pipeline  construction  and  in  auto  transport  (for 
both  freight  and  passengers)  are  highlighted  in  the  Ninth  Five- Year 
Plan.   (See  Table  3.) 

TABLE  3— TRANSPORTATION  IN  THE  9TH  5-YEAR  PLAN 


1970 

1975  (planned) 

Billions 

Billions 

1975  as  a 

of  ton 

Percent 

of  ton 

Percent 

percentage 

kilometers 

of  total 

kilometers 

of  total 

of  1970 

3, 829. 2 

100.0 

5,171.9 

100.0 

135 

2,  494.  7 

65.1 

3,  050. 0 

59.0 

122 

656.1 

17.1 

918.6 

17.7 

140 

174.0 

4.5 

217.3 

4.2 

125 

220.  8 

5.8 

338.0 

6.5 

153 

1.9 

.1 

3.0 

.1 

161 

281.7 

7.4 

645.0 

12.5 

229 

Freight  transport: 

Turnover  of  freight  transport  (ton 

kilometers) 

railroad . . . 

sea 

lake 

automobile 

air 

pipeline 


Billions  of 
passenger 
kilometers 


Percent 
of  total 


Billions  of 
passenger 
kilometers 


Percent 
of  total 


Passenger  transport: 

Turnover    of    passenger    transport 

(passenger  kilometers) 548.9  100.0  782.3  100.0 

railroad 265.4  48.3  330.0  42.2 

sea 1.6  .3  1.9  .2 

lake 5.4  1.0  6.4  .8 

automobile  (bus) _  198.3  36.1  311.0  39.8 

air 78.2  14.3  133.0  17.0 


1975  as  a 

percentage 

of  1970 


143 
124 
119 
118 
157 
170 


Source:  Planovoe  khoziaistvo  (Planned  Economy).  No.  5,  1972,  p.  16. 


40  A  large  increase  in  passenger  car  production  was  projected  In  the  Ninth  Five- Year 
Plan.  An  output  of  1,335,000  cars  is  planned  for  1975,  compared  with  392,000  in  1970. 
See  Baibakov,  op.  clt,  p.  126. 

41  Peterson  Report  (1972),  op.  cit,  Annex  A,  p.  22. 


550 


Improvements  in  Soviet  transportation  have  depended  heavily  on 
imports  of  technology  from  abroad.  Cooperative  ventures  with  West- 
ern European  companies  have  aided  in  the  construction  of  pipelines 
from  Siberia  to  Europe.  The  Soviet  automotive  industry  is  importing 
large  quantities  of  Western  machinery,  equipment,  and  know-how. 
Major  imports  of  Western  technology,  including  American,  have 
aided  in  building  the  Kama  River  Truck  Plant.  The  Kama  Plant,  cur- 
rently under  construction,  is  a  massive  project  which  will  produce 
150,000  trucks  a  year  plus  250,000  diesel  engines.  About  three-fourths 
of  all  the  machinery,  equipment,  and  technology  for  the  project  is  ex- 
pected to  come  from  Western  firms.42 

Improvement  in  Planning  and  Management 

Soviet  interest  in  foreign  technology  extends  to  planning  and  man- 
agement techniques.  Moreover  acceptance  of  the  conditions  required 
in  joint  ventures  with  Western  market  economies  will  tend  to  push 
the  Soviet  economy  further  in  the  direction  of  economic  change  needed 
to  improve  performance. 

A  new  Five- Year  Plan  and  a  Soviet  Party  Congress  are  the  usual 
occasions  for  an  assessment  of  past  performance,  current  problems, 
and  future  prospects  of  the  world's  second  largest  economy.  The 
discussions  preceding  the  Ninth  Five- Year  Plan  were  of  particular 
interest  because  of  the  Party  leadership's  preoccupation  with  lagging 
economic  performance.  The  discussions  in  Party  and  professional  cir- 
cles ranged  from  issues  relating  to  resource  allocation  policy  to 
changes  in  the  system  of  planning  and  management.43  While  plan 
figures  provide  evidence  of  Soviet  resource  allocation  policy,  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  assess  the  leadership's  dedication  to  economic  reform. 

The  key  elements  in  the  economic  reform  discussions  are  the  creation 
of  a  new  role  for  economic  enterprises  and  a  new  approach  to  central 
planning.44  The  reformers  propose  more  independence  for  enterprise 
managers  to  decide  on  what  and  how  to  produce.  Fewer  guidelines  and 
success  indicators  would  be  handed  down  to  enterprise  managers  from 
the  central  bureaucracy.  One  new  indicator  would  be  profitability: 
each  enterprise  would  be  required  to  take  demand  factors  into  consid- 
eration and  to  generate  sufficient  sales  to  earn  a  profit.  An  important 
aspect  of  the  reforms  is  a  renewed  emphasis  on  material  incentives — 
profit  incentives  to  encourage  enterprise  efficiency  and  wage  incentives 
to  stimulate  worker  productivity.  New  planning  techniques,  a  more 
flexible  price  system,  and  increased  reliance  on  market  forces  are  key 
aspects  of  the  reforms. 

The  reform  proposals  represent  a  dramatic  departure  from  past 
Soviet  practices  and  have  predictably  run  into  opposition  from  con- 
servative elements  in  the  Party  and  government  bureaucracies.  The 
Party  Congress  was  apparently  delayed  from  the  fall  of  1970  to  the 
spring  of  1971  to  accommodate  further  debates  on  resource  allocation 


"Imogene  Edwards,  "Automotive  Trends  In  the  USSR."  In  U.S.  Congress.  Joint  Eco- 
nomic Committee.  Soviet  Economic  Prospects  for  the  Seventies.  93d  Cong.,  1st  sess.  Wash- 
ington, DC.  U.S.  Govt.  Print.  Off.,  1973. 

**  Prnvdn  Feb  4  1970-  Interview  of  Mr.  Gorecllnd  of  Gostilnn.  \Io»kor»kaui  Praraa, 
Feb.  21,  1971  ;  Pravda,  July  4,  1971  ;  Pravda,  Feb.  14,  1971  ;  Sovietskaia  Rossiia,  Feb.  4, 
1970 

«*  See  Richard  Judv  "The  Economists,"  and  John  Hardt  and  Theodore  Frankel,  "The 
Industrial  Managers,"  In  H.  Q.  Skllllng  and  Franklyn  Griffith,  eds.,  Interest  Groups  m 
Soviet  Politics  (Princeton  :  Princeton  University  Press,  1971). 


551 


and  planning  and  management  reform  in  the  formulation  of  the  Plan. 
Yet  the  Plan  Directives  and  the  leadership  speeches  at  the  Congress 
were  disappointing  as  blueprints  of  the  future  course  of  reform  in  the 
Soviet  economy. 

In  the  debate  on  planning  and  management,  Party  General  Secre- 
tary Leonid  Brezhnev  identified  himself  with  a  variety  of  differing 
positions.  He  appeared  to  bless  a  conference  chaired  by  Academician 
Fedorenko  in  April  1970  which  featured  more  professional  techniques 
in  planning.45  He  also  supported  the  extension  of  market  simulating 
enterprise  reforms,  such  as  the  Shchekino  chemical  plant  experiment, 
to  all  industrial  enterprises.  At  the  same  time,  by  rhetoric,  if  not  by 
direct  support,  he  aligned  himself  with  traditional  views  of  manage- 
ment by  criticizing  labor  disciplining  and  supporting  the  revival  of 
the  revolutionary  subbotnik  (an  unpaid  "voluntary"  Saturday  work- 
day by  workers  organized  by  the  Party).46  Thus,  Brezhnev  was  not 
to  be  tacked  down  to  any  firm  commitment  on  the  system  of  planning 
and  management, 

The  evidence  of  the  Congress  or  the  pre-Congress  deliberations  did 
not  suggest  that  Soviet  leaders  were  undertaking  serious  changes  in 
planning  and  management.  Although  the  leadership  was  pushed  by  the 
logic  of  rationalization  to  develop  better  models  for  forecasting  and  to 
favor  market  simulating  enterprise  reforms,  it  apparently  found  the 
political-economic  cost  of  change  unacceptable.  At  some  point,  the  cost 
of  not  changing  may  be  perceived  by  the  Soviet  leadership  to  be 
greater  than  the  cost  of  change.  Whether  the  need  for  change  is  fully 
perceived  by  the  leadership  is  unclear. 

Alec  Nove  has  suggested  that  the  apparent  setbacks  of  the  reformers 
or  economic  modernists  are  only  temporary.  Time,  he  claimed,  is  on 
their  side,  and  the  search  for  a  synthesis  between  a  market  and 
planned  economy  must  begin  again.47  An  important  article  written  by 
Soviet  Academician  T.  S.  Khachaturov  shortly  after  the  24th  Party 
Congress  provides  some  substantiation  of  Nove's  view.48  Khacha- 
turov's  article,  which  argued  in  favor  of  planning  and  management 
reforms,  may  have  indicated  the  beginning  of  a  policy  swing  of 
the  Brezhnev  leadership  back  to  reform.  If  it  did,  it  may  yet  result  in 
significant  changes  during  the  Ninth  Five- Year  Plan. 

How  do  the  discussions  of  economic  reform  relate  to  Soviet  foreign 
economic  relations?  While  Soviet  reformers  have  not  emphasized  the 
international  implications  of  the  reforms,  it  is  clear  that  a  more  ra- 
tional economic  decision-making  structure  would  facilitate  the  integra- 
tion of  the  Soviet  economy  into  the  international  economic  system. 
Rationalization  of  Soviet  prices  would  encourage  the  importation  of 
goods  produced  inefficiently  by  domestic  industries.  At  the  same  time, 
by  fostering  efficiency  in  domestic  enterprises,  the  Soviet  Union  may 
be  able  to  expand  its  exports  to  Western  markets.  Moreover,  economic 
reform  would  remove  many  of  the  features  of  Soviet  central  planning 

45  Pravda,  Apr.  14,  1970  ;  Ekonomika  i  matematicheskie  tnetodu,  vol.  VI,  No.  4,  1970, 
pp.  631-638. 

«  Pravda,  Apr.  14,  1970  :  Jan.  13,  1970. 

47  See  Netie  Zuerrher  Zeitunq.  April  5.  1970  :  and  T.  Kirstein.  "The  Controversy  over  the 
Market  and  the  Plan  in  the  Soviet  Union."  Neue  Zuercher  Zeitung,  March  31,  1971. 

**  Pravda,  May  15,  1970.  T.  S.  Khachaturov  is  a  member  of  the  Academy  of  Sciences 
and  editor  of  one  of  its  publications,  Voprosy  ekonomiki   (Problems  of  Economics). 


552 


which  inhibit  Western  businessmen  from  dealing  with  Soviet  foreign 
trade  organizations.49 

Soviet  economic  reforms  center  on  adoption  of  modern  mathematical 
methods,  improved  computer  capability,  and  new  management  tech- 
niques. Systems  analysis  in  regional  planning,  and  input-output  analy- 
sis in  national  economic  planning,  are  examples  of  the  new  trend.  More 
computer  capability  is  required  to  support  the  more  sophisticated  eco- 
nomic analysis.  If,  or  as,  the  change  proceeds,  more  application  of 
Western  techniques,  analysis,  and  hardware  will  become  relevant.  The 
professional  bridge  between  Soviet  and  Western  economists,  statisti- 
cians, and  management  science  specialists  will  likely  follow  economic 
reform  in  the  Soviet  Union.  At  the  same  time,  industrial  cooperation 
or  joint  ventures  of  industrial  nations  with  the  Soviet  Union  may 
encourage  and  facilitate  these  reform  trends. 

In  this  early  stage  of  expanding  U.S.-Soviet  commercial  relations, 
the  correlation  between  domestic  economic  reform  and  foreign  eco- 
nomic policy  cannot  be  tested  empirically.  It  could  be  argued  that 
the  trends  are  offsetting  rather  than  complementary.  Thus,  it  may  be 
that  Soviet  awareness  of  a  need  for  technological  change  and  improved 
efficiency  in  the  domestic  economy  has  convinced  the  leadership  that 
thev  should  turn  to  foreign  technological  assistance  as  a  substitute 
for  domestic  reform.  Only  future  experience  in  East-West  economic 
cooperation  will  resolve  the  question  of  the  interrelationship  of  foreign 
involvement  and  domestic  reform  in  the  Soviet  economy. 

Changing  Priorities  in  Resource  Allocation:  Growth.  Versus  Defense 
The  technological  priorities  in  the  Ninth  Five- Year  Plan,  which  are 
designed  to  modernize  the  civilian  economy,  improve  the  quality  of 
living,  and  raise  the  efficiency  of  planning  and  management,  imply  a 
shift  in  resource  allocation  policy  from  military  to  civilian  invest- 
ment and  consumption.  These  goals  are  suggested  in  the  detailed  pub- 
lication of  planned  targets.  An  increase  in  civilian  programs  above 
past  levels  suggests  a  decrease  in  the  prior  defense  priorities.  The 
specific  goals  for  increased  energy  output — focusing  on  the  West  Si- 
berian oil-gas  complex — provide  evidence  of  a  reordering  of  priorities. 
The  Soviet  leadership's  commitment  to  new  priorities  in  resource 
allocations,  if  sustained,  will  have  important  implications  for  Soviet 
foreign  economic  relations.  Increased  expenditures  on  major  invest- 
ment projects,  such  as  oil  and  gas  exploration,  and  on  consumer  goods, 
such  as  quality  foods  and  automobiles,  will  increase  Soviet  demand 
for  imports  of  foreign  technology.  Presumably,  Western  technology 
is  needed  less  during  a  defense-priority  period,  since  Soviet  military 
technology  is  widely  considered  to  be  near  parity  with  that  in  the 
West,  and,  in  any  event,  military  technology  is  not  generally  trans- 
ferred to  the  Soviet  Union  in  normal  commercial  transactions.  Thus, 
in  assessing  future  Soviet  needs  for  U.S.  technology,  it  is  important 
to  evaluate  the  prospects  for  a  reorientation  of  Soviet  priorities. 

A  firm  commitment  to  new  priorities  runs  counter  to  the  traditional 
policy  of  the  Party  and  is  also  uncharacteristic  of  Party  Secretary 


49  See  below,  pp.  62-64. 


553 


Brezhnev's  past  record.  During  the  period  preceding  the  announce- 
ment of  the  Plan  (i.e.,  1969-1971),  Brezhnev  voiced  his  displeasure 
over  the  performance  of  the  economy,  but  committed  himself  firmly 
to  neither  a  reform  of  planning  and  management,  nor  a  new  set  of 
priorities.  Indeed,  he  advocated  a  variety  of  programs  in  the  pre- 
Congress  period.  He  favored  the  military  in  a  speech  at  the  Dvina 
River  Maneuvers  in  February  1970;  he  favored  agricultural  invest- 
ment in  the  July  1970  Party  Plenum  and  at  the  meeting  of  the  Col- 
lective Farmers  (Kolkhozniki)  Congress;  he  apparently  approved  a 
call  for  more  housing  in  a  February  1971  revision  of  the  Plan;  and  he 
identified  himself  with  technological  change  by  personally  signing  the 
Plan  Directives  that  same  month.  Finally,  he  approved  the  publica- 
tion of  the  Ninth  Five- Year  Plan,  under  the  editorship  of  his  State 
Planning  Committee  Chairman,  N.  K.  Baibakov,  in  April  1972.  In 
short,  on  the  allocation  of  resources,  he  behaved  like  a  politician  who 
was  securing  his  position  by  supporting  everyone's  programs.  But  the 
grim  fact  faced  by  all  politicians,  whether  the  President  of  the  United 
States  or  the  Prime  Minister  of  the  United  Kingdom,  is  that  choice 
is  the  inexorable  requirement  of  political  economy.  Especially  when 
growth  is  slow,  a  leader  must  be  against  some  programs  to  be  for 
others.  Specifically,  there  was  no  indication  that  the  high  military 
priority  of  the  1960's  was  being  scaled  down  as  it  had  been  by 
Khrushchev  in  1959. 

If  expensive  development  of  weapons  systems  is  to  continue,  the 
level  of  military  claims  on  resources  will  then  be  at  least  equal  to  past 
levels  and  will  probably  require  a  large  share  of  the  new  resources 
generated  by  modest  economic  growth.  Unless  military  spending  is 
curtailed,  increased  requirements  for  modernization  and  consumer  im- 
provement must  lead  to  overcommitment  in  the  Ninth  Five- Year  Plan. 
Brezhnev's  dilemma  illustrates  that  the  two  central  economic  policy 
issues  in  Soviet  politics  remain  civilian  investment  versus  military 
output,  and  the  question  of  changes  in  planning  and  management. 

In  view  of  Brezhnev's  equivocation  on  economic  issues  in  the  past, 
why  should  he  be  expected  to  pursue  the  politically  risky  changes  in 
economic  policy  projected  by  the  Ninth  Five- Year  Plan  ?  A  possible 
answer  is  that  Brezhnev  for  the  first  time  is  able  and  willing  to  con- 
vince conservative  Party  interests  to  permit  such  change.  The  Gen- 
eral Secretary  appears  to  have  emerged  from  the  24th  Party  Congress 
with  more  power  and  responsibility  than  he  enjoyed  in  the  pre- 
Congress  Brezhnev-Kosygin  collegial  leadership.50  At  the  same  time, 
Brezhnev's  future  tenure  in  office  and  position  of  power  are  likely  to 
depend  to  a  large  extent  on  economic  performance.  Thus,  there  is  a 
more  persuasive  post-Congress  logic  for  Brezhnev  to  make  firm  deci- 
sions and  reasonable  commitments  that  he  judges  will  facilitate  im- 
proved economic  performance.  A  stronger  power  base  might  enable 
Brezhnev  to  overcome  Party  conservatives  who  oppose  economic 
change  and  to  resist  greater  military  outlays  to  compete  with  the 
United  States,  to  meet  the  Chinese  threat,  and  to  exploit  the  oppor- 
tunities of  Middle  Eastern  instability.  A  decision  to  change  priorities 
would  be  reinforced  by  success  in  the  SALT  talks,  by  possible  Euro- 
pean troop  cuts,  and  by  other  post-Summit  developments. 

^  »Te  }l3^on  Ru8h.  "Brezhnev  and  the  Succession  Issue,"  Problems  of  Communism,  vol. 
XX,  No.  4  (July-August  1971),  pp.  9-15. 


554 


The  progress  of  the  SALT  talks  could  also  have  a  negative  influence : 
i.e.,  failure  of  the  talks  would  strengthen  the  influence  of  those  resist- 
ing change,  even  if  Brezhnev  should  decide  to  change  priorities.  It  is 
important  to  assess  whether  Brezhnev  was  influenced  by  the  interpre- 
tations placed  on  the  Interim  Agreement  by  members  of  Congress  who 
insisted  on  future  parity  in  the  number  of  strategic  weapons  as  a  pre- 
condition for  SALT  and  for  a  comprehensive  agreement  on  offensive 
weapons.  The  Soviet  press  has  been  critical  of  congressional  reserva- 
tions on  the  SALT  agreements.  It  was  also  critical  of  Secretary  of  De- 
fense Melvin  Laird's  view  that  an  acceleration  of  certain  weapons  sys- 
tems development  was  necessary  to  assure  parity  and  stability.  This 
critical  reaction  points  to  some  uncertainty  among  Soviet  leaders  on 
future  military  spending. 

History  has  provided  two  scenarios  which  suggest  alternative 
courses  for  the  present  Soviet  leadership — one  in  1956  which  led  to  a 
reduction  in  the  emphasis  on  defense,  and  one  in  1962,  an  upgrading  of 
the  defense  priority.  In  1956  Nikita  Khrushchev,  Minister  of  Defense 
Zhukov,  and  the  Party  leadership  agreed  to  reduce  military  manpower 
and  modernize  the  Soviet  armed  forces.  The  stimulus  to  economic 
growth  from  the  release  of  resources  was  a  factor  in  the  continued 
high  growth  rates  and  may  have  led  Khrushchev  subsequently  to 
promise  to  overtake  and  surpass  the  United  States.  It  was  only  later, 
after  the  first  Kennedy  budget  and  the  Cuban  missile  crisis,  that 
Khrushchev  apparently  reversed  these  priorities,  initiating  the  buildup 
of  some  of  the  weapons  now  deployed  by  the  Soviet  Union  and  tem- 
porarily stopping  the  progress  of  military  manpower  reduction.  This 
reversal  and  the  concurrent,  and  possibly  resultant,  poor  economic  per- 
formance may  have  been  a  factor  in  Khrushchev's  removal  from  power. 

The  interrelationship  of  political  and  economic  variables  in  these 
two  scenarios  may  be  relevant  to  the  current  scene.  Leonid  Brezhnev 
is  certainly  no  Khrushchev  in  power  or  personality,  but  the  political 
context  in  which  he  perceives  himself  may  influence  his  interpretation 
of  economic  alternatives,  as  an  earlier  political  context  influenced 
Khrushchev.  Is  Brezhnev  emulating  the  Khrushchev  of  1956  or  the  one 
of  1962?  Some  evidence  suggests  the  1956  scenario:  (1)  the  apparent 
commitment  of  a  very  high  priority  to  the  West  Siberian  development ; 
and  (2)  repeated  evidence  that  Western  technology  is  highly  valued 
and  required  for  completion  of  civilian  programs. 

The  Soviet  leadership's  policy  in  the  West  Siberian  development 
best  illustrates  how  military  and  civilian  claimants  may  be  competing 
for  scarce  investment  funds.  The  explicit  Party  and  Government  direc- 
tive of  January  1970  on  the  West  Siberian  development  called  for  co- 
ordination of  many  Ministries,  including  the  Ministry  of  Dcfen.se  In- 
dustries (a  rare  public  reference),  to  bring  about  the  expeditious  com- 
pletion of  the  regional  development. r>1  Moreover,  the  number  of  proj- 
ects  related  to  the  West  Siberian  development  specifically  mentioned 
in  the  Plan  Directives  suggests  continuing  high  priority  consideration 
in  1972.  In  the  Ninth  Five- Year  Plan  a  good  portion  of  the  identified, 
large  projects  are  directly  related  to  the  West  Siberian  complex."  To 
have  effective  priority,  the  particular  new  claims  of  the  Siberian  proj- 
ects would  appear  to  be  competitive  with  military  hardware  output 

51  Pravda,  Jan.  15,  1970,  p.  1. 

83  Voprosy  ekonomiki,  No.  6  (June  1971),  p.  3  ;  Pravda,  Apr.  11,  1971. 


555 


for  high  test  metals,  sophisticated  machines,  manpower,  and  other  im- 
portant inputs.  Military  leaders  would  thus  appear  to  have  an  interest 
in  downgrading  the  priority  for  the  Siberian  projects. 

Significant  progress  could  perhaps  be  made  in  critical  military  areas, 
such  as  installation  of  MIRV  warheads  for  the  existing  Soviet  ICBM 
inventory,  without  new  construction  of  either  silos  or  missiles.  This 
alone  would  tend  to  convert  numerical  advantage  into  a  strategic  ad- 
vantage by  offsetting  the  technological  leadership  of  the  United  States. 
In  this  special  sense,  it  is  conceivable  that  the  Soviets  could  continue 
to  improve  their  strategic  position  and  reorder  priorities.  However, 
MIRV  retrofitting  may  not  be  a  low-cost  operation,  if  the  Soviet  mili- 
tary is  not  already  well  developed  in  this  area. 

The  potential  competition  between  military  projects  and  the  West 
Siberian  development  has  a  special  time  dimension  to  it.  The  longer 
the  Siberian  development  proceeds  in  time,  the  more  compelling  the 
logic  to  allocate  the  necessary  resources  to  bring  it  to  full  effectiveness. 
If  the  development  of  new  strategic  systems,  e.g.,  the  SS-0,  SS-11, 
and  SS-17  ICBMs,  should  involve  a  long,  risky,  and  expensive  proc- 
ess— the  gestation  period  for  such  systems  is  said  to  be  8-10  years— the 
question  would  arise  as  to  whether  the  two  patterns  of  resource  alloca- 
tion could  be  simultaneously  supported.  If  both  military  and  civilian 
projects  were  begun,  at  what  point  could  overcommitment  be  per- 
ceived and  resources  shifted  to  bring  the  effort  having  first  priority  to 
timely  completion?  Vnderfunding  and  delay  of  both  military  and 
civilian  programs  would  not  be  an  attractive  prospect  to  the  Party 
or  its  leader. 

Moreover,  if  overcommitment  should  be  permitted,  it  might  be  diffi- 
cult, even  technologically  impossible,  to  shift  resources  from  one  pro- 
gram to  the  other.  The  long  completion  times  required  for  such 
sophisticated  military  and  civilian  projects  create  both  technological 
and  management  problems  in  conversion,  and  the  ability  to  shift  re- 
sources committed  to  these  projects  becomes  increasingly  limited  over 
time. 

Brezhnev  may  soon  have  to  act  decisively  in  order  to  avoid  over- 
commitment on  two  competitive,  nonconvertible  patterns  of  resource 
allocation.  If  Brezhnev  views  the  West  Siberian  development  and  the 
deployment  of  SS-9  and  SS-11  missiles  as  competitive  patterns  of 
resource  allocation,  and  if  some  relatively  irreversible  decisions  on  al- 
locations are  necessary,  he  may  be  inclined  to  divert  resources  from  the 
potential  military  program  to  bring  to  fruition  the  civilian  invest- 
ment project.  At  present,  it  appears  that  there  may  be  a  delay  in  the 
program  for  further  buildup  of  the  SS-9  and  SS-11.53  Commitments 
may  not  yet  be  made  to  a  new  round  in  strategic  weapons  buildup.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  West  Siberian  oil-gas  complex  appears  to  be  moving 
ahead,  possibly  with  support  from  the  military  industries. 

Although  oil  and  gas  targets  were  not  met  in  the  1972  Plan,  and  the 
1973  Plan  has  scaled  down  targets,  the  West  Siberian  priority  appears 
intact.  A  four-day  visit  by  Premier  Kosygin  to  the  Siberian  oil  and 
gas  fields  in  January  1973  may  have  been  intended  to  give  further  evi- 
dence of  the  leadership's  support  for  the  Siberian  project.54 


ra  New  York  Times,  Mar.  8,  1971,  p.  1  and  Mar.  27,  1971,  p.  1.  Some  indications  suggest 
the  MIRV-equipped  SS-lls  are  being  tested.  New  York  Times,  Oct.  9,  1972. 
64  New  York  Times,  Jan.  15,  1973. 


556 


Another  problem  area  in  the  Soviet  leadership's  dilemma  over  re- 
source allocation  is  the  chronic  manpower  shortage  in  the  Soviet  econ- 
omy. Although  only  limited  information  is  available,  the  Plan  direc- 
tives indicate  the  severity  of  the  problem.  Increased  labor  productivity 
is  planned  to  account  for  87-00  percent  of  the  total  increment  in  out- 
put during  the  Ninth  Five-Year  Plan.  While  the  total  labor  force  is 
to  increase  at  an  annual  rate  of  1.7  percent,  the  key  industrial  force  is 
stipulated  to  grow  by  only  one  percent.  This  modest  increase  in  the 
industrial  labor  force  is  about  one-third  the  rate  realized  during  the 
Eighth  Five- Year  Plan  (1.0  percent  as  compared  to  2.8  percent).  In 
the  past,  overambitious  plans  for  increased  labor  productivity  were 
offset  by  highe»'-than-planned  expansion  of  the  industrial  labor  force 
at  the  expense  of  "buffer"  sectors  such  as  agriculture  and  services. 
However,  shifts  from  low  priority  sectors  are  becoming  more  difficult. 
As  noted  by  Murray  Feshbach  of  the  Commerce  Department,  "in  most 
years  prior  to  the  1960's  the  planned  number  of  workers  and  employ- 
ees was  met,  and  in  industry  the  actual  number  frequently  was  200,000- 
300,000  persons  above  the  plan.  In  1965,  however,  the  actual  number 
for  industry  was  barely  25,000  above  the  plan,  and  by  1967  there  was 
a  shortage  of  125,000  industrial-production  personnel  relative  to  plan 
requirements.''  55  This  fact  graphically  measures  the  end  of  "buffer" 
sectors  to  cover  shortfalls  in  industry  manpower  needs. 

At  present,  not  only  is  labor  unlikely  to  be  released  from  other  sec- 
tors to  meet  industrial  needs,  but  in  the  current  Plan,  income,  invest- 
ment, and  administrative  policy  are  designed  to  keep  skilled  workers  in 
agriculture  from  migrating  to  urban  industrial  jobs.  Nonetheless,  90 
percent  of  the  high  school  graduates  from  rural  schools  still  seek  ur- 
ban employment.50  Shortfalls  in  ,the  improvement  in  labor  produc- 
tivity are  likely  to  aggravate  the  labor  shortage.  While  labor  produc- 
tivity was  scheduled  to  rise  by  6.1  percent  in  1972,  it  grew  by  only  5.2 
percent/'7  Improvement  in  labor  productivity  may  turn  on  technolog- 
ical change  in  output — better  energy  and  equipment — and  such  im- 
proved managerial  techniques  as  the  Shchekino  experiment  and  the 
agricultural  zveno.58 

Demobilization  of  some  3  million  members  of  the  armed  forces  in  the 
late  1950's  (from  5.S  to  3.0  million  in  the  period  1955-1961)  eased 
Khrushchev's  labor  problem  and  coincided  with  rather  good  years  of 
economic  performance.59  Although  the  reduction  in  military  manpower 
may  have  been  facilitated  by  technological  modernization  of  the  mili- 
tary forces  and  a  reduction  of  such  missions  as  the  withdrawal  from 
Austria,  it  may  provide  a  precedent  for  current  Soviet  policy.  Again, 
at  a  time  when  manpower  deficiencies  are  becoming  more  serious,  no 
ready  major  source  of  labor — ('specially  young  males  to  meet  civilian 
needs — is  available  other  than  the  military  forces.  Military  demobiliza- 
tion would  probably  be  stoutly  resisted  but  not  necessarily  with  suc- 

63  Murray  Feshbnoh.  Manpower  Trrtuls  in  the  TTRS!R  ( Washington,  D.C.  :  Department  of 
Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic  Annlvsis,  Mnv  1071)    pp.  1,  18. 

MTb!d.,  p.  12. 

BT  TzveaUya,  .Inn.  30.  1073.  p.  1. 

^  Tho  Shchekino  experiment  provides  a  sot  of  Incentives  which  oneourase  tho  enterprise 
to  fulfill  its  plan  without  Increasing  employment  or  by  reducing  It.  At  the  24tli  Tarty  Con- 
cress.  Brezhnev  specifically  endorsed  the  Shchekino  experiment.  Tin'  zveno  provides  a  con- 
tinuous relationship  of  the  work  unit  and  tlie  common  plot — a  partial  property  rijrht. 

John  Godaire.  "The  Claim  of  the  Soviet  Military  Establishment."  T'.s.  Congress. 
Joint  Economic  Committee,  Dimcnxions  of  Soviet  Economic  Power,  S7th  Cong.,  2d  sess.. 
1962.  p.  43. 


557 


cess.  Indeed,  demobilization  was  apparently  quietly  resumed  after 
1961,  as  noted  by  Xikita  Khrushchev  in  1963  at  the  Party  Plenum;  by 
1965  his  original  target  of  2.4  million  in  military  manpower  reduc- 
tion was  reached.150  Soviet  military  leaders  probably  did  not  favor  the 
reduced  term  of  service  in  the  1967  draft  reform,  but  they  were  over- 
ridden by  the  Brezhnev-Kosygin  leadership.  With  the  China  border 
crisis  and  the  Czech  invasion,  the  strength  is  apparently  again  above 
the  1961  level  of  about  3  million,  possibly  as  high  as  3.6  million  (in- 
cluding the  border  guards  and  internal  security  forces). ni  The  logic  for 
reduction  in  the  size  of  the  military  force  might  now  again  be  based 
on  improved  economic  performance,  especially  if  Soviet  leaders  decide 
to  reduce  substantially  the  number  of  Soviet  forces  in  Eastern  Europe. 
However,  the  Sino-Soviet  border  situation  would  seem  to  preclude  a 
massive  cutback  in  military  manpower. 

Thus,  three  options  for  economic  change  open  to  the  Soviet  leader- 
ship are,  in  order  of  probability:  (1)  a  reduction  of  the  priority  for 
new  strategic  weapons  systems;  (2)  a  cutback  in  military  manpower; 
and  (3)  a  withdrawal  of  Party  control  and  involvement  in  the  economy 
so  as  to  permit  improved  efficiency  through  economic  reform.  All  are 
issues  which  will  be  influenced  by  both  the  international  situation  and 
domestic  political  considerations.  A  downward  revision  in  the  priority 
for  further  military  weapons  buildup,  for  example,  is  likely  only  if  the 
economic  rationale  is  persuasive  and  the  domestic  political  and  inter- 
national climate  are  favorable. 

The  Moscow  Summit  agreements,  the  Vietnam  settlement,  and  prog- 
ress in  solving  other  political  problems  in  East -West  relations  should 
help  to  provide  the  basis  for  a  change  in  Soviet  domestic  economic 
priorities.  Increasing  Soviet  interest  in  technologically  oriented  trade 
may  be  evidence  that  the  Soviet  leadership  is  indeed  committed  to  a 
reordering  of  priorities.  The  linkage  of  moderation  in  the  strategic 
arms  race  and  settlement  in  Vietnam  to  a  mutually  beneficial  trade 
agreement,  as  described  by  Dr.  Kissinger,  may  be  a  valid  intercon- 
nection, especially  in  the  minds  of  Leonid  Brezhnev  and  Richard 
Nixon. 

U.S. -Soviet  Technology  Transfers 

Secretary  Peterson  remarked  on  his  return  .from  the  first  meeting  of 
the  Joint  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Commercial  Commission  in  August  1972 
that  the  United  States  had  let  the  other  industrial  countries  steal  a 
march  on  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union,  and  that  U.S.  businessmen  are 
now  anxious  to  get  "a  piece  of  the  action."  This  "action"  includes  tech- 
nological transfers  and  industrial  cooperation  that  was  characteris- 
tic of  Soviet-U.S.  relations  before  but  not  after  World  War  II.  The 
prospect  of  resuming  the  pre-World  War  II  relationship  raises  im- 
portant questions.  What  contribution  will  U.S.  technology  make  to 
Soviet  economic  and  military  development?  In  the  past,  U.S.  export 
control  legislation  was  enacted  under  the  assumption  that  controls 
would  retard  Soviet  development  bv  limiting  transfers  of  U.S.  tech- 
nology to  Soviet  industry.  Soviet  achievements  in  military  technology 

""  Confirmed  in  an  interview  of  Marshal  Sokolovskv.  See  Neiv  York  Times,  Feb.  18, 
19R5.  d.  6. 

91  Institute  of  Strategic  Studies,  The  Military  Balance  1970-1971,  London,   1972,  p.  6. 


558 


and  in  selected  areas  of  civilian  technology  surest  the  need  for  re- 
assessing that  assumption. 

Another  important  question  involves  the  ability  of  U.S.  companies 
to  compete  with  other  Western  exporters  in  sales  of  high-technology 
products  to  the  Soviet  Union.  In  view  of  evidence  of  the  loss  of  Amer- 
ican technological  leadership  in  many  areas  to  Japan  and  Western 
Europe,  why  should  Soviet  importers  prefer  the  United  States  to  other 
Western  sources?  Two  hypotheses  may  help  to  explain  an  apparent 
Soviet  inclination  to  expand  trade  with  the  United  States — especially 
in  high-technology  products.  First,  there  is  a  traditional  Soviet  view 
that  American  technology  is  the  best.  Second,  and  perhaps  more  per- 
suasive, U.S.  technology  and  the  ability  of  U.S.  industry  to  deal  in 
large  projects  is  attractive.  Specifically  in  areas  such  as  petroleum  and 
natural  gas  development,  computer  systems,  and  agribusiness  the  abil- 
ity of  the  United  States  to  supply  the  latest  technology  and  the  neces- 
sary credit  .facilities  are  demonstrably  superior. 

U.S.  TECHNOLOGY  AND  SOVIET  ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  PRIOR  TO   194  6 

Most  students  of  Soviet  economic  development  agree  that  foreign 
technology  played  an  important  role  in  Soviet  industrialization.  In 
the  pre-World  War  II  period.  Soviet  industries  imported  advanced 
Western  machinery  and  equipment,  purchased  foreign  technical  in- 
formation, and  employed  industrial  specialists  from  the  West.  Ameri- 
can technology  was  imported  and  applied  in  many  sectors  of  the  Soviet 
economy.  The  U.S. -Soviet  technology  transfer  continued  during  the 
war.  largely  through  the  Lend-Lease  program. 

Antony  Sutton,  who  has  published  comprehensive  studies  on  West- 
ern technology  and  Soviet  economic  development,  has  concluded  thf>* 
"Western  technical  assistance  was  the  major  causal  factor  in  Soviet  eco- 
nomic growth  for  the  period  1928-1945. '" r>2  Sutton's  conclusion  differs 
somewhat  from  the  findings  of  other  scholars  and  may  overstate  Soviet 
dependence  on  Western  technology.  Richard  Moorsteen  and  Raymond 
Powell,  for  example,  concluded  in  a  1966  study  that  the  major  part  of 
Soviet  economic  growth  can  be  attributed  to  increments  of  capital  and 
labor,  rather  than  technological  progress.63 

Nevertheless,  the  importance  of  the  technology  transfer  from  the 
United  States  and  other  Western  countries  is  undeniable.  Certainly, 
the  high  regard  for  U.S.  technology  is  well  documented  in  Soviet 
sources.  For  example,  the  admiration  of  the  American  engineer  Hugh 
Cooper,  who  supervised  the  building  of  both  Muscle  Shoals  (a  dam 
on  the  main  stream  of  the  Tennessee  River)  and  the  Dnepr  River 
hydroelectric  system  (a  key  project  in  the  Soviet  First  Five-Year 
Plan)  was  symbolic  of  the  Soviet  view  of  American  technical  assist- 
ance. Moreover,  the  American  approach  to  mass  production  in 
machine-building  was  chosen  in  the  First  Five-Year  Plan  over  the 
European  small-scale  operations.  The  Soviet  tractor  and  automobile 
industry  were  applications  of  American  mass  production  techniques.6* 
U.S.   technological   contributions   were   frequently   acknowledged  by 


•"Antony  Sutton.  Wentern  Tcchnoloau  and  Soviet  Economic  Development ,  vol.  II  :  1910- 
19iS  (Stanford  :  Hoover  Institution  Press.  1071).  p.  330. 

"Richard  Moorsteen  and  Ravmond  P.  Powell.  The  Soviet  Capital  Stock,  1928-1962 
(Homewood.  111.  :  Richard  I)    Irwin.  Inc..  1966). 

"*  David  Granlck.  Soviet  Metal  Fabricating  and  Economic  Development  (Madison:  Uni- 
versity of  Wisconsin  Press,  1907).  pp.  24.  40,  41. 


559 


Soviet  political  and  industrial  leaders.  Even  Joseph  Stalin  paid  hom- 
age to  American  work  techniques : 

American  efficiency  is  that  indomitable  force  which  neither  knows  nor  recog- 
nizes obstacles:  which  with  its  businesslike  perseverance  brushes  aside  all 
obstacles:  which  continues  at  a  task  once  started  until  it  is  finished,  even  if  it 
is  a  minor  task  ;  and  without  which  serious  constructive  work  is  inconceivable.*5 

Sutton  claimed  that  Soviet  industry  generated  very  little  tech- 
nology of  its  own  in  the  period  prior  to  1946 : 

No  major  plant  under  construction  between  1030  and  1045  has  been  identified 
as  a  purely  Soviet  effort.  No  usable  technology  originated  in  Soviet  laboratories 
except  in  the  case  of  synthetic  rubber.  .  .  .60 

Soviet  achievements  since  World  War  II  in  military  and  space 
technology,  presumably  independent  of  technology  transfers  from  the 
West,  raise  doubts  of  the  current  validity — even  accepting  its  earlier 
basis — of  the  view  that  Soviet  industry  is  incapable  of  generating 
necessary  technological  change.  Certain  civilian  sectors  have  also  made 
important  technological  innovations.  Huge  Soviet  expenditures  on  re- 
search and  development  have  apparently  created  a  new  capability  for 
generating  technology.  Thus,  while  Soviet  officials  are  again  showing 
an  interest  in  importing  U.S.  technology,  the  present  situation  differs 
somewhat  from  that  of  the  prewar  period. 

CURRENT    SOVIET    TECHNOLOGICAL    REQUIREMENTS 

In  official  negotiations  of  the  Joint  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Commercial 
Commission  and  in  private  talks  with  U.S.  businessmen,  Soviet  officials 
are  again  expressing  an  interest  in  importing  various  kinds  of  U.S. 
technology.  Soviet  representatives  have  shown  most  interest  in  those 
areas  in  which  the  United  States  appears  to  have  a  legitimate  claim  to 
world  technological  leadership :    . 

(1)  large-scale  petroleum  and  natural  gas  extraction,  transmission, 
and  distribution  systems,  including  special  permafrost  problems  and 
oil  recovery  systems ; 

(2)  management  control  systems  utilizing  computer  facilities; 

(.3)  mass  production  machinery  output,  such  as  of  trucks  and  ears; 

(4)  animal  husbandry  as  characterized  by  U.S.  agricultural  busi- 
ness; and 

(5)  tourist  systems  including  hotels,  packaged  tours,  and  transport. 

Each  of  these  technological  areas  requires  large-scale  financing,  con- 
sortium operations,  and  marketing  systems.  The  experience  of  U.S. 
multinational  corporations  might  lend  itself  to  industrial  coopera- 
tion with  the  Soviet  Union. 

European  and  Japanese  firms  may  wish  to  limit  their  commitments 
to  the  Soviets.  For  example,  Italian  Fiat  and  French  'Renault  in- 
volvement in  the  Tol'iatti  and  Kama  plants,  respectively,  may  be  as 
far  as  they  wish  to  go.  Japanese  leaders  may  prefer  some  joint  U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. -Japanese  arrangements. 

For  political  reasons,  the  Soviet  leadership  may  wish  to  spread  the 
participation  of  non-Communist  countries  to  minimize  outside  lever- 
age. Japan,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  Germanv  have  been  the  lead- 


65  Joseph  Stalin.  The  Foundations  of  Leninism  (Moscow:  Foreign  Languages  Publishing 
House,  1950).  p.  160. 

66  Sutton,  op.  cit,  p.  346. 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  37 


560 


ing  non-Communist  trading  partners  with  the  U.S.S.R.  (See  Table 
4.)  It  may  well  be  that  a  more  balanced  pattern — with  the  share  of  the 

United  States  increasing — is  in  line  with  Kremlin  policy. 

TABLE  4.-S0VIET  TRADE  WITH  SELECTED  WESTERN  COUNTRIES  AND  JAPAN  i 

[In  million  U.S.  dollars] 

1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 

Japan: 

Exports 239  353  391  357  379  419 

Imports 224  166  185  264  345  396 

Turnover 463  519  576  621  725  815 

United  Kingdom: 

Exports 330  303  367  427  465  452 

Imports 169  197  273  240  248  222 

Turnover 499  501  640  667  713  674 

West  Germany: 

Exports 189  196  215  229  257  292 

Imports 144  176  242  350  375  484 

Turnover 333  372  457  579  632  776 

Finland: 

Exports 257  244  244  262  287  359 

Imports 217  269  266  294  303  273 

Turnover.. 474  513  510  556  590  632 

Italy: 

Exports 155  233  232  232  212  259 

Imports 95  154  208  317  313  291 

Turnover 251  387  441  548  524  550 

France: 

Exports 130  145  137  141  140  216 

Imports 160  188  294  323  319  313 

Turnover 290  333  432  464  459  529 

United  States: 

Exports 47  39  43  61  64  60 

Imports 63  63  57  117  115  143 

Turnover 110  102  99  177  179  203 

Canada: 

Exports 15  23  20  12  8  18 

Imports 346  141  126  33  131  151 

Turnover 361  163  146  45  139  164 

Total  Soviet  trade  with  the  developed  counties: 

Exports 1.711  1,886  2.051  2.230  2,345  2.712 

Imports 1,742  1,782  2,144  2,495  2,780  2.859 

Turnover 3,453  3,668  4,195  4,725  5,125  5,571 


1  Components  may  not  add  to  the  totals  shown  because  of  rounding. 
Source:  Peterson  report  (1972),  annex  B,  p.  13. 


» 


Soviet  Balance-of -Payments  Potential 

For  the  past  few  years,  Soviet  exports  to  the  United  States  have 
lagged  far  behind  imports  (see  Table  4).  While  Soviet  exports  to  the 


561 


United  States  expanded  significantly  in  1972,  they  still  totaled  only 
$95  million,  and  the  trade  deficit  worsened  (imports  from  the  United 
States  were  $547  million).  In  1973,  the  imbalance  is  likely  to  be  at 
least  as  great  because  of  the  large  amounts  of  grain  purchased  by  the 
Soviet  Union.  Thus.  Soviet  obligations  to  the  United  States  can  be 
expected  to  grow  at  a  rapid  rate.  How  will  these  obligations  be  met? 
The  following  are  areas  in  which  increases  in  Soviet  dollar  earnings 
are  possible : 

(1)  Increased  Soviet  exports  of  raw  materials,  such  as  energy 
sources  and  metals,  and  industrial  goods ; 

(2)  Gold  sales; 

(3)  Non-trade  income,  such  as  tourism  and  shipping; 

(4)  Multilateral  relations,  such  as  balancing  a  trade  deficit  with 
the  United  States  by  a  trade  surplus  with  Japan ; 

(5)  Cooperative  ventures;  and 

(6)  Credits  (only  a  short-term  consideration,  as  eventual  repay- 
ment is  required,  plus  interest) . 

SOVIET    EXPORT    POTENTIAL 

Soviet  exports  to  the  developed  West  (see  Table  5)  appear  to  include 
several  commodities  with  inelastic  demand,  i.e.,  regardless  of  the  price 
of  Soviet  exports,  the  foreign  demand  is  unlikely  to  change  much. 
Foreign  demand  for  Soviet  furskins,  for  example,  appears  to  be  in- 
elastic. Other  commodity  exports  such  as  petroleum,  natural  gas.  and 
some  non-ferrous  metals  face  more  elastic  demands.  For  this  latter 
group,  development  of  rich  Soviet  sources  in  Siberia  may  facilitate  a 
reduction  in  price  and  an  increase  in  supply.  If  the  Northern  Sea 
Route  in  the  Arctic  Ocean  should  become  economically  usable  on 
closer  to  a  twelve-month  basis,  the  transport  by  water  of  wood  and 
wood  products,  coal  and  coke,  and  some  other  raw  materials  to  Europe, 
the  United  States,  and  Japan  might  help  to  expand  Soviet  exports. 

Metal  products  such  as  nickel,  palladium,  platinum,  and  chrome  ore 
have  been  the  Soviet  Union's  biggest  exports  to  the  United  States  (see 
Table  6).  An  expansion  of  U.S. -Soviet  trade  would  bring  some  in- 
crease in  Soviet  exports  of  these  commodities,  as  the  demand  of  certain 
U.S.  industries  for  them  is  growing.  Palladium  and  platinum,  for 
example,  are  becoming  increasingly  important  in  the  automobile  indus- 
try for  antipollution  catalytic  exhaust  devices.  Chrysler  Corporation 
reportedly  contracted  to  import  100,000  ounces  of  Soviet  palladium 
in  107.3  at  a  price  of  $00  an  ounce.07  U.S.  imports  of  nickel,  traditionally 
important  in  U.S. -Soviet  trade,  are  also  increasing. 


87  U.S.  News  and  World  Report,  Oct.  16,  1972. 


562 


E 
< 


ooooNfONOOinr^ 


u-iir>oooo^oo*rt£>r» 
r^  _  m       coj,^       roar 


irifiintfjff'NOfnin 


E 


to 

UJ 

a 

LlJ 

o. 
o 

_l 

LU 

> 
UJ 

o 


i    = 


CC        ». 


E 

< 


CM*  U">"  »£l  •— "  00  ui  CM  ^  co 

Cn.  —  •— «  CM 


■*       N  ro  oo  m  o  n  «r  run 

U-,  __  m        cnj  __        rnm 


OCMinm^OTJCM^fOT) 

.-"  m'  in  co  "*"••  oo"  cm*  co  cm 

CM         *-•  «— "CM 


oo  in  id  k  ^  oo  <j>  01  o 

«D  "-1  ^f  (^  ^  CT>  ^r  <7>  ^h 

^ .— >  co      •— •  ^-      cm  in 


^•"  ^"  <£)in'OrC  cm'  in  co" 


^  m  m  ©»  r»»  ~-  o 

(fifJrNinmrvte 


cm  <x>  i/">  o  «— •  in  -— 
*r  oo  — «  r^  oo  ct>  r^- 
o  co  cm  .-•  co  -«r  •— « 


o 
o 


in  ~-  r-.^- » 


< 


o  co  ^r  *r  in 


tooeocM°co^r** 

oococD'Ti^rin^-ou 
m^m^N^       cocm 


com,— ir^.oor«.cJ»cMco 
o    I  co  iT)  r-."  in  c^  r*^  cm\d  o 

2I~    ■"     " 


^f-  — •  ro  ~-  «^  ~-i       ro  ^^ 


O 

O 


o 

o 


> 
o 

CO 


00 

I 


CD 


E 

< 


E 

< 


f-jirs^^icMiro 


~^    I  ix)  o  oo  o  5fi  in  co  —>  co 

— .  tD  O  O**  OO  ^  — -  <£>  <X>  OO 

r^.         CO^CM         CM  ^-         CM*-« 


E 

< 


ey>  r-*  ^  cm  o  co  in 

O"*  CO  •— «  CM  OO  O"*  CO 
O  CO  CM  .— •  CM  in  .— . 


OO  — ■  UD  ~-  — '  O  CSJ 


n    I  oorvutooicoo 
T>    I   ->  r- ^- cm  rv  o  oo 

»      I    —  ~->CM         CMU-)  ^* 


oo  co  .— ■  co  ~-  r*.  co 


to  r-»  in  •— •  ot>  cm  CM 
o*>  m  o*>  cm  in  cm  o*> 

oo  ^-  ~-  *-»  cm  *r 


t£>  *J-  CO  CM  CO  00  CM 


o  cm  tr>  r*.  ct»  <x>  o 
r-»  co  t£>  **•  — «  o  ^r 

l£>  —  —  —  CNI   »T 


•-»  cm  cm  r-»  r»*  in  in 
cm  in  oo*  co"  (X>  ~-»  cm 


o  ~-  cm  co  to  in  co 

co  o>  ^r  ~-  — •  r*»  ^r 
in       .— «  ^-  ~-  co 


__  "OJ3*- 

—        °  c  «j        c 

2        o>  <o  _  c  """* 

w  UO>OCDLlU.O 


E 
a. 

=3 

3 
o 

a 

F 

c 

cr 

a>  *o 

TO 

c 

a> 

XT 

TO 

l/l 

« 

in 

-o 

n 

d 

h 

o 

C 

h- 

m 

U 

n 

5CDO 

■c 

S    m 


563 

TABLE  6.-U.S.  IMPORTS  FROM  U.S.S.R. 
II n  thousands  of  dollars) 


Major  commodity  type'  1966       1967       1968       1969       1970         1971 

Crude  materials 16,377  14,410  15,505  14,470  18,314  15,388 

Furskins 6,302  4,227  4,633  5,059  3,334  2,731 

Chromeore 6,323  6,785  7,297  7,807  13,691  11,147 

Nonferrous  metal  scrap 739  914  1,332  700  767  1,292 

Mineral  fuels  and  related  materials 2  5  5  1,777  2,807  652 

Chemicals 1,387  1,125  1,017  1,312  913  1,062 

Organic  chemicals 9  98  8  429  399  220 

Inorganic  chemicals _ 1,208  822  857  727  143  584 

Manufactures 30,251  21,725  39,969  32,079  46,451  35,725 

Glass      .     ....       931  1,050  1,264  1,315  1,492  1,614 

Diamonds  and  precious  stones 3,542  6,810  10,828  11,018  13,439  11,244 

Platinum,  etc     .     ..     19,048  10,725  24,963  14,063  22,887  19,515 

Nonferrous  base  metals..     1,041  2,993  2,228  5,295  7,996  2,728 

Miscellaneous 459  557  1,071  1,610  2,666  3,044 

Manufactured  articles:  Jewelry  and  precious  metal  articles 943  1,872  1,973 

Total  imports 49,414  41,046  58,357  51,504  72,312  57,598 

1  Subcommodity  types  may  not  add  to  total  because  of  omission  of  insignificant  items. 
Source:  "Peterson  Report"  (1972),  Annex  B,  p.  16. 

Other  products  which  the  Soviet  Union  now  exports  in  large  quan- 
tities to  the  industrial  West  are  crude  oil  and  petroleum  products  and 
wood  and  wood  products.  The  United  States  currently  imports  rela- 
tively little  of  these  two  categories  from  the  Soviet  Union.  (See  Tables 
5  and  6.)  With  a  relaxation  of  barriers  to  U.S. -Soviet  trade,  the  Soviet 
Union  is  unlikely  to  increase  substantially  its  sales  of  wood  products  to 
the  United  States  (a  net  exporter  of  wood)  ;  probably,  only  small 
quantities  of  certain  types  of  wood  not  produced  in  the  United  States 
would  be  sold.  However,  rising  prices  and  timber  product  shortage  in 
the  United  States  may  generate  a  greater  demand  for  Soviet  wood.  On 
the  other  hand,  Soviet  exports  of  petroleum  products  (which  the 
United  States  imports  in  ever  increasing  quantities)  would  undoubt- 
edly expand  rapidly  if  the  Soviet  Union  could  produce  sufficient 
surpluses. 

A  major  hard-currency  earner  for  the  Soviet  Union  is  diamonds. 
Although  Soviet  foreign  trade  officials  do  not  reveal  the  value  of 
diamonds  sold  to  Western  countries,  it  is  reported  to  be  quite  large. 
For  example,  the  Soviet  Union  reportedly  sells  up  to  $200  million  worth 
of  diamonds  every  year  through  a  London  bank.08  Other  sales  have 
been  reported  in  New  York,  Frankfurt,  and  Amsterdam.69  Be- 
cause the  Soviet  Union  does  not  enjoy  MFX  status,  Soviet  diamonds 
are  at  present  subject  to  high  U.S.  tariffs.  If  MFN  status  is  granted, 
Soviet  exporters  will  undoubtedly  increase  their  sales  of  diamonds  in 
the  United  States. 

The  potential  for  Soviet  exports  of  high-technology  industrial  prod- 
ucts to  the  United  States  remains  uncertain.  Unlike  that  of  most  in- 
dustrialized countries,  the  structure  of  Soviet  exports  remains  heavily 
biased  toward  raw  materials,  foodstuffs,  and  semi-manufactures.  The 
commodity  composition  of  Soviet  exports  may  result  from  the  leader- 
ship's priorities — that  is.  potentially  exportable,  technologically  ad- 
vanced products  may  be  reserved  for  high-priority  domestic  civilian 

88  Economist,  Jan.  6,  1973,  p.  18. 

09  "The  USSR's  Undisclosed  Assets,"  Radio  Free  Europe  Research,  Jan.  11,  1973. 


564 


and  defense  programs.  Conceivably.  Soviet  leaders  might  change  pri- 
orities and  concentrate  on  development  of  high-technology  products 
for  export,  as  the  Japanese  have  done. 

Soviet  foreign  trade  organizations  have  demonstrated  their  ability 
to  export  high-technology  products  in  certain  sectors.  Those  exports 
demonstrate  that  the  Soviet  Union  now  has  the  capacity  to  generate 
technology.  Some  Soviet  industries  have  undoubtedly  benefited  from 
technological  spin-off  of  high-priority  military  and  space  programs. 
Other  industries  may  have  developed  independent  technologies  in 
response  to  foreign  export  control  policies  which  deprived  them  of 
some  technical  information  from  the  West. 

Listed  below  are  some  types  of  Soviet  machinery  and  equipment — 
the  most  technologically  intensive  category  of  exports —which  have 
been  exported  by  the  Soviet  Union,  or  which  Soviet  officials  have  said 
they  want  to  sell: 70 

Machinery  and  mechanical  equipment. — Forging  and  pressing 
equipment;  rolling  equipment :  mining  machinery :  power  equipment — 
hydraulic  and  steam  turbines;  machinery  for  food  preparation  ;  textile 
machines;  printing  equipment;  road-building  machinery:  and  parts 
of  machines — anti-friction  bearings. 

Electrical  machinery  and  equipment. — Generators,  transformers: 
radio  receivers  and  components ;  and  electronics  components. 

Transportation  equipment. — Aircraft — supersonic  airplanes,  heli- 
copters; motorcycles;  seagoing  freighters — tankers,  dry  cargo;  sea- 
going passenger  ships — hydrofoils ;  and  tractors. 

Miscellaneous  equipment. — Measuring  instruments — optical,  meteor- 
ological, et  cetera;  medical  equipment:  tools,  watches  and  com- 
ponents; cameras,  photographic  accessories;  and  movie  projectors  and 
accessories. 

While  many  of  these  items  will  probably  prove  noncompetitive  in 
the  U.S.  market,  some  of  them  should  find  buyers.  Soviet  ability  to  ex- 
port machinery  and  equipment  to  the  United  States  will  depend 
largely  on  whether  the  Soviet  Union  receives  most-favored-nation 
treatment.71 

One  very  marketable  commodity  of  the  Soviet  Union  is  its  gold 
stock.  Soviet  state  gold  reserves  in  1972  were  estimated  to  be  1800 
metric  tons,  and  annual  gold  production  was  believed  to  be  about  220 
metric  tons.72  Gold  has  been  exported  in  large  quantities  when  Soviet 
hard  currency  needs  were  particularly  pressing,  as  in  1964.  1965,  and 
1972,  to  pay  for  large  grain  imports.  (See  Table  7.)  It  is  uncertain 
how  much  gold  Soviet  leaders  will  be  willing  to  export  in  the  future: 
they  appear  to  share  the  "Midas  complex"  of  their  Western  counter- 
parts in  associating  great  value  to  a  substantial  gold  stock.  As  large 
sales  of  gold  in  1972  and  1973  have  reduced  state  reserves.  Soviet  of- 
ficial^ may  be  reluctant  to  export  gold  in  future  commercial  transac- 
tions. They  may  prefer  to  accumulate'  gold  in  the  event  of  another 


T"  Siiv  for  p\nmplp.  Hnherl  II.  Hnmphrev  nnrl  Henry  s  Ki'iks.  Ohscrrations  <>»  Emit-West 
Economic  delation*:  U.S.S.R.  and  Poland.  A  trip  report  prepare]  for  the  U.S.  Congress 
Joint    Rconomlo  Pommltri  •   (Washington,  D.C. :  U.S.   Government  I'rintlnp  Office,  1973). 

71  See  below,  V.8.  Restrictions  on  Imports  from  the  Soriet  Union  :  the  Issue  of  Most- 
Favored-Nation  Treatment,  pp.  r>2   ."p.r>. 

"Keith  Hush.  "The  Rest  Western  Estimates  on  Soviet  Gold."  Radio  Libert)/  Dispatch, 
Aup.  lift.  H»72  ;  "The  USSR's  Undisclosed  Assets,"  op.  clt. 


565 


agricultural  crisis.  The  Soviet  preference  for  maintaining  considerable 
state  reserves  may  preclude  a  policy  of  continuous  export  of  gold. 

TABLE  7.— ESTIMATES  OF  SOVIET  GOLD  OUTPUT  AND  DISPOSITIONS  (METRIC  TONS) 


Domestic 

Sales  to 

Sales  to 

Changes  in 

Year 

Output 

consumption 

Comecon 

West 

reserves 

1964 

145 

12 

5 

401 

-272 

1965 

.___•_                   156 

14 

5 

488 

-351 

1966 

167 

16 

5 

(') 

+146 

1967 

177 

19 

5 

13 

+140 

1968 

188 

22 

6 

10 

+  151 

1969 

... 198 

36 

6 

0) 

+157 

1970... 

208 

42 

6 

(') 

+  160 

1971 

212 

52 

6 

202 

+134 

1972 

220 

(3) 

<3) 

250 

-90 

1  Negligible. 

2  Samuel  Montagu  &  Co.  Ltd.,  "Annual  Bullion  Review  1971,"  London,  1972,  p.6  suggests  a  figure  closer  to  65  tons. 

3  No  estimates  available. 

Sources:  Michael  Kaser,  "Soviet  Gold— Production  and  Use,"  Gold  1971  and  "Soviet  Gold  Production  and  Sales  in  1971," 
Gold  1972;  "The  U.S.S.R.'s  Undisclosed  Assets,"  Radio  Free  Europe  research,  Jan.  11, 1973. 

SOVIET    EARNINGS    FROM    INVISIBLE    TRADE 

Yugoslavia  and  other  East  European  countries  have  demonstrated 
that  a  rapid  expansion  in  tourism  is  possible  even  for  Communist 
countries.  In  Yugoslavia,  for  example,  the  tourist  business  is  thriving. 
In  recent  years,  tourism  has  been  a  major  factor  in  improving  the 
Yugoslav  balance  of  payments;  $335  million  was  earned  in  the  first 
nine  months  of  1972."  Perhaps  the  uneven  quality  of  Intourist,  Aero- 
flot,  and  other  Soviet  tourist  facilities  will  continue  to  restrict  tourism 
in  the  Soviet  Union  to  a  more  modest  scale.  However,  there  are  signs 
that  the  Soviet  Union  may  try  to  capture  a  larger  share  of  the  tourist 
trade.  Arrangements  have  been  made  with  Western  airlines  and  hotel 
chains  to  provide  better  facilities  for  foreign  visitors.  Further  Soviet 
changes,  such  as  a  relaxation  of  travel  restrictions  and  security  harass- 
ment, could  lead  to  a  substantial  increase. 

Tourism  has  already  brought  a  small,  but  significant,  inflow  of  hard 
currency.  Intourist  claimed  that  2.5  million  visitors  would  visit  the 
Soviet  Union  in  1972,  an  increase  of  12  percent  over  1971.74  Generally, 
a  larger  number  of  tourists  travel  from  hard  currency  countries  to  the 
Soviet  Union  than  vice  versa.75  Thus,  the  Soviets  have  a  considerable 
positive  balance  in  the  tourist  trade.  Without  major  changes  in  present 
policies,  the  Soviets  are  unlikely  to  be  as  successful  as  their  East 
European  neighbors  in  promoting  tourism. 

Soviet  merchant  shipping  has  expanded  at  an  impressive  rate  in  re- 
cent years.  The  merchant  marine  now  totals  over  16  million  gross 
registered  tons,  and  is  the  sixth  largest  fleet  in  the  world.  During  the 
current  five-year  plan,  1971-1975,  the  Soviet  merchant  marine  plans 
to  add  five  million  tons.  Soviet  ships  now  carry  most  goods  shipped  to 
and  from  the  Soviet  Union,  and  Soviet  shipping  officials  have  recently 
begun  to  compete  for  cargoes  in  other  parts  of  the  world.  For  example, 
they  now  do  a  considerable  amount  of  business  on  the  Australia-to- 
Europe  shipping  routes. 


73  Zdanko    Antic,    "Yugoslav    Balance    of    Payments    Improving,"    Radio    Free    Europe 
Research,  Nov.  29,  1972. 

74  "The  Tourist  In  Russia,"  Washington  Post,  Sept.  3,  1972. 

75  For  Soviet  travel  statistics,  see  International  Union  of  Official  Travel  Organizations. 
International  Travel  Statistics. 


566 


Its  enlarged  fleet  gives  the  Soviet  Union  the  capacity  to  earn  sub- 
stantial sums  of  hard  currencies.  Since  the  early  1960s.  Soviet  mer- 
chant shipping  has  made  net  contributions  to  the  Soviet  balance  of 
payments  with  hard  currency  countries.  One  estimate,  for  example, 
put  the  Soviet  merchant  marine's  net  hard  currency  earnings  in  li)6fi 
at  106  million  rubles.76  Its  earning  capacity  is  undoubtedly  growing. 
However,  the  Soviet  fleet's  contribution  to  its  balance  of  payments  in 
Soviet-American  trade  will  be  limited  by  the  terms  agreed  to  in  the 
recently  signed  maritime  agreement.  The  agreement  stipulates  that 
vessels  of  each  country  would  have  the  opportunity  to  carry  one-third 
of  all  cargoes  between  the  two  countries.  Moreover,  the  Soviet  Union 
contracted  to  pay  higher  than  world  rates  for  shipments  of  agricul- 
tural goods  in  U.S.  ships. 

MULTILATERAL    RELATIONS 

Although  the  Soviet  Union  has  shown  a  preference  for  bilateral 
trade  in  the  past,  it  could  conceivably  attempt  to  use  multilateral  bal- 
ancing arrangements  to  alleviate  its  negative  trade  balance  with  the 
United  States.  The  Soviet  Union  has  enjoyed  a  favorable  balance  of 
trade  with  some  of  the  major  trade  partners  of  the  United  States, 
including  Japan  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Ideally,  it  could  transfer 
its  positive  balances  with  those  countries  to  pay  for  needed  imports 
from  the  United  States.  A  precedent  for  multilateral  balancing  in 
East-West  trade  is  the  pattern  of  Soviet  trade  with  the  Sterling  Area. 
The  Soviet  Union  has  used  its  earnings  from  trade  with  the  United 
Kingdom  to  buy  from  other  countries  in  the  Sterling  Area. 

However  the  potential  for  multilateral  balancing  arrangements  is 
limited  at  present.  The  Soviet  Union  does  not  have  many  positive 
balances  in  its  trade  with  hard-currency  countries,  partly  because 
some  hard-currency  countries  are  unwilling  to  accept  deficits  in  then- 
trade  agreements  with  Communist  countries.  Generally,  the  Soviet 
Union  runs  an  overall  deficit  in  its  trade  with  Western  industrial 
countries. 

COPRODUCTION    AGREEMENTS  77 

New  forms  of  industrial  cooperation  between  Soviet  state  enter- 
prises and  Western  firms  help  the  Soviets  to  import  high-technology 
machinery  and  equipment  without  large  outlays  of  hard  currency. 
Most  joint  ventures  in  the  Soviet  Union  involve  the  technical  and 
financial  participation  of  Western  firms  in  the  exploitation  of  natural 
resources  or  the  construction  of  plants.  The  Western  partners  generally 


78  Robert  E.  Athay,  The  Economics  of  Soviet  Merchant-Shipping  Policu  (Chapel  Hill: 
The  University  of  North  Carolina  Press,  1971),  p.  6S. 

77  A  distinction  Is  sometimes  made  between  the  terms  "reproduction  arrangement"  and 
"joint  venture"  on  the  grounds  that  the  latter  involves  equity  ownership  and  more  control 
by  the  foreign  investor.  In  this  paper,  the  terms  are  used  synonymously. 


567 


supply  equipment  and  technical  services  on  credit  and  are  repaid  by 
deliveries  of  raw  materials  or  commodities  produced  in  the  joint  ven- 
tures. Western  European  shipments  of  gas  pipeline  in  return  for 
natural  gas,  and  joint  Soviet-Japanese  exploitation  of  Siberian  timber 
resources,  are  examples  of  East-West  coproduction  arrangements. 

Representatives  of  several  American  companies  have  discussed  co- 
production  ventures  with  Soviet  officials.  By  far  the  largest  project 
envisioned  at  present  is  a  bid  by  several  U.S.  and  Japanese  companies 
to  help  finance  development  of  Soviet  natural  gas  reserves.  The  trans- 
action could  reportedly  result  in  repayment  delivery  of  $45.6  billion 
of  natural  gas  to  the  United  States  and  Japan.78  Several  other  large 
projects  for  raw  material  development  have  been  discussed.  If  U.S.- 
Soviet cooperative  ventures  on  this  scale  should  be  established  and  the 
central  problem  of  credits  resolved,  the  U.S. -Soviet  balance  of  pay- 
ments would  look  quite  different.  For  a  number  of  years,  large  U.S. 
surpluses  in  the  trade  balance  would  be  offset  by  outflows  of  U.S.  cred- 
its. Some  of  the  projects  now  being  discussed  would  increase  Soviet 
export  capabilities  only  after  an  extended  development  period. 

Potential  Level  of  U.S.-Soviet  Trade 

A  number  of  optimistic  estimates  have  been  made  on  the  future  ex- 
pansion of  U.S.-Soviet  trade.  The  former  Secretary  of  Commerce 
Maurice  Stans  predicted  that  Soviet-U.S.  trade  turnover  increases 
might  cumulate  $5  billion  from  1971-1975.79  This  would  imply  a  trade 
turnover  of  over  $1  billion  in  1975,  as  compared  with  $200  million  in 
1971.  The  U.S.-Soviet  commercial  agreement  more  modestly  forecast  a 
threefold  cumulative  increase  in  three  years  (1972-75),  over  the  pre- 
vious three  years  ( 1969-71 ) . 

Mr.  Steven  Lazarus,  Director  of  the  Bureau  of  East-West  Trade  in 
the  Department  of  Commerce,  speaking  in  Houston  in  January  1973 
stated: 

We  hope  the  volume  of  U.S.  East-West  trade  will  approach  4  billion  and  will 
yield  a  positive  contribution  to  our  trade  balance  of  approximately  one  billion 
annually  by  the  end  of  the  decade.60 

The  trade  imbalance  of  a  billion  dollars  implies  U.S.  exports  of  $2.5 
billion  and  imports  of  $1.5  billion  with  Communist  countries.  How 
much  of  the  trade  was  projected  for  the  U.S.S.R.  and  how  much  for  the 
East  European  countries  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China  in  1980 
is  not  clear. 

The  Lazarus  projection  may  well  be  very  conservative.  Preliminary 
estimates  of  individual  analysts  in  the  Department  of  Commerce  indi- 
cate that  U.S.  exports  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  other  Eastern  Euro- 
pean countries  might  reach  $2.6  billion  in  1978.81  (See  Table  8.) 


w  Washington  Post.  Nov.  3.  1972  and  Dec.  26,  1972. 

™?>~eic  York  Times,  Nov.  IS.  1971,  p.  1. 

*  World  Trade  Club,  Houston.  Tex..  Jan.  16,  1973. 

81  Erast  Borissoff  and  Stephen  Sind,  Projections  of  U.S.  Exports  to  U.S.S.R.  and  Eastern 
Europe.  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  East-West  Trade.  Research  Note  No.  3. 
May  1973. 


568 


TABLE  8.-T0TAL  PROJECTED  U.S.  EXPORTS  TO  EASTERN  EUROPE  AND  THE  SOVIET    UNION  (UNDER  VARYING 

CONDITIONS) 

[Millions  of  U.S.  dollars] 

1972,  if  1973.  if  1973,  if  1978,  if  1978,  if 
trade  trade  trade  trade  trade 
1972                               were  is  were  is  is 
actual          Classifi-    "normal-  "main-  "normal-  "main-  "normal- 
exports            cation         ized"  tained"  ized"  tained"  ized" 


High. 


Total  Eastern  Europe/U.S.S.R 816.45    Middle. 

Low 


1,272.83 
1,"  10107" 


530.03    1,441.60 
"439."i6"Tl819T 


964.  04 
588" 52" 


High 804.61 

Eastern  Europe 269.84    Middle.  736.03 

Low 654.83 


U.S.S.R.' 2  546.61 


High 468.62 

Middle 

Low 448.24 


348.  64 
309.  50 
273.  64 

181.79 

"165."  46" 


905.  97 
806. 94 
696.  40 

535.  63 

487.51" 


356.  65 
232.12" 


2,601.13 
"l,"  572"  34 


607.39  1,500.32 
464.  52  1,  238.  54 
356.  40         888.  42 


1,050.81 
"683.92 


1  Projections  exclude  any  possible  grain  deals  of  the  type  concluded  in  July  1972,  whose  nature  and  causes  prevent  them 
from  being  estimated. 
-2 1972  actual  includes  grain. 

Source:  Office  of  East-West  Trade  Analyssis,  Bureau  of  East-West  Trade,  Department  of  Commerce. 

This  estimate  suggests  a  trade  turnover  of  over  $5  billion  in  1978  and 
presumably  larger  by  1980.  If  U.S.-Chinese  trade  is  added  to  this 
figure,82  total  U.S.  trade  with  Communist  countries  might  exceed  S7 
billion  by  the  end  of  this  decade. 

The  basis  for  such  optimistic  estimates  appears  to  be  the  large  import 
requirements  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  other  Communist  countries  for 
Western  goods  and  services.  A  1973  estimate  by  a  Soviet  observer  con- 
firms that  these  requirements  are  substantial.  The  Soviet  projection 
placed  import  requirements  in  1980  (from  Western  industrial  coun- 
tries) at  $7-7.5  billion  for  the  U.S.S.R.  and  $17-18  billion  for  all  of 
the  nations  of  Comecon,83  also  from  Western  industrial  countries. 

I  Iowever.  in  1972  the  Soviet  t  rade  deficit  with  the  United  States  was 
si.Vj  million  (Soviet  imports  totaled  sr> 1 7  million,  while  exports  were 
only  *(.)~>  million).  It  is  unlikely  that  t  he  Soviets  will  be  able  or  willing 
to  maintain  such  deficits  in  future  trade1  with  the  United  States.  Thus. 
in  order  to  rapidly  expand  their  trade  with  the  United  States,  the 
Soviets  must  either  increase  their  commodity  exports  or  offset  the  im- 
balance with  invisible  trade  earnings  from  tourism,  gold  sales  and 
shipping,  or  with  credits  from  the  Export-Import  Bank  or  private 
commercial  banks. 

In  assessing  these  projections,  it  i^  best  to  concentrate  on  Soviet 
ability  to  export  to  the  United  States,  because  Soviet  dollar  earnings 
will  be  a  major  constraint  on  future  trade.  Soviet  dollar  earnings  from 
tourism,  shipping,  and  gold  sales  are  likely  to  grow  in  the  next  few 
years:  but  without  changes  in  present  policies,  these  items  may  add 
only  several  hundred  million  < lobars  to  Soviet  hard-currency  holdings. 
I  f  the  Soviet  I  nion  adopts  a  new  policy  of  maximizing  income  in  dol- 
lars from  gold  sales,  tourism,  and  shipping,  annual  earnings  of  nearly 
$r>00  million  do  not   seem  unattainable.  This  amount   would  involve 


83  James  B.  Stopanck  oltos  estimates  of  IT. S. -Chinese  trade  In  19SO  of  S.r>00  million  to 
si  billion.  Sino-Amertcan  Trade  (Washington,  D.C. :  Library  of  Congress.  Congressional 
Research  Service,  May  1973).  p,  54, 

93  X,  Shmelev,  "Novye  gorlzonty  ekonomichesklkh  sviazey"  (New  Horizons  of  Economic 
Relations),  Mirovata  ekonomika  i  mezhdunarodnye  otnosheniia,  No.  1.  January  1973,  p.  13. 


569 


sales  of  the  bulk  of  the  U.S.S.R.'s  annual  gold  output,  a  more  effective 
system  of  attracting  American  tourists,  and  a  full  exploitation  of  the 
new  shipping  opportunities  for  both  freight  and  passengers.  Joint  ven- 
tures in  the  tourist  and  shipping  areas  would  probably  be  necessary  to 
teach  the  higher  levels. 

In  assessing  Soviet  export  trade  potential,  the  following  variables 
are  most  relevant : 

(.1)  Soviet  willingness  to  shift  exports  of  oil  and  gas  from  other 
markets,  including  domestic  and  Comecon,  to  the  United  States; 

(2)  the  size  of  L7.S.  Government  (P^xport-Import  Bank  and  Com- 
modity Credit  Corporation)  and  private  credits  to  the  Soviet  Union 
as  part  of  large-scale  joint  ventures  for  raw  material  extraction  proc- 
essing, transportation,  and  marketing.  Without  large-scale  projects, 
potential  energy,  metal,  timber  and  other  raw  material  resources  may 
not  be  economically  exploitable.  Moreover,  without  Western  capital, 
credit,  and  technology,  many  of  the  rich  potential  Siberian  resources 
may  not  be  exploited  for  decades.  Increased  output  marketed  by  West- 
ern multinational  corporations  may  permit  a  significant  net  increase 
in  export  capability  above  that  required  to  repay  the  financing. 

(3)  U.S.  willingness  to  extend  most-favored-nation  treatment  to 
the  Soviet  Union; 

(4)  Soviet  ability  to  launch  a  major  effort  to  produce  industrial 
products  for  the  AVestern  market  facilities  that  provide  efficient  mar- 
keting not  subject  to  market  disruptions  problems.  Use  of  such  multi- 
national companies,  as  International  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Cor- 
poration, which  might  involve  trade  of  machine  tools  for  electric 
equipment — an  industrial  version  of  the  Pepsi  for  vodka  barter  ar- 
rangement— could  prove  attractive. 

These  variables  will  largely  determine  the  size  of  total  U.S.-Soviet 
trade  turnover  in  the  years  ahead.  With  current  Soviet  priorities  for 
technologically  advanced  goods,  the  detente  environment,  and  the 
equalization  of  U.S.  commercial  policy  toward  the  U.S.S.R.  with  that 
of  other  industrial  countries  through  liberalized  export  control  and 
credits,  the  Soviet  demand  for  U.S.  imports  is  likely  to  run  ahead  of 
their  ability  to  pay.  Therefore,  the  Soviet-U.S.  trade  turnover  may  be 
expected  to  maintain  its  current  level,  increase  modestly,  or  rise  signifi- 
cantly, depending  on  the  above  noted  variables. 

These  three  steps  in  potential  turnover  of  1980  may  be  illustrated 
by  the  following  estimates : 

(1)  A  diversion  of  Soviet  oil  and  gas  exports  and  other  hard  cur- 
rency earning  exports  to  the  United  States  and  modest  credit  allow- 
ances, for  example,  might  lead  to  an  expansion  of  trade  to  an  average 
annual  level  of  $700-800  million. 

(2)  If  the  Soviet  Union  receives  MFN  status  and  liberal  credits 
and  initiates  an  aggressive  industrial  product  sales  effort,  a  $2-3  bil- 
lion trade  turnover  is  possible. 

(3)  A  projection  of  $4-5  billion  annual  trade  turnover  is  conceiv- 
able if  negotiations  on  joint  U.S.-Soviet  development  of  Siberian  nat- 
ural gas  resources  are  successful.  The  two  Liquified  Natural  Gas 
(L.NG)  projects  under  discussion  could  total  investments  of  $5-6  bil- 
lion each  with  repayment  presumably  over  an  8-10  year  period  (the 
presumed  Export-Import  Hank  maximum). 


IV.  U.S.  Interest  in  Expanded  Economic  Relations  With  the 

Soviet  Union 

In  assessing  the  new  U.S. -Soviet  commercial  relationship,  the  pri- 
mary task  for  U.S.  policymakers  is  to  determine  its  effect  on  the  U.S. 
economy  and  on  U.S.  foreign  policy  goals.  The  United  States  has  an 
obvious  interest  in  importing  valuable  raw  materials  and  selected 
manufactured  goods  from  the  Soviet  Union.  But  how  will  U.S. -Soviet 
trade  influence  the  U.S.  economy  as  a  whole?  In  view  of  the  small 
volume  of  trade,  can  U.S.  consumers  and  producers  expect  significant 
benefits?  Administration  officials  have  frequently  cited  improved  U.S.- 
Soviet diplomatic  relations  as  a  primary  motivation  for  expanding 
commercial  relations.  What  diplomatic  benefits  will  the  United  States 
reap,  in  terms  of  specific  U.S.  foreign  policy  goals? 

Economic  Benefits  for  the  United  states 

The  economic  advantages  of  Soviet-U.S.  economic  relations  are 
likely  to  be  significant  in  particular  sectors,  rather  than  for  the  na- 
tional economy  as  a  whole.  Grain  traders  and  petroleum  companies, 
for  example,  may  benefit,  but  the  overall  effect  on  the  national  econ- 
omy will  be  modest. 

U.S.  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  represented  less  than  1  percent 
of  total  U.S.  foreign  trade  in  1971.  In  1072.  trade  turnover  increased 
substantially.  However,  if  U.S.-Soviet  trade  should  increase  in  eight 
years  to  $3  billion — a  remarkable  attainment — it  would  still  be  only 
about  2  percent  of  U.S.  foreign  trade.  Currently,  the  United  States 
imports  as  much  in  a  week  from  Canada  as  it  imports  in  a  year  from 
the  Soviet  Union.84  As  a  result,  a  major  relative  change  or  increase 
in  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  could  be  offset  by  a  relatively  minor 
change  in  U.S.  trade  relations  with  its  major  trading  partners.  More- 
over, job  creation,  economic  growth,  and  other  economic  benefits  asso- 
ciated with  increased  trade  would  be  modestly  affected  by  Soviet  or 
East -West  trade. 

Furthermore,  the  U.S.  trade  and  balance-of-payments  deficits  will 
probably  not  be  substantially  reduced  by  increased  Soviet  trade.  Al- 
though "the  United  States  is  likely  to  have  considerable  surpluses  in  its 
trade  with  the  Soviet  Union,  they  will  be  small  in  comparison  with 
overall  U.S.  deficits. 

Stability  of  U.S.  Trade  Gains 

Soviet  foreign  trade  organizations  have  frequently  been  criticized 
by  Western  businessmen  as  erratic  and  unreliable  trade  partners.  In- 
deed, several   aspects  of   past    Soviet    practices  support   this  notion: 

i  Peterson  (1971),  op.  cit.,  Appendix  1 1,  pp.  is.  23. 

(570) 


571 


agricultural  trade  is  periodic,  depending  on  the  grain  harvest;  trade 
may  take  place  in  technologically  advanced  products,  to  fill  short-run, 
non-recurrent  needs;  and  some  trade  is  required  to  meet  unexpected 
bottlenecks  in  Soviet  domestic  plans. 

Soviet  imports  of  cereal  grains  are  particularly  unstable.  The  So- 
viet Union  changes  from  a  net  exporter  in  good  weather  years  to  a 
substantial  net  importer  in  bad  years.  (See  Table  9.)  The  United 
States  exported  large  amounts  o,f  grain  in  1964  and  in  1972-1973. 
However,  in  the  intervening  years,  exports  were  negligible,  as  the 
Soviet  Union  returned  to  its  role  as  a  net  grain  exporter.  Moreover, 
the  Soviet  Union  may  not  buy  from  the  United  States  even  when  it 
is  a  net  importer  (as  in  1965  and  1966).  In  1972-1973,  the  Soviet 
Union  might  have  traded  more  extensively  with  Canada,  Australia, 
or  France,  if  those  countries  had  not  already  exhausted  their  export 
capability.  France  exported  a  million  tons  to  the  Soviet  Union  in  1972. 
Canada  and  Australia  reportedly  could  not  take  any  more  orders  be- 
cause of  grain  shortages  and  saturation  of  their  transport  facilities. 

TABLE  9.— SOVIET  EXPORTS  AND  IMPORTS  OF  GRAIN  (EXCLUDING  GROATS  AND  FLOUR) 

|ln  thousands  of  metric  tons) 

1963        1964        1965        1966        1967        1968        1969        1970  1971 

Cuba 462          516         464         492  513  481  526  550  574 

Czechoslovakia... 1,501          900      1,169      1,242  1,349  1,422  1,383  1,378  1,489 

Egypt 1,000  298  301 

GDR 1,577      1,191       1,054      1,148  1,187  1,256  1,488  1,596  1,913 

Hungary 141            15         378  101  277  288  114  426 

North  Korea... 50.. 100          118  251  105  130  247  152 

Poland 820          110         491          504  1,042  830  1,272  1,073  2,133 

United  Kingdom.. 276  49  224  404  302  283 


Total  exports  including 6,260      3,514      4,330      3,557      6,248      5,406      7,205      5,698        8,640 

Argentina ._  6  106         763      1,443  21  30  165 196 

Australia 273      1,402      1,239  137  277 

Canada 2,323      3,  f  85      3,310      4,494      1,613      1,289  30      1,634        1,805 

France.... 834      1,168  171  1  437 

United  States 1,785 


Total  imports  including 3,103      7,287      6,375      7,746      2,185      1,606         639      2,200        3,500 

Netexports... 3,157  4,063      3,800      6,566      3,498        5,140 

Netimports 3,573      2,045      4,189.. 

Sources:  USSR.  Ministerstvo  Vneshnei  Torgovli.  "Vneshniaia  torgovlia  za  1964-71  god;  statisticheskii  obzor,  Mos- 
cow 1965-72,  and  "The  Soviet  Grain  Trade  Balance,"  Radio  Liberty  Dispatch,  Aug.  30,  1972. 

Soviet  imports  of  other  goods  may  also  be  sporadic.  In  the  past,  the 
Soviet  Union  has  occasionally  chosen  to  import,  rather  than  tool  up,  to 
meet  short-run,  high-technology  requirements.  The  short-term  require- 
ment of  diesel  locomotives  in  the  1959-1965  Seven-Year  Plan,  im- 
ported largely  from  France,  is  a  case  in  point.  The  Soviet  reluctance 
to  manufacture  large-diameter  gas  transmission  pipe  may  be  another 
example.  Pipe  is  currently  imported  from  West  Germany  and  Italy. 

The  Soviet  Union  also  imports  to  meet  unexpected  bottlenecks  in 
high-priority  economic  activities.  Once  this  type  of  requirement  is 
satisfied,  it  may  not  recur.  Such  unforeseen  requirements  may  be  caused 
by  shifts  in  priorities,  rather  than  technical  bottlenecks.  A  classic  ex- 
ample occurred  in  1954:  the  British  textile  industry  tooled  up  to  meet 
an  apparent  Soviet  demand  for  consumer  goods  brought  on  by  Premier 
Malenkov's  new  economic  policies.  However,  another  change  in  leader- 
ship, the  replacement  of  Premier  Georgi  Malenkov  by  Khrushchev, 


572 


led  to  a  further  revision  in  Soviet  economic  priorities,  and  large  orders 
for  British  textiles  were  not  forthcoming. 

The  traditional  Soviet  foreign  trade  policy  of  autarky  or  self-suf- 
ficiency seems  to  foster  instability  in  foreign  trade  relations.  Soviet 
leaders  who  advocated  an  autarkical  foreign  trade  policy  believed  that 
continued  reliance  on  foreign  sources  would  be  politically  undesirable 
and  economically  hazardous.  There  was  a  tendency  among  Soviet  pol- 
icy makers  to  overestimate  the  political  and  economic  dangers  of  trad- 
ing in  the  "anarchic"  capitalistic  markets.  The  present  Soviet  leader- 
ship appear  to  be  willing  to  reassess  the  ideological  underpinnings  of 
the  traditional  policy  of  autarky:  if  so.  the  Soviet  Union  may  become 
a  steadier  customer  over  time. 

Certainly,  the  new  policy  of  industrial  cooperation  with  Western 
industrial  countries  would  suggest  a  change  in  policy.  Coproduction 
ventures  with  Western  firms  to  develop  oil  and  gas  resources  in  Siberia 
would  presumably  be  negotiated  to  continue  for  a  decade  or  more. 
Moreover,  feed  grain  sales  and  other  agricultural  exports  to  extend 
over  multiple  years — three  at  the  outset — may  create  a  more  stable  pat- 
tern of  trade. 

Increasing  U.S.  sales  in  agribusiness  facilities,  petroleum  and  natu- 
ral gas  equipment,  computer  systems,  and  a  variety  of  other  high-tech- 
nology lines  may  be  an  effective  wedge  into  the  Soviet  market:  once 
begun,  these  sales  tend  to  accelerate  over  time.  Soviet  purchases  of  T  \S. 
computers,  for  example,  may  lead  to  follow-up  sales  of  software,  to 
new  Soviet  requirements  for  peripheral  equipment,  and  to  broader 
Soviet  requirements  for  managerial  expertise.  The  complexity  of  mod- 
ern technology  transfer  creates  a  need  for  long-term  commitments.  In 
many  cases,  the  Soviet  Union  will  be  required  to  make  substantial  pur- 
chases over  a  number  of  years  in  order  to  receive  and  continue  to  bene- 
fit from  T'.S.  technology.  Thus,  requirements  for  long-term  technologi- 
cal transfers  will  tend  to  stabilize  the  pattern  of  Soviet  foreign  trade. 

Tt  clmvlogiral  Export  Policy 

Increased  Soviet  demand  for  U.S.  high-technology  products  should 
help  to  achieve  the  U.S.  goal  of  increasing  that  type  of  export.  Such 
industries  as  elect  ionics,  agribusiness,  petroleum  refining,  and  automo- 
tive tooling  and  forging  equipment  are  characterized  by  economies  of 
scale,  i.e.,  the  larger  the  volume  of  production,  the  lower  the  per  unit 
cost.  At  a  time  when  government  investment,  subsidies,  and  tax  incen- 
tives are  being  used  to  ensure  that  U.S.  prices  are  competitive  in  the 
world  market,  an  expansion  of  foreign  markets  is  a  factor  that  may 
facilitate  reductions  in  cost  and  presumably  prices.  The  opening  of 
the  Soviet  market  to  U.S.  businesses  may  provide  the  basis  for  a  larger, 
more  economical  scale  of  domestic  output.  Moreover,  an  expanding 
market  may  encourage  research  and  development  on  a  scale  that  would 
help  U.S.  industries  mail  it  am  their  competitive  position. 

Two  important  considerations  should  be  kept  in  mind  in  assessing 
the  advantages  of  increased  U.S. -Soviet  technology  transfers.  First. 
does  the  sale  of  high-technology  products  to  the  Soviet  Union  encour- 
age or  discourage  Soviet  military  preparedness?  "    Second,  will  such 


86  See  above,  Changing  Priorities  in  Resource  Allocation:  Growth  vs.  Defense,  pp.  24-29. 


573 

technology  transfers  produce  long-term  advantages  for  the  U.S.  econ- 
omy? The  Soviet  leadership  may  be  intent  on  absorbing  U.S.  tech- 
nology in  as  short  a  time  and  as  inexpensively  as  possible.  Thus,  in 
assessing  the  net  benefit  of  increasing  transfers  of  technology  to  the 
Soviet  Union,  U.S.  policy  makers  must  attempt  to  answer  the  ques- 
tion of  whether  or  not  Soviet  leaders  are  reordering  priorities  toward 
a  civilian  economy  that  is  increasingly  linked  to  the  world  economic 
system.  The  question  may  be  raised  in  different  contexts :  (1)  Do  Soviet 
requirements  for  U.S.  technology  require  longer  periods  of  commit- 
ment that  was  the  case  in  the  past?  (2)  Does  the  trade  agreement  rep- 
resent a  part  of  a  new  pattern  of  relationship  between  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  United  States?  and  (3)  Does  the  agreement  presage  a 
new  relationship  between  the  Soviet  economy  and  the  non-Communist 
world  economic  system?  If  these  questions  can  be  answered  affirma- 
tively, the  outlook  for  political  and  economic  net  benefits  to  the  United 
States  will  be  favorable. 

High  Technology  Trade  and  a  Pattern  of  Economic  Involvement 

Current  Soviet  requirements  for  high  technology  assistance  from 
the  United  States  appear  to  represent  a  pattern  of  technical  and  man- 
agerial interrelatedness  that  would  limit  the  ability  of  Soviet  leaders 
to  take  short-term  advantages,  borrow  technology',  and  then  withdraw 
from  continued  U.S.-Soviet  economic  relations  in  particular  lines. 
Formal  agreements,  such  as  the  arrangements  with  Fiat  and  Renault 
in  auto  and  truck  production,  respectively,  extend  for  a  decade.  In- 
formal continuity  derives  from  a  continued  need  for  technology  trans- 
fer. Some  examples  follow : 

(1)  Advanced  industrial  systems. — Several  kinds  of  U.S.  technology 
might  be  applied  in  the  Soviet  Union's  oil  and  natural  gas  industry : 
Alaska  Northern  Slope  technology,  advanced  drilling  techniques, 
transmission  and  construction  materials,  and  oil  recovery  systems 
(especially  applicable  in  the  Soviet  Union's  older  Caucasian  fields). 
Presumably,  agreements  on  cooperation  in  this  field  will  involve  a 
degree  of  joint  managerial  responsibility,  a  definite  period  of  repay- 
ment— largely  in  natural  gas  and  oil  deliveries — and  a  continuing 
technological  interdependence. 

(2)  Management-Control -Communications  /Systems. — The  Soviets 
are  clearly  interested  in  advanced  American  computer  and  electronic 
hardware,  but  they  also  seem  to  be  interested  in  the  systems  that  the 
hardware  represents.  The  Soviet  postal,  telephone,  and  telegraph 
sj'stem  will  be  improved  by  installation  of  an  electronic  message 
switching  system  valued  at  $1.3  million  from  a  French  subsidiary  of 
the  International  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Corporation.  The  system 
will  process  six  million  messages  a  month  and  will  be  in  operation  by 
the  end  of  1973.8C 

Computer-assisted  systems  would  appear  to  have  a  wide  applica- 
tion throughout  the  Soviet  economy.  The  many  Soviet  managerial 
service  specialists  studying  the  United  States  may  stimulate  Soviet 
interest  in  this  area.  European  experience  suggests  that  the  field  is 
one  in  which  the  United  States  not  only  has  the  leadership,  but  seems 

■*  Wall  Street  Journal,  Oct.  23,  1972. 


574 


able  to  maintain  and  expand  on  its  advantages.  Transfer  of  this  sort 
of  technology  appears  to  create  markets  for  export  rather  than  satisfy 

them. 

(-i)  Mass  Production  Machinery  Output. — Traditionally,  the  Soviet 
machine-building  industry  has  patterned  itself  after  the"  large-scale 
industries  of  the  United  States.  The  Gorki  auto  works,  patterned 
after  the  Ford  Plant  in  Michigan  in  the  1930s,  was  an  example  of 
this  pattern.  Although  the  Soviets  are  at  present  relying  on  Italian 
and  French  assistance  in  auto  and  truck  production,  there  is  still  a 
major  role  for  U.S.  technology.  Some- of  the  key  equipment  for  the 
new  Soviet  auto  and  truck  plants  was  purchased  from  the  United 
States  by  European  companies  for  installation  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  trade  agreement  includes  a  special  arrangement  for  a  Soviet  pur- 
chasing office  in  New  York  to  buy  American  equipment  for  the  new 
Kama  River  Truck  Plant.  If  the  Soviet  economy  is  "entering  the  auto- 
motive age,"  then  a  continuing  requirement  may  be  expected.  Like- 
wise, in  other  areas  where  production  for  the  large  American  market 
justifies  assembly  line  and  mass  production  techniques,  the  machinery 
outputs  of  the  United  States  may  find  an  expanding  market. 

(4)  Agribusiness :  A  System  and  A  Technological  Development. — 
If  the  Soviet  planners  are  serious  in  seeking  a  qualitative  improve- 
ment in  the  diet  by  increased  meat  output,  the  agricultural  approach 
prevalent  in  the  United  States — the  so-called  "■agribusiness"- -would 
be  an  appropriate  approach  for  them  to  adopt.  The  performance  of 
Soviet  leaders  after  the  poor  1972  harvest  suggests  a  genuine  com- 
mitment to  attain  their  new  goals  for  food  output.  It  was  estimated 
that  nearly  $24  billion  was  shifted  to  agriculture  because  of  the 
crop  failures.87  The  Soviet  Union  also  exported  substantial  quantities 
of  gold.  Major  outlays  of  scarce  hard  currency  were  made  in  order  to 
import  feed  grains  and  wheat.  "While  purchases  on  the  1972  scale  are 
unlikely  to  recur,  large  imports  of  agricultural  commodities  and  tech- 
nology will  be  needed. 

A  new  system  of  animal  husbandry  for  the  Soviet  Union  would  in- 
volve imports  of  soybean  products,  feed  grains,  breeder  stock,  and 
technical  advice.  Also,  improved  meat  supplies  would  require  storage. 
transport,  and  sales  facilities.  These  needs  add  up  to  a  sizeable  in- 
vestment over  time.  Nikita  Khrushchev  attempted  to  increase  meat 
production  by  introducing  a  new  program  for  corn  and  pig  produc- 
tion. But  discovery  of  the  corn-hog  cycle  was  not  enough  to  raise  the 
meat  supply,  particularly  when  livestock  holdings  were  sharply  di- 
minished in  the  poor  crop  year  of  L963.  The  Soviet  livestock  inventory 
was  again  threatened  during  the  even  more  extreme  crop  failure  in 
l!)Ti^,  hut  survived  without  major  reductions. 

(-'7)  Tourist  Systems. — With  better  facilities.  Soviet  tourist  income 
from  the  United  States,  Western  Europe,  and  Japan  might  rise  sub- 
stantially. Judging  by  the  changes  in  tourism  in  developing  coun- 
tries— including  Yugoslavia  a  consortium  or  Western-Soviet  joint 
venture  approach  seems  most   appropriate.  The  tourism  package  in- 

-7  Veto  York  Times.  Oct.  31,  1972. 


575 


volves  travel  facilities,  hotels,  and  a  tourist  agency  to  arrange  the 
trips.  Aeroflot,  Soviet  hotels,  and  lntourist  are  not  the  greatest  stimu- 
lants to  tourism;  such  comparable  Western  concerns  as  Pan  American 
Airlines,  Holiday  Inn,  and  Cooks,  Ltd.  might  be  more  conducive  to 
foreign  travel  in  the  Soviet  Union.  The  opening  of  direct  Pan  Am 
flights  to  Moscow  and  the  Soviet  agreement  in  principle  with  Occi- 
dental Petroleum  Corporation  to  build  a  Holiday  Inn  facility  suggest 
that  this  sort  of  development  is  possible.  The  easing  of  Soviet  restric- 
tion on  internal  travel,  the  availability  of  tourist  credit  facilities  such 
as  American  Express,  and  improved  facilities  for  foreign  sales  of 
Russian  goods  might  stimulate  the  development  of  tourism. 

Such  an  arrangement  would  not  lend  itself  to  short-term  advan- 
tages for  the  Soviet  Union.  However,  if  the  political  costs  of  tourism 
could  be  tolerated,  the  advantages  would  build  over  time.  A  Soviet 
decision  to  accept  the  political  costs  and  promote  tourism  could  create 
a  demand  for  more  goods  and  services  from  the  U.S.  tourist  industry. 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1-38 


V.  Restrictions  on  Soviet  Trade  With  the  United  States 

The  Nixon  Administration  and  the  Congress  are  considering  steps 
that  would  bring  U.S.  trade  policy  toward  the  Soviet  Union  more 
closely  into  line  with  those  of  other  Western  industrial  nations.  Among 
the  changes  which  are  under  active  consideration  or  which  have  al- 
ready been  made  are:  reducing  tariffs  on  imports  from  the  Soviet 
Union  to  the  same  level  as  those  of  other  trade  partners,  i.e.,  granting 
most -favored-nation  treatment :  making  available  more  credits,  at 
better  terms;  limiting  export  controls  to  items  with  direct  military 
applications;  and  reducing  restrictions  on  shipping  between  the  two 
countries.  What  impact  will  such  changes  have  on  the  volume  of 
U.S. -Soviet  trade  ?  The  answer  hinges  on  a  number  of  economic  and 
political  variables — Soviet  export  capabilities,  Soviet  preference  for 
U.S.  technology  over  that  of  other  Western  countries,  the  willingness 
of  the  U.S.  business  and  banking  community  and  the  Export-Import 
Bank  to  finance  transactions  with  the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  ability 
of  the  Soviet  Union  to  adapt  its  institutions  and  practices  to  new  roles 
in  expanded  U.S. -Soviet  economic  relations. 

The  following  is  a  discussion  of  past  obstacles  to  U.S. -Soviet  trade 
and  of  the  likely  consequences  of  prospective  changes. 

U.S.  Controls  on  Exports  to  the  Soviet  Union 

Several  legislative  enactments  since  1945  have  provided  the  author- 
ization for  the  U.S.  export  control  program.  Their  original  purpose 
was  primarily  to  deny  the  Soviet  Union  and  other  Communist  coun- 
tries exports  which  could  facilitate  their  industrial  growth  and  en- 
hance their  military  potential.  The  following  text  describes  the  major 
acts  which  have  regulated  U.S.  exports  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  Export  Control  Act  of  1949  (50  U.S.C.  App.  2021  et  seq.,  1964) 
authorized  the  President  to  "prohibit  or  curtail"  all  commercial  ex- 
ports except  shipments  to  U.S.  territories  and  most  exports  to  Can- 
ada. The  purpose  of  the  Act  was  to  use  export  controls :  (1)  to  prevent 
domestic  economic  shortages;  (2)  to  protect  the  national  security: 
and.  (.'>>)  to  promote  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States.  The  Act 
was  extended  several  times  through  December  1969.  with  some  modi- 
fications. The  1962  extension  of  the  Act  specified  that  its  intent  was  to 
prevent  a  significant  contribution  not  only  to  a  Communist  country's 
military  potential,  but  also  to  its  economic  potential. 

To  regulate  U.S.  exports,  a  licensing  system  was  established.  Under 
this  system,  which  is  still  in  effect,  the  Office  of  Export  Control  of 
the  Department  of  Commerce  regulates  virtually  all  U.S.  exports 
by  granting  (or  not  granting)  one  of  two  types  of  licenses:  a  gen- 
eral authorization  which  permits  shipment  of  certain  types  of  goods 
to  certain  destinations  without  a  specific  application  by  the  exporter, 
or  a  validated  license  to  an  individual  exporter  for  a  specified  export. 

( r,76) 


577 


i»fost  U.S.  exports  are  made  under  general  licenses.  Validated  li- 
censes are  required  for  commodities  and  technical  data  of  a  more  sen- 
sitive nature  which  may  not  be  exported  freely  to  designated  countries. 
To  administer  the  program  the  Department  of  Commerce  maintains 
the  Commodity  Control  List  which  identifies,  for  each  listed  com- 
modity, the  destinations  to  which  a  validated  license  is  required.  For 
export  control  purposes,  the  Soviet  Union  is  classified  in  Country 
Group  Y  with  most  of  the  Eastern  European  countries,  Mongolia,  and 
the  People's  Republic  of  China.  Other  Government  agencies,  such  as 
the  Department  of  State,  the  Federal  Power  Commission,  and  the 
Atomic  Pmergy  Commission,  exercise  authority  (under  other  legisla- 
tion) for  regulating  exports  of  specialized  commodities  and  technical 
data.  The  most  important  criteria  for  approval  or  denial  of  a  com- 
modity for  export  to  Communist  countries  are:  (1)  the  military 
applicability  of  the  item;  (2)  the  nature  of  the  technological  contri- 
bution which  the  item  is  likely  to  make  to  the  military  or  economic 
potential  of  the  country;  and  (3)  the  availability  of  the  item  from 
other  countries. 

In  March  1951.  all  general  licenses  to  export  to  the  Soviet  Union  were 
revoked.  This  requirement  for  validated  licenses  was  relaxed  somewhat 
in  1956,  when  a  number  of  specified  items  was  again  made  exportable 
to  the  U.S.S.R.  under  general  licenses.  Since  that  time,  there  has  been 
a  gradual  trend  toward  relaxation  in  the  licensing  of  exports  to  East- 
cm  p:urope.  Poland,  in  1957,  and  Romania,  in  1964,  were  placed  in  a 
separate  category  for  which  validated  licenses  for  fewer  exports  were 
required.  In  1966,  the  requirement  for  validated  licenses  for  exports 
to  the  other  Eastern  European  countries,  including  the  Soviet  Union, 
was  removed  for  over  400  items.  In  subsequent  years,  several  hundred 
more  commodities  were  placed  in  the  general  license  list  for  export  to 
p]astern  Europe. 

This  trend  toward  relaxation  accelerated  in  the  late  1960s,  particu- 
larly after  passage  of  the  Export  Administration  Act  of  1969  (50 
U.S.C.  App.  2401  et  seq.,  1970),  which  replaced  the  Export  Control 
Act.  The  new  Act  maintained  export  controls,  but  called  for  a  review 
of  control  regulations  and  control  lists.  It  called  on  the  Commerce  De- 
partment to  lift  controls  on  commodities  freely  available  to  Communist 
countries  from  non-U. S.  sources  and  on  items  that  are  only  marginally 
of  military  value.  In  short,  the  1969  legislation  represented  a  congres- 
sional mandate  for  a  new  direction  in  export  controls.  Whereas  the 
thrust  of  the  Export  Control  Act  of  1949  was  to  limit  East-West  trade,. 
the  new  legislation  was  designed  to  foster  such  trade.  The  Export  Ad- 
ministration Act  expired  on  June  30, 1971,  but  Congress  enacted  resolu- 
tions (twice  in  1971,  once  in  1972)  extending  export  controls  to  Au- 
gust 1,  1972. 

Upon  expiration  of  the  Export  Administration  Act  on  August  1, 
L972,  the  President  invoked  the  authoritv  of  Section  5(b)  of  the  Trad- 
ing With  the  Enemy  Act  of  1917  (50  U.S.C.  App.  5(b)  1970)  to  con- 
tinue the  export  control  program.  That  Act  authorized  the  President 
to  prohibit  all  private  financial  and  commercial  transactions  with 
U.S.  enemies  and  their  allies  during  time  of  war  or  during  any  period 
of  national  emergency.  In  the  postwar  period,  this  law  had  previously 


578 


been  used  to  regulate  trade  with  North  Korea,  the  People's  Republic  of 
China,  and  North  Vietnam  (it  no  longer  applies  to  trade  with  ( 'hina). 

On  August  29,  1972,  the  Export  Administration  Act  was  extended 
and  amended.  The  new  law  called  for  further  relaxation  of  controls 
on  exports  freely  available  from  sources  outside  the  United  States.  It 
also  directed  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  to  report  to  the  President  and 
to  the  Congress  on  the  progress  of  export  control  liberalization. 

A  number  of  laws  regulate  the  export  of  specific  commodities  to 
the  Soviet  Union  and  other  Communist  countries.  Among  these  are  the 
Mutual  Security  Act  of  1954  (22  U.S.C.  1934.  1970)  which  authorizes 
the  President  to  restrict  the  exportation  to  any  nation  of  arms,  muni- 
tions, implements  of  war.  and  related  technology.  Another  such  law  is 
the  Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  Assistance  Act  of  1954,  :ls 
amended  (7  U.S.C.  1691-l736d,  1970)  which  prohibits  sales  agree- 
ments on  agricultural  commodities  for  local  currencies  or  long-term 
dollar  credit  to  some  Communist  countries. 

The  United  States  also  attempts  to  coordinate  its  strategic  export 
controls  with  the  foreign  trade  policies  of  its  XATO  allies  (except 
Iceland)  and  Japan.  In  1949.  a  Consultative  Group  of  seven  countries 
(later  increased  to  15)  set  up  the  Coordinating  Committee  (  COCOM) 
to  discuss  the  embargo  and  control  lists  that  the  members  were  to 
apply  in  their  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  other  Eastern  Euro- 
pean' countries.  The  Mutual  Defense  Assistance  Control  Act  of  19~>1 
or  "Battle  Act*'  (22  U.S.C.  1611  et  se<].,  1970)  provides  the  legisla- 
tive basis  for  U.S.  support  of  the  coordinated  approach  to  export 
controls. 

The  Battle  Act  (subsequently  amended  in  1961)  not  only  prohibits 
the  export  of  implements  of  war,  atomic  energy  materials,  and  other 
strategic  commodities  to  Communist  countries,  but  also  provides  that 
all  U.S.  military,  economic,  or  financial  assistance  be  denied  to  any 
nation  that  knowingly  permits  shipment  of  such  goods  to  the  Commu- 
nist Bloc.  Although  the  President  may  waive  this  provision  if  he 
finds  it  in  the  national  interest,  its  enactment  provided  him  with  a 
bargaining  tool  for  persuading  other  countries  to  apply  the  strategic 
embargo. 

As  COCOM  has  no  formal  charter,  its  decisions  are  not  binding  on 
member  countries.  Rather,  it  is  an  advisory  board  which  issue<  rec- 
ommendations of  goods  to  be  embargoed  or  controlled.  These  are  re 
garded  as  minimum  li-ts  to  which  each  member  might  add  commodi- 
ties. Since  its  inception,  COCOM  has  steadily  reduced  its  list  of 
embargoed  items.  The  U.S.  Commodity  Control  List  has  considerably 
more  controlled  items  than  COCOM's  International  List.  Perhaps  be 
cause  of  their  traditional  trade  ties  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  other 
East  European  Communist  countries,  the  other  members  of  COCOM 
have  consistently  lobbied  for  fewer  controls,  while  the  United  States 
has  favored  more.  For  example,  Japan  and  the  European  NATO 
countries  have  exported  advanced  electronics,  communications  and 
transport  equipment,  and  many  other  items  that  are  still  prohibited 
for  export  in  t  he  I    nited  States. 

The  COCOM    liberalization  of  export   controls  has  been  paralleled 
(at  a  much  slower  rate)   by  the  trend  in   U.S.  export  control  policy. 


579 


The  Export  Administration  Act  has  effected  significant  changes  in 
the  U.S.  administration  of  export  controls.  In  the  first  year  after  its 
passage,  1,550  commodities  were  made  available  under  general  license 
for  countries  in  Group  Y.  Trade  with  Romania  was  further  liberal- 
ized, and  in  1971  the  President  relaxed  the  U.S.  embargo  on  Commu- 
nist China,  freeing  many  nonstrategic  goods  for  export  to  China  under 
general  license.  Since  passage  of  the  law  in  1969.  there  has  been  a  sus- 
tained effort  to  remove  controls  from  most  items  not  controlled  by 
other  COCOM  countries.  Most  of  the  export  license  applications  for 
Eastern  Europe  that  have  been  denied  by  the  U.S.  Government  have 
been  for  items  also  under  COCOM  controls.  In  its  100th  quarterly 
report,  for  example,  the  Commerce  Department  reported  that  all  appli- 
cations that  were  denied  for  the  second  quarter  of  1972  involved  com- 
modities subject  to  COCOM  controls.88  The  reduction  of  the  number 
of  embargoed  items  has  been  accompanied  by  new  export  clearance 
procedures  to  expedite  the  licensing  process. 

The  U.S.  exporter  to  Communist  countries  is  still  confronted  with 
greater  barriers  than  his  counterparts  in  other  Western  countries.  U.S. 
businessmen  complain  that  tighter  T'.S.  controls  and  time-consuming 
procedures  for  licensing  exports  of  technology  give  other  Western 
companies  a  considerable  advantage.  Foreign  competitors  sometimes 
obtain  information  on  pending  U.S.  exports  which  puts  them  in  a 
favorable  competitive  position.  Approval  of  applications  of  export 
licenses  can  take  from  a  few  weeks  to  several  months. 

Nonetheless,  evidence  suggests  that  relaxation  of  controls  has  rap- 
idly expanded  opportunities  for  sale  of  American  technology  to  the 
Soviet  Union.  In  1971,  for  example,  there  was  a  significant  increase 
in  the  dollar  value  of  export  licenses  for  the  Soviet  Union:  the  total 
dollar  value  in  1971  was  $1.27  billion,  compared  with  only  $1.51  million 
the  year  before.89  The  bulk  of  the  increase  was  attributable  to  the 
licensing  of  U.S.  machinery  and. technology  for  the  Soviet  automotive 
industry.  In  accordance  with  the  Export  Administration  Act,  the  De- 
partment of  Commerce  has  narrowed  the  range  of  exports  subject  to 
controls.  Many  items  embodying  modern  technology  but  having  no  di- 
rect military  significance  are  now  exportable  to  the  Soviet  Union  under 
general  licenses.  Among  the  items  decontrolled  in  recent  months  are 
construction  and  agricultural  equipment,  electronic  equipment,  se- 
lected synthetic  rubber  manufactures,  selected  metals  and  metal  man- 
ufactures, chemicals,  and  photographic  equipment.  Moreover,  many 
exports  of  technical  data,  blueprints,  and  patented  processes  which 
were  formerly  controlled  are  now  exportable  under  general  licenses. 

In  the  past,  export  controls  have  been  the  most  direct  barrier  to  the 
transfer  of  technology  from  the  United  States  to  the  Soviet  Union. 
However,  changes  brought  about  by  the  Export  Administration  Act 
have  minimized  the  effect  of  export  controls  on  U.S. -Soviet  economic 
relations.  In  conjunction  with  other  changes  in  Soviet-American  trade 
relations,  export  control  liberalization  paves  the  way  for  U.S.  ex- 
porters to  expand  their  sales  in  the  Soviet  Union.  The  ability  to  export 


88  Export  Control,  100th  Quarterly  Report,  2d  Quarter  1972.  Washington,  D.C.,  U.S. 
Dept.  of  Commerce,  1972,  p.  7. 

**  Export  Control,  99th  Quarterly  Report,  1st  Quarter  1972.  Washington.  D.C..  U.S. 
Dept.  of  Commerce,  p.  S. 


580 


commodities  embodying  modern  technology  will  undoubtedly  make 
U.S.  exports  more  attractive  to  Soviet  buyers.  At  the  same  time,  the 
changes  will  allow  the  Soviet  Union  to  import  needed  technology  for 
certain  sectors  of  its  economy. 

U.S.  Restrictions  on  Import*  From  the  Soviet  Union;  the  Issue  of 
Most-Fa vored-Nation  Treatment 
U.S.    tariff   discrimination    against    Communist    countries   has   its 
origin  in  the  Trade  Agreement*  Extension  Act  of  1951  (65  Stat.  72). 
Section  5  of  that  Act  directed  the  President  to : 

.  .  .  suspend,  withdraw  or  prevent  the  application  of  any  reduction  in  any  rate 
of  duty,  or  binding  of  any  existing  customs  or  exercise  treatment,  or  other  con- 
cession contained  in  any  trade  agreement  ...  to  imports  from  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics  and  to  imports  from  any  nation  or  area  dominated 
or  controlled  by  the  foreign  government  or  foreign  organization  controlling  the 
world  Communist  movement. 

Section  11  directed  the  President  to  prevent  the  importation  of  ermine, 
fox,  kolinsky,  marten,  mink,  muskrat,  and  weasel  furskins  from  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Communist  China.  The  rationale  for  section  5  was 
grounded  in  heightened  international  tensions,  particularly  during  the 
Korean  War.  The  position  was  taken  that  Communist  nations  which 
were  aiding  aggression  in  Korea  should  not  share  in  the  benefits  of 
trade  concessions  made  by  the  U.S.  to  other  countries.  Section  11  may 
have  been  enacted  in  part  to  protect  domestic  producers  from  foreign 
imports. 

In  accordance  with  the  law.  all  concessions  granted  by  the  U.S. 
in  trade  agreements  with  Communist  countries  (except  Yugoslavia) 
were  suspended.  With  respect  to  U.S. -Soviet  trade,  this  measure  re- 
sulted in  abrogating  the  trade  agreement  concluded  between  the  two 
countries  on  August  4,  1937.  That  agreement  had,  in  effect,  granted 
conditional  most-favored-nation  (MFN)  treatment  to  the  Soviet 
Union  in  return  for  Soviet  guarantees  to  import  specified  quantities 
of  American  goods.90 

The  denial  of  trade  concessions  to  Communist  countries  and  the  ban 
on  the  importation  of  certain  furskins  were  later  embodied  in  section 
231  of  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  of  1962  (ID  U.S.C.  1861,  1970)  and 
the  Tariff  Act  of  1930  (19  U.S.C.  1202,  Schedule  1,  Pari  5,  Subpart  B, 
1970).  The  MFN  provision  of  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  differed  some- 
what from  the  1951  legislation.  While  the  original  law  in  effect  ap- 
plied only  to  countries  that,  in  the  President's  opinion,  were  controlled 
by  the  world  Communist  movement,  the  1902  Act  was  made  applicable1 
to  all  Communist  countries.  Therefore,  Yugoslavia  and  Poland,  which 
had  previously  enjoyed  MFN  treatment,  were  no  longer  eligible  for  it. 
However,  this  provision  was  relaxed  in  L963  to  allow  those  two  coun- 
tries to  regain  their  MFN  status.  Subsequently,  in  the  late  1960s  and 
early  197<>s.  unsuccessful  attempts  were  made  to  extend  MFN  status 
to  Romania  and  ( Jzechoslovakia.  The  prohibition  against  trade  conces- 
sions to  the  Soviet  Union  remains  in  effect,  despite  several  attempts 
nt  repeal  (most  recently,  in  the  proposed  "East-West  Trade  Relations 
Act  of  1971"). 


"n  See  Vladimir  N  Pregelj  ''Most -Favored  Nation"  Principle:  Definition,  Brief  History, 
and  is,  bu  thi  United  state--.  (Washington,  D.C. :  The  Library  of  Congress,  Congressional 
Research  Service,  Oct.  26,  1972.  Report  No.  72-226E). 


581 


New  legislation  would  be  required  to  extend  MFN  treatment  to  the 
Soviet  Union.  Such  legislation  is  certain  to  run  into  strong  congres- 
sional opposition.  Many  congressmen  have  opposed  trade  concessions 
to  the  Soviet  Union  because  of  repressive  Soviet  domestic  policies. 
Soviet  policy  of  restricting  emigration  of  Soviet  citizens  has  become 
the  focal  point  of  recent  efforts  to  block  MFN  status  for  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  proposed  "Jackson  Amendment."  endorsed  by  a  majorit}' 
of  the  members  of  the  Senate,  ties  trade  concessions  to  Soviet  domestic 
policies : 

...  no  nonmarket  economy  country  shall  be  eligible  to  receive  most-favored- 
nation  treatment  or  to  participate  in  any  program  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  which  extends  credits  or  credit  guarantees  or  investment  guaran- 
tees, directly  or  indirectly,  during  the  period  beginning  with  the  date  on  which 
the  President  of  the  United  States  determines  that  such  country — 

(1)  denies  its  citizens  the  right  or  opportunity  to  emigrate;  or 

(2)  imposes  more  than  a  nominal  tax  on  emigration  or  on  the  visas  or 
other  documents  required  for  emigration,  for  any  purpose  or  cause  whatso- 
ever ;  or 

(3)  imposes  more  than  a  nominal  tax,  levy,  fine,  fee,  or  other  charge  on 
any  citizen  as  a  consequence  of  the  desire  of  such  citizen  to  emigrate  to  the 
country  of  his  choice. .  .  .91 

The  issues  of  tariff  discrimination  and  most-favored-nation  treat- 
ment were  among  those  discussed  at  the  1972  U.S. -Soviet  trade 
negotiations.  Tariff  negotiations  between  the  United  States  and 
Communist  countries  tend  to  be  more  complex  than  others  because  of 
the  differences  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  trade  in  the  two  economic 
systems. 

Since  1923,  U.S.  policy  has  been  to  extend  MFN  treatment  to  its 
trade  partners  automatically  and  unconditionally.  Such  treatment  as- 
sures equal  access  to  the  domestic  market  for  all  trade  partners.  Gen- 
erally, the  United  States  expects  only  equivalent  treatment,  assuring 
non-discrimination  against  U.S.  exports.  The  Soviet  Union  also  ac- 
cords its  trade  partners  MFN  treatment.  However,  under  the  Soviet 
system  of  state-directed  foreign  trade,  a  grant  of  MFN  tariff  treatment 
does  not  guarantee  access  to  its  domestic  market.  Soviet  enterprises 
do  not  purchase  freely  abroad  according  to  their  production  needs 
and  cost  limitations.  Imports  are  planned  by  government  agencies  and 
are  purchased  by  government-controlled  foreign  trade  enterprises. 
Thus,  Avhen  the  Soviet  Union  reduces  its  tariffs  on  U.S.  exports,  pur- 
chases of  American  goods  do  not  automatically  increase. 

Consequently,  in  trade  negotiations  with  the  U.S.S.R.  the  United 
States  has  traditionally  taken  the  position  that  MFN  status  is  a  nego-. 
tiable  trade  concession  which  requires  some  special  form  of  reciproca- 
tion from  the  Soviet  Union.  Soviet  leaders,  however,  regard  MFN 
status  as  a  symbol  of  good  will  and  friendship;  they  believe  that  the 
Soviet  Union  is  entitled  to  the  same  treatment  as  other  U.S.  trade 
partners.  For  this  reason,  they  have  taken  the  position  in  trade  nego- 
tiations that  MFN  status  is  not  a  matter  for  quid  pro  quo  bargaining, 
but  a  natural  concomitant  to  improved  diplomatic  relations. 

As  part  of  the  comprehensive  trade  agreement  between  the  two  coun- 
tries, concluded  on  October  18,  1972,  the  President  agreed  to  submit 


81  Amendment  Xo.  1691  to  S.  2620,  92d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  Oct.  4,  1972.  260  members  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  cosponsored  similar  legislation  (the  "Mllls-Vanlk  Amendment") 
In  the  first  session  of  the  93rd  Congress  (H.R.  3910). 


582 


legislation  to  the  first  session  of  the  93rd  Congress  to  extend  most- 
favored-nation  treatment  to  the  Soviet  Union.  The  agreement  enters 
into  force  only  after  such  legislation  is  enacted.  While  the  issue  of 
reciprocity  was  not  explicitly  addressed  in  the  agreement,  perhaps  in 
deference  to  Soviet  views,  the  agreement  included  several  features 
which  were  undoubtedly  related  in  part  to  the  MFN  question.  The 
Soviet  agreement  to  repay  the  Lend-Lease  debt,  the  assurance  that 
business  facilities  would  be  provided  in  Moscow  for  American  busi- 
nessmen, and  the  understanding  that  the  level  of  U.S.-Soviet  trade 
would  expand  rapidly  may  all  be  interpreted  as  reciprocal  concessions. 

These  provisions  are  intended  to  assure  that  the  United  States  will 
receive  reciprocal  benefits  in  future  U.S.-Soviet  economic  relations. 
The  new  business  facilities  to  be  established  in  Moscow  for  U.S.  busi- 
nessmen should  provide  them  with  some  of  the  necessary  trade  infra- 
structure to  expand  their  operations  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Furthermore, 
the  understanding  that  the  level  of  U.S.-Soviet  trade  will  triple  oyer 
the  next  three  years  and  the  Soviet  Government's  announced  intention 
to  place  "substantial"  orders  for  U.S.  machinery,  plant  and  equipment, 
agricultural  products,  industrial  products,  and  consumer  goods  portend 
considerable  benefits  for  U.S.  exporters. 

Soviet  leaders  also  expect  considerable  economic  benefits  from  MFN 
treatment.  Some  Soviet  exports  currently  face  very  high  U.S.  tariffs 
which  would  be  substantially  reduced  if  the  U.S.S.R.  received  MFN 
status.  The  Soviet  Union  will  need  to  increase  its  exports  to  the  United 
States  if  it  is  to  pay  for  the  American  technology  and  agricultural 
products  it  apparently  needs.  The  effect  of  MFN  treatment  on  Soviet 
exports  is  uncertain.  In  the  past,  most  Soviet  exports  to  the  United 
States  have  consisted  of  raw  materials  and  primary  products.  Such 
goods  are  largely  unaffected  by  the  absence  of  MFN  treatment  because 
the  rates  of  duty  in  the  U.S.  tariff  schedules  tend  to  escalate  according 
to  the  degree  of  processing.  A  recent  U.S.  Tariff  Commission  study 
suggests  that,  with  the  current  structure  of  exports  by  the  Soviet 
Union  to  the  United  States,  no  significant  increase  in  exports  would 
result  from  MFN  treatment.5'- 

However,  if  the  structure  of  Soviet  trade  should  change — for  ex- 
ample,  if  some  industrial  products  of  advanced  technology  and  Soviet 
manufactured  goods  were  available  for  export— MFN  status  might 
bring  significant  advantages.  Given  the  Soviet  Union's  chronic  need 
for  hard  currency,  Soviet  foreign  trade  enterprises  might  be  expected 
to  take  advantage  of  lower  tariff  rates  and  make  a  vigorous  effort  to 
export  machinery  and  manufactured  goods  to  the  United  States.  In 
some  lines,  this  effort  might  he  successful.  For  example,  businessmen 
in  the  United  States  and  other  developed  countries  have  already  shown 
mi  interest  in  advanced  Soviet  metal-working  machinery,  machine- 
building  and  electronics  industries,  electrical  engineering  technology, 
mid  other  areas.  Furthermore,  some  low  and  medium  quality  machin- 
ery and  consumer  manufactures  may  become  competitive  in  segments 
of  the  U.S.  market.0 


O2.\nton  P.  Mnlisli.  Jr.,  United  States-East  European  Trade  Considerations  Involved  in 
Granting  MostFavored-Nation  Treatment  to  the  Nations  of  Eastern  Europe  (Washington, 
D.C. :  United  States  Tariff  Commission,  1972). 

93  See  above,  p.  30. 


583 


By  facilitating  imports  of  Soviet  machinery  and  industrial  prod- 
ucts, the  United  States  might  reap  an  unexpected  benefit  from  ex- 
panded trade  ties  with  the  Soviet  Union,  namely,  the  acquisition  of 
new  Soviet  technology  in  a  few  industrial  sectors.  In  certain  high- 
priority  industries,  the  Soviet  Union  has  devoted  considerable  re- 
sources to  research  and  development.  Some  Soviet  industries  have 
made  important  technological  innovations  which  could  prove  very 
valuable  to  U.S.  firms.  The  steel  and  aluminum  industries  and  certain 
mining  industries  are  examples  of  U.S.  sectors  which  could  benefit 
from  such  an  exchange  of  technology. 

The  structure  of  Soviet  exports  to  other  industrial  nations  does  not, 
however,  suggest  that  a  dramatic  shift  in  the  pattern  of  Soviet-Ameri- 
can trade  would  follow  tariff  concessions.  While  the  volume  of  trade 
between  the  Soviet  Union  and  Western  industrial  nations  increased 
in  the  1960s,  the  structure  of  trade  remained  fairly  stable.  Although 
some  new  Soviet  products  will  inevitably  be  sold  to  U.S.  buyers,  past 
experience  indicates  that  the  pattern  of  U.S.-Soviet  trade  outlined  by 
Secretary  Peterson  and  others  of  U.S.  exports  of  capital-intensive 
products  in  return  for  Soviet  raw  materials  will  dominate  U.S.-Soviet 
economic  relations  in  the  near  future. 

U.S.  Restrictions  on  Credit  Transactions  With  the  Soviet  Union 

In  trade  negotiations  with  the  United  States,  Soviet  representatives 
have  indicated  that  the  availability  of  credits  is  an  indispensable  con- 
dition to  expanded  U.S.-Soviet  trade.  Because  of  the  Soviet  Union's 
shortage  of  foreign  exchange  reserves  and  its  limited  export  possibili- 
ties, the  availability  of  credit  is,  in  fact,  crucial  to  expanded  commercial 
relations.  Soviet  leaders  are  seeking  two  types  of  credit  from  the 
United  States.  First,  Soviet  trade  enterprises  need  deferred-payment 
credits  for  specific  transactions.  These  are  routine,  short-  or  medium- 
term  loans  which  are  'commonplace  in  all  foreign  trade  transactions. 
Secondly,  the  Soviet  government  wants  long-term  "project  loans"  for 
such  large-scale  projects  as  the  exploitation  of  Siberian  mineral  re- 
serves. U.S.  Government  restrictions  have,  in  the  past,  inhibited  both 
types  of  credits. 

The  Export-Import  Bank  plays  an  important  and  expanding  role 
in  most  U.S.  foreign  trade.  However,  past  legislation  has  restricted  its 
participation  in  the  extension  of  credits  to  the  Soviet  Union.  Title  III 
of  the  Foreign  Assistance  and  Related  Agencies  Appropriation  Act  of 
1965  (P.L.  88-634)  prohibited  the  Eximbank  from  lending  or  in  any 
other  way  participating  in  the  extension  of  credits  to  any  Communist 
country  except  when  the  President  made  a  determination  that  credits 
to  a  particular  Communist  country  would  be  in  the  national  interest. 
This  prohibition  was  later  included  in  Section  2  of  the  Export-Import 
Act  of  194S  (12  U.S.C.  635,  1970),  by  an  amendment  approved  on 
March  13,  1968.  The  1968  legislation  added  an  absolute  prohibition  on 
Eximbank  participation  in  the  extension  of  credit  to  any  country  fur- 
nishing by  direct  government  action  "goods,  supplies,  military  assist- 
ance or  advisers''  to  a  nation  which  engages  in  armed  conflict  with  the 
armed  forces  of  the  United  States.  The  latter  prohibition  was  not 
subject  to  Presidential  waiver. 


584 


In  1971,  the  Export  Expansion  Finance  Act  (85  Stat.  345)  removed 
the  absolute  prohibition  on  Eximbank  credit  operations  in  trade  with 
those  Communist  countries  not  in  armed  conflict  with  the  United 
States.  Only  North  Vietnam  is  currently  prevented  by  legislation 
from  receiving  Eximbank  credits.  All  other  Communist  countries  are 
eligible  for  such  credits  if  the  President  determines  that  credit  trans- 
actions with  a  specific  Communist  country  would  be  in  the  national 
interest.  In  conjunction  with  the  comprehensive  U.S. -Soviet  trade 
agreement  of  October  18,  1972.  the  President  used  the  authority  of  the 
Export-Import  Bank  Act  of  1945,  as  amended,  to  .allow  Eximbank 
credits  and  credit jruarantees  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  Johnson  Debt  Default  Act  of  1931*  (18  U.S.C.  955.  1970)  as 
amended,  prohibits  private  persons  or  institutions  in  the  United  States 
from  extending  loans  to,  or  purchasing  or  selling  bonds,  securities  or 
other  obligations  of  a  foreign  government  which  is  in  default  on  obli- 
gations to  the  United  States  (unless  the  country  is  a  member  of  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  and  the  International  Bank  for  Recon- 
struction and  Development).  At  the  time  of  the  bill's  passage,  the 
Attorney  General  found  that  the  Soviet  Union  was  among  those  coun- 
tries in  default  in  their  payments  of  obligations  to  the  United  States. 
In  October  1963,  in  connection  with  the  proposed  sale  of  wheat  to  the 
Soviet  Union,  the  Attorney  General  issued  an  Opinion  to  the  effect 
that  the  intent  of  the  Johnson  Debt  Default  Act  was  to  prohibit  the 
extension  of  financial  loans  to  countries  in  default,  but  that  it  did  not 
intend  to  rule  out  supplier's  credit,  which  he  defined  as  "the  assign- 
ment or  negotiation  by  an  American  seller,  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
business,  of  contract  rights  or  commercial  paper  resulting  from  sales 
of  goods  on  normal  commercial  terms."  94  This  Opinion  was  reaffirmed 
by  the  Attorney  General  in  1967. 

The  Attorney  General  Opinions  and  the  settlement  of  the  Soviet 
Lend-Lease  debt  in  1972  have  left  some  questions  about  the  applicabil- 
ity of  the  Johnson  Act  to  U.S. -Soviet  transactions.  The  Soviet  Union 
is  still  technically  in  default  on  Russia's  World  War  I  debt  to  the 
United  States.  Therefore,  private  long-term  loans  are  illegal.  Private 
commercial  credits,  or  loans  made  directly  by  Government  agencies  or 
with  the  participation  of  Government  agencies  (e.g.,  Eximbank  guar- 
antees) are  permitted  under  the  Act.  The  distinction  between  private 
loans  and  commercial  credits  is  not  always  clear  and  is  subject  to  legal 
interpretation.  Generally,  any  financial  arrangement  which  has  an  un- 
derlying business  transaction  and  is  made  on  normal  commercial  terms 
is  considered  exempt  from  the  Johnson  Act. 

In  past  negotiations  on  credit  matters  the  U.S.  position  has  been  that 
no  major  concessions  were  possible  until  the  Soviet  Lend-Lease  debt 
was  settled.  The  debi  proved  to  be  a  major  st  umbling block  to  expanded 
l'.S.  Soviet  trade.  The  two  Governments  unsuccessfully  attempted  to 
negotiate  a  settlement  on  several  occasions.  Negotiations  took  place  in 
I960  and  broke  up  after  only  two  weeks.  At  that  time,  the  U.S.  repre- 
sentatives demanded  $800  million  and  Soviet  negotiators  offered  $300 
million.  The  U.S.  assessment  of  the  debt  was  based  on  the  value  of 
civilian  goods  or  military  goods  usable  in  the  civilian  economy,  which 


"*  t'.S.   House  of   Representatives,   Committee  on   Agriculture,   Communication  from    the 
President  of  the  United  States.  Document  No.   163,  88th  Cong.,  1st  sess.,  Oct.  29,  1963. 


585 


were  delivered  under  Lend-Lease  and  remained  in  the  hands  of  the 
Soviet  Union  after  World  War  II.  The  major  element  in  the  disparity 
between  the  U.S.  and  Soviet  figures  was  the  determination  of  which 
goods  were  essential  to  the  Soviet  war  effort — the  United  States  did 
not  try  to  collect  for  those  goods — and  which  were  civilian  goods  not 
consumed  by  the  end  of  the  war.  In  addition,  there  were  problems  in 
setting  an  appropriate  rate  of  interest  and  repayment  schedule  for  the 
Lend-Lease  debt.  The  U.S.  negotiating  position  was  recently  summar- 
ized by  Sidney  Weintraub,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
International  Finance  and  Development : 

The  original  value  of  all  lend-lease  equipment  provided  the  Soviet  Union  dur- 
ing World  War  II  is  estimated  at  $10.8  billion.  This  figure  excludes  both  mer- 
chant and  naval  vessels  which,  for  technical  reasons,  were  not  included  under 
the  lend-lease  agreement. 

In  lend  lease  settlement  negotiations  with  all  our  allies  including  the  Soviet 
Union,  it  was  our  policy  to  seek  payment  only  for  those  goods  which  had  useful- 
ness in  the  civilian  economy.  After  repeated  requests  for  an  inventory  of  these 
"civilian-type"  articles  in  the  Soviet  Union  went  unanswered,  the  United  States 
estimated  their  value  at  approximately  $2.6  billion. 

In  reaching  agreements  with  our  other  World  War  II  allies,  we  settled  for  a 
percentage  of  the  value  of  the  "civilian-type"  equipment.  As  noted  in  this  testi- 
mony to  which  this  explanation  is  appended,  the  U.S.  Government  has  made 
specific  settlement  offers  of  $1.3  billion  and  $800  million.  Both  offers  were  rejected 
by  the  Soviet  Union.  Our  present  negotiations  are  approaching  a  figure  which 
will  compare  favorably  with  the  final  terms  reached  with  other  lend-lease  re- 
cipient countries.*5 

The  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States  agreed  on  the  amount  of  the 
Soviet  Lend-Lease  debt  on  October  18,  1972.  The  total  debt  was  finally 
assessed  at  $722  million,  of  which  the  Soviet  Union  paid  $12  million 
on  the  day  of  the  agreement.  $24  million  is  to  be  paid  on  July  1.  1973. 
$12  million  on  July  1,  1975,  and  the  balance  in  28  equal  annual  install- 
ments of  $24,071,429  through  the  year  2001.  The  Soviet  Union  is  per- 
mitted four  postponements  provided  interest  is  paid  at  an  additional 
three  percent  a  year.  The  settlement  covers  all  Soviet  World  War  II 
indebtedness  to  the  United  States.  However,  Soviet  repayment  of  the 
debt  is  contingent  on  U.S.  extension  of  MFN  status  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  At  the  same  time,  the  Soviet  Union  executed  an  operating 
agreement  with  the  Eximbank  which  provides  that  its  foreign  trade 
enterprises  would  receive  equal  treatment  with  those  of  other  U.S. 
trade  partners  in  all  credit  matters — amount  of  credit,  interest  rate 
and  repayment  provisions. 

Settlement  of  the  Soviet  debt  and  the  President's  determination' 
that  Eximbank  financing  .for  the  Soviet  Union  is  in  the  national  in- 
terest removed  most  major  governmental  restrictions  on  credit  trans- 
actions. Xot  only  are  direct  Eximbank  credits  available,  but  the  way  is 
now  open  for  private  individuals  and  institutions  to  extend  Exim- 
bank-guaranteed  credits — both  short  term  and  long  term — to  the  So- 
viet Union.96  Because  of  Eximbank's  unique  role  in  U.S.  foreign  trade, 


05  U.S.  Conrjress.  House.  Committee  on  Government  Operations.  Delinquent  International 
Debts  Owed  to  the  United  States.  Hearings  before  a  subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on 
Government  Operations,  House  of  Representatives,  92d  Cong..  1st  and  2d  sess..  1072. 
p.  125. 

90  The  Jackson  Amendment  and  similar  legislation  could  prohibit  the  Soviet  Union  from 
participating  in  U.S.  Government  credit  operations.  See  above,  U.S.  Restrictions  on  Im- 
ports from    the  Soviet  Union;  the  Issue  of  Most-Favored-Nation  Treatment,  p.   53. 


586 


its  programs  may  play  a  particularly  important  role  in  future  Soviet- 
American  trade.97  Eximbank  extends  direct  credits  and  serves  as  guar- 
antor and  insurer  only  when  private  financial  institutions  are  unable 
or  unwilling  to  do  so.  As  some  private  institutions  may  balk  at  dealing 
with  Soviet  foreign  trade  enterprises  because  of  inadequate  credit 
worthiness  information  or  because  of  general  unfamiliarity  with  the 
Soviet  economy,  frequent  Eximbank  participation  may  be  required. 

The  Eximbank  extends  credits  at  a  favorable  rate  of  interest — cur- 
rently 6  percent  on  direct  loans  to  foreign  borrowers.  This  practice 
has  raised  some  controversy  over  whether  such  credits  are  a  form  of 
export  subsidy.98  The  question  of  whether  the  Soviet  Union  should 
continue  to  receive  such  low-cost  credits  is  certain  to  be  an  important 
issue  when  Congress  is  asked  to  extend  the  Eximbank's  franchise. 
(It  is  currently  authorized  to  operate  through  June  1974.) 

That  the  Eximbank,  with  its  present  resources,  can  fill  all  Soviet 
credit  needs  is  unlikely.  Its  current  overall  operational  authority  is 
$20  billion,  and  its  largest  exposure  to  any  single  country  is  about  $1.3 
billion.99  Soviet  negotiators  have  indicated  that  they  hope  to  attract 
huge  sums  of  American  capital — far  more  than  Eximbank  could  pro- 
vide— for  projects  in  the  Soviet  Union.100  Such  large-scale  financing 
is  available  only  from  private  institutions  in  the  United  States.  Fur- 
thermore, no  Government  program  is  available  for  insuring  large, 
long-term  capital  investments  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Government  pro- 
grams such  as  those  of  the  Overseas  Private  Investment  Corporation 
are  denied  to  the  Soviet  Union,  unless  a  Presidential  waiver  is  granted, 
by  Section  620(f)  of  the  Foreign.  Assistance  Act  of  1961  as  amended 
(22US.C.2151  etseq.,  1970). 

Despite  these  problems,  the  removal  of  restrictions  on  Eximbank  and 
private  credits  represents  a  major  step  toward  improved  U.S. -Soviet 
economic  relations.  The  Soviet  Union  is  expected  to  run  heavy  deficits 
in  its  balance  of  trade  with  the  United  States,  and  U.S.  credits 
will  be  needed  to  help  finance  them.  Soviet  trade  with  most  other 
Western  industrial  countries  has  followed  a  similiar  pattern:  imports 
from  these  countries  have  continually  exceeded  exports  in  recent  years, 
and  liberal  credit  policies  have  been  necessary.  If  U.S.  exporters  are 
to  compete  effectively  with  other  Western  exporters  to  the  Soviet 
Union,  large  amounts  of  credits  will  have  to  be  made  available. 

Shipping  Arrangements  in  U.S.-Soviet  Trn<]( 

Various  shipping  regulations  have  been  issued  by  U.S.  Government 
agencies  in  their  administration  of  legislative  restrictions  on  commerce 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  Department  of  Commerce  Transportation 
Order  T  1  regulates  the  transport  by  U.S.  ships  or  aircraft  of  certain 
controlled  commodities  (even  though  originating  in  a  foreign  port)  to 


07  While  the  Eximbank's  operations  have  generally  been  credited  with  Increasing  the 
level  of  U.S.  exports,  this  view  was  disputed  in  a  1072  article.  Sec  Douglas  R.  Bolii.  "Export 
Credit  Subsidies  and  D.S  Exports:  An  Analysis  of  the  U.S.  Eximbank,"  in  V  S.  Congress. 
Joint  Economic  Committee.  The  Economics  of  Federal  Subsidy  Programs.  92d  Cong..  2d 
sess..  1972.  pp.  157  175,  For  a  contrasting  view,  see  Howard  S  Piquet.  The  Export-Impori 
Bank  of  the  United  states:  An  Analysis  of  Some  Current  Problems.  (Washington,  D.C. : 
National  Planning  Association,  1970). 

'"■See  articles  bv  Bohl  and  Piquet,  Ibid.  Also  see  Congressional  Record.  Jan.  23.  1973, 
pp.  Si  1 70   S1188 

»»  Peterson  Report  (1972).  op.  cit..  p.  20. 

100  Ibid.,  p.  20. 


587 


most  Communist  countries,  including  the  Soviet  Union.  Such  ship- 
ments are  prohibited  unless  a  validated  license  (for  shipments  from 
U.S.  ports)  or  an  authorization  issued  by  the  Assistant  Secretary  (for 
shipments  from  foreign  ports)  has  been  obtained. 

Soviet  ships  are  also  affected  by  U.S.  restrictions  on  shipping  to 
Cuba  and  North  Vietnam.  Foreign  vessels  which  call  on  Cuban  or 
Xorth  Vietnamese  ports  are  not  allowed  to  carry  U.S.  Government- 
financed  cargoes  shipped  from  U.S.  ports  (pursuant  to  National 
Security  Action  Memoranda  No.  220,  dated  February  5,  1963,  and 
No.  340,  dated  January  25,  1966).  This  restriction  applies  to  Com- 
modity Credit  Corporation-financed  grain  shipments  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  Moreover,  the  sale  of  petroleum  fuels  and  other  petroleum 
products  to  vessels  and  aircraft  which  have  recently  called  on,  or  will 
soon  be  calling  on,  Cuban  or  North  Vietnamese  ports  is  prohibited. 

Until  recently,  Soviet  merchant  shipping  in  U.S.  waters  was  severely 
restricted  by  various  port  security  regulations.  For  example,  Soviet 
ships  were  allowed  to  call  on  only  15  U.S.  ports  and  were  required  to 
give  14  days  notice  in  advance.  (The  Soviet  Union  maintained  similar 
restrictions  on  U.S.  shipping.)  These  restrictions  were  considerably 
lightened  by  the  Soviet-American  maritime  agreement  signed  on  Octo- 
ber 14,  1972.  The  agreement  opened  ports  in  each  country  to  the  ships 
of  the  other  upon  four  days'  notice.  Soviet  ships  are  now  able  to  call 
at  East  and  Gulf  Coast  ports  for  the  first  time  since  1963. 

The  maritime  agreement  also  resolved  the  difficult  problem  of  deter- 
mining U.S.  and  Soviet  shares  of  the  maritime  business  between  the 
two  countries.  In  the  1963-64  grain  sales  to  the  Soviet  Union,  shipping 
was  a  major  problem.  Reacting  to  domestic  political  pressures,  Presi- 
dent Kennedy  stipulated  that  50  percent  of  all  U.S.  grain  sold  to  the 
Soviet  Union  must  be  shipped  in  American  vessels.  This  provision 
proved  to  be  a  barrier  to  further  grain  shipments.  Because  of  the  high 
cost  of  U.S.  shipping,  U.S.  grain  shipments  to  the  Soviet  Union  vir- 
tually ceased.  President  Nixon  rescinded  the  50  percent  requirement 
in  June  1971.  The  maritime  agreement  stipulates  that  each  country's 
ships  will  have  the  opportunity  to  carry  at  least  one-third  of  the  car- 
goes between  the  tAvo  countries.  Third  country  ships  can  compete  for 
the  remaining  third.  The  agreement  also  provides  that  the  Soviet 
Union  will  have  to  pay  shipping  rates  that  are  higher  than  the  world 
average  for  goods  transported  on  American  ships. 

Soviet  Institutions  and  Practices 

A  major  barrier  to  expanded  U.S. -Soviet  economic  relations  is  the 
unfamiliarity  of  U.S.  businessmen  with  Soviet  foreign  trade  tech- 
niques, with  Soviet  import  needs  and  export  possibilities,  and  with 
provisions  of  Soviet  law  pertaining  to  foreign  trade  matters.  Serious 
problems  inevitably  arise  from  any  attempt  to  widen  commercial  ties 
between  two  countries  with  very  different  political,  economic,  and 
legal  systems.  The  U.S. -Soviet  trade  agreement  has  provided  a  mech- 
anism for  resolving  some  of  the  problems  and  facilitating  commercial 
exchanges  between  American  companies  and  Soviet  foreign  trade 
organizations.  Other  important  problems  remain  to  be  solved. 


588 


PROBLEMS  OF  SOVIET  LAW  AND  TJ.S.-SOVIET  TRADE 

By  Soviet  law,  a  foreign  visitor  to  the  Soviet  Union  is  accorded  the 
same  legal  rights  and  obligations  that  any  Soviet  citizen  enjoys.  In 
actual  practice,  foreign  businessmen  enjoy  considerably  more  rights, 
such  as  private  property  ownership  privileges  denied  to  the  average 
Soviet  citizen.  The  rights  of  foreign  corporations  are  somewhat  more 
nebulous.  The  trade  agreement  stipulates  only  that  American  corpo- 
rations "shall  be  recognized  as  having  a  legal' existence"  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  Soviet  legal  code  adds  little  to  this.  It  provides  only  that- 
foreign  juridical  persons"  (a  term  that  presumably  includes  U.S. 
corporations)  may  conclude  foreign  trade  transactions  with  officially 
designated  Soviet  foreign  trade  organizations.101 

Issues  involving  Soviet  accreditation  of  foreign  corporations,  banks, 
and  other  commercial  institutions  are  now  being  negotiated.  Currently, 
accreditation  confers  no  special  rights,  such  as  the  right  to  deal  di- 
rectly with  Soviet  enterprises  or  to  travel  freely  in  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  recent  years,  the  Soviet  Union  has  entered  into  coproduction 
agreements  with  Japanese  and  West  European  firms.  Under  such 
arrangements,  foreign  companies  generally  provide  machinery  and 
equipment  and  technical  assistance  for  Soviet  projects  on  long-term 
credit  and  receive  a  share  of  the  output  in  return.  However,  direct 
foreign  investments  in  the  sense  of  equity  ownership  would  appear  to 
be  ruled  out  by  Soviet  law  and  by  recent  Soviet  practice.  Since  the 
early  1930s,  the  Soviet  Government  has  prohibited  agreements  which 
would  allow  foreign  firms  to  participate  in  management  or  in  control 
over  profits  of  economic  activities  inside  the  Soviet  Union.  A  resolution 
of  the  All-Union  Soviet  of  People's  Commissars  on  December  27,  1930, 
discontinued  the  practice  of  granting  foreign  concessions  for  manufac- 
turing and  mining  operations  in  the  Soviet  Union.102  Furthermore, 
private  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  is  prohibited  by  the 
Soviet  Constitution. 

If  future  joint  Soviet-American  projects  require  very  large  outlays 
of  American  private  capital,  the  usual  coproduction  arrangement  may 
prove  to  be  inadequate.  U.S.  companies  are  unlikely  to  make  huge  in- 
vestments without  some  managerial  control.  Soviet  willingness  to  com- 
promise on  this  issue  is  one  of  the  important  intangibles  in  future 
Soviet-American  relations.  In  a  recent  interview  with  the  West 
German  magazine  Der  Spiegeh  Dzherman  Gvishiani,  deputy  chairman 
of  the  Soviet  State  Committee  for  Science  and  Technology,  suggested 
that  there  were  no  basic  obstacles  "in  principle"  to  the  establishment 
of  foreign  owned  property  in  the  Soviet  Union  : 

.  .  .  Even  now  in  our  country  the  trend  for  multinational  property  is  emerg- 
ing. For  instance,  we  are  ready  to  set  up  and  organize  joint  research  institutes. 
In  Dubna  we  have  the  research  institute  for  atomic  energy,  which  is  the  property 
of  the  countries  participating  in  it.  I  think  that  this  is  no  goal  in  itself.  What 
really  matters  is  to  find  a  favorable  form  of  cooperation  with  the  partners.103 

However,  he  added  that  he  saw  no  practical  need  for  such  arrange- 
ments at  the  present  time.lc 


104 


101  James  Henry  Glffen,  The  Legal  and  Practical  Aspects  of  Trade  With  the  Soviet  Union 
(New  York,  Praeper  Publishers,  1071),  pp.  1!">1-152. 

"'-'  Sutton,  op.  Clt..  p.  17. 

m Dzherman  Gvishiani.  interview  with  Der  Spierjcl  (May  1,  1972,  pp.  G7-73),  translated 
In   Foreign   Broadcast   Information  Service   (Western  Europe),  May  3,  1972,  p.  U3. 

,n«  Ibid.,  p.  U2. 


589 


The  foreign  businessman  who  wants  to  buy  from  or  sell  to  the  Soviet 
Union  generally  conducts  his  business  with  a  Soviet  foreign  trade 
organization  which  specializes  in  a  given  line  of  imports  or  exports. 
The  Soviet  foreign  trade  organization  has  a  somewhat  ambivalent 
status.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  an  official  agency  of  the  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Trade  which  conducts  its  foreign  trade  operations  in  strict 
accordance  with  governmental  dictates.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  a 
juridical  person  under  Soviet  law  which  can  possess  property,  acquire 
rights  to  property  under  its  name,  incur  obligations,  and  sue  or  be 
sued.105  The  foreigner  may  enter  contracts  with  a  foreign  trade  orga- 
nization, as  long  as  the  organization  is  operating  in  accordance  with 
the  charter  which  is  granted  to  it  by  the  Soviet  Government.  In  short, 
the  foreign  trade  organization  has  a  legal  status  which  is  somewhat 
similar  to  that  of  Western  corporations.  Some  legal  complications 
may  arise  in  foreign  trade  transactions,  however,  because  of  the  Gov- 
ernment's foreign  trade  monopoly.  The  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade 
may  refuse  to  issue  or  revoke  an  export  license.  There  are  also  strict 
Soviet  regulations  to  prevent  the  foreign  trade  organization  from 
making  contracts  that  the  state  considers  contrary  to  national 
interests. 

Arbitration  of  foreign  trade  disputes  involving  Soviet  foreign  trade 
organizations  must  normally  take  place  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Soviet  Foreign  Trade  Arbitration  Commission,  a  panel  of  15  Soviet 
nationals  which  convenes  in  Moscow.  While  Western  specialists 
acknowledge  that  the  Commission's  procedures  have  been  generally 
fair,  the  United  States  has  insisted  that  parties  to  a  dispute  should 
have  the  right  to  have  arbitrators  from  a  third  country,  in  accordance 
with  the  Arbitration  Rules  of  the  Economic  Commission  for  Europe. 
The  latter  procedure  was  agreed  to  in  the  U.S.-Soviet  trade  treaty, 
although  parties  to  a  dispute  are  permitted  to  decide  upon  any  other 
form  of  arbitration  which  they  mutually  prefer. 

For  the  American  corporation  considering  the  export  of  commod- 
ities embodying  new  technology,  Soviet  laws  dealing  with  protection 
of  patents,  trademarks,  and  copyrights  are  a  crucial  consideration.106 
Soviet  laws  and  practices  have  changed  considerably  in  recent  years. 
The  widely  publicized  Soviet  practice  of  buying  prototypes  and  copy- 
ing them  is  no  longer  the  most  prevalent  method  of  acquiring  foreign 
technology.  Soviet  leaders  have  apparently  concluded  that  the  older 
method  did  not  enable  Soviet  industry  to  keep  pace  with  the  rapid 
growth  of  technological  innovation  in  the  rest  of  the  world.  Not  only 
did  it  inhibit  Western  corporations  from  exporting  technology  to  the 
Soviet  Union,  but  Soviet  enterprises  frequently  found  that  by  the 
time  a  prototype  was  obtained  from  the  West  and  readied  for  pro- 
duction, it  was  already  obsolescent.  Moreover,  as  Soviet  expenditures 
on  research  and  development  grew,  Soviet  leaders  became  more  con- 
cerned about  protecting  Soviet  innovations. 

Symbolic  of  the  Soviet  leadership's  new  attitude  toward  the  inter- 
national exchange  of  technology  and  know-how  was  their  ratification 


i05  Giffen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  152-156. 

108  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  this  aspect  of  Soviet  law,  see  Samuel  Plsar.  Coexist- 
ence and  Commerce  (New  York:  McGraw-Hill  Book  Company,  1970),  pp.  336-374. 


590 


in  1965  of  the  Paris  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Industrial 
Property.  The  terms  of  the  Paris  Convention  require  signatories  to 
extend  to  individuals  and  companies  of  other  signatories  the  same 
degree  of  protection  as  the  country  provides  its  own  citizens. 

Soviet  law  provides  protection  for  both  foreign  patents  and  foreign 
trademarks.  Trademarks  may  be  registered  in  the  Soviet  Union  and 
are  protected  for  a  specified  period  of  time,  in  much  the  same  manner 
as  in  Western  countries.  Soviet  patent  law,  however,  is  quite  different 
from  Western  laws.  Under  Soviet  law,  an  inventor  is  given  the  option 
of  receiving  a  patent  or  an  inventor's  certificate  for  his  innovation. 
The  foreign  inventor  who  submits  an  application  to  the  Soviet  Union 
is  given  the  same  choice.  The  certificate  gives  the  inventor  recogni- 
tion for  his  achievement  and  assures  him  of  a  predetermined  financial 
reward,  but  vests  in  the  state  all  rights  to  use,  develop,  and  exploit 
the  invention.  The  Soviet  patent  is  similar  to  its  Western  counterpart ; 
the  patentee  gains  the  right  to  exploit  his  invention  for  his  own  per- 
sonal profit,  up  to  a  ceiling  established  by  law.  As  an  innovation  by  a 
Soviet  citizen  can  generally  be  exploited  only  by  a  state  enterprise,  the 
incentive  to  own  a  patent  is  reduced.  Moreover,  legal  requirements 
for  obtaining  a  patent  and  various  tax  benefits  and  compensation  ad- 
vantages for  certificate  holders  induce  most  Soviet  inventors  to  apply 
for  certificates. 

Most  foreign  inventors  prefer  the  Soviet  patent;  they  generally 
consider  the  certificate's  scale  of  remuneration  too  small.  However,  the 
Soviet  patent  does  not  provide  the  foreigner  the  same  protection  as 
most  Western  patents.  A  patented  invention  can  be  exploited  only 
by  a  state  enterprise.  If  the  patentee  is  dissatisfied  with  the  way  it  is 
to  be  used,  or  with  the  state  enterprise's  terms  of  compensation,  he 
cannot  go  to  a  competitor.  Furthermore,  Soviet  enterprises  generally 
have  inadequate  provisions  for  the  kind  of  inspection  and  reporting 
that  could  insure  the  patent-holder's  compensation  rights.  For  ex- 
ample, there  is  often  no  way  for  the  patent-holder  to  insure  that  he  is 
being  compensated  according  to  volume  of  output  or  the  savings  his 
innovation  generates.  There  is  also  no  independent  judicial  authority 
to  handle  disputes  involving  patents;  the}7  are  handled  by  the  Soviet 
Chamber  of  Commerce.  These  and  other  problems  involving  patents 
have  not  been  resolved  in  U.S.-Soviet  trade  negotiations. 

The  problem  of  copyrights  was  also  examined  by  the  Joint  U.S.- 
U.S.S.R.  Commercial  Commission.  Until  1973,  the  Soviet  Union  did 
not  belong  to  the  Universal  Copyright  Convention  and  had  few  bi- 
lateral treaties  dealing  with  copyrights.  Nor  did  Soviet  law  provide 
for  protection  of  copyrights  of  materials  first  published  outside  the 
Soviet  Union.  Many  U.S.  books  and  articles,  especially  in  the  scientific 
and  technical  fields,  have  been  published  in  the  Soviet  Union  without 
compensation  for  U.S.  authors.  The  Soviet  decision  to  adhere  to  the 
Universal  Copyright  Convention  on  May  27,  \»7:\  should  help  to 
solve  this  longstanding  problem. 

SOVIET  STATE  TRADING 

Some  of  the  barriers  to  expanded  U.S.-Soviet  trade  arise  from  the 
natun  of  Soviet  state  trading  itself.  The  essence  of  the  Soviet  state 
trading  monopoly  is  State  control  over  all  Soviet  foreign  business 


591 


activities.  The  State  not  only  performs  the  regulatory  function  com- 
mon to  all  Governments,  but  also  acts  as  manufacturer,  merchant,  and 
banker.  A  fundamental  problem  of  the  U.S.  businessman  trading  with 
the  Soviet  Union  or  of  a  government  agency  attempting  to  regulate 
and  promote  such  trade  is  that  of  operating  in  an  entirely  new  com- 
mercial environment.  Westerners  who  have  traded  with  the  Soviet 
Union  frequently  complain  that  Soviet  institutions  are  not  conducive 
to  normal  commercial  ties. 

One  feature  of  Soviet  state  trading  to  which  Western  businessmen 
object  is  the  necessity  of  dealing  with  Soviet  foreign  trade  enterprises. 
The  foreign  businessman  is  prevented  from  conducting  business  di- 
rectly with  Soviet  producers,  consumers  and  distributors.  Instead,  he 
must  deal  with  middlemen  in  the  foreign  trade  apparatus  who  may 
lack  firsthand  information  about  items  being  bought  or  sold.  Although 
Soviet  foreign  trade  enterprises  are  specialized  according  to  export 
or  import  lines,  they  often  cannot  give  the  foreigner  exact  specifica- 
tions for  the  import  needs  and  export  offerings  of  domestic  enterprises. 
In  addition,  since  Soviet  foreign  trade  enterprises  have  no  domestic 
competitors,  they  can  exercise  monopolistic  bargaining  power  when 
dealing  with  a  single  foreign  company.  The  U.S.  businessman  has  the 
choice  of  dealing  with  a  Soviet  export-import  monopoly  or  not  dealing 
at  all.  The  Soviet  foreign  trade  enterprise,  on  the  other  hand,  is  free 
to  take  advantage  of  the  competition  among  American  companies  or 
between  American  companies  and  their  foreign  competitors. 

Another  Soviet  institution  which  encumbers  commercial  ties  with 
the  West  is  central  economic  planning.  As  Soviet  production  and  con- 
sumption are  centrall}7  planned,  the  U.S.  businessman  cannot  estimate 
potential  supply  and  demand  conditions  in  the  Soviet  economy.  Nor 
can  he  judge,  on  the  basis  of  arbitrary  Soviet  prices,  which  goods  are 
marketable  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Centrally  planned  foreign  trade  can 
also  be  extremely  unstable  because  the  government  sometimes  uses 
trade  to  dispose  of  unplanned  surpluses  or  to  meet  unplanned  short- 
ages. Furthermore,  since  there  is  no  necessary  link  between  cost  of 
production  and  price  in  the  Soviet  economy,  it  is  difficult  for  U.S. 
Government  agencies  to  regulate  dumping  or  market  disruption  on  the 
part  of  Soviet  exporters.  The  U.S. -Soviet  trade  treaty  addresses  the 
latter  problem  by  establishing  a  procedure  for  imposing  import  quotas 
or  other  restrictions  for  preventing  market  disruptions. 

Soviet  isolation  from  the  international  trade  community  also  creates 
problems  for  Western  companies  seeking  to  buy  from  or  sell  to  the 
Soviet  Union.  The  Soviet  Union  lacks  some  of  the  fundamental  re- 
quirements for  unencumbered  foreign  trade  transactions,  such  as  a 
convertible  currency  and  a  realistic  exchange  rate.  The  1972  agree- 
ment in  which  Pepsi  Co.,  Inc.,  agreed  to  market  Soviet  vodka  in  the 
United  States  in  return  for  a  Pepsi  Cola  franchise  in  the  Soviet  Union 
typifies  many  Soviet  foreign  trade  transactions.  This  characteristic 
often  leads  Soviet  foreign  trade  enterprises  to  insist  on  barter  trade, 
tied  transactions,  and  other  clumsy  arrangements.  Another  Soviet  de- 
ficiency which  results  from  its  traditional  isolation  from  Western  mar- 
kets is  the  lack  of  a  basic  foreign  trade  infrastructure  for  Soviet- 
American  trade.  Such  basic  requirements  as  office  space,  communica- 
tions services,  and  advertising  facilities  are  virtually  nonexistent.  In 
the  1972  commercial  agreement,  provisions  were  made  to  alleviate  this 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  39 


592 


deficiency.  Business  facilities  for  U.S.  companies  and  a  large  trade 
center  are  to  be  built  in  order  to  facilitate  U.S. -Soviet  foreign  trade 
transactions. 

Another  set  of  problems  arising  from  Soviet  institutional  arrange- 
ments is  related  to  the  necessity  of  dealing  with  state  agencies.  As  dis- 
cussed above,  trading  with  a  government  agency  raises  a  number  of 
difficult  legal  problems.  In  addition,  state  trading  can  degenerate  into 
politically  motivated  trading.  A  state  trading  monopoly  may  reward 
or  punish  a  trade  partner  for  purely  political  reasons.  Among  the 
political  devices  at  the  state  trading  monopoly's  disposal  are  market 
disruption,  preemptive  buying,  discrimination  against  imports,  and 
denial  of  exports.  As  the  State  decides  what  to  buy  and  sell  on  a  some- 
what arbitrary  basis,  the  existence  of  such  practices  may  be  difficult  to 
prove  and  counteract. 

Prospects  for  Removal  of  Barriers  to  U.S.-Soviet  Trade 

A  definite  trend  toward  trade  liberalization  has  characterized  recent 
Soviet-American  economic  relations.  U.S.  policy  changes  with  regard 
to  exports,  imports,  credits,  and  shipping  arrangements  have  removed 
many  of  the  artificial  barriers  to  normal  economic  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  Furthermore,  the  maritime  and  trade  agreements  and 
the  agreement  on  the  Soviet  Lend-Lease  debt  have  demonstrated  a 
willingness  on  the  part  of  both  countries  to  make  concessions  on  many 
substantive  matters. 

The  Nixon  Administration  took  another  step  toward  normalization 
of  U.S.-Soviet  trade  relations  when  it  submitted  the  "Trade  Reform 
Act  of  1973"  to  Congress  on  April  11,  1973.107  Among  the  measures 
in  the  comprehensive  trade  legislation  were  two  important  sections 
which  are  applicable  to  U.S.-Soviet  trade.  One  proposal  would  grant 
the  President  the  power  to  extend  most-favored-nation  treatment  to 
countries  not  now  enjoying  it  (including  the  Soviet  Union).  Another 
would  repeal  the  Johnson  Debt  Default  Act,  thus  removing  another 
barrier  to  U.S.-Soviet  credit  operations. 

Some  innovations  and  experiments  in  the  Soviet  foreign  trade  sys- 
tem may  in  the  long  run  help  to  normalize  U.S.-Soviet  commercial 
relations.  Export  councils  composed  of  government  officials  and  in- 
dustry representatives  now  act  as  a  liaison  between  domestic  industries 
and  foreign  trade  enterprises.  This  development  could  alleviate  some 
of  the  problems  confronted  by  the  foreigner  who  deals  with  the  Soviet 
foreign  trade  apparatus.  A  small  percentage  of  Soviet  foreign  trade 
is  now  conducted  by  local  officials  in  border  regions  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  Such  decentralized  state  trading  is  now  taking  place  between 
outlying  regions  and  neighboring  countries  including  Japan,  North 
Korea,  Iran,  Turkey,  and  several  European  countries  adjoining  the 
Soviet  Union.108  Material  incentives  have  been  introduced  to  encourage 
production  for  export.  Industrial  enterprises  which  successfully  fulfill 
their  export  targets  are  allowed  to  use  part  of  their  foreign  currency 


107  U.S.  House  of  Representatives.  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means.  Trade  Reform  Act  of 
197 S  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Govt.  Print.  Off.,  1973). 

108  Keith  Bush,  "A  New  Impetus  for  Border  Trade,"  Radio  Liberty  Dispatch,  August  21, 


593 


earnings  for  imports  of  needed  machinery  and  equipment.109  Such 
changes  may  portend  a  more  flexible  Soviet  foreign  trade  system  for 
the  future.  However,  the  evolution  has  not  proceeded  very  far. 

In  recent  years,  important  new  practices  have  helped  to  expand 
Soviet  commercial  ties  with  the  West.  Coproduction  ventures,  joint 
marketing  arrangements,  licensing  agreements,  and  other  special  ar- 
rangements play  an  increasingly  important  role  in  East-West  trade. 
Such  practices  will  undoubtedly  be  used  in  furthering  U.S.-Soviet 
economic  cooperation. 

However,  many  potential  roadblocks  remain.  The  trade  agreement, 
Export- Import  Bank  financing,  and  the  Lend-Lease  agreement,  for 
example,  are  contingent  on  congressional  approval  of  MFN  status  for 
the  Soviet  Union.  Moreover,  U.S.  financial  institutions  may  be  unable 
to  provide  sufficient  credits  to  meet  Soviet  needs.  Eximbank's  resources 
are  apparently  inadequate,  and  the  Johnson  Act  still  restricts  private 
loans  to  the  Soviet  Union.  Furthermore,  considerable  differences  of 
opinion  remain  over  interest  rates  and  repayment  schedules.  Even  if 
all  U.S.  restrictions  should  be  removed,  limited  Soviet  export  capabil- 
ities might  be  a  serious  constraint  on  the  volume  of  future  trade.  An- 
other uncertainty  is  the  adaptability  of  some  Soviet  foreign  trade  in- 
stitutions to  large-scale  economic  cooperation  with  the  United  States. 

Furthermore,  there  is  still  considerable  opposition  in  the  United 
States  to  exports  of  certain  kinds  of  U.S.  technology.  Although  export 
controls  have  been  relaxed,  questions  on  the  national  security  and  in- 
dustrial espionage  aspects  of  foreign  trade  continue  to  be  raised.  Even 
technology  transfers  to  long-time  allies  are  sometimes  questioned.  The 
sale  of  the  Thor-Delta  rocket  to  Japan,  for  example,  was  cited  by  a 
representative  of  the  AFL-CTO  to  Congress  as  an  export  of  technol- 
ogy with  adverse  national  security  implications.110  Many  technology 
transfers  to  the  Soviet  Union  are  likely  to  be  more  controversial. 

The  changes  that  have  already  been  made  seem  likely  to  strengthen 
trade  ties  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  but  many 
obstacles  to  completely  normalized  economic  relations  remain.  The 
long-run  growth  of  Soviet-American  economic  relations  will  depend 
in  large  part  on  the  continuation  of  the  liberalization  process. 

109 Nikolai  Patolichev,  U.S.S.R.  Foreign  Trade:  Yesterday,  Today,  Tomorrow  (Moscow: 
Novosti  Press  Agency  Publishing  House,  n.d.),  p.  131. 

110  Mr.  A.  Biemieller  to  the  Senate  Finance  Committee.  Congressional  Record,  Mar.  6, 
1973,  S3977-3982. 


VI.  Issues  in  the  Interplay  of  Technology,  Trade,  and  Diplomacy 

U.S.  foreign  trade  policy  toward  the  Soviet  Union  has  always  been 
motivated  by  a  combination  of  political  and  economic  factors.  U.S. 
policymakers  have  encouraged  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union — in  the 
mid-1980s,  in  the  immediate  postwar  period,  and  in  the  past  few 
years — because  they  believed  that  benefits  would  accrue  to  the  U.S. 
economy  and  that  U.S. -Soviet  diplomatic  relations  would  improve. 
At  other  times — in  the  1920s  and  early  1930s  and  in  the  Cold  War 
period — trade  has  been  restricted  in  order  to  discourage  Soviet  leaders 
from  pursuing  policies  considered  hostile  to  U.S.  interests.  Indeed,  this 
inclination  to  use  trade  for  political  purposes  is  a  deeply  imbedded 
tradition  in  American  diplomacy  dating  back  to  the  earliest  years  of 
the  republic.  Moreover,  commercial  relations  have  been  used  to  further 
foreign  policy  goals.  As  observed  by  Professor  Harold  Berman, 

Of  course,  in  one  sense,  all  trade  is  "embedded  in  politics,"  but  in  another 
sense,  trade,  like  diplomacy  and  cultural  and  scientific  exchange,  is  a  way  of 
maintaining  mutually  advantageous  relations  among  countries  whether  or  not 
they  are  politically  antagonistic  to  each  other.1" 

U.S.-Soviet  trade  has  been  characterized  by  the  exchange  of  U.S. 
technologically-advanced  goods  and  services  for  Soviet  raw  materials. 
While  the  absence  of  normal  U.S.-Soviet  trade  relations  has  probably 
been  an  economic  burden  to  both  countries,  U.S.  leaders  have  acted 
under  the  assumption  that  the  promise  of  trade  (and  U.S.  technology) 
to  the  Soviet  Union  was  an  effective  lever  for  exacting  political  con- 
cessions. Denial  of  trade,  on  the  other  hand,  has  been  assumed  to  be  a 
barrier  to  Soviet  industrial  and  technological  progress. 

The  U.S.-Soviet  technology  transfer,  the  new  commercial  relation- 
ship, and  U.S.-Soviet  diplomatic  relations  present  an  interrelated  pat- 
torn  of  policy  issues,  illustrated  by  the  following  questions: 

(1)  How  will  the  emerging  commercial  relationship  benefit  the  U.S. 
economy  ? 

(2)  How  can  economic  exchanges  with  the  Soviet  Union,  particu- 
larly those  involving  technology  transfers,  be  used  to  further  U.S. 
foreign  policy? 

(3)  What  changes  are  needed  in  negotiating  procedures  and  commer- 
cial institutions  necessary  to  insure  that  the  United  States  maximizes  its 
political  and  economic  benefits? 

Rene-fit x  to  tlie  United  States  From  Expanded  Trade  With  the  Soviet 
Union 
The  U.S.  grain  sales  to  the  Soviet  Union  in  1972-73  and  prospective 
U.S.-Soviet  cooperation  in  Siberian  natural  gas  exploitation  demon- 
strate some  of  the  potential  benefits  and  costs  of  expanded  U.S.-Soviet 


1,1  New  York  Times,  Letter  to  the  Editor,  Apr.  2,  1973,  p.  34. 

(594) 


595 


commercial  relations.  Both  the  1972-73  grain  deal  and  the  potential 
gas  deal  have  important  implications  for  the  U.S.  economy  and  for 
U.S.-Soviet  diplomatic  relations. 

THE   19  72-73   GRAIN  SALES 

The  experience  gained  in  1972  by  private  grain  exporters  and  U.S. 
Government  officials  should  provide  valuable  guidelines  for  future 
U.S.-Soviet  transactions.  With  respect  to  U.S.  economic  benefits,  the 
grain  sales  raised  an  important  question :  How  good  a,  market  is  the 
Soviet  Union? 

In  the  summer  of  1972,  the  Soviet  Union  purchased  an  estimated 
440  million  bushels  of  wheat  from  the  United  States,  about  one-fourth 
of  the  total  U.S.  crop.112  From  July  7, 1972,  when  the  Soviet  grain  sale 
was  first  announced,  to  September,  when  Soviet  agents  stopped  buying, 
the  price  of  U.S.  hard  red  winter  wheat,  the  principal  kind  sold  to 
the  Soviets,  rose  from  $1.69  to  $2.49  per  bushel.  The  Soviet  Union  pur- 
chased the  wheat  at  approximately  $1.63  per  bushel.  The  difference 
between  the  price  paid  by  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  U.S.  domestic 
price  was  made  up  by  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture  subsidy  pay- 
ments to  grain  exporters,  which  totaled  approximately  $300  million 
for  the  July-September  period. 

The  U.S.  Government's  role  in  the  sales  caused  considerable  con- 
troversy. For  almost  two  years  prior  to  the  sales,  the  Department  of 
Agriculture  had  pegged  the  world  market  price  of  wheat  at  $1.63  a 
bushel.  However,  because  of  a  world  shortage  of  wheat  in  1972,  the 
competitive  world  market  price  judged  by  normal  commercial  prac- 
tices should  have  been  much  higher.  In  fact,  the  world  price  without 
price  supports  would  have  approximated  the  U.S.  domestic  price  be- 
cause the  United  States  was  the  only  country  exporting  significant 
quantities  of  wheat.  Inasmuch  as  the  United  States  was  the  only  source 
for  large  amounts  of  wheat  and  as  its  domestic  price  equaled  the 
competitive  world  market  price,  the  subsidies  represented  a  net  price 
advantage  for  the  Soviet  Union. 

U.S.  grain  exporters  had  been  involved  in  major  grain  sales  to  the 
Soviet  Union  on  one  previous  occasion  in  1963-64.113  In  those  sales, 
as  in  the  1972-73  sales,  the  United  States  appeared  to  be  a  source  of 
last  resort  for  the  Soviets :  Soviet  buyers  went  into  the  U.S.  market 
only  after  their  traditional  sources  were  exhausted.  In  1963  the  Soviets 
had  already  purchased  large  amounts  of  wheat  from  Australia  and 
Canada.114  In  1972,  France  had  exported  to  the  Soviet  Union,  while 
Canada  and  Australia  had  been  unable  to  supply  large  amounts  to  the 
Soviets.  Moreover,  in  the  period  between  the  large  U.S.-Soviet  trans- 
actions of  1963-64  and  1972-73,  the  Soviet  Union  had  chosen  to  buy 
from  traditional  trade  partners  rather  than  the  United  States.114  (See 
Table  9,  p.  43.) 

112  For  a  discussion  of  Soviet  agricultural  purchases,  see  Humphrey  and  Bellmon, 
op.  cit. 

^  For  details  of  the  1963-64  grain  sales,  see  Leon  M.  Herman,  The  1963-64  Wheat  Sales 
to  Russia:  A  Summary  of  Major  Developments.  (Washington,  D.C.  :  The  Library  of  Con- 
gress, Legislative  Reference  Service,  Apr.  7,  1964.) 

u*  Correspondence  made  public  by  Congressman  John  Melcher  reveals  that  both  the 
Australian  and  Canadian  Wheat  Boards  had  advised  the  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture 
as  early  as  July  1972  to  reduce  U.S.  export  subsidies  and  allow  world  prices  to  rise.  The 
reduction  came  In  September  1972  after  most  of  the  Soviet  orders  were  placed.  See  the 
Congressional  Record,  Apr.  9,  1973,  H2501-2502. 


596 


Thus,  the  United  States  was  in  a  monopoly  position,  apparently 
selling  to  a  buyer  with  inelastic  demand  (quantity  not  sensitive  to 
price) ,  and  there  was  little  historical  evidence  that  the  purchases  could 
be  tied  to  future,  continual  sales.  The  1972-73  situation  was  probably 
an  ideal  one  for  extracting  high  profits.  Instead,  U.S.  grain  ex- 
porters provided  a  consumer's  or  purchaser's  surplus  to  the  U.S.S.R. 
A  reassessment  of  the  exchange  may  give  insights  into  the  criteria  to 
be  employed  in  future  U.S.-Soviet  commercial  transactions  involving 
high-technology  products. 

Grain  exporters  and  Agriculture  Department  officials  claimed  that 
Soviet  buyers  were  offered  low  prices  because  no  one  knew  the  extent 
of  Soviet  needs.  Soviet  agents  kept  their  buying  intentions  a  closely 
guarded  secret.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  1963  U.S.-Soviet  grain 
sale  was  also  criticized  because  Soviet  agents,  by  dealing  secretly,  were 
able  to  buy  at  low  prices.  Certainly,  a  seller  can  never  know  precisely 
the  shape  of  the  buyer's  demand  curve,  i.e.,  the  quantity  demanded  at 
different  price  levels.  However,  he  should  try  to  improve  his  knowledge 
of  the  buyer's  situation  and  of  world  supply  and  demand  conditions. 
He  should  also  attempt  to  maximize  his  return  from  the  sale  or,  if  not. 
carefully  weigh  the  benefits  of  a  non-profit-maximizing  policy. 

The  grain  sales  point  up  the  need  for  the  Government's  active  and 
impartial  participation  in  trade  with  centrally  planned  economies.  The 
role  of  Government  agencies  in  East- West  commercial  transactions 
should  be  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  U.S.  producers,  consumers,  and 
taxpayers.  From  the  standpoint  of  some  exporters  and  producers,  the 
1972-73  grain  deal  may  have  provided  maximum  benefits.  However,  its 
impact  on  some  farmers,  on  the  U.S.  consumer,  and  on  the  Federal 
budget  was  certainly  less  than  maximally  beneficial.  Soviet  purchases 
contributed  to  a  sharp  rise  in  U.S.  domestic  food  prices  and  resulted  in 
high  Government  subsidy  payments  to  exporters  and  shippers.  Some 
U.S.  farmers,  who  sold  their  grain  before  Soviet  needs  became  known, 
suffered  substantial  losses  of  income.  A  study  conducted  by  the  General 
Accounting  Office  faulted  the  Department  of  Agriculture  for  some  of 
these  problems.115  The  study  found  that  the  Department  had  not  prop- 
erly used  and  disseminated  available  information  on  Soviet  needs  for 
U.S.  grain. 

Despite  these  shortcomings,  grain  exporters  and  Government  officials 
rightfully  claimed  that  the  1972-73  grain  sales  brought  considerable 
benefits  to  the  U.S.  economy.  The  balance-of -payments  benefits  were 
estimated  to  exceed  $700  million.116  Many  farmers  benefited  from 
higher  prices  and  increased  sales,  and  employment  and  earnings  in 
transportation  industries  and  agribusinesses  were  stimulated.  More- 
over. Government  expenditures  for  farm  subsidies  and  grain  storage 
were  greatly  reduced.  Finally,  American  grain  exporters  may  have 
established  close  commercial  ties  with  Soviet  importers  which  could 
facilitate  future  sales. 

The  outcome  of  the  grain  sales  suggests  that  the  United  States  can 
benefit  economically  by  trading  with  the  Soviet  Union.  However,  some 


«*  Elmer  R  Staats,  "The  Russian  Wheat  Sales  and  Agriculture's  Role  In  Expanding  U.S. 
Wheat  Exports,"  in  Remarks  of  Hubert  H.  Humphrey,  Congreaaional  Record,  vol.  119, 
Mar.  8,  1973,  S4124-S4127. 

"« Ibid.,  S4124. 


597 


Government  policies  and  institutions  should  be  reexamined.  The  grain 
sales  raise  questions  as  to  the  appropriate  role  for  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment in  future  commercial  transactions.  What  should  U.S.  pricing 
policy  be?  Pricing  policy  may  differ  depending  on  whether  the  U.S. 
Government  considers  the  Soviet  Union  a  preferred  customer  and  on 
what  the  elasticity  of  Soviet  demand  is  assumed  to  be.  If  credit  is 
necessary,  but  not  commercially  available,  what  Governmental  risks 
and  costs  are  justified?  Are  there  other  ways  in  which  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment can  assist  American  businesses  dealing  with  Soviet  trading 
monopolies  ?  Each  o.f  these  questions  is  relevant  to  future  U.S.-Soviet 
commercial  relations,  not  only  in  grain  sales  but  in  advanced  tech- 
nology transfers. 

JOINT  DEVELOPMENT  OF  SIBERIAN  NATURAL  GAS  RESOURCES 

In  assessing  potential  Soviet  exports  to  the  United  States,  there 
are  also  important  questions  on  investment,  pricing,  and  supply  pol- 
icy. The  proposal  for  joint  development  of  Soviet  Siberian  natural 
gas  resources,  for  example,  raises  the  question,  How  good  an  invest- 
ment is  Soviet  energy  exploitation?  The  two  natural  gas  projects 
might  require  a  U.S.  investment  of  about  $10-12  billion,  largely  for 
pipeline  and  tankers.  Upon  completion  of  the  projects,  gas  would  flow 
from  Urengoy,  in  West  Siberia,  to  Murmansk  by  pipeline ;  from  there 
it  would  be  shipped  to  the  U.S.  East  Coast.  A  second  pipeline  would 
carry  gas  from  Yakutsk,  in  East  Siberia,  to  Nakhodka,  where  it  would 
be  loaded  for  shipment  to  Japan  and  the  U.S.  West  Coast.  (See  map, 
Figure  3.) 


598 


599 


Of  the  two  projects,  the  West  Siberian  development  appears  clos- 
est to  realization.  Negotiations  are  currently  underway  between  Soviet 
officials  and  a  consortium  of  three  American  companies — Tenneco, 
Texas  Eastern  Transmission  Corporation,  and  a  Halliburton  Com- 
pany subsidiary.  While  all  of  the  details  of  the  transaction  are  not 
completed  or  agreed  to  and  have  not  been  officially  announced,  some 
tentative  figures  have  been  published,  which  appear  to  be  the  basis  of 
current  negotiations.117  The  entire  West  Siberian  development  would 
cost  about  $7.6  billion.  Of  that  sum,  the  Soviet  Union  would  invest 
about  $1.5  billion  ,for  drilling,  gas-gathering,  and  cleaning  equipment. 
The  remainder  would  be  invested  by  the  U.S.  consortium  for  building 
20  liquefied  natural  gas  tankers  (costing  about  $2  billion)  and  for 
construction  of  a  1,500-mile  pipeline,  compressors,  a  gas  liquefication 
plant,  and  loading  facilities. 

The  contract  would  run  for  25  years,  with  gas  deliveries  to.  the 
United  States  valued  at  $150  million  per  year  to  begin  in  1980.  The 
U.S.  credit  would  be  repaid  over  a  12-year  period  with  seventy-five 
percent  of  the  gas  deliveries  used  to  pay  off  the  principal  and  interest 
on  the  loan,  and  the  remaining  twenty-five  percent  used  to  buy  other 
U.S.  capital  goods.  After  the  U.S.  loan  was  repaid.,  the  gas  deliveries 
to  the  United  States  would  continue  for  the  duration  of  the  contract 
with  the  proceeds  convertible  to  purchases  in  the  United  States. 

The  U.S.  Export-Import  Bank  and  a  consortium  of  private  U.S. 
banks  could  be  expected  to  finance  the  deal.  Under  the  terms  currently 
being  discussed,  the  Soviet  Union  would  receive  somewhat  better 
treatment  than  other  U.S.  trade  partners.  No  "progress  payments" 
(i.e.  payments  made  while  the  project  was  under  construction)  would 
be  required.  Payments  would  begin  only  after  construction  was  com- 
pleted and  the  project  was  in  operation.  The  Soviets  might  also  be 
granted  a  longer-than-usual  repayment  period.  Mr.  Kearns,  chairman 
of  the  Eximbank,  reported  after  lengthy  discussions  with  Soviet  of- 
ficials in  Moscow  that  the  Eximbank's  normal  terms  and  rules  of  dis- 
closure were  posing  problems  for  Soviet  officials.118  Either  a  U.S.  de- 
cision to  compromise  and  give  the  U.S.S.R.  preferred  status  or  an  un- 
precedented disclosure  of  information  and  acceptance  of  commercial 
terms  by  the  Soviets  will  be  required  if  the  transaction  is  to  be  financed 
by  Eximbank. 

Moreover,  the  projected  cost  of  Soviet  natural  gas  would  be  consid- 
erably higher  than  the  present  U.S.  price.  The  U.S.  companies  would 
buy  the  gas  in  Murmansk  for  60  cents  per  thousand  cubic  feet  and 
spend  an  additional  65  cents  to  deliver  it  to  an  East  Coast  port. 

The  total  figure,  $1.25,  compares  with  a  $0.45  delivered  price  for 
U.S-produced  natural  gas  in  1972.  Although  most  U.S.  energy  special- 
ists appear  to  agree  that  the  current  price  is  too  low,  few  seem  to  argue 
that  the  U.S.  price  should  be  raised  to  $1.25.  U.S.-produced  gas  will 
be  more  expensive  in  the  1980s :  a  recent  estimate  which  allows  for  in- 
flation puts  the  price  of  U.S.  gas  in  1985  at  about  93  cents.119  Moreover, 


U7  See  James  Flanigan,  "Farewell  to  Adam  Smith,"  Forbes,  vol.  110,  No.  11  (Dec.  1, 
1972),  pp.  25-26. 

118  New  York  Times,  Apr.  4,  1973,  p.  67. 

118  Edward  W.  Erickson  and  Robert  M.  Spann,  "Balancing  the  Supply  and  Demand  for 
Natural  Gas,"  In  Balancing  Supply  and  Demand  for  Energy  in  the  United  States.  (Denver  : 
Rocky  Mountain  Petroleum  Economics  Institute,  1972),  p.  105. 


600 


U.S.  negotiators  claim  that  the  price  impact  on  U.S.  consumers  would 
be  minimal  because  cheaper  U.S.  sources  would  still  provide  most  of 
the  domestic  supply  and  fixed  costs  make  up  most  of  the  price.  A 
provision  for  "rolling  in"  the  foreign  gas  into  domestic  supply  would 
prevent  large  price  increases  for  U.S.  consumers. 

The  large-scale  and  the  long-term  nature  of  the  projected  natural 
gas  transaction  make  it  especially  important  that  U.S.  Governmental 
and  private  interests  carefully  study  the  terms  of  the  arrangement  to 
insure  that  the  United  States  receives  maximum  benefits.  The  follow- 
ing are  some  of  the  important  questions  which  should  be  examined: 

1.  What  economic  benefits  will  the  United  States  receive?  The  gas 
project  involves  a  huge  outlay  of  U.S.  investment  funds.  Will  the  im- 
ports of  natural  gas  and  the  stimulus  to  U.S.  shipbuilding  and  other 
capital  goods  industries  provide  an  adequate  economic  return? 

2.  What  are  the  alternative  costs  of  obtaining  the  same  energy  sup- 
plies from  other  sources?  Mr.  Thornton  F.  Bradshaw,  President  of 
Atlantic  Richfield  Company,  suggested  that,  at  the  currently  projected 
price  of  Soviet  gas,  the  same  supply  could  be  obtained  from  domestic 
natural  gas  reserves,  gasification  of  coal,  and  other  domestic  sources.120 
Alternative  foreign  sources  also  warrant  consideration. 

3.  What  are  the  appropriate  roles  for  the  U.S.  Government  and  pri- 
vate industry?  How  much  of  the  American  investment  should  be 
financed  or  guaranteed  by  the  Eximbank?  What  should  the  Govern- 
ment's policies  be  with  regard  to  other  aspects  of  the  arrangement,  such 
as  shipbuilding  subsidies  and  import  regulation  ? 

4.  What  kinds  of  commercial  arrangements  are  needed  for  U.S.- 
Soviet cooperation  in  this  area?  Business  facilities  in  the  Soviet  Union 
are  inadequate  for  an  operation  of  this  scale.  Although  private  owner- 
ship is  not  likely  or  necessary,  some  clear  assurances  of  authority  and 
managerial  responsibility  will  be  needed. 

5.  What  are  the  indirect  economic  costs  of  the  project?  How  much 
would  be  added  to  fuel  prices  for  U.S.  consumers  ?  Would  financing  for 
the  Soviet  project  saturate  the  U.S.  capital  market  and  drive  up  inter- 
est rates  for  long-term  capital  ? 

<■».  Is  the  Soviet  project  a  preferred  investment,  eligible  for  lower 
rates,  more  favorable  terms,  and  higher  risks  than  other  investments? 
If  preferential  treatment  for  the  natural  gas  project  is  warranted  by 
political  factors,  what  are  the  net  political  benefits? 

POLITICAL  BENEFITS  FROM  EXPANDED  U.S.-SOVIET  COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS 

Dr.  Kissinger,  Mr.  Peterson,  and  other  U.S.  officials  have  attached 
great  political  significance  to  expanded  commercial  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  Both  the  grain  sales  and  the  natural  gas  negotiations 
may  test  the  assumption  that  increased  economic  ties  lead  to  improved 
diplomatic  relations.  The  commercial  relationships  established  by  U.S. 
agribusinesses  and  by  the  U.S.  oil  and  gas  industry  with  their  Soviet 
counterparts  may  be  long  term.  The  potential  gas  project  would  be 
based  on  a  25-year  contract.  While  grain  sales  are  unlikely  to  recur 
on  the  l!)7'_J-7.')  scale,  considerable  sales  of  feed  grains  and  agricultural 
technology  are  likely  in  the  future. 

•  i  •         i     • 

U.S.  exports  of  grain,  technical  assistance,  and  capital  investment 
would  be  balanced  in  part,  on  an  economic  balance  sheet,  by  U.S.  im- 


v>0  Panel  Discussion  at  the  National  Association  of  Manufacturers*  "U.S.-Sovlet  Trade 
Conference,"  Feb.  28,  1973,  Washington,  D.C. 


601 


ports  of  raw  materials.  But  technology  transfer  on  a  long-term  basis 
must  also  be  assessed  in  terms  of  political  costs  and  benefits.  An  inter- 
esting aspect  of  both  the  grain  sales  and  the  natural  gas  negotiations 
is  the  suggestion  that  the  Soviet  Union  may  now  be  receiving  prefer- 
ential treatment  in  U.S.  foreign  trade  policy.  The  Soviets  purchased 
U.S.  grain  at  a  price  that  was  lower  than  warranted  by  the  world 
market  situation,  and  the  price  which  has  been  mentioned  for  U.S. 
purchases  of  Soviet  natural  gas  seems  high.  Is  preferential  treatment 
for  the  Soviet  Union  justified  by  potential  diplomatic  gains  for  the 
United  States?   . 

The  following  are  among  the  political  costs  of  the  new  commercial 
relationships: 

1.  The  risks  involved  in  the  unreliability  of  the  Soviet  Union  as  a 
supplier  of  important  raw  materials.  Reliance  on  the  Soviet  Union  as 
a  source  for  vitally  needed  energy  resources  appears  to  be  a  particu- 
larly risky  undertaking. 

2.  Contributions  to  the  Soviet  fund  of  technical  knowledge  that 
could  be  translated  into  security  programs  or  which  could  result  in 
the  release  of  resources  for  military  programs. 

3.  Potential  leverage  to  the  Soviet  Union  that  could  result  from  So- 
viet control  over  U.S.  investments  and  personnel — a  possible  source 
of  economic  blackmail,  or  an  economic  hostage  system. 

The  following  are  some  of  the  political  benefits : 

1.  Soviet  reliance  on  the  United  States  as  a  source  of  supply  and  ex- 
pertise. Soviet  dependence  on  U.S.  agricultural  products  and  ad- 
vanced technology,  for  example,  is  a  potential  source  of  U.S.  political 
leverage. 

2.  Encouragement  to  the  Soviet  Union  to  reorder  priorities  between 
military  and  civilian  programs.  Expanded  commercial  relations  may 
serve  as  an  economic  reinforcement  of  the  arms  control  and  other 
agreements  between  the  two  countries. 

3.  Encouragement  of  domestic  change  in  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
presence  of  many  American  citizens  in  the  Soviet  Union  with  some 
decisionmaking  power  and  a  wider  exchange  of  ideas  may  in  the  long 
run  contribute  to  a  moderation  of  the  Soviet  political  control  system 
and  command  economy. 

In  summary,  expanded  economic  relations  which  facilitate  massive 
technology  transfer  from  the  United  States  to  the  U.S.S.R.  may  create 
new,  potentially  dangerous  dimensions  in  U.S.  diplomacy.  On  the 
other  hand  there  is  at  least  a  possibility  that  the  process  of  integrating 
the  centrally  planned  Soviet  economy  into  the  market  economy  of 
the  United  States  and  the  rest  of  the  non-Communist  world  might  un- 
leash irreversible  forces  of  constructive  change  which  could,  in  turn, 
contribute  to  international  interdependence  and  stability. 

Concluding  Observations 

POLITICAL,   GAINS    LIKELY   TO    OUTWEIGH    ECONOMIC   BENEFITS    TO 

UNITED   STATES 

The  volume  of  Soviet  trade  with  the  United  States  by  any  projec- 
tion is  not  likely  to  represent  a  large  share  of  U.S.  trade  or  GNP. 
Economic  advantages  to  the  United  States  are  likely  to  be  centered 
on  such  specific  sectors  as  imports  of  petroleum  and  natural  gas,  and 


602 


exports  of  soybeans,  feed  and  cereal  grain,  and  computers,  and  other 
high-technology  products.  The  balance  of  payments  deficit  of  the 
United  States  and  our  program  for  expanding  the  export  of  high 
technology  may  receive  benefits  which  are,  at  best,  only  marginal 
compared  to  those  which  may  derive  from  potential  changes  in  eco- 
nomic relations  with  non-Communist  countries. 

At  the  same  time,  if  the  Soviet  Union  should  reorder  its  priorities 
and  permit  more  foreign  decisionmaking  involvement  in  domestic  co-  • 
operative  ventures,  significant  long-run  benefits  of  a  predominantly 
political  nature  might  accrue  to  the  United  States  such  as:  a)  the 
potential  reduction  of  the  Soviet  threat  to  our  security  from  reordered 
Soviet  priorities;  b)  a  degree  of  Soviet  acceptance  of  the  international 
system,  implied  by  the  U.S.S.R.'s  permitting  domestic  involvement 
of  foreign  corporations  as  partners;  and  c)  political  advantages  in- 
herent in  increasing  international  commercial  and  financial  inter- 
course. Overall,  such  political  gains  might  far  outweigh  the  relatively 
modest  economic  returns. 

RELATIVE  INCREASE  IX  U.S.-SOVIET  TRADE  MAY  BE  IMPRESSIVE  BY   19 SO 

Still,  the  relative  increase  in  trade  may  be  impressive.  From  a  level 
of  about  $200  million  (exports  plus  imports)  before  the  commercial 
agreement,  the  exchange  may  rise  by  the  end  of  the  decade  to  between 
$800  million  and  $5  billion  if  the  presently  favorable  environment  for 
expanding  commercial  relations  continues.  Three  alternative  dollar- 
volume  levels  seem  possible,  depending  on  key  variables  in  trade. 

a.  Projection  of  Current  Trends. — Up  to  $800  million  average  an- 
nual turnover  through  expansion  of  Soviet  raw  material  exports,  in- 
cluding diversion  of  oil  and  gas  sales  from  other  developed  economies 
to  the  United  States,  additional  Commodity  Credit  Corporation 
credits  for  agricultural  imports  (feed  grains  and  soybeans),  and  ex- 
pansion of  tourism. 

b.  Changed  Credit  and  Export  Structure. — Up  to  $2-3  billion  if 
MFN  status  is  granted  to  the  Soviets  and  if  Soviet  foreign  trade  orga- 
nizations give  priority  to  exporting  industrial  products.  U.S. -Soviet 
joint  ventures  in  energy  and  raw  material  extraction,  industrial  pro- 
duction, shipping,  and  development  of  tourism  and  increases  in  Soviet 
gold  exports  could  also  push  US.-Soviet  trade  turnover  to  this  level. 

c.  Major  Joint  Venture  Development. — Up  to  $4—5  billion  if  (in 
addition  to  the  activities  cited  above)  the  several  massive  Siberian 
liquefied  gas  projects  in  West  and  East  Siberia  are  consummated. 
These  would  probably  bring  about  a  very  extensive  American  involve- 
ment in  Soviet  exploration,  construction,  and  production  activity  and 
an  equally  unprecedented  acceptance  of  risk  by  the  U.S.  Government 
and  private  banks. 

FUTURE  U.S.-SOVIET   ECONOMIC   TIES   DEPENDENT   ON    CONTINUED 
RELAXATION    OF    INSTITUTIONAL   AND   LEGAL   BARRIERS 

The  degree  of  Soviet  flexibility  in  permitting  cooperative  ventures 
to  go  beyond  agreement  on  I:.S.  financing  and  sharing  in  output, 
toward  managerial  and  investment  decision  participation,  will  deter- 
mine how  broad  or  narrow  are  the  limits  on  change.  The  U.S.  relaxa- 
tion of  barriers  to  East-West  trade  is  symptomatic  of  a  new  willing- 


603 


ness  to  provide  the  same  trade  and  credit  arrangements  other  indus- 
trial nations  have  had  with  the  U.S.S.R.  for  some  years.  Revision  of 
export  controls,  restrictive  tariffs,  and  credit  constraints  will  raise  the 
potential  for  hard-currency  earnings  (i.e.,  dollars),  and  credit  ar- 
rangements in  the  joint  ventures  will  influence  Soviet  decisions  to 
import  and  ability  to  expand  commercial  relations. 

NEW   SOVIET  EMPHASIS   ON   TECHNOLOGICAL   CHANGE   AND   MATERIAL 
INCENTIVES   STIMULATES  TRADE  PROSPECTS 

The  increased  Soviet  interest  in  improved  economic  relations  with 
the  United  States  results  from  an  apparent  reordering  of  Soviet  prior- 
ities. Reordered  priorities  appear  to  favor  technological  change  and 
an  improvement  in  the  availability  of  desirable  consumer  goods  to  the 
Soviet  workers  and  peasants. 

In  bringing  about  technological  improvement,  energy,  especially  as 
supplied  by  oil  and  gas,  plays  a  central  role.  In  the  development  of 
the  rich  Siberian  resources,  Soviet  trade  with  the  United  States  can 
be  expected  to  expand  as  to  both  imports  and  exports :  imports  of  tech- 
nologically advanced  petroleum  and  gas  extraction,  transmission,  and 
processing  facilities,  and  exports  of  the  natural  gas  and  oil  produced. 
Likewise,  imports  of  products  such  as  breeder  stock  and  feed  lots 
which  permit  Soviet  animal  husbandry  to  borrow  from  U.S.  agri- 
business are  singularly  designed. to  increase  meat  output,  which  in 
turn  may  facilitate  improvement  in  labor  productivity.  Few  products 
represent  as  clear  a  means  of  absorbing  increased  money  wages  as 
meat. 

DEFENSE    AND    CONTROL    VERSUS    ECONOMIC    GROWTH    AND    PROFESSIONAL 

PERFORMANCE    ARE    SOVIET    CHOICES 

The  extent  to  which  priorities  have  been  or  will  be  reordered  turns, 
in  large  part,  on  how  much  of  the  Soviet  output  goes  to  defense  and 
on  the  volume  of  Soviet  trade  with  other  nations.  If  the  Soviet  leaders 
view  new  strategic  systems  as  characterized  by  rapidly  rising  costs 
and  very  modest  benefits — a  post-summit  view  expressed  by  Dr.  Henry 
Kissinger — then  civilian  claimants  will  probably  do  better  in  receiv- 
ing shares  of  Soviet  economic  growth.  If,  in  contrast,  the  Soviets  ap- 
pear to  follow  the  view  expressed  by  others  that  the  arms  race  will 
continue  and  accelerate  in  those  areas  not  specifically  limited  by  the. 
SALT  agreements,  then  the  reordering  of  priorities  may  further 
strengthen  the  priority  of  defense  outlays,  as  in  the  1960s.  Without 
change  in  the  traditional  defense  priority,  increases  in  Soviet-U.S. 
economic  relations  may  be  largely  dependent  on  modest  shifts  of  trade 
and  other  activities  from  other  industrial  nations  to  the  United  States. 
Only  upgraded  civilian  requirements  will  generate  significant  new 
import  needs  and  provide  a  basis  for  releasing  resources  for  export. 

COST  TO  SOVIETS  OF  SUPPLYING  RAW  MATERIALS  TO  EASTERN  EUROPE 

IS   HIGH   AND  RISING 

A  potential  for  significant  improvement  in  Soviet  export  capabili- 
ties to  the  West,  especially  in  petroleum  and  natural  gas.  lies  in  a 
possible  shift  away  from  the  current  and  projected  supply  to  Eastern 


604 


Europe  and  Cuba— i.e.,  member  nations  of  COMECON.  The  Soviets 
might  also  find  it  advantageous  to  reduce  a  drain  on  hard  currency 
by  limiting  transshipment  of  grain  to  Eastern  Europe  and  Cuba  on 
Soviet  account.  The  1972  Soviet  purchase  financed  by  gold  sales  or 
dollars  of  U.S.  wheat  to  meet  delivery  requirements  to  Poland  is  a 
case  in  point.  This  kind  of  reappraisal,  although  increasing  potential 
trade  with  the  United  States  in  the  short  run,  poses  serious  longer- 
range  political  and  strategic  problems  of  control  for  the  Soviet  Union 
in  the  Communist  world. 

STATE  TRADING  POSES  PROBLEMS  FOR  A  COUNTRY  WTITH  A  MARKET 
ECONOMY    SUCH    AS    THE    UNITED    STATES 

Commercial  relations  between  a  market  economy  and  a  centrally- 
planned  economy  with  a  state  trading  monopoly  pose  problems  of 
effective  administration  and  may  place  the  United  States  at  a  disad- 
.  vantage. 

Most  Soviet-Japanese  trade  transactions  are  on  a  Soviet  trading 
agency — Japanese  Corporation  basis  and  are  effectively  resolved  in 
kind.  This  Soviet  pattern  of  bilateral  trade,  accepted  not  only  by 
Japan  but  also  by  European  countries,  will  inhibit  a  shift  of  balance- 
of-payment  surpluses  from  those  industrial  nations'  accounts  which 
could  otherwise  help  to  balance  possible  Soviet  deficits  on  the  U.S. 
account.  U.S.  trade  too  is  thus  likely  to  be  tied  to  bilateral  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  Similarly,  these  bilateral  criteria,  in  coopera- 
tive ventures  with  other  industrial  nations  like  Japan,  may  in  turn 
restrict  the  volume  of  hard-currency  earnings  available  to  support  a 
negative  Soviet  trade  balance  with  the  United  States. 

One  approach  to  trading  with  the  Soviet  Union  might  be  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  governmental  trading  agency  like  the  Canadian  Grain 
Board.  There  might  also  be  other  agencies,  such  as  a  Computer  Board. 
It  is  of  mutual  interest  to  have  the  most  knowledgeable  technical 
people  on  each  side  working  directly  with  each  other.  But  there  is  a 
possibility  that  all  suppliers  would  not  have  equal  access  to  the  Soviet 
market.  The  Occidental  Petroleum  Corporation  made  a  commercial 
agreement  without  Government  help  or  knowledge.  Is  this  to  be  dis- 
couraged? Government  participation  runs  the  risk  of  Government 
favoritism,  whereby  one  or  more  companies  might  become  "chosen 
instruments.''  Although  such  a  restraint  of  trade,  under  special  cir- 
cumstances where  the  national  interest  is  involved,  might  perhaps  be 
permitted  by  U.S.  law,  there  might  also  be  serious  reservations  about 
it  in  the  Congress  and  in  the  country  as  a  whole. 

The  U.S.  Government  might  provide  improved  information  serv- 
ices for  U.S.  business  interests  to  keep  them  informed  on  economic 
conditions  and  market  prospects  in  the  Soviet  Union.  It  is  also  impor- 
tant to  take  measures  to  protect  U.S.  citizens  and  their  investments 
in  the  Soviet  Tnion.  Even  formal  treaty  negotiations  on  the  status 
of  U.S.  citizens  in  the  Soviet  Union,  similar  to  "Status  of  Forces" 
agreements  on  U.S.  troops  abroad,  might  be  considered.  For  example, 
the  U.S.  grain  exporters  and  computer  corporations  should  have 
specific  governmental  connections  with  whom  they  may  share 
information. 


605 


Other  industrial  nations  such  as  France  and  Japan  have  developed 
counterparts  of  Soviet  institutions  in  order  to  accommodate  the  Soviet 
state  trading  monopoly.  U.S.  leaders  may  prefer  to  encourage  more 
institutional  changes  on  the  part  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

IMPROVEMENTS   ARE   NEEDED  IN   U.S.   PROCEDURES   AND   INSTITUTIONS   FOR 
ADMINISTRATION    AND    NEGOTIATION 

To  maximize  the  net  economic  and  political  benefits  to  the  United 
States,  the  negotiating  process  and  the  mechanism  for  commercial 
relations  (i.e.,  U.S.  membership  in  the  Joint  Commercial  Commis- 
sion), should  be  reevaluated.  In  order  to  link  the  broadest  security  and 
diplomatic  interests  with  the  commercial  arrangements,  the  involve- 
ment of  high-level  policymakers  is  essential.  Specialists  on  the  Soviet 
Union,  foreign  trade  specialists,  and  private  businessmen  are  also  in- 
dispensable to  provide  guidance  in  their  areas  of  expertise. 

The  long-term  process  of  negotiation,  its  specialized  character,  and 
the  broad  national  interests  inherent  in  U.S.-Soviet  relations  require  a 
permanent  working  blend  of  experienced  people  with  the  following 
characteristics : 

a.  Top  politicians  from  both  executive  and  legislative  branches, 
authorized  to  speak  for  the  White  House  and  Congress  as  a  whole; 

b.  Governmental  trade  specialists  from  the  Departments  of  Com- 
merce, Treasury,  State^  and  other  agencies. 

c.  Specialists  on  Soviet  political -economic  affairs  from  governmental 
or  academic  positions ;  and 

d.  Representatives  of  private  business  and  banking. 

The  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks  team  in  SALT  I  was  appar- 
ently successful  in  combining  the  appropriate  elements  of  authority 
and  expertise.  The  Soviet  SALT  team  was  roughly  representative  of 
opposite  numbers.  In  negotiations  between  different  systems  it  is  not 
easy  to  make  such  comparisons.  For  example,  the  Supreme  Soviet,  the 
Soviet  legislature,  need  not  be  represented,  as  it  does  not  have  the 
power  or  responsibility  of  the  U.S.  Congress.  In  the  U.S.  system  of 
checks  and  balances,  on  the  other  hand,  it  would  be  particularly  bene- 
ficial to  include  Members  of  Congress  in  the  commercial  negotiations. 

Congressional  involvement  would  permit  a  broader  representation 
of  U.S.  public  opinion  and  facilitate  passage  of  legislative  measures 
needed  to  improve  U.S.-Soviet  commercial  relations.  Without  continu- 
ous involvement  of  the  Congress  and  private  interests,  it  could  be  diffi- 
cult to  have  an  informed  debate  on  important  issues.  The  establish- 
ment of  a  special  congressional  committee  or  subcommittee  to  deal 
with  East-West  trade,  roughly  paralleling  the  Jackson  Subcommit- 
tee on  SALT,121  might  be  appropriate.  The  creation  of  the  Jackson 
Subcommittee  gave  evidence  of  congressional  interest,  involvement, 
and  authority. 

Direct  congressional  involvement  would  seem  especially  desirable 
in  view  of  the  complex,  significant,  and  long-term  nature  of  the  U.S.- 
U.S.S.R.  Commercial  Commission  deliberations.  Such  involvement 
on  a  continuing  basis  could  facilitate  effective  treatment  of  issues  con- 
cerning statutory  authority,  such  as  Most- Favored -Nation  Agree- 

121  Subcommittee  to  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks,  the  Senate  Committee  on  Armed 
Services,  Chaired  by  Senator  Henry  M.  Jackson. 


606 


ments,  and  in  general  those  in  which  congressional  interest  is  high, 
e.g.,  export-import  credits. 

It  would  also  appear  desirable  that  the  Joint  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Com- 
mercial Commission  include  a  blend  o.f  political  leaders  (from  both 
executive  and  legislative  branches),  technical  trade  specialists,  and 
Soviet  area  specialists.  As  the  effective  protection  of  U.S.  interests 
requires  a  continued  high-level  political  and  lower-level  technical  in- 
volvement, institutional  means  should  be  sought  for  keeping  attention 
at  all  levels  high.  Moreover,  the  principle  of  professional  continuity: 
at  the  working  level  should  be  adhered  to  in  order  to  meet  the  level 
of  Soviet  competence  in  negotiations  and  administration  in  the 
Commission. 

THE  CURRENT  OPPORTUNITY  FOR  IMPROVED  SOVIET-U.S.  RELATIONS 

IS    CRUCIAL 

The  present  period  appears  to  be  a  critical  one  in  U.S. -Soviet  rela- 
tions. If  the  two  countries  move  ahead  in  developing  commercial  re- 
lations, progress  in  political,  cultural,  and  other  areas  may  be  facili- 
tated. The  failure  to  do  so  may  engender  disappointments,  frustra- 
tions, and  suspicions  which  could  ultimately  result  in  a  return  to  the 
pre- Summit  atmosphere.  In  short,  an  opportunity  is  now  available  to 
the  United  States  which  might  conceivably  lead  to  either  substantially 
expanded  relations  over  a  10-  to  20-year  period  or,  if  the  opportunity 
is  not  seized  and  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  trade  is  not  now  expanded,  to  con- 
tinued diversion  of  the  Soviet  market  to  Western  European  and  Jap- 
anese suppliers  and  to  a  sharp  deterioration  in  Soviet-U.S.  relations. 

RISKS  AND  UNCERTAINTIES  OF  THE   NEW  RELATIONSHIP  CAN  BE  REDUCED 

BUT    NOT   ELIMINATED 

Because  political  benefits  are  the  main  measure  of  net  gain  to  the 
United  States  from  any  pattern  of  increased  U.S.-Soviet  trade,  care- 
ful calibration  of  the  risks  and  uncertainties  is  in  order. 

If  the  Soviet  Union  is  indeed  in  the  process  of  reordering  priorities 
and  accepting  greater  involvement  in  the  international  political  and 
economic  system — i.e.,  accepting  the  rules  of  behavior  of  that  system — 
a  significant  reduction  of  impediments  to  trade  may  result ;  this  would 
be  much  more  beneficial  to  the  United  States  than  would  the  modest 
economic  gains  to  be  derived  from  expanding  markets. 

If,  however,  Soviet  trade  overtures  do  not  extend  further  than  a 
willingness  to  settle  old  accounts,  such  as  Lend  Lease,  and  purchase  of 
more  grain  and  technologically  advanced  equipment,  in  exchange  for 
relaxation  of  trade  and  credit  restrictions,  U.S.  policymakers  may  be 
well  advised  to  limit  concessions  and  engage  in  hard  bargaining,  with 
expectation  of  only  modest  political  and  economic  benefits. 

The  policies  followed  by  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  will 
greatly  influence  the  probabilities  of  alternative  outcomes.  As  the 
policy  objectives  of  the  Soviet  leaders  are  especially  crucial  to  such  a 
projection,  it  cannot  be  known  for  some  time  with  any  certainty  which 
different  alternative  courses,  or  what  compromise  between  them,  is 
being  followed. 

Thus,  as  knowledge  of  which  of  the  alternatives  will  prevail  may  not 
be  evident  for  several  years,  very  careful  official  and  public  scrutiny  of 
each  step  in  the  progress  of  the  Joint  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Commercial  Com- 
mission discussions  would  appear  to  be  in  order  for  both  the  executive 
and  legislative  branches.